Investigating and the Response Modulation Hypothesis Using an Adapted Emotional Stroop Paradigm

Zara Bamdad (10620842) Psychology Research Master Thesis August 2015

Supervisors: Prof. Dr. Arnoud Arntz

Dr. Lieke Nentjes Abstract

Emotional response deficiencies have been demonstrated in psychopathy in various domains. According to the response modulation hypothesis, these deficiencies arise in non-anxious psychopathy due to difficulties integrating information that is peripheral to the focus of attention. The present study tested this hypothesis using an adapted Stroop paradigm. In this paradigm attention was manipulated towards or away from valenced word information in a within-subjects design. Through comparing response latencies for valenced stimuli and neutral stimuli when stimuli were peripheral or central to attentional focus, we measured the change in emotional responding as a function of attentional focus. In accordance with the response modulation hypothesis, we expected that this measure would be predicted by psychopathy, moderated by anxiety, in a sample of 40 male student participants. This effect was not found and thus the hypothesis was not supported. Findings and future directions are discussed.

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Contents

Abstract ...... 2 Introduction ...... 5 Method ...... 9 Participants ...... 9 Design ...... 9 Slow Stroop effect ...... 10 Materials and Apparatus ...... 10 Speech Recognition ...... 10 Stroop Task ...... 10 Word Stimuli ...... 11 Questionnaires ...... 11 Procedure...... 12 Results ...... 13 Data analysis ...... 13 Outliers ...... 13 Interference ...... 14 Psychopathy and Anxiety ...... 14 Paradigm ...... 15 Manipulation check ...... 15 Stroop effect ...... 15 Within-block emotional Stroop effect ...... 15 Between-block Stroop effect ...... 16 Stimulus Category ...... 16 Follow-up correlational analyses ...... 18 Response modulation hypothesis ...... 18 Planned Moderation Analyses ...... 19 Group differences ...... 21 Psychopathy and anxiety ...... 21 Psychopathy, anxiety and category-specific interference ...... 22 Unplanned Moderation analysis ...... 23 Discussion ...... 26 Response Modulation Hypothesis...... 26

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Paradigm ...... 28 Interference effects ...... 28 Stimulus Categories ...... 29 General discussion ...... 31 References ...... 32 Appendix ...... 36 Appendix I – Word Stimuli ...... 36 Appendix II – Word Ratings ...... 37 Appendix III – Distribution Plots ...... 38 Histogram of interference in each condition ...... 38

Histogram of overall fast and slow effects (interferenceemotion-focus- interferencecolour-focus) ...... 38 Appendix IV – Local Regression Plots ...... 39 Fast effect...... 39 Slow effect ...... 40

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Introduction

Psychopathic individuals are known to be cold and callous, and consistently show antisocial behaviours with no apparent (Viding, McCrory, & Seara-Cardoso, 2014). Psychopathy as a construct comprises at least two factors: Factor 1 (F1) relates to the affective and interpersonal characteristics, such as callousness, and Factor 2 (F2) relates to the social deviance characteristics, such as impulsiveness (Williamson, Harpur, & Hare, 1991). These factors correlate moderately with each other, have distinct external correlates (Benning, Patrick, Hicks, Blonigen, & Krueger, 2003), and both factors have been implicated in recidivism and resistance to intervention (Olver, Lewis, & Wong, 2013). The link between psychopathy with antisocial behaviours and resistance to treatment means that it is arguably of great value to increase our understanding of psychopathy.

‘Primary’ or non-anxious psychopathy differs from ‘secondary’ psychopathy, in that individuals high in primary psychopathy tend to be less affectively-driven and “unconcerned with aversive events of no immediate consequence” (Gorenstein & Newman, 1980, p. 303). While psychopathy as a whole has demonstrated emotional deficits in various domains, and is often explained by psychopathic functional impairments (Blair, 2013), a lesser-acknowledged explanation, specific to non-anxious psychopathy, is that the observed emotional deficit is a result of abnormal attentional processing (Lorenz & Newman, 2002). This explanation is known as the Response Modulation Hypothesis (RMH) and is the focus of the present study.

The RMH states that non-anxious psychopathy is linked to difficulties automatically integrating information from the environment that is peripheral to the current focus of attention (Newman & Lorenz, 2003). This idea originated from findings that psychopathic individuals experience difficulties shifting their attentional focus between stimuli (Patterson & Newman, 1993), with authors concluding that “self- regulatory failures occur when they must switch attention to accommodate less salient information” (p728). It stands to reason that in order to respond to valenced information in our environments that is not at the focus of our current attention, we must shift our attention from our primary focus to the valenced information in question. Deficiencies in shifting attention automatically may be adaptive in certain circumstances in that it could aid task focus. However, this same deficiency may also lead to problems with experiencing and responding to emotional information, which could hinder functioning (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Such deficiencies in automatic attentional shifts are believed to exist in primary psychopathy, (Lorenz & Newman, 2002), thus resulting in the observed emotional deficit.

The RMH has been successful in refuting widely-believed affective phenomena observed in psychopathy. For instance, often the psychopathic emotion deficit is explained by reduced amygdala activity. However, this effect disappears when attention is manipulated to be focused on affective stimuli (Larson et al., 2013). Similar results have been found with fear potentiated startle responses (Newman, Curtin, Bertsch, Baskin-Sommers, 2010). Despite this evidence, the RMH remains relatively under- researched in comparison with other emotion-deficit accounts of psychopathy.

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According to the RMH, non-anxious psychopathy should be linked to superior performance at any task which involves keeping attention focused on a target and resisting distraction from peripheral information. An experimental paradigm which exploits this process is the emotional Stroop task. Here, participants report the colour that valenced and neutral word stimuli are presented in, whilst ignoring the word itself. Therefore the valenced meaning of the word is peripheral to the primary colour-naming goal. The premise of the task is that that the valenced meaning of the stimuli automatically captures attention and therefore interferes with the primary colour-naming task, leading to slower response latencies (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996)1. Thus, subtracting response latencies to neutral words from response latencies to valenced words provides an index of the degree to which an individual automatically integrates emotional information that is peripheral to their attentional focus. This is known as ‘emotional interference’. Under the RMH, non-anxious psychopathy should be more resistant to interfering peripheral information, manifesting in faster response times, or ‘reduced’ interference.

Previous studies which have looked at the emotional Stroop and psychopathy are uninterpretable in terms of the RMH, which pertains specifically to non-anxious psychopathy, as none, to our knowledge, have accounted for anxiety. The findings from these studies are nonetheless worth reviewing.

Thus far, emotional Stroop findings relating to psychopathy appear to be in contrast to what would be expected under the RMH. For instance, Sadeh et al. (2013) found that F1 was linked to increased interference with positive words, and F2 was linked to increased interference for all valenced words in a sub- clinical sample. Another study comparing offender groups to controls found that high psychopathic traits were associated with more interference with violence-related words compared to neutral words (Domes, Mense, Vohs & Habermeyer, 2013). A study which used a picture form of the emotional Stroop task, and found no difference in interference between healthy participants high and low in trait psychopathy (Carolan, Jaspers-Fayer, Asmaro, Douglas & Liotti, 2014).

While this lack of support for the RMH in previous emotional Stroop research may be a result of participants not having ‘primary’ psychopathic characteristics, perhaps these unexpected findings can also be explained by the passive nature of the Stroop paradigm. The paradigm assumes that the participant attempts to stay focused on colour throughout the task, however it is not possible to be certain of this. A stronger interference paradigm would be one in which attentional focus is manipulated (Zeier, Maxwell, & Newman, 2009). Thus, the present study introduces a new paradigm which aims to manipulate attention within an emotional Stroop task better enable us to test the RMH.

This paradigm aims to focus attention towards or away from the colour or valenced meaning of the word whilst simultaneously measuring interference. In an emotion-focus condition, the emotional stimulus is brought to the centre of attentional focus by asking participants to recall whether a word was positive or

1 While the specific mechanism underpinning the Stroop effect is unclear (Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 2004; Ben-Haim et al., 2014; Phaf & Kan, 2007), what is agreed on is that the emotional Stroop interference effect involves failure to focus on the primary task of naming the colour word.

6 negative at various intervals. In a colour-focus condition, the emotional stimulus is made peripheral to the central attentional focus by asking participants to recall whether the previous word was a light or dark colour at various intervals. The difference in interference in both of these conditions indicates how responding changes as a function of whether the valenced information is peripheral or central to the attentional focus. The present study aims to implement this new paradigm in order to test the RMH.

In addition to a new experimental paradigm, the present study includes improved stimulus material as the emotional Stroop effect relies on the stimulus words being “personally relevant” (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996, p. 21). An additional advantage to using psychopathy-relevant peripheral stimuli is that it reduces the chance that any observed resistance to peripheral information is simply due to being less motivated by the content of the peripheral information, rather than a deficit in automatic integration. Thus, psychopathy-relevant stimuli enable us to draw more confident conclusions regarding observed interference (or lack thereof).

Such psychopathy-relevant stimuli may be best found within the interpersonal domain. Psychopathy has been linked to a hostile/dominant interpersonal style (Podubinski, Lee, Hollander, & Daffern, 2014), increased use of anger and hostility (Hicks & Patrick, 2006) and heightened accuracy in appraising vulnerability and assertiveness in others (Book, Quinsey, & Langford, 2007). Additionally, psychopathy has been linked with cognitive biases in the interpersonal domain, such as an attribution bias for hostility (Vitale, Newman, Serin, & Bolt, 2005). Therefore, the present study aims to use words related to submissive-dominance, hostility-friendliness dimensions within a new emotional Stroop task paradigm to investigate the RMH.

The RMH proposes that reduced emotional responsiveness in ‘primary’ psychopathy is due to integrating peripheral information less automatically than other groups. While this integration is less automatic than in high-anxious psychopathy or low-psychopathy, the RMH states that this capacity is not functionally impaired, but that it can be normalized under the influence of deliberate shifts in attentional focus. If this is the case, emotional interference should change as a function of attentional focus, and this effect should be greater with increasing non-anxious psychopathy.

Therefore, in the new paradigm put forward in the present study, an individual who integrates peripheral valenced information automatically should experience emotional interference from both emotion-focus and colour-focus conditions, whereas an individual who only integrates peripheral valenced information when his attention is manipulated would experience less interference from the colour-focus condition and more interference from the emotion-focused condition.

Thus, our primary hypothesis is that psychopathy, moderated by anxiety, will difference in interference between the emotion-focus and colour-focus conditions.

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In examining the new paradigm, we expect to see the greatest Stroop effect in the emotion-focus condition, followed by standard emotional Stroop, then colour-focus condition, irrespective of psychopathy and anxiety. In light of evidence for interference with personally-relevant Stroop words, we expect that category-specific interference effects for dominant and hostile words in the emotion-focus condition will be positively associated with psychopathy and anxiety individually.

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Method

Participants

Forty2 student participants from the business, economics, law, and politics departments of the University of Amsterdam (UvA) and the Vrije Universiteit took part in the study3. Ages ranged from 19-44 (M = 22.73, SD = 4.65). Participants were recruited online through the UvA digital subject management system, and through active recruitment on the UvA campus. To control for potential speech recognition and task confounds, and for easier comparison with previous research in the field, the inclusion criteria required that participants were male, Dutch native speakers, not colour-blind and not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Each participant was compensated with €10.

Students of the aforementioned subject areas were chosen as they had opted to study subjects that may enable them to pursue corporate careers, which has in the past been linked to increased prevalence’s of high psychopathy levels (see for instance, Boddy, Ladyshewsky, & Galvin, 2010; Howe, Falkenbach, & Massey, 2014). An additional advantage of this sample demographic is that they were unlikely to have previous knowledge and experience with psychological research.

Design

The study used a within-between design, with psychopathy and anxiety as between-subjects variables, and three within-subjects Stroop task conditions (standard, colour-focus and emotion-focus). All participants completed the standard condition first. The order of the colour-focus and emotion-focus was counterbalanced across participants. Emotional interference (as calculated by response times (RTs) in valenced trials subtracted by RTs in neutral trials) in each condition is operationalized as a dependent measure of emotional responsiveness.

The standard emotional Stroop condition offers a baseline indication of emotional interference. In the colour-focus condition participants were asked whether a previous colour was light or dark at various intervals, providing a measure of emotional interference when the valenced meaning of a stimulus is peripheral. In the emotion-focus condition participants were asked whether a previous word was positive or negative at various intervals, providing a measure of emotional interference when the valenced meaning of a stimulus is central. The difference in emotional interference in the emotion-focus relative to colour-focus conditions is operationalised as the dependent measure of emotional responsiveness as a function of attentional focus

2 A power analysis (f2 = 0.3, power= 0.8) suggests that 36 participants are necessary for a regression analysis using total psychopathy and anxiety as predictors. This was oversampled to 40 participants.

3 This sample was used to pilot the task before conducting the experiment on a forensic sample.

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Slow Stroop effect In typical emotional Stroop research, response to a given stimulus word is measured as the RT to the stimulus word itself (the ‘fast’ Stroop effect). On the other hand, the slow Stroop effect occurs when an emotional word stimuli increases the response latency on the trial which follows (McKenna & Sharma, 2004; Phaf & Kan, 2007). As blocking valenced trials together may introduce a mood build-up (Ben-Haim, Mama, Icht, & Algom, 2014), the present proposed study followed each target stimulus with a neutral control stimulus to absorb any slow effect. This way fast effect is measured using the RT for a given target stimulus, and the slow effect is measured using the RT of the stimulus that follows the target stimulus.

Materials and Apparatus Speech Recognition The Stroop task was presented on a PC through NeuroBS Presentation (version 18.1). Responses were given vocally through an external microphone and amplifier linked to the task program. Each participant’s speech was calibrated to ensure that response input was recognized by the program. The microphone was placed in a stand approximately 20cm from the participant, whom was asked to read each of the possible task responses into the microphone at a volume and in a sitting posture that was comfortable. Microphone gain was adjusted on the amplifier to a level that obtained the best accuracy with the program speech recognition system.

Responses were logged automatically through voice recognition software throughout the task. The RTs logged by the program were accurate, however due to technical problems, the program was not able to log response content accurately. To obtain accuracy scores, the experimenter followed participant’s responses with a list of correct responses and noted incorrect responses, disfluency4, and technical glitches in the task using a coding system.

Stroop Task The task consisted of three blocks, with an optional one minute break and instructions between each. In the standard condition participants were instructed to name the colour that words are presented in as quickly as possible. All trials in this condition were word stimulus trials. The word-focus and colour-focus condition blocks included additional ‘question’ trials and corresponding instructions. In the word-focus condition, participants received additional instructions to pay close attention to a words meaning because they would be questioned “Was the previous word POSITIVE or NEGATIVE?”. In the colour-focus condition participants received additional instructions to pay close attention to colour because at various points they would be questioned “Was the previous colour LIGHT or DARK?”.

There were 60 target trials and 60 neutral control trials in each block. The second and third block included an additional 30 question trials at pseudo-random positions. Two sets of 20 practice trials occurred at the start of each block. Word positions were pre-determined within each block. Each word appeared twice

4 Including repetition and non-lexical utterances.

10 in each block in a different colour5. All words and colours appeared equally.

Each block began with a white fixation cross on a black screen for 500ms, followed by a blank screen for 500ms. Following this, the first word stimulus appeared in the centre of a black screen and remained until the participant made a response. The maximum time available for responding was 5000ms during regular trials, however there was no limit during practice trials or question trials. Between each trial was an intertrial interval of 32ms6.

Word Stimuli Six words were selected for each target category: dominant, submissive, hostile, friendly and neutral (see Appendix I for details). Word stimuli were selected from a set of 69 Dutch interpersonal words, rated by 20 students on scales from dominance – submissiveness, and hostility - friendliness. From these rated words, target stimuli were selected in such a way that hostile and friendly words differed as much as possible on the hostile-friendly scale, whilst being as close as possible on the submissive-dominance scale, while the reverse was true of submissive and dominant words (see Appendix II for illustration).

We compared categories by means of two group x rating ANOVAs on both scales. Main effects of group emerged suggesting that mean ratings of each word category on differed according to ratings on the dominance-hostility scale (F(4,25) = 120.73, p < .0001) and the friendliness-hostility scale (F(4.25) = 104.18, p < .0001). On the submissiveness-dominance scale, submissive and dominant words differed significantly from each other (p < .0001) as well as neutral words (p < .0001 in both cases). On the hostility-friendliness scare, friendly and hostile words differed significantly from each other (p < .0001) as well as neutral words (p < .0001 in both cases). Word categories did not differ in mean word length (F(4,25) = 2.13, p = .107).

An additional 30 neutral control nouns were selected from word database provided by Moors et al. (2013) on the basis of moderate ratings on both valence and arousal.

Questionnaires

Psychopathy and anxiety were measured through Dutch forms of the Welsh Anxiety Scale (WAS)7 (Welsh, 1956) and the Youth Psychopathy Traits Inventory (YPI)8 (Andershed, Kerr, Stattin, & Levander, 2002). The YPI consists of three subscales: YPI-I measures dishonest charm, , lying and manipulation; YPI-II measures remorselessness, callousness and unemotionality; YPI-II measures thrill-seeking, impulsiveness and irresponsibility. Questionnaires were computerised and completed using a mouse before the task.

5 In the regular condition the colours were: red, yellow, green and blue. In the word and colour-focus conditions, a light and a dark variant of each colour was used instead. 6 As recommended by McKenna and Sharma (2004) 7 Translated by Derksen, Mey, Sloore, & Hellenbosch (2006); Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88 (Derksen et al., 2006). 8 Translated by Das and de Ruiter, (2010); Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91 (Uzieblo et al., 2010)

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Procedure Participants were asked to partake in a study on ‘personality and response times’, for which they provided written consent. Following calibration (see ‘Speech Recognition’), the task began with participants completing the YPI and WAS. This transitioned automatically into the start of the Stroop task. Participants were able to respond by speaking the name of the colour into the microphone. At the end of the first block the participants were introduced to the new light and dark versions of colours followed by instructions. In the colour-focus condition, participants were asked to respond to question trials with the word “light” or “dark” and in the word-focus condition with “positive” or “negative”. The experimenter ensured that participants understood instructions and provided feedback accordingly during the practise trials at the start of each block. At the end of the task participants were thanked and debriefed.

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Results

Data analysis Participants’ RTs were logged automatically in milliseconds by speech recognition software built in to the task. All data analysis was conducted using R and SPSS.

RTs during trials in which participants made disfluency or accuracy errors, and responses to question and practise trials were removed from analysis.

RTs below 300ms are generally regarded as too close to stimulus onset to be theoretically meaningful (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), thus responses below 300ms were removed. It was not possible to set a specific maximum threshold due to the unknown nature of the new paradigm, thus a relative measure was used such that responses over three standard deviations from the mean were removed. See final mean accuracy rates and overall RTs in table 1.

Table 1. Accuracy and mean response time (standard deviations). Accurate number of Condition Accuracy (%) Overall RTs (ms) trials Standard 110.65 (4.97) 92.2 708.95 (128.70) Colour-focus 109.05 (4.97) 90.9 854.56 (184.29) Emotion-focus 110.33 (6.03) 91.9 903.72 (211.07) Note: Mean accurate number of trials was out of a total of 120.

Outliers All participants responded ‘correctly’ to over 75% of trials in every block and thus no participants were removed from analysis on this basis. Each variable was examined for extreme values (outside of three standard deviations of the mean), and cases were removed from analyses accordingly.

In analyses using raw mean RTs, two participants were removed from overall analyses (manipulation check and Stroop effect) and one participant was removed in stimulus category-specific analyses9. This participant was also removed from slow effect raw RT analyses involving the submissive category in the standard condition.

In analyses using overall interference per block, one participant was removed from each analysis involving only fast interference in standard and colour-focus conditions, and slow interference in colour- focus and emotion-focus conditions.

In analyses using category-specific interference effects, one participant was removed for all analysis in the standard condition, all but the dominant category in the colour-focus condition and only the friendly category in the Emotion-focus condition. One participant was removed from analysis of category-specific slow interference in the submissive category in the Standard condition, the dominant category in the colour- focus condition, and all but the friendly category in the Emotion-focus condition.

In the main dependent variable, only participant was removed from analysis of the overall slow effect.

9 This was due to extreme values in over 75% of categories across conditions.

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Interference To measure emotional responding in a given condition we calculated interference as the difference in mean RT between valenced trials and neutral trials. Thus, in a given block interference was calculated as:

훴푅푇푣푎푙푒푛푐푒푑 훴푅푇푛푒푢푡푟푎푙 푖푛푡푒푟푓푒푟푒푛푐푒 = − 푛푣푎푙푒푛푐푒푑 푛푛푒푢푡푟푎푙

For the ‘slow’ Stroop effect, the same calculation was applied to the neutral control trials which followed the valenced or neutral target trials. Interference scores for specific stimulus categories were obtained in the same manner as valenced trials – mean RT to trials of a given category, subtracted by mean RTs to neutral trials. See table 2 for means and standard deviations of interference overall and for each stimulus category.

Table 2. Means and standard deviations of fast and slow interference scores in each condition: Overall and by stimulus category.

Condition Overall Dominant Submissive Friendly Hostile

Standard 2.13 (44.31) 9.44 (59.26) 1.24 (54.89) -2.52 (49.75) 0.18 (62.46)

Fast Effect Colour-focus 6.43 (72.88) 7.92 (107.55) 4.34 (91.73) 2.59 (74.56) 35.27 (85.15)

Emotion-focus 52.45 (90.15) 53.53 (135.29) 54.83 (97.94) 39.23 (86.65) 55.07 (107.63)

Standard -21.89 (51.37) -24.08 (63.01) -36.67 (54.70) -16.46 (77.53) -18.57 (57.39)

Slow Effect Colour-focus 9.81 (96.00) 55.90 (112.90) 31.32 (142.00) -34.18 (113.69) 6.98 (114.83)

Emotion-focus -1.21 (84.90) 16.74 (90.98) -4.96 (111.08) -8.33 (132.64) -1.63 (116.96)

Psychopathy and Anxiety Psychopathy factor scores were obtained through combining scores on individual subscales of the YPI. These factor scores were combined to a total psychopathy score for all primary analyses. Anxiety score was obtained as the single score on the WAS. See table 3 for an overview of raw participant scores. Both psychopathy and anxiety were converted to z-scores for analysis.

Table 3. Anxiety and psychopathy means and standard deviations. Trait Anxiety (WAS) YPI I YPI II YPI III YPI Total Score 12.83 (7.05) 40.3 (10.05) 30.875 (5.55) 35.8 (7.17) 106.975 (16.88) Note: YPI I measures grandiose and manipulative traits, YPI II measures callous and unemotional traits, YPI III measures impulsive/irresponsible traits.

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Paradigm Manipulation check We compared mean overall RTs in each block to establish whether participants had been behaving according to instructions. Assuming that reading and making a valenced judgement on a word requires more time than identifying whether the word’s colour is light or dark, we expected to see larger RTs in the emotion-focus block compared to the colour-focus block. Due to the lower demands of the standard condition we expected this condition would show the lowest RTs of the three conditions. A Wilcoxon signed rank test suggested that, indeed, RTs in the emotion-focus block were significantly larger than the colour-focus block (Z = 3.70, p < 0.0001) and standard block (Z = 5.37, p < 0.0001). Additionally, latencies in the colour-focus block were significantly larger than latencies in the standard block (Z = 5.30, p < 0.0001).

Stroop effect Within-block emotional Stroop effect The emotional Stroop effect assumes longer RTs for valenced trials compared to neutral trials. To test this, we conducted several Wilcoxon signed rank tests comparing mean RTs to valenced trials compared to mean RTs for neutral trials in each condition. See table 4 for descriptive and inferential statistics.

Table 4. Mean (SD) raw response times in neutral and valenced trials across conditions, Z-scores and p-values from comparison. Condition Neutral Valenced Z p Standard 691.11 (120.81) 690.40 (96.62) 1.05 .295 Fast Colour-focus 804.00 (109.81) 815.29 (88.36) 1.55 .122 Effect Emotion-focus 850.66 (185.37) 897.07 (145.75) 3.34 .001 Standard 721.07 (115.94) 698.01 (111.90) -2.83 .005 Slow Colour-focus 796.79 (135.33) 816.96 (137.22) 1.08 .283 Effect Emotion-focus 837.75 (141.20) 836.55 (129.86) -0.32 .748

In looking at the fast effect, mean RTs were significantly larger in response to valenced trials than neutral trials during in the emotion-focus condition (p = .001). No significant differences were found in the standard and colour-focus conditions.

Slow effect trials revealed a reversed pattern in the standard condition – mean RTs were significantly larger in trials following neutral stimuli compared to trials following valenced stimuli (p = .005). No significant differences were found within the colour- or emotion-focus conditions.

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Between-block Stroop effect We expected to see greatest interference in the emotion-focus block, and least interference in the colour- focus block as a result of our manipulation. To test this we conducted several Wilcoxon signed rank tests comparing mean interference in each condition (see figure 1).

Significant differences were found in fast effect interference between the emotion- and colour-focus conditions (Z = 3.22, p = .001), and emotion-focus and Standard conditions (Z = 3.43, p = .001), suggesting largest interference in the emotion-focused block. No significant difference in interference emerged between the standard and colour-focus conditions (Z = -0.52, p = .607).

No significant differences were found in slow effect interference between standard and colour-focus conditions (Z = -1.65, p = .10), standard and emotion-focus conditions (Z = -1.44, p = .151) or colour- and emotion-focus conditions (Z = -0.47, p = .637).

Figure 1. Mean interference across conditions

Stimulus Category To check whether overall interference effects were carried by interference for a specific stimulus category, a follow-up analysis was conducted comparing mean RTs for specific stimulus categories to mean RTs for neutral stimuli through several Wilcoxon signed rank tests. See table 5 for Z-scores (p-values are indicated for significant values).

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Table 5. Z-scores for mean RTs in specific valenced category trials compared to neutral trials across conditions Stimulus Category Condition Dominant Submissive Friend Hostile Standard 0.92 1.05 -0.73 0.02 Fast Effect Colour-focus 0.67 0.65 0.47 *2.07 Emotion-focus *2.32 **3.31 *2.75 **3.36 Standard *-2.46 ***-3.69 *-2.01 -1.8 Slow Effect Colour-focus *2.95 1.06 *-2.17 0.34 Emotion-focus 1.09 -0.27 -1.27 0.41 *p < .05 **p = .001 *** p < .0001

All valenced word categories in the emotion-focus condition showed significantly larger fast effect RTs than neutral words (dominant: p = .021, submissive: p = .001, friendly: p = .006, hostile: p = .001). In the colour-focus condition fast effect RTs to hostile words were significantly larger than for neutral words (p=.039).

Slow effect analyses suggested that RTs to in neutral control trials in the Standard condition were significantly slower following neutral stimuli compared to dominant stimuli (p = 0.14), submissive stimuli (p <.0001), and friendly stimuli (p = .044). In the colour-focus condition responses to trials following neutral stimuli were significantly faster than trials following dominant stimuli (p = .003) and slower than trials following friendly stimuli (p =.03). See figures 2 and 3 for mean interference and standard errors for each category in each condition.

Figure 2. Mean fast effect interference in each stimulus category across each condition

Stimulus Categories: Fast interference 80 70 60 50 40 30 Dominant 20 Submissive 10

0 Friendly Interference -10 Hostile -20 -30 -40 -50 Standard Colour-focus Emotion-focus Condition

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Figure 3 - Mean slow effect interference for each stimulus category across each condition

Stimulus Categories: Slow interference 80 70 60 50 40 30 Dominant 20 10 Submissive 0 Friendly

Interference Interference (ms) -10 Hostile -20 -30 -40 -50 Standard Colour-focus Emotion-focus Condition

Follow-up correlational analyses To explore whether category-specific differences could be due to underlying attentional biases related to psychopathy or anxiety, we conducted correlational analyses comparing these trait scores to interference scores for specific stimulus categories. Significant associations are reported below.

Psychopathy

The second YPI subscale (callous and unemotional traits) correlated negatively with interference from submissive stimuli in the emotion-focus condition (r(38) = -.343, p = .03), while the third YPI subscale (impulsive and irresponsible traits) correlated positively with interference from hostile stimuli in the emotion-focus condition (rs(38) = .323, p = .042).

Anxiety

Anxiety correlated inversely with slow-effect interference from submissive (rs (38) = -.453 , p = .003) and hostile (rs (38) = -.44, p = .004) stimuli in the colour-focus condition.

Response modulation hypothesis To index how emotional responding changes as a function of attentional focus, we calculated a difference score between mean interference in the colour-focus condition and emotion-focus condition. Both a ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ version of this overall effect were calculated using the equation:

푂푣푒푟푎푙푙 = 퐼푛푡푒푟푓푒푟푒푛푐푒푒푚표푡푖표푛푓표푐푢푠 − 퐼푛푡푒푟푓푒푟푒푛푐푒푐표푙표푢푟푓표푐푢푠

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Planned Moderation Analyses We conducted a moderator analysis to test the hypothesis that psychopathy, moderated by anxiety, would predict the change in emotional responding as a function of attentional focus (see table 6 for regression coefficients).

Table 6. Regression coefficients from moderation analysis Outcome Predictor Unstandardised b df t p Constant 38.37 36 3.13 .003 Anxiety 4.84 36 0.37 .713 Fast Psychopathy -8.08 36 -0.60 .550 Interaction 9.86 36 0.70 .488 Constant -20.94 35 -0.10 .326 Anxiety 21.47 35 0.96 .345 Slow Psychopathy 8.82 35 0.39 .700 Interaction -1.41 35 -0.06 .953

This model was unable to explain a significant proportion of the variance in the overall fast effect (R2 = .029, F(3,36) = 0.355, p = .786) (see figure 4). The interaction effect of psychopathy and anxiety was not significant (unstandardised b = -9.86, t(36) = 0.70, p = .4877) and did not significantly improve the model with only the main effects of psychopathy and anxiety (ΔR2 = .013, F(1,36) = 0.492, p = .488). There was no significant effect of psychopathy on the fast effect at high (unstandardized b = -17.94, t(36) = -0.79 p = .437), median (unstandardized b = -8.08, t(36) = -0.60, p = 0.55), or low levels of anxiety (unstandardized b = 1.78, t(36) = 0.12 , p =.908).

The same analysis was conducted on the slow overall effect. Again, the model was unable to explain a significant proportion of variance in the slow effect (R2 = .033, F(2, 35) = 0.392, p = .760) (see figure 5). The interaction effect between psychopathy and anxiety was not significant (unstandardized b = -1.41, t(35) = 0.06, p = .953), and similarly unable to explain a significant amount of variance above that explained by the main effects of psychopathy and anxiety (ΔR2 = .00, F(1,35) = 0.004, p = .953). There was no significant effect of psychopathy on the fast effect at high (unstandardized b =7.46, t(35) =0.20 , p=0.845), median (unstandardized b =8.86, t(35) =0.40 , p = 0.695), or low levels of anxiety (unstandardized b =10.27, t(35) = 0.39 , p = .698).

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Figure 4. The effect of psychopathy on the overall fast effect at high and low levels of anxiety

Moderation: Fast effect 300

200

100 High Anxiety Low Anxiety 0

Linear (High Anxiety) Fast Fast Effect (ms) Linear (Low Anxiety) -100

-200 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Psychopathy Z-Scores

Figure 5. The effect of psychopathy on the overall slow effect at high and low levels of anxiety

Moderation: Slow effect 200

100

0

-100 High Anxiety

-200 Low Anxiety Linear (High Anxiety) Slow Slow Effect (ms) -300 Linear (Low Anxiety)

-400

-500 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Psychopathy Z-Score

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Group differences As the RMH pertains to low-anxious psychopathy and participants were students with sub-clinical levels of psychopathy, median splits on psychopathy and anxiety were applied the data to examine interference effects at differing levels of psychopathy and anxiety. See figure 6 for illustration of medians, quartiles and ranges across groups formed through these splits.

Figure 6 - Median, quartiles and ranges across groups split on median anxiety and psychopathy

Fast Effect Slow Effect

Interference Interference

Condition Condition

Note: HPLA: high psychopathy/low anxiety, HPHA: high psychopathy/high anxiety, LPLA: low psychopathy/low anxiety, LPHA: low psychopathy/high anxiety.

Psychopathy and anxiety As the RMH pertains to individuals high in psychopathy and low in anxiety, we conducted an exploratory 2x2 ANOVA (high vs. low anxiety, high vs. low psychopathy) to test for an interaction effect between psychopathy and anxiety on the overall fast and effects.

There was no significant interaction between anxiety and psychopathy on the fast effect (F(1,36) = 0.267, p = .609). Nor were there significant main effects of psychopathy (F(1,36) = 0.021, p = .885) or anxiety (F(1,36) = 0.058, p = .819) on the fast effect.

Similarly, there was no significant interaction between anxiety and psychopathy on the slow effect (F(1,35) = 0.444, p = .510). Nor were there significant main effects of psychopathy (F(1,35) = 0.00, p = .998 ) or anxiety (F(1,35) = 2.79, p = .104 ) on the slow effect.

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Psychopathy, anxiety and category-specific interference To examine group-differences in interference to specific stimulus categories, we used the index of overall fast and slow interference effects with each valenced stimulus category individually (i.e. interference for a given category in the emotion-focussed block, subtracted by interference that category in the colour-focus block). Using this measure of the change in stimulus category interference as a function of attentional focus, we conducted two 2x2x4 repeated measures mixed ANOVAs, with high vs. low anxiety and high vs. low psychopathy as between-subjects factors, and stimulus category interference (dominant vs. submissive vs. friendly vs. hostile) as within-subjects factors. All effects are listed in tables 7 and 8.

There were no significant main effects of psychopathy or anxiety groups, nor stimulus category. There was one significant interaction effect between category and anxiety (see figure 7). This interaction suggested that high-anxiety participants experienced more change in slow effect interference as a function of attentional focus than low-anxiety participants, with the exception of the dominant category. In the dominant category the reverse was true, and low-anxiety participants experienced more interference.

Table 7. Category specific fast effect ANOVA outcomes: Anxiety x Psychopathy x Category

Main Effects df 1 df 2 F p Psychopathy 1 34 0.135 .715

Anxiety 1 34 0.004 .949

Category 3 102 0.531 .662

Interaction df 1 df 2 F p

Psychopathy group * Category 3 102 0.466 .707 Anxiety group * Category 3 102 0.262 .853 Psychopathy * Anxiety 1 34 0.279 .60 Psychopathy * Anxiety * Category 3 102 0.1277 .286

Table 8. Category specific slow effect ANOVA outcomes: Anxiety x Psychopathy x Category

Main Effects df 1 df 2 F p Psychopathy 1 33 0.02 0.887 Anxiety 1 33 0.946 0.338 Category 3 99 2.641 0.054 Interaction df 1 df 2 F p Psychopathy * Category 3 99 0.263 0.852 Anxiety * Category 3 99 4.349 0.006 Psychopathy * Anxiety 1 33 0.417 0.523 Psychopathy * Anxiety * Category 3 99 2.394 0.074

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Figure 7. Interaction between anxiety and overall slow effect for specific stimulus categories

Unplanned Moderation analysis

The initial operationalization of the dependent variable as interferenceemotion-focus – interferencecolour-focus was based on the assumption that the colour-focus condition was a more controlled form the standard Stroop condition. This assumed that the colour-focus condition would move attention away from the emotional stimulus leading to less interference than the standard condition. However, this assumption was not supported by the data as there was no significant difference in interference between the colour-focus and standard conditions. As the colour-focus and standard conditions are relatively equivalent in terms of interference, in the interests of investigating the utility of our new paradigm we repeated the RMH moderation analysis using the difference between interference in the emotion-focus and standard conditions as a measure of the change in interference as a function of attentional focus. See table 9 for regression coefficients.

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Table 9. Regression coefficients from unplanned moderation analysis with new dependent variable

Predictor Unstandardised b df t p

Constant 41.81 35 3.01 .005 Anxiety -8.69 35 -0.59 .562 Fast Effect Psychopathy -16.86 35 -1.13 .269

Interaction 54.54 35 3.47 .001

Constant 17.08 35 1.30 .201

Anxiety -8.14 35 -0.56 .580 Slow Effect Psychopathy -4.11 35 -0.28 .782

Interaction -40.41 35 -2.61 .013

The RMH model was able to account for a significant amount of variance in new overall fast effect scores (R2 = .2602, F(3,35) = 4.1034, p = .014) (see figure 8). The interaction effect of psychopathy and anxiety was significant (unstandardized b = 54.54, t(35) = 3.47, p = .001) and significantly improved the model with only main effects of psychopathy and anxiety (ΔR2 = .2541, F(1,35) = 12.0204, p = .001). At higher levels of anxiety, psychopathy was a significant negative predictor (unstandardized b = -69.51, t(35) = - 2.77, p = .009) while at lower levels of anxiety, psychopathy was a significant positive predictor (unstandardized b = 39.02, t(35) = 2.250, p = .031). There was no significant effect of psychopathy at median levels of anxiety (unstandardized b = -15.24, t(35) = -1.03, p = .311).

Figure 8. The effect of psychopathy on new overall fast effect at high and low levels of anxiety

Unplanned Moderation: Fast effect 400

300

200

100 High Anxiety

0 Low Anxiety Linear (High Anxiety) -100 New New Effect Fast (ms) Linear (Low Anxiety)

-200

-300 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Psychopathy Z-Score

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The model was not able to account for a significant amount of variance in new slow effect scores (R2 = .176, F(3,35) = 2.484, p = .077) (see figure 9). However, the interaction effect of psychopathy and anxiety was significant (unstandardized b = -40.41, t(35) = 2.611, p = 0.013) and did significantly improve the model with only main effects of anxiety and psychopathy (ΔR2 = .1606, F(1,35) = 6.8196, p = .013). At higher levels of anxiety, psychopathy was a significant positive predictor of overall slow effect (unstandardized b = 37.30, t(35) = 2.19, p = .036), however not at low (unstandardized b = -43.11, t(35) = -1.75, p = .089) or median levels (unstandardized b = -2.91, t(35) = -0.20, p = .843).

Figure 9. The effect of psychopathy on new overall slow effect at high and low levels of anxiety

Unplanned Moderation: Slow effect 400

300

200 High Anxiety 100 Low Anxiety

0 Linear (High Anxiety) New New Effect Slow (ms) Linear (Low Anxiety) -100

-200 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Psychopathy Z-Scores

The interaction between psychopathy and anxiety in both plots was in such a direction which suggested that high psychopathy and low anxiety were linked to increased fast and slow effect interference. As illustrated in figures 8 and 9, at low levels of anxiety, new fast and slow effects appear to increase as psychopathy increases.

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Discussion

The RMH postulates that the emotion response deficits observed in low-anxious psychopathy are due to difficulties with integrating information that is peripheral to attentional focus. The present study aimed to test the RMH using a new Stroop paradigm which manipulated attention towards or away from a valenced or neutral target. Findings are discussed first in relation to the RMH, and then in relation to the paradigm.

Response Modulation Hypothesis

In light of the RMH, we expected that psychopathy moderated by anxiety would significantly predict the change in Stroop interference between the emotion-focus and colour-focus conditions. This hypothesis was not supported and thus the present study failed to find evidence for the RMH.

This lack of support may be due to a flaw with the RMH: perhaps low-anxious psychopathy is, in fact, not linked to problems integrating peripheral information. Some follow-up exploratory analyses from the present study also suggest that this may be the case: at high and low levels of psychopathy and anxiety there were no differences in the overall change in interference as a function of attentional focus (with the exception of an interaction between anxiety and category).

Indeed, the RMH may lack some theoretical substance. It has received scrutiny in the past for failing to conform to major neuro-cognitive models (Blair & Mitchell, 2009). The theory behind the RMH also does not appear to explain fully how information processing difficulties would arise in the first instance. Vitale, Newman, Bates, et al. (2005) did suggest that response modulation problems were present in childhood, and thus may preclude adult psychopathy. Specifically, difficulties with integrating peripheral information can result in difficulties responding to environmental feedback, thus poor socialization, which in the presence of additional factors this can lead to adult psychopathy. This does not tell us where the information processing difficulties originate from, or why the difficulties would only exist in non-anxious psychopathy. The issue of low-anxiety is a similarly grey area, as does not appear to be explained on a process level. Newman argues strongly that anxiety should be accounted for as a confound as it is independent from psychopathy, with distinct external correlates (Newman & Brinkley, 1997), and more tentatively suggests that anxiety may “mitigate” the effects of psychopathy alone (Lorenz & Newman, 2002). Yet despite this, research supporting the RMH endorses the idea of ‘non-anxious psychopathy’ to varying degrees10. Nonetheless, grey areas within the RMH do not necessarily render the theory invalid. Indeed, there is research that does support the existence of difficulties integrating peripheral information in non-anxious psychopathy. It is also possible that having been rather under-researched in relation to its counterparts, it has not yet had the opportunity to fill in the gaps.

Another problem related to the theoretical ambiguities within the RMH is that we are not certain of the extent to which the hypothesis is generalizable outside of forensic samples. This means the utility of the non-forensic sample used in the present study is unclear. Previous research providing evidence for the RMH does appear to largely use forensic samples, however the RMH provides no strong theoretical

10 For instance, Larson et al. (2013) does not include a measure of anxiety, yet provides support for the RMH.

26 explanation for why, and thus the extent to which, the specific attentional processes are specific to forensic non-anxious psychopathy. For this reason it may be unjust to extrapolate findings from the present study as evidence for or against the RMH, as findings from students may not translate to a forensic sample.

Previous studies which have provided support for the RMH appear to have comparable median and mean anxiety scores as found in the present sample11, and thus it seems unlikely that the present sample differed from previous forensic samples in this respect. Psychopathy may be the more important construct in the RMH, as high-psychopathy participants have demonstrated more response modulation deficits than low-psychopathy participants matched on anxiety (Zeier et al., 2009). Psychopathy is difficult to compare across RMH studies in light of different tools used, however YPI psychopathy scores in the present study (M = 106.98, SD =16.88) were close to a sample of serious juvenile offenders (M=109.86, SD= 23.13) (Cauffman, Kimonis, Dmitrieva, & Monahan, 2009) and substantially higher than a previous community sample (M =89.63 , SD = 17.33) (Uzieblo, Verschuere, Van den Bussche, & Crombez, 2010). Thus, the psychopathy and anxiety scores present the student participants would appear to be suitable for testing the hypothesis. However, community samples are likely to differ from forensic samples in qualitatively different ways (Mullins-Nelson, Salekin, & Leistico, 2006). For instance, the sample used in the present study is likely to have relatively high intelligence due to recruiting from a higher education institution. Thus, the sample used in the present study may be qualitatively different from a forensic sample in such a way that attentional processing is not comparable.

Additionally, the present study used word stimuli which were developed for a forensic sample, and therefore may not have been personally-relevant enough to the student sample to demonstrate expected interference effects. The stimuli were selected on the basis of links between psychopathy with dominance and hostility (e.g. Podubinski et al., 2014). Such a concern may not have been present in the student sample. The present study used a student sample as a pilot for a forensic sample. Repeating the experiment on a forensic sample may yield more generalizable results.

We are also limited in the extent to which we can draw conclusions regarding the RMH as we are not yet confident of the processes involved in the paradigm. The paradigm and stimulus materials used in the present study had never been tested before, and thus we cannot be entirely confident regarding the specific processes at play. We need to be certain that we are indeed measuring emotional responding as a function of attentional focus before we can draw concrete conclusions regarding how this pertains to psychopathy and anxiety. The effects observed during the present study provide a mixed answer to this issue (see ‘Paradigm’ for full discussion of effects). The standard condition does not compare easily with the emotion- and colour-focus conditions due to additional task demands of the latter. Nor do the colour-focus and emotion-focus conditions compare with each other, as the nature of words and colours as concepts (and thus instructions pertaining to either) are qualitatively different. Perhaps the paradigm requires more understanding before it is able to provide more concrete evidence regarding the RMH.

11 In the present study mean WAS score 12.83 (SD = 7.06). Previous research has shown, for instance: M=12.94, SD=9.03 (Zeier & Newman, 2013); M = 12.62, SD=8.56 (Zeier et al., 2009).

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In summary, the RMH was not upheld by the present study. While the RMH is certainly not without its ambiguities, considering the relatively unexplored paradigm used in the present study, as well as sub-clinical sample, it may be unwise to dismiss the hypothesis altogether on the basis of the present study.

Paradigm Interference effects Using the new paradigm put forward in the present study we attempted to manipulate attention towards and away from a valenced stimulus. Examining interference in these conditions enabled us to measure the change in emotional responding as a function of attentional focus. We had expected to see the greatest interference in the emotion-focused condition, where the emotional stimulus was central to attentional focus, and the least interference in the colour-focus condition, where the emotional stimulus was peripheral to attentional focus.

The manipulation check suggested that participants acted according to instructions in each condition, and an interference effect appeared as expected through fast trials in the emotion-focus condition. This can be likely be explained as the valenced meaning of the word capturing attention and interfering with the task at hand (Williams et al., 1996). However, this condition deviated from the conventional Stroop task by including extra instructions and demands, and thus the interference may not be specifically an emotional Stroop effect. As the valenced meaning of the word interfered with the primary colour-naming task it may be better described as a general emotional interference effect. As expected, more fast interference was observed in this condition, than the colour-focus and standard conditions. Presumably, in the standard and colour-focus conditions the valenced stimulus was more peripheral to the focus of attention, and thus there was less opportunity for the stimulus to capture attention and interfere with the primary task.

While no slow effects were observed in the emotion-focus or colour-focus conditions, we did find evidence for a slow effect in the standard emotional Stroop condition. However, this effect acted in the opposite direction to what was expected: responses following valenced trials were significantly shorter than responses following neutral trials. Such a reversed Stroop effect is not to well-documented in previous Stroop literature and may thus have emerged due to our novel trial order which allowed target trials to manifest in neutral ‘filler’ trials. Rather than a Stroop effect, the pattern whereby participants responded faster in trials following valenced stimuli more closely resembles an emotion-induced hypervision effect. Emotion-induced hypervision occurs when an emotional stimulus enhances recognition for a stimulus that follows, as opposed to emotion-induced blindness which occurs when an emotional stimulus reduces recognition for stimulus that follows. The former occurs in cases where there is little competition between the emotional stimulus and stimulus that follows, whereas the latter occurs when there is competition, presumably due to cognitive processing demands (Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009). It is possible that the slow reversed Stroop effect observed in the least cognitively demanding standard Stroop condition is a case of emotion-induced hypervision, while this could not occur in the other conditions due to higher cognitive demands.

Perhaps it is these cognitive demands of the colour-focus condition which explain why this block failed to show significantly less interference than the standard emotional Stroop condition. We assumed that

28 the manipulation in the colour-focus condition was simply a more controlled version of the standard emotional Stroop: participants were less free for their attention to roam to the content of the word in the colour-focus condition. Concordantly, we expected that participants would experience less interference than the standard condition. Unexpectedly however, the two conditions did not differ significantly. Perhaps the colour-focus manipulation failed to distract attention from the words meaning, and instead simply encouraged more effort from the participant. This is unclear.

In summary, the paradigm put forward in the present study has shown interference effects: in the standard and emotion-focus conditions the valenced meaning of the word, and additional instructions, have interfered with the colour-naming goal. However, the nature of these interference effects is not clear. An additional note is that the task used one quarter fewer neutral target words than valenced target words. In future may be important to include a greater number of neutral target trials for a more reliable measure of interference.

Stimulus Categories Exploratory findings suggested that there were stimulus category-specific interference effects. Fast effect trials in the emotion-focus condition showed interference effects for all valenced word categories compared to neutral target words, while the colour-focus condition showed interference only for hostile words compared to neutral target words. Slow effect trials showed significant interference effects for dominant, submissive and friendly words in the standard condition, and dominant words in the colour-focus condition.

Interference effects from all categories in the emotion-focus condition is in fitting with expectations. Shifting attention towards the valenced meaning in the emotion-focus condition allowed for greater interference from the valenced meaning of all words, whereas attending elsewhere (as in the colour- focus and standard conditions) resulted in much fewer words interfering with responses. It may not surprising that the hostile category showed interference effects, as interference from threat-words are well- documented in previous Stroop literature, albeit largely within anxious samples (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007). This is traditionally explained as an attentional threat-bias within anxiety, however arguably threats are also of concern to non-anxious controls. While threat-biases may not occur as much in healthy controls using traditional emotional Stroop paradigms, perhaps our attention manipulation brought this threatening stimulus more into conscious awareness and thus a bias was no longer required to evoke interference effects for hostile words. The observed interference effects for dominant and submissive word categories may also be secondarily linked to threat. For instance an interpersonal situation involving a dominant “powerful” (“machtig”) person and a submissive “powerless” (“machteloos”) individual may be one involving threat.

We had expected that specific interference effects for dominance and hostility may be linked to psychopathy and anxiety due to their relevance to these traits. Similar findings were observed. In the emotion-focus condition the impulsive and irresponsible traits psychopathy subscale was linked to more fast interference hostile words and the callous and unemotional traits psychopathy subscale was linked to less

29 fast interference from submissive words. Anxiety was linked to less slow effect interference from hostile and submissive words in the colour-focus condition.

Personally-relevant emotional Stroop stimuli have been linked to psychopathy in the past. For instance, (Domes et al., 2013) found that high-psychopathy offender participants showed more Stroop interference for violence-related stimuli than non-offender controls. Furthermore, different constructs within psychopathy have also been linked to distinct cognitive and affective processing styles, resulting in differing interference effects within psychopathy (Sadeh et al., 2013).

The relationships between psychopathy, anxiety and stimulus categories may reflect an underlying attentional bias associated with the trait in question - specifically, hostility and dominance. Indeed, psychopathy has been linked to a dominant and hostile interpersonal style (Podubinski et al., 2014) and hostile attribution biases (Vitale, Newman, Serin, et al., 2005). Perhaps the link between increased interference for hostile words with greater impulsive and irresponsible trait scores is indicative of an underlying attentional bias for hostility, reflecting the antisocial traits associated with this factor. Similarly, the reduced interference for submissive words observed with greater callous and unemotional trait scores may indicate reduced concern regarding submissiveness due to a dominant interpersonal style.

Additionally it may be worth nothing that the fact that these attentional biases are only observed in the emotion-focus, where attention is directed towards the valenced meaning of the word, fits nicely with the RMH. Future research using clinical samples may yield more insight into attentional biases in psychopathy.

The link between anxiety and interference is generally regarded as a result of an attentional bias due to increased concern regarding threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Thus, in contrast to the callous/unemotional subscale of psychopathy, it seems unlikely that reduced interference reflects reduced concern. Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that much of the interference scores for these word categories were below zero (i.e. RT’s were longer following neutral compared to valenced trials). This may, again, reflect emotion- induced hypervision: a hostile situation, or a situation in which one is in the submissive position, is arguably a threatening one, thus stimuli related to this may lead to an affective response and thereby facilitate responding on the following trial. This may occur more in participants with greater anxiety. It is unexpected that this relationship would emerge in the colour-focus condition, where arguably there is the least opportunity for interference. Perhaps the increased task demands of the colour-focus condition relative to the standard condition interact with anxiety. Indeed, Attention Control Theory (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009) postulates that anxiety is linked to increased distractibility with increasing task demands. This may underlie the difference in interference effect. This may not have emerged in the emotion-focus condition as the task demands were arguably higher still, forcing participants were forced to slow responses on a given trial, which destroyed any effect.

In summary, the paradigm used in the present study appears to have successfully performed as an interference task in most respects, and illustrated individual differences for specific interference categories. However, some results, such as the apparent emotion-induced hypervision effect, were not as expected. For

30 more insight into the process underlying the observed effects it may be useful to test the paradigm by, for instance, varying the cognitive demands, ITIs and trial order in each condition.

General discussion The RMH postulates that the observed emotional deficit observed in non-anxious psychopathy can be normalized when the emotional information in question is made central to attentional focus. Therefore, the field of research has considerable implications for interventions with this notoriously difficult treatment group, whose unemotional traits are linked to poor therapeutic change and recidivism (Olver et al., 2013).

The present study put forward a new paradigm which was used to test the RMH. The paradigm manipulated attention within an interference task, demonstrating some interference effects and individual differences. However, these effects did not support the RMH: the change in emotional responding as a function of attentional focus was not related to psychopathy and anxiety. Nonetheless, the absence of support for the RMH may be due to the nature of the novel paradigm used and the sample on which it was tested. In light of the hypothesis’ implications, it is arguably of value to continue examining the processes involved in the RMH and paradigm put forward by the present study.

In manipulating attention towards or away from a stimulus within in interference task, the paradigm presented here provides a platform with which to measure the RMH, and potentially use further afield. In order to make more confident assertions regarding the RMH, however, the paradigm requires further understanding and development. Including various sample groups may allow us to understand more interference for specific traits. Especially for examining the RMH, repeating the study using a forensic sample should provide more insight. The paradigm is currently in its infancy, however has a promising future in cognitive research.

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Appendix

Appendix I – Word Stimuli

Dominant: Dominant (dominant), Heerser (ruler), Machtig (powerful), Leider (leader), Assertief (assertive), Krachtig (powerful).

Submissive: Onderdanig (submissive), Weerloss (defenceless), Nederig (humble), Machteloos (powerless), Volgzaam (docile), Gehoorzaam (obedient).

Hostile: Kwaad (evil), Leugenaar (liar), Onbeleefd (rude), Geergerd (annoyed), Kil (cold), Boos (angry).

Friendly: Vriendelijk (friendly), Lief (sweet), Aardig (nice), Aangenaam (pleasant), Sociaal (social), Medelevend (compassionate).

Neutral: Neutraal (neutral), Afwezig (absent), Formeel (formal), Conventioneel (conventional), Peinzend (pensive), Alledaags (average).

Neutral control: Broek (pants), auto (car), rommel (clutter), bank (couch), koffie (coffee), stoel (chair), vlinder (butterfly), palmboom (palmtree), hond (dog), kicker (frog), vrachtwagen (truck), buiten (outside), water (water), bakjes (containers), fluweel (velvet), hout (wood), pindakaas (peanut butter), kleuren (colours), yoghurt (yoghurt), shirt (shirt), volwassen (adult), voertuig (vehicle), plant (plant), naaimachine (sewing machine), makreel (mackerel), luipaard (leopard), boodschap (message), electriciteit (electricity), framboos (raspberry), televisie (television),

Practise:

Mooi (nice),, venster (window), melodie (melody), ekster (magpie), cement (cement), kever (beetle), standbeeld (statue), populair (popular), citroen (lemon), bloem (flower), vaandel (banner), ansjovis (anchovy), mobile (mobile), ontroering (emotion), marmer (marble), scooter (scooter), vloedgolf (tidal wave), tafel (table), sneeuw (snow), ballon (balloon), sukkelig (awkward) ochtend (morning), schrift (writing), emmer (bucket), honderd (hundred), winter (winter), vierkant (square), koud (cold), boom (tree), schaduw (shadow), borstel (brush), duizend (thousand), hamster (hamster), vuilnisbak (trash can), spinazie (spinach), student (student), dof (dull), persoon (person), antwoord (answer), nummer (number).

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Appendix II – Word Ratings Figure 10. Graph showing mean ratings of a selection of interpersonal words rated on two scales: dominant - submissive (where 0 was a submissive word, and 100 was a dominant word) and hostile - friendly (where 0 was a hostile word and 100 was a friendly

Mean Word Ratings 100 Vriendelijk Lief Aardig 90 Medelevend Sympathiek Sociaal Aangenaam Vaderlijk Loyaal Vrolijk 80 Behulpzaam Attent Dankbaar Gehoorzaam 70 Vroom Volgzaam Onschuldig Reflectief Meegaand Geschikt Moedig 60 Weerloos Buigzaam Peinzend Extravert Friendly Onderdanig Kwetsbaar Alledaags Diep Bedeesd Verlegen Dun Formeel Krachtig Submissive Nederig Stil Neutraal Eigenwijs Friendly (100) Friendly 50 Assertief - Zielig Afwezig Dominant Machteloos Nonchalant Leider Naarstig Plat Sceptisch Zwak Hostile 40 Gereserveerd Afstandelijk Baas Conventioneel Onverschillig Neutral Tactloos Hardvochtig Machtig Hostile (0) Hostile Mopperig Dominant 30 Verwaand Heerser Unselected Onoprecht Nors Geërgerd Chagrijnig Arrogant Autoritair Onbeleefd Bazig 20 Liegen Kil Leugenaar Boos Ruzieachtig Vals Overheersend Kwaad Boosaardig Ruziemaker 10 Kankeraar Gemeen Wreed 0 Vijandig 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Submissive (0) - Dominant (100)

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Appendix III – Distribution Plots Histogram of interference in each condition One outlier removed from each of the following due to value above or below three standard deviations from the mean: standard fast effect, colour-focus fast effect, colour-focus slow effect, emotion-focus slow effect. Figure 11. Frequency distribution of fast and slow interference scores across conditions

Histogram of overall fast and slow effects (interferenceemotion-focus- interferencecolour-focus) No outliers removed from overall fast effect analysis. One outlier removed from slow effect analysis for value over three standard deviations above the mean

Figure 12. Distributions of overall fast and slow effects

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Appendix IV – Local Regression Plots All LOESS curve applied to all plots of main dependent variables against predictors. Line shown is adjusted to fit 70% of points. No points were removed from fast effect analyses. One point was removed from slow effect analyses (labelled).

Fast effect

Figure 14. Relationship of YPI Z-score with overall fast Figure 13. Relationship of WAS Z-score with overall effect fast effect

Figure 15. Relationship of interaction between WAS and YPI Z-score with overall fast effect

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Slow effect

Figure 18. Relationship of YPI Z-scores with overall Figure 16. Relationship of WAS Z-scores with overall slow effect slow effect

Figure 17. Relationship of interaction between WAS and YPI Z-scores with overall slow effect

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