APPENDIX 2

Influenza A (Highly Pathogenic Avian • If adaptation to -to-human transmission were Influenza-H5N1) to occur, the world’s population is immunologically naïve and would be nearly universally susceptible. Agent: Vector and Reservoir Involved: • Influenza A virus (H5N1) • are the reservoir, although a number of mam- Disease Agent Characteristics: malian have been shown to be susceptible to • Family: ; Genus: Influenzavirus A . (subtype H5N1) Blood Phase: • Virion morphology and size: Enveloped, helical nucleocapsid, spherical to pleomorphic virions, • Animal models of influenza A demonstrate viremia 80-120 nm in diameter after experimental infection. • Nucleic acid: Linear, segmented, negative-sense, • infected with HPAI develop disseminated single-stranded RNA, ~13.6 kb in length infection, with virus isolated from nonrespiratory • Physicochemical properties: Virions are sensitive to sites. treatment with heat, lipid solvents, nonionic deter- • Other human influenza A strains have been demon- gents, formaldehyde, oxidizing agents; infectivity is strated to cause disseminated infection to organs reduced after exposure to radiation. outside the respiratory tract that suggests viremia occurs. Disease Name: • A single case report describes influenza A H3N2 • Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) () viremia in a naturally infected, asymp- tomatic patient, which would be most relevant to Priority Level: concerns about transfusion transmission. • Scientific/Epidemiologic evidence regarding blood • Influenza A virus has been isolated in blood and from safety: Theoretical extrarespiratory sites from patients with symptomatic • Public perception and/or regulatory concern regard- H5N1. ing blood safety: Very low • Public concern regarding disease agent: High Survival/Persistence in Blood Products:

Background: • Unknown

• Transmission to from domestic was first Transmission by Blood Transfusion: described in Southeast in 1997 with high mortal- ity among both birds and humans. • This has never been documented, but there has been • Transmission to humans is inefficient, and human concern in the blood and regulatory communities in disease is rare after 10 years of potential exposures. the context of planning. • by birds may constitute a pan- Cases/Frequency in Population: demic threat.

Common Human Exposure Routes: • No sustained transmission of H5N1 in humans has been observed. • Almost all recent exposures have had close contact • H5N1 has now spread in birds from Asia to with . and with human cases detected as far west as • Unsustained H5N1 transmission from human to and . human has been documented rarely, under condi- • 429 confirmed cases and 262 deaths reported to WHO tions of crowding. from 2003 to May 2009 Likelihood of Secondary Transmission: • of virus could allow human-to-human transmission that would increase concern. • Rarely occurs • If circulating strains adapt for human-to-human Incubation Period: transmission, an influenza pandemic could occur. • Usually 2-9 days At-Risk Populations: Likelihood of Clinical Disease: • Usually, but not exclusively, occurs in children and young adults with very close contact to infected • Ratio of asymptomatic to symptomatic disease is cur- domestic fowl in Southeast Asia and Egypt. rently unknown.

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Primary Disease Symptoms: • Prudent practice would be to defer donor until are gone. • Severe, with most patients presenting with an influenza-like illness of , , and shortness of Impact on Blood Availability: breath • Agent-specific screening question(s): • Fulminant and multiorgan failure ᭺ Symptomatic infection is already cause for develop in a high proportion of patients and are asso- deferral. ciated with poor outcomes. ᭺ If there is a concern about asymptomatic Severity of Clinical Disease: viremia, and a deferral for contact with influenza is considered during a seasonal outbreak or pan- • result in frequent hospitalization and demic, the impact could be major. death from respiratory and multiorgan failure. • Laboratory test(s) available: No screening test is cur- • Median time from onset of illness to acute respiratory rently available; if screening for viremia by NAT were distress syndrome is 6 days. implemented, additional impact on availability is unknown. Mortality: Impact on Blood Safety: • The mortality rate is over 60% for cases reported to WHO as of May 2009. • Agent-specific screening question(s): Not applicable • High death rates are seen among infants and children. • Laboratory test(s) available: Not applicable

Chronic Carriage: Leukoreduction Efficacy:

•No • Unknown • Likely to be minimal because of Treatment Available/Efficacious: on influenza A and high levels of virus in RBC fractions in experimental models • inhibitors (e.g., ) that have in vitro activity are available, but clinical efficacy has Reduction Efficacy for Plasma Derivatives: not been proven. • Virus inactivation steps used to manufacture • Resistance to neuraminidase inhibitors has already derivatives (including pasteurization for albumin, developed in Southeast Asia. solvent-detergent treatment for intravenous immu- • Ventilatory support and other ICU care, with or noglobulin, vapor heating for Factor VIII inhibitor without corticosteroids, and broad-spectrum antibi- bypassing activity, and incubation at low pH for intra- otics for bacterial are widely used. venous immunoglobulin) were effective in one study Agent-Specific Screening Question(s): using a reassortant of H5N1 influenza A.

• No specific question is in use, but symptomatic Other Prevention Measures: donors are excluded by current donor criteria (“Are • Vaccines are under development and likely to be you feeling well and healthy today?”). efficacious • No question is feasible for exposure to influenza A during a community outbreak or a pandemic. Suggested Reading:

Laboratory Tests Available: 1. Hourfar MK, Themann A, Eickmann M, Puthavathana P, Laue T, Seifried E, Schmidt M. Blood screening for • No FDA-licensed blood donor screening test exists. influenza. Emerg Inf Dis 2007;13:1081-3. • Antemortem diagnosis confirmed by viral isolation, 2. Khakpour M, Saidi A, Naficy K. Proved viraemia in experimental nucleic acid testing for H5N1-specific Asian influenza (Hong Kong variant) during incuba- RNA, and the less sensitive antigen detection tests tion period. Br Med J 1969;4:208-9. • All tests have been validated for sputum/pharyngeal 3. Kreil TR, Unger U, Orth SM, Petutschnig G, Kistner O, secretions but not for blood or blood fractions. Isola- Poelsler G, Berting A. H5N1 influenza virus and the tion may be higher from pharyngeal samples (at a safety of plasma products. Transfusion 2007;47:452- median of 5.5 days). 9. • An RT-PCR assay in minipools has been evaluated in 4. Likos AM, Kelvin DJ, Cameron CM, Rowe T, Kuehnert 10,272 blood donor samples. All were negative. MJ, Norris PJ; National Heart, Lung, Blood Institute Retrovirus Epidemiology Donor Study-II (REDS-II). Currently Recommended Donor Deferral Period: Influenza viremia and the potential for blood-borne • No FDA Guidance or AABB Standard exists. transmission. Transfusion 2007;47:1080-8.

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5. Mounts AW, Kwong H, Izurieta HS, Ho Y, Au T, Lee M, Nguyen DT, Le HN, Nguyen KT, Le HS, Le VT, Buxton Bridges C, Williams SW, Mak KH, Katz JM, Christiane D, Tran TT, Menno de J, Schultz C, Farrar J; ThompsonWW, Cox NJ, Fukuda K. Case-control study World Health Organization International Avian Influ- of risk factors for avian influenza A (H5N1) disease, enza Investigation Team. Avian influenza A (H5N1) in Hong Kong, 1997. J Infect Dis 1999;180:505-8. 10 patients in . N Engl J Med 2004;350:1179- 6. Stanley ED, Jackson GG. Viremia in Asian influenza. 88. Trans Assoc Am Phys 1966;79:376-87. 10. Ungchusak K, Auewarakul P, Dowell SF, Kitphati R, 7. The Writing Committee of the World Health Organi- Auwanit W, Puthavathana P,Uiprasertkul M, Boonnak zation (WHO) Consultation on Human Influenza K, Pittayawonganon C, Cox NJ, Zaki SR, Thawatsupha A/H5. Avian influenza A (H5N1) infection in humans. P, Chittaganpitch M, Khontong R, Simmerman JM, N Engl J Med 2005;353:1374-85. Chunsutthiwat S. Probable person-to-person trans- 8. To KF, Chan PK, Chan KF, Lee WK, Lam WY, Wong KF, mission of avian influenza A (H5N1). N Engl J Med Tang NL, Tsang DN, Sung RY, Buckley TA, Tam JS, 2005;352:333-40. Cheng AF. Pathology of fatal human infection associ- 11. Yuen KY, Chan PK, Peiris M, Tsang DN, Que TL, Shor- ated with avian influenza A H5N1 virus. J Med Virol tridge KF,Cheung PT,ToWK, Ho ET, Sung R, Cheng AF, 2001;63:242-6. Members of the H5N1 study group. Clinical features 9. Tran TH, Nguyen TL, Nguyen TD, Luong TS, Pham and rapid viral diagnosis of human disease associated PM, Nguyen VC, Pham TS, Vo CD, Le TQ, Ngo TT, Dao with avian influenza A H5N1 virus. Lancet 1998;351: BK, Le PP, Nguyen TT, Hoang TL, Cao VT, Le TG, 467-71.

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