Transnational Relations and World Politics: an Introduction Author(S): Joseph S

Cambridge University Press International Organization Foundation

Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction Author(s): Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert O. Keohane Source: International Organization, Vol. 25, No. 3, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Summer, 1971), pp. 329-349 Published by: University of Wisconsin Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706043 Accessed: 12/08/2010 14:35

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http://www.jstor.org TransnationalRelations and World Politics:

An Introduction

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., AND ROBERT 0. KEOHANE

STUDENTS and practitionersof internationalpolitics have traditionallyconcentrated their attention on relationshipsbetween states. The state,regarded as an actorwith purposesand power,is the basic unit of action; its main agentsare the diplomatand soldier.The interplayof govern- mentalpolicies yieldsthe patternof behaviorthat studentsof international politicsattempt to understandand that practitionersattempt to adjust to or control.Since force,violence, and threatsthereof are at the core of thisinter- play, the strugglefor power,whether as end or necessarymeans, is the dis- tinguishingmark of politicsamong nations.' Most political scientistsand manydiplomats seem to acceptthis view of reality,and a state-centricview of worldaffairs prevails.2 It is obvious,however, that the interactionsof diplomatsand soldiersdo not take place in a vacuum. They are stronglyaffected by geography,the

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., a memberof the Board of Editorsof InternationalOrganization, is professorof political science in the GovernmentDepartment of Harvard Universityand programdirector of the Center for InternationalAffairs, Harvard University,Cambridge, Massachusetts. ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, also a memberof the Board of Editors,is associateprofessor of politicalscience at SwarthmoreCollege, Swarthmore,Pennsylvania.

1 This is, of course,the orientationof Hans J. Morgenthau,but it also reflectsthe generalpoint of view of eminentscholars like RaymondAron and KennethN. Waltz. See Morgenthau,Politics among Nations: The Strugglefor Peace and Power (4th rev. ed.; New York: AlfredA. Knopf,I967); Aron, Peace and War: A Theoryof InternationalRelations, trans. Richard Howard and AnnetteBaker Fox (New York: FrederickA. Praeger,I967); and Waltz, Man, the State and War: A TheoreticalAnalysis (Topical Studies in InternationalRelations No. 2) (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, I959). 2 Internationallawyers and economistsseem less prone to accept the state-centricparadigm as much of the literaturein internationaleconomics and internationallaw indicates.See, particularly,the worksof RichardCooper, Raymond Vernon, and Philip Jessup.

329 330 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION natureof domesticpolitics in the variousstates, and advancesin scienceand technology.Few would questionthat the developmentof nuclear weapons has dramaticallyaltered the natureof twentieth-centuryinternational politics or deny the importanceof internalpolitical structure for relationsbetween states.From the state-centricperspective geography, technology, and domestic politicscomprise aspects of the "environment"within which statesinteract. They provide inputs into the interstatesystem but for considerationsof analyticconvenience are consideredto be outsidethe system. The environmentof interstatepolitics, however, does not includeonly these powerfuland well-knownforces. A good deal of intersocietalintercourse, with significantpolitical importance, takes place withoutgovernmental control. For example,among the major Westerncountries this includesmost trade,personal contact, and communication.Furthermore, states are by no means the only actorsin world politics.Arnold Wolfersnoted more than a decade ago that "the Vatican, the Arabian-AmericanOil Company,and a host of othernonstate entities are able on occasionto affectthe courseof in- ternationalevents. When this happens,these entitiesbecome actorsin the internationalarena and competitorsof thenation-state. Their abilityto operate as internationalor transnationalactors may be tracedto the fact that men identifythemselves and theirinterests with corporatebodies otherthan the nation-state."3 AlthoughWolfers and othershave pointedout the importanceof inter- societal interactionsand "transnationalactors" in internationalaffairs, the impact of these phenomenaon world politicshas oftenbeen ignoredboth in policy-orientedwritings and more theoreticalworks.4 When they have been recognized,they have oftenbeen consignedwith the factorsmentioned above to the environmentof interstatepolitics, and relativelylittle attention has been paid to themor to theirconnections with the interstatesystem. This

3 Arnold Wolfers,"The Actorsin World Politics,"in Discord and Collaboration:Essays on Interna- tional Politics,ed. ArnoldWolfers (Baltimore, Md: JohnsHopkins Press, I962), p. 23. This essay was firstpublished in I959 in William T. R. Fox, ed., TheoreticalAspects of InternationalRelations (Notre Dame, Ind: Universityof Notre Dame Press, I 959). Other politicalscientists who have departedfrom the state-centricparadigm are JohnW. Burton,Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules (Cambridge:Cam- bridgeUniversity Press, I968); tames N. Rosenau,ed., Linkage Politics:Essays on the Convergenceof Nationaland InternationalSystems (New York: Free Press,I969); Karl Kaiser,"Transnationale Politik: Zu einerTheorie der multinationalenPolitik," Politische Vierteliahresschrift, I969 (Special Issue, No. I), pp. 8o-i0o; and Horst Menderhausen,"Transnational Society vs. State Sovereignty,"Kyklos, I969 (Vol. 22, No. 2), pp. 251-275. 4 The most strikingexamples of neglectof transnationalrelations and completeconcentration on state policiesappear in the literatureon the North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO). See, for example, Henry A. Kissinger,The Troubled Partnership:A Re-Appraisalof the AtlanticAlliance (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co. [for the Council on ForeignRelations], ig65). On the more theoreticalside the editorsof a recentvolume of essays on internationalrelations note that, despite ardentdisagreement over methods,"each authorclearly conceives the subjectto consistof the individualsand groups who initiateand sustainthe actionsand interactionsof nation-states."Klaus Knorr and JamesN. Rosenau, eds., ContendingApproaches to InternationalPolitics (Princeton, N.J: PrincetonUniversity Press, I969), P. 4. 'IRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS 331 volume,by contrast,focuses on these"transnational relations"-contacts, coali- tions,and interactionsacross state boundaries that are not controlledby the centralforeign policy organsof governments.It treatsthe reciprocaleffects betweentransnational relations and the interstatesystem as centrallyimpor- tantto the understandingof contemporaryworld politics. A glance at the tableof contentswill revealthat we are interestedin a wide varietyof transnationalphenomena: multinational business enterprises and revolutionarymovements; trade unions and scientificnetworks; international air transportcartels and communicationsactivities in outerspace. Yet, we do not explore transnationalrelations simply "because theyare there"; on the contrary,we hope to use our analysisto cast lighton a numberof empirical and normativequestions that are directlyrelated to the contemporarycon- cernsof statesmenand studentsof internationalaffairs. These questionscan be groupedinto fivebroad areas of inquiry:i) What seemsto be the net effectof transnationalrelations on the abilitiesof govern- mentsto deal with theirenvironments? To what extentand how have gov- ernmentssuffered from a "loss of control"as a resultof transnationalrelations? 2) What are the implicationsof transnationalrelations for the study of world politics?Is the state-centricview, which focuseson the interstate system,an adequate analyticframework for the investigationof contempo- raryreality? 3) What are the effectsof transnationalrelations on the alloca- tion of value and specificallyon asymmetriesor inequalitiesbetween states? Who benefitsfrom transnationalrelations, who loses, who controlstrans- nationalnetworks, and how is this accomplished?4) What are the implica- tions of transnationalrelations for United Statesforeign policy? Insofaras the United Statesis indeed preponderantin transnationalactivity, what dan- gers as well as opportunitiesdoes this presentto Americanpolicymakers? 5) What challengesdo transnationalrelations raise for internationalorganizations as conventionallydefined? To what extentmay new international organizationsbe needed,and to what extentmay older organizationshave to change in orderto adapt creativelyto transnationalphenomena? We elaboratethese questions later in thisintroduction and returnto them in the conclusion,drawing on evidencepresented in the variousessays to documentour assertions,reinforce our speculations,and proposehypotheses for furtherresearch. We do not pretendto be definitive;we realize thatwe are just beginningto explorethis field and that even our best-documented beliefs are only provisional.We hope to stimulateinquiry, not to codify knowledge. Beforeconsidering these five broad questionsin detail,however, it is neces- saryto definethe two aspectsof transnationalrelations on whichwe concen- tratein this introduction-transnationalinteractions and organizations-and to analyze some of theireffects on interstatepolitics. Definition and descrip- 332 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION tiontherefore take priority at thispoint, although our broader and more specu- lativeinquiries should not be forgotten.We returnto thembeginning with sectionIII of thisintroduction.

I. TRANSNATIONAL INTERACTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS In themost general sense one can speakof "globalinteractions" as move- mentsof information,money, physical objects, people, or othertangible or intangibleitems across state boundaries. We can distinguishfour major types of globalinteraction: i) communication,the movementof information,in- cludingthe transmission ofbeliefs, ideas, and doctrines;2) transportation,the movementof physicalobjects, including war materieland personalproperty as well as merchandise;3) finance,the movement of money and instruments of credit;4) travel,the movementof persons.Many international activities involveall fourtypes of interactionsimultaneously. Trade and warfare,for example,both require coordinated movements of information,physical objects,money, and persons;so doesmost personal participation by individuals in foreignsocieties-"transnational participation"-as discussed in Donald P. Warwick'sessay. Some global interactionsare initiatedand sustainedentirely, or almost entirely,by governmentsof nation-states.This is trueof mostwars, a large amountof internationalcommunication, considerable trade, and some finance.These we consider"interstate" interactions along with conventional diplomaticactivity. Other interactions, however, involve nongovernmental actors-individualsor organizations-andwe considerthese interactions "transnational."Thus, a transnationalinteraction may involve governments, butit maynot involve only governments: Nongovernmental actors must also playa significantrole. We speakof transnationalcommunication, transportation,finance, and travelwhen we referto nongovernmentalor only partially governmentalinteractions across state boundaries. Thus, "transnational interactions"is ourterm to describethe movement of tangibleor intangibleitems acrossstate boundaries when at leastone actoris notan agentof a governmentor an intergovernmentalorganization.5 Anotherway of lookingat transnationalinteractions, and ofdistinguishing themfrom interstate interactions, is to referto a diagramthat we founduse- fulin thinkingabout the subject. The classicparadigm of interstatepolitics, depictedin figureI, focuseson governmentsas the agencies through which societiesdeal politicallywith each other. Interstate politics is conceptuallydis- tinguishedfrom, although linked indirectly to, domesticpolitics; transna- ,5As our conclusionexplains at greaterlength, "transnational interactions" constitute only one aspect of "transnationalrelations" by our definition.Yet, mostof the essaysthat followfocus on transnational interactionsand transnationalorganizations. Thus, in order to understandthe essays,our definitionof transnationalinteractions is crucial. TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS 333 tional interactionsare ignored or discounted.Governments may, however, interactthrough intergovernmental organizations; thus, this is included in the classicparadigm.

GIt IGOG2

I X

I J

'GO= Intergovernmentolorganizotion Figure I. A state-centricinteraction pattern

The additionallines drawn in figure2 indicatewhat we mean by transnationalinteractions. For each of the interactionsrepresented by theselines at least one of the actorsis neithera governmentnor an intergovernmental organization.The point can be made somewhatdifferently by referringto J. David Singer'sdistinction between two ways in which individualsand or- ganizationsin a given societycan play roles in world politics:i) They may participateas membersof coalitionsthat control or affecttheir governments or 2) theymay play directroles vis-a-visforeign governments or foreignso- cietiesand thusbypass their own governments.6Only the secondtype of behavior is transnationalby our definition. At the Centerfor InternationalAffairs Conference on TransnationalRela- tionsthe objectionwas raised thata definitionsuch as ours concentratesex- clusivelyon theposition of an actor-whetherwithin a governmentor outside it-and does not raisethe questionof whethergovernmental actors necessarily play governmentallydefined roles. It was pointedout thateven high officials may takeactions that cannot be ascribedto theirstatus as governmentalactors. Militaryofficers in the United States,for example, frequently share common interestswith militarymen in allied countriesand may sometimesact in con-

6 J. David Singer,"The Global Systemand Its Subsystems:A DevelopmentalView," in Rosenau,p. 24. 334 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IGO ' S~~ \

. Ga GI ./ \.

Classic interstate politics ------Domestic politics *--Transnational interactions G-= Government S = Society IGO=Intergovernmental organization Figure2. Transnationalinteractions and interstatepolitics certwith theseforeign military officers against other elements of the Ameri- can government to achieve common political goals.' Leon N. Lindberg and StuartA. Scheingoldhave notedthe development of coalitionsamong agricul- turalofficials from various countries of the EuropeanEconomic Community (EEC): "The Ministersof Agricultureof the six and theiraides and advisors, chargedwith primarynegotiating responsibility along with the Commnission, have come to sharepreoccupations and expertise.They are subjectto similar constituencydemands, engaged in annual budgetbattles against their respec- tiveMinisters of Finance,and theyseek the same generalgoals of improving the conditionsof farmersand of modernizingagriculture. Indeed, in the eyes of manyof theircolleagues in othergovernmental ministries, they have come to form'an exclusiveclub, thoroughlydefended by impenetrabletechnical complexities.'"/ The positionof a governmentalactor, however, is more visibleand thus more easilyknown than his behavioralrole. Furthermore,an actor'sposition is classifiablein one of threecategories-governmental, intergovernmental, or nongovernmental-whereashis role may slide back and forthbetween the three.Even with perfectknowledge it would becomeextremely difficult and ultimatelyarbitrary to say exactlywhere a governmentalagent stopsplaying 7 Robert0. Keohane, "The Big Influenceof Small Allies," ForeignPolicy, Spring I97I (Vol. i, No. 2), pp. I6I-I82. 8 Leon N. Lindbergand StuartA. Scheingold,Europe's Would-BePolity: Patterns of Change in the European Community(Englewood Cliffs,N.J: Prentice-Hall,I970), p. i6o. Their quotationis from "How Not to Rule the Roost: More Troublein the PoultryMarket," Common Market, July I963 (Vol. 3. No. 7). P. 131. TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS 335 a governmentallydefined role and beginsto act "on his own." Furthermore, sincethe essaysin thisvolume focus primarily on nongovernmentalactivities and organizations,a definitionthat stressesthe governmental/nongovernmental/intergovernmentaldistinction focuses attention on the relationships with which we are mostconcerned here. For a firstapproximation that can be easilyapplied in widelyvarying essays, therefore, we use thenarrower and more precisedefinition, centering on the positionof an actor,rather than a broaderand vaguerdefinition in termsof role. In the conclusion,in which we contrasta world politicsparadigm with the state-centricparadigm, we reintroducethe dimensionof role and discussthe problemsand prospectsthat it raises.The readershould be aware,therefore, that in thisintroduction we use the phrase"transnational relations" as shorthandfor "transnational interactionsand organizations,"whereas in the conclusionwe also considerrela- tionsbetween governmental actors that are not controlledby the centralforeign policyorgans of theirgovernments. Many transnationalinteractions take place withoutthe individualsinvolved leavingtheir localities or the organizationsmaintaining any branchesoutside theircountries of origin.Domestic industries, trade unions, and farmersen- gage in internationaltrade without necessarily changing their loci of activity; bankerscan move vast sums of moneywithout leaving their offices; student groups may broadcasttheir views via world televisionwhile remainingin Paris, Cambridge,or Tokyo; the New York Times would somehowbe ob- tainedin otherworld capitalseven if it did not maintainsales officesabroad. Thus, purelydomestic organizations, such as nationaltrade unions, can participatein transnationalinteractions. Yet, we are also concernedwith the activitiesof nongovernmentalorgani- zations thatdo operateregularly in severalstates. Transnational relations by our definitiontherefore include the activitiesof transnationalorganizations, exceptwithin their home states,even when some of theiractivities may not directlyinvolve movements across state boundaries and may not,therefore, be transnationalinteractions as definedabove. Thus, the activitiesof IBM in Brazil or Unileverin the UnitedStates are withinthe context of transnational relationseven thoughsome of theseactivities may take place entirelywithin Brazil,on the one hand, or the UnitedStates on the other.It would seemex- tremelyartificial, for example, to exclude an arrangementmade between StandardOil Companyof New Jerseyand the Frenchgovernment from the arena of transnationalrelations merely because all negotiationsfor the agree- mentmay have takenplace in Paris.9 Multinationalbusiness enterprises,international trade union secretariats, 9It would seem equally absurd,on the otherhand, to considera grantby the Ford Foundationto Newark,New Jersey,or the sale of computersby IBM in Des Moines,Iowa, to be transnationalactivities. Thus, we exclude from transnationalrelations the activitiesof transnationalorganizations within theirhome statesif the organizationsretain such nationalidentification. 336 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION globalreligious organizations, and far-flungfoundations are all transnational byour definition. This doesnot imply, however, that they are staffed by "citi- zensof theworld" or thatthey are necessarily controlled by individuals from severalstates. In fact,most transnational organizations remain linked primarily to one particularnational society. Multinational enterprises tend to be managedby citizensfrom the home state; thus, according to SidneyRolfe, 21 percentof the employees,but only 1.5 percentof the managers,of I50 UnitedStates-based multinational enterprises in the I96os were non- American."0In thisvolume J. Bowyer Bell pointsout that transnational revolutionarymovements often aspire to becomenationalist regimes, and PeterD. Bell showsthat the Ford Foundation'sinternational staff remains predomi- nantlyAmerican. These organizations are transnational by ourdefinition, but theyare not "geocentric.""An organizationbecomes geocentric only when thecomposition of its leadershipand itspattern of behaviorindicate that it has lostall specialties to one or twoparticular states. Intergovernmentalorganizations often devote considerable effort to assur- ing thatthey will be geocentricin factas well as in name: One needonly notethe continuing attempts by lessdeveloped states in theUnited Nations to assure"equitable geographical distribution" of positionsin thesecretariat. Transnationalorganizations, by contrast,are rarelyestablished as suchbut usuallyevolve gradually from national organizations. Furthermore, they fre- quentlydo nothave autonomous constituent units-such as thestates in intergovernmentalorganizations-to insist on geocentricity.Thus, transnational organizationstend to becomegeocentric gradually and quitefrequently move in thatdirection only after pressure has beenbrought from outside, particu- larlyby host governments.'2

II. SOME EFFECTS OF TRANSNATIONALRELATIONS ON INTERSTATEPOLITICS How do transnationalinteractions or organizations affect interstate politics? At themost general level our contention is thatthese transnational relations increasethe sensitivity of societiesto one anotherand therebyalter relationshipsbetween governments. This pointis illustratedby two examples,one fromthe area of internationaltrade and finance,the other from global mass communications. 10 Sidney Rolfe, The InternationalCorporation (Paris: InternationalChamber of Commerce,I969), p. 76. 1" For theseterms see Howard V. Perlmutter,"The TortuousEvolution of the MultinationalCorpora- tion," Columbia journal of World Business,January-February I969 (Vol. 4, No. I), pp. 9-18. 1'2 encompasstransnational organizations as well as interactionsfigure 2 would have to be three- dimensional.Transnational organizations would appear on the thirddimension, linked to governments, nationalsocieties, and intergovernmentalorganizations by a varietyof interactions.Since such a repre- sentationis beyondour artisticpowers, the readerwill have to be contentwith the reminderthat transnationalrelations under our definitioninclude these organizationalactivities as well as the interactions that figure2 depicts. TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS 337 RichardN. Cooperhas convincingly argued the case for the economic arena: As thedecision domains of business and bankingtranscend national jurisdic- tions,small changes in one state'spolicies may have large effects on thesys- tem."3The essayby LawrenceKrause in thisvolume makes a similarpoint. Statesmay be able to reducetheir sensitivity to outsideinfluence but only at thehigh price of reducing the concomitant benefits which result from their intercourse. As a resultof globalmass communications various groups in differentso- cieties,such as radicalstudents, military officers, or racialminorities, can ob- serveeach other's behavior and copyit whenit seemsappropriate. Thus, student radicalsmay suddenlydevelop similar political demands and tactics withoutdirect contact with one another.Their international "conspiracies" arecarried on in publicand transmittedwith the assistance of attentive media. Precursorsof thisphenomenon can be found,but its scale, scope, and speed are largelyproducts of globaltelevision. Although its immediateeffects are on thesensitivity ofone state'sdomestic politics to thatof another, its second- aryeffects-or the effects of effortsto halt unwantedcommunication-may well have consequencesfor interstate politics. We can becomemore specific by suggestingfive major effects of transnationalinteractions and organizations,all withdirect or indirectconsequences formutual sensitivity and therebyfor interstate politics. Four of thesemay resultfrom transnational interactions even withoutthe presenceof transnationalorganizations, although transnational organizations may produce themas well; thefifth effect necessarily depends on thepresence of transnationalorganizations as autonomousor quasi-autonomousactors. We sum- marizethese effects under the followingheadings: i) attitudechanges, 2) internationalpluralism, 3) increasesin constraintson statesthrough dependenceand interdependence,4) increases in theability of certain governments to influenceothers, and 5) theemergence of autonomousactors with private foreignpolicies that may deliberately oppose or impingeon statepolicies. Our categorizationdoes not pretendto be exhaustiveor definitivebut is rather designedsystematically to suggest some effects of transnationalrelations on interstatepolitics. Transnationalinteractions ofall typesmay promote attitude changes which may have possibleconsequences for state policies. As Warwick'sessay sug- gests,face-to-face interactions between citizens of differentstates may alter theopinions and perceptionsof realityof elitesand noneliteswithin national societies.Transnational communication at a distance,transmitted either elec- tronicallyor throughthe printed word, may also promoteattitude changes. 13 RichardN. Cooper, The Economicsof Interdependence:Economic Policy in the AtlanticCommu- nity (AtlanticPolicy Studies) (New York: McGraw-HillBook Co. [for the Council on ForeignRela- tions], I968), especiallychapters 3, 4, and 6. 338 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION Similarresults may follow, although probably less directly,from transnational transportation,travel, and finance.World peace may not,as the IBM slogan has it, come throughworld trade,but buyinga Toyota or a Fiat may very well influenceone's attitudestoward Japanese or Italians. New attitudescan also be fosteredby transnationalorganizations as they createnew myths,symbols, and normsto providelegitimacy for their activities or as theyattempt to replicateWestern beliefs, life-styles, or social prac- ticeselsewhere in the world. Thus, JamesA. Field, Jr.,traces the activityof missionariesand the "cultural package that accompanied the Protestant gospel" in the nineteenthcentury as well as the economicand evangelical activitiesof multinationalbusiness enterprises in thetwentieth century. Peter B. Evans arguesthat advertising by thesemultinational enterprises affects popu- lar attitudesin less developedsocieties to thedetriment of theirautonomy and economicdevelopment; Robert W. Cox refersto themultinational enterprise as the new hero of functionalisttheory. Cox also givesexamples of the justifica- tionsfor transnationaleconomic activity developed not only by corporations but also by certainunion leaders.Examining the ideas of sometrade unionists, Cox perceivesan emerging"policy of symbiosis"between the trade union and the corporationin which both sharepower and throughwhich unions would replace nation-statesas the chief countervailingforce to corporate dominanceof the world economy. It is clear to Cox and to otherauthors in thisvolume that the nation-state will not be as easilyreplaced as such visionsmight imply. Indeed, manyof the essaysin thisvolume focus on the role of the statein transnationalnetworks. BowyerBell observesthat even transnationalrevolutionaries usually seek power withina state,although they may draw supportfrom outside; Peter Bell and Ivan Vallier focusa good deal of theirattention on relations betweenthe Ford Foundationand the Roman Catholicchurch, on the one hand, and the nation-stateswithin which theyoperate on the other.Whereas Krause and RaymondVernon argue fornew internationalagreements to ac- commodateincreases in transnationalexchanges, Robert Gilpin speculates thatgovernments will be led to supportregional intergovernmental organizationsas defensesagainst global transnationalism.A welterof divergenttrends, predictions,and proposalsemerges from these essays. What is clear to any- one, however,is that the attitudesproduced by transnationalrelations will not necessarilylead to eitheruniversal concord or to the continuedgrowth of transnationalrelations themselves. A secondeffect of transnationalrelations is the promotionof international pluralism,by whichwe mean the linkingof nationalinterest groups in trans- nationalstructures, usually involving transnational organizations for purposes of coordination.The essayby Kjell Skjelsbaekdocuments the rapid growth of internationalnongovernmental organizations which link nationalorgani- TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS 339 zations having common interests.After their creationthese transnational organizationsmay stimulatethe creationof new nationalaffiliates and thus contributeto the internationalizationof domesticpolitics. But transnational organizationsthemselves are apparentlythe productof increasingspecializa- tion of societiescombined with the phenomenaof transnationalcommunication,travel, and transportationwhich allow people to perceivethe possibili- ties for transnationalorganizations and to implementtheir visions. The crea- tion of organizationallinkages, as the essayby Edward Miles indicates,may in turnaffect attempts by nationalgroups to influencegovernmental policy. It is interestingto note thatthe firsttwo suggestedeffects of transnational relationsare similarto thosethat have been mostfrequently observed by studentsof Europeanintegration. The "cybernetic"school of theoristshas stressed the effectof transactionson mass attitudechanges, whereas the "neo-func- tionalist"approach emphasizes the rolesof interestgroups and elites,or international pluralism.'4Theorists of both varietiesattempt to specifycertain effectsof transnationalrelations that are likelyto constraingovernments and make theirpolicies more cooperative. A thirdeffect of transnationalrelations, the creationof dependenceand interdependence,is oftenassociated with internationaltransportation and finance. The essaysby Krause and Edward L. Morse focus on this relation- ship,and the essaysby Field, Gilpin,Robert L. Thornton,and Vernon also give it a good deal of attention.Yet, as we have suggestedabove, one may also become dependenton a transnationalcommunication network or on transnationaltravel. Even totalitarianstates, if their governmentswant to keep pace scientifically,may have to allow theirscientists to read foreign journals and to participatein internationalconferences. States may also become dependenton transnationalorganizations, particularly if thoseorgani- zations provide something-goods,services, information, managerial skills, religiouslegitimacy-that they need. Dependence is translatedinto policy most directlywhen certainpolicies whicha governmentmight otherwise follow become prohibitively costly. Inte- grationinto a world monetarysystem may make it impossiblefor a stateto follow an autonomousmonetary policy without drastic changes in its economy; dependenceon foreigncompanies for technology, capital, and managerial skill may deterless developedcountries from following highly nationalistic and socialisticeconomic policies. Where transnationalorganizations become importantwithin a hostsociety, they may alterthe patternsof domesticinter- ests so that certaingovernmental policies become prohibitivelycostly politi- cally even if theymight be feasibleeconomically. Furthermore, new actors, such as multinationalenterprises, with new patternsof behaviormay raise

14 See Peter J. Katzenstein,"Hare and Tortoise:The Race towardIntegration," International Organi- zation,Spring I97I (Vol. 25, No. a), pp. 290-295. 340 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION difficultiesfor bureaucratized governments that tend to followstandard oper- ating procedureswhen reactingto change. Following an effectivepolicy towarda new transnationalactor may thereforebe too costlyon bureaucratic grounds. Coping with dependenceand interdependenceraises special problemsfor large states.Small or weak statesmay well be able to make theirdecisions solelyby consideringthe costsand benefitsof variousalternative policies to themselves,taking into account,of course,the probablereactions of other states.More powerfulstates, however, must also considerthe effectsof their own policieson the systemof transnationalrelations. Insofar as thestate benefitsfrom a particularset of linked transnationalarrangements, it will need to exercisecare lest a reversionto autonomyin one area sets offretaliatory measuresby otherlarge statesthat could-quite apartfrom their direct effects on the firststate-destroy the entiresystem. Yet, only if statesmenperceive both interdependenceand system-fragilitywill theyallow considerationssuch as these to constraintheir actions. Perceptions of transnationalrelations by governmentalelites are thereforea cruciallink betweendependence or interdependence,on the one hand, and statepolicies on the other. We have just notedthat transnational relations may make all statesdepen- dent on forcesthat none of them controls.But theymay have a less even- handed resultas well by creatingnew instrumentsfor influencefor use by some governmentsover others.Among powersof roughlyequal weightboth sides may be able to take advantageof theseinstruments, as in the use of the PugwashConferences on Scienceand World Affairsby theUnited States and the Union of SovietSocialist Republics to explorequestions of arms control. But among unequal statestransnational relations may merelyput additional means of leverageinto the hands of the morepowerful states, located at the centerof the transnationalnetworks, to the disadvantageof thosewhich are alreadyweak. Governmentshave oftenattempted to manipulatetransnational interactions to achieveresults that are explicitlypolitical: The use of touristsas spies or the cultivationof sympatheticethnic or religiousgroups in otherstates are examplesof such "informalpenetration."'" Governments may also seek,however,to directthe flow of economictransactions to theirown politico-economic ends. Through the use of tariffand quota policiespowerful governmentsmay attemptto affectthe flow of internationaltrade-for example, they can discouragemanufacturing in less developedcountries by levying highertariffs on importsof processedand semiprocessedgoods than on raw materials.Or, as the essay by Krause indicates,governments may try to

15 See AndrewM. Scott,The Revolutionin Statecraft:Informal Penetration (Random House Studies in PoliticalScience, 551) (New York: RandomHouse, I965); and RichardW. Cottam,Competitive In- terferenceand TwentiethCentzury Diplomacy (Pittsburgh,Pa: PittsburghUniversity Press, I967). TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS 34I producechanges in internationalmonetary arrangements by unilateralor multilateralaction. Insofar as statesbecome dependent on one another,some statesmay acquire new meansby which to influenceothers. Transnationalorganizations are particularlyserviceable as instrumentsof governmentalforeign policy whether through control or willing alliance. This has beenevident in theuse ofUnited States-based multinational business en- terprisesby the Americangovernment. Thus, in the mid-Ig6osthe United Statessought to retardthe development of France'snuclear capability not by sendingan ultimatumor launchinga war but by forbiddingIBM-France to sell certaintypes of computersto the Frenchgovernment. The United Stateshas alsoused its influence over United States-based multinational enter- prisesas a meansof internationalizingitsembargoes against the People's Re- publicof China (CommunistChina) and Cuba.'" Cox givesexamples of Britishand Americantrade unions which, following private foreign policies similarto the publicforeign policies of theirgovernments, interfere in the domesticpolitics of othercountries to combatreal or imaginedcommunism. Evenwhen there is no explicitcoordination, transnational organizations can be usefulto states.The FordFoundation has been one of few American links to manyArab states since I967. Vallierargues that states which hold key positionsin transnationalresource systems are able, often with decisive advantage, to draw on, and to somedegree mobilize, all the "funds"that the system encompasses. The fiftheffect of transnationalrelations on interstatepolitics depends on the presenceof transnationalorganizations as autonomousor quasi-autonomousactors in worldpolitics. Several essays in thisvolume discuss such organizations-revolutionarymovements, trade unions, multinational business enterprises,and the RomanCatholic church among others-that maintain privateforeign policies. In somecases these organizations possess enormous resources:In I965 some85 businessenterprises each had annualsales larger thanthe gross national products of some57 votingmembers of theUnited Nations.'7As Krausepoints out, in themonetary field the resources in the handsof some twenty banks can, at leastin theshort run, render nugatory the effortsof national monetary authorities even in verypowerful countries. Thus, autonomoustransnational organizations are potentialand sometimesactual opponentsof governmentalpolicy in a wide varietyof areas-whetherthe policyis liberalizingdivorce in Italy,living at peacewith Israel in theMiddle East,enforcing economic plans in France,or maintaininga strong balance- of-paymentsposition in theUnited Kingdom. The conflictbetween govern- 16 For a discussionof some of the controlsused by the United Statesfor thesepurposes see JackN. Behrman,National Interests and the MultinationalEnterprise: Tensions among the NorthAtlantic Coun- tries (EnglewoodCliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall,1970), chapter7, pp. 101-113. 17 G. Modelski,"The Corporationin World Society,"The Year Book of World Atfairs,1968 (Lon- don: Stevens& Sons [under the auspicesof the London Instituteof World Affairs],I968), pp. 64-79. 342 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION mentand transnationalorganizations may reflectthe policiesof a home gov- ernmentstanding behind the transnationalorganization, but it may also result fromdifferences between the policiesof a hostgovernment and thoseof a transnationalorganization, without the home government,if any,becoming involvedin thedispute. Where home governmentsare involved,the presenceof transnationalor- ganizationsmay exerta distinctiveeffect on the interstaterelations that de- velop. Thus, it would be difficultto understandBritish-Iranian relations dur- ing I95I-I953 or American-Cubanrelations between I959 and I96I without appreciatingthe role of certaininternational oil companiesin bothsituations."8 In thesecases actionsby the oil companiesalmost certainly aggravated exist- ing interstateconflicts. It is possible,however, for a transnationalorganization also to facilitategood relationsbetween states; certainly, these same oil companieshave triedto fostercooperation between the UnitedStates and the Arab world.Their effortshave, in turn,been partiallyfoiled by a verypowerful transnationalforce-namely, Zionism-which has workedeffectively for good Americanrelations with Israel even at the expenseof United Statesre- lations with Israel's adversaries.Not only may a strugglebetween transnational organizations,or betweentransnational organizations and states,lead to interstateconflict; interstate conflict, such as the Arab-Israeliconflict, may lead to strugglesfor influenceamong transnationalorganizations or movements.The interrelationshipsare complexand oftenreciprocal, but theycan hardlybe ignored.

III. TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND "Loss OF CONTROL" BY GOVERNMENTS Our observationsabout changesin world politicsdo not denythat govern- mentsremain the mostimportant players in thegame. Althoughtransnational organizationsare immenselymore plentiful and significantnow thanbefore I914 or I945, governmentshave attemptedsince World War I not only to maintainbut also to extendtheir control over outside forces and events.Previ- ously ignoredareas of activityhave been broughtwithin the regulationand concernof governments.International monetary flows, for example, were of muchless importanceto governmentsbefore 19I4 thanthey are now. In those yearsfew governmentsconsciously attempted to plan economicgrowth or to promotefull employmentat home. As Cooper has stressed,new tasks for governments"place greaterburdens on the available instrumentsof policy" and make it moredifficult to accept"the intrusionsof internationaleconomic integrationon national economicpolicy."' Thus, the sensitivityof govern-

-8For a discussionof these cases see Michael Tanzer, The PoliticalEconomy of InternationalOil and the UnderdevelopedCountries (Boston: Beacon Press, I969), chapter24, pp. 3I9-348. 19 Cooper,p. x5I. TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS 343 mentsto changeselsewhere increases as governmentsbecome more ambitious. Increasedaspirations for controland increasedinterdependence go hand in hand. It thereforebecomes clear thatto pose questionssuch as we did at the out- set in termsof an alleged "loss of control"is to put the issuein a misleading way. Governmentshave generallynot been able to controltheir environments successfullyfor long periods of time wheneverthose environmentshave changedrapidly as a resultof large-scalesocial forcesor advancingtechnol- ogy. Small and middle powers,and even greatpowers within a balance-of- power system,have had to accustomthemselves to a verysmall degreeof en- vironmentalcontrol; they have had to adjustto changesrather than to shape the forcesof history.It maybe thatUnited States policymakers have less con- trolnow thanin the I95os,but it was the I950S thatwere exceptional, not the present. As governmentsbecome more ambitious,however, the impactof transnationalrelations does createa "controlgap" betweenthe aspirationfor control and the capabilityto achieve it. The essaysby Morse,Krause, and Vernon discussvarious facets of thisproblem. At the same time,as Vallierand Evans argue,transnational relations may redistributecontrol from one stateto anotherand benefitthose governments at the centerof transnationalnetworks to the disadvantageof thosein the periphery. It seems better,therefore, to raise the issue of governmentalcontrol as a questionfor investigationrather than to prejudgethe issue at this point in termsof "loss of control."It is clear that governmentsare becomingmore ambitiousand thatthis forces them to reactto, and oftento adapt to, transnationalinteractions and organizations.The furthergovernments seek to extend theirreach, the more theyinvolve themselves with the environmentof interstatepolitics and particularlywith transnational relations. Insofar as they are unwillingto pay the pricefor complete control, they must contend with relativelyautonomous transnational forces. From the analyst'sperspective, therefore,their behavior becomes more and moredifficult to predictwithout a ratherdetailed knowledge of transnationalrelations. Our next questionis thereforeposed: Does the phenomenonof transnationalrelations make the state-centricparadigm inadequate for understandingcontemporary world politics?

IV. TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE STATE-CENTRIC PARADIGM Sophisticatedproponents of the state-centricview have observedtransna- tional interactions,and theyhave certainlynot been blind to the fact that actorsother than statesexist. Yet, theyhave deliberatelyexcluded transnational relationsfrom the interstatesystem on the groundsthat theirdirect 344 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION politicalimportance is smalland thattheir indirect effects enter, along with domesticfactors, into the formationof nationalforeign policies. Although thisconclusion has partiallyrelied on a definitionof politicsmerely in terms of statebehavior, it doescontain a solidcore of insight.States have been and remainthe most important actors in worldaffairs, acting both directly and throughintergovernmental organizations to whichstates, and onlystates, be- long.States virtually monopolize large-scale, organized force which remains the ultimateweapon and a potentbargaining resource. Thus, there would be no pointin ignoringthe nation-state. Instead, one mightask the following questions:Should more attention be paid to theeffects of transnationalrela- tionson interstaterelations, and is thestate-centric paradigm adequate if we wish to explorethese effects? Evans has expressedthis feeling pungently althoughin a somewhat"loaded" way: "It is notinteresting to exclude tradi- tionalstate behavior and thenstudy the residual only. What is interestingis the contaminationof interstaterelations by transnationalrelations."20 If we departfrom a state-centric,institutional definition of politics, the need fora broaderfocus becomes evident immediately. The classicmodel as depictedin figurei normallyassumed as a definitionof worldpolitics the actionsand interactionsof states.Students of domesticpolitics, however, have movedaway from such exclusive reliance on thestate and havefocused more broadlyon theprocess by which societies make binding decisions.2" The prob- lemswith definitions such as David Easton'sare well known: Departing from a traditional,narrow view of politicsseems to lead one to a definitionwith- outclear limits. Until we adopta broaderdefinition, however, we continueto viewgovernments as more clearly unique than they are, and we areforeclosed fromexamining the politicsof tradeunions, industrial corporations, or schools.Likewise, with international politics, a definitionof politicsin terms of statebehavior alone may lead us to ignoreimportant nongovernmental ac- torsthat allocate value and thatuse meanssimilar to thoseused by govern- mentsto achievetheir ends. We thereforeprefer a definitionof politicsthat refers to relationshipsin whichat leastone actorconsciously employs resources, both material and symbolic,including the threat or exerciseof punishment,to induce other ac- torsto behavedifferently than they would otherwise behave. Using this definitionof politics, we defineworld politics as all politicalinteractions between significantactors in a worldsystem in whicha significantactor is anysome- what autonomousindividual or organizationthat controls substantial re- sourcesand participatesin politicalrelationships with other actors across state

20 This is a close paraphraseof a remarkmade by Evans at the Centerfor InternationalAffairs Con- ferenceon TransnationalRelations, Harvard University, June 4-5, I970. 21For a discussionof this trendsee David Easton, "'PoliticalScience," InternationaZl Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,ed. David L. Sills (I7 vols.; n.p: MacmillanCo. and Free Press, I968), Vol. I2, pp. 282-298. TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS 345 lines.22Such an actorneed not be a state:At any pointwhere a transnational organizationemploys techniques such as economicboycotts, airline hijack- ings,or religiousexcommunication to achievethe modification of otheractors' behavior,it is behavingpolitically. International oil companies,for example, insofaras theyact to maintainpolitical stability in producingcountries, are transnationalpolitical actors by this definition.23 If the effectsof transnationalrelations were slight,variable, and perhaps transitory,consigning them to a vaguelyspecified and generallyignored en- vironmentwould be acceptableas a parsimonioussimplifying device. Yet, thisentire volume testifies to thefact that the effects of transnationalrelations are much moreimportant and pervasivethan that.Knowing the policiesand capabilitiesof a set of governmentsmay not allow us accuratelyto predict outcomesor futurecharacteristics of the systemif significanttransnational interactionsor powerfultransnational organizations are involved.Even if statesin some sense"win" confrontationswith transnationalforces, their anticipationof theseforces, and of the actionsof transnationalorganizations, may lead statesto altertheir policies in advanceto avoid costlyconfrontations. Transnationalrelations are not "new," although,as Skjelsbaek'sessay indicates,the growthof transnationalorganization in the twentiethcentury has been spectacular.Yet, our contentionis not only that the state-centricparadigm is inadequatefor reasonsindicated above but also that it is becoming progressivelymore inadequate as changesin transnationalrelations take place. As a partialview of internationalpolitics it was moreuseful in the past than in the present,and it is stillmore useful now than it is likelyto be in the future.The essaysshed some light on changesin transnationalrelations; the conclusionto this volume attemptsto draw the evidencetogether in order to buttressthe case thathas been sketchedabove and to introduceour alterna- tive "world politicsparadigm" as a substitutefor the state-centricanalytic framework.

V. TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND VALUES Thus far in thisessay we have been viewingtransnational relations largely froman empiricalperspective, but theycan also be evaluatednormatively. This immediatelyraises the questionof who benefitsfrom transnational relations.It could be arguedthat transnational relations enrich and strengthen the strongand the rich-in short,the mostmodernized, technologically adept segmentsof the world-because only theseelements are able to take full advantage of its networkof intersocietallinkages. The continuingdebate on the effectsof multinationalbusiness enterprises on welfare,for example,has 22 These definitionsborrow heavily and consciously,although with substantialmodification, from an essay by Oran R. Young, "The Actorsin World Politics,"in The Analysisof InternationalPolitics, ed. JamesN. Rosenau,B. VincentDavis and MauriceA. East (Glencoe,Ill: Free Press,forthcoming). 23 For an analysisof the activitiesof these corporationssee Tanzer. 346 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION raised numerousquestions about the value of transnationalrelations for less developedcountries in particular.24Many of theessays in thisvolume, particularly thosein partsIII and IV, raise questionsof thiskind. In producinga volumethat emphasizes transnational interactions and organizationswe mean to pointout theirimportance, not necessarilyto celebratetheir effects. Some would regardtransnational relations as a new name forthe old phenomenonof imperialism.As one scholarhas noted,however, the word "imperialism"is "entirelyat the mercyof its user."25It is sometimesused to de- scribevirtually any relationshipacross state boundaries between unequals that involvesthe exerciseof influence.If thisdefinition is used, "imperialism"nin- cludesmost of worldpolitics and therebybecomes virtually devoid of analytic value. Imperialismmay be used,however, in a more restrictedalthough not very preciseway to referto cross-nationalrelationships in which unequal power is used to achieve"unfair" allocations of value. Some actors,whether states or not,exploit others. Given an agreedconcept of "fairness"(which is, of course, the chiefdifficulty) some transnationalrelations would presumablybe "imperialistic"and otherswould not. Yet, the ambiguitiespresent even in this use of "imperialism"are so greatthat we would ratherask directlyabout the effectsof transnationalrelations than inquirewhether a given set of transnational relationsis "imperialistic"or not. Focusing on "asymmetries"or "inequalities"seems more useful to us than tryingto employolder termsen- crustedwith manylayers of ambiguousor contradictorymeaning. The readershould therefore bear in mindwhile readingthese essays Harold Lasswell's definitionof politicsin termsof "who gets what." Do the activities of multinationalbusiness enterprises, trade unions, or the Ford Founda- tion redistributeeconomic resources? If so, in what directiondoes the flow go? Do thesetransnational organizations, or transnationalinteractions gener- ally, differentiallyaffect the welfare,security, or autonomyof variousstates or regions?To what extentare the effectsunidirectional and to what ex- tent are cross-currentsmore typical,with some benefitsand some costsfor each stateor region? Once again, the conclusionattempts to draw together evidencefrom the essaysin orderto give at least a tentativeanswer to these questions.

24 For some recentworks on the subjectsee CharlesP. Kindleberger,American Business Abroad: Six Lectureson Direct Investment(New Haven, Conn: Yale UniversityPress, I969); Harry Magdoff,The Age of Imperialism:The Economicsof U.S. ForeignPolicy (New York: MonthlyReview Press,I969); and Harry Johnson,"The Efficiencyand Welfare Implicationsof the InternationalCorporation," in The InternationalCorporation: A Symposium,ed. Charles P. Kindleberger(Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press,1970), pp. 35-56. 25 Hans Daalder, "Imperialism,"in the InternationalEncyclopedia of the Social Sciences,Vol. 7, p. I08. TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS 347

VI. TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY As Field pointsout in his essay,Americans have alwayshad a propensity for transnationalactivity. The United States has the world's most highly modernized,as well as its largest,economy. American social units such as corporations,foundations, labor organizations,and universitiesinvolved in transnationalactivities often have annual budgetsgreater than those of the governmentsin whose territoriesthey operate. Vernon and PeterBell indicate in theiressays that perhaps three-fourths of the world'smultinational enter- prisesand 29 of 32 foundationswith assets over $ioo millionhave theirorigins in the United States.In ironiccounterpoint hostility toward the American colossusis one of the few tiesuniting the revolutionarymovements described by BowyerBell. At the same timeit would be a mistaketo view transnationalactivities as a purelyAmerican game, let alone a United Statesgovernment game, particularly if one looks at recenttrends. Stephen Hymer and RobertRowthorn have concludedfrom an analysisof comparativegrowth of European and Americanfirms that the future will see increasingEuropean direct investment in the United States as multinationalfirms from the Old World vie with those fromthe New World to "establishworld-wide market positions and protectthemselves from the challengesof each other."26Rainer Hellmann has pointedout thatalthough American direct investment in Europe is more than double Europeandirect investment in the UnitedStates, if one includes portfolioinvestments the totalsare almostexactly equal. Furthermore,"since I967 Europeancompanies have forthe firsttime increased their direct invest- mentsin Americamore rapidlythan Americanfirms increased theirs in Eu- rope."27Apart fromthe economicrealm Americais by no means dominant evennow: The UnitedStates is not thecenter of transnationalpolitical parties, revolutionarymovements, or the Roman Catholicchurch. It is, however,the mostimportant focus of transnationalactivity in basic scienceand one of the major centersof transnationaltrade unionism.Not all roads lead to New York; some stilllead to Rome,Peking, Geneva, or even Damascus. We can thereforesee an emergingdialectic between American predomi- nance, at least in the economicarea, and European or Japanesechallenges, with less developed statesas bystanders,victims, or junior partnersas the case may be. Such a dialecticraises the questionof whetherUnited States foreignpolicy should seek to defend,ignore, or countervailthe transnational effectsof Americansociety. Is the United Stateslike an elephantin a hen- 26 Stephen Hymer and Robert Rowthorn,"Multinational Corporations and InternationalOligopoly: The Non-AmericanChallenge," in Kindleberger,The InternationalCorporation, p. 8i. 27 Rainer Hellmann,The Challengeto U.S. Dominance of the InternationalCorporation, trans. Peter Ruof (Cambridge,Mass. Dunellen,University Press of Cambridge,Mass., 1970), p. 306. Hellmannesti- mates that 6o percentof worldwidedirect investment originates in the United Stateswhile 30 percent originatesin Europe (p. 305). 348 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION house-so powerfulthat it causesproblems regardless of itsintentions-or is theUnited States more like Great Britain in thelate nineteenth century-still dominant,but imperceptiblylosing the advantageson whichits dominance is based?Although few authors in thisvolume confront these questions directly,most of theessays are highly relevant to suchproblems of foreign policy.The readershould be awareof these policy issues as he readsthis volume; we returnto themin theconclusion.

VII. TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION A discussionof the effects of transnational relations on valuesand ofAmer- ica's role in transnationalnetworks raises the inevitablefurther question of intergovernmentalcooperation to controlthese effects and to limitor legiti- mateAmerican dominance. It is clearthat most if notall governmentswill findit verydifficult to cope alone with many aspects of transnational relations in thedecade of the I970S and thereafter.In reading this volume students of internationalorganizations, international politics, and internationallaw will surelyask themselveswhat tasks intergovernmental institutions can be expectedto assumein theirattempts to influenceand controltransnational trends.Outer space, the oceans,and the internationalizationof production are onlythree of themost obvious areas in whichintergovernmental control maybe demandedin theform of new international laws or newinternational organizationsor both.The newlaws and organizationswill have to takeinto accountimportant nongovernmental actors, perhaps including them in the organizationsas well as acknowledgingthem in thelaws. Whether governmentswill cooperatemore successfully in regulatingtransnational relations thanin controllingeach other'sconflict behavior remains to be seen. Yet,a fewtentative steps in thisdirection can be discerned.The European EconomicCommunity aspires to convertits trade bloc into a singlecurrency area duringthe I970s.28 Less sweepingalterations have been made in Atlantic and globalintergovernmental arrangements in the area of monetarypolicy to copewith disruptions caused by transnational financial activity. There has been considerablediscussion in Europeof developingan EEC-wideincor- porationlaw to assistthe growth of Europeanmultinational corporations to combatthe "American challenge."29 By declaringthe sea to be "thecommon heritageof mankind" the United Nations General Assembly has takena sym- bolicstep toward controlling the activities of transnational organizations, such as multinationalbusiness enterprises, as well as theactivities of statesin their exploitationof thesea and seabedfor commercial and militarypurposes. The recentTreaty Prohibiting the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on theSea- 28 New YorkTimes, February io, 1971, p. I. 29 Hellmann, p. 30I. See also J.-J.Servan-Schreiber, The AmericanChallenge, trans. Ronald Steel (New York: Avon Books. io6o). TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS 349 bed and Ocean Floor has limitedstates' rights to use the seabed by banning atomicarms, and limitson the encroachmentsof transnationalorganizations are likely to follow.30The United Nations Conferenceon the Human En- vironment,to be held in I972, will certainlyhave to come to gripswith the transnational,as well as governmental,actors that help determineenviron- mentalimprovement or decay. Most of theseare small steps,significant only if theyrepresent the opening edge of a wedge. Whatevertheir impact, it is clear thatnone of themwas takenautomatically; individuals had to perceivepresent and futureproblems and act on them beforegovernments could be expectedto cooperate.Basic research,directed at describingand explainingimportant phenomena, is a necessaryprerequisite to such anticipationof futuredifficulties as well as to intelligentpolicy analysisand recommendationsafter problems have been identified.Students of internationallaw and organizationshould therefore become involvedin the studyof transnationalrelations not merelyfor the sake of understandingreality but also in orderto help changereality. The essaysthat follow are intendednot onlyto improveour understandingbut also to improvethe ways in which we can increasethe generalwelfare by con- trollingthe forcesthat shape our lives.

30 New York Times,February I2, I97I, p. I.