Unholy alliance? Assessing the links between organised criminals and terrorists in Southern Africa
Annette Hübschle Institute for Security Studies
ISS Paper 93 • October 2004
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INTRODUCTION United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which measures a country’s achievements in terms of What links, if any, are there between terrorism and life expectancy, educational attainment and adjusted organised crime in Southern Africa? Following the real income, eight countries including Kenya fell into events of 11 September 2001, global law enforcement the category of ‘medium human development’. With agencies, international organisations and research in- the exception of the Seychelles, all other SADC member stitutions have increasingly examined the possible link- states were categorised as ’least developed’ countries. ages between terrorist groupings and organised crimi- nals in different parts of the world. In countries such as Thus, the countries covered display different levels of Ireland and Peru, such links have been shown to exist. economic and social development and incongruous This paper explores whether similar links can be sub- political systems. However, the evils of poverty, under- stantiated in Southern Africa. In doing so, definitional, development, the HIV/Aids pandemic, social inequi- theoretical and methodological prob- ties and economic inequalities are lems around the concepts of terror- prevalent in all of them. In addition, ism and organised crime are high- Structural, some are reeling from the effects of lighted. Seven case studies are exam- economic, social violent conflict, which has led to a lack ined, of which four deal with in- of internal regulation and/or to a stances of ‘international terrorism’. and political weakness of the rule of law. A 2003 These are the United States (US) em- UN Office on Drugs and Crime weaknesses, 2 bassy bombings in the Tanzanian capi- (UNODC) report stated that tal, Dar es Salaam, and the Kenyan combined with organised crime was on the increase. capital of Nairobi, the implications of well-organised Incidents of domestic and interna- the gemstone tanzanite for terrorist fi- tional terrorism have been docu- nancing, the terror attacks in the Kenyan criminal networks, mented in parts of the sub-region. port of Mombassa and the case of provide for The structural, economic, social, and Mohamed Suleman Vaid, an alleged potential linkages political weaknesses in the sub-region, South African intermediary between combined with well-organised crimi- terrorists and organised criminals. between nal networks, provide, on the face of Furthermore, three cases of what has organised crime it, for potential linkages between been classified as ‘domestic terrorism’ organised crime and terrorism. are assessed. These are the Hezbollah and terrorism. movement in Mauritius and in South SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS Africa, the vigilante group Pagad and the right-wing Afrikaner grouping, Boeremag. All examples were cho- This section deals with definitions of ‘terrorism’ and sen due to contentions that organised crime and ter- ‘organised crime’. Both are contested concepts invoking rorism were inter-connected in these instances. emotional debates among many commentators.
The focal area is Southern Africa, including the 14- Definition: terrorism member Southern African Development Community (SADC)1 and the East African nation of Kenya. Accord- Terrorism has been catapulted into the international ing to the 2002 Human Development Index of the limelight following the terrorist attacks in Washington
Hübschle • page 1 Paper 93 • October 2004 and New York in September 2001. The events of that contained in the Algiers Convention shall be employed tragic day have come to be acknowledged as a turning as the working definition for this paper: point in international concern around the issue. The attacks did not occur in isolation,3 yet many myths were ‘Terrorist act’ means: born and persist around the highly-disputed concept (a) Any act which is a violation of the criminal of terrorism, such as that it is a new phenomenon, a laws of a State Party and which may endan- weapon of the weak. The phenomenon originates from, ger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, and reflects, everyday occurrences in the developing or cause serious injury or death to, any per- world. son, any number or group of persons or There certainly have been many attempts to arrive at a causes or may cause damage to public or universally acceptable definition of terrorism. Schmid private property, natural resources, environ- and Jongman4 recorded 109 different definitions in a mental or cultural heritage and is calculated survey in the mid-1980s, but a present-day study would or intended to: probably significantly increase that number. Definitions (i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or range from the highly specific to the overly general. Yet induce any government, body, institution, most states seem to share a common understanding of the general public or any segment thereof, the types of activities they regard as terrorism and the to do or abstain from doing any act, or to types of groups and individuals to be categorised as adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, terrorist.5 Few state actors would admit that the actions of or to act according to certain principles; or states could match the same criteria as applied to the (ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of activities of non-state actors and sub-national groupings. any essential service to the public or to cre- ate a public emergency; or The international community has actively sought con- (iii) create general insurrection in a State. sensus on the definition of terrorism for many years. Twelve separate international conventions on terror- (b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, ism have been signed, each covering a specific type of command, aid, incitement, encouragement, activity linked to terrorism. Despite UN pressure, broad attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or ratification has been difficult to achieve. The task of procurement of any person, with the intent creating a comprehensive binding international con- to commit any actreferred to in paragraph vention against terrorism has proved to be a slow and (a) (i) to(iii). tiresome process, as all fails when the question of de- State terrorism is not considered in this definition. In fining terrorism is tackled. A major point of friction is fact, the inclusion of state terrorism was whether terrorism should apply to the ac- a bone of contention among OAU tions of states in the same manner that it members. Globally there is a contro- applies to the actions of non-state actors.6 Should a definition of versy between those countries that feel The closest to a universally accepted and that the activities of the state should not state-sanctioned definition of terrorism is terrorism apply be labelled ‘terrorist’ and others who perhaps contained in the United Nations to the actions want to address the phenomenon in all General Assembly Resolution 54/110 of 9 its forms and manifestations. It is argu- December 1999, stating that terrorism com- of states in the able that most governments want to ex- prises: clude the potential for any acts of their same manner armed forces to fall under any interna- criminal acts intended or calculated to it applies to tional conventions against terrorism. provoke a state of terror in the general non-state public, a group of persons or particular Definition: organised crime persons for political purposes. actors? This concept per se denotes the activi- Defining terrorism has been a particularly ties of organised criminal groups consisting of three or difficult task on the African continent. In fact, most le- more persons who commit serious crimes over a pe- gal drafters stay clear of defining it but rather describe riod of time for profit. However, the meaning of an ‘act of terror’ or ‘terrorist activity’. The 35th Ordi- organised crime differs from country to country due to nary Session of the Heads of State and Government its divergent nature. Analysts from the northern hemi- adopted the Organisation of African Unity Convention sphere tend to emphasise the hierarchical structure of on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (the organised crime, a typical feature of the American Mafia Algiers Convention) in July 1999. With the exception La Cosa Nostra.7 of Zambia and Zimbabwe, all other SADC countries have signed and/or ratified and/or deposited the Algiers Unlike terrorism, organised crime is a relatively new Convention. This seems to indicate a level of consen- concept to Southern Africa. However, the novelty of sus in the sub-region on what members consider to be the concept should not detract from interpretational a terrorist act. Hence, the definition of ‘terrorist act’ difficulties. Charles Goredema maintains that organised
Hübschle • page 2 Paper 93 • October 2004 criminal groups in Southern Africa bear little semblance poses of this paper, though the distinctions may seem with the Mafia. In fact, they tend to function “in loose minor or artificial. Gastrow defined indigenous and shifting associations and alliances with others or in organised criminal groups as follows: a network without a clear hierarchy”.8 Although there is a paucity of literature on organised crime in South- ‘Indigenous organised criminal groups’ are those ern Africa, many authors offer their own interpretation that are made up primarily (but not exclusively) of the concept. According to Andre Standing,9 these of nationals from your country and that are in- authors all share a common understanding of the con- volved mainly (but not exclusively) in criminal 14 cept based on an underlying paradigm. This paradigm activities within your borders. is anchored in the belief that organised crime is a noun Accordingly, he provided the following definition for depicting a homogenous, structured group of crimi- transnational organised crime groups: nals that exists outside the parameters of the formal economy. Peter Gastrow has provided a different per- Those that are made up primarily (but not ex- spective by acknowledging that the concept can be clusively) of foreign nationals or of individuals applied as a noun for a group or as an activity: who originate from countries other than the re- spondent country and who are involved in cross- Organised crime consists of those serious crimi- border crimes.15 nal offences committed by a criminal organisation, which is based on a structured asso- Since the early 1990s organised crime has been iden- ciation of more than two persons acting in concert tified as a growing security concern throughout South- over a prolonged period of time in pursuit of both ern Africa. All states in the sub-region have either signed their criminal objectives and profits.10 the United Nation’s Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (hereinafter the Palermo Convention) Gastrow added the additional concept of “criminal syn- or have undertaken to do so in due course. Presently, dicate,” which implies that organised crime can also only Zambia has adopted the UN’s definition of be seen as an activity. ‘organised criminal group’. According to a study con- 16 A crime syndicate is a criminal organisation, ducted by Peter Gastrow in 2000, only four police engaged in the commission of serious criminal forces in the SADC region operated with an official offences, which is based on a structured asso- definition of organised crime. ciation of more than two persons acting in con- Reaching consensus on an internationally-agreed defi- cert over a prolonged period of time in pursuit nition of organised crime proved a most difficult en- of both their criminal objectives and deavour at the 1999 and 2000 meetings profits.11 of the UN Ad-Hoc Committee in Vienna to negotiate the Palermo Convention. By introducing the second concept, Since the early 17 Gastrow has distanced himself from the According to Gastrow, participants com- traditional Americanised approach to 1990s promised in the end. Multi-national per- ‘organised crime’ which provides certain organised ceptions around the concept pointed to- typical traits such as a clear structure and wards very divergent perspectives on its the commission of serious offences. Tra- crime has been salient features. Andre Standing interprets the final broad definition as “probably a ditional definitions often omit the fact a growing 18 that not only seasoned criminals, but compromise by weary delegates”. The also law enforcement agencies or the security Palermo Convention does not define ‘long arm of the state’ can be involved concern in organised crime; instead it provides a defi- in organised criminal activities. South nition of an organised criminal group and African researchers tend to differentiate Southern then proceeds to criminalise participation organised crime as involving domestic Africa. in such a group. criminals or foreign nationals. The latter Article 2 of the Palermo Convention stipu- category refers to what is generally lates: known as ‘transnational organised crime’. This form of organised crime relates to a culturally homogenous (a) ‘Organized criminal group’ shall mean a group derived from their country of origin, i.e. the Ital- structured group of three or more persons, ian or Russian Mafia or the Chinese Triads. Standing existing for a period of time and acting in argues that South African commentators imply that concert with the aim of committing one or transnational organised crime is more sophisticated than more serious crimes or offences established its local variant.12 in accordance with this Convention, in or- der to obtain, directly or indirectly, a finan- Gastrow, in his 2001 questionnaire on police percep- cial or other material benefit; tions of organised crime,13 made a distinction between indigenous and transnational organised criminal groups. (b) ‘Serious crime’ shall mean conduct consti- The same distinction shall be employed for the pur- tuting an offence punishabl by a maximum
Hübschle • page 3 Paper 93 • October 2004 deprivation of liberty of at least four years or borders and the explosion of information technology a more serious penalty; are said to have contributed to the increased threat from sub-state actors. In fact, some commentators re- (c)‘Structured group’ shall mean a group that is fer to organised crime and terrorism as “the darker side not randomly formed for the immediate com- of globalisation”20 or the “new evil empire”. While terror- mission of an offence and that does not need ism and organised crime are not new phenomena, they to have formally defined roles for its mem- are far removed from the political terrorism of the 1970s bers, continuity of its membership or a de- and 1980s or the clichéd Mafia syndicates. veloped structure.19 Not only academics but also the UN have expressed Article 5 provides: their concern about terrorism and organised crime and their proposed linkages. On 28 September 2001, the 1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 in terms and other measures as may be necessary to of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. All states, including establish as criminal offences, when commit- those who are not UN members, were compelled to ted intentionally: implement the Resolution’s operative provisions. This (a) Either or both of the following as criminal includes the criminalisation of the financing and other offences distinct from those involving the acts of support for terrorism, the freezing of bank ac- attempt or completion of the criminal ac- counts, the introduction of effective border controls and tivity: other measures to fast-track the exchange of operational (i) Agreeing with one or more other per- information. Besides the operative provisions, the Reso- sons to commit a serious crime for pur- lution acknowledges the close connection between in- pose relating directly or indirectly to the ternational terrorism, transnational organised crime and obtaining of a financial or other mate- other forms of crime: rial benefit and, where required by do- mestic law, involving an ac undertaken The Security Council…notes with concern the by one of the participants in furtherance close connection between international terror- of the agreement or involving an orga- ism and transnational organized crime, illicit nized criminal group; drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms traffick- (ii) Conduct by a person who, with knowl- ing, and illegal movement of nuclear, edge of either the aim and chemical, biological and other po- general criminal activity of an Many tentially deadly materials, and in this organized criminal group or its regard emphasizes the need to en- intention to commit the crimes countries hance coordination of efforts on na- in question, takes an active proclaimed tional, sub-regional, regional and in- part in: ternational levels in order to a. Criminal activities of the orga- terrorism and strengthen a global response to this nized criminal group; organised serious challenge and threat to inter- b. Other activities of the orga- national security.21 nized criminal group in the crime as the knowledge that his or her par- The concern about the “close connec- ticipation will contribute to the most poignant tion” or linkage between these two dis- achievement of the above de- threat to tinct phenomena begs the question of scribed criminal aim; where this originates and whether there (b) Organizing, directing, aiding, national is substance to such theories. Many ana- abetting, facilitating or counselling security. lysts have claimed that the forces of the commission of serious crime globalisation have provided organised involving an organized criminal criminals and terrorists with the spring- group. board to expand their operations from a domestic to a 2. The knowledge, intent, aim, purpose or global terrain in recent years. In the aftermath of the agreement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Cold War, many countries proclaimed terrorism and article may be inferred from objective fac- organised crime as the latest and most poignant threat tual circumstances. to national security. According to Standing,22 this has led to a new set of regulations, the establishment of specialised law enforcement agencies and a range of ISSUES AROUND METHODOLOGY academic interest in the two phenomena. AND THEORY Traditional criminal justice systems seem to be unpre- In recent years, international relations specialists have pared to face the new challenges posed by organised increasingly moved away from theories that inter-state crime and terrorism. There have been widespread calls warfare poses the greatest threat to the sovereignty of for dramatic new investigatory and prosecutorial pow- states. Factors such as globalisation, transparency of ers, including an increased scope for police to use
Hübschle • page 4 Paper 93 • October 2004 means on the legal periphery in conducting undercover the particular cases. In attempting to answer the basic operations, measures to trace and seize the proceeds research question, i.e. whether can linkages between of criminal activities or terrorist financing and laws to organised crime and terrorism in Southern Africa can make membership of a criminal or terrorist organisation be substantiated, the author asked whether there was a crime per se.23 Perhaps this would partially explain a linkage between the two phenomena. If research af- the interest of international bodies such as the UN in firmed such linkages, the follow-up question looked at promulgating new international regimes aimed at coun- their nature. tering terrorism and organised crime?
Before rushing to enforce new international legal in- THEORETICAL DISCOURSE ON THE struments, it may be appropriate to ask some basic LINKAGES BETWEEN ORGANISED question as to who the sponsors of these new mea- CRIME AND TERRORISM sures are, who stands to gain from them and what the motives are for implementing these new measures and Before exploring the linkage between organised crime regiments. Naylor24 poses a valid question in asking how and terrorism, we first look at how to distinguish be- clear the frontier is between profit-driven crime and tween them. Organised crime is traditionally seen as normal economic activity. The same applies to terror- profit-maximising endeavour. The success of organised ism: when does political violence as sanctioned by the criminal groupings is usually dependent upon attract- state and its law enforcement agencies become a form ing as little government attention to their activities as of terrorism? possible, while terrorist organisations thrive on media attention. Acts of political violence garnering maximum Recent research has shown that many organised crime attention are the raison d’être of terror groupings.27 Ac- groupings are not economic but political and social in cording to Francesco Marelli: nature. Thus, they tend to form a kind of underground government to adjudicate and allocate territorial and terrorists are generally perceived as a grave threat property rights. Once the ground rules have been set, to national security, whereas organised crime, al- each individual member operates alone or in partner- though seen as problematic, enjoys tacit tolerance ship with others, who may or not be members of the due to corruption or short-term pragmatism. 28 group.25 Certain terrorist networks, such as al-Qaeda, show similar characteristics, i.e. terror cells Alex Schmid29 summarises the differences may act independently of the core, only between terrorist and organised crime occasionally falling back on its logistical, Media groups as follows: While terrorist groups financial or spiritual support. are usually ideologically or politically mo- attention is tivated, organised criminals seek to By the same token, Naylor argues26 that important to maximise their profit. Some terrorist group- criminal markets fail to mirror hierarchi- ings attempt to compete with governments cal administrative structures operating on terrorists but for legitimacy, which does not feature on command to monopolise a market, but not to the agenda of organised criminal group- operate rather as loose and ad-hoc net- ings. Media attention is of importance to works engaged in at-arms-length commer- organised terrorists but not to organised crime cial transactions. Bearing in mind the wide crime groups. groups. Lastly, terrorist victimisation tends variety of definitions of organised crime to be less discriminate than the violence and terrorism and the short overview pro- used by organised criminals. vided of the contested nature of both concepts, it needs to be pointed out that any academic analysis dealing Citing the deaths of Giovanni Falcone and Paolo with either concept is likely to be biased. Commenta- Borsellino in 1993 as an example of organised crimi- tors often point out that the interpretation of what con- nals employing a terrorist strategy, Marelli30 believes stitutes terrorism lies in the eye of the beholder. The that the distinctions between criminals and terrorists same can be said for organised crime. It suffices here are becoming increasingly blurred. He argues that well- to mention that the present author has adopted state- established terrorist groups have advanced economic and UN-sanctioned definitions of both concepts. The machines that support their activities. For example, the paper was conceived against the backdrop of a UN majority of Irish Republican Army (IRA) members are initiative exploring of the nature of linkages between actively involved in racketeering, drug trafficking and the two phenomena. dealing, whereas only a small number of the IRA’s members carry out acts of terror. In some cases, terror- For the purposes of present analysis, seven case stud- ists and criminals collaborate on the exchange of ex- ies were chosen. The criteria for their selection included pertise or the purchase of materials needed in the ex- whether, on the face of it, a linkage between terrorism ecution of their deeds. Thus, criminals may provide and organised crime seemed plausible. Subsequent to terrorists with weaponry and sometimes provide ex- the selection, an in-depth analysis was undertaken of perts to use them. Columbia’s Fuerzas Armadas primary and secondary research materials and where Revolucionarios de Colombia (FARC), the Shining Path possible, interviews were conducted with experts on in Peru, al-Qaeda and others control drug-producing
Hübschle • page 5 Paper 93 • October 2004 territory, supplying some of the major drug cartels. The lenge state authority and its monopoly on the use of vio- Shining Path and FARC have entertained a reciprocal lence. This argument could be turned around. How does arrangement with local drug lords.31 state authority collaborate with criminal and terrorist groupings to achieve political, military and economic ends? Another area of convergence is the illegal market in However, for the purposes of this paper, an analysis of arms and munitions serviced by organised criminals and the linkages between the latter two is undertaken. aimed at meeting the demands of fellow criminals, rebel movements, terrorist groupings and pariah states. Pro- ponents of a strong link between the two phenomena TERRORISM AND ORGANISED CRIME argue that globalisation has facilitated and expanded IN SOUTHERN AFRICA the potential market for traffickers. Thus, an increased earnings potential has emerged for dealing in explo- Africa has witnessed a wide array of terror incidents sives and biological, chemical and radioactive devices. including domestic, state and international terrorism. Terror groups are said to be making increasing use of The United Nations Convention against Transnational 34 money laundering systems and illegal markets created Organised Crime stipulates that an offence is of a by organised criminal groups to generate and disguise transnational nature if: revenue used for terrorist activities. Gold and gem- • It is committed in more than one State. stones, identity papers, passports and stolen telecom- munication devices such as mobile and satellite phones • It is committed in one State but has substan- are readily available on the black market. In this in- tial part of its preparation, planning, direc- stance the laws of demand and supply apply. tion or control takes place in another State.
Both terrorists and organised criminals challenge state • It is committed in one State but involved an authority and its monopoly on the use of violence. Sev- organised group that engages in activities in eral rebel movements, FARC in Columbia being the more than one State. most prominent, employ terror tactics to fight their enemies, on one hand, and employ criminal tactics to • It is committed in one State but has substan- support themselves and their activities, on the other. tial effects in another State.35 Such tactics may include black market activities in diamonds, gold, cocaine, Examples of terror attacks that would fall heroin and ‘tax collection’ through ex- Many into the category of ‘international terror- tortion. FARC and the War Lords in ism’ or ‘transnational terrorism’ are the Burma control territory where the state insurgent US embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam exercises no authority and no monopo- movements and Nairobi, the simultaneous attacks on listic control over the use of violence.32 the Mombassa-based Paradise Hotel and The analogy to be drawn is that the and an Israeli Arkia jetliner and the spate of growth of terrorist and/or criminal net- government suicide bombings in the Moroccan city works may flourish in developing coun- of Casablanca in 2003. Africa may not tries with weak state structures. However, forces in Africa have witnessed many incidents of inter- this does not preclude the developed still employ national terrorism, but domestic or sub- world from providing similar opportuni- national terrorism and state terrorism ties for criminal and terrorist activities. tactics of terror have a long history on the continent. Weak states may simply be more suscep- and Most of the continent suffered from pro- tible and easily corrupted. intimidation. longed sectarian, colonial and state-spon- In sum, the relationship between sored violence throughout the 20th and organised crime and terrorism can take the following into the 21st century. There has been little forms: regard for humanitarian law and many war crimes have been committed, including indiscriminate attacks on • terrorists may engage in the drug trade, extortion civilians and conscription of child soldiers.36 Many in- and black market activities in gemstones, weapons surgent movements and government forces still em- and contraband to finance their activities; ploy tactics of terror and intimidation. Here are a few • from time to time, drug producers and traffickers may examples of domestic terrorism: hire terrorist groups to protect their interests; and • Unita and Renamo in Angola and Mozambique, • organised criminal groups may employ terror tac- respectively; tics in their struggle with the state or rival groups.33 • the Mai-Mai in Kenya; Analysts from the ‘strong links’ spectrum have left out • the tit-for-tat violence perpetrated by the Ugandan a very important variable in their assessments. What is government forces and John Kony’s Lord’s Resis- the role and the connection of the state and its law en- tance Army (LRA) in the northern parts of Uganda; forcement agencies with criminal and terrorist groupings? They contend that terrorists and organised criminals chal- • violence in the Angolan Cabinda enclave;
Hübschle • page 6 Paper 93 • October 2004 • the five-year conflict in the Democratic Republic of the most readily available drug is cannabis (marijuana) Congo (DRC)—the struggle for control over the Ituri but other drugs have been introduced from outside district’s gold, oil and diamonds has killed 50,000 the region. Huge quantities of cocaine, heroin and ec- people and displaced over half a million more; stasy are smuggled into the sub-region. South Africa tends to be the main destination for these drugs, but it • the spate of bombings in South Africa allegedly per- also doubles up as the main transit point in the trade petrated by the right-wing Afrikaner group, Boeremag; between South-East Asia, South America, North and America and Western Europe.41 Fraud and money laun- • vigilantism in Mauritius and the urban terror campaign dering occur on a massive scale. The laundering of drug in South Africa. proceeds through the international banking system is made easy due to the inadequate level of preparation Prominent examples of state-sponsored and state ter- and countermeasures on the part of states in the sub- rorism include: region, which have only recently been exposed to the • the Zimbabwean government under Robert Mugabe activities of criminal cartels. The situation seems of an (especially its campaign in Matabeleland); and especially grave nature in South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia and Mozambique. Trafficking in • the South African military campaign, with Western persons and smuggling of migrants, as well as smug- backing, against the Namibian liberation forces of gling of human body parts, is another area of criminal the South West African People’s Organisation activity.42 The illegal export of diamonds, gold, precious (Swapo) in southern Angola. minerals, agricultural products and game meat is also 43 Another point to take cognisance of in the debate on on the rise. Growing high-level business and govern- terrorism in Africa is the level of colonial violence per- ment corruption goes hand in hand with the increase petrated against African peoples. in organised criminal activity in the sub-region. In a nutshell, the difference between Western concep- CASE STUDIES tions of international terrorism and the terror tactics experienced in Africa is that the African form is often This section presents case studies from the southern “an ancillary tactic of guerrilla or even, occasionally, of Southern African sub-region, selected due to a sug- conventional warfare, aimed primarily at gested link between terrorism and gaining benefits such as control of terri- organised crime. tory, governmental resources or lines of Organised supply for weapons or food”.37 criminal Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, 7 August 1998 The relative paucity of international ter- activities rorism incidents in Africa should not de- On 7 August 1998, two massive bombs tract from the problem posed by emerged in exploded outside the US embassies in organised criminal activities. In South Southern Dar es Salaam and Nairobi killing 224 Africa alone, in August 2003 the South people and injuring more than 5,000. A African Police Service knew of 238 crimi- Africa much small pickup truck packed with explosives nal syndicates operating in South Africa later than in was driven to the delivery entrance of the and across its borders.38 US Embassy in Nairobi. After the occu- other parts of pants of the vehicle had killed several However, the phenomenon emerged in the world. guards with a grenade, they triggered the Southern Africa much later than in other bomb. The blast collapsed the adjacent parts of the world. According to Peter Ufundi Co-operative Building and de- 39 Gastrow, organised criminal groupings came of age stroyed the left and rear side of the embassy build- in the 1970s and 1980s. While governments of fledg- ing.44 ling democracies dealt with teething problems such as post-conflict reconstruction, transformation and struc- A few minutes later, a similar scenario played itself out tural adjustment programmes, numerous criminal net- in Dar es Salaam. A vehicle pulled up to the main gates works entrenched themselves and developed significant of the US embassy and a hidden bomb exploded, tear- illicit markets across the sub-region. ing off the east wing of the concrete building and rain- ing debris on streets and houses for nearly a mile in The forgery of money, arms smuggling, vehicle theft every direction. According to Tanzanian police sources, and hijacking are well-established in the sub-region, a suicide bomber detonated the bomb.45 as revealed by surveys conducted by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in 2001 among nine of SADC’s There were no immediate claims of responsibility. The 14 member states. In eight of the nine countries sur- Egyptian group, al-Jihad, was initially under suspicion veyed, other widespread forms of organised crime in- because it had made threats against American installa- cluded drug trafficking, forgery and the smuggling of tions before the bombings. Within days, Pakistani au- ivory and rhino horns.40 Narcotics trafficking is well- thorities detained a Palestinian national who had flown established throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Internally, from Nairobi to Karachi on the day of the bombing.
Hübschle • page 7 Paper 93 • October 2004 Mohammad Sadiq Odeh admitted having a role in the On 16 November 2001, only two months after the ter- blasts, as part of a team that was recruited and financed rorist attacks on New York and Washington, reporters by the Saudi millionaire, Osama bin Laden. Kenyan Robert Block and Daniel Pearl of the Wall Street Jour- authorities detained another suspect, Mohamed Rashed nal dropped a bombshell by suggesting that Osama bin Daoud al Owhali, who was believed to have driven Laden’s al-Qaeda network controlled a sizeable chunk the truck that carried the Nairobi bomb. Owahali later of the tanzanite trade. This rare gemstone is mined only admitted that he had attended terrorist training camps at a 13km2 patch of graphite rock in northeastern Tan- affiliated with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.46 Within weeks, zania. The journalists’ investigation was founded on authorities claimed that the bombings were linked to a an allegation that an al-Qaeda member had sold a few widespread conspiracy orchestrated by bin Laden. tanzanites in London a few years earlier. Tanzanite’s Three more suspects with alleged links to al-Qaeda links to bin Laden were suspected before September were arrested in September. 11, however: during the 2001 trial of four men ac- cused of the 1998 embassy bombings Nairobi and Dar Police investigations indicated that preparations for the es Salaam a prosecution witness testified that al-Qaeda attacks started in the early 1990s, when some of the operatives fed the terror network’s coffers by trading attackers left for military and logistical training in Af- in commodities including animal hides, sugar and tan- ghanistan. In the period preceding the bombings, the zanite. attackers were engaged in petty business deals. Cloth- ing was shuttled between Dar es Salaam and According to the Wall Street Journal article,52 “Muslim Mombassa.47 Police searches in Dar es Salaam yielded extremists loyal to Mr bin Laden buy stones from min- several passport applications for the same persons. Local ers and middlemen, smuggling them out of Tanzania police found that terror suspects infiltrated local com- to free-trade havens such as Dubai and Hong Kong”. munities through sham marriages and through religious, The article suggested that smuggling spirited 90% of charity and non-governmental organisations.48 Police tanzanite production out of the country. Local traders also suggested that explosives used in the bombings bought plastic bags full of rough stones, paying cash were shipped to Kenya and Tanzania via Somalia. The with no exchange of paperwork. lawless situation in that country means there was—and still is—little control over the movement of vessels from The article also claimed that the courtyard of the Taqwa the Middle East and South-East Asia to mosque in Mererani, a town a few miles the East African coastline.49 from the tanzanite mining shafts, doubled The high risk of up as an open-air gem-dealing space. It Though investigations indicated that al- was alleged that mosque traders acted Qaeda might have interacted with detection makes as informal intermediaries and were in- organised criminals in the procurement it unlikely that structed by the local imam, Sheikh Omar of weapons, ammunition and explosives, Suleyman, to sell their stones only to the this should not be overemphasised. Due there wouldbe a region’s largest tanzanite dealer, to the clandestine and the self-sufficient permanent Abdulhakim Mulla. Al-Qaeda sympathisers nature of al-Qaeda, it is highly unlikely bought gemstones from him and smuggled that there would be a permanent arrange- arrangement them through ‘rat routes’ to Mombassa. ment between it and organised criminals. between From there, tanzanites would make their The risk of detection is too high. The ter- way to Hong Kong or Dubai via two al- rorists themselves are guilty of petty and al-Qaeda and Qaeda companies, Tanzanite King and serious criminal activities, such as iden- organised Black Giant. These two companies were tity document forgery, arms smuggle or allegedly set up by Wadih el Hage, a gem the manufacture of arms and bombs. In criminals. dealer and former personal secretary to this instance, the linkage between terror- Osama bin Laden. From Nairobi, el Hage ists and organised criminals is of a tenu- personally ran Tanzanite King. His diary, ous nature and interactions are based on ad-hoc busi- which FBI agents seized in 1997, detailed his travels to ness deals. London, Los Angeles and San Francisco, marketing the gem to jewellery stores.53 Tanzanite: An instance of terrorist financing? It was alleged in the Wall Street Journal article that the It is no secret that al-Qaeda has been linked to dia- smuggling of gold and gemstones is a means to move mond and gemstone dealings in Africa. As recently as terrorist funds around the world. May 2003, former Liberian President Charles Taylor harboured al-Qaeda members that came to trade in Imam Suleyman subsequently denied that the mosque diamonds. Two al-Qaeda members bought diamonds was used to facilitate bin Laden’s tanzanite trade. Mulla, and attempted to buy surface-to-air missiles in Liberia.50 the tanzanite dealer, also vehemently denied that he The role played by so-called ‘blood diamonds’ in re- was bankrolling the terror network. He suggested that viving and sustaining Unita in Angola and different rebel the allegations linking him to al-Qaeda were part of a 54 factions in the DRC is well documented elsewhere.51 plot by competitors trying to force him out of business.
Hübschle • page 8 Paper 93 • October 2004 The Wall Street Journal article was not without conse- In November 2001, the team met in Mogadishu, where quences. Sales of the gem plummeted as the patriotic junior members were provided with ideological orien- American public reacted to the allegations. Major re- tation and small-arms training. Kalashnikovs, pistols and tailers, such as Tiffany & Company, Zale and others, hand grenades were purchased on the local Somali dropped tanzanite from their offerings.55 As the US had black market and two surface-to-air missiles and two provided 80% of the global market for tanzanite, the gripstock launchers were procured for the attack. implications for Tanzania were severe and impacted on the livelihoods of miners, cutters, manufacturers, The trafficking in small arms remains a problem along suppliers and dealers alike. the long border between Kenya and Somalia. There is a surplus supply of small arms on the black market in However, Tanzanian investigators could find no evi- the neighbourhood of Eastleigh, an area of the Kenyan dence of the operations the article had suggested. In capital inhabited largely by Somali nationals. The UN February 2002, a Tanzanian delegation attended a ma- Panel of Experts also saw evidence that some weapons jor gem trade show held in Tucson, Arizona where they were smuggled in from either Sudan or the DRC.59 assured dealers that no terrorist groups were profiting from the sale of tanzanite. The East African Affairs Of- UN investigations revealed that the missiles had been ficer for the US State Department supported this: sold to Yemen as part of a larger consignment. There were two possible routes of entry into Somalia: either We have seen no evidence that al-Qaeda or any commercial arms dealers smuggled them directly from other terrorist group is currently using tanzanite Yemen or they were transferred to Eritrea and then to to finance its efforts or launder money.56 Somalia as part of an Eritrean Government transfer to faction leader Hussein Aideed in 1998. In August 2002, The Tuscon Tanzanite Protocols, which established a the missiles were smuggled into Kenya by sea from So- system of warranties guaranteeing that the gems were malia. In an effort to minimise the risk of detection, mined and exported legally, originates from this meet- the launchers were painted blue and white.60 The ex- ing. More than a dozen national and international plosives used in the blast at the Paradise Hotel con- organisations signed the Protocols. In addition, Tanza- sisted of steel gas cylinders packed with ammonium nia has declared the mining site a controlled area where nitrate, which was locally prepared in Kenya. no visitors are allowed without a dealer’s license and other identification.57 The attention given to the illegal traffic There is no across the Kenyan-Somali border has cast There is no concrete evidence that al- a new light on the historic trading routes Qaeda had dealings in the tanzanite concrete that form a 2,000-mile arc from Pakistan trade. US authorities contended that in evidence that down to the eastern coast of Africa, to the the aftermath of September 11 and the Comoros Islands, between Mozambique subsequent disruption of some al-Qaeda al-Qaeda had and Madagascar. This age-old, unregulated cells in Europe and Northern America, the dealings in the trade route is sustained by tribal links and terror network was seeking to set up shop religious sympathies. Off the coast, small in new destinations. In this case, journal- tanzanite wooden boats stream back and forth be- ists in need of a good news story may have trade. tween the neighbouring countries. A blown an allegation out of proportion. small sailing vessel can travel from Kenya to Mogadishu in less than three days. Mombassa, 28 November 2002 Modern shipping vessels can do the same trip in less than 12 hours.61 On 28 November 2002, suicide bombers attacked the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel at Kikambala, north of The Kenyan-Somali border is very difficult to police. Mombassa, killing 12 people. At the same time, mem- The boundary stems from a colonial agreement be- bers of an East African al-Qaeda cell unsuccessfully at- tween British East Africa and Italian-controlled tempted to shoot down Arkia Airlines flight 582 leav- Somaliland. It cuts across 424 miles of dense forests ing Moi International Airport in Mombassa for Tel Aviv. and savannah to the shores of the Indian Ocean. A recent report by a UN Security Council Panel of Ex- Kenyan border guards say they lack the tools to com- perts on Somalia58 sheds light on the preparations lead- bat smugglers, who they claim are armed with rocket- ing to the simultaneous attacks. According to the re- propelled grenades and heavy machine guns. Another port, preparations for the Mombassa attacks com- issue, of course, pertains to corruption: many border menced shortly after the embassy bombings in 1998. guards allegedly turn a blind eye in return for cash from Under the leadership of a Comoros national, Fazul the smugglers. Abdallah Mohamed (sought by the US for his involve- The UN Panel of Experts noted that pursuant to the ment in the embassy bombings), a team was assembled Mombassa attacks: along the Kenya-Somali coast. Its members became involved in small-scale lobster fishing with capital pro- Owing to violations of the Somalia arms em- vided by al-Qaeda. bargo, transnational terrorists have been able to
Hübschle • page 9 Paper 93 • October 2004 obtain not only small arms, but also man-portable money smuggling was to fund the al-Qaeda terror net- air-defence systems, light anti-tank weapons and work before the attacks on New York and Washington. explosives. On at least one occasion in the past 12 They made a case that South Africa, due to its riches in months, arms delivered illegally to Somalia were commodities like diamonds and gold, its economic in- employed in the commission of a terrorist act in frastructure, communication network, accessible trans- Kenya; although that particular attack was unsuc- portation and geographical location, was an ideal lo- cessful, the Panel believes that additional weap- cation for money laundering and smuggling.65 There ons may have since been imported into Somalia have been allegations that Hamas has been active in solely for the purpose of carrying out further ter- South Africa since 1992, that Hezbollah para-military rorist attacks in neighbouring States.62 members were trained there in 1999—the list of al- leged links between South Africa and terror organisations In addition to the possible links between al-Qaeda and goes on. Yet police investigations initially made no head- arms smugglers, there were initial allegations of a drug way. While Vaid admitted to carrying concealed money connection. Kenya is known as one of the major drug across the border, he insisted that he was not aiding al- conduits in Eastern Africa. Following the attacks, Kenyan Qaeda or any other terrorist organisation. authorities arrested two brothers, Palestinian nationals who were connected to the late Kenyan drug baron, What makes the Vaid case interesting is the allegation Ibrahim Akasha. It was alleged that they trailed the that the foreign exchange bureau in question in Maputo white Mitsubishi Pajero whose occupants were sus- may have been Unicambios,66 which was owned by pected of having fired the missiles at the Arkia jetliner.63 Ayob Abdul Satar, one of three men found guilty in Charges against the brothers were later dropped be- January 2003 of ordering the murder of investigative cause of a lack of evidence. journalist Carlos Cardoso. During the Cardoso murder trial it transpired that Unicambios moved large sums of In this case, the alleged linkage between terrorists and money outside of the control of the supervision de- organised criminals boils down to a business transac- partment of the Bank of Mozambique. Satar and his tion on the black market. Al-Qaeda linked up with arms brother, Momade Assife Abdul (‘Nini’) freely admitted dealers, who fall into the category of transnational to these illegal transactions.67 Nini Satar also ran a loan- organised criminals. The nature of this relationship was shark racket from Unicambios, offering loans at extor- a once-off ad-hoc business deal. Arms tionate interest rates to people who were smugglers provided the terror network unable to borrow from commercial with the goods it required in exchange Mozambique banks. There were strong suspicions that for money, gold or gemstones. has long been Unicambios was involved in the illegal Once the deal was signed off, both sides movement of vast amounts of South Af- would erase traces of the interaction. As regarded as a rican banknotes from South Africa to both terrorists and transnational haven for Dubai. Mozambican authorities closed organised criminals live in constant fear down Unicambios at the end of 2003. of detection, a permanent arrangement money The Mozambican capital alone has 36 between them would endanger the suc- laundering exchange bureaux and 12 banks, which cess of future operations on both sides. activities. begs the question whether there is enough business for everyone. The In- The case of Mohamed Suleman Vaid dian Ocean nation has long been re- On 25 April 2001 South African police detained a Durban garded as a haven for money laundering activities. resident, Mohamed Suleman Vaid, and his wife, who were However, investigations in the Vaid case are still un- attempting to cross South Africa’s border with Swaziland derway and it would not be prudent to draw a link with R1.2 million stuffed into their underwear. Initially between terrorists and organised criminals at this stage. authorities believed that Vaid was a rogue businessperson trying to evade South African currency regulations. How- South Africa: People Against Gangsterism and ever, before his arrest he had travelled from Durban Drugs (Pagad) through Swaziland to neighbouring Mozambique 150 times in 18 months. Telephone records indicated that on Between 1994 and 2000 over 400 bomb explosions several occasions Vaid had called an exchange bureau in rocked urban centres in South Africa. Most occurred the Mozambican capital of Maputo that had ties to gold in the context of gang warfare and vigilante action dealers in Dubai.64 against criminal gangs on the Cape Flats, home to the majority of Cape Town residents. This area was intended South African intelligence agents thought that the R1.2 to act as a labour repository for the Apartheid State. It million they seized was destined for a Mozambican is severely underdeveloped and characterised by pov- business executive of Lebanese origin, with dual Czech- erty. The blame for the bombings was firmly placed at Mozambican nationality. As the incident happened just the doorstep of Pagad. The organisation originated in a few months before September 11, South African po- a network of hitherto isolated anti-drug, anti-crime lice investigators concluded that the reason for the groups and neighbourhood watches. Members felt frus-
Hübschle • page 10 Paper 93 • October 2004 trated by their inability to tackle exploding levels of A point to note is that during the so-called urban drug-dealing and drug-taking, increased crime levels terror campaign, some newspaper reports linked and socio-economic problems in their neighbour- Pagad with organised criminal activities. It was al- hood.68 The group found resonance with large num- leged that it was running an extortion racket, de- bers of people across the Cape Flats. However after its manding protection money from Muslim business formation in 1995 as a popular anti-crime movement, people. Attacks were directed at non-payers and perceptions around Pagad gradually changed. It gained anyone suspected of drug dealing.75 Pagad members notoriety following the public setting alight of drug lord themselves acknowledged that gangsters abused the Rashaad Staggie, in August 1996. Pagad campaign in the later stages. Pagad members usually masked their faces during the marches. Pagad Following the Staggie murder the motive for some acts claimed that gangsters and petty criminals abused of violence seemed to have changed. Violence on the the masquerade, raiding houses and businesses dur- Cape Flats was no longer a tit-for-tat between gangs ing these marches. Furthermore, there were allega- battling for territory and markets, on one hand, and tions that one of the Pagad leaders had been a ‘mule’ vigilantes attempting to rid society of suspected drug (drug carrier) prior to joining the organisation and 69 dealers, on the other. Martin Schönteich maintains had carried drugs between India and South Africa. that the new violence sought to “create a climate of fear and terror among the citizens of Cape Town”. From Pagad itself committed acts of crime, such as the mur- mid-1998 onwards, the locale where acts of violence der of Staggie. However, the link between terrorism occurred was no longer restricted to the ganglands of and organised crime and/or other forms of criminality the Cape Flats but spread to the Cape Town city centre is less clear. Corruption and a close and reciprocal re- and tourist destinations in the Cape Peninsula. In fact, lationship between gangsters and state authorities ac- the urban terror campaign struck at the heart of gov- tually led to Pagad’s formation. It was never clearly es- ernment power, increasingly targeting police stations, tablished whether Pagad were the perpetrators in the courts, personnel of the justice system, as well as popu- urban terror campaign. Be this as it may, elements in lar tourist and entertainment areas, restaurants and Pagad committed criminal acts. Furthermore, oppor- Cape Town International Airport.70 tunists and outsiders used the platform provided by Pagad marches to launch their criminal activities. To this day it remains unclear whether Pagad was responsible for the wave of Mauritius: Hezbollah bombings that hit the Western Cape be- Similar to tween 1998 and 2000. Despite its de- Similar to Pagad in South Africa, the nial of responsibility, the South African Pagad in South Mauritian Muslim opposition party police said that it had evidence to the Africa, Hezbollah (which bears no relation to the contrary, even though most of it ap- Lebanese Party of God) was able to peared to be circumstantial.71 Hezbollah in mobilise around opposition to drug traf- Mauritius ficking and mounted a campaign of vio- As early as 1996, media reports linked lence against those thought to be in- Pagad with the Palestinian and Lebanese mobilised volved. Hezbollah took a tough stance groups, Hamas and Hezbollah. It was around against drugs, gambling and other non- suggested that they were corroborating Islamic practices, such as pork consump- 72 on setting up military training camps. opposition to tion.76 Drug abuse had become endemic Probably the most publicised attack in drug among Mauritian Muslims to the extent Cape Town was a bomb blast at the that in 1995, a group of drug warlords Planet Hollywood restaurant at the Wa- trafficking. controlled the Port Louis city of Plaine terfront complex, a popular tourist des- Verte with the open and publicly-known tination and shopping mall. The bomb- support of high government officials. ing killed two people and wounded 26, prompting the US State Department to add Pagad to its list of terrorist In December 2000, Mauritian authorities arrested the organisations.73 leader of Hezbollah. Cahl Meeah77 was charged with instructing party supporters to gun down three activists Pagad has repeatedly denied responsibility for terror- of the Mauritian Militant Movement-Labour alliance ism. A prominent member of the Pagad leadership during the 1996 general elections. The charges were maintained that many high-ranking police officers were based on the testimony of a single witness, who was a on the payroll of the gangsters. Pagad thus presented a member of a military unit, the Death Squadron, which threat to the status quo. Before the Staggie murder, carried out the murders. Hateem Oozer, a lifelong Pagad enjoyed high levels of sympathy among the Cape criminal and alleged drug addict, turned state witness community. Members of the organisation marched to in return for de facto immunity from prosecution. drug merchants’ houses, issuing them with ultimatums to stop selling drugs. In return for ceasing their activi- The Death Squadron was initially created to deal with ties, the community offered them alternate and legal the proliferation of drugs in Muslim-dominated areas methods of making a livelihood.74 of the country, particularly in Plaine Verte.78 Some
Hübschle • page 11 Paper 93 • October 2004 Hezbollah members were suspected of being involved African law enforcement and intelligence agencies by in the Death Squadron, which commanded the tacit surprise. By late 2002, the group had become South and silent support of a large section of the Muslim com- Africa’s primary state security concern. munity. It killed alleged drug kingpins and destroyed property. In exchange for immunity from prosecution, The key objective of the Boeremag was the establish- Hateem Oozer revealed some of Hezbollah’s alleged ment of an exclusive Afrikaner state. Their campaign evil-doings. He charged that bank robberies and armed of sabotage was driven by noxious mix of religious fa- hold-ups resulting in the monetary value of three mil- naticism and radical nationalism. Police confiscated a lion Mauritian rupees had helped to fill Hezbollah’s document that provided the group’s perceived justifi- coffers.79 cation for establishing an Afrikaner state. Among the points listed were ‘unjust’ affirmative action practices In the aftermath of September 11, US authorities iden- and the sidelining of the Afrikaans language.82 tified Mauritius as a haven for Islamist extremists and a money laundering centre for al-Qaeda. The Mauritian The Boeremag had a number of fantastical plans up its government seemed eager to jump on the bandwagon sleeve. It plotted to kill former South African president of the US-led ‘War on Terror’. Late in 2001, the Nelson Mandela by blowing him up in his car. It planned Mauritian Prime Minister, Sir Anerood Jugnauth, to wage a car-bombing campaign aimed at creating claimed that “certain daredevils close to the panic among the residents of Alexandra township, Hezbollah”80 were plotting to use crop sprayers and northeast of Johannesburg. The group also hired ten insecticide to destroy the country’s sugarcane planta- rental vehicles, which they stored in rented property tions. There were allegations that Hezbollah received in Alexandra and which were to be converted into car foreign funding from states and movements support- bombs to be detonated at the World Summit on Sus- ing the introduction of sharia law on the island. tainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002. The operation was called off after security forces learnt Whether Hezbollah was a vigilante or a terrorist group- about the plans. The campaign was intended to incite ing or just a political party lies in the eye of the be- violent protests from black people, creating a climate holder. Evidence shows that it took violent action against that would be conducive to staging a coup d‘ètat. drug dealers, thereby defeating the ends of justice. It is, however, doubtful whether it co-operated with Schönteich and Boshoff negate the level of threat posed organised criminals. The political oratory employed by in South Africa by extreme right-wing organisations such the Hindu-dominated government suggests that as Boeremag: “The extreme white right cannot attract Hezbollah had become a political force to be reck- sufficient popular support, and develop organisational 83 oned with. To link the party with organised criminals capacity, to execute a coup d‘ètat.” and international terrorists may have served to taint During and in the run-up to the Boeremag’s terrorist Hezbollah’s reputation. campaign, members of the organisation were accused of extortion, of stockpiling firearms and ammunition South Africa: Boeremag and of manufacturing and using explosives. It was al- In the early morning hours of 30 October 2002, eight leged that Boeremag members were behind weapons 84 bomb blasts rocked Soweto, a township in the South thefts from several military bases. It is highly unlikely African city of Johannesburg. Seven of the bombs were that the Boeremag co-operated with organised crimi- planted close to commuter railway lines, destroying nals in the procurement of weapons and ammunition. them and inconveniencing more than 200,000 com- In fact, the clandestine nature and structure of such a muters. One woman was killed. Other blasts subse- terrorist grouping precludes interaction with ordinary quently occurred at a bridge on the south coast, at an criminals. Confiscated ‘coup documents’ indicate that airport north of Johannesburg and at a Buddhist temple their authors were very well informed about military in a small town outside Pretoria. equipment and personnel at most military bases in the country. Two key points in the documents were that A hitherto unknown organisation, Die Boeremag, the Boeremag would employ strict security measures claimed responsibility for the bombings. In 2002, 23 to prevent infiltration of the group by state security and alleged Boeremag members were arrested and charged intelligence agents and that it would, in turn, infiltrate with terrorism-related offences, sabotage and high trea- military and police structures to obtain weapons, am- son. The counter-terrorist police unit in charge of the munition and communication equipment.85 The ‘white right’ investigation found a lorry loaded with a Boeremag more than likely adopted an organisational few thousand automatic rifles and uncovered various structure used by most guerrilla and terrorist movements arms cache around the country. Raids on the homes of to minimise the risk of detection and infiltration by in- suspected Boeremag members also uncovered docu- telligence officials: Schönteich and Boshoff suggest that ments and computer disks outlining the group’s plans it was organised into small cells consisting of three to to depose South Africa’s government.81 four people, co-ordinated into commandos and sec- tors. This organisational design is necessary for an The unexpected appearance of the Boeremag, a small organisation that needs to operate in secrecy and com- para-military right-wing group, initially caught South mit acts of terror.
Hübschle • page 12 Paper 93 • October 2004 CONCLUSION ferent criminal syndicates. Entering into a close rela- tionship with terrorists would not feature on their agen- The structural, economic, social and political weak- das unless there was an immediate financial gain. Fur- nesses in the sub-region, combined with well-organised thermore, there is little political or ideological com- and firmly entrenched criminal networks would, on the mon ground between terrorists and criminals. During face of it, suggest that linkages between organised crime Africa’s ‘winds of change’ period, some ‘indigenous’ and terrorism are plausible. However, none of the cases criminal groups did work with so-called terrorists. But examined here could establish a clear linkage between in the post-transformation period, ‘indigenous’ groups organised crime and terrorism in Southern Africa. are a-political; support for terrorist structures would not derive from similar thinking, or from fighting for a They show that international terrorists may have inter- similar cause. (Though some of the former liberation acted with organised criminals at times in straightfor- fighters have in fact found a new home in criminal syn- ward business deals, on ad-hoc basis. Thus, in the case dicates.) of the embassy bombings and the Mombassa attacks, al-Qaeda had to procure weapons, ammunition and While proven linkages elsewhere in the world (FARC, explosives from black market arm dealers. IRA, etc) would suggest that there is much to gain from a close symbiotic linkage between terrorists and The cases involving domestic terrorists and their pur- organised criminals, this reality is not reflected in South- ported linkages to organised criminals indicate that the ern Africa. terrorists themselves are implicated in criminal deeds. In conclusion, analysts, policy advisers and others Taking the organisational profile of organised criminals should proceed cautiously in linking the two forms of and terrorists into consideration, it is highly unlikely criminality, both of which are threatening the very base that they would co-operate with each other on an on- of the nation-state. In fact, the question that arises is going basis. Transnational organised criminals and ter- how terrorists and organised criminals are managing to rorists fear detection; collaboration would serve to sustain themselves and grow stronger in the shadow of heighten the risk. As mentioned earlier, Southern Afri- the nation-state. Proving or establishing a linkage be- can law enforcement officials and intelligence commu- tween the two distinct phenomena may conceal some nities have taken note of the threat posed by these uneasy questions, such as the linkages between states, types of crime. Infiltration by such officials is just one commercial enterprises and multi-national co-opera- of the means available to fight them. tions, on one hand, and organised criminals and ter- rorists, on the other. This would be a challenging topic It should be noted that organised criminals are fighting for future analysis. for survival due to increased competition between dif-
Notes 8 Ibid. 1The SADC region consists of Angola, the DRC, Tanzania,9 A Standing, Rival views of organised crime, ISS, Pretoria, Mozambique, Mauritius, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, 2003, p 43. Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Lesotho, Malawi and 10 P Gastrow, Organised crime in the SADC region: police the Seychelles. Due to financial difficulties, the Seychelles perceptions, ISS, Pretoria, 2001. announced its intention to pull out of SADC in 2004. Though the DRC and Angola are members of SADC, they 11 Ibid, p 30. have not been considered in this paper. The DRC is still 12 Standing, op cit, p 45. in the midst of civil war, while Angola has only recently re-emerged from decades of civil strife. 13 Gastrow, op cit, pp 21-23. 2 UNODC Regional Office for Southern Africa, Strategic 14 Ibid, p 55. programme framework on crime and drugs for Southern 15 Ibid, p 57. Africa, Pretoria, UNODC, 2003. 16 Ibid, p 9. 3 A Hübschle, Conceptualising terrorism, paper delivered at a seminar on terrorism in Southern Africa, 18-19th Sep- 17 Ibid, p 29. tember 2003, Colosseum Hotel, Pretoria, South Africa, p 1. 18 Standing, op cit, p 37. 4 A Schmid & A Jongman, Political terrorism (2nd edition), 19 For the purposes of this paper, the high level of accep- Nort-Holland Publishing Company, Oxford, 1988. tance of the Palermo Convention in terms of its ratifica- 5 A Rilke (ed), Terrorism research: Trends, achievements and tion amongst states in Southern Africa justifies the em- failures, Frank Cass, London, 2003, p 2. ployment of the definition provided. 6 P Cyran, Defining terrorism,
Hübschle • page 13 Paper 93 • October 2004 22 Standing, op cit. 45 V Mlowola, Terrorism in Tanzania, paper delivered at a seminar on terrorism in Southern Africa, 18-19th Septem- 23 R T Naylor, Predators, parasites, or free-market pioneers: ber 2003, Colosseum Hotel, Pretoria, South Africa, p 8. reflections on the nature and analysis of profit-driven crime, in Margaret E Beare (ed) Critical reflections on 46 The Washington Post, op cit. transnational organised crime, money laundering, and 47 V Mlowola, op cit, p 8 corruption, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2003, p 35. 48 Ibid, pp 10-11. 24 Naylor, op cit. 49 Ibid, p 11. 25 Naylor, op cit, p 41. 50 D Farah, Liberian is accused of harbouring al-Qaeda, The Washington Post, 15 May 2003. 26 Naylor, op cit. 51See: For a few dollars more,Global Witness, April 2003, 27 F Marelli, Organised crime and terrorism: dancing to-
Hübschle • page 14 Paper 93 • October 2004 meticais (about US$420,000), lent by a South African 75 D Daniels, Pagad’s true colours revealed, Mail & Guard- associate named Bachir Abdullah. Nini was supposed to ian, 28 August 1998. collect the repayment from the casino in exchange for a 76 Goredema, op cit, p 7. commission. Nini did not reveal who Abdullah was or what sort of business he was running. But he said that 77 According to Muslim sources, Meeah had been a thorn Abdullah had paid the money in Rands into an account in the eyes of Hindu-dominated government since he held by the Polana Casino in South Africa. He alleged returned to his birthplace after having spent seven years that he was supposed to collect the repayment from the in Mecca. Upon his return he had founded Hezbollah to casino in meticais. represent the interests of the island’s 250,000 Muslims. In 1995, the party won its first seat in parliament. 68 B Dixon and L-M Johns, Gangs, Pagad and the state: Vigi- lantism and revenge violence in the Western Cape, Cen- 78 K Mahmood, Ex-Hizbullah man reveals military training tre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Vio- for Mauritians in Qatar,
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Hübschle • page 15 Paper 93 • October 2004 The ISS mission
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About this paper About the author
Following the events of 11 September 2001, the ANNETTE HÜBSCHLE joined the ISS in November international community has increasingly examined 2002 and is a researcher in the Organised Crime and the possible linkages between terrorist groupings and Corruption Programme. She specialises in issues organised criminals. The structural, economic, social dealing with the funding of terrorism, the fight against and political weaknesses in the Southern African sub- terrorism versus the protection of civil liberties, and region, combined with well-organised and firmly matters relating to organised crime in the SADC entrenched criminal networks, would, on the face of region. She holds an Honours degree in International it, suggest that linkages between organised crime and and Comparative Political Studies and International terrorism are plausible. However, none of the cases Political Economy from the University of Cape Town. examined in this paper could establish a clear linkage She is currently working on a Masters degree focusing between the two phenomena. They show, instead, on the impact of international anti-terrorism strategies that terrorists may have interacted with organised on developing economies. criminals in straightforward business deals, on an ad- hoc basis. Entering into a close and more permanent arrangement with terrorists would not feature on the agendas of organised criminal groups unless there was an immediate financial gain. Ultimately, ongoing About the funders collaboration would heighten the risk of detection for both parties. Furthermore, there is little political or The publication of this paper was supported by the ideological common ground between terrorists and Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation criminals to sustain such linkages. (NORAD).
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