EUROPE on the WORLD STAGE — Balance Sheet and Prospects

SPEECH/09/503

Benita Ferrero-Waldner

Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy

EUROPE ON THE WORLD STAGE — Balance sheet and prospects

Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

Berlin, 28 October 2009 Mr President, Your Excellencies, Dear students, Ladies and gentlemen, I am very happy to be here today at the Humboldt University in Berlin. The University has matured into a true centre of excellence on European issues, and it is a great honour for me to join the long list of eminent figures who have spoken here. The subject of ‘Europe as a global player’ is more topical today than ever before. I would therefore like to extend my warmest thanks to Professor Pernice and the Humboldt University for the invitation. Ladies and gentlemen, Europe stands at a major crossroads. A new European Commission is gradually taking shape and we are in the process of fashioning a major institutional transformation that holds enormous potential. Without question, the Lisbon Treaty will bring about major changes. Not only for the European institutions themselves, but also for all those who deal with them. The preparatory work for this transformation is well under way and I am confident that the Heads of State and Government at tomorrow’s European Council will lay down the essential framework for this new system. Nevertheless we must be clear about one thing: Time and tide wait for no man, and it seems highly unlikely that the foreign policy challenges facing us will wait for the European Union to finish pondering its institutional future. Our world today is a multi-polar world. Besides our main partner, the USA, together with Russia and Japan, several new actors have appeared on the stage, such as China, India, Brazil, and a number of other emerging countries. Over the past five years as Commissioner for external relations I have therefore consolidated these strategic partnerships enormously, partly though new agreements but more generally by greatly extending our common agenda on the many challenges confronting us all. And in our closely interlinked world that is inevitable. The global financial and economic crisis has forced governments around the globe to introduce economic stimulus programmes and financial reforms on a scale unparalleled in history. The effects can be felt in numerous areas. The important point here, however, is that thanks to its strong internal market, strict competition rules, stable currency, and sound foreign trade the EU is a driving force in the G-20 process and the global effort to tackle the crisis. And the G20 summit in Pittsburgh showed that our internal proposals for new financial regulations — based on the de Larosière report — can also serve as a model for other countries. Secondly, of course, tackling the twin challenges of climate change and energy security is another absolute priority, even in economically difficult times. These issues are increasingly becoming conflict multipliers, because of food shortages, land destruction (island states, for instance), and increased migration. When it comes to climate protection in particular, the EU is a driving force for international consensus. But time is running out if we are to arrive at a comprehensive binding global agreement on climate protection at the UN conference in Copenhagen at the end of the year. There have already been positive developments in the USA. Under the new administration, the United States has committed itself to a green New Deal, even if domestically this was and is no simple matter.

2 Together we must try now to persuade the emergent countries — notably China, India, and Russia — to accept binding international climate targets. With our ambitious EU targets — hammered out not least under German presidency of the Council — we are now taking a leading role in this area. And our proposals on climate funding — here we are the first in the world — offer a substantial impetus for a successful agreement in Copenhagen. But we must realise that the weeks remaining will still call for a massive effort in order to reach an international consensus on genuine system change. Thirdly the issue of energy security has shown how much the international agenda is changing and how important it is for Europe to play a stronger part. The gas stand-offs between Ukraine and Russia have shown that this is an area of vital interest to Europe. Thankfully and importantly, the Member States were prepared to act within the framework of the European Union on this issue. Over the past years I have repeatedly addressed the question of energy security in all my foreign policy contacts around the globe, be it in China, Russia, Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, or in dealings with our eastern and southern neighbours. The core concern has always been diversification of energy sources, energy suppliers, and energy transportation routes. That our efforts are bearing fruit is borne out not least by the Southern Corridor declaration of May and the concrete commitments given by the countries of the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Mashreq countries, and Egypt to give fresh impetus to this new “Silk Road” for energy. However, I also believe that this is an issue where we in the Union should show greater ambition. We will only be able to project our European strength outwards successfully if we have a genuine internal energy market. All in all, it is becoming increasingly obvious that EU foreign policy is most effective when it is backed up by strong Community competence, in the same way that a strong common commercial policy is underpinned by the world’s largest internal market. The Lisbon Treaty for the first time makes explicit provision for shared competence between the Member States and the European Union in the energy sector so that we can pursue an energy policy to secure energy supplies in line with the principle of solidarity. Ladies and gentlemen, With the world’s population set to rise to 7.7 billion or more by the year 2020, all these challenges can only become even more daunting. Because population growth will mean more intense competition for natural resources – for energy, water and land. That in turn will lead to migratory pressures, civil unrest, and further poverty. On top of which, we also need to face up to problems such as ideological extremism, religious fundamentalism, and failed states. So our multi-polar world will also have to find new recipes to cope with the dark sides of globalisation, such terrorism, failed states, modern-day piracy, or nuclear proliferation. Turning briefly now to the most critical foreign policy flashpoints, I would single out in particular the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea and the current instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan. And unfortunately the Middle East and our eastern neighbourhood harbour plenty of potential for conflict too. On all these issues we need more robust European solutions.

3 On the other hand, a multi-polar world also means we will have to engage increasingly with other world views and philosophies. We are faced with emerging countries that in some cases view values such as human rights, the rule of law, and democracy in a different light, to put it diplomatically. In addition, not for the first time since 11 September 2001 are we witnessing a new radicalism that has not spared Europe either. All the more vital, then, is genuine, concrete and open dialogue such as we have been holding over the past few years through the Alliance of Civilisations and a number of other European forums, for example. In economic terms, too, the geographical balance has shifted. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the ‘West’, described in such monumental terms by Professor Heinrich August Winkler of this University in his latest book, to set the global agenda. A recently published study by Goldman Sachs predicts that “within 40 years the economies of the BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia, India and China – will overtake the G6 countries, namely Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the USA.” Against this background it is no surprise that China is investing on a large scale in Africa and Latin America, with more than one thousand Chinese companies operating in Africa alone. Russia, too, is becoming increasingly self-assertive, and India – the largest democracy in the world – expects to be heard and treated accordingly. At this point in particular it can be asked, as many are doing, whether we are already living in the century of China. But we are not, ladies and gentlemen, contestants in a mere global competition. Globalisation is not a winner-takes-all game for power and resources. Instead, our multi-polar world needs rules, without which it will not be able to function. But this new form of global governance also requires institutions that that can take up the current challenges and apply the common rules of the game for everyone. In this context, the existing multilateral network has already taken on a more central role in shaping the agendas of international foreign policy over the past few years. We Europeans, then, must promote our ideas more actively in international forums such as the UN Security Council, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the G8. During my time as Austrian Foreign Minister, I already argued in the UN General Assembly in favour of a permanent seat for the EU on the UN Security Council. At that time I said that the EU seat should first exist ‘alongside’ the other EU States and might then come to represent Europe as a whole at a later stage. I am therefore very pleased at the support for this idea in the recent German coalition agreement. The same applies to the IMF and the World Bank. And the EU's voice must also be heard in new forums encompassing major new players, for instance in the G-20. In the future we must hold a serious discussion about when and where we would benefit more from being represented by the Community rather than by individual States. Ladies and gentlemen, As I have said: We must view foreign policy today in very broad terms. In our integrated world, areas that have hitherto been regarded as ‘domestic’ matters, such as energy, environmental, or research policy, have far-reaching external implications and, conversely, are directly influenced by international developments. These issues, then, are central to our strategic partnerships.

4 The European Union must make its voice heard louder than in the past on the international stage. Only if we speak increasingly with one voice can we shape the world according to our interests and values. That is why the structural changes made by the Treaty of Lisbon, which I will come to later, are of such significance! We must make a global Europe our political imperative in the twenty-first century! But we are not starting from scratch. With a Union of twenty-seven Member States and half a billion people, we already constitute the world's largest trading entity and, with almost sixty percent of global resources, we are the largest donor of economic and development aid. In addition, we generate one fifth of the world's gross domestic product. The European Union is already without question a major global player and partner. Take our transatlantic partnership, for example. The agenda of the upcoming EU- USA summit shows how deeply and extensively our bilateral relationship has developed and how important the transatlantic axis is in the context of global multilateralism. Our daily (!) trade volume has now risen to over €2 billion — a very solid basis. On the other hand, various thorny issues such as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and not least the Middle East conflict, demonstrate that the EU should be far more courageous with regard to protecting its own security interests and taking on a leading role rather than trailing in Washington's wake, as it so often does. This means that Europe must not only face up to its role as an equal player with all the others, but it must also be self-assertive in following its own security policy agenda in line with its responsibilities towards its own citizens. But speaking up on the international stage is not a one-way process — either for us or others. If we Europeans want to accept more responsibility – in our own interests and in the interests of the international community – then we must demonstrate the necessary political courage. In addition, we must make better use than in the past of our entire range of foreign policy instruments – be they political, economic, financial or, when absolutely necessary, military. Not least, the reworking of the European Security Strategy, moving from its clear focus on dangers such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in 2003 to a comprehensive threat analysis in 2008 that includes taking account of climate change and energy security as potential sources of conflict, shows how much our thinking on foreign policy has matured in this regard. Over the past few years we have successively strengthened the security dimension of EU foreign policy. Take Mission Atlanta in the Gulf of Aden, for example, the EU's first naval mission, which aims to combat postmodern, stateless piracy and to secure a key international trade route – after all, 90 % of international trade is transported on the world's seas. And there are numerous others, such as those in Darfur, the Balkans, and Georgia; or the EUPOL mission in Afghanistan and the EUBAM mission in Raffah. These examples show that we have broken free of the classic distinction between hard and soft power. The EU is already a smart power in important areas and uses the many instruments in its foreign policy arsenal in an intelligent way. We must build on this trend in the future! Now I would like to turn specifically to the European Neighbourhood Policy, which is my special area of responsibility and which — if you would allow me this pedagogical comparison — I have nurtured from a tender embryo in 2003 to a savvy, though at times also somewhat rebellious teenager.

5 This policy uses the transformational power of the European Union to stimulate reform — from the Ukraine to the Caucasus, from Lebanon to Morocco — and so create prosperity and stability in and around Europe. Over the last five years we have drawn up customised reform agendas with at least 12 countries. Our foreign policy instruments range from financial aid to free trade, from energy policy to security missions, from commitment to human rights to civil society networking. We always attach great value to the building of democratic structures. Building such capacity for the rule of law is ultimately the best ‘help for self-help’. Building on the bilateral ENP, we have created additional platforms in the shape of the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership to meet common challenges ranging from the environment to ‘frozen conflicts’. With the creation of real flagship projects such as motorways of the sea and improved use of solar energy, we have already achieved some initial successes. Here it is important to recognise that long-term political and economic relations such as the Eastern Partnership, what we call Europe's ‘beacon’ function, are not a substitute for short-term crisis interventions. But they play a key role in crisis prevention and in building trust and interactive networking, things which ultimately enable the EU to act as an effective crisis manager. Ladies and gentlemen, This new form of smart foreign policy calls for structural adjustments, as provided for in the Lisbon Treaty. This also reflects the desire not only of our international partners but also of a large majority of the EU’s citizens. Here I would like to single out just a few key points: Under the Lisbon Treaty the two posts held by myself and Javier Solana will be merged into that of a High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy who, as Vice-President of the EU Commission, will also be working within the Community structures. This will enable us to implement our shared political goals faster thanks to better coordinated decision-making. This new HR/VP will be the ‘voice and face of the EU’ in the world. He or she will have access to the full range of CFSP and Community foreign policy instruments and will even chair the meetings of EU foreign ministers. Strong chairmanship offers the opportunity to focus more on real political content rather than time-consuming internal coordination of the Member States’ various positions. This will boost the effectiveness, coherence and visibility of European foreign policy. The HR/VP will be supported by a modern European diplomatic service in the form of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which will draw on the best qualified staff from across the EU (that is, from the Commission, the Council Secretariat and the Member States) and so pool together the EU's collective foreign policy expertise. It will also represent the EU in our partner countries. We already have more than 130 Commission delegations around the world, which will become genuine EU missions once the Treaty enters into force. Together with the new President of the European Council and, of course, the Commission President, the HR/VP will ensure the continuity of Union foreign policy. So in future President Obama, President Hu, and their counterparts elsewhere will have a European partner who does not change every six months. And I might also add that much depends on the personalities and the personal chemistry of the EU representatives.

6 Ladies and gentlemen, What do these treaty changes mean in political practice? In theory, we know it is not difficult to persuade someone that the EU should bring its collective political weight to bear. People have clearly expressed the desire for more Europe in foreign policy. Perhaps not least because “we have developed a self-critical attitude towards our own history for good reason. So national passion has become alien to us,” as Professor Heinrich August Winkler points out in his new history of the West. In practice, however, things sometimes look different. You can imagine that it is not always easy to get agreement from 27 foreign ministers on every agenda item. That will not change even after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, despite all the improvements. Therefore, I frankly would have liked the introduction of qualified majority voting for foreign policy as well. On this important procedural issue we must also engage in a substantive debate. At European level we need clearly defined political goals, a results-oriented policy that goes beyond the lowest common denominator and is truly shared by all. That also means working harder to obtain the maximum political leverage from our not inconsiderable financial support to non-member countries – we are after all the largest donor in the world. The best example of this is the Middle East. This is precisely an example where what is needed is the political will of all the Member States and their recognition that common European interests must prevail over short-term national triumphs, however politically attractive they may appear. Ladies and gentlemen, All this shows that the Lisbon Treaty offers us a great opportunity to make European foreign policy more effective, coherent and visible and thus strengthen the role of Europe on the world stage. We in the Commission are determined to seize this opportunity. But I emphasise again that a common European foreign policy needs not only charismatic leadership, effective procedures and a ‘smart policy mix’, but also robust and efficient supranational institutions that are able to deal with the challenges of our time. But above all, a ‘global Europe’ is not simply a question of institutional reform. As in the past, so in the future an ambitious foreign policy will not be possible without the collective will of the Member States.