The Putin System Vladimir Putin Has Dominated Russian Politics for Nearly Two Decades

CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich N0. 225, April 2018, Editor: Christian Nünlist

The Putin System Vladimir Putin has dominated Russian politics for nearly two decades. On 18 March 2018, the president was re-elected for another six years, winning nearly 77 per cent of votes cast. The “Putin System” is not geared towards urgently needed economic and social reforms, but mainly serves to cement existing relations of power.

By Jeronim Perovic

Putin’s electoral victory has come as no surprise. Support for the president and his policies has been high for many years, despite the Russian economy chafing under Western sanctions and low oil prices. In- terestingly, not only is support for Putin quite high, but surveys show that a majority of the Russian population backs the Russian leadership’s current course in domestic and foreign affairs or even supports a tougher stance – regardless of who rules Russia as president (cf. graphic on p. 3).

It would be too simplistic to attribute these high approval rates solely to official propaganda, which is spread primarily via state television. For years, every channel has ex- tolled the myth of Putin as the supposed “savior” of a Russia that only recovered President Vladimir Putin was reelected on 18 March 2018. Anton Vaganov / Reuters from the decline of the 1990s thanks to him. There is a widespread notion of Russia as a “humiliated” country that, thanks only to Putin’s firm hand, has managed to rise again and once more actively assert its le- ally played into the hands of the regime. cept the cutbacks imposed by the difficult gitimate interests on the global stage. These For Moscow, they only offer further confir- economic situation and the budget reduc- narratives work not only due to propagan- mation that Western policy ultimately aims tions to healthcare, education, and pen- da, however. They are persuasive because at weakening Russia. The sanctions, it is ar- sions. they strike a chord with the population and gued, are part of a larger strategy to bring because many Russians, based on deeply about a regime change in Russia itself. Of Fear of Revolutions held convictions, share the views that the course, Russians want prosperity and a bet- The result of the 18 March 2018 election state is promoting. ter life. However, it appears that in order to also revealed that despite all the govern- sustain Russian great power ambitions, a ment’s mobilization efforts, more than 32 In this respect, the economic sanctions im- majority of the people are willing, at least per cent of eligible voters abstained from posed by Western states in 2014 have actu- temporarily, to tighten their belts and ac- casting their ballot. In many cities and re-

gions, notwithstanding heavy police pres- power. According to surveys, many Rus- The government rhetoric and the increas- ence, there were even public protests sians today view corruption in particular as ing repression betray the sensitivities of a against Putin in the run-up to the polls. one of their country’s greatest scourges. regime that feels threatened, despite high approval rates. For Putin, the mass demon- Even though the potential for protest cur- Enhanced Repression strations of 2011/2012 were an ominous rently appears to be very small, and liberal- Since these events, the state authorities development: The people were taking to minded politicians have hardly any support have not only turned up the rhetorical heat the streets not due to immediate economic among the population (they two liberal even further. Suppression of the remnants distress, but in order to protest against presidential candidates, Ksenia Sobchak of the political opposition and societal or- state-sanctioned election fraud. This placed and Grigory Yavlinsky, together won less ganizations operating independently of the Putin’s system of power under severe strain. than three per cent of all votes), the coun- state has also increased recently. In particu- try’s leadership is nevertheless extremely lar, the law on “foreign agents” introduced A Stress Test for the Putin System sensitive regarding any manifestations of in 2012 has been used to raise the pressure One important factor in Putin’s consolida- discontent. Long before the “Euromaidan” on NGOs and private academic institu- tion of power has been the fact that the of 2013/14, the Kremlin has been aware tions significantly. Some of these have even Russian state, following the largely chaotic that seemingly innocuous protest move- been forced to shut down completely in re- privatization of the 1990s, managed quite ments can always develop unforeseen dy- cent years. Thus, even the well-known rapidly to regain control of the commodi- namics, especially in times of crisis. Before “Levada Center”, the last independent ties sector and other strategic economic as- the crisis in Ukraine, there had been a se- polling organization, has been severely ha- sets and to roll back the influence of the ries of portentous developments – the rassed by the state authorities since Sep- formerly powerful oligarchs. This is signifi- “Rose Revolution” in Georgia (2003), the tember 2016, when the government listed cant because only a few dozen corporations “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine (2004), it as a “foreign agent”, claiming that it re- account for the lion’s share of Russia’s na- and the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan ceived funding from the US. tional economic output. Currently, compa- (2005). In all of these countries, street pro- nies from just 12 key sectors generate over tests had overthrown the elected govern- At the same time, the Kremlin is working 90 per cent of the revenues of the 500 larg- ments. The Kremlin was also able to study harder than ever to establish a “national est Russian corporations. This means that the potential momentum that mass move- consensus”, not least by instilling a patri- power in Russia is concentrated among ments can achieve in the “Arab Spring” otic view of history in the general popula- those who control these key sectors. from 2011 onwards, which in some cases tion. To this end, schoolbooks are rewrit- Among these 500 important businesses, led to peaceful regime change, in others to ten, and the Kremlin supports foundations the oil and gas companies alone are respon- chaos and civil war. and internet portals that propagate the sible for over 30 per cent of turnover and state-sanctioned historiography. Already in nearly half of total profits. Currently, the oil Ever since, the Russian leadership has re- May 2009, the then president of Russia, and gas sector generates about the same sponded aggressively to protests inside the Dmitry Medvedev, appointed a commis- profit as the five next-largest economic sec- country. The large-scale anti-government sion to counter attempts at “falsifying his- tors combined. demonstrations of 2011/12 marked a turn- tory to the detriment of Russia’s interests”. ing point. They were set off by irregularities Under Russian law, the state authorities are Due to the sustained depression of oil discovered in some regions dur- prices, however, the oil and gas companies ing the Russian parliamentary Even in authoritarian states, have generated considerably lower reve- election, which led to demon- nues in recent years, with immediate ef- strations involving tens of thou- people seem unwilling to tolerate fects on the federal budget: While the sands of protesters. Demonstra- election manipulation. state until recently depended on the oil tions took place not only in and gas sector for about half of its tax rev- major cities like Moscow and St enue, that share had diminished to 40 per Petersburg, but in many smaller cities, too, empowered to prosecute dissenting opin- cent in 2017. Russia has been falling back thousands took to the streets protesting ions, for example when it comes to assess- on its National Wealth Fund to balance against fraud and the country’s leadership. ing the role of the Soviet Union in the Sec- the budget deficit, and the devaluation of ond World War. the ruble relative to the US dollar (the These protests movements, which contin- trade currency in the oil business) has ued for several months, did not pose a seri- While the internet remains a largely free helped to soften the blow of the oil price ous threat to the stability of the regime. The domain in Russia, the law also permits the crash. Nevertheless, revenues from com- government rallied massive police forces to state authorities to move rigorously against modities exports have declined, and there break up the demonstrations and had hun- critics in this sphere by shutting down op- is less rent available for redistribution. The dreds of participants arrested. Nevertheless, position websites. For example, in February effects are felt particularly acutely in the the Kremlin was caught by surprise by the 2018, the website of well-known Kremlin area of social services (including pensions, scale of the protests, the tenacity of the par- critic Alexei Navalny was blocked after he education, and healthcare). Taking infla- ticipants, and the high mobilization poten- had posted a video exposé of a corruption tion into account, there is currently far less tial within society. At the same time, to case involving a high-ranking state official. funding available for welfare than in previ- those in power, the events indicated that The demonstration laws have also been ous years. At the same time, due to the there were limits to the state’s arbitrary pol- tightened: The security forces now even poor economic climate among other fac- icies. Even in authoritarian states, people have permission to open fire on crowds at tors, real wages have also declined in Rus- seem unwilling to tolerate election manip- their own discretion. sia over the past three years. About two ulation or obvious corruption and abuses of thirds of the working population currently

Russian Opinion Polls and the state intends to control it as far as possible to stave off any contingencies. The Significance of the Ukraine Crisis In this context, the eruption of the Ukraine crisis was not inconvenient for the Kremlin at the time. Certainly, the aggressive Rus- sian behavior towards Ukraine should also be understood as backlash against Ukraine’s rapprochement with the West and Kiev’s refusal to join the Moscow-dominated Eurasian economic integration project. The prospect of Ukraine one day joining NATO or the EU has always been the worst-case scenario from Moscow’s per- spective. Looking further, however, one should not underestimate the domestic im- portance of the Ukraine crisis. Among the Russian population, the absorption of Crimea into the Russian state federation has been hugely popular. At the same time, the Kremlin’s propaganda machine has very skillfully exploited the conflict in eastern Ukraine to paint an image of chaos and civil war in the neighboring country. The receive salaries that are below the country’s medium to long term, the authorities will Kremlin has portrayed the Maidan events average wage level, indicating that the pay have to consider ways and means of reduc- as a movement controlled by Western ac- gap is also broadening. ing Russia’s dependence on exports of raw tors, ultimately leading to a “putsch” and materials. However, at the current point in power grab by forces dominated by “fas- There have also been cutbacks in the de- time, those in power are unlikely to wel- cists”. In this way, the Ukraine revolution fense sector, though it is unclear to what come reforms aimed at strengthening those was denied any form of democratic legiti- extent. According to official numbers, in sectors of the economy not directly con- macy, while the West was accused of trying 2017, the government spent about 25 per trolled by the state, such as small and medi- to “divide” the Russian and Ukrainian “fra- cent less on the military than in the previ- um-sized enterprises (SMEs). Neverthe- ternal peoples”. ous year. However, real expenditures are less, support for SMEs would be an likely to be much higher, since some of the urgently needed step towards diversifying In this way, the Kremlin hopes to demon- defense funding is “hidden” among other Russia’s economy, where they currently strate to its own citizens the destructive budget items or classified. It is believed only contribute about 20 per cent of GDP potential of revolutions. Whenever the that the government earmarks about one – much less than in most Western states, Russian state takes action against domestic third of its budget for the area of “security”, where their share of value creation stands protestors and critics, it justifies this by ar- which includes not just expenditures on at significantly over 50 per cent. guing that it is limiting the influence of ex- the military and the military-industrial ternal forces hostile to Russia. Only against complex, but also the cost of police and Mobilizing the full innovation potential of this domestic background can the Krem- various other security and intelligence ser- Russian society would require not just lin’s reluctance to play a constructive role in vices. Despite the depressed economic cli- strengthening the rule of law, but also abol- resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine be mate, that share is unlikely to decline in the ishing bureaucratic hurdles, waging a more properly understood. Moscow has no in- coming years, while it is doubtful that the determined campaign against corruption, terest in seeing Ukraine succeed, since this state will agree to raise expenditures on so- and making loans available to cial programs and civilian projects in diffi- SMEs. However, the real prob- Economic sanctions imposed cult economic times. lem with effective diversifica- tion is that under the existing by Western states in 2014 have Preserving Existing Structures “Putin System”, there is no actually played into the hands The “Putin System” can only function if ex- place for a large flourishing pri- isting power structures are maintained. vate sector. If the prime direc- of the regime. Therefore, the regime is investing in de- tive is to preserve a system in fense and the security apparatus and going which political power equals control of the would contradict the official Russian nar- to great lengths to control key sectors of economy, then the state can have no real rative of a misguided Ukrainian national the economy via elites loyal to the state. interest in fostering a sector consisting of project and question Russia’s own develop- Conversely, as beneficiaries of the system, private SMEs, which due to its very struc- ment model. the country’s economic elites are seeking ture would be much more difficult to con- the proximity of the political power center trol than a few dozen large corporations Strong President, Strong Russia more than ever, since their own survival is and loyal oligarchs. In the “Putin System”, Only a “strong president” can guarantee a tied to the resilience of the system. In the society itself is the main uncertainty factor, “strong Russia”, according to one of Putin’s

election slogans. However, this “strength” as reinforce national cohesion. With this goal this point. Support for Putin means sup- understood by the regime does not consist in mind, the regime has kept the entire so- port for stability and the desire to preserve in the ability to innovate, implement re- ciety in a kind of state of emergency for national cohesion in the face of external forms, or engage in self-criticism. The main years by stoking fears of foreign bogeymen threats and a domestic economic crisis. aim is the preservation of power. To this and employing increasingly aggressive However, this kind of stability rests on feet end, the president relies fully on the loyalty rhetoric designed to appeal to citizens’ pa- of clay while Russia’s economy remains in of the people surrounding him. This is like- triotism. In this way, supporting the presi- the doldrums. As long as retaining power is ly why Putin has tended in recent years to dent becomes the duty of each citizen, and the main priority, and as long as Russian recruit young, largely unknown officials for a vote for Putin signifies a vote for a strong society is refused the opportunity of unim- his staff and to appoint new people to im- and unified Russia. peded evolvement and of gaining a stake in portant government posts. He has also had their country’s development, it is unlikely a number of regional governors replaced in Putin’s recipe for retaining power has been that Putin will introduce the changes nec- the recent past. This is intended to strength- a success: In March 2018, he was re-elected essary for an effective transformation of en the “power vertical” from the top down, as Russian president without having pre- Russia. sented any sort of tangible elec- Strength as understood by tion platform. Apparently, most the regime does not consist people in Russia are not keen to see radical changes. At the same in the ability to innovate, time, this does not preclude implement reforms, or engage them from hoping for a better Prof. Dr. Jeronim Perovic is Professor of Eastern and more prosperous life. Opin- European History at the University of Zurich and in self-criticism. ion polls commissioned just be- Director of the Center for Eastern European fore the election show that even Studies (CEES). He is the author of numerous minimizing the danger of potential parti- within society at large, there is no consen- publications including “From Conquest to san infighting within the governmental and sus on the steps required to achieve a Deportation: The North Caucasus under Russian administrative bodies of the state. change for the better. Putin’s high approval Rule” (2018). The present CSS Analysis was rates are not necessarily evidence of opti- produced as part of a cooperation agreement Measures to unify the country’s political mism regarding the future, but simply indi- concluded between the CSS and the CEES in leadership have coincided with efforts to cate that voters see no alternative to him at January 2018.

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