The National-Religious Party, the Rabbinate, and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Principle and Pragmatism in Religious-Zionist Statecraft (1974–1977)

Home , Sde Eliyahu, Shlomo Hillel, Shuva, Simcha Dinitz, Tirat Zvi, Tower and stockade

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Brandeis University

Department of Near Eastern and Judaic Studies

Yehudah Mirsky, Advisor Ilan Troen, Advisor

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Ari Moshkovski

February 2021

The signed version of this form is on file in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.

This dissertation, directed and approved by Ari Moshkovski’s Committee, has been accepted and approved by the Faculty of Brandeis University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of:

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Eric Chasalow, Dean Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

Dissertation Committee:

Yehudah Mirsky, Near Eastern and Judaic Studies Ilan Troen, Near Eastern and Judaic Studies Arye Naor, Public Policy and Administration, Ben Gurion University of the Negev

2021

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

עמ״י ע ש ״ ו

After years of study, research, and writing, I now face the happy task of recognizing those who enabled me to complete this dissertation.

The education I received at Queens College, CUNY continues to serve me in good stead.

I thank all my instructors, and acknowledge Kristina Richardson, Miryam Segal, Julia

Sneeringer, and Bobby Wintermute for preparing me for the rigors of post-graduate studies.

Studying and working with Mark Rosenblum was the centerpiece of my experience at Queens. I thank Prof. Rosenblum for supervising my master’s thesis, for the adventures, and for the comic relief. I fondly acknowledge Steven Appel, Sophia McGee, and Batya Septimus, my colleagues and co-conspirators at the CERRU.

The Schusterman Center for Israel Studies has been my academic home at Brandeis

University, and I am indebted to the faculty, staff, and patrons who have built and sustained this vibrant institution. The Center provided a generous fellowship as well as the fellowship of valued colleagues and friends. I wish to acknowledge Aviv Ben-Or, Robert DeBoard, Rachel

Fish, Iddo Haklai, Susanna Klosko, Gangzheng “Almog” She, Karen Spira, and Jason Olson. I thank Amber Taylor for her good cheer and thoughtful insights, and I am indebted to Eva

Gurevich for her collaboration, friendship, and faithful guardianship of my books. It was both a privilege and a pleasure to have Mostafa Hussain as my “neighbor.”

The Department of Near Eastern and Judaic Studies (NEJS) provided a rigorous post- graduate education. I thank Jonathan Decter, ChaeRan Freeze, Eugene Sheppard, and Ilana

Szobel for their assistance as Directors of Graduate Studies. I am especially grateful to Ellen

Kellman for examining me in Yiddish and to Naghmeh Sohrabi for examining me in the history of the modern Middle East. Joanne Arnish made everything work.

My studies at Brandies were greatly enriched by visiting faculty. Uri Bialer broadened my perspective on Israeli foreign policy. Abdel Monem Said Aly and Khalil Shikaki, together with Shai Feldman, co-taught an inimitable course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Michael Feige, z”l, was a unique educator and scholar whose door was always open. He is deeply missed. Tuvia

Friling’s expert tutelage in archival methods prepared me for the challenges of dissertation research.

This research was made possible by The Charles and Lynn Schusterman Foundation, the

Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, NEJS, and the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at

Brandeis University. I am particularly grateful to Dr. Mitchell Bard, Executive Director of the

American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise for a generous AICE/Schusterman Israel Scholar

Award.

I am profoundly grateful to Dzintra Lacis and her team at Goldfarb Library, who provided herculean research support. I also acknowledge the archivists and staff at the Israel

State Archive, the National Library of Israel, the Kfar Etzion Archive, the library at Yeshivat Har

Etzion, and the Archive of Religious Zionism at Bar Ilan University. I thank Aliza Adelman,

Shifra Mescheloff, and Rachel Vermus for providing otherwise-inaccessible primary sources.

I am truly fortunate to have Ilan Troen and Yehudah Mirsky as my dissertation advisors.

Prof. Troen has been my teacher and mentor since I arrived at Brandeis, if not before. Prof.

Troen has expertly guided and prodded me throughout my studies, encouraging me to explore my interests while providing a solid foundation in Israel Studies. I thank Prof. Troen for the tenacity of his mentorship.

Yehudah Mirsky has been a dedicated teacher of Jewish law and lore, Zionism, and

political philosophy, enabling and encouraging me to explore the connections between these

subjects by generously sharing his unique expertise and experience. I have benefitted greatly

from Prof. Mirsky’s counsel and encouragement, and am indebted to him for telling me what I

needed to hear, always be-darkhei no’am, especially when it was difficult to hear.

The first flowerings of this dissertation began during my undergraduate studies at

Queens College, when first I picked up a copy Religion and Politics in Israel by Charles

Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya. It was a thrill, then, to have Prof. Don-Yehiya on my

dissertation committee. I am grateful to Prof. Don-Yehiya for suggesting avenues of inquiry that

shaped this dissertation, and for his insightful comments on the early chapters. Although Eliezer,

z”l, passed away in December 2018, his lasting impact is evident in the pages that follow.

I give special thanks to Arye Naor for joining my dissertation committee in midstream.

Professor Naor read this dissertation with great care, offering prescient comments, critiques, and suggestions. These insights have already enhanced my work, and I look forward to discussing them further with Prof. Naor as I develop this project.

The comradery, hospitality, and encouragement of friends were essential in completing

this endeavor. Among many others, I am grateful to The Borvicks, Moshe and Dr. Shayna

Bernstein, Evan and Tova Levine, Sampath Rathnayaka, Lydia and Marcus Rosenberg, and

Esther and Shalom Tzvi Shafier.

I am profoundly grateful to my family for their enduring love, encouragement, and

support. My grandparents, Bela and Hillel Moshkovski, z”l, personified resilience,

determination, and a commitment to learning; their memory remains a source of strength and

inspiration. My siblings, Reuven and Miriam, were my first traveling companions on the journey

vi of life, and we are blessed to have Moshe along for the ride. The recent arrival of my niece, Bella

Rina, was a source of great joy as this dissertation neared completion. It has been inspiring (and entertaining) to see my nephew, Netanel Hillel (aka, “Nate”), meet each day with excitement, curiosity, and pancakes.

I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Dror and Dr. Francine Moshkovski, in appreciation of their enduring love and support.

Ari Moshkovski Jerusalem, 2021

vii

ABSTRACT

The National-Religious Party, the Rabbinate, and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Principle and Pragmatism in Religious-Zionist Statecraft (1974–1977)

A dissertation presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Brandeis University Waltham, Massachusetts

By Ari Moshkovski

This dissertation investigates the involvement of the Israeli National-Religious Party

(NRP) in the Arab-Israeli peace process between 1974 and 1977. This peace process, orchestrated by U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger, catalyzed processes of change within the

“National-Religious,” or “religious-Zionist,” camp. Yet, studies of religious-Zionism during this period overlook the movement’s elected political leadership- the NRP- in favor of the Gush

Emunim settlement movement and related ideological developments. Similarly, the

historiography of the post-1973 peace process overlooks the NRP’s involvement, despite the

party’s critical role in Israeli coalition governance, and the outsized influence of coalition politics

on Israeli foreign policy.

I address these lacunae through a historical study of NRP politicians and their

interlocutors between 1974 and 1977. Using a variety of primary sources, this study illuminates

the inter-causal relationships between the American-mediated peace process, the escalation of

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inter-factional competition within the NRP, and the deterioration of the Historic Alliance with

Labor.

Kissinger’s diplomacy raised the prospect of territorial withdrawal and presented the government with decisions germane to the disposition of the West Bank. Concomitantly, the

NRP Zeirim- an insurgent youth faction- escalated their struggle against the party’s “Old Guard”

leadership and its coalition partnership with Labor. While pragmatic, material considerations

informed the NRP leadership’s practice of statecraft, the Zeirim stressed adherence to religious

principles and opposed ceding sacred ground in the West Bank.

Hoping to pacify the Zeirim, the Old Guard reached accommodations with Labor during

coalition talks and cabinet deliberations, thereby avoiding fateful decisions over the West Bank.

These accommodations constrained the Rabin government’s diplomacy, and steered the peace

process away from the West Bank, toward an accord with Egypt.

The Zeirim, though, continued their struggle and expanded their influence by joining the cabinet and coopting parts of the Old Guard. Taking a hard line in the name of religious

principles, the Zeirim confronted both Labor and the NRP leadership over the peace process and

provocations by Gush Emunim. These confrontations destabilized the NRP, disrupted the

coalition, and undermined the Rabin government, leading to a rupture with Labor and upending

the NRP’s inter-factional balance of power.

Table of Contents

Introduction ...... 1 Background: The Impact of the 1973 Yom Kippur War ...... 1 The Nexus between Inter-Factional Competition in the NRP, the “Historic Alliance” with Labor, and the Post-1973 Peace Process ...... 3 Methodology, Research Design, and Sources ...... 8 Previous Scholarship ...... 17 The Significance of this Study ...... 24 Description of Chapters ...... 26 Chapter 1: Piety and Pretense: The NRP, the Rabbinate, and the Struggle over Coalition Formation following the Yom Kippur War ...... 32 “Opening Feints”: Coalition Negotiations Following the 1973 Knesset Elections...... 34 “Split in the House of Israel”: The NRP Consults the Chief Rabbinate ...... 47 On Wednesday, the Rabbis Said No: Fallout from the CRC’s Decision ...... 64 “Israel Has a New Government” ...... 73 Summation ...... 82 Chapter 2: “Hosifu Het al Pesha”: Rabbinic Authority, the Campaign to Force the NRP out of Coalition, and the “Next Step” in the Peace Process (March–November 1974) ...... 90 The Zeirim Wage a Propaganda Campaign Against the NRP Leadership ...... 91 “The Last Chance”: The NRP Central Committee Vote of March 31, 1974 ...... 104 Labor, The Next Generation: Yitzhak Rabin Forms a Government ...... 111 Chief Rabbi Goren’s ‘Ultimate Deal’? ...... 128 “Their Religion Says They Must Have All of Israel to Govern:” The Judea and Samaria Proviso, the NRP, and the Decision to Pursue a “Next Step” with Egypt...... 147 “It Will Require a Hell of a Lot of Work to Keep it Together”: The Peace Process Focuses on Egypt as the NRP Joins the Government ...... 154 Summation ...... 157 Chapter 3: Discourse, Debate, and Dissent: NRP Responses to the Breakdown of Negotiations Over an Israeli–Egyptian Interim Accord (March–July 1975) ...... 164 “Greek Tragedy”: The Breakdown of Negotiations Over an Israeli-Egyptian Interim Agreement ...... 166

Reassessment: “Policy Examination” or Pressure Campaign? ...... 180 Israeli Reactions to Reassessment ...... 186 The U.S. Reassessment as a Driving force for Discourse in the NRP ...... 200 Toward a Resumption of Talks and the Problematics of Military Aid as Compensation For Territorial Withdrawal ...... 217 “This Nation Will Never yield”: The Zeirim, Gush Emunim, and Anti-American Protests of July 1975 ...... 247 Summation ...... 253 Chapter 4: “A Ticklish Domestic Problem [with] Foreign Policy Overtones”: the NRP, Gush Emunim, and the Sinai II Accords (June–November 1975) ...... 268 Another Reassessment: Efforts to Appoint Zevulun Hammer to the Cabinet Prior to Secretary Kissinger’s Return (July–August 1975) ...... 269 “Operation Kissinger”: Gush Emunim Enters the Fray over the Sinai II Accords upon Kissinger’s Return ...... 285 Confrontation in the NRP over Ratifying the Sinai II Accords ...... 320 “Shalom Bayit” or Schism? Fallout from the Struggle over Sinai II and Zevulun Hammer’s Cabinet Appointment (September – November 1975) ...... 349 Summation: ...... 363 Chapter 5: A Game of Factions: Inter-factional Competition in the NRP and the Rabin Government’s Agenda (Nov. 1975-Sept. 1976) ...... 372 Solidarity or Settlement? Competing “Zionist Responses” to Israeli Diplomatic Isolation and International Support for the PLO (November–December 1975) ...... 373 Internal NRP Strife, Israeli Settlement Policy, and Rabin’s Agenda for 1976-1977 ... 402 “The Government Will Not Fall”: Rabin and the NRP Avoid a Cabinet Crisis over Kaddum ...... 425 “I am Not so Politically Crazy as to Say It”: Rabin’s Agenda for 1976–1977 and Conflicting Perspectives on Gush Emunim ...... 443 Summation ...... 447 Chapter 6: Semakh Zevulun Be-Tzeitekha: U.S. Military Aid, the Sanctity of the Sabbath, and the End of the Labor-NRP Historic Alliance (1976–1977) ...... 452 Yitzhak Raphael Fights for his Political Survival (May–November 1976) ...... 454 The F-15s Arrive: An “Occasion to Rejoice” or a “Very Grave Matter”? ...... 458 “And You Shall Surely Rebuke Your Fellow”: The NRP Abstains from Voting Confidence in the Government (Except for Burg) ...... 466

“Minister Burg is in Favor of Sabbath Desecration”: Fallout from the No-Confidence Vote in the NRP (December 15–17, 1976) ...... 475 Prime Minister Rabin’s “Brilliant Maneuver” ...... 481 The Fallout from Rabin’s Gambit and the 1977 Knesset Elections ...... 504 Summation ...... 514 Conclusion ...... 524 Summary of Main Findings ...... 524 Analysis...... 535 Avenues for Further Research ...... 550 Selected Bibliography ...... 553 Primary Sources ...... 553 Secondary Sources ...... 562

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Introduction This dissertation investigates the nexus between the Arab–Israeli peace process, the

National-religious Party (NRP), and its coalition partnership with Labor from 1974–1977. I

construct a detailed, historical narrative of the day-to-day actions, debates, and decisions of NRP parliamentarians, ministers, and party activists, along with their interlocutors in the legislative, cabinet, and partisan arenas. I use this narrative to illuminate the organic, causal relationships between inter-factional competition within the NRP, the deterioration of the party’s “Historic

Alliance” with Labor, and the Arab–Israeli peace process between 1974 and 1977. By reconstructing religious-Zionist praxis in the cabinet, legislative, and partisan arenas, I contribute to the historiography of both the Arab–Israeli peace process and religious Zionism.

Background: The Impact of the 1973 Yom Kippur War The 1973 Yom Kippur War left a lasting imprint on Israeli society, politics, and

diplomacy. Egyptian and Syrian forces breached the 1967 ceasefire lines in Sinai and the Golan

Heights in a surprise attack, shattering the sense of confidence produced by Israel’s euphoric

military victory in the Six-Day War. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) eventually recouped their losses; however, turning the tide of battle exacted a high price. The war ended with Israeli forces within artillery range of Damascus and the Egyptian Third Army enveloped in Sinai.

Nevertheless, the Egyptian and Syrian militaries displayed unanticipated martial prowess,

inflicting heavy losses that pushed the limits of Israeli tolerance for casualties. To remain in the

fight, the IDF relied on a massive American airlift for resupply.

The task of disentangling the Israeli and Arab armies fell to Henry Kissinger, the

American secretary of state and national security advisor. With the support of an embattled

president and dominance of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus, Kissinger made Arab–Israeli

diplomacy a top American priority with global ramifications. Wartime tensions had generated a

superpower crisis, while the Arab deployment of the “oil weapon” destabilized the global

economy.

Kissinger seized the “warportunity,”1 assuming an active, ongoing, and dominant role in

Arab–Israeli peacemaking. The basis for negotiations was the “land-for-peace” formula implicit

in Security Council Resolution 242, adopted in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab–Israeli War.2

Determined to sideline the USSR, Kissinger conducted personal, direct mediation between Israel

and the Arab states. Through his efforts, Kissinger hoped to prove that, by virtue of the United

States’ “special relationship” with Israel, American diplomacy could deliver what Soviet

weapons could not: the return of Arab territory lost in 1967.

Kissinger believed that a comprehensive accord to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict was

beyond reach. Instead, he adopted a “step-by-step” strategy: The United States would mediate

bilateral agreements of limited scope and duration by eliciting limited Israeli territorial

concessions in exchange for specific Arab undertakings, American security guarantees, and other

“positive inducements.”3 Each agreement would be designed to facilitate a next “step” toward an

eventual peace accord. The first step was to diffuse the immediate military crisis by brokering

separation-of-forces agreements to disentangle the Egyptian and Syrian armies from the IDF.

1 The term “warportunity” was coined by humorist John Stewart in a satirical analysis of the 2006 Lebanese-Israeli war, the 2007 Hamas-Fatah conflict in the Gaza Strip, and ongoing violence in American-occupied Iraq. See, Comedy Central, “The Daily Show with John Stewart: Warportunity In The Middle East,” June 18, 2007, Video, 3:55. http://www.cc.com/video-clips/ayu3ic/the-daily-show-with-jon-stewart-warportunity-in-the-middle-east 2 The resolution called for Israel to withdraw its “armed forces from territories occupied” during the 1967 conflict, an end to the state of war, and respect for the right of every state “to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.” United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967,” Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1967, S/RES/242 (1967), http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/1967.shtml accessed April 24, 2018. 3 Scott Lasensky, “Dollarizing Peace: Nixon, Kissinger and the Creation of the US-Israeli Alliance,” Israel Affairs 31:1 (2007), 164-186.

That, in turn, would make further steps possible between Israel and Egypt, Syria, or Jordan as

part of an ongoing, incremental peace process sustained by American mediation.

The Nexus between Inter-Factional Competition in the NRP, the “Historic Alliance” with Labor, and the Post-1973 Peace Process

For Israelis, the very existence of an ongoing, viable peace process created the prospect of ceding territories rich with historical and religious significance, particularly in the West Bank.

Bearing in mind the outsized role of partisan and coalition politics in Israeli national security decision-making, I argue that a nexus formed between the peace process and two “domestic” processes involving the NRP, which was Labor’s perennial coalition partner. These processes

helped shape, and were shaped by, Kissinger’s diplomacy.

2.A The Escalation of Inter-Factional Competition within the NRP

The first process in this nexus was the escalation of inter-factional competition within the

NRP concomitant with the post-1973 peace process. The NRP was the “camp party” representing the religious-Zionist, or “national-religious” camp, and it operated on the basis of “structured factionalism.” Factions within the NRP competed in elections to the party convention and received seats on the NRP’s governing bodies, leadership positions, and patronage in proportion to their share of the vote.4

4 Liebman and Don-Yehiya, “Anatomy of a Religious Party,” in Religion and Politics in Israel (Bloomington: Indiana U. Press, 1984). See, also Eliezer Don-Yehiya, “Stability and Transformation in a Camp Party: the MaFDaL and the Revolution of the Zeirim,” Medinah, Mimshal Vi-yehasim Benle'umiyim 14 (1980), 25-52. [Hebrew]

2.A.1 Background

This process of escalation began after the death of NRP leader Haim Moshe Shapira in

1970.5 In his absence, the Old Guard factions fielded separate lists in the NRP elections of 1972.

Yosef Burg’s LaMifneh garnered 27–28% of the vote, and Yitzhak Raphael’s Likud U’Temurah

came in second with 24%. The NRP Zeirim, led by Zevulun Hammer, came in third with 20%, while Shapira’s “Center List” faction, now led by Zerach Warhaftig, plummeted to 14%.

Subsequently, the factions led by Burg and Raphael reached an entente cordiale, and together they commanded a majority in the NRP’s governing institutions. The Zeirim remained in the

“opposition,” while Warhaftig found himself out in the cold.6

This fragmented distribution of power invited an escalation of inter-factional competition, with direct repercussions for the NRP and its coalition partnership with Labor. This escalation was largely, though not exclusively, driven by the Zeirim. Fiercely critical of both the

NRP and Labor (Mapai until 1968), the Zeirim opposed the Historic Alliance between the two parties. In their view, the NRP leadership marginalized the national-religious camp by promoting narrow, sectoral interests and religious issues, while enabling the Labor machine to dominate other areas of governance, commerce, and society. Emboldened by the Old Guard’s

5 In the 1968 NRP elections, Shapira led a bloc that that included HaPoel HaMizrahi’s “historic” factions: Shapira’s “Center List,” the progressive “LaMifneh” faction led by Yosef Burg, and the more conservative “Likud U’Temurah” under Yitzhak Raphael. The NRP’s insurgent youth faction- the “Zeirim”- remained outside the bloc, and functioned as the opposition, controlling 22.5% of the NRP Central Committee. See, Eliezer Don-Yehiya, “Stability and Transformation in a Camp Party” [Hebrew]; Daniel Dagan, “Who will rule the MaFDaL?” Ma'ariv (Dec. 6, 1972), 15; “The Moshavim Faction in the MaFDaL Joins LaMifneh-Raphael,” Ma'ariv (Dec. 17, 1972), 6; “The Large Factions in the MaFDaL Court the Small ones,” Ma'ariv (Feb. 26, 1976), 4 [Hebrew]; Gary S. Schiff, Tradition and Politics: The Religious Parties of Israel (Detroit: Wayne St. University Press, 1977), 64-65. 6 Don-Yehiya, Stability and Transformation; Dagan, “Who will rule?” Ma'ariv (Dec. 6, 1972), 15; “The Moshavim Faction,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 17, 1972), 6; “The Large Factions,” Ma'ariv (Feb. 26, 1976), 4.

fragmentation, the Zeirim expanded their influence and injected tough language against territorial

withdrawal into the NRP platform for the 1973 Knesset elections.7

A combination of political ambition and religious principles drove the Zeirim’s

opposition to the NRP Old Guard and the Historic Alliance with Labor. Their aim was not

merely to unseat the Old Guard, but to transform the NRP into a national party that practiced

politics based on religious principles instead of self-interested realpolitik. Thus, the Zeirim

expressed their ambition in terms of religious principles. Early on, the Zeirim championed a

“Torah Regime,” calling on the party to establish a body of religious-Zionist rabbis and

intelligentsia to fill the halakhic lacunae pertaining to the governance of a modern state. At the

same time, the Zeirim demanded that the NRP groom young religious Zionists to assume senior

roles in politics, commerce, the military, the diplomatic corps, and the civil service.8

After Israel’s capture of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Golan

Heights in the 1967 war, the “Wholeness of the Land of Israel” replaced the “Torah Regime” as

the Zeirim’s flagship religious principle. This principle translated into support for expansive

Jewish settlement in the newly occupied territories and fervent opposition to territorial concessions, especially in the West Bank.9

7 Yoni Garb, “The MaFDaL Youth and the Conceptional Roots of Gush Emunim,” in Cohen, Asher and Yisrael Harel (eds) The Religious Zionism: An Era of Changes; Studies in Memory of Zvulun Hammer (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 2004), 171-200. [Hebrew]; Vermus, Daniel. The Knitted Revolution: How the Zeirei HaMaFDaL Captured the Party Leadership, (Israel: Published Privately, 2016), 10-36. [Hebrew]. See, also: Eliezer Don-Yehiya, “Stability and Transformation in a Camp Party: the MaFDaL and the Revolution of the Zeirim,” Medinah, Mimshal Vi- yehasim Benle'umiyim 14 (1980), 25-52. [Hebrew]; Aharon Kampinsky, “The impact of political upheaval on a party's ideational position: the MaFDaL and the 1977 upheaval,” Israel Affairs 24:6 (2018), 958-975; Kampinsky, “Minister Zevulun Hammer's Ambivalent Attitude to the Peace Process with Egypt,” Iyunim 33 (Ben Gurion U. of the Negev, 2020) 40-63; Dov Schwartz, “From the First Flowering to Fulfillment,” in Cohen, Asher and Yisrael Harel (eds) The Religious Zionism: An Era of Changes; Studies in Memory of Zvulun Hammer (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 2004), 24-134. 8 Garb, The MaFDaL; Kampinsky, Impact of Political Upheaval; Kampinsky, Hammer’s Ambivalent Attitude. Eliezer Don-Yehiya, “Stability and Transformation.” 9 Ibid.

2.B The Connection between the Peace Process and the NRP–Labor “Historic Alliance”

Kissinger’s step-by-step diplomacy operationalized the Zeirim’s policy positions by putting territories on the negotiating table and forcing the Israeli government to make decisions, however preliminary, regarding their eventual disposition. The Zeirim opposed both the “land- for-peace” formula and Labor’s stated readiness for territorial compromise. Thus, the Zeirim’s opposition to the NRP’s partnership with Labor became linked to their flagship religious principle – the “Whole Land of Israel.” This translated into an aggressive, confrontational stance against the Labor-led government and its policies between 1974 and 1977. This confrontational stance, in turn, destabilized the governing coalition and eventually caused a rupture between the

NRP and Labor in December 1976.

Therefore, the deterioration – and eventual rupture – in relations between the NRP and the governing Labor Alignment is the second process at the heart of this dissertation. From 1935 until 1977, Labor Zionism and religious Zionism maintained a Historic Alliance that formed the backbone of Israeli coalition governance.10 This partnership, established to foster national unity and political stability in the Yishuv, allowed Labor and the NRP to manage their differences over the role of Judaism in the public sphere. Not incidentally, it also guaranteed Labor hegemony over Israeli politics and governance, while the NRP enjoyed outsized patronage and influence on

“religious” issues and sectoral interests.

10 Dvora Hacohen, “The Historical Alliance between Ideology and Politics,” in Don-Yehiya, Eliezer, ed., Between Tradition and Innovation: Studies of Judaism, Zionism, and the State of Israel; Yehoshua Kaniel- In Memorium (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2005) 259-296. [Hebrew]; See, also: Dov Schwartz, “From the First Flowering to Fulfillment,” in Cohen, Asher and Yisrael Harel (eds) The Religious Zionism: An Era of Changes; Studies in Memory of Zvulun Hammer (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 2004), 24-134, especially 114-115. [Hebrew]

Following the Knesset elections of December 1973, the Zeirim put this partnership to the test. The gap narrowed between the governing Labor Alignment and the opposition Likud party

– a new right-wing bloc led by Menachem Begin.11 The Zeirim saw Likud as a potential alternative to Labor and an ally in the struggle over the Land, which took on a new urgency due to Kissinger’s diplomacy. Consequently, the Zeirim agitated against the formation of a new

Labor–NRP coalition and the slightest hint of territorial withdrawal.

11 “1973 – Elections for the Eighth Knesset – Additional Information,” The Elections of 1973, Elections Collection, Ephemera, Jerusalem: National Library of Israel. http://web.nli.org.il/sites/NLI/Hebrew/collections/treasures/elections/all_elections/Pages/1973-data.aspx [Accessed May 7, 2018]; “1969 – Elections for the Seventh Knesset – Additional Information,” The Elections of 1969,” The Elections of 1969, Elections Collection, Ephemera (Jerusalem: National Library of Israel) http://web.nli.org.il/sites/NLI/Hebrew/collections/treasures/elections/all_elections/Pages/1969-data.aspx [Accessed May 7, 2018]

Methodology, Research Design, and Sources 3.A Methodology

I investigate the nexus between the post-1973 Arab–Israeli peace process, the escalating inter-factional competition in the NRP, and the deterioration in NRP–Labor relations by constructing a detailed historical narrative of events, debates, and decisions related to the NRP and the Mideast peace process. This narrative begins in January 1974, as the NRP and Labor struggled to form a government while Kissinger mediated separation-of-forces agreements between Israel, Egypt, and Syria. It concludes in 1977, with a coalition crisis between Labor and the NRP, a decisive change in the NRP’s internal balance of power, and the end of “step-by- step” diplomacy due to transfers of power in both the US and Israel.

While this study interrogates interrelated processes, my historical reconstruction centers on the people whose beliefs, actions, and decisions drove these processes. The primary subjects of my study are NRP lawmakers, cabinet ministers, and activists whose religious-political praxis

focused on the partisan, parliamentary, and cabinet arenas. I also investigate related actors such

as rabbinic figures, Gush Emunim, Labor politicians, and American officials.

3.B Research Design

3.B.1 Israeli Coalition Governance and Party Politics

As discussed below, the role of the NRP in Arab–Israeli diplomacy receives limited historiographical attention. While this lacuna offers a promising avenue for further research, it also complicates the task of formulating avenues of historical inquiry. Therefore, I borrow heuristically from the rich conceptual lexicons of cognate disciplines and the findings of related studies in formulating questions and working hypotheses for historical research.

My focus on the NRP’s activities in the cabinet, coalition, and partisan arenas reflects my

first working hypothesis: that the nexus between the Arab–Israeli peace process, the deterioration

of the NRP–Labor partnership, and inter-factional competition within the NRP reflects causal

relationships between these processes. This hypothesis is informed by Freilich’s finding that

Israeli national security decision-making has historically been “a highly politicized process” in which “maintaining the coalition becomes an end in itself … that supersedes strategic

considerations.” Moreover, “parochial party views, rather than a broad conception of the national

interest, are built into the coalition structure.”12 This politicization of Israeli foreign policy

suggests that an examination of Israeli coalition governance – including coalition parties –

promises to deepen our understanding of Israeli policy and behavior toward the peace process.

Furthermore, insofar as the NRP–Labor Historic Alliance was the cornerstone of Israeli coalition governance until 1977, this alliance features prominently in my study.

My investigation of the NRP, its relationship with Labor, and the peace process, is also informed by Don-Yehiya’s work on the NRP and its partnership with Labor. Drawing upon models of consociational democracy and inter-group conflict, Don-Yehiya holds that the NRP was the “camp party” representing the religious Zionist, or “national-religious” camp.13 In order

12 Charles Freiluch, Zion's Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs), (Ithica: Cornell University Press 2012), 37-43. Indeed, Kissinger himself was often exasperated by the seemingly irrational behaviour of Israeli cabinets, and is said to have quipped that “Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic politics.” See, Richard Holbrooke, “Censored in Israel,” New York Times (May 30, 1976), 157. 13 Liebman and Don-Yehiya note that the religious-Zionist camp constituted “a subgroup within [Israeli] society distinguished by its unique values and behavioural patterns.” Members of the national-religious camp were “integrated” into a “system of institutions and organizations that extend[ed] to all spheres of life.” Young religious Zionists were socialized in a national-religious school system and attended the Bnei Akiva youth movement. Many studied at Bar Ilan, the national-religious university, did business at the “Mizrahi” bank, and read the Ha-Tsofeh daily newspaper. Consequently, religious Zionists and the NRP were linked “by a network of economic, social, and ideological relationships.” Liebman and Don-Yehiya “Anatomy of a Religious Party,” in Religion and Politics in Israel (Bloomington: Indiana U. Press, 1984). See, also: Eliezer Don-Yehiya, “Stability and Transformation in a

to claim that it represented the religious-Zionist camp writ-large, the NRP used a system of

“structured factionalism” to give members the ability to choose their representatives within the party framework. This, in turn, allowed the NRP to form the Historic Alliance: a perennial coalition partnership with the Labor party that enabled the two “camps” to accommodate their differences. Hence, the NRP’s partnership with Labor and its robust inter-factional competition were intertwined, and intrinsic to the very nature of the NRP.14

Don-Yehiya’s findings regarding the NRP suggest several avenues of inquiry for this

study. Insofar as political accommodation was the basis for the NRP–Labor alliance, then it is

necessary to investigate why this accommodation failed to prevent the deterioration of that

alliance between 1974 and 1977. Furthermore, the deterioration of the NRP–Labor alliance

coincided with escalating inter-factional competition within the NRP, as well as broader changes

within religious Zionism.15 Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether escalating factionalism

and ideological change were connected to the deterioration in Labor–NRP relations. Finally,

insofar as inter-factional competition and change within the NRP and the breakdown in Labor–

NRP relations coincided with the post-1973 peace process, it is necessary to investigate whether these phenomena were somehow connected.

3.B.2 The “Status Quo Principle” and the Avoidance of Decisions

Just as an examination of the NRP’s alliance with Labor and its inter-factional competition promise to shed light on the peace process, scrutinizing the peace process is likely to

Camp Party: the MaFDaL and the Revolution of the Zeirim,” Medinah, Mimshal Vi-yehasim Benle'umiyim 14 (1980), 25-52. [Hebrew] 14 Eliezer Don-Yehiya, “Conflict management of religious issues: The Israel case in a comparative perspective,” Israel Affairs 6:2 (1999), 85-108; Liebman and Don-Yehiya “The ‘Status Quo’ Agreement as a Solution,” in Religion and Politics in Israel (Bloomington: Indiana U. Press, 1984). 15The historiographical debate over these processes of change is discussed below.

10 illuminate the deterioration of Labor–NRP relations and the escalating strife in the NRP. My second working hypothesis, then, involves the causal relationship between these phenomena: I hypothesize that the peace process contributed to the deterioration in Labor–NRP relations and the escalation of inter-factional strife in the NRP by compelling Labor and the NRP to make decisions that exposed disagreements over territorial compromise.

This hypothesis reflects the functional distinction drawn by Don-Yehiya between matters of “religion and state” and “foreign and defense issues.”16 Don-Yehiya finds that consociational mechanisms of accommodation were useful for managing disagreements over “religious” issues.

In particular, the “status quo principle” facilitated the avoidance of “explicit and clear-cut decisions”17 on matters such as public Sabbath observance and religious jurisdiction over personal status.18 “Foreign and defense issues,” however, involved a “dynamic international environment” that forced decisions in response to new and evolving threats (or opportunities), regardless of internal disagreements.19

16 Don-Yehiya, “Conflict Management of Religious Issues.” 17 Eliezer Don-Yehiya, “Conflict Management of religious issues”; Liebman and Don-Yehiya “The ‘Status Quo’ Agreement as a Solution,” 34; Don-Yehiya, “The Resolution of Religious Conflicts in Israel,” in Cohen, Stuart A. and Eliezer Don-Yehiya (eds.) Comparative Jewish Politics Vol. II: Conflict and Consensus in Jewish Political Life (Jerusalem: Bar Ilan University Press, 1986), 203-218 18 It is noteworthy that the “status quo” arrangement likely originated with the beginning of the Historic Alliance in 1935. Friedman convincingly refutes the general view that the status-quo agreement originated with a 1947 agreement between Ben-Gurion and Agudath Israel, since Ben-Gurion’s offer was never accepted. Instead, Friedman argues that the “status quo” on religion-and-state developed later, in order to meet the needs of religious soldiers and religious members of the Provisional State Council in 1948. Hacohen, though, locates the origins of the “status quo” in the 1935 agreement bringing Mizrahi into the Zionist Executive, which marked the beginning of the Historic Alliance. This Ur-coalition agreement included many elements of the “status quo”: The Jewish Sabbath (Saturday) would be the day of rest for (Labor-dominated) industry and agriculture; public kitchens would be Kosher, and localities with religious residents would receive religious services. (Provisions regarding education and personal status were unnecessary: each Zionist “stream” already enjoyed educational autonomy; and the British Mandate preserved Ottoman laws placing marriage and divorce under religious jurisdiction.) Menachem Friedman, “The Structural Foundation for Religio-Political Accommodation in Israel: Fallacy and Reality,” in Israel: The First Decade of Independence, eds, Troen, S. Ilan and Lucas, Noah (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 51-81; Dvora Hacohen, “The Historical Alliance between Ideology and Politics,” in Don-Yehiya, Eliezer, ed., Between Tradition and Innovation: Studies of Judaism, Zionism, and the State of Israel; Yehoshua Kaniel- In Memorium (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2005) 259-296 [Hebrew]. 19Don-Yehiya, “Conflict management of religious issues,” Israel Affairs 6:2 (1999), especially 86, 97.

Thus, I search for instances when the peace process created an impetus for decision that

prevented the NRP and Labor from avoiding fundamental differences over territorial compromise and settlement. Additionally, I scrutinize Gush Emunim’s efforts to force decisions upon the Rabin government, and the impact those decisions had on the NRP–Labor alliance.

Here, I follow Drezon-Tepler in treating Gush Emunim as an extra-parliamentary interest group whose advocacy for settlement expanded to include agitation against government policy toward

the peace process.20

3.B.3 Religion and State(craft): A Matter of Perspective?

My third working hypothesis is that the prospect of negotiations over territory raised the

question of whether, and how, to conceptualize and react to Kissinger’s diplomacy, and

statecraft generally, in terms of the ideas, principles, and imperatives of religious Judaism. This

hypothesis is informed by Shakman Hurd’s argument for research design in cognate disciplines

based on a “suspension of (dis)belief” in a “secular/religious binary” that is “fixed, secure, and

universal.” In such a binary, “normal, rational politics” are assumed to be “secular,” while “a

range of nonrational and nonuniversal dimensions... outside the range of ‘normal’ politics” are

identified as “religious.”21 Insofar as “normal” politics are often understood to be “secular,” the

“secular/religious binary” may be rephrased as a “political/religious” duality. By treating this

duality as historically contingent, I ask whether, and how, the NRP and its interlocutors

conceptualized decisions related to the peace process in terms of realpolitik, religious principle,

20 Marcia Drezon-Tepler, “Part IV: Gush Emunim,” Interest Groups and Political Change in Israel, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 169-224 21 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “A Suspension of (Dis)Belief: The Secular-Religious Binary and the Study of International Relations,” in. Calhoun et al, eds. Rethinking Secularism, (New York: Oxford U. Press, 2011), 166- 184, esp. 170, 172.

or a combination and/or synthesis of the two. In particular, I ask whether diplomacy predicated

on territorial withdrawal was treated as a “religious” issue, a “political” issue, or both.

Tellingly, Don-Yehiya’s distinction between matters of “religion and state” and “foreign

affairs and defense issues” is a functional one, based on the impetus for decisions in a “dynamic,

international environment” that stymies efforts at accommodation. Moreover, this distinction is

the product of a debate over the “politics of accommodation” precipitated by religious

opposition to the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s.22 The second Rabin government advanced the

Oslo peace process with a one-vote parliamentary majority, and religious opponents of Oslo

objected to both the substance of the accords and the government’s unilateral decision on a

religiously charged issue.

To Hazan, Cohen, and Susser, this illustrates the replacement of the “politics of accommodation” with the “politics of decision.”23 Don-Yehiya, though, argues that the “politics

of accommodation” endured, but only on issues of religion and state. Rabin and the proponents

of Oslo “perceived the peace process in purely political terms.” Therefore, Rabin did not employ

methods of accommodation used to manage disagreements over “religious” issues because he did

not consider the Oslo peace process a “religious” issue.24 Insofar as proponents of Oslo

perceived territorial compromise as a “purely political” matter, while opponents perceived it as

22See, Arend Lijphart, “Israeli Democracy and Democratic Reform in Comparative Perspective, in Spritznak, Ehud and Larry Diamond (eds.) Israeli Democracy Under Stress (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 1993) 107-124; Reuven Y. Hazan, “Religion and Politics in Israel: The rise and fall of the Consociational Model,” Israel Affairs, 6:2 (1999) 109-137; Asher Cohen and Bernard Susser, “From Accommodation to Decision: Transformations in Israel's Religio-Political Life,” Journal of Church and State 38:4 (Autumn 1996), 817-839; Don-Yehiya, “Conflict Management of Religious Issues,” 97. 23 Reuven Y. Hazan, “Religion and Politics in Israel: The rise and fall of the Consociational Model,” Israel Affairs, 6:2 (1999) 109-137; Asher Cohen and Bernard Susser, “From Accommodation to Decision: Transformations in Israel's Religio-Political Life,” Journal of Church and State 38:4 (Autumn 1996), 817-839. 24 Don-Yehiya, “Conflict Management of Religious Issues,” Israel Affairs 6:2 (1999), 85-108, especially 86, 97.

both religious and political, the controversy over Oslo reflected a fundamental disagreement over

the distinction between “religious” issues and “foreign and defense issues.” 25 Consequently, this

distinction emerges as subjective, contested, and historically contingent. While the clash between

Rabin and other proponents of the Oslo Accords is beyond the scope of this study, it begs one

last question: Did the debate over territorial compromise between 1974 and 1977 involve competing perceptions of statecraft as either “purely political” or “religious”?

3.C Sources

I investigate these questions through a close examination of a wide variety of sources in

both Hebrew and English, including newspapers, government documents, archival material,

memoirs, and ephemera.

Ha-Tsofeh, the NRP’s daily newspaper, provides an essential record of day-to-day events

in the party, along with insight into the views of the party and its constituency. Though Ha-

Tsofeh enjoyed unparalleled access to the NRP leadership and the party’s inner workings, the paper occasionally omitted potentially embarrassing details. Therefore, I also consulted Davar, the Labor daily, and Ma’ariv, an independent publication. The Jerusalem Post and the Jewish

Telegraphic Agency’s Daily News Bulletin offer a broader view of events and perspectives both within Israel and abroad.

In addition to journalistic material, I draw upon U.S. Government documents, especially diplomatic cables from the American missions in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.26 These cables

25 Indeed, Kalman Neuman argues that the Israeli debate over territorial compromise is an issue of religion-and- state, based on the statistical correlation between religiosity and opposition to territorial concessions and the religious basis for much of the discourse among opponents of ceding territory. Kalman Neuman, Territorial Concessions as an Issue of Religion and State - Policy Paper No. 96, (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Inst., 2013). [Hebrew] 26 Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, National Archives (accessed October 24, 2019).

illuminate events from the perspective of well-informed outsiders, and they often supplement

journalistic accounts with firsthand reports of conversations with Israeli officials. The Foreign

Relations of the United States (FRUS) series provides an annotated, curated, and canonical

documentary record of Kissinger’s diplomacy. Systematic digitization by the Gerald R. Ford

Presidential Library and Museum allows for remote access to facsimiles of Kissinger’s reports to

the President on his Middle East “shuttles,” as well as draft agreements, position papers, and

other records. Additionally, the National Security Archive at George Washington University

provides (via ProQuest) indexed, searchable collections offering “a verbatim record of U.S.

diplomacy” under Kissinger. Memoranda of Conversations (Memcoms), handwritten meeting

notes, and other records of internal U.S. Government conversations help illuminate the impact of

the Labor–NRP coalition partnership on Kissinger’s decision-making, and, by extension, the

National Security Council and the President.

The main body of evidence for this dissertation, though, is derived from Israeli sources.

The memoirs of Daniel Vermus, an intimate of Zevulun Hammer and an NRP Secretary-General,

provides a firsthand perspective of the Zeirim’s “revolution.”27 The accompanying CD-ROM containing digital facsimiles of Vermus’ personal papers compensates for the occasional editorial lapses inherent in self-publishing. The personal archive of Rabbi Shlomo Goren, now housed at the Israel State Archives (ISA), includes a vast and valuable collection of press clippings, handwritten notes of conversations, protocols, official documents from the Chief Rabbinate, and more. Shifra Mescheloff’s In the Eye of the Storm is both an indispensable biographical study of

27 Daniel Vermus, The Knitted Revolution: How the Zeiri HaMaFDaL Captured the Party Leadership, (Published Privately, 2016) [Hebrew].

R. Goren and a finely tuned compass for navigating the trove of materials that R. Goren gathered

and left behind.28

I also make heavy use of protocols, memoranda, transcripts, and other documents housed

at the ISA, particularly from the bureaus of Prime Ministers Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin, as

well as Yigal Allon, Yisrael Galili, Yitzhak Raphael, Zevulun Hammer, and Yosef Burg. Burg

sat for over 120 interviews conducted by the oral history division of the Leonard Davis Institute

for International Relations. Portions of these transcribed interviews are available at the ISA and

at the Zerah Warhaftig Institute for the Study of Religious Zionism at Bar Ilan University (BIU).

The BIU archives also contain the records of the NRP Knesset Faction, including handwritten

meeting notes, press releases, and correspondence, as well as the personal papers of many key

figures, including Zerach Warhaftig and Yosef Burg.

28 Shifra Mescheloff, In the Eye of the Storm: The Public Image and Creative Torah Work of Rabbi Shlomo Goren; 1948-1994, Ph.D. Thesis submitted to the Senate of Bar-Ilan University (Ramat-Gan, Israel: July, 2010), 53.

Previous Scholarship The extant historiography of the Arab–Israeli peace process pays scant attention to the role of the NRP in the post-1973 peace process. Diplomatic and political histories of the Arab–

Israeli peace process often focus on the “heroic diplomacy” of presidents and premiers, ministers and secretaries of defense, and foreign affairs.29 Moreover, historical works on the peace process that investigate the Israeli cabinet, parliamentary, and party arenas prior to 1977 generally focus on the governing Labor party; the NRP is relegated to the background – either as a marginal coalition partner or in relation to the rise of Gush Emunim.30

Similarly, limited historiography exists pertaining to the NRP’s involvement in diplomacy, affairs of state, and security. In a concise monograph, Reiser historicizes the evolution of NRP foreign policy from 1948–1984. Using secondary literature, memoirs, and journalistic sources, Reiser describes the NRP’s shift from a cautious foreign policy favoring diplomacy in 1948–1967 to one with an increasingly hardline stance during 1967–1984. While

29 William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1986); William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967, (University of California Press, 2001); and Kenneth Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, (New York: Routledge, 1999); Gerald M. Steinberg and Ziv Rubinovitz, Menachem Begin and the Israel-Egypt Peace Process: Between Ideology and Political Realism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2019). 30 See, e.g. Shlomo Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins U., 1978). Keival pays more attention to the NRP, particularly in the Begin government. Gerson R. Keival, Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories, (Westport, Conn. and London: Greenwood Press, 1983.). Bar Siman Tov includes NRP parliamentarians in his examination of the legitimization of Israeli- Egyptian diplomacy in Israeli domestic politics. However, Bar Siman Tov’s study begins in 1977 and does not include the perspective of NRP ministers. Yaacov Bar Siman Tov, Israel and the Peace Process 1977-1982: In Search of Legitimacy for Peace, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994). Similarly, Avi Shilon, in his biography of Menachem Begin, briefly notes Begin’s decision to appoint NRP Chairman Yosef Burg as Israel’s lead negotiator on Palestinian autonomy, and recounts that Begin appealed to Burg’s religious sensibilities in convincing him to accept the position. Avi Shilon, Menachem Begin: A Life, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 316-317. The role of Yosef Burg also receives brief mention in Ephraim Dowek, “Negotiating Palestinian Autonomy,” Israeli-Egyptian Relations: 1980-2000 (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), 226-244. More recently, Burg makes brief appearance as Israel’s lead negotiator over Palestinian autonomy in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s in Seth Anziska’s revisionist history of the post Camp-David peace process. Seth Anziska, Preventing Palestine: A Political History From Camp David to Oslo (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018).

Reiser’s survey lacks historical detail and supporting archival documentation, it provides useful guideposts for further research on the NRP’s role in the peace process. 31

Don-Yehiya’s recent study of religious Zionism and affairs of state and security between

1936 and 1970 begins to fill the lacuna in the historiography of religious Zionism and the Arab–

Israeli conflict. Drawing upon extensive archival research and the conceptual tools of comparative political science, Don-Yehiya focuses on the persona of Haim Moshe Shapira, the

Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi (until 1956) leader who dominated the NRP until his death in 1970. He argues that Shapira kept operative foreign policy decisions off the agenda of the NRP’s governing bodies, affording him the freedom to act against the prevailing sentiment in the party.

Thus, Shapira took a moderate, cautious line in the cabinet room, where he played an active and, at times, decisive role in deliberations over foreign affairs and defense. While Shapira was able to suppress hawkish tendencies within religious Zionism, the fragmented NRP leadership that succeeded him lacked the will and capacity to keep these tendencies from impacting NRP policy.32

4.A Religious-Zionist Attitudes toward Affairs of State and Security

Don-Yehiya’s findings invite a new historiographical conversation about religious-

Zionist attitudes toward, and involvement in, the Arab–Israeli conflict and foreign policy in

31 Stuart Reiser, The Politics of Leverage: The National Religious Party of Israel and its Influence on Foreign Policy [Harvard Middle East Papers, Modern series no. 2], (Cambridge, MA: Center for Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University, 1984). Reiser concludes with the observation that the NRP underwent a shift toward moderation following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Barzilai’s study of the effects of war-making on Israeli society echoes Reiser’s observation that the NRP leadership retained much of its traditional reluctance to engage in military operations during the deliberations over the 1982 Lebanon War. Gad Barzilai, Wars Internal Conflicts, and Political Order: A Jewish Democracy in the Middle East, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 136. 32 Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Religious Zionism under the Leadership of Chaim Moshe Shapira and the Struggle for the Land of Israel, 1936-1970 (Sde Boker, Israel: Ben Gurion Research Inst. for the Study of Israel and Zionism, Ben Gurion U. of the Negev, 2019), especially 9-15, 446-472 [Hebrew]: For a concise presentation of this argument, see, Eliezer Don-Yehiya, “Leadership and Statecraft in Religious Zionism- Haim Moshe Shapira, the MaFDaL and the Six Day War,” in Cohen, Asher and Yisrael Harel (eds) The Religious Zionism: An Era of Changes; Studies in Memory of Zvulun Hammer (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 2004), 135-170. [Hebrew].

18 general. He refutes the popular view that religious Zionism was uninterested and uninvolved in statecraft prior to 1967.33 Moreover, his study of Shapira debunks the myth that the NRP simply fell in line with Mapai’s foreign policy.34 Consequently, Don-Yehiya rejects the argument that religious Zionism underwent a “linear” transformation from a “moderate” political force to one of “extremism.” Instead, he holds that religious Zionism fluctuated between moderation and extremism both before and after 1967.

Don-Yehiya also distinguishes between the ends of foreign policy and the means of achieving them. He asserts that the Israeli debate over matters of state and security has centered around two questions: 1) the purpose of Zionism and the State of Israel, particularly with regard to territory, and 2) the necessary and appropriate means for realizing the purpose of Zionism.

Some hold by the “maximalist” view that Zionism mandates statehood in the entire Land of

Israel, while others believe that Zionist aspirations can, and should, be realized only in part of the

Land. Similarly, some have supported the use of “activist” means – including violence – to realize Zionist aspirations, while others have opposed it. Thus, Don-Yehiya finds that the dissonance between means and ends is one of the causes of fluctuations in religious-Zionist attitudes toward foreign policy.35

33 Shapira likely contributed to the impression that the NRP was disinterested in affairs of state and simply fell in line with Mapai by keeping operative decisions on such matters of the agenda in party bodies. Don-Yehiya, Religious Zionism under Shapira, 460. 34Don-Yehiya, Religious Zionism under Shapira, 302-320, 446-448. Shapira, for instance, challenged Ben-Gurion’s “activist” approach to retaliatory border raids in the 1950’s and religious-Zionists engaged in spirited debates over the ethics and effectiveness of such raids. For a theoretical discussion of religious-Zionist views on the use of force see, Elie Holzer, “Attitudes Towards the Use of Military Force in Ideological Currents of Religious Zionism,” in Schiffman, Lawrence and Joel B. Wolowelsky, War and Peace in the Jewish Tradition (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 2007), 341-414; For a discussion of military heroism in religious-Zionist collective memory see, Dror Greenblum, “The Making of a Myth: The Story of Kfar Etzion in Religious Zionism 1948-1967,” Israel Studies 21: (2016), 132-56. 35 For instance, Don-Yehiya finds that, prior to 1947, most religious-Zionists aspired to the establishment of a state in the entire Land of Israel. Despite this maximalist objective, religious-Zionists also rejected “activist” means, opposing retaliatory attacks on Palestinians or the British. After the United Nations endorsed partition in 1947,

In addition to the dissonance between means and ends, another cause of fluctuation in

religious Zionism was the divide between elites with a stake in national governance and other,

less senior actors. Therefore, Haim Moshe Shapira conducted the NRP’s operative foreign policy

in the cabinet room, keeping hawkish elements in the party ranks from affecting operational

policy.

Although Don-Yehiya’s study ends with Shapira’s death in 1970, the issues he raises

suggest several questions relevant to my study of 1974–1977. Did religious Zionism continue to

fluctuate between moderation and extremism? How, if at all, did the post-1973 peace process

impact the debate over Zionism’s territorial objectives and the means to achieve them?

Moreover, why did the NRP leadership that succeeded Shapira fail to restrain the hardline

elements within religious Zionism?

4.B Processes of Change in Religious-Zionist Politics

These questions are closely related to processes of change within the NRP and religious

Zionism. The identification of multiple inflection points in the development of religious-Zionist

politics and ideology further problematizes the notion that religious Zionism underwent a linear

transformation.

Garb’s study of Alei Mishmeret , the NRP Zeirim’s bulletin in the 1950s and 1960s, treats

the advent of the Zeirim as the locus of change in religious-Zionist politics, though he also locates the origins of Gush Emunim among the Zeirim due to the involvement of many Gush

Emunim activists with the NRP Zeirim (in their various incarnations) during the late 1950s and

though, most religious-Zionists accepted it, rejecting a maximalist territorial stance until 1967. Concomitantly, support grew for “activist” means to combat cross-border infiltration, guerrilla raids, and sabotage. Don-Yehiya, Religious Zionism under Shapira, 448-449, 452-453.

20 early 1960s.36 Schwartz also identified the advent of the Zeirim as the driving force of change in religious-Zionist politics.37 More recently, though, Sagi and Schwartz’s study of the impact of the 1967 Six-Day War on religious Zionism alludes to two “constitutive events” that drove processes of change within religious Zionism: the advent of the Zeirim and the advent of Gush

Emunim after 1973.38

Inbari identifies the diplomatic process orchestrated by Henry Kissinger following the

1973 war as the “watershed” for R. Zvi Yehudah Kook, who grew uneasy with the direction of

Zionism and the state of Israel, as it negotiated on the basis of “land for peace.” Gush Emunim,

Inbari argues, was a “counterreaction” to Kissinger’s diplomacy aimed at “prevent[ing] a retreat from the achievements secured in the Six-Day War.”39 Hellinger, Hershkowitz, and Susser also identify Kissinger’s diplomacy as a key moment in the development of religious-Zionist ideology, Halakha, and political theology with regard to civil disobedience and (occasionally violent) protest against territorial withdrawal. Indeed, they argue that R. Zvi Yehudah articulated

36 Yoni Garb, “The MaFDaL Youth and the Conceptional Roots of Gush Emunim,” in Cohen, Asher and Yisrael Harel (eds) The Religious Zionism: An Era of Changes; Studies in Memory of Zvulun Hammer (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 2004), 171-200. [Hebrew]. Garb challenges the view of Aran and others that Gush Emunim’s origins may be traced to Gahelet. See, Gideon Aran, “From Religious Zionism to Zionist Religion: The Roots of Gush Emunim,” Medding, Peter Y., ed. Studies in Contemporary Jewry II (Bloomington: Indiana U. Press, 1986), 116-143; See, also, Samuel C. Heilman, “Guides of the Faithful: Contemporary Religious-Zionist Rabbis,” in Appleby, R. Scott, (ed.) Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East (U. of Chicago Press, 1997) 328-362. 37 Dov Schwartz, “From the First Flowering to Fulfilment,” in Cohen, Asher and Yisrael Harel (eds) The Religious Zionism: An Era of Changes; Studies in Memory of Zvulun Hammer (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 2004), 24-134. 38 Sagi and Schwartz, Religious Zionism and the Six-Day War: From Realism to Messianism, Trans. Batya Stein (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), 4. Sandler, as well, argues that the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War was the pivotal moment that transformed religious-Zionism, as it birthed the Gush Emunim movement. Shmuel Sandler, The State of Israel, The Land of Israel: The Statist and Ethnonational of Foreign Policy (Westport Conn. & London: Greenwood Press, 1993) 155-157. 39 Inbari’s study of messianic, religious-Zionist responses to territorial withdrawal focuses mainly on Gush Emunim and other “fundamentalists.” Utilizing theories of “cognitive dissonance caused by “failed prophecy,” Inbari demonstrates the theological and ideological impact of the “Land-for-Peace” formula after it became operational following the 1973 war, and subsequent peace processes. In arguing that Gush Emunim was born of messianic crisis, Inbari disputes Ravitzky’s assertion that the messianism of Gush Emunim was based in triumph and success. Motti Inbari, Messianic Religious Zionism Confronts Israeli Territorial Compromises (Cambridge University Press, 2012); Aviezer Ravitzky, “The Messianism of Success in Contemporary Judaism,” in The Encyclopedia of Apocalypticism, 3: Apocalypticism in the Modern Period and the Contemporary Age, edited by Stephen Stein, Stephen (New York and London: Continuum, 1998) 204–29.

a new doctrine between 1974 and 1977 as the basis for his challenge to the legitimacy of the first

Rabin government and the anathematization of Kissinger.40

The aforementioned works historicize the emergence of ideas and religious change,

placing them in the context of concomitant events in the political and international arenas. These

works connect changes in religious-Zionist ideology and theology to political and diplomatic

events. However, they do not reconstruct the participation of religious Zionism’s elected

representatives in those events. To the extent that the NRP enters the picture, the Zeirim receive pride of place as fellow travelers with Gush Emunim. The post-1973 period is identified as a key turning point for religious Zionism, with Henry Kissinger emerging as R. Zvi Yehudah’s nemesis. Yet, there is no reconstruction of religious Zionism’s encounters with Kissinger’s diplomacy “on the ground.”

There is no denying the impact of changing religious-Zionist ideology and theology on

Israeli politics and society, as well as the Arab–Israeli conflict and peace process. Religious

Zionism has undoubtedly undergone profound and consequential changes as a religious-political force. Moreover, these developments cannot be understood without historicizing religious

Zionist ideology and theology in light of concomitant political events. However, we cannot fully understand “what happened to religious Zionism” without first asking, “What happened?”

While Don-Yehiya’s study illuminates “what happened” until 1970, Kampinsky’s recent articles begin to address this question during a later period. Kampinsky sees the “revolution” of

40 Moshe Hellinger, Isaac Hershkowitz, and Bernard Susser, Religious Zionism and the Settlement Project: Ideology, Politics, and Civil Disobedience (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2018.

the Zeirim as the main process of change in religious-Zionist politics, but he finds that this revolution produced moderation, not extremism. Though his study focuses on the period after

1977, Kampinsky locates the beginning of this “moderation process” in Hammer’s reactions to

Gush Emunim’s settlement bids at Sebastia. In 1974, Hammer joined the settlers in solidarity and lambasted Labor from the Knesset rostrum for preventing Jewish settlement in the Land of

Israel. During the December 1975 Sebastia standoff, however, Hammer took the “more state-like official stance” expected of a cabinet minister.

After Likud took power in 1977, the NRP supposedly went from an “appendage” of

Labor to a “prominent member” of the Begin government, bearing national responsibility.

Therefore, Hammer and the Zeirim shelved the implementation of “the Whole Land of Israel” and took moderate foreign policy positions by supporting (or at least acquiescing to) the peace accords with Egypt and opposing the expansion of hostilities during the Lebanon war.41 Hence,

Kampinsky locates the NRP’s “right-wing shift” in its reaction to the Oslo Accords in the early

1990s.42

Though Kampinsky points to the significance of the period between 1974 and 1977, his

work focuses on the peace process after 1977. Moreover, it is impossible to contrast the NRP’s

role in the Begin government without examining its role in the first Rabin government.

41 Aharon Kampinsky, “The impact of political upheaval on a party's ideational position: the MaFDaL and the 1977 upheaval,” Israel Affairs 24:6 (2018), 958-975, especially 962. See, also, Kampinsky, “Minister Zevulun Hammer's Ambivalent Attitude to the Peace Process with Egypt,” Iyunim 33 (Ben Gurion U. of the Negev, 2020) 40-63 [Heb.]. 42 Kampinsky, “The impact of political upheaval,” 970-971. Several of Kampinsky’s empirical findings are worthy of additional scrutiny. The NRP was, indeed, a “prominent member” of the Begin government: Begin understood the necessity of a coalition partnership with the NRP, was close to traditional Judaism, and appointed NRP leader Yosef Burg to lead the Israeli negotiating team over Palestinian autonomy. However, the NRP was hardly a mere “appendage” in the first Rabin government. Indeed, I argue that the NRP was a force for restraint in the Rabin cabinet, and Kampinsky’s description of the NRP’s “moderation” in the Begin government may also be characterized as restraint and caution. Similarly, I find that Hammer’s behavior as a cabinet minister during the Sebastia standoff in 1975 was in sharp contrast with vocal criticism of the Rabin government from the Knesset rostrum the previous year. However, it is unclear whether this reflects moderation on Hammer’s part, or differences between the two situations.

Therefore, a study of the NRP’s involvement in the peace process in 1974–1977 remains

necessary.

The Significance of this Study This dissertation makes an original contribution to knowledge by illuminating the

organic, causal relationships between the Arab–Israeli peace process, inter-factional competition within the NRP, and the deterioration of NRP–Labor relations. I build a detailed, historical reconstruction of the day-to-day actions, debates, and decisions of NRP officials and their interlocutors regarding the Arab–Israeli conflict and peace process between 1974 and 1977. By reconstructing religious-Zionist praxis in the cabinet, legislative, and partisan arenas, I contribute to the historiography of the Arab–Israeli peace process as well as the historiography of religious

Zionism.

I add to our understanding of the Arab–Israeli conflict and peace process by including hitherto neglected actors – including NRP officials, party activists, and rabbinic figures – who had a discernible interest in and impact on the peace process. I demonstrate how these actors involved themselves in statecraft, coalition governance, and party politics, thereby influencing the decisions by Israeli and American officials to pursue an interim accord with Egypt and to repeatedly pass over a “next step” with Jordan during the course of Rabin’s first term.

This investigation of the NRP’s role in the peace process also contributes to the scholarly debate over processes of change in religious Zionism. Following Don-Yehiya, I problematize the

claim that religious-Zionist ideology and politics underwent a linear transformation from

moderation to extremism traceable to a specific watershed moment. Although Kissinger’s post-

1973 diplomacy sparked theological innovations by R. Zvi Yehudah and the emergence of Gush

Emunim, these changes were not characteristic of religious Zionism as a whole. Indeed, I find

that religious Zionism’s elected representatives held a range of views on the peace process

between 1974 and 1977. Moreover, adherents of R. Zvi Yehudah were in the minority among

NRP-elected officials. Indeed, the very notion of applying religious principles in response to

American-mediated diplomacy was, itself, a major bone of contention within the NRP as well as

among rabbinic figures. Therefore, it is impossible to speak of a linear transformation within

religious Zionism.

Furthermore, my detailed examination of this period demonstrates that processes of

change within the NRP impacted – and were impacted by – relations with Labor. I argue that

Kissinger’s diplomacy – along with Gush Emunim’s protests and countermoves by the Palestine

Liberation Organization (PLO) and Syria – forced the Rabin government and the NRP to make

decisions with possible implications for the future of the territories. These decisions, spread

throughout Rabin’s term, were catalysts for confrontation between the NRP and Labor, as well as

conflict within the NRP.

Confrontation, though, went along with cooptation. The Zeirim joined the Rabin cabinet,

made deals with parts of the Old Guard, and eventually entered into a power-sharing arrangement to oust Raphael. It is imprecise to speak of a “revolution” led by the Zeirim during the mid-1970’s, when processes of political and ideological change in the NRP were contested, ambivalent, and inchoate. I therefore characterize these processes as inter-factional competition, rather than “revolution.” Moreover, I argue that these processes were historically contingent and shaped by a series of discernable episodes in which the NRP and others reacted to developments with implications for the future of the territories captured in 1967.

Description of Chapters This dissertation consists of six chapters organized chronologically. The first chapter

examines the Zeirim’s bid to obstruct the formation of a Labor–NRP coalition by demanding

that Labor foreswear territorial concessions in the West Bank, form a unity government with

Likud, and amend the Law of Return to recognize only Orthodox conversions to Judaism. Labor

and the NRP “Old Guard” reached an accommodation over the West Bank: the government

could negotiate an accord, but any coalition party could demand elections to ratify territorial concessions. In response, the Zeirim shifted their focus to recognition of Orthodox conversions, leading the party leadership to seek the Chief Rabbinate’s permission to join the coalition. The chapter continues with an examination of the discourse in rabbinic circles prior to the Chief

Rabbinate’s surprise decision to prohibit the NRP’s entry into the government. Following reports of a security crisis, the NRP Old Guard joined Golda Meir’s short-lived government in defiance of the Chief Rabbinate.

The second chapter examines the ongoing struggle over the NRP’s entry into the coalition as Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren came to favor the NRP’s entry into the government. The chapter begins with the Zeirim’s propaganda campaign against the Old Guard, which culminated in a contentious meeting of the NRP Central Committee and the resignation of Welfare Minister

Michael Hazani. After Meir’s abrupt resignation, the NRP leadership refused to defy the

Rabbinate again by joining Yitzhak Rabin’s new government in June 1974. R. Goren, though, traveled to the United States in search of a legislative compromise on conversions that would allow the NRP to join the government. After Labor rejected his compromise, R. Goren blamed the NRP Zeirim, Gush Emunim, and R. Zvi Yehuda Kook for using conversion as a pretense to

keep the NRP out of a Labor-led government willing to concede territory. Rabin, however, was determined to bring the NRP into the coalition. He therefore rejected American overtures for an interim agreement with Jordan over the West Bank, which would force elections should the NRP join the government. Ultimately, the US decided to pursue an Egyptian–Israeli interim agreement, and the NRP joined the Rabin government in October 1974.

The third chapter examines NRP reactions to the breakdown of American-mediated talks over an Israeli–Egyptian accord in March 1975 and the American pressure campaign in the guise of a policy “Reassessment” that followed. The Administration delayed or withheld military aid to

Israel while it reassessed its Mideast policy. The policymaking exercise clarified two alternatives: 1) the “comprehensive” option aimed at a final, contractual peace between Israel and the Arab states and 2) the “Step-by-Step” option, which meant a return to Kissinger’s

“Shuttle Diplomacy” to reach limited, bilateral agreements through American mediation, thereby marginalizing the Soviets.

“Reassessment” created opportunities for dissent on both the Right and the Left, which undercut Israeli public diplomacy in the US. NRP leaders responded to the reassessment in different ways. Raphael stressed his staunch support for Rabin, while Burg focused on healing the rupture with the US. The Zeirim, though, resolutely opposed additional concessions as

“capitulation” to American pressure, which would harm the nation’s spirit—the true source of

Israel’s strength. Raphael and Burg both supported a return to “Step-by-Step” peacemaking,

while Avraham Melamed, Chairman of the NRP Knesset Faction, favored an Eban-esque

comprehensive peace. Unlike Eban, Melamed framed his argument in religious terms,

advocating for the “Judaism of Rabbi Yohanan Ben Zakai,” which championed the principle of

“pikuah nefesh” – safeguarding human life.

The diversity of views within the NRP translated into different courses of action. Burg

and Raphael were both alarmed by Israeli spokespeople in the US who took (what they

considered) overly dovish views. Burg responded by raising the issue in the Cabinet, while

Raphael publicly defended the government line. Hammer and Ben-Meir dissented from the

Right, brining “national-religious” public diplomacy to the US. In contrast, Melamed voiced

dissent from the Left, co-founding the “Intellectual-Political Circle for Balanced Religious

Zionism,” which eventually became the religious-Zionist peace movement Oz VeShalom. While

the Circle was met with approval from some Laborites, the group of three-dozen intellectuals

could not compete with R. Zvi Yehudah Kook’s call to rebel against foreign “coercion.”

As the peace process picked up steam, the differences between the Zeirim and the Old

Guard on US–Israel relations came into focus. While the Old Guard stressed Ben-Gurion’s doctrine of ensuring great power support, the Zeirim stressed self-reliance and spiritual resilience. Thus, Ben-Meir orchestrated a clever parliamentary gambit to reallocate funds for military research, development, and manufacturing, thereby wreaking havoc in the coalition. As

Kissinger’s return grew more likely, Burg called for mending fences with the Administration, while Hammer and Ben-Meir headlined a rally that devolved into an anti-American protest and a march on the U.S. Embassy.

The fourth chapter centers on Hammer’s appointment to the Rabin cabinet, the successful resumption of talks over a Sinai accord, and the shock of Gush Emunim’s unprecedented anti-

Kissinger protests. In June 1975, Welfare Minister Hazani’s sudden death put Hammer in line for

28 the cabinet seat, and the Zeirim reconsidered their refusal to join the government. Rav Goren had long believed that Hammer could best influence the peace talks from within, and the Chief

Rabbinate gave Hammer and Ben-Meir dispensation to join the government. Hammer’s nomination was put on hold, though, by Kissinger’s return to the region and Gush Emunim’s mass demonstrations.

These demonstrations involved unprecedented civil unrest, leading to clashes between protestors and the police. As a result, the NRP debate over the interim agreement went hand-in- hand with a debate over Gush Emunim’s conduct and the police response, deepening existing fissures within the party. The Zeirim steadfastly opposed the agreement and defended Gush

Emunim, blaming the police for the violence. Burg and Raphael both supported the interim accord, but had different attitudes toward Gush Emunim. Burg was deeply opposed to the group, while Raphael attempted to engage with Gush Emunim’s moderate elements. Both were mortified by the vitriol directed at Kissinger (and at them). Ultimately, the NRP Executive deferred to Burg and Raphael and instructed the Knesset Faction to vote for the accord, while allowing Hammer and Ben-Meir to vote in accordance with their principles. The chapter concludes efforts to ease tensions in the party as it refocused on Hammer’s cabinet nomination.

Despite opposition from the Labor Alignment’s left-flank, Hammer joined the cabinet in

November 1975. It remained unclear, though, whether the Zeirim accepted coalition discipline

The fifth chapter examines the clashing responses by Gush Emunim and the Rabin government to diplomatic gains by the PLO, the escalation of inter-factional competition in the

NRP, and Rabin’s attempts to set the diplomatic and electoral agendas for 1976–1977. Gush

Emunim’s wildcat settlement bid at Sebastia in December 1975 directly challenged

29 government’s authority; however, Rabin chose to compromise by allowing the Elon Moreh group to remain temporarily in the nearby Kaddum military camp, pending a cabinet debate on settlement policy. As the cabinet debate approached, the Zeirim allied with Warhaftig and an informal group of activists (including Kaddum settlers) to establish the NRP’s largest faction.

The Zeirim also threatened to secede from the NRP unless Burg ended his entente cordial with

Raphael.

The Zeirim’s new-found power allowed Ben-Meir to avoid coalition sanctions after he denounced the Rabin government’s acceptance of an American initiative to explore the feasibility of “end-of-war” agreements with Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. The Zeirim’s growing strength also led Burg to warn Rabin that forcibly evacuating Kaddum would trigger a cabinet crisis. Rabin postponed the cabinet’s settlement debate in order to reach a compromise, but a tense meeting with the NRP Executive exposed the limits of Rabin’s empathy for religious sensibilities over territorial concessions and his as well as genuine concerns for the safety of the

Kaddum setters. The Cabinet ultimately decided to resettle the Elon Moreh group at an alternative site, but efforts to find a location acceptable to both Labor and the settlers deadlocked. Within the NRP, inter-factional discord continued to escalate between Burg and

Raphael.

The sixth chapter examines the December 1976 cabinet crisis that created a rupture between the NRP and Labor, affected a shift in the NRP balance of power, and triggered early elections that brought Likud to power. In late 1976, Burg and the Zeirim negotiated a power- sharing deal to marginalize Raphael, whose political survival depended on his position as

Minister of Religion. Therefore, Raphael led the protest in the cabinet against alleged Sabbath

desecration caused by the arrival of American F-15s. Raphael co-drafted, and then accepted, a public apology from Rabin in exchange for the NRP (except the Zeirim) voting confidence in the government.

Public uproar led Raphael to reverse his decision and persuade the NRP Knesset Faction

(except Burg) to abstain. Though the government narrowly prevailed, Rabin decided to assert his authority and dismiss the NRP ministers. Burg angrily accused Rabin of dissolving the “Historic

Alliance,” while Hammer noted that he was a long-time opponent of the partnership. Tellingly,

Raphael accused Rabin of weakening Labor’s friends in the NRP (i.e. Raphael). The Labor ministers – including Rabin – insisted that the dismissal of their NRP colleagues had no bearing on the Historic Alliance. However, many in the Alignment Knesset Faction were alarmed by the rise of extremism in the NRP, exasperated by Ben-Meir’s parliamentary stunts, and angered by the NRP’s (alleged) obstruction of an accord with Jordan.

Shortly after dismissing the NRP ministers, Rabin submitted his own resignation, turning his cabinet into a caretaker government impervious to no-confidence votes. Rabin’s “Brilliant

Maneuver,” which conspicuously left the NRP out of the cabinet, triggered early elections and indeed weakened Raphael, who was ousted entirely from the NRP slate. The NRP took an ambivalent, yet significant, rightward turn in its 1977 election campaign, with Rabbi Haim

Druckman – a close disciple of R. Zvi Yehudah – joining the ticket. Burg kept the NRP’s coalition options open, while Rabin abdicated to arch-rival Shimon Peres due to alleged violations of foreign currency regulations. Likud ultimately won a decisive victory, and even the

NRP’s doves rejected the notion of a narrow Labor-led government. As the NRP Knesset Faction discussed the party’s purpose in a Likud government, the Historic Alliance had reached an end.

Chapter 1: Piety and Pretense: The NRP, the Rabbinate, and the Struggle over Coalition Formation following the Yom Kippur War

This chapter focuses on the Zeirim’s struggle to prevent the NRP from joining a Labor-

led government under Golda Meir, the intervention of the Chief Rabbinate, and the NRP

leadership’s efforts to outmaneuver the Zeirim. The first part of this chapter describes the initial

coalition maneuvering the December 1973 general elections. The growing influence of the

Zeirim led NRP negotiators to open with a hard line. They demanded that Labor forswear any

withdraw from the West Bank, amend to the Law of Return to recognize only halakhic

conversions to Judaism, and establish a unity government with Likud. The ensuing logjam in

coalition talks coincided with high-stakes diplomacy to disengage the Arab and Israeli armies, leaving American diplomats flummoxed by the Israeli preoccupation with domestic politics during a national emergency.

Labor and the NRP leadership reached an accommodation over the West Bank in which the government retained its authority to negotiate an accord, while any coalition party could force elections to ratify any concessions in the West Bank. With Labor refusing to amend the

Law of Return, the Zeirim refocused on “Who is a Jew?” to mobilize broader opposition to the

NRP’s entry into the government, thereby linking “who is a Jew?” to land-for-peace in coalition

bargaining.

The second part of the chapter examines the NRP decision to consult the Chief

Rabbinate, with the “Old Guard” counting on Chief Rabbi Goren to legitimate the NRP’s entry

into the coalition. This section begins by describing the rift between Sephardic Chief Rabbi

Ovadia Yosef, and his Ashkenazic counterpart Rabbi Shlomo Goren. Though R. Ovadia told the

NRP leadership to use their best judgment, R. Goren and the Chief Rabbinical Council (CRC)

took up the issue. The prospect of territorial withdrawal featured prominently in the

deliberations, even though halakhic conversion was ostensibly the matter at hand. After

consulting with Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik of Boston, the Rabbinate unexpectedly refused to

allow the NRP to join the government absent a pormise to amend the Law of Return.

The third part of this chapter examines the fallout from the CRC’s surprising decision.

NRP Chairman Yosef Burg saw the CRC decision as an inappropriate intervention in coalition

politics, not a binding religious edict. Raphael, for his part, insisted that he asked Goren for

advice, not a binding ruling. Within Labor, the Zeirim and R. Goren came under fire for involving the Chief Rabbinate in the “secular” business of government. Golda Meir, though, began assembling a minority government, while NRP–Labor negotiations continued behind the scenes. The Zeirim, though, received the backing of Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook, who lent his support to the Zeirim’s struggle against the NRP joining the government. Amidst reports of a security crisis on the Syrian front, the NRP leadership reversed its position and joined the government in defiance of the Rabbinate.

The chapter concludes with the presentation of Meir’s new government, which included

Burg, Raphael, and Hazani. Though Zerach Warhaftig refused to join the cabinet in deference to the Rabbinate, he accepted party discipline and voted confidence in the government after a 10- hour debate in the Knesset plenary. The debate laid bare the divisions within the NRP; MKs from the Old Guard factions deflected criticism for defying the Rabbinate, while Zevulun

Hammer warned that the NRP risked a schism by remaining in the cabinet. However, the abrupt resignation of Golda Meir’s cabinet several weeks later gave the Zeirim another chance to

33 obstruct efforts by Yitzhak Rabin to form a new government with the NRP, which is the focus of the next chapter.

“Opening Feints”: Coalition Negotiations Following the 1973 Knesset Elections

Postponed due to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, elections for the eighth Knesset were held on December 31, 1973.1 The Labor Alignment2 garnered 51 seats – five less than it held in the previous Knesset. It faced strong competition from Likud (39 seats), a new bloc of right-wing factions led by Menachem Begin. The NRP remained the third-largest faction in the

Knesset, though it won only 10 Knesset seats, down from 12.3

Within the NRP, the balance of power was also shifting. The Zeirim were bolstered by the party’s strong showing in municipal elections, in which “authentic representatives of the

‘Zeirim’ were elected for the first time.”4 Increasingly influential within the party, the Zeirim was emboldened by Likud’s gains and Labor’s weakness. Although Likud lacked the strength to form a government, the Zeirim believed that Labor’s poor showing of 51 mandates would afford

1 “1973 – Elections for the Eighth Knesset – Additional Information,” The Elections of 1973, Elections Collection, Ephemera, Jerusalem: National Library of Israel. http://web.nli.org.il/sites/NLI/Hebrew/collections/treasures/elections/all_elections/Pages/1973-data.aspx [Accessed May 7, 2018]; “1969 – Elections for the Seventh Knesset – Additional Information,” The Elections of 1969,” The Elections of 1969, Elections Collection, Ephemera (Jerusalem: National Library of Israel) http://web.nli.org.il/sites/NLI/Hebrew/collections/treasures/elections/all_elections/Pages/1969-data.aspx [Accessed May 7, 2018]; Daniel Vermus, The Knitted Revolution: How the Zeirei HaMaFDaL Captured the Party Leadership, (Israel: Published Privately, 2016), 81.” [Hebrew] Vermus, a longtime Zeirim activist, consiglieri to Zevulun Hammer, and NRP Secretary-General from 1978-1982, offers a first-hand account of the Zeirim’s conquest of the NRP and its role in government. I thank Ilana and Daniel Vermus for providing a copy Dr. Vermus’s memoir and a CD-ROM disc containing digital facsimiles of material from Dr. Vermus’s personal papers. 2 For a concise, yet precise, overview of the splits and mergers of the Labor movement which led to the formation of The Alignment, see: Asher Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Generation (Chatham,N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1985), 71-79. 3 Ibid; Golda Meir, My Life (Tel Aviv: Sifri'at Ma'ariv), 329-333. 4 Vermus, 81-82. The NRP Faction led by Zevulun Hammer and Yehudah Ben-Meir went by a number of appellations, such as, Zeirei Ha’MaFDaL (the NRP Youth), Siyat Ha-Zeirim (the Youth Faction), Hugei Ha- Tzeirim, (The Youth Circles), and the “Young Guard,” or Mishmeret HaTeirah, after the NRP’s youth auxiliary where the “Zeirim” got their start in the party. The faction was most often referred to simply as the “Zeirim,” (Literally, the “Youths”). The group was also commonly referred to as the “Young Guard” in English.

the NRP extra leverage in the upcoming coalition negotiations; with its 10 MKs, the NRP’s entry

into a Labor government would give the coalition its parliamentary majority. To the Zeirim the

outcome of the elections was “the dream of every mid-sized party.” 5

The NRP’s pragmatic, veteran leadership “faced a dilemma.”6 During the campaign, the

NRP had promised to demand an amendment to Israel’s Law of Return so that only those who

underwent conversions according to Halakha (Jewish Law) would be recognized as “Jews”

eligible for Aliyah, or immigration to Israel. Many NRP voters and, no less, its rabbinic

supporters, expected the party to make good on its promise.7

Prime Minister Golda Meir was loathe to accept NRP demands while IDF reservists in

the “freezing cold” were intermittently exchanging fire along the Egyptian and Syrian fronts. On

the diplomatic front, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger shuttled between Israel and Arab

capitals to de-escalate the military situation, keeping Meir occupied. Meir correctly viewed the

NRP’s demand on “who is a Jew?” as the product of inter-factional competition within the party,

and took a dim view of politicking during a national emergency.8 More importantly, though,

Meir strove to maintain Israel’s relationship with the non-Orthodox majority of American Jewry,

whose support would be vital to withstanding American diplomatic pressure.9

Indeed, as Meir tended to separation-of-forces agreements with Egypt and Syria and preparations for the Geneva Peace Conference, U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Keating kept a close

5 Vermus, Knitted Revolution, 81-82. 6 Vermus, 82. 7 Vermus, 82. The Law of Return offers any Jew (as well as certain family members of a Jew) the right to immigrate to Israel and receive citizenship, but the definition of “Jew” was (and remains) the subject of perennial controversy. See, The Law of Return, 5710 – 1950 and, specifically, The Law of Return (Amendment number 2) 5730 – 1970. 8 Meir, My Life, 329-330. 9Kenneth Keating, Embassy Tel Aviv to Department of State, “Israeli Elections” Telegram 00092, Jan. 7, 1974, 1974TELAV00092, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, National Archives (accessed July 6, 2018). [All American diplomatic cables cited hereinafter are taken from this record group]

watch on the coalition negotiations.10 Keating’s dispatches to Washington and the U.S.

delegation in Geneva predicted that “intense maneuvering” to form a coalition would last “at

least several weeks.” The NRP had opened with a “hard line” on the West Bank and demanded a

unity government with Likud. Labor, in turn, hinted at “deals which could exclude [the] NRP.”

The ambassador predicted that these “opening feints” would give way to a “serious negotiation

effort” with a high probability of success.11 Labor and the NRP were expected to take a common

position on the “immediate issues” related to disengagement negotiations with Egypt and Syria.

Keating expected the two parties to “fuzz or defer [the hard questions]” over the West Bank,

with Labor providing “additional incentives” to entice the NRP.12

While this type of logrolling was typical of the Historic Alliance between Labor and the

NRP, it was precisely what the NRP’s insurgent Zeirim were determined to prevent.13 Led by

Zevulun Hammer and Yehudah Ben-Meir, the Zeirim staunchly opposed any withdrawal from

“Judea and Samaria” (the West Bank), the biblical heartland of Eretz Yisrael. They also resented the NRP leadership’s willingness to play a supporting role on the national stage for the sake of narrow, sectoral interests. The Zeirim thus pushed the NRP leadership to take a hard line in the coalition talks, demanding that Labor forswear territorial concessions in the West Bank, establish a unity government with Likud, and amend the Law of Return.14

10 Keating to State, “Israeli Elections,” 1974TELAV00092 (Jan. 7, 1974). 11 Keating to State, “Israeli Elections,” 1974TELAV0457, (Jan. 7, 1974). 12 Keating to State, “Negotiations for New Coalition Government Get Underway,” 1974TELAV00217 (Jan. 11, 1974). 13 Vermus 81-83; Keating to State, “Status of Coalition Talks,” 1974TELAV00295 (January 18, 1974). The NRP Faction led by Zevulun Hammer and Yehudah Ben-Meir went by a number of appellations, such as, Zeirei Ha’MaFDaL (the NRP Youth), Siyat Ha-Zeirim (the Zeirim), Hugei Ha-Tzeirim, (The Youth Circles), and the “Young Guard,” or Mishmeret HaTeirah, after the NRP’s youth auxiliary where the “Zeirim” got their start in the party. The faction was most often referred to simply as “The Zeirim,”(Lit. The Youths”). The group was also commonly referred to as the “Young Guard” in English 14 Vermus, 82; Shifra Mescheloff, In the Eye of the Storm: The Public Image and Creative Torah Work of Rabbi Shlomo Goren; 1948-1994, Ph.D. Thesis submitted to the Senate of Bar-Ilan University (Ramat-Gan, Israel: July, 2010), 53.

The Alignment also faced a hard line on the Left. The Independent Liberal Party (ILP)

and Shulamit Aloni’s newly elected – and staunchly secularist – Citizens Rights Movement

(CRM) opened discussion to form a joint parliamentary bloc to increase their leverage over

Labor. The would demand the right to introduce legislation for a written constitution, civil

marriage, and other limits on religion in the public sphere. In exchange, the secularist parties

offered the Alignment a 61-member coalition.15

The NRP, for its part, softened its position. While the party publicly reiterated its demand

for a unity government with Likud, it “pointedly made clear that this [was] not an ultimatum.”16

After a conversation with Ariel Sharon, Keating reported that “at least some senior leaders of

Likud believe[d] [that the] Labor Alignment [would] succeed in forming [a] new government.”17

Thus, the NRP was expected to drop the demand for a unity government “in [the] next few

days.” The main challenge would be finding a middle ground with the NRP on religious issues,

but the embassy assessed that the “prospects [were] reasonably good” that Labor would

succeed.18

1.A Israel’s “Schizophrenic” Politics: Coalition Talks in the Face of Geopolitical Crisis

Egypt and Israel reached a separation-of-forces agreement on January 17, 1974, which was signed the next day in Geneva. The deal was brokered by U.S. Secretary of State Henry

Kissinger, who frantically “shuttled” between Cairo and Jerusalem.19 The focus of American

mediation would now shift to the north, where Israeli troops remained in artillery range of

15 Keating to State, “Negotiations for New Coalition Government Get Underway,” 1974TELAV00217 (January 11, 1974), 2. 16 Keating to State, “Negotiations for New Coalition,” 1. 17 Keating to State, “Negotiations for New Coalition,” 2 18 Keating to State, “Negotiations for New Coalition, 2. 19 “Telegram from Secretary of State Kissinger to the Mission to the United Nations (Jerusalem, January 17, 1974),” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, ed. Adam M. Howard (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011) [Hereinafter, FRUS XXVI], Document 10.

Damascus and Syria held an undetermined number of Israeli prisoners of war (POWs).

Ambassador Keating, though, was confounded by Israel’s “schizophrenic” political leadership.

The separation-of-forces negotiations with Egypt and Syria “loomed over all other international

events,” while Golda Meir considered the POWs’ return a personal priority and a central

objective for the Israeli government. Yet, Israel’s leaders were pre-occupied with “[the] age-old

question of [the] relationship between religion and state.”20

Keating also reported that the NRP leadership continued to publicly demand that Labor foreswear any withdrawal from the West Bank. During formal consultations with President

Ephraim Katzir, the party also pressed for a national unity government. Behind the scenes, though, there were signs that the NRP would drop its demand for “stipulations on the West

Bank” and agree to continue the previous government’s foreign policy. Indeed, the Alignment’s

Gad Ya’acobi, then Deputy Minister of Transportation, told American diplomats that a Labor–

NRP deal on foreign policy and the distribution of cabinet portfolios had been “virtually

achieved.”21

Ya’acobi’s report quickly proved premature. The embassy reported that the controversy

over “who is a Jew?” had “emerged more sharply” as the “obstacle” to forming a new

government. The NRP continued to insist on amending the Law of Return as a precondition to

entering the government, and Labor threatened to form a government without the NRP, or even

to call new elections. Meanwhile, the U.S. embassy continued to predict that “a solution would

be found out of the impasse,” though it gave no evidence to support that assertion.22

20 Keating to State, “Status of Coalition talks”. 21 Keating to State, “Status of Coalition Talks”. 22 Keating to State, “Coalition Discussions Hit Snag on Who is a Jew” 1974TELAV0457 (January 25, 1974).

By the end of January 1974, President Katzir concluded his obligatory consultations with

representatives of the Knesset factions and formally tasked Golda Meir with forming Israel’s

next government. This gave Meir until February 20 to assemble and present a government to the

Knesset, though Katzir could grant an extension.23 Labor’s coalition negotiators, led by Finance

Minister Pinchas Sapir, intensified their efforts to close a deal with the NRP.

Sapir came out publicly against forming a narrow coalition without the NRP during a meeting of Labor’s central committee. In a private conversation with Ambassador Keating, MK

Haim Zadok expanded upon Sapir’s statement. Bringing the NRP into the government was vital,

Zadok explained, lest the NRP “link up with [the] opposition Likud.” The chances of a deal were

“quite good,” Zadok believed, since the NRP could not afford to lose its ministerial portfolios and patronage.24

Zadok’s optimism reflected the conventional wisdom that the NRP and Labor would eventually sign a coalition deal, as they always had. The NRP and Labor had a long-standing

arrangement: The NRP guaranteed Labor’s political hegemony, while Labor provided its junior

partner with outsized influence on questions of “religion and state,” ministerial fiefdoms, and a

hearty slice of the coalition pie. Moreover, the “Historic Alliance” between the two parties

predated the state, allowing the religious-Zionist and Labor-Zionist camps to accommodate their differences for the sake of national unity.

Keating’s cables reflected this conventional wisdom, combining reports of deadlock with dissonantly optimistic predictions. He reported that Labor would not agree to amend the Law of

Return to meet Orthodox demands and that Meir had promised as much to the Jewish Agency’s

23 “Announcement to the Knesset on the Matter of the Bestowal of the Task of Forming a Government upon Member of Knesset Golda Meir,” Divrei Knesset v. 69 (Feb. 4, 1974), 167. 24 Keating to State, “Prospect for Formation of New Israeli Government,” 1974TELAV00598 (February 1, 1974).

Board of Governors on January 30. This was largely “because it would cause [a] rift between

Israel and American Jewry.” While a compromise on “who is a Jew?” had yet to be found, the

embassy held that it was in each party’s interest to form a government and that neither would

benefit from snap elections. Keating therefore continued to believe that that Labor, the NRP, and

the Independent Liberals would almost certainly “find [a] way out of [the] current impasse.”25

Unbeknownst to Keating, on January 31, the Chief Rabbinate sent letters to Knesset

Speaker Yisrael Yeshayahu and to Eliyahu Mizrahi, Prime Minister Golda Meir’s bureau chief.

Foreshadowing later events, the letters called the Knesset and the government’s attention to the

Rabbinate’s recent decision that “all conversions in Israel and the Diaspora must be conducted in

accordance with the Halakha as it has been established, accepted, and sanctified for

26 generations.”67F Any other conversion procedure was tantamount to planting “a strange weed in

27 the vineyard of the House of Israel and [had] no halakhic or Jewish validity.”68F The message

from R. Goren – who envisioned an expanded role for the Chief Rabbinate in military and diplomatic affairs – was clear: The Rabbinate considered itself a stakeholder in the on-going

28 coalition talks.69F

***

As coalition negotiations continued in February, the conventional wisdom among

“political observers” held that Labor and the NRP would hammer out a compromise on “who is a

Jew?” and establish a coalition. The ILP and CRM failed to create a joint bloc, leading the ILP to

25 Keating to State, “Prospect for Formation of New Israeli Government.” 26 Akiva Moshe Gottleib to Eliyahu Mizrahi, 8 Shevat 5734 – January 31, 1974; Akiva Moshe Gottleib to Yisrael Yishayahu, 8 Shevat 5734 – Jan. 31, 1974, ISA P/5084/17. 27 Ibid. 28 “Decision of the Supreme Rabbinical Council of 7 Shevat 5734 [January 30, 1974],” quoted in Shmuel Katz, “Yoman Peulot Shel HaRahabanut HaRashit” [A Journal of the Activities of Chief Rabbinate], Collection of Articles in Celebration of Seventy Years Since the Establishment of the Israel Chief Rabbinate, Volume III (History and Personalities) ed. Dr. Itamar Warhaftig and R. Shmuel Katz (Jerusalem: Heichal Shlomo Publications, 5762 [2002]), 1157-1501, 1411.

demonstrate more flexibility as Labor reached out to Agudat Yisrael.29 On February 4, a Labor

spokesperson told U.S. diplomats that talks would come “down to the wire.” The Alignment had

no desire to face the electorate after an unpopular cut in government subsidies, though

“considerable tension and uncertainty” were likely to continue.30 The Embassy was also told by

an NRP lawmaker that Meir would have to make a better offer on “who is a Jew?” to avoid

returning to the polls. While Ambassador Keating remained confident that Sapir would find a

solution, the Ambassador was forced to admit that, “just how he will perform this feat… remains

to be seen.”31

1.B The View from Washington: “The Problem is the Religious Party”

As Israel and Egypt implemented the US-brokered separation-of-forces agreement,

Secretary Kissinger turned his attention to the Syrian front. Anticipating tough negotiations,

Kissinger met with prominent members of the American-Jewish community to pre-empt domestic pushback when he pressured the Israelis.32 During the meeting, Kissinger painted a

bleak strategic picture. The Yom Kippur War caught Israel unaware and unprepared.33 “Without the [U.S.] airlift,” Kissinger argued, Israel “would have lost [the Yom Kippur War].”34 The Arab

armies now possessed the military prowess to “survive as a fighting force” and inflict intolerable

casualties until Israel buckled from within.

Another U.S. airlift would not be forthcoming, Therefore, Israel’s security depended on

Kissinger brokering a Syrian deal that created “belts so that any attack couldn’t take place

29 Keating to State, “Coalition Talks Remain Deadlocked” 1974TELAV00727 (February 7, 1974). 30 Keating to State, “Coalition Talks Remain Deadlocked.” 31 Keating to State, “Coalition Talks Remain Deadlocked.” 32 “Memorandum of Conversation [Hereinafter, Memcon], Washington, February 8, 1974: 4:20-5:40PM” FRUS XXVI, Document 23. 33 “Memcom, Washington, Feb.8, 1974, 114. 34 “Memcom, Washington, Feb.8, 1974, 114.

41 without attacking the UN.”35 Moreover, such a deal would enable “Sadat to take the next step” and reach a “territorial settlement that will take [Egypt] out of the war.”36 Kissinger tried to convince his American-Jewish interlocutors that his diplomatic efforts were vital to Israel’s survival.

Kissinger claimed that Israel ran “incredible risks” by making “outrageous proposals” during the previous round of negotiations.37 The “almost peasant-like doggedness” among

Israelis may have provided the “extraordinary endurance” for achieving Jewish statehood – which Kissinger admired. The times had changed, however, and Israel now needed “flexibility and maneuver – indeed, the qualities of the ghetto” from which Zionism had sought to liberate the Jewish people.38

Syrian President Assad was “a madman,” Kissinger asserted, and a reckless hardline position by Israel could well precipitate a breakdown in talks.39 Kissinger expressed particular concern over the “parliamentary situation, their cabinet distrust, etc.” in Jerusalem. The Israeli government did not function as a rational actor and had “lived dangerously” during the previous round of negotiations.40 Kissinger promised that “as long as I am here, we will not knowingly do anything that injures the possibility of the survival of Israel.”41 His aim was merely to “get the

Israelis to go along with saving themselves.” Still, he feared efforts to rally American Jewry against him if the negotiations got heated. The Israelis had to know, Kissinger insisted, that they could not “automatically count on mobilizing support” among American Jewry.

35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 “Memcom, Washington, Feb.8, 1974, 115-116. 38 Ibid, 114. 39 Ibid, 116. 40 Ibid, 118. 41 Ibid, 118.

Kissinger anticipated that it would be possible to negotiate with Jordan’s King Hussain

after a Syrian–Israeli disengagement. In his view, all Hussein wanted was “a foothold on the

West Bank, so that he can claim he speaks for somebody.”42 Israel could strike a deal with

Jordan by giving Hussein a small enclave around Jericho, close to the Jordan River.43 If not,

Kissinger predicted that within six months to a year, Yasser Arafat and the PLO would become the “internationally recognized” representatives of the Palestinians. If Kissinger could give Meir one piece of advice, it would be “for God’s sake do something with Hussein while he is still one of the players.”44 Unfortunately, even a limited Israeli–Jordanian deal was impossible because

“the balance of power is held by the religious party.”45 On the West Bank, Kissinger insisted,

“the problem is the religious party.”46

1.C The Alignment’s “Final Offer” and the Zeirim’s “Delaying Tactics”

Back in Israel, the Alignment proposed a moratorium on “who is a Jew?”, giving the

NRP until February 13 to accept. With the February 20 deadline fast approaching, Keating

learned from Foreign Minister Abba Eban that the Alignment had tentatively decided to form a

narrow government without the NRP. Agudat Yisrael, he claimed, had given Labor “quiet

assurances” that it would vote confidence in the government and support its position on matters

of national security.47

In Eban’s view, the NRP believed that “it had [the] Alignment over [a] barrel” and that

the way to “set [the] NRP straight” was to form a government without them. Though a minority

government would be “uncomfortable,” it would be temporary. The NRP would see that the

42 Ibid, 116. 43 Ibid, 118. 44 Ibid, 116. 45 Ibid, 116. 46 Ibid, 119. 47 Keating to State, “Formation of New Israeli Government” 1974TELAV00832 (February 12, 1974).

Alignment could manage without them, realize the limits of their influence, and return to the

government to reclaim their ministries.48

On February 14, the U.S. embassy received word that the Labor party was “in turmoil”

after a deadlock in negotiations with the NRP. Meir refused to establish a unity government with

Likud and was dead set against capitulating to the NRP on “who is a Jew?”. Meir was also loathe

to ask President Katzir for another three-week mandate to form a government beyond February

20. Moreover, she was unwilling to lead a coalition of 61 MKs that included Shulamit Aloni.49

Keating offered no further predictions during the final week of Meir’s 21-day mandate,

reporting that the Israeli political scene was suffused with an “atmosphere of intense

uncertainty.” Labor had “gone [a] considerable distance” toward meeting the NRP’s demands,

offering a moratorium on “who is a Jew” and agreeing to call elections before any withdrawal

from the West Bank. Labor also put a hefty IL 500 million on the table for West Bank

settlements. Still, the two parties continued to bargain.50

On February 16, MK Yehudah Ben-Meir told U.S. diplomats that the Zeirim would

demand that the Central Committee approve any coalition agreement with the Alignment. In a

Television interview the next day, Hammer declared that the Zeirim would oppose joining the

government when the issue was brought before the Central Committee. Meir and Hammer also

visited Katzir, asking the President to urge Meir to form a unity government. Katzir reportedly

agreed to raise the matter, but he had questions for the two MKs. While Katzir understood the

48 Keating to State, “Formation,” (Feb. 12, 1974). 49 Keating to State, “Formation of new Israeli Government: Status Report” 1974TELAV00922 (February 15, 1974). 50 Keating to State, “Coalition Talks Remain Deadlocked as Mrs. Meir’s Mandate Approaches its End,”1974TELAV00969 (February 19, 1974); “’Young NRP’ balks as coalition talks advance,” Jerusalem Post (Feb 18, 1974), 1.

NRP’s stance on Judea and Samaria, the NRP’s position on the Law of Return was less clear to him.51

Within the NRP, efforts to block the party’s entry into the government intensified.

However, Burg, Hazani, Raphael, and Warhaftig reportedly supported the compromise on “who is a Jew?”, seeing it as “a step closer.”52 For their part, the Zeirim were quick to take credit for

Labor’s commitment to increased settlement funding, even as they opposed entering the government. Later, the NRP Knesset Faction announce that it was willing to accept Labor’s moratorium on “who is a Jew?”, so long as the Chief Rabbinate approved.53 Things seemed to be moving, albeit slowly.

Keating reported that while the Chief Rabbis had “decided that the issue [was] of significant magnitude to require [a] convening of [The Chief] Rabbinical Council on February

20,” the NRP Central Committee would not meet until February 24. These “delaying tactics” placed Prime Minister Golda Meir in a bind. Meir preferred reconstituting the outgoing coalition with the NRP and Independent Liberals over a minority government. Negotiations to that end had been stymied for weeks over “who is a Jew?”, with a viable compromise emerging just as

Meir’s mandate to form a government was set to expire. President Katzir had the authority to extend Meir’s mandate, but only at her request and on the grounds that an agreement was in the making.

Thus, Meir risked telling the President that she would be able to form a government, only to have the Chief Rabbinate or the NRP Central Committee reject the deal and undermine her credibility.54 Interestingly, Keating made no mention of reports that Meir’s aversion to an

51 Ma’ariv, (Feb. 18, 1974), 1. 52“Young NRP balks,” Jerusalem Post (Feb. 18, 1974), 1. 53 Keating to State, “Coalition Talks Remain Deadlocked.” 1974TELAV00969 (February 19, 1974). 54 Keating to State, “Coalition Talks Remain Deadlocked ,”.

extension from the President was a product of her desire to focus on the Syrian disengagement

talks. Indeed, Kissinger was expected to arrive for another round of shuttle diplomacy in the

coming weeks.55

Meir also remained steadfast in opposing legislation that would exclude the Reform and

Conservative movements. On February 19, Meir met with the Zionist Executive. She praised the

NRP for its patience and its willingness to cooperate in solving the conundrum over “who is a

Jew?”. Meir also praised the Reform movement for rejecting its anti-Zionist roots and

developing closer ties with the Jewish State. In a meeting the Alignment Knesset Faction, Meir

emphasized that any ministerial committee formed to resolve the “who is a Jew?” issue would

consult with the Reform and Conservative movements as well.56

During her meeting with the Zionist Executive, Meir was asked why she refused to

establish a unity government with Likud. The questioner argued that the Alignment had nothing

to fear from Likud’s showing in the last election. Its gains were merely the result of

consolidating three smaller parties into one united bloc. Moreover, the Alignment remained the

largest faction in the Knesset. Consequently, a unity government with Likud posed no threat to

Labor’s position as the dominant party in the Knesset.57

Meir replied that her decision was based on substantive policy concerns, not partisan

politics. Israel was approaching a period of difficult diplomacy, and it needed a government

capable of making tough choices. Meir had been criticized for being a stubborn negotiator in the

past. Indeed, she would be “sorry… if there would be a government in Israel that would say ‘yes’

55 “Fear Kissinger Diplomacy May Be Affected,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:36 (New York: Feb. 21, 1974), 3. 56 “Fear Kissinger Diplomacy May Be Affected.” 57 “Reply of the Prime Minister to Question at Meeting of the Va’ad Ha-Poel HaZioni – 19.2.74,” 1. in Coalition Negotiations for the Formation of a Government (1/1974-12/1974), Israel State Archives [hereinafter ISA], A/7025/18.

to everything.” However, she would be “even more sorry” if Israel’s government were to “say no

to everything.” Meir needed a cabinet able to withstand pressure as well as make concessions in

the interests of the country. Just as Israel had to be ready for war, it also needed to be “ready to

seek out every possibility … if not for peace – then maybe for [an accord that there would be] no

war.”58

In Meir’s view, Likud was an unsuitable coalition partner. Labor was committed to

uphold the ceasefire, implement the disengagement agreement in Sinai, and make every effort to

achieve a political solution. Likud, though, had opposed the ceasefires and the disengagement

with Egypt, while adopting a rejectionist platform. Thus, Likud and Labor held conflicting and

irreconcilable positions, and a unity government between the two would be unable to reach the consensus necessary to advance the political process with Israel’s Arab neighbors.59

“Split in the House of Israel”: The NRP Consults the Chief Rabbinate Indeed, a unity government unwilling to make territorial concessions was precisely what

the Zeirim hoped to achieve.60 Once Labor and the NRP reached an accommodation on the West

Bank, the Zeirim focused on “who is a Jew?”, leading the NRP leadership – seemingly at the

initiative of Yitzhak Raphael – to approach Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren.61 R. Goren had helped

both the NRP and Labor avoid crises over “religious issues” in the past, and it was widely

expected that he would do so again to facilitate the NRP’s entry into the coalition. Had “who is a

58 “Reply of the Prime Minister to Question at Meeting of the Va’ad Ha-Poel HaZioni – 19.2.74,” 2, ISA A/7025/18; “Fear Kissinger Diplomacy May Be Affected,” JTA Daily News Bulletin, XLI:36 (New York: February 21, 1974), 3. 59 “Reply of the Prime Minister at the Va’ad Ha-Poel HaZioni,” 3; Keating to State, “Breakthrough Toward Forming New Government,” 1974TELAV00978, (February 20, 1974). 60 “Major Obstacles to Coalition Government Remain Unsolved,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI: 17 (January 24, 1974), 3; Liebman and Don-Yehiyah, 110-118; Vermus, Knitted Revolution, 84-85. 61 Ibid.

Jew?” been the only issue at play during the CRC’s deliberations, this may well have been the

case.

On the night of February 19, the NRP leadership proposed that the Knesset Faction

formally announce that “conditions have already been created for the NRP to join the Coalition.”

This would have given Meir a measure of assurance when asking Katzir for an extension.

Hammer and Ben-Meir objected, insisting that the party wait for the Chief Rabbinical Council to

convene. The Knesset Faction eventually instructed the NRP negotiators to swiftly conclude the

negotiations, consult with the Chief Rabbinate, and bring the matter before the appropriate NRP

forum for a decision.62 However, the NRP leadership was confident that R. Goren would get the

CRC to adopt a decision in favor of the NRP joining the coalition.63 U.S. Ambassador Keating

reported back to Washington that a coalition agreement was expected by the evening of February

20 and that it would be ratified by the various party committees over the next few days.64

2.A The Rift between Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren and Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef and the Controversy of the NRP’s Entry into the Government

When the CRC convened on February 20, 1974 to consider the matter of the NRP’s entry

into the government, Sephardic Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef was conspicuously absent. Despite

the precarious security situation, tense negotiations over a disengagement agreement with Syria

and the return of Israeli POWs, and the prospect of a political crisis that threatened to paralyze

the government, the two Chief Rabbis were locked in a bitter feud in full view of world Jewry, as

well as rabbinic circles in Israel and abroad. An examination of the Chief Rabbis’ activities

62 Asher Walfish, “NRP Young Guard Bid Successful,” Jerusalem Post (Feb. 20, 1974), 1; Keating to State, “Breakthrough Toward Forming New Government,” 1974TELAV00978, (February 20, 1974). 63 Walfish, “NRP Young Guard Bid Successful.” 64 Keating to State, “Breakthrough Toward Forming a Government,” 1974TELAV00987 (February 20, 1974), 3.

during and after the war illustrates not only the different roles that rabbinic leaders could – and

did – play, but also the complete breakdown in relations between R. Goren and Rav Ovadia.

During and after the war, Rav Goren and Rav Ovadia both ministered to the troops on the

front, as well as to the injured in hospital.65 In early January, R. Goren asked the Vatican to

intervene on behalf of Israeli POWs in Syria and to facilitate the return of the remains of Israeli

soldiers killed on the Egyptian front.66 R. Goren also held clandestine talks with the intelligence

officer of the Third Army, which came to light during the implementation of the Egyptian–Israeli disengagement agreement. The Egyptians told R. Goren that the remains of Israeli soldiers had been respectfully buried in temporary graves with IDs and personal effects.67

On February 5, the IDF Rabbinate’s Hevra Kadisha took custody of the remains of Israeli

soldiers killed during the Egyptian assault on the Bar-Lev line, as called for in the disengagement accord.68 The same day, British Chief Rabbi Dr. Immanuel Jacobovits publicly urged the NRP

and Chief Rabbi Goren to accept the Alignment’s offer of a moratorium on “who is a Jew?”, in

light of the ongoing state of emergency. In his view, the debate over “who is a Jew?” had

become “divisive and counter-productive.”69 It would be better, Jacobovits held, for the NRP to

focus on integrating Jewish values and identity into Israeli school curricula.

Jacobovits also acknowledged that territorial compromise in the West Bank had become

an issue in the coalition talks. He caution against rabbinic involvement in foreign policy, and

65 Katz, “Yoman Peulot Shel HaRahabanut HaRashit,” 1408-1411. 66 JTA “Goren Meets Pope’s Envoy on POWs,” The Jewish Press, (New York: July 11, 1974) in Press Clippings 1/1974-5/1974,” Personal Archive of Rabbi Shlomo Goren, ISA, P/5072/6; Katz, Yoman Peulot, 1411. 67 “Progress on Retrieval of Israeli Dead,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI: 17 (January 24, 1974), 1. 68 “Israel, Egypt Exchange Dead,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI: (Feb. 27, 1974), 2. 69 In R. Goren’s handwritten notes of a telephone conversation with Jacobovits, the British Chief Rabbi urged Goren to facilitate the NRP’s entry into the government. See R. Shlomo Goren, handwritten notes entitled “Opinion of the Chief Rabbi of England-Recorded By Telephone on Monday night from 1200-1230,” Decisions of the Chief Rabbinical Council on the Matter of Who is a Jew, Personal Archive of Rabbi Shlomo Goren, Israel State Archives, P/5084/17

warned against taking a rejectionist position. To be sure, the Jewish people’s right to the Land of

Israel was immutable. However, “what is questionable is whether we should assert [that right] at

the risk of thousands of lives.” Echoing the position of Rabbi Soloveitchik, Jacobovits also held

that the matter was for Israel’s security and diplomatic professionals to decide, not rabbis.70

Meanwhile, R. Goren’s efforts with the Vatican bore fruit on the day the CRC convened to consider the NRP’s entry into the government. Goren received a letter from Monsignor Pio

Lagghi, the Apostolic Delegate in Jerusalem. Lagghi informed R. Goren that he had brought the

Chief Rabbi’s “very humanitarian request” on behalf of Israeli POWs in Syria and the families of

Israeli MIAs to “the personal attention of the Holy Father,” Pope Paul VI. The Pope, in turn,

“made a plea to the respective civil authorities with all the means and through all the channels at his disposal.”71 Shortly thereafter, the Pope granted an audience to the parents of two Israel

POWs in Syria and confirmed that he had personally intervened on their behalf. He expressed

hope that “the positive and fruitful pursuit of negotiations will make possible the rapid exchange

of prisoners” between Israel and Syria.72

For his part, Rav Ovadia convened a special rabbinical court at the headquarters of the

IDF General Staff in November 1973. R. Ovadia established the beit din of three rabbinic judges

at the request of the IDF Chief Rabbinate. Brigadier General Mordechai Piron, the Chief Rabbi

of the IDF, joined R. Ovadia on the court, along with his second-in-command Rabbi Gad Navon.

The beit din, which met twice a week, took up the cases of Israeli troops who were missing in

70 “Rabbi Urges Disengagement of Religious Activities from Partisan Politics” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:27 (Feb. 7, 1974), 2. 71 JTA, “Pope Pleads on Behalf of Israel,” The Jewish Chronicle (Pittsburg: Feb 21, 1974), ISA P/5072/6. 72 WNS, “Pope Urges Swift Exchange of POWs” The Hebrew Watchman (Memphis, TN: March 1, 1974) ISA P/5072/6.

action to verify that they were, in fact, deceased. This, in turn, would allow their families to

properly mourn, and, critically, their spouses would be free to remarry. The beit din worked

intensively, taking up 963 cases. By February of 1974, it had been able to resolve 243, and by

May, only approximately 40 cases were still open, with R. Ovadia hopeful that solutions would

be found for these as well. 73 Years later, Rav Ovadia’s experience on the beit din would weigh

heavily on him during the controversy over the Camp David Accords and “land for peace.”

One would have expected R. Goren to participate in the beit din. Not only was Goren the leading expert on military Halakha, but he was also the Chief Rabbi of Israel and the founding

Chief Rabbi of the IDF. Indeed, R. Goren took a special interest in matters related to the IDF even after his retirement. However, relations between R. Goren and R. Piron were strained.

While touring the front lines during the Yom Kippur War, Goren saw many corpses of IDF troops in-situ. This led him to fiercely criticize Gen. Piron (who had served under Goren and succeeded him as IDF Chief Rabbi) over the military rabbinate’s handling of casualties and

MIAs during the Yom Kippur War.74 According to R. Ovadia, Piron and his deputy excluded R.

Goren from the beit din after being treated poorly while serving under his command.75 However,

the reason for Piron’s refusal to include R. Goren in the beit din may also have stemmed from

Goren’s dispute with Piron over this particular issue. Either way, the episode illustrates the

tensions generated by R. Goren’s leadership style, as well as the rift between him and R. Ovadia.

R. Ovadia also took up the cause of the remnants of Syria’s Jewish community, which

numbered approximately 3,500 persons. R. Ovadia planned a trip for the Spring of 1974 to the

73 Katz, Yoman Peulot, 1411; “Rabbi Yosef Hopes War Wil Not Leave Any ‘agunot’,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:1 (Jan. 2, 1974), 3; “Agunot May Be Free to Re-marry,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:33 (Feb. 15, 1974), 3; 73 R. Ovadia Yosef [interview] “The Rishon LeZion Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef: There is no legal validity to the decision of the Chief Rabbinical Council,” Yediot Aharonot (May 17, 1974). ISA P/5072/6. 74 Mescheloff, 32 n 176. 75 Ovadia Yosef, Yediot Aharonot (May 17, 1974), 18.

United States and Canada, under the auspices of the United Jewish Appeal and the World

Federation of Sephardic Jewry. During the trip, Rav Ovadia worked to raise awareness about the

plight of Syrian Jewry and held talks with UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, as well as with

the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate Leadership. According to R.

Ovadia’s spokesman, he asked the Congressional Leadership to intercede with Secretary

Kissinger, so that the right of Syrian Jews to emigrate would be included in his talks with

Syria.76 R. Ovadia was forced to cut his trip short, either due to the intensification of coalition

talks between the NRP and Labor or because of the resignation of a Rabbinate Kashrut official as

a result of the ongoing conflict between the Chief Rabbis.77

***

The varied activities of the Chief Rabbis in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War shared one characteristic: They were undertaken separately. Indeed, Rav Goren consulted with a wide range of rabbis from within Israel and abroad on the “who is a Jew?” issue and the question of the NRP’s participation in the government. He consulted Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik of

Boston, British Chief Rabbi Immanuel Jacobovits, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, members of the

NRP’s Haver HaRabanim, and others. However, Rav Ovadia was neither consulted nor present

during the CRC deliberations.

Rav Ovadia refused to attend meetings of the CRC, claiming that “on the council there is

only one opinion – the opinion of Rav Goren, and everyone follows him with closed eyes.”

76Ovadia Yosef (Interview) “The Rishon LeZion Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef: There is no legal validity to the decision of the Chief Rabbinical Council,” Yediot Aharonot (May 17, 1974). ISA P/5072/6; “Rabbi O Yosef: It is also possible to struggle over Who is a Jew from within the government,” Al HaMishmar (May 7, 1974), ISA P/5072/6. 77 Katz, Yoman Peulot, 1413; Deborah Lightstone, “Rabbi Yosef is Forced to Return Home: Political Pot is Boiling,” Canadian Jewish News, (Toronto: May 17, 1974) ISA P/5072/6; Ephraim Lahav, “Split in the House of Israel: While Blood Flows, Rabbis Feud” Jewish Observer and Middle East Revew (London: May 31, 1974) ISA P/5072/6; “Rabbi O. Yosef” Al HaMishmar (May 7, 1974) ISA P/5072/6.

While Goren and R. Ovadia had enjoyed a brief period of cooperation as Chief Rabbis of Tel

Aviv, their relationship soured almost immediately after their election in October 1972.78

Relations between the two continued to deteriorate in 1974, with the Chief Rabbis barely on

speaking terms. R. Ovadia charged that rabbinic appointments went only to supporters of Rav

Goren, and tried to establish a “conference of Sephardic Rabbis” in response to his

marginalization on the CRC.79

2.B Conflicting Accounts of the NRP’s Consultations with the Rabbinate

Rav Goren and the NRP leadership held consultations before the CRC convened to

discuss the NRP’s entry into the government.80 In Raphael’s telling, R. Goren implied that he

would help the NRP join the coalition and suggested that the matter be brought before the Chief

Rabbinical Council. In his memoir, Raphael claims that he refused on the spot, because the NRP

was opposed to rabbinic involvement in partisan politics.81 Raphael was surprised, then, when he

received an invitation to a special session of the CRC – an invitation that he could not refuse.

Along with Michael Hazani, Raphael explained the NRP’s reasons for joining the

government to the Council. From the moment he entered the room, though, it was clear to

Raphael that the members of the council had already made up their minds, and that his

arguments fell on deaf ears. In Raphael’s telling, the CRC fell in line with Rav Goren, who had

become a “tool” of the Zeirim. During the meeting, Goren left the room to answer a phone call.

According to Raphael, when Goren returned, he told the CRC that “Rabbi Yosef Dov Halevy

78Ovadia Yosef and Menahem Barash (interview) “The Rishon LeZion Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef: There is no legal validity to the decision of the Chief Rabbinical Council,” Yediot Aharonot (May 17, 1974). ISA P/5072/6. See also, Ovadia Yosef and David Landau (interview) “The Rishon Lezion” Jerusalem Post, (October 20, 1972), A3; David Landau, “Yosef, in tears, says he can’t work with Goren,” Jerusalem Post (Jan. 4, 1973) 1. 79Lahav,” Split in the House of Israel.” 80 Yitzhak Raphael, Not Easily Came The Light (Jerusalem: Edanim and Yediot Publishers:1981); Shlomo Goren and Raphael Bashan (interview) “The Chief Rabbi of Israel, Shlomo Goren: ‘I Offered Golda A Compromise Proposal But she Said: This won’t work, MaPaM Won’t Agree’” Yediot Aharonot (May 10, 1974), ISA, P/5072/6. 81 Raphael, 378.

Soloveitchik of Boston, the Ga’on Ha-Dor, had forbidden [The NRP’s entry into the Meir government].” According to Raphael, Goren presented R. Soloveitchik’s decision as a binding

halakhic ruling and used it to quash the debate. He and Hazani left, and the CRC published its

decision.82

Rav Goren recalled events quite differently, stating that the NRP came to him not for an

eitza – sagely rabbinic advice – but for a binding halakhic ruling. Moreover, Raphael came to R.

Goren’s office several hours prior to the CRC meeting to deny press reports that the NRP might

not abide by the Rabbinate’s decision. Had that been the case, Goren claimed, then he would

have canceled the CRC’s special session. However, Raphael had “unequivocally” pledged to

abide by the Council’s decision, and only then did Goren convene the CRC to adjudicate the

matter.83

When Raphael and Hazani appeared before the council, they declared that the NRP

would abide by the CRC’s instructions.84 Hazani and Raphael presented their case for the NRP’s

entry into the government, and the CRC thoroughly debated the issue before reaching a

unanimous decision. Goren subsequently invited the NRP leadership to his office, where he

informed them of the CRC’s decision not to permit the NRP to join the government.

According to R. Goren, participants in the meeting included Burg, Raphael, Hammer, and

Ben-Meir, along with Zvi Bernstein, the NRP Secretary-General. Goren recalled that they

appeared surprised and confused, but that Raphael reiterated his promise that the NRP would

respect the decision. Yosef Burg, however, began to “quibble over the meaning of the decision,

82 Raphael, 378. 83 “The Chief Rabbi of Israel Shlomo Goren: ‘I offered Golda a compromise proposal – but she said: 'This won’t work, MaPaM won’t Agree’” Yedioth Ahronot, Sabbath Supplement (May 10, 1974), 7. 84 Ibid. Later, Hazani and others would offer accounts of events which largely corroborate Goren’s story.

54 in order to find loopholes in it.” In response, Goren reiterated, unequivocally, that the decision was both binding and unanimous. Later, R. Goren expressed shock when the NRP entered the government in defiance of the Chief Rabbinate.85

The conflicting accounts between Raphael and R. Goren reflect the contentious relationship between the two. Raphael, who would become Minister of Religion in the new government, was in a complicated position within the party. While Raphael led the NRP’s second-largest faction, Likud U’Temurah, he also faced widespread antagonism due to allegations of past association with financial misconduct. Many blamed Raphael for the NRP’s loss of two mandates in the Knesset elections, and support was slowly building for his eventual ouster.

Raphael’s political strength would come to depend on his position as Minister of

Religion, which provided a source of patronage through appointments to local religious councils and other positions within the religious bureaucracy.86 Raphael was also the son-in-law of Rabbi

Yehudah Leib Maimon, a signatory of the Proclamation of Independence, Israel’s first Minister of Religion, the former leader of Mizrahi, and a respected rabbinic scholar. Maimon’s legitimacy and authority were primarily based on his institutional roles as a party leader and government minister. However, he was also a scholar who enjoyed religious prestige, if not authority.

Raphael attempted to cultivate similar prestige, taking office with an agenda aimed at expanding the influence of the Ministry.87

R. Goren, on the other hand, came to the Chief Rabbinate after serving as the founding

Chief Rabbi of the IDF, and later as Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv, together with R. Ovadia Yosef.

85 Ibid. 86 Dunnigan, “Current Status of the National Religious Party,” 1976TELAV08339, (Dec. 13, 1976). 87 See, e.g. “Minister Raphael: Even if I were to be impaled by Arrows and Catapults I Would Continue to be Silent,” Ma’ariv, (March 28, 1974), P/5072/6.

Goren’s forceful personality and tendency to test the limits of his authority served him well

during his tenure as Israel’s top military rabbi, as he worked to institutionalize and expand the

IDF Rabbinate’s areas of responsibility.88As Chief Rabbi, he envisioned the Rabbinate as a

“Sanhedrin on-the-way” and worked to institutionalize and expand the Rabbinate’s activities and

authority both in Israel and abroad.89 R. Goren’s vision for the Rabbinate brought him into

conflict with Raphael, as he sought to expand the Rabbinate’s activities into areas of activity

under the purview of the Ministry of Religion. In addition, Goren’s forceful personality and

unilateral leadership style contributed not only to the breakdown in relations with R. Ovadia, but

also to a personal feud with Raphael.

Therefore, when Raphael came before the CRC, Rav Ovadia’s absence worked against

him. To be sure, Rav Ovadia held that only halakhic conversions were valid, and that the Law of

Return should be amended to state this explicitly. However, at this point in his rabbinic career,

Rav Ovadia held a far narrower view of rabbinic authority than Goren.

R. Ovadia argued that “the Chief Rabbinate must deal only with matters of Halakha and

the Rabbinate.” While this included “public and mamlakhti” situations, which raised halakhic

issues, Rav Ovadia held that “under no circumstances whatsoever should [the Chief Rabbinate]

involve itself in partisan and political issues.”90 Rav Ovadia consequently saw no religious prohibition against the NRP joining the government. Indeed, he would later characterize the

CRC’s ruling as “an improper involvement of the Chief Rabbinate in matters of party politics.”91

2.C The Deliberations of the CRC on February 20, 1974

88 Mescheloff, 41-44. 89 Mescheloff, 43. 90 R. Ovadia Yosef, interview, Yediot Aharonot, (May 17, 1974). 91 Ibid.

With Rav Ovadia absent, the issue would be decided by the eight members of the CRC

who attended the meeting and Rav Goren. During the meeting, Goren also received a telephone

call from Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik that would become the subject of considerable

controversy.92 However, the documentary evidence contained in R. Goren’s files suggests that

while R. Soloveitchik’s opinion certainly carried weight, R. Goren and the CRC reached their

decision based on a number of considerations, including the prospect of an Israeli withdrawal

from the West Bank.

Goren’s file on the CRC’s “who is a Jew?” decision contains the two clauses of the

proposed coalition agreement that were the subject of the CRC’s deliberations. With regard to

“who is a Jew?”, Goren received the language of the Alignment’s final offer.93 It acknowledged

that “‘conversion’ is a halakhic concept,” and provided for the establishment of a ministerial

committee to study the issue and find an “agreed upon legal arrangement” to settle the matter

within a year. The offer had previously contained a clause directing the committee to consult

with the Chief Rabbinate as well as (non-Orthodox) rabbinic figures abroad. The NRP objected,

and the entire clause on rabbinical consultations was stricken from the final language.94

The second clause discussed by the CRC is recorded in a handwritten note in Goren’s

file.95 In anticipation of possible negotiations with Jordan, the clause stipulated that if the

government reached an agreement with Jordan that included “territorial concessions” on the

West Bank, then the issue would be brought before the public by calling an early election.96

92 London Jewish Chronicle, “The Boston rabbi who vetoed Golda’s coalition” The Jewish Week and American Examiner, (March 29, 1974), ISA, P/5072/6; “Diaspora Rabbis’ ‘Who is a Jew’ Intervention Resented in Israel,” Jewish Herald, (Johannesburg, SA: March 5, 1974), ISA, P/5072/6; “Rav Soloveitchik: ‘I do not issue rulings on the problems of The State of Israel,” Davar, March 27, 1974, ISA, P/5072/6 93 “Final Language of the Ma’arakh’s offer to the MaFDaL,” ISA, P/5084/17. 94 Asher Walfish, “NRP Young Guard Bid Successful,” Jerusalem Post (February 20, 1974), 1. 95 Shlomo Goren, handwritten note entitled “To Be Inserted into the Coalition Agreement,” ISA P/5084/17. 96 Handwritten Note “To Be Inserted,” ISA P/5084/17

During the course of the CRC’s deliberations, the issue of “who is a Jew?” would thus become

linked to the future of the territories.

As mentioned above, the CRC first heard reports from Raphael, Hazani, and Hammer

over the progress of the coalition negotiations. Afterwards, the members of the CRC exchanged

views. The CRC consisted of 10 members – five Ashkenazim and five Sephardim – as well as

the two Chief Rabbis. Of the 10, 8 were candidates supported by Rabbi Goren during the 1972

rabbinic elections. Two others, Rabbi Shlomo Yosef Zevin, the editor of the Talmudic

Encyclopedia, and Rabbi Yosef Kapah, a member of the Supreme Rabbinical Court, were highly respected scholars and consensus candidates who had been supported by R. Ovadia as well.

Rabbi Hayyim David Halevy, one of the five Sephardim on the Council, had resigned days earlier, while R. Zevin was absent due to illness. With Rav Ovadia refusing to attend the meeting due to his marginalization by R. Goren, only 9 of the Council’s 12 members (including the Chief

Rabbis) were present. R. Goren took notes during the meeting and recorded the gist of each member’s remarks.97

R. Katriel Fischel Tchursh, head of the Hever HaRabanim, the NRP’s rabbinic caucus,

was the first to speak.98 R. Tchursh adamantly opposed the NRP joining the government without

amending the Law of Return to specify that “conversion must be in accordance with Halakha.”

Rabbi Menachem Ushpezai of Ramat Gan went further, declaring that the NRP must not enter

any government without an amendment to the Law of Return as well as a commitment not to

consider a withdrawal from Judea and Samaria.99

97 R. Shlomo Goren, handwritten notes entitled “Statements of the Members of the Chief Rabbinical Council on the matter of Who is a Jew- 28 Shevat 5734 [February 20, 1974].” ISA, P/5084/17. 98 Aaron Kampinsky, “Rabbinical Organization Within Religious Zionism: The Case of the Hever HaRabanim” Studies in Religious Zionism: Development and Changes, eds. Yishai Arnon, Yehudah Friedlander, and Dov Schwarz, (Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar Ilan University Press, 2012). 99 Goren, “Statements of CRC Members,” 1.

According to Goren’s notes, Raphael Zaban, a rabbinic judge on the Supreme Rabbinical

Court, also held that the NRP should not join the government unless the law was amended. R.

Yosef Kapah, however, urged the council to carefully formulate its decision to avoid any

political slant. Moreover, R. Kapah urged the council not to comment on territorial concessions,

since he was unsure, “in his heart of hearts,” about what should be done about the territories.100

Rabbi Binyamin Aviad, however, joined his colleagues in opposition to the NRP joining the

government and proposed that the Council adopt a resolution on the matter. Rabbi Eliyahu Katz

also opposed NRP participation in the government.101

Rabbi Yosef Sharbit expressed his view using more forceful language. After listening to

the report of the NRP representatives and examining the proposed compromise on the issue of

“who is a Jew?”, Sharbit suggested that the council inform the NRP that “if there’s no ‘Giyur ke-

Halakha’ there’s no place for the religious [sic] in the government.”102 Rabbi Eliezer Shapira

also opposed the NRP entering the government without amending the Law of Return. However,

he called for the CRC to reconsider if a national unity government with Likud were to be formed.

In such a case, the CRC would have to decide whether amending the Law of Return should still

prevent the NRP from joining.103

Thus, R. Goren’s notes record that every member of the CRC explicitly opposed the

NRP’s participation in the government, except for Rabbi Kapah. Some even stated that it was

religiously forbidden for the NRP to join the government without an amendment to the Law of

100 Goren, “Statements of CRC Members,” 1. 101 Rabbi Katz also proposed that the council reference a previous decision, likely the decision of the previous CRC issued June 4, 1970. Under Chief Rabbis Yehudah Unterman and Yitzhak Nissim, the CRC resolved that it was “prohibited according to Torah law to register a non-Jewish person as a Jew in the population registry. The Council also called for an immediate amendment to the Law of Return, absent which the NRP ministers were obligated to resign from the government. However, the clause calling on the NRP ministers to resign was not for publication. R. Akiva Moshe Gottleib to H. M. Shapira (1 Sivan 5730) [June 5, 1970], ISA P/5084/17. 102 Goren, “Statements of the Members of the Chief Rabbinical Council,” 1. 103 Goren, “Statements of the Members,” 2.

Return. The council was split, however, over the NRP’s participation in a unity government and whether to condition the NRP’s entry upon a pledge not to withdraw from the West Bank.

Indeed, the council was divided over even mentioning territorial withdrawal and decided to only address the issue of halakhic conversions in its decision.

The decision, drafted by R. Goren and adopted unanimously by the council, was delivered privately to members of the NRP before being released to the press.104 It noted that the

Council had received a “detailed report” from Raphael, Hazani, and Hammer and that the

Council held “comprehensive deliberations and an in-depth examination of the language of the proposed compromise” on “who is a Jew?”. The CRC held that:

Without an amendment of The Law through legislation or any appropriate regulation which establishes that all conversions not [conducted] according to the Halakha that has been sanctified from Generation to Generation have no validity at all – the council is not able to grant a dispensation (le’horot heter) to the petitioners to join the government.

The decision concluded with “a great cry, from heart to heart,” urging the cabinet and the

Knesset to work together to “preserve the unity, purity, and sanctity of the Jewish people.”105

The decision also noted that, during the CRC meeting, R. Goren consulted with Rabbi

Joseph B. Soloveitchik in Boston by phone. R. Soloveitchik was generally reluctant to involve himself in Israeli politics. However, the issue of “who is a Jew?” had significant repercussions for American Jewry, leading R. Soloveitchik to take an active, albeit ambivalent, role in the controversy over the NRP’s participation in the coalition. In late January, Rabbi Soloveitchik addressed the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the US and Canada, of which he was honorary president, and he declared that the NRP “may definitely not withdraw her demand that the Law

104 R. Goren’s file contains numerous copies and drafts of the decision with notations and amendments in R. Goren’s handwriting, indicating that Goren drafted it himself. ISA P/5084/17. 105 “Decision of the Chief Rabbinical Council on the Matter of ‘Who Is a Jew’ from 28 Shevat 5734,” February 20, 1974,” ISA, P/5084/17; Decisions Adopted during the Meeting of the Chief Rabbinical Council of Israel- In extraordinary Session on Wednesday 25 Shevat 5734, ISA, GL/43551/11.

of Return should be amended so that it should state explicitly that conversions will be recognized

only if they are performed in accordance with halacha.” Moreover, he foreclosed the possibility

of “any compromise,” which he considered to be “deceptive and will not serve its purpose.”106 R.

Soloveitchik and R. Moshe Feinstein were said to have been “bombarding Israeli leaders with

telephone calls exhorting against any compromise” on the eve of the CRC session with the

NRP.107

2.D The Role of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik: “The Rov” as a “Layman”?

R. Goren and R. Soloveitchik had been conducting ongoing discussions regarding the

issue of halakhic conversions. On Monday, February 18, two days before the meeting of the

CRC, the two spoke by telephone at 4:30pm Israel Standard Time. According to R. Goren’s

shorthand notes of the conversation, the Rov108 urged against any compromise on the issue of

“who is a Jew?”. His first consideration was the situation in the United States, where the Rov

was a leading figure in the battle between the Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform movements

over the soul of American Jewry. As a member of the Mizrahi, R. Soloveitchik warned that any

compromise “would destroy the [American religious-Zionist] movement.” On a personal level, he also opposed a compromise. The involvement of the Conservative and Reform movements made it “impossible to make concessions at the moment.” The issue had become “a sort of symbol,” and it was therefore essential to insist on amending the Law of Return to read “in accordance with the Halakha.”109

106 JTA Daily News Bulletin, XLI:17 (January 24, 1974), 2. 107 JTA Daily News Bulletin, XLI:17 (February 21, 1974) 3; See also, Ma’ariv, Feb. 18, 1974, 1. 108 A leading Talmudist who was the rabbi of the Boston Jewish community and the head of Yeshiva University, R. Soloveitchik was widely held to be the spiritual leader of modern-Orthodox Jewry in the United States, and his stature was such that he was often referred to simply as “The Rov” (The Rabbi). 109 R. Shlomo Goren, handwritten notes “Conversation with Rabbi Soloveitchik on Monday, 26 Shevat at 16:30,” (February 18, 1975), 1. ISA P/5054/11.

According to his notes, R. Goren asked R. Soloveitchik how the Chief Rabbinate should rule on the matter. The Rov replied that the Rabbinate should “respond in the negative” and that the response would be conveying the Torah perspective. Moreover, “saving the religious-Zionist movement [was] also a halakhic issue,” since the matter had turned into a “confrontation between Orthodox Judaism and the Reform.” Rav Soloveitchik thus believed that the Rabbinate should reject the Alignment’s offer “from both a Torah and practical perspective.”110

At 11:45pm, R. Goren spoke with R. Soloveitchik again. This time, R. Soloveitchik emphasized that he was “not issuing halakhic rulings nor providing binding [rabbinic] instruction.” Rather, he anticipated “a tragedy” in the United States. The involvement of the

Reform and Conservative movements in the debate over amending the Law of Return had transformed the issue from a “local,” Israeli matter to an issue of broader concern, especially to

American Orthodoxy.111

The question was no longer “who is a Jew?”, but rather “who has the authority to perform conversions?”. While the Reform and Conservative movements had little presence in Israel, they were uppermost in R. Soloveitchik’s mind and now in sharper focus for R. Goren. He predicted that if the Law of Return was not amended, it would be “a victory for the Reform.” Moreover, the NRP had raised the stakes by conditioning the party’s participation in the government on amending the Law of Return. Should the NRP concede and join the government, it would be seen as a victory for the Reform and Conservative movements in the United States.”112 As to the question of the NRP entering the coalition, R. Soloveitchik admitted that it was “difficult for

[him] to decide.” He ultimately told Goren, “I definitely think that [they] should not enter the

110 Goren, “Conversation with Rabbi Soloveitchik,” (Feb. 18, 1975), 2. 111 R. Shlomo Goren, handwritten notes “Rabbi Soloveitchik – Monday at 11:45 in the Evening,” 1, ISA P/5054/11 112 R. Shlomo Goren, “Rabbi Soloveitchik – Monday at 11:45 in the Evening,”1. ISA P/5054/11

62 government on these terms.” Wondering aloud, R. Soloveitchik asked “what would be [the problem] in adding the little word ‘Halakha?’”113

During the meeting of the CRC two days later, R. Soloveitchik repeated his view that the

NRP should not enter the government. Speaking with Goren by telephone, R. Soloveitchik asserted that any concession by the NRP would “destroy” American religious Zionism, since the majority of the American Orthodoxy fiercely opposed the NRP’s entry into the government. The matter had “become a symbol” in the clash between the Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform movements in the United States, and if the NRP were to join the coalition without achieving anything on “who is a Jew?”, then it would be a “victory” for the non-Orthodox movements.114

R. Soloveitchik dismissed concerns over new elections. If the security situation in Israel was so dire that the government could not afford to be without the NRP, then one could ask, “why doesn’t Golda Meir make a concession?”115

However, R. Soloveitchik also backed away from his comments to R. Goren two days prior, in which he had framed the matter in halakhic terms. Soloveitchik repeatedly emphasized that he was not speaking as a rabbi or halakhic decisor, but as “a friend” of R. Goren and a member of Mizrahi. Moreover, his recommendations were not based in Halakha, but in

“practicality and reasoning as a lay-person (ba’al ha-bayit).” The Rov stated that “if [the NRP] wants to concede, then they will concede.” However, he urged Goren not to be a party to the concession.116

113 Goren, Rabbi Soloveitchik- Monday at 11:45, 2. ISA P/5054/11. 114 R. Shlomo Goren, handwritten notes “Telephone Conversation – 28 Shevat 5734 [Feb. 20, 1974], Jerusalem: Rabbi Soloveitchik Called me at 15:30 Local Time,” ISA P/5052/11. 115 Goren, Rabbi Soloveitchik- Monday 11:45, 2. ISA P/5054/11. 116 Goren, Rabbi Soloveitchik- Monday 11:45, 2. ISA P/5054/11.

R. Goren’s conversations with R. Soloveitchik reveal the latter’s ambivalence over rabbinic involvement in politics and his deep reservations over Diasporic interference in Israeli affairs. However, R. Soloveitchik decided to involve himself as a “layman” because the controversy over halakhic conversions was also an inter-denominational class within American

Jewry. Thus, R. Soloveitchik issued a statement that either “all conversion must be approved by the Chief Rabbinate,” or the government should explicitly instruct the ministry of interior that

“all conversion needs to be according to Halakha.” Otherwise, the NRP should not join the coalition.117

On Wednesday, the Rabbis Said No: Fallout from the CRC’s Decision The CRC’s ruling was a matter of contention before it was ever written. On February 19,

Party Chairman Yosef Burg maintained that the CRC’s authority was limited to halakhic, not political matters.118 Later, Burg would insist that the CRC’s decision did not amount to a

religious prohibition against entering the government, while Raphael would argue that he had

asked for advice, not a halakhic ruling. Moreover, Rabbi Soloveitchik had privately emphasized

that the issue was not one of Halakha, but a political matter in which his advice was “practical,”

“logical,” and coming from a “layman.”

3.A “Outmaneuvered”: Toward a Minority Government?

The Rabbinate’s decision surprised Meir, Labor, the NRP leaders, and much of the

political establishment.119 Ambassador Keating reported that the NRP leadership had been

“outmaneuvered” by the Zeirim, whose insistence on waiting for the CRC decision had

117 Handwritten note, “announcement of Rabbi Schoenfeld on 28 Shevat 5734 at 12:45,” P/5072/6. 118 “NRP Young Guard Bid Successful” Jerusalem Post (Feb. 20, 1974), 1; David Landau and Gil Sedan “Coalition Woes: On Wednesday The Rabbinate Said No; Mrs. Meir Begins to Fill Cabinet Posts in First Minority Gov’t in Israel’s History,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:37 (Feb. 22, 1974), 3. 119 Keating to State, “Formation of New Israeli Government: Status Report,” 1974TELAV01010 (Feb. 21, 1974).

temporarily torpedoed the NRP’s entry into the government. Keating expected that the NRP

Executive, where the Old Guard enjoyed an advantage over the Zeirim, would support the

decision not to join the coalition. While the CRC’s “negative advice” tied the NRP’s hands,

Keating assessed that the party would be able to reverse the decision in a matter of weeks.120

In the meantime, Meir began to form a minority government, as Eban had predicted.121

On the night of February 20, Meir informed Katzir that she had been unable to form a

government based on the outgoing coalition and asked for a brief extension of her mandate to assemble a government based on a 58-seat plurality in the Knesset, including Labor’s 51 MKs, the ILP (four MKs) and the Arab Lists (three). Kissinger would soon return to broker a separation-of-forces agreement between Israel and Syria, and Meir could not afford to spend the next three weeks trying to bring the NRP into the government. Meir expressed regret to Katzir, apologizing that she “cannot bring you something more complete.” In a televised address, Meir announced that she was keeping the NRP’s three ministerial portfolios available should they reconsider their decision not to join the coalition. However, the offer would not be on the table indefinitely.122

Within the Labor party, there was considerable bitterness toward figures in the NRP as

well as rabbinic personalities in Israel and abroad. Labor Secretary-General Aharon Yadlin accused Zeirim leaders Yehuda Ben-Meir and Zevulun Hammer of deliberately using the

Rabbinate as a political tool to sabotage the negotiations, and Prime Minister Meir referred to the involvement of diaspora rabbis as “a tragedy.” Furthermore, Haim Zadok, who emerged as a central figure in the negotiations, had harsh words for both the NRP and the Chief Rabbinate. On

120 Keating to State, “Formation of New Israeli Government: Status Report.” (Feb. 21, 1974). 121 Keating to State, “Formation of New Israeli Government: Status Report.” 122 Landau and Sedan, “Coalition Woes.”

the one hand, he accused them of committing a “great breach of the division between religious

authority and secular politics.” On the other hand, Zadok held up Rav Ovadia as a paragon of

Rabbinic leadership. Though Rav Ovadia advocated for amending the Law of Return to recognize halakhic conversions, he nevertheless declined to address the political question of whether the NRP should join the coalition.123

As infighting within the Alignment complicated Meir’s attempt to form a minority

government, efforts continued to bring the NRP into the government.124 Meir threatened to

resign several times, insisting that she would only form a minority government with the support

of all of the factions and MKs in the Alignment. Meanwhile, the NRP Knesset Faction met on

February 26 to debate its vote on the expected motion of confidence in Meir’s new government.

Some argued that the faction should vote against the government because elections were

inevitable, and should be held sooner rather than later. Others argued that the NRP should

abstain to buy time to reach a new accommodation with the Alignment.125

3.B “A Disgraceful Purim Play”: Enter Rav Zvi Yehudah

Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook, who was developing close ties with the NRP Zeirim, had

already denounced Meir’s plan to form a minority coalition as a “Desecration of God’s Name.”

Moreover, the NRP’s participation in such a government would constitute an expression of

“contempt for our people and our state.” Quoting directly from the Talmud, Rav Zvi Yehudah declared this to be an unpardonable sin, for “there is no clemency for the desecration of God’s name [BT Kedushin 40a]!” (Eyn Makifin Le’Hillul HaShem)126

123 JCNS “Bitterness over NRP Inflexibility on Conversions issue,” Jewish Echo, (Glasgow England: March 1, 1974) ISA, A/5072/6. 124 Keating to State, “Formation of New Israeli Government: Status Report” 1974TELAV01106 (Feb. 26, 1974). 125 Ibid. 126Vermus, 92. A slightly different version of R. Zvi Yehuda’s letter, seemingly published after the NRP joined the Meir government, appears in the Agudas HaRabbanim- affiliated periodical Hapardes 48:7, ed. R. Simcha Elberg (New York: Union of Orthodox Rabbis April, 1974), 6.

As the NRP Knesset Faction was debating whether to abstain from or oppose the anticipated vote of no confidence, Daniel Vermus, a founding member of the Zeirim and close confidant of Zevulun Hammer, paid a visit to R. Zvi Yehudah.127 The two sat in the rabbi’s

“modest” and “minimalist” apartment in the Geula neighborhood of Jerusalem; the most prominent piece of décor was a large, color portrait of Theodore Herzl. Vermus spoke briefly to

R. Zvi Yehudah, who then reached for a piece of stationary and quickly penned a letter. He asked

Vermus to deliver it by hand to the NRP Executive.128

In his letter to “The MaFDaL,” R. Zvi Yehudah expressed his “agitation” that the NRP persisted in its efforts to form a coalition with Labor. He branded the coalition talks “a disgraceful Purim play” and warned the NRP against being “seduced” into the proposed government. He also denounced the latest proposal for a moratorium on registering the nationality and religion of new immigrants as “grotesque and grievous nonsense,” which would turn “our sacred and supernal state” into an object of “scorn and ridicule.” R. Zvi Yehudah did, however, end the brief letter on an upbeat note, with “thoughts of warm endearment,” hope for

“complete and revealed salvation,” and, in the spirit of Purim, “Marbim Be’Simha.”129

3.C Toward a Breakthrough?

Vermus delivered the letter, but efforts to bring the NRP into the coalition intensified. As

Kissinger arrived in Jerusalem on February 26, Keating reported that Labor had made yet another offer “on the overworked issue of ‘who is a Jew?’.” However, the “apparent determination of the Youth Group” to keep the NRP outside of the government, combined with

“pressures from rabbinical groups,” led Keating to predict that Meir would go through with

127 Vermus, 100. 128 Vermus, 100. 129 Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook, Facsimile of Handwritten Letter to the MaFDaL dated 4 Adar 5734 [Feb. 26, 1974], in Vermus, The Knitted Revolution, 268. See also, Vermus, 101.

67 forming a minority government.130 The next day, however, when Kissinger departed, Eban told

Keating that “prospects were somewhat improved” for bringing the NRP into the government.131

Two days later, Keating reported that, according to sources in the Labor Party, Meir was finalizing her roster of Cabinet appointments and would present them to a meeting of the

Alignment Executive and Knesset Faction on March 3. The NRP, he reported, was “still debating whether to join the government” and would also convene its Executive on March 3.132 After

Dayan announced that his Rafi faction would not participate in a minority government (though it would support the government in the Knesset), Meir visited President Katzir to return her mandate to form a government. However, Katzir was able to persuade Meir to continue her efforts until March 6, when the extension of her mandate would expire. With both Rafi and the

NRP refusing to join a narrow coalition, Likud leader Menachem Begin visited Katzir to inform him that Likud and the NRP were willing to serve in a unity government led by Meir. 133

On March 5, the Labor Central Committee unanimously appealed to Meir to stay on. At midnight, after a cabinet meeting on a developing security situation on the Syrian Front, it was announced that Meir had agreed to form a new government and that Dayan had agreed to join the cabinet. Moshe Dayan had opposed a minority government, arguing that the government would be too dovish. Without the NRP at the cabinet table to balance them out, the Independent

Liberals, MaPaM, and the Labor party’s own doves would tilt the government too far to the left, particularly on the Palestinian issue. Dayan and the Rafi branch of the Alignment had tried to pressure Meir into a national unity government with Likud, but Meir refused to budge. Faced

130 Keating to State, “Formation of New Government: Status Report,” 1974TELAV01125 (Feb. 27, 1974). 131 Keating to State, “Formation of New Government: Status Report,” 1974TELAV01154 (Feb 28, 1974). 132 Keating to State, “Formation of New Government: Status Report,” 1974TELAV01168 (March 1, 1974). 133 Keating to State, “Israel’s Government Crisis – Mrs. Meir Reconsiders,” 1974TELAV01239 (March 5, 1974).

with the choice of a narrow government led by Meir or a National Unity Government under

someone else, Dayan preferred the first option.134

On March 4, a majority of NRP leaders decided to support joining the. However, Meir’s

announcement that she would return her mandate to Katzir put a stop to efforts at bringing the

decision to a vote.135 After the Labor Central Committee appealed to Meir to stay on, NRP and

Alignment negotiators spoke by phone and agreed to meet on Tuesday March 5, if necessary.136

With Abba Eban set to visit the United States on behalf of Israel Bonds, Sapir and Zadok stepped up efforts to bring the NRP into the coalition. Meanwhile, in Washington, an “authoritative State

Department source” told the press that Kissinger’s planned round of “shuttle diplomacy” would be rescheduled due to the “uncertain political situation in Israel.”137 On March 6, the NRP met

with Meir and her entire negotiating team; the NRP made one last pitch for a unity government,

but Meir refused.138

3.D The Zeirim and Rav Zvi Yehudah’s Last-Ditch Attempt to Block a Coalition Agreement

The Zeirim mounted an 11th-hour struggle to keep the NRP out of a Labor coalition.

Zevulun Hammer announced that he would oppose any steps toward joining the government that

were not coordinated with Chief Rabbi Goren. When the NRP Executive scheduled a meeting for

the afternoon of March 6, the Zeirim replied that they would not relent unless the CRC permitted

the NRP to join the government. With Meir’s mandate set to expire at midnight, the Zeirim tried

134Keating to State, “Meir Reconsiders,” (March 5, 1974); Keating to State, Israel’s Government Crisis – Mrs. Meir and Dayan Will Stay On,” 1974TELAV01317 (March 6, 1974). 135 Keating to State, “Meir and Dayan will Stay On,” (March 6, 1974); “NRP Refused to Appear Before Rabbinical Court”, Jerusalem Post, (March 5, 1974), 2. 136 “NRP ‘Wait and See’”, Jerusalem Post, (March 6, 1974), 1. 137 “Israeli-Syrian Talks in Limbo,” JTA Daily News Bulletin, XLI:45 (March 6, 1974), 1. 138 “NRP votes to join coalition,” Jerusalem Post (March 7, 1974), 1.

to prevent the NRP leadership from announcing that it had reached an agreement in principle to

join Meir’s government.139

The Zeirim’s efforts to delay and obstruct the NRP’s participation in the government were bolstered by the intervention of Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook. On March 6, Daniel Vermus was summoned to the rabbi’s home, arriving at around 5pm. Despite a deterioration in his health,

R. Zvi Yehudah wrote another letter “To the MaFDaL.”140 The rabbi warned that if the NRP

joined the government, “Heaven forbid, may the Lord save us” (khalila ve’chas, rahmana

letzlan), then he would “immediately make it known to the entire world that [he would] have no

connection whatsoever with the Mizrahi or the NRP.” All of R. Zvi Yehudah’s prior statements

in support of the NRP would be “null and void, and “from here on out there will be nothing

between us.”141

On the evening of March 6–7, the NRP Executive and Knesset Faction convened for a

“stormy” session.142 The March 5 cabinet meeting over a security crisis to the north and Dayan’s

subsequent agreement to serve as defense minister paved the way for the NRP and Labor to close

a deal. Dayan claimed that he decided to serve in the cabinet due to the security situation on the

Syrian border, giving Burg and Raphael justification to do the same.143

The Zeirim repeated their demand for a national unity government, and their spokesman

later told the press that “if there is national danger, [then] national unity [was] more imperative

than ever.” It was unfortunate, then, that Meir rebuffed an appeal for a unity government earlier

that day. The Zeirim insisted upon a secret ballot, but the NRP Executive still approved the

139 Keating to State, “Meir and Dayan will Stay On,” (March 6, 1974); “NRP votes to join coalition,” Jerusalem Post (March 7, 1974), 1. 140Vermus, 101; R. Zvi Yehudah Kook, Facsimile of Handwritten Letter to the MaFDaL Dated 12 Adar 5734, 5PM [March 6, 1974], in Vermus, 269. 141 Ibid 142 “NRP votes to join coalition,” Jerusalem Post (March 7, 1974),1. 143 “NRP Votes to Join Coalition” Jerusalem Post, (March 7, 1974), 1.

decision to join the government by a 30–17 vote margin.144 When the expanded NRP Executive

convened, the meeting nearly boiled over into a fistfight. Nevertheless, it ultimately approved the

NRP’s participation in the government by a margin of 93–69, with seven abstentions.145

After losing the votes in both the Executive and the expanded Executive, the Zeirim

gathered 175 signatures to convene the NRP Central Committee. They then appealed the

decision to the party’s internal court, which issued an injunction against joining the government

until the case could be heard.146 With the expanded NRP Executive, the Knesset Faction, and the

party secretary-general present, the court convened on Friday March 8.147 Ben-Meir told

Ambassador Keating prior to the hearing that the NRP leadership would likely enter the government no matter what the court decided, over the objections of Warhaftig’s Central Faction and the Zeirim.148 The court ultimately held that “those entitled to decide” had the authority to

agree to join the government, but that the Central Committee should be convened as soon as

possible to have the final say .149

The same day, Minister Yisrael Galili wrote to Golda Meir to memorialize their meeting

with NRP leaders Burg, Hazani, and Raphael. During the meeting, Labor and the NRP agreed on

the final language of a proviso in the coalition agreement regarding the West Bank; Israel would

neither ratify nor implement an agreement with Jordan involving territorial withdrawal without bringing the issue before the people by calling elections. By the same token, the parties agreed

144 NRP votes to join coalition,” Jerusalem Post (March 7, 1974),1. 145 Keating to State, “Formation of New Govt: Status Report,” 1974TELAV01391 (March 8, 1974) 146 Keating to State, “Formation of New Govt: Status Report,” 1974TELAV01391 (March 8, 1974); “NRP Youth Guard: Last Ditch Struggle Against Joining Gov’t,” (March 10, 1974), 2. 147 Shapiro, “NRP Youth Guard” 148 Keating to State, “Formation of New Govt: Status Report,” 1974TELAV01391 (March 8, 1974). 149 Shapiro, “NRP Youth Guard”

that “the Government of Israel will be free to conduct peace negotiations with Jordan and make

binding decisions during every stage of the negotiations.”150

On the evening of March 9, the NRP Knesset Faction convened to select its

representatives in the new government to be sworn in the next morning. Hammer and Ben-Meir

persisted in their opposition, demanding that the NRP ministers-in-waiting pledge to resign if the

NRP Central Committee voted to leave the coalition. Zerach Warhaftig, the incumbent Minister

of Religion, refused to join the cabinet in deference to the Rabbinate. Though he opposed

rabbinic involvement in politics, Warhaftig was unwilling to defy the CRC after seeking its

guidance. In his view, the credibility of the institution of the Chief Rabbinate was at stake.151

3.E The Coalition Agreement

The Alignment, NRP, and ILP signed a coalition agreement the next morning. 152 The parties committed to uphold the “status quo” on affairs of religion and state, such as public

Sabbath observance, marriage, and divorce. The NRP also made significant gains in funding for religious education, which were enumerated in a separate appendix.153 In addition, the coalition

agreement included a reformulated compromise on halakhic conversion different from the proposal rejected by the CRC. The original proposal included a vague announcement that the

Minister of the Interior would “continue to act with regard to conversions abroad as he has acted until now, within the framework of his authority.”154 The new agreement, however, included an

150 Yisrael Galili to Golda Meir, March 8, 1975, ISA, A/7025/18. 151 Keating to State, “Formation of New Govt: Status Report,” 1974TELAV01391 (March 8, 1974); Shraya Shapiro, “NRP Youth Guard,” Jerusalem Post (March 10, 1974), 2; “Va'ad HaPoal of the MaFDaL Decided to Join the Government - Party Court Delays,” Ma'ariv (March 8, 1974), 3; “Danger of Schism in the MaFDaL- If the Zeirim's 'Rebellion' against Joining the Government Will Continue,” Ma'ariv (March 8, 1974) 1; “Burg to Warhaftig: Don't Lay this Stone Upon Us,” Ma'ariv (March 10, 1974), 2. 152 “Coalition Agreement Between the Factions: The Alignment (The Labor Party -MaPaM - The Arab List), The National-Religious Party, and The Independent- Liberal Party; Concluded on 16 Adar 5733 - 10 March 1974,” ISA, A/7025/18. 153 Coalition Agreement (March 10, 1974), 4. 154 “Final Language of the Ma’arakh’s offer to the MaFDaL,” ISA, P/5084/17.

explicit promise from the government. The Interior Minister would announce that “to the best of

his knowledge… no non-Jew had been registered as a Jew – and the government will continue to

act as such.”155

With regard to the West Bank, or “Judea and Samaria,” the agreement included a clause

that “no peace treaty will be concluded with Jordan, if it will include concession over parts of

Judea and Samaria, without the subject being brought for a decision by the Nation in new

elections, if one of the factions participating in the Coalition requests this.”156 This proviso

allowed the government to negotiate a withdrawal from West Bank, but limited its ability to

ratify and carry out a withdrawal during its term in office. The proviso also incentivized the

NRP’s continued membership in the government, since only coalition parties could request

elections.

“Israel Has a New Government” 4.A Golda Meir Announces the new Government’s Policy Guidelines

The next morning, Meir presented her new government to the Knesset.157 In her remarks,

she thanked and paid tribute to the members of the IDF and reiterated Israel’s desire for peace

while praising its resilience for standing up to terrorism and international pressure to withdraw to

the 1967 lines.158 Moreover, she stressed that the central goal of the government’s program was

to seek peace with the Arab states by building on the ceasefires and “transition[ing]” to a lasting peace through interim agreements. Meir expected “difficult struggles over the borders of the

155 “Coalition Agreement,” (March 10, 1974), 5. 156 “Coalition Agreement,” (March 10, 1974), 5. This proviso also had to be read in the context of the first clause in the Government Guidelines, which stated that “central aim of the government of Israel in the coming for years is to work toward achieving a lasting peace with each one of the neighboring states.” See, “Policy Guidelines for the Government Program: Presented for the Knesset’s Approval with the Presentation of the Government on 15 Adar 5734 (10.3.74),” ISA, A/7025/18. 157 Divrei Knesset v. 69 (March 10, 1974), 581-645. 158 Divrei Knesset v. 69, 581.

state,” and while the government was prepared to compromise, it would also negotiate from a

position of strength.159

Meir noted that Likud had opposed the decision to accept the American ceasefire

proposal, as well as the accords for a separation of forces in Sinai and the return of Israeli POWs.

Facing difficult negotiations with Syria, the country needed a fit government that operated on the basis of shared principles to make the difficult decisions. Thus, Meir saw no opportunity for a unity government with Likud, whose foreign policy was rejectionist and irreconcilable with that of the Alignment.160

After thanking U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for obtaining a list of Israeli

POWs in Syria and for arranging a visit by the ICRC, Meir expressed Israel’s readiness to

conclude an immediate prisoner exchange with Syria. With regard to Jordan, Meir announced

that Israel would seek an agreement with the Hashemite Kingdom that included a resolution of

the Palestinian issue. However, the government would not, under any circumstances, permit the

establishment of another state between the Jordan and the Mediterranean, nor would it negotiate

with representatives of the PLO. In accordance with the promise made to the NRP, Meir also

announced that the government would not sign an agreement involving territorial concessions in

the West Bank without calling new elections.161

Meir also reiterated the government’s commitment to, and authority over, settlement on both sides of the Green Line. Turning to immigration (Aliyah) policy, Meir paid tribute to the struggle of, and for, Soviet Jewry, as well as the plight of the Jewish communities in Iraq and

159 Divrei Knesset v. 69, 582. 160 Divrei Knesset v. 69, 582. 161 Divrei Knesset v. 69, 583.

Syria. She then thanked the coalition negotiators, especially Finance Minister Pinchas Sapir, for

reaching an accommodation on the “medini” issue – the American-mediated peace process.162

Meir then returned to the issue of Aliyah and addressed the controversy over the status of

new immigrants who underwent conversion to Judaism abroad. In accordance with the new

coalition agreement, Meir acknowledged the complexity of the issue and the sensitivities

surrounding it. She announced the formation of a ministerial committee tasked with resolving the

issue within one year. In the meantime, she recognized that conversion was a “halakhic concept,”

and the government would treat it as such. Moreover, Meir informed the Knesset that the Interior

Minister had announced that no non-Jew had been registered as a Jew and that this would

continue.163 After presenting the roster of cabinet ministers and the government guidelines, Meir

asked the Knesset for its vote of confidence.

4.B Menachem Begin: “Turn away from Evil”

In his rebuttal, opposition leader Menachem Begin castigated the NRP for compromising

on “who is a Jew?”. It was with a “pained heart” that Begin recounted a recent meeting with Rav

Zvi Yehudah Kook, “wrapped in tallit and tefillin.” The rabbi was “entirely seized by pain” over the NRP joining the government, as were “multitudes of religious people, irrespective of party affiliation.” Had the NRP forgotten the religious precepts to “guard your tongue,” “distance yourself from falsehood,” and “turn away from evil?”164

4.C Melamed, Scheinman, and Abuhatzira: “In Favor”

NRP Knesset members Avraham Melamed, Pinchas Scheinman, and Aharon Abuhatzira carried the burden of justifying the NRP’s entry into the coalition in defiance of the CRC ruling.

162 Divrei Knesset v. 69, 584. 163 Divrei Knesset v. 69, 585 164 Divrei Knesset v. 69, 587.

Adding insult to injury, Labor also refused the NRP’s demands for a national unity government,

an amendment to the Law of Return, and a commitment not to withdraw from territory in the

West Bank.165

The three NRP lawmakers stressed the urgent need for a majority government following

a security scare on the northern front, and with difficult diplomatic decisions on the horizon.

Melamed stressed that it was Meir who rejected a unity government, not the NRP. Moreover,

Abuhatzira pointed out that the NRP was not entering the coalition “empty handed,” while

Scheinman pledged to safeguard both religious interests as well as the homeland.

Regarding the West Bank, Scheinman and Abuhatzira both touted the coalition accord’s

Judea and Samaria proviso as a major achievement. Abuhatzira, though, evoked cries of indignation from the opposition by characterizing Labor’s pledge to hold elections over a West

Bank withdrawal as a guarantee against concessions. Melamed noted that the party was keeping its pledge to safeguard “the future of Eretz Yisrael.” At the same time, the NRP’s most prominent “dove” stressed that “trends in the Arab world” toward peace with Israel could not be ignored.

Justifying the NRP’s concessions on halakhic conversion posed a significant challenge.

Abuhatzira rose to the occasion with a creative reading of the coalition agreement. He argued that forming a ministerial committee tasked with finding an agreed, legal solution was tantamount to Labor promising to find such a solution. In the meantime, the government officially recognized conversion as a “halakhic concept.” Scheinman, though, emphasized that, as Interior Minister, Burg would ensure that the population registry defined Jewishness according to Halakha. Melamed, for his part, claimed that the NRP never promised to rectify the

165 For Melamed’s remarks, see Divrei Knesset v.69, 594-596. For Abuhatzira, 617-619. For Scheinman, 627-628.

76 legislation on conversion, only the “situation.” Moreover, it was to the NRP’s credit that no non-

Jew had been registered as Jewish.166

4.D Zevulun Hammer: “Abstain”

Toward the end of the debate, Hammer delivered a rejoinder to his NRP colleagues, and defended the involvement of rabbinic figures in coalition politics. He observed that the party faced tough times, and the debate over joining the government now jeopardized the “wholeness” of the party. The NRP was at odds with “the Torah world in Israel and abroad,” as well as

“settler and youth circles.”167 Hammer lauded the NRP for making demands that upheld the principles of national unity and Israeli “sovereignty over Judea and Samaria,” and he castigated the Alignment for refusing to even consider a unity coalition with Likud.

Before addressing the Zeirim’s role in the coalition talks, Hammer delivered a rebuttal to the argument that Israel must either leave the territories or lose its Jewish character. He rejected the “false contradiction” between demography (the “Jewishness of the state”) and geography (the

“Jewishness of the Land”). From Hammer’s perspective, Eretz Yisrael belonged to the Jewish people by virtue of a historic and religious right to the Land. Therefore, Israel’s claim to the

Land derived from its status as the nation-state of the Jewish people. By the same token, the intrinsic Jewishness of the Land made it the place where the Jewish people built their state.168

Hammer also framed the issue of “who is a Jew?” in a similar vein. The intrinsic bond between the “Jewishness” of the state and the “Jewishness” of the Land depended upon Jewish peoplehood. Converts were to be welcomed with open arms, but one could only join the Jewish

People in accordance with the halakhic tradition handed down through the generations. To be

166 Ibid. 167 Divrei Knesset v. 69, 632 168 Divrei Knesset v. 69, 633.

sure, the controversy over “who is a Jew?” raised novel, yet primordial, questions about Jewish

identity. Therefore, it was only natural that the NRP seek guidance in wrestling with these

dilemmas.

Addressing the controversy over rabbinic involvement in Israeli coalition politics,

Hammer defended the NRP’s right to consult with rabbinic figures in general and Rabbis Goren,

Soloveitchik, and Zvi Yehudah Kook in particular. Rav Goren’s “patriotism” was undeniable,

Hammer asserted, and “the state and its existence [was] a significant and decisive factor in his halakhic decision-making.” Hammer had been “part of the group” that turned to the Chief

Rabbinate over joining the government, and he saw first-hand that Rav Goren’s decision-making was guided by “concern for the State.” How, then, could Rav Goren be faulted for giving an honest answer dictated by his conscience?169

Moreover, one could ask, was it “so terrible” for the NRP to “consult with Rav

Soloveitchik?” Amending the Law of Return had significant implications for world Jewry.

Therefore, it made good sense to consult the “spiritual leader of the national-religious

community in the United States.” While R. Soloveitchik lived abroad, he “love[d] the state” and

“educated thousands of pupils who immigrated to the country and [were] building it, spiritually

and physically.”170

Hammer also came to the defense of R. Zvi Yehudah, “our rabbi and the rabbi of the

‘tankists’ and paratroopers of the Hesder Yeshivot.” The rabbi’s harsh rhetoric was the product of

“heartache,” since Rav Zvi Yehudah was well known for his “love of the Land of Israel, the

People of Israel, and the State of Israel.” A “significant part” of the NRP considered Rav Zvi

169 Divrei Knesset v. 69, 633. 170 Divrei Knesset v. 69, 633.

Yehudah to be their spiritual leader, and the party was obliged to consult him over a matter with

“far-reaching implications for our lives and our worldview.”

Rav Zvi Yehudah’s influence was especially strong among the idealistic, “national-

religious youth[s] faithful to their nation and to their Land.” Hammer lauded these young,

religious Zionists and lamented that the NRP had let them down by compromising its principles.

Furthermore, these young people now felt “trepidation” over the future of the Land of Israel,

“despite the political arrangement” between Labor and the NRP to hold elections over a West

Bank withdrawal. Hammer promised “the youths, who sent [him and Ben-Meir] to the Knesset to

be their voice,” that the Zeirim would stand up for their principles “in accordance with [their]

conciseness and with all of [their] ability.” Therefore, Hammer and Ben-Meir were “unable to support the government today.”171

4.E Golda Gets the Last Word

After nearly 10 hours of debate, Golda Meir had harsh words for Hammer. Meir

respected religious values and “every truly religious person.” Meir found it strange, though, that

Hammer conditioned the NRP’s participation in a Labor-led government on amending the Law of Return, but he was willing to join a unity coalition with Likud unconditionally. In Meir’s view, this proved that amending the Law of Return was not a matter of conscience for Hammer, but a pretense to bring hawkish, right-wing parties into the government.172

Meir also had harsh criticism for a rabbi whom Hammer had neglected to mention.

Turning to Poalei Agudat Yisrael MK Kalman Kahana, Meir expressed dismay that Kahana

could “follow a rebbe, perhaps a great [rebbe],” living outside the county, asking, what gave this

Diaspora rabbi the right to tell Israelis “under what sort of regime we need to live?” Meir was

171 Divrei Knesset v. 69, 633. 172Divrei Knesset v. 69, 644.

79 particularly critical of this rebbe’s call for an end to Labor-led governance and its “socialism.173

Meir did not refer to this rebbe by name, but her remarks were clearly a rejoinder to statements reportedly made by the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Menachem Mendel Schneerson.

4.F “Israel Has a New Government”

When the Knesset moved to a vote of confidence in Meir’s government, Likud forced a roll call vote, drawing attention to the abstention of coalition MKs. Although the Knesset approved Meir’s government, it received a vote of confidence from only 62 of the 68 coalition lawmakers.174 Within the NRP, Ben-Meir and Hammer abstained, while Warhaftig voted confidence in the government despite refusing a cabinet seat. Two Alignment MKs also abstained, while another two absented themselves from the vote.175

In his cable to Washington, Ambassador Keating reported that the debate “focused on

[the] Labor Alignment–Likud confrontation.” Labor leaders Meir, Dayan, Peres, and Allon stressed the “importance of ongoing negotiations” and the new “government’s readiness to make concessions in the interest of peace.” Likud, in contrast, declared that the government had no credibility and that the country was suffering “from a crisis of confidence.”

In Keating’s view, the debate “underscored [the] deep gap” between the Labor-led coalition and Likud over the peace process. Keating noted that Dayan and Meir both made

“strong statements … on [the] need for [a] flexible approach and [the] development of further diplomatic contact with Arab states.” Therefore, he predicted that the incoming government

“improve[ed] prospects for reaching further accommodations.” Keating also predicted that the

NRP’s participation in the government—over the objections of the party’s “hardline Youth

173 Divrei Knesset v. 69, 643. 174 Divrei Knesset v.69, 644-645. 175 Divrei Knesset, v.69, 644-645; The Coalition’s Missing 6 Votes,” Jerusalem Post (March 11, 1974), 2.

Group”—improved the new cabinet’s chances of survival and created a “reasonable prospect for

effective decision-making.”176

As it turned out, Keating was half-correct. The Meir government effectively concluded a disengagement agreement with Syria, which was signed on May 31, 1974.177 The talks were

especially difficult, and Kissinger told to a group of Jewish–American communal leaders that the

Israeli government was “not… a joy to negotiate with where territory is involved.” Kissinger

attributed this to Israeli domestic politics, which “create[d] incredibly petty situations.” Still,

Kissinger joked, if the Israeli government were easy to deal with, then the Arabs would have no

need for American mediators.”178

Although the cabinet demonstrated its decision-making ability, the government’s

prospects for survival were dim. The Agranat Commission’s interim report on the failures prior

to, and during, the Yom Kippur War sparked an outcry over ministerial responsibility, which

nearly split the Alignment.179 On April 10, one month after the government was sworn in, Meir

submitted her resignation to President Katzir. Meir and her cabinet continued to function as a

caretaker government – immune to motions of no confidence. After a close contest with Shimon

Peres, Labor tapped Yitzhak Rabin to succeed Golda Meir. In June 1974, Rabin presented his

government to the Knesset, Meir’s premiership came to an end, and the NPR went into the

opposition.

176 Keating to State, “Israel Has New Govt,” (March 11, 1974). 177 “Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement,” [Agreement on Disengagement Between Israeli and Syrian Force, Geneva, May 31, 1974], FRUS XXVI, Document 88. 178 “Memcom: Washington, April 25, 1974, 5:08-6:35pm,” FRUS XXVI, Document 36. 179 Keating to State, “Israeli Domestic Political Situation,” 1974TELAV02143, (April 11, 1974); Gold Meir, My Life, 22.

Summation Following the elections to the eighth Knesset, Labor and its prospective coalition partners

bargained over a coalition agreement and government guidelines that also served as the first

official articulation of the Government of Israel’s policy toward the post-1973 peace process. In its new capacity as the broker for Arab–Israeli diplomacy, the United States kept a close eye on coalition negotiations through its Tel Aviv embassy.

Ambassador Keating’s cables demonstrate the connection between the coalition talks and the peace talks. His reports on the fits and starts of the coalition talks included forecasts of the government-in-formation’s policies and decision-making capability in future peace negotiations.

Keating based these forecasts on his assessments of the formal commitments to be included in the coalition agreement and government guidelines, as well as on the informal understanding between the parties. His forecasts also evaluated the coalition’s parliamentary prospects and the composition of the cabinet. Indeed, the process of coalition formation was as much about policymaking as it was about personnel. In addition to a stable parliamentary majority, Meir sought a cabinet able to make tough decision during peace talks. The challenge facing the coalition negotiators was to formulate policy guidelines and allocate ministerial portfolios that would enable the cabinet to withstand American pressure while demonstrating the flexibility necessary for effective bargaining.

Golda also sought to avoid “poison pills” that might undermine the government’s position in future negotiations. Indeed, Golda’s opposition to amending the Law of Return was, in large part, a product of the imperative to maintain close ties with American Jewry (the majority of which was not Orthodox). Meir hoped, and Kissinger feared, that American-Jewry’s sympathies would hamper the administration’s efforts to pressure Israel during peace talks.

(American Jewry’s financial support through philanthropy and investment was also of vital

importance.)

Whereas Golda’s objective was to create the conditions necessary to drive a hard bargain

in future negotiations, the Zeirim intended to forestall any bargain over the West Bank. However,

the Zeirim lacked the political strength in 1974 to break the NRP’s “Historic Alliance” with

Labor against the will of the party’s “Old Guard.” While the Zeirim were unable to push the NRP

directly into an alliance with Likud, they chose to block the formation of a Labor-NRP coalition

in order to force Labor into a unity government with Likud.

Indeed, obstructionist tactics were well-suited to the protest mentality among the Zeirim, who started out as a youth rebellion within the NRP.180 This mentality allowed the Zeirim to

stymie the process of coalition formation despite the accommodation reached between Labor and

the “Old Guard” to hold elections before ceding territory in the West Bank.

Although the Zeirim persisted in their opposition to a Labor–NRP coalition, the Judea and Samaria proviso nevertheless became a central consideration for Kissinger as he contemplated the next step for in his “step-by-step diplomacy.” As Kissinger told prominent members of the American Jewish community, “the problem [with an agreement on the Jordanian front] is the Religious Party.” Kissinger may have been exaggerating for effect, but even if the

NRP was not the problem, it was certainly a problem due to the Zeirim’s growing influence. As

Keating observed, the coalition agreement’s clause on Judea and Samaria (for which the Zeirim

claimed credit) would not necessarily “block” Israeli–Jordanian negotiations, though it would

certainly “complicate” the endeavor.

180 Yehudah Azrieli, The Generation of Knitted Skullcaps: The Political Revolution of the Zeirim in the MaFDaL, (Israel: Avivim Publishers, 1990), 36-40. [Hebrew]

Keating’s forecast of the Zeirim’s impact on future peace talks provides useful

terminology for analyzing the role of the Zeirim. The Zeirim were able to “complicate” the process of coalition- and policy- formation by hardening the NRP’s stance on the territorial issue. However, they were unable to “block” the NRP’s entry into the government over the West

Bank. While many in the NRP were reluctant to withdraw from territory, the issue had never been a precondition for the NRP’s participation in the government. “Who is a Jew?” was another matter entirely. By demanding an amendment to the Law of Return absent a unity government with Likud (that would preclude territorial concessions), the Zeirim effectively linked the issue of territorial withdrawal to halakhic conversion. This linkage, in turn, allowed the Zeirim to create an impasse in the coalition talks.

Although the Zeirim sought to broaden the party’s areas of activity beyond “religious” issues into other areas of governance, including the “medini” arena, shifting the NRP’s priorities would take time. In the meantime, linking a “religious” issue with a “medini” issue became a key tactic employed by the Zeirim to obstruct the process of coalition- and policy- formation.

I argue that this linkage was a function of the Zeirim’s practice of politics, which

combined political ambition with religious principles. The link between “who is a Jew?” and

land-for-peace was instrumental, not ideological. The two issues were connected by their

concomitance on the coalition bargaining table, not substantive, ideological or philosophical

connections between a particular “religious” issue and a particular “medini” issue. To be sure,

the “medini” issue of territorial withdrawal was, for some, as much a “religious” issue as “who is

a Jew?” (The most striking example of this is the stance of R. Zvi Yehuda Kook.) Indeed,

Hammer offered an ideological justification for linking territorial concessions with “who is a

Jew?” during the debate over Meir’s new government. Israel’s right to the Land of Israel derived

from the Jewish nation’s religious and historical connection to the land, which was perpetuated

through the generations by Jewish tradition. The same tradition that enshrined the Jewish

national right to the Land also dictated the criteria for membership in the Jewish nation. Hence, it

was equally imperative to wage a political struggle on behalf of each of these principles.

However, many NRP supporters viewed “who is a Jew?” and territorial concessions in

the West Bank as two separate and distinct issues. The linkage between them was not

ideological, but a function of the NRP’s insistence upon these demands during the coalition talks.

This functional linkage is illustrated by the CRC deliberations over the NRP joining the

coalition. Some on the Council argued that the NRP’s entry into the government be permitted on

two conditions: a commitment to amend the Law of Return and a guarantee not to negotiate

concessions in the West Bank.

While both issues were of religious significance, the linkage between the two was not

ideological, but a product of the fact that the Council was considering both simultaneously.

Indeed, the willingness of some on the CRC to allow the NRP into a unity government with

Likud, without amending the Law of Return, illustrates that the linkage between these two issues

was a function of political bargaining. Moreover, that linkage could (and would) be undone to

safeguard Judea and Samaria, at the expense of the Law of Return.181 On the other hand,

members of the Council who forbade the NRP’s entry into the government, irrespective of its

composition, implicitly rejected any linkage between the two issues.

One result of the Zeirim’s strategy of linking “who is a Jew?” with the territorial issue

was that it mobilized broader opposition to the NRP joining the government. For the Zeirim, the aim was to keep the NRP out of a Labor government with a platform of territorial compromise.

181 See, Chapters 2 and 4.

For others, however, the territorial issue had no bearing on whether the NRP should join the

government. The Rov involved himself in rabbinic deliberations over the NRP’s entry into the government because he considered halakhic conversion an existential issue for American Jewry.

In R. Soloveitchik’s view, Israeli recognition of non-halakhic conversion would encourage more

Americans to opt for such conversions. Of course, the Rov considered such conversions entirely invalid, and individuals who underwent such rites would remain non-Jews, even as they took

Jewish spouses. Thus, the Rov’s involvement was primarily a product of his struggle against intermarriage and assimilation in the United States.

Symbolically, The Rov viewed the controversy over the Law of Return as a struggle over rabbinic authority to perform conversions, as well as religious legitimacy more broadly. Indeed,

R. Soloveitchik expressed opposition to the NRP’s entry into the government on the grounds that it would lend the Reform and Conservative movements a political victory. When the Zeirim pushed “who is a Jew?” into the center of the coalition negotiations, it raised the profile of the issue and increased its symbolic importance. In response, the Reform and Conservative movements intensively lobbied the Israeli government to reject the NRP’s demand to amend the

Law of Return.182 Should the NRP abandon the demand and enter the government, R.

Soloveitchik opined, it would hand the non-Orthodox movements a victory that would “destroy”

the Mizrahi movement in the United States.

R. Soloveitchik’s stature was such that he, himself, was a powerful and prominent symbol of rabbinic authority. When the Rov’s involvement became a matter of contention in the

Knesset debate over Meir’s government, Hammer described R. Soloveitchik as the spiritual

182 “U.S. Reform Judaism seeks solution on conversions with Orthodox, Conservative,” Jerusalem Post (Mar. 13, 1974), 3; “Orthodox Assail Reform and Conservative Pressure on Israel,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:9 (Jan. 14, 1974), 4; “Reform, Conservative Groups Opposed to Nrp Foisting Views on New Gov't,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:8 (Jan. 11, 1974), 3.

leader of “national- religious” Jews in the United States, creating a parallel with R. Zvi Yehudah,

who was the leader of Israeli national-religious Jews. In Hammer’s telling, R. Soloveitchik and

R. Zvi Yehuda were members of the same ideological camp. This was, to put it mildly, a gross

misrepresentation of the Rov’s ideology and affiliation.183 However, this misrepresentation

illustrates the Zeirim’s success in mobilizing unlikely allies in the struggle against joining the

government.

R. Soloveitchik held that rabbis living in the Diaspora had no right to meddle in internal

Israeli affairs, and he was generally wary of state involvement in rabbinic affairs, lest rabbis be

coopted and lose their autonomy. In the same vein, the Rov viewed certain matters as beyond

rabbinic jurisdiction; he held that territorial compromise was a matter for experts in statecraft and

security, not rabbis. Thus, R. Soloveitchik’s active opposition to the NRP’s entry into the

government was all the more remarkable, and illustrates the efficacy of the Zeirim’s “linkage”

strategy.

R. Soloveitchik’s consultations with R. Goren in February 1974 reveal the Rov’s ambivalence over his involvement, as well as his attempts to uncouple that involvement from his

role as a rabbi. The Rov repeatedly declared that he opposed the NRP’s entry into the

government not as a rabbi and halakhic authority, but as a “layman” who happened to be a

“member of the Mizrahi.” Nevertheless, the Rov’s conversations with Rav Goren were still construed by the public as a prominent rabbi and posek calling on the NRP not to join the

government. Indeed, how could the author of “Halakhic Man,” widely referred to simply as “the

183 For a discussion of R. Soloveitchik’s views on the State of Israel and “land for peace” see, Neuman, “Between Modern Orthodoxy in the United States and Religious Zionism in Israel” In Rav BeOlam HeHadash: Iyunim BeHashpaato Shel HaRaV Yosef Dov Soloveitchik al Tarbut al HaHinukh VeAl Mahshava Yehudit, Rozenak and Rothenberg (eds.), 471-489. Jerusalem: Van Leer Institute and Magness Press, 2010. [Hebrew]; and R. Soloveitchik to E. Simone, 14 Marheshvan 5728 [Nov. 17, 1976], in Yair Kahn and Kalman Neuman, “A Rabbinic Exchange on the Disengagement: A Case Study in R. Aharon Lichtenstein's Approach to Hilkhot Tsibbur,” Tradition 47:4 (2015) 157-187.

Rov” (the Rabbi), be perceived as a layman? Thus, while Hammer may have misrepresented

Soloveitchik’s ideological orientation, it still was reasonable to characterize Rav Soloveitchik as a leading rabbinic figure whom the NRP leadership had defied by joining the government.

The NRP’s entry into the coalition generated a new debate over the nature and legitimacy of rabbinic authority. The NRP leadership’s claim that it joined the government for security reasons was widely dismissed as a pretense. Within Labor, the Chief Rabbinate was seen as improperly involving itself in supposedly secular political affairs, and among religious circles, many perceived the NRP’s entry into the government as an affront to both rabbinic authority and the dignity of the Torah itself. Yitzhak Raphael began his tenure as Minister of Religion amidst a feud with Chief Rabbi Goren, and was harshly criticized for his role in the initiative to consult the Chief Rabbinate. This was in stark contrast to Raphael’s predecessor, Zerach Warhaftig, who refused a cabinet seat in deference to the Rabbinate, as well as Michael Hazani, who would later resign from the government.

The rift between the NRP Old Guard and rabbinic circles enabled the Zeirim to make rabbinic authority and religious legitimacy the central themes of their pressure campaign to force the NRP out of the government, and, later, to hamstring Yitzhak Rabin’s attempt to form a new coalition after Meir’s resignation. The Zeirim’s efforts, which are the focus of the next chapter, had far-reaching consequences for the NRP.

The controversy over the NRP’s entry into the Meir government was also a key moment in the deterioration of the Historic Alliance between the NRP and Labor. The Zeirim’s obstructionism foreshadowed their destabilizing role in the Rabin government and demonstrated the ideological and generational fissures within the NRP. With Labor weakened by the Yom

Kippur War, the Zeirim saw an opportunity to force Labor into a unity coalition with Likud. In

88 addition, the diplomatic process following the Yom Kippur War operationalized the “land-for- peace” formula, making territorial withdrawal a realistic possibility. This, in turn, lent ideological impetus to the Zeirim’s struggle against the Historic Alliance between the NRP and

Labor, a development that would have significant repercussions for Israeli policy toward the

Peace Process.

Chapter 2: “Hosifu Het al Pesha”: Rabbinic Authority, the Campaign to Force the NRP out of Coalition, and the “Next Step” in the Peace Process (March–November 1974)

This chapter begins by describing the Zeirim’s campaign to force the NRP out of the

coalition, which coincided with a rift between the NRP leadership and the rabbinate. The Zeirim

and their supporters waged an anonymous pressure campaign against Burg, Raphael, and Hazani,

charging them with degrading the rabbinate, dishonoring the Torah, and desecrating the Name of

God (Hillul Hashem) by joining the government over rabbinic objections. Concomitantly, the

NRP’s own rabbinic association condemned Burg, Hazani, and Raphael, as did R. Moshe Zvi

Neriah, head of the Bnei Akiva Yeshiva network and a former NRP Knesset member. Rabbi Zvi

Yehudah Kook recanted his support for the NRP, while R. Goren had a public falling out with

Yitzhak Raphael, the new Minister of Religion.

The second part of this chapter reconstructs the March 31, 1974 meeting of the NRP

Central Committee, in which Burg and Raphael struck back against the personal attacks against

them, while Hazani announced his intent to resign. While the Central Committee endorsed the

fait accompli of the NRP’s entry into the government, the abrupt resignation of Meir’s cabinet

triggered fresh coalition talks. Having just endured a bitter struggle and promised to reconcile with the Rabbinate, the NRP could not defy the Rabbinate again by joining Yitzhak Rabin’s new government.

The chapter continues by recounting R. Goren’s attempt to broker a compromise over the

Law of Return that would facilitate a Labor–NRP coalition agreement, thereby putting the NRP in a position to prevent territorial withdrawal from within the cabinet. Goren turned to Rabbi

Joseph B. Soloveitchik, hoping that the leading rabbinic figure in American Modern Orthodoxy would endorse an amendment to the Law of Return. Rabbi Soloveitchik, however, was wary of

again being drawn into Israeli coalition politics, and efforts by Labor and the NRP to reach an

accommodation stalled. The Meir cabinet stepped aside after concluding a separation-of-forces agreement with Syria; Yitzhak Rabin’s government was sworn in with a one-vote majority, and the NRP headed into the opposition.

In the summer of 1974, Labor and the NRP kept in touch, while R. Goren traveled to the

US in search of a compromise formula for amending the Law of Return. Although Labor ultimately rejected R. Goren’s compromise, Rabin was determined to bring the NRP into the coalition. After a few months, the Zeirim realized that the NRP could not force Labor into a unity government with Likud and softened their opposition to the Old Guard’s efforts to join the government. Thus, Burg, Hazani, and Raphael returned to the cabinet after a brief stint in the opposition. In the interim, Israel and the US held consultations over the next step in the peace process. Rabin insisted to Kissinger that an accord with Jordan would force early elections, which the cabinet was unwilling to accept. In any event, Rabin’s priority was an agreement with

Egypt. The chapter concludes by discussing the U.S. administration’s decision to pursue an

Israeli–Egyptian interim accord.

The Zeirim Wage a Propaganda Campaign Against the NRP Leadership

1.A Ikuv Keriya: Religious Principles in the Zeirim’s Pressure Campaign

Vermus recalls that the Zeirim used “every weapon at [their] disposal” in their campaign to force the NRP out of Meir’s government. They adopted “underground” tactics and waged a propaganda campaign against the party leadership, publishing anonymous leaflets, flyers, and pashkaviliot—large posters made of cheap paper that were glued to city walls.1 One such

1 Vermus, Knitted Revolution, 98.

pashkavilia is preserved in Vermus’s personal archive.2 The Zeirim put out the pashkavilia under

the pseudonym “Nationalist Religious Disciples of the Torah” (B’nei Torah Da’ati’im

Le’umi’im). Its headline proclaimed that “there is no clemency for the Desecration of God’s

Name,” echoing R. Zvi Yehudah’s earlier criticism of the NRP leadership and the Meir

government. These “Disciples of the Torah” called upon “believers in the Jewish faith” to protest

the “debasement” and “grave injury” inflicted upon “the Dignity of the Torah,” the Chief

Rabbinate of Israel, and Chief Rabbis Shlomo Goren and Ovadia Yosef, as well as R. Zvi

Yehudah Kook and R. Soloveitchik.3

The perpetrators of this unpardonable sin were none other than the NRP’s so-called

“leaders”: Burg, Hazani, and Raphael. These self-styled “Disciples of the Torah” accused the

NRP ministers of choosing the perks of power over “the eternal life of the People of Israel.”

Therefore, they announced an “ikuv keriya”— a traditional act of protest by delaying the reading of the weekly Torah portion— that was to occur “in every synagogue [that] Sabbath.” As worshippers waited for the reading of the Torah to begin, synagogue rabbis and others

conducting services were to denounce and condemn the “debasement of the dignity of the

Rabbinate and the rabbis.”

The propaganda campaign extended beyond Israel’s borders. As the controversy

unfolded, two prominent figures in the American Mizrahi, Dr. Maurice Sage and Rabbi Bernard

Bergman, offered public support and congratulations to Ministers Burg, Raphael, and Hazani on

assuming their posts.4 According to Vermus, this show of support lent legitimacy to the three

2 Poster “Eyn Makifin Ha-Hilul Hashem” file 1 (12)-001.jpg, CD-ROM disc accompanying Vermus, The Knitted Revolution (2016); Copy in possession of the author. See also, Vermus, Knitted Revolution, 98-99. 3 Vermus, Knitted Revolution, 98-99. 4 Sage and Bergman were the President and Honorary President, respectively, of the Religious Zionists of America.

92 ministers, creating “a need to neutralize this support.” Therefore, the Zeirim “saw to it that activists loyal to [the Zeirim]” in the US distributed flyers condemning Sage and Bergman.5

The flyer, written in Hebrew by nameless “Mizrahi members in the U.S.A.,” featured photographs of Bergman and Sage, who were denounced as “supporters of destroying the

[Jewish] Religion.” The flyer alleged that “these irresponsible people” had “added insult to injury” (hosifu het al pesha) by conveying “their greetings and blessings” to Burg, Raphael, and

Hazani. According to the flyer, the ministers were guilty of violating “the clear halakhic ruling” of the Chief Rabbinate and “the leaders of our movement,” Rabbis Soloveitchik and Zvi

Yehudah Kook. These eminent rabbis “forbade [Burg, Hazani, and Raphael] from joining the government under any circumstances” and prohibited any compromise over halakhic conversion.

Bergman and Sage were condemned for “joining in this horrific desecration of the Name of Heaven” and “the debasement of the rabbis and the Rabbinate.” Moreover, by expressing their best wishes to the NRP ministers, Bergman and Sage had implicated the entire American

Mizrahi movement in “this terrible crime.” Consequently, “the members of the Mizrahi” had no choice but to “declare that our hands had no part in this fraud, and that Sage and Bergman had acted of their own accord.”

1.B Rabbinic Participation in the Campaign Against the NRP Leadership

In addition to employing “underground” tactics, the Zeirim also enlisted rabbinic support.

The NRP’s Hever HaRabanim, led by Rabbi Katriel Fischel Tchorsh, passed a resolution condemning the NRP for joining the government in defiance of the CRC.6 Rabbi Moshe Zvi

Neriah, head of the network of Bnei Akiva yeshivot, an incubator for up-and-coming young

5 Vermus, 99-100; Flyer entitled “Ardent Protest Against The Supporters of the Destruction of the Faith,” file 1 (47)-001.jpg, CD-ROM Disc accompanying Vermus, The Knitted Revolution; copy in possession of the author. 6 “Hever HaRabanim of the NRP Condemns the Decision to Join the Government.” Ma’ariv (March 18, 1974) 3.

elites, and a former NRP MK, penned an open letter to Burg, Raphael, and Hazani. He expressed

regret that the NRP leaders had succumbed to “panic” by joining the government without a

commitment to amend the Law of Return. Rav Neriah accused the three of “breaking faith” with

the voters, defying the rabbinate, and “doing serious damage to the character of the movement.”

For the sake of the party, R. Neriah called upon the ministers to admit their mistake and leave the

7 government forthwith.231F

R. Zvi Yehudah Kook also lent his support to the cause of forcing the NRP out of the

government. On March 27, days before the Central Committee was scheduled to meet, Vermus

was again summoned to the house of R. Zvi Yehudah Kook. The rabbi penned a letter to “the

Great Central Committee which will be convening on Sunday.”8 In the letter, R. Zvi Yehudah

“call[ed] out, beseech[ed], and demand[ed]” that the Central Committee “arise, rally, and save

the People of Israel” from “those three people who are called ‘ministers.’” R. Zvi Yehudah

alleged that Burg, Hazani, and Raphael had “trample[d] on and desecrate[d] the Name of the

Lord, God” and “defile[d], desecrate[d], and destroy[ed] the name of Israel through their

criminal participation in this government.” The only hope of salvation for the three ministers,

“who [were] destroying our Holy State,” was for them to “decisively and swiftly leave [the]

positions [they had] obtained through [their] wicked crime.”

1.C The Zeirim Urge the NRP Central Committee: “Vote to Accept the Ruling of the Chief Rabbinate!”

The Zeirim made use of these rabbinic condemnations in their final attempt to persuade

the Central Committee to force the NRP out of the government. They compiled these rabbinic

7 “Head of Bnei Akivah Yeshivot Sharply Criticizes NRP Ministers,” Ma’ariv, (March 22, 1974), 4. 8 Vermus, Knitted Revolution, 101-102; R. Zvi Yehudah Kook, Handwritten Letter dated 4 Adar 5734 [March 27, 1974], file number: 1 (2)-04.jpg, CR-ROM Disc accompanying Vermus, Knitted Revolution. Copy in possession of the author.

condemnations, along with their own material, in a pamphlet that was distributed to the

Committee members.9 The pamphlet, entitled “The Last Chance,” was also published

pseudonymously under the guise of unnamed “Members of the Central Committee.” Vermus

admits though, that “one could deduce, quite easily,” that it was the handiwork of the Zeirim.10

The cover juxtaposed the images of Burg, Raphael, Hazani, and Raphael Ben Natan11 with those

of R. Zvi Yehudah Kook, R. Goren, R. Soloveitchik, R. Moshe Zvi Neriah, and Dr. Zerach

Warhaftig. The decision before the Committee members was about more than membership in the

coalition their votes would also decide who the NRP’s true leaders should be: the party machine

or its spiritual guides.12

The pamphlet went on to address the typical NRP Committee member. He supported the

party during the election campaign because he believed that the NRP kept its promises. He

believed that the NRP would “fight for Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria, for amending

the Law of Return, and for establishing an emergency government of national unity.” He

believed that he was “support[ing] a party that heeded the words of the Chief Rabbinate, and

whose “spiritual leaders [were] great Torah scholars…in the spirit of our teacher Rabbi

[Abraham Isaac] Kook of righteous and blessed memory.” Most importantly, the average

member of the NRP Central Committee had supported a “whole and united movement– old-

timers and youth, settlers and city-dwellers, rabbis and academics, yeshiva students and

university students.”13

9 Vermus, Knitted Revolution, 94-96. 10 Vermus, 93. 11 Raphael Ben-Natan was a leading political operative in Burg’s LaMifneh faction and Secretary General of Ha- Poel Ha-Mizrahi. 12 Warhaftig’s “Central Faction” had formed an alliance with the Zeirim, and Warhaftig, himself, opposed the NRP’s decision to enter the government on account of the CRC’s ruling. 13 Vermus, 94.

Instead, the “party machine” pulled a fast one by breaking its promises and abandoning

its principles. The NRP leadership paid lip service to forming a national unity government, only

to concede the issue without a fight. Later, it joined the coalition “in opposition to the express

decision of the Chief Rabbinical Council” in exchange for a compromise on Halakhic

conversations formulated “by MaPaM and the Independent Liberal Party.” If that were not

enough, the leadership refused to heed the words of its “spiritual leaders in the country and

around the world – Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook and Rabbi Yosef Dov Soloveitchik.” Worst of all,

Burg, Raphael and Hazani betrayed the party membership by violating the NRP platform, which had been unanimously adopted at the party convention.14

After enumerating the rabbinic condemnations of the NRP leadership, the pamphlet concluded with an appeal to the members of the Central Committee, who faced a number of stark

choices: Who would lead the party, the unscrupulous Old Guard or idealists faithful to their

principles? Would the party choose “renewal as in the days of old or, Heaven forbid, continued

spiritual deterioration”? Would the party “sanctify the Name of Heaven” or desecrate it? The

anonymous authors called upon the members of the Central Committee to “consider the future of

our movement…and vote to accept the ruling of the Chief Rabbinate.”15

1.D We Answer to a Higher Authority: The Impact of the Zeirim’s Campaign on the NRP Leadership

The Zeirim’s campaign had a significant impact on the party’s various constituencies, leading to a number of public confrontations between party leaders and youth groups, rabbis, and others. As a result, pressure mounted on Burg, Raphael and Hazani, who felt great emotional distress.

14 Vermus, 95. 15 Vermus, 95.

When the party’s Hever HaRabanim convened to condemn the leadership for joining the government, NRP Secretary-General Zvi Bernstein appeared before the assembled rabbis. He acknowledged that when the NRP leadership decided to approach the Chief Rabbinate, “no one knew if it would consult [with the rabbis] or to receive a halakhic ruling.”16 Bernstein was under the impression that the Hazani and Raphael went to “consult with the rabbis, but perhaps they thought differently.”

However, when the NRP approached the Chief Rabbis (separately), Rav Ovadia instructed them to “act in accordance with [their] judgement.” Later, when they met with R.

Goren, they “got the impression” that he, too, was inclined to give a positive answer. Therefore, when Goren proposed convening the CRC, “we told the Council that we would accept its halakhic ruling.” Bernstein’s implied that the NRP leadership did, in fact, ask for a halakhic ruling, but only after they were led to believe that the ruling would be to their liking.

Bernstein “admitted and confessed” that the NRP should not have acted the way it did.

In addition, “it was clear that the honor of the Rabbinate had been harmed.” Nevertheless,

Bernstein still believed the NRP leadership had made the correct decision by joining the government. The party leadership had faced the dilemma of “whether the honor of the

Rabbinate” was the “supreme value” or whether there were “other security values” that took precedence. It was easy to judge the NRP leaders post facto. However, “the security situation was extremely dangerous [when the NRP leadership decided to join the government], and [they] thought that, at a time like this, we need to be in the government.”

Bernstein’s appearance before the Hever HaRabanim was not well received. Some of the rabbis suggested that there might be mitigating factors to consider, and called for further

16 “Hever HaRabanim of the NRP Condemns the Decision to Join the Government.” Ma’ariv (March 18, 1974), 3.

deliberations. Others wanted to hear from the ministers, and noted that Rav Ovadia had

instructed the NRP leaders to do what they thought was best. The majority of the rabbis,

however, were disinclined to ignore the blow to the Rabbinate’s credibility. It did not help the

NRP leadership’s case that several rabbis on the CRC were also part of the Hever HaRabanim.

Ultimately, the Hever HaRabanim unanimously condemned the NRP’s entry into the

government.

The influence of the group’s chairman, Rabbi Katriel Tchorsh, was also a critical factor.

Tchorsh, who was also a member of the CRC, had rejected requests by Burg and Raphael to

postpone the Hever HaRabanim meeting to allow for private discussions. R. Tchorsh dismissed

the NRP ministers’ “deceitful” use of pikuah nefesh– the halakhic imperative to save human life

at all costs– as a pretense for keeping their cabinet seats, and called on them to resign

forthwith.17

While Bernstein had the unenviable task of facing the NRP’s disgruntled rabbinic

constituents, Dr. Yosef Burg, Chairman of the NRP and Minister of the Interior, unexpectedly

found himself in a public clash with a similarly formidable constituency: the teenagers. Bedlam

erupted when Burg appeared before over 300 young activists at the World Convention of Bnei

Akiva in Jerusalem.18 Ma’ariv described an “atmosphere of rebellion,” while Davar reported that

19 “veterans of the Bnei Akiva movement” were "shocked by the sight of rioting and outbursts.”243F

Earlier, Goren had addressed the convention, heaping praise on Bnei Akiva for its activism in the “national, spiritual, and military” arenas.20 The Chief Rabbi had only warm

17 Ma’ariv, (March 18, 1974), 3. 18 “Cries of boos for Dr. Burg and Cheers for Rabbi Goren – During Bnei Akivah Convention,” Ma’ariv, (March 13, 1974), 6; “Flared Tempers against the NRP at Bnei Akivah Conference,” Davar (March 13, 1974), 2. 19 Davar, (March 13, 1974), 2. 20 Ma’ariv, (March 13, 1974), 6.

words for the young activists, proclaiming that the NRP was “fortunate” to have “a youth movement such as this.”21 His opinion of the NRP leadership, however, was another matter. Rav

Goren had harsh words for the NRP leaders (such as Burg) who “disgraced the institution of the

Rabbinate in Israel” by joining the government.22

Burg had the unfortunate task of representing both the NRP and the government – neither

of which was particularly popular among the young activists. Burg was heckled and booed as he

took to the dais. Insults and invective were hurled at him as he read a letter of greetings from

Prime Minister Golda Meir and delivered warm remarks of his own. Burg proclaimed that while

“others talk about values, about pioneering, and about borders, this movement actualizes those

values.”23 This movement, though, was unmoved by Burg’s kind words, as shouts from the

audience repeatedly forced Burg to stop speaking. Finally, Yosef Shapira, World Secretary of

Bnei Akiva, came down from the dais to speak directly to the youths protesting against Burg and

appeal for calm. Burg was eventually able to conclude his remarks after a group of young

activists angrily stormed out of the hall.24

Raphael, the newly minted Minister of Religion, found himself in a direct public

confrontation with Chief Rabbi Goren. On March 26, over 200 rabbis and members of municipal

religious councils in the Tel Aviv area gathered at the Devorah hotel. Chief Rabbi Goren and

Raphael were both in attendance, with Raphael slated to address the participants at the beginning

of the conference and R. Goren scheduled to deliver the keynote lecture on the laws of the

upcoming Passover holiday.

21 Ma’ariv,(March 13, 1974), 6. 22 Davar,(March 13, 1974), 2. 23 Ma’ariv,(March 13, 1974), 6. 24 Davar,(March 13, 1974), 2.

After introductory remarks by the Chief Rabbis of Tel Aviv, Raphael took the podium to

present his agenda for Ministry of Religion as he assumed his new post. Raphael promised

cooperation and collaboration with the Chief Rabbinate, municipal rabbis, and local religious

councils. Raphael told the audience that 17 municipalities in Israel, including Haifa and

Jerusalem, lacked city rabbis, and he was determined “fix this situation immediately.”25 When

Raphael turned to the subject of Kashruth standards, a fracas broke out in the hall.26 One Rabbi

Brickman, an immigrant from the Soviet Union, shouted at the minister, “How can you talk

about [cooperation with] the Rabbinate after you betrayed the Chief Rabbinate?”27 Others in the

hall shouted, “who sent you?” and “who do you speak for?” The rabbi replied that he spoke “in

the name of Russian Jewry,” which “fought for Judaism” in the Soviet Union, and was deeply

troubled by “the things that we see happening here [in Israel]…things like this, that they betray

the Chief Rabbinate.” After the shouting match ended, Raphael replied that “while [he] had what

to say about the subject” of the NRP joining the coalition, he would address the issue “at the next

[appropriate] opportunity.”28

Later, R. Goren rose to deliver his keynote lecture. That year, Seder night fell out on a

Saturday evening, immediately after the Sabbath – a situation that posed intricate halakhic

questions. However, R. Goren chose to begin his remarks by discussing the custom of “asking”

questions and “teaching the halakhot of Passover 30 days before [the holiday].” And, since they

were already on the subject of asking questions and providing halakhic instruction, R. Goren felt

25 “Honor of the Torah Lessened Because It’s Friends Who Established It Mistreated it,” Ha-Tsofeh, (March 27, 1974), 2; “’I Love You, but it is Forbidden for Me to be Silent’ said Rav Goren to the Minister of Religious Affairs Dr. Raphael,” Ma’ariv (March 27, 1974), 15. 26 “Raphael Leaves Conference After Being Condemned by Rav Goren,” Ha’aretz (March 27, 1974), ISA, P/5072/6. 27 Ma’ariv, (March 27, 1974), 15. 28 Ma’ariv, (March 27, 1974), 15; Ha’aretz, (March 27, 1974), ISA, P/5072/6.

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it necessary “to say that, indeed, we ask and teach, but we must also accept [the answers to the

questions we ask].”29

Visibly agitated, Goren turned to Raphael, who was sitting in the audience. “My friend,”

he said, “you came to me that day…and you said ‘we will do everything that the rabbis instruct

us to do.’” “I do love you,” he declared, “but it is halakhically forbidden for me to remain

silent.”30 Goren rebuked the new Minister of Religion for perpetrating a “severe affront to the

Rabbinate, almost a disgrace.” Raising his voice, Goren accused Raphael of “destroy[ing] the rabbinate’s prestige,” injuring the “dignity of the Torah,” and hindering provision of “religious

services” in Israel. Most of all, R. Goren “worried about the youth, both religious and non-

religious.” After suffering such humiliation, how could Goren minister to “the youth of

HaShomer HaZair, with whom [he] did intense work?”31

Eventually, Goren returned to his lecture on the laws of Passover. As Goren delivered his

remarks, Raphael conspicuously rose and left the hall.32 When Goren finished his speech, an

official from the Ministry of Religion apologized on Raphael’s behalf, telling the audience that

the minister “had to leave for an urgent meeting in Jerusalem.”33

The next day, Raphael was the guest of honor at a similar conference in Nahariya, where

the keynote lecturer was R. Goren’s estranged colleague, Sephardic Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef.

When Raphael rose to speak, he announced that while he had “what to say about the current

debate on the issue of the rabbinate,” he would remain silent “in order to safeguard the honor of

the Torah.” Raphael insisted that he would not comment, even if he were “impaled by arrows

29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ha’aretz, (March 27, 1974), 15. 32 Ma’ariv, (March 27, 1974), 15; Ha’aretz, (March 27, 1974), ISA, P/5072/6 33 Ma’ariv, (March 27, 1974), 15.

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and catapult fire.” Raphael explained that, having been “raised at the knees of great Torah

scholars (Gedolim Ba’Torah),” he considered himself “in the service of the Rabbinate.” Raphael

asserted that the NRP’s entry into the government created a “basis” for further progress on

halakhic conversion. Although the NRP had been unable to achieve all of its goals, it had

received a guarantee that “all converts who immigrate to Israel have been converted ke-

Halakha.” Moreover, this would continue to be the case. Nobody, Raphael declared, would

“create a rift between [the NRP] and the Rabbinate over the question of halakhic conversion.”34

When it was Rav Ovadia’s turn to speak, he took the podium and delivered his lecture on

the ritual laws surrounding the Passover holiday. No mention was made of the dispute between

the NRP and the Rabbinate or the feud between R. Goren and Raphael. Later, at a reception

hosted by the mayor of Nahariya, R. Ovadia blessed Raphael on the occasion of his appointment

as Minister of Religion and wished him success in his new post. Raphael expressed great

appreciation for Rav Ovadia’s gesture. He announced that an institute for instructing prospective converts in Jewish thought and practice would be established in Nahariya as a joint project between the Ministry of Religion and local government. The conversion institute would be named “Ulpan Rishon LeZion” honor of Rav Ovadia’s formal instillation as the “Rishon Lzion” the day before. The mayor of Nahariya, for his part, embraced Raphael’s proposal, pledging to open the center as soon as possible.35

While Raphael and Rav Ovadia remained on good terms, the rift between the NRP and much of the rabbinic community was exacerbated by the Zeirim’s pressure campaign. This rift,

34 “Minister Raphael: Even if I were Impaled by Arrows and Catapults, I would remain Silent,” Ma’ariv, (March 28, 1974), 5. 35 Ibid.

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in turn, ratcheted up the pressure on the NRP ministers. Michael Hazani, the Minister of Social

Welfare, became increasingly distressed by the rift between the NRP leadership and the rabbinic

community. During the week leading up to the Central Committee meeting, reports circulated

that Hazani intended to resign his cabinet post.36 Many activists from yeshivot and religious

settlement movements were urging Hazani to quit the government, who announced to the

LaMifneh faction that he was “not glued to his seat” at the cabinet table.37 Hazani had come to

believe that it had been a mistake to consult the Chief Rabbinate only to disregard its ruling.

After a meeting between Hazani, Burg, and Bernstein on March 28, Bernstein asserted

that reports of Hazani’s resignation were part of the Zeirim’s propaganda campaign. According

to Bernstein, Hazani held that “the NRP needs to continue and remain in the government.”38 The

next morning, Hazani refused to comment, as demonstrators associated with the Zeirim picketed

his home in Tel Aviv.

Ambassador Keating cabled Washington the same day, reporting that the NRP Central

Committee would convene to decide on the party’s continued participation in the government.

Keating predicted that the Central Committee would “probably” vote to remain in the

government, though the party was deeply divided. He reported that a “considerable press

campaign” had been mounted against the NRP leadership, attacking the old guard’s defiance of the CRC and its failure to amend the Law of Return. Thus, “a close or unfavorable vote [could]

36 “NRP Central Committee to meet Sunday over Participation in the Government,” Ma’ariv, (March 29, 1974), 2; “Heavy Pressure on M. Hazani not to resign from the government,” Davar, (March 29, 1974), 1-2. 37 Davar, (March 29, 1974), 1-2. 38 Ma’ariv, (March 29, 1974), 2.

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not be excluded from the realm of the possible.” However, Keating told Washington that he did

not “expect a government crisis at this juncture.”39

“The Last Chance”: The NRP Central Committee Vote of March 31, 1974 The 501 members of the NRP Central Committee convened at 1 pm in Tel Aviv’s “Ohel

Shem” auditorium.40 Ushers guarded the entrances, allowing only committee members and

credentialed journalists into the building. Yeshiva students and members of Bnei Akiva gathered

outside, chanting slogans and the occasional invective against the NRP leadership. Some

managed to surreptitiously enter the hall, where they threw leaflets from the balcony prior to

being “bodily expelled” by “burly” ushers.41

Inside the hall, there was minimal disruption and considerable tension during the Central

Committee’ seven-hour meeting. Burg’s LaMifneh faction and Raphael’s Likud U’Temurah had

the support of the religious Moshav movement, while the Zeirim were backed by Warhaftig’s

Central Faction and the Religious Kibbutz Movement. Floor time was allocated based on the

relative size of each faction, but the “Old Guard” ensured that the only question put to a vote

would be whether to ratify the NRP’s membership in the cabinet: Yes, or no.

2.A Hazani Feels the Pressure while Raphael Denounces the (Dis)Loyal Opposition

Hazani was the first to take the floor, not as a representative of LaMifneh but on his own

behalf. He proposed that the Central Committee demand a commitment from the cabinet to

39 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “National Religious Party Central Committee to Vote on Participation in Coalition,” 1974TELAV01862, (March 29, 1974). 40 “NRP Central Committee Votes: 296 In Favor of Continuing in the Coalition – 198 Against – 7 Abstentions,” Ma’ariv, (April 1, 1974), 3; “The NRP will remain in the government – It is possible that Minister Hazani will Leave,” Davar, (April 1, 1974), 1-3; “NRP decides to remain in government: but party tension high” Jerusalem Post, (April 1, 1974), 1. 41 Jerusalem Post, (April 1, 1974), 1.

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amend the Law of Return within a month. During this period, the NRP ministers would absent

themselves from any cabinet meeting that did not address the conversion issue. Should the

cabinet fail to act within a month, the NRP would quit the government. In addition, Hazani

called for the Central Committee to reiterate its demand for a national unity government.42

Hazani would support any compromise approved by the Central Committee, but “would see [him]self as obligated to resign [his] membership in the government” if no compromise was reached. Hazani declared that “the conversion issue pained [his] conscience,” as did the NRP’s

“disobedience of the Rabbinate.”43 Although the controversy over the NRP joining the

government was a product of “political obstruction,” it also reflected “sincere discontent” within

the party. Hazani acknowledged that the NRP had joined the government following an acute

security crisis and made significant gains in terms of education and other religious issues.

Nevertheless, the situation had gotten out of hand. The NRP was alienated from the rabbinic and

yeshiva worlds, from intellectual circles, from the settlers, and from the youth. In Hazani’s view,

the time had come to heal these rifts.

Shouts and chants from outside the hall grew louder, drowning out Hazani’s remarks.

“This is terror!” Burg cried out. “They’re trying to organize terror!”44 Outside, a scuffle broke

out, shattering a glass door in the entryway. The police were summoned to restore order, and

security guards asked Rabbi Moshe Zvi Neriah – a Committee member and head of the Bnei

Akiva Yeshivot – to come outside and calm the tempers of the agitated youths.45

42 Davar, (April 1, 1974), 3. 43 Davar, (April 1, 1974), 3, Ma’ariv, (April 1, 1974), 3. 44 Ma’ariv, (April 1, 1974), 3. 45 Ma’ariv, (April 1, 1974), 3; Davar, (April 1, 1974), 3; Jerusalem Post, (April 1, 1974), 1.

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Raphael took the floor, expressing anger at “people making noise from the outside.”46 “It is the right of the opposition to fight from within,” he declared, but it was illegitimate for outside elements to organize a propaganda campaign meant to “mislead the public.”47 These outside

agitators were certainly “not acting out of reverence for rabbis and the rabbinate.”48 Raphael was prepared to debate “Rav Neriah and the settlers willingly and with respect.”49 However, he

denounced the alleged involvement of Likud activists and hostile journalists “who only cover us

in times of crisis.”50 Raphael conceded that some of the opposition came from within the NRP

but dismissed these individuals as disloyal. “Those of you like the residents of Kiryat Arbah have

not the right to talk,” Raphael declared, adding that “most of you voted either for Rabbi

Kahane’s J.D.L. or the Likud.”51

2.B Warhaftig Suggests an Exit Strategy and Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Dati Urges Unity

Warhaftig, who declined a cabinet seat, expressed opposition to remaining in the

coalition.52 He firmly believed that the Chief Rabbinate should stay out of party politics, but

noted that a person who comes to a rabbi with a question must then obey the rabbi’s answer. “If

we do not accept the authority of the Rabbinate,” Warhaftig exclaimed, “then for what did we go

and ask them?”53 Therefore, Warhaftig proposed that the NRP comply with the CRC’s ruling by

immediately leaving the coalition. At the same time, the NRP would abstain from no-confidence

votes for three months to prop up the government while the party negotatiated with Labor to

amend the Law of Return.54

46 Ma’ariv (April 1, 1974), 3. 47 Davar, (April 1, 1974), 3. 48 Ma’ariv, (April 1, 1974), 3. 49 Davar, (April 1, 1974), 3. 50 Ma’ariv, (April 1, 1974), 3. 51 Jerusalem Post, (April 1, 1974), 1. 52 Ma’ariv, (April 1, 1974), 3. 53 Ma’ariv, (April 1, 1974), 3. 54 Davar, (April 1, 1974), 3.

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Shlomo Levi of Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Dati proposed a compromise. The important thing was to

change “the situation” regarding conversions abroad, not the law. Levi believed that this would

have been possible had the party “not gotten bogged down with the [other] demands.” However,

the party was now being torn apart and seemed to be on the brink of schism. Therefore, Levi

proposed a compromise: The NRP would leave the coalition but would not allow the government

to fall. In the meantime, the Central Committee would appoint a special committee to negotiate

for a unity government and an amendment to the Law of Return.55

2.C Hammer Speaks for “the Bnei Akiva Students and the Settlers”

When Zevulun Hammer took the podium, he expressed his respect for Hazani and

declared his willingness to accept a compromise proposal by Hazani or anyone else. Hammer

declared that the crisis facing the NRP was a crisis of leadership. It was the leadership’s defiance

of the Chief Rabbinate that had created a rift in the party, not nameless outside agitators, as

Raphael alleged. The NRP was genuinely divided over the Old Guard’s defiance of the

rabbinate, and the Central Committee was faced with a choice: It could vote to remain in the

government, thereby causing a schism in the party, or it could leave the coalition for the sake of

party unity.56

“You are threatening to secede!” shouted one Committee member.

Hammer replied that, to the contrary, he had been urging “the Bnei Akiva students and the settlers” to remain in the party. It was up to the Central Committee, he asserted, to “prove that it

[was], indeed, possible to achieve something by struggling from within [the party].” Only a vote to leave the government would convince these disillusioned activists to remain in the NRP.57

55 Davar, (April 1, 1974) 3. 56 Davar, (April 1, 1974), 3; Ma’ariv, (April 1, 1974), 3. 57 Ma’ariv, (April 1, 1974), 3.

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2.D Burg faces off with Ben-Meir

When Burg took the floor, he seized the opportunity to fight back against the propaganda

campaign against him. Burg began by accusing those behind the propaganda campaign against

the Old Guard of trying to “shatter and destroy” everything the NRP had achieved over the

decades. “Nobody in the movement has been vilified more than I have,” he declared, “but I’m

not made of stuff that breaks easily.”58 Burg struck a confident, assertive note as he summed up the coalition talks, emphasizing that the NRP leadership acted "in compliance with the party’s

bylaws and charter” at every turn. Regarding “Who is a Jew,” Burg insisted that the NRP was

better off with him serving as Interior Minister because “by me, there is no conversion except in

accordance with Halakha.” Therefore, it would be self-defeating for the NRP to quit the

59 coalition.283F

Burg asked the Central Committee for “a year to work…to have discussions with

Diaspora Jewry and to find language that would please both Rav Goren and Rav Soloveitchik.”

There was a real chance of success with the new coalition, and Burg rejected any proposal to

leave the government. If, in a year’s time, there was still no movement on the issue, then the

NRP could leave the government with its head held high and its credibility as a coalition partner

intact.60

Burg delivered a sharp rebuttal to the Zeirim’s campaign against him. They claimed that

the Judea and Samaria proviso in the coalition agreement “[was] not an achievement for the

NRP,” yet a Likud MK had declared that “he, himself, could have entered the government on the

basis of such guidelines.” The Zeirim “quote[ed] rabbis,” but they did so “selectively.” They

58 Ma’ariv (April 1, 1974), 3; Davar, (April 1, 1974), 3. 59 Davar, (April 1, 1974), 3. 60 Davar, (April 1, 1974), 3.

108 insisted that Burg “demand a solution on ‘Who is a Jew’ during the coalition negotiations” and then told the press that halakhic conversion was “really a secondary issue and that the main thing

[was] national unity.”61 “Where,” Burg asked, was the “intellectual integrity” in threatening a

“schism in the movement” for the sake of “national unity?”62

Addressing those “waging the war on behalf of the rabbis and the Torah,” Burg asked,

“what [gave them] the right to lie in advertisements? To say nothing of who [gave them] the money for the announcements?”63 Burg insisted that while Goren forbade the NRP from joining the government, Rav Ovadia had instructed Burg to “act according to your judgement.” Faced with two contradictory opinions, it was up to the party to “act according to its truth, as [the party] understands it.”64 The “rift with the rabbis” was regrettable, of course, and Burg pledged “to do everything possible” to mend relations.65

Ben-Meir delivered a stinging riposte. The party chairman made it sound as “if, Heaven forbid, Burg won’t be a minister for a month – it will bring catastrophe upon us.”66 He went on to ask Burg “What world are you living in?”67 How could Burg be trusted after promising to respect the rabbinate’s decision, only to do the exact opposite? Burg had met with R. Goren, who explicitly stated that it was “forbidden for the NRP to enter the government,” yet Burg joined the government regardless. “You, Burg, are inciting rabbi against rabbi,” Ben-Meir proclaimed, adding that “Nobody believes your promises anymore.”68

61 Ma’ariv, (April 1, 1974), 3. 62 Davar, (April 1, 1974), 3. 63 Davar, (April 1, 1974), 3; Ma’ariv, (April 1, 1974), 3. 64 Ma’ariv, (April 1, 1974), 3. 65 Davar, (April 1, 1974), 3. 66 Ma’ariv, (April 1, 1974), 3. 67 Davar, (April 1, 1974), 3. 68 Ma’ariv, (April 1, 1974), 3.

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Rounding out the debate, Gush Emunim leader Hanan Porat threatened to quit the NRP

unless the NRP quit the government. Rav Moshe Zvi Neriah insisted that remaining in the

government would be “suicide for the NRP,” which would pay a price in the next election.

Moreover, the issue of halakhic conversions was a matter of concern to all Jews, not just the

NRP. Rav Neriah therefore implored the Committee, “for the sake of your honor, for our honor, and for the future of the movement, do not ignore the opinion of the public.”69

Over the course of the proceedings, Hazani grew visibly stressed as he sat quietly in his

chair, listening to the speakers. The leadership of the LaMifneh faction held an emergency

meeting over Hazani’s defection. Afterwards, Hazani withdrew his proposal prior to the vote,

which was conducted by secret ballot. Refusing to speak with the press, Hazani went home while

the polls were still open.70 The next day, he submitted his letter of resignation to Prime Minister

Meir.71

The NRP Central Committee ratified the decision to join the government, with 296

members voting in favor, 198 against, and seven abstentions. Heckling and applause broke out

when Secretary-General Bernstein announced the results. Bernstein adjourned the meeting by

promising that the NRP would “not ignore the mistake [it had] made,” and apologizing to the

Chief Rabbinate and to Rav Zvi Yehudah. Bernstein was optimistic that the party and the rabbis

would reconcile.72

* * *

69 Davar, (April 1, 1974), 3; Ma’ariv (April 1, 1974), 3. 70 Ma’ariv (April 1, 1974), 3; Davar, (April 1, 1974), 1 71 Michael Hazani to Golda Meir, Letter of Resignation, (April 1, 1974), ISA,G/7445/9. In his letter, Hazani told Golda that his conscience would not allow him to continue serving in the cabinet, but he pledged to “continue, bli neder, to support [The Government] as a Member of the Knesset and [the NRP’s] parliamentary faction.” 72 Davar, (April 1, 1974), 3; Ma’ariv, (April 1, 1974), 3; Jerusalem Post, (April 1, 1974), 1.

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The next day, U.S. Ambassador Keating cabled Washington and reported that an

embassy official had attended the NRP Central Committee meeting. The debate, he wrote,

“highlighted the fundamental division between moderates and hardliners” in the NRP. The

Central Committee vote indicated that the party moderates, who sought to “work from within the government for new legislation on [the] ‘Who is a Jew’ issue,” won out over the hardliners, who wanted to bolt the coalition in the hope of forcing Labor into a unity government with Likud.

Keating commented that while Hazani might well resign out of remorse for defying the

Rabbinate, “the NRP can safely be counted in the government for its duration.” He also predicted that the “next and perhaps more serious challenge to the government’s survival” would be the release of the Agranat Commission’s interim report.73

Labor, The Next Generation: Yitzhak Rabin Forms a Government By the end of April 1974, Meir had resigned, and Labor tasked Yitzhak Rabin with

forming a government – quickly.74 Coalition talks began anew, and Rabin raced to form a

government based on the existing coalition agreement and platform. At the same time, Rabbis

Goren and Soloveitchik continued their telephone consultations over “Who is a Jew” and met

several times when Goren traveled to the US during the summer of 1974.75 During this period,

efforts to find a compromise amendment to the Law of Return continued, with R. Goren and R.

Soloveitchik discussing the merits of different proposals.

73 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “National Religious Party Decides to Remain in Coalition,” 1974TELAV01884 (April 1, 1974). 74 Gold Meir to Ephraim Katzir, Letter of Resignation, (11 April 1974), Resignation of the 15th Government and the Formation of the 16th Government, Presidents Katzir and Navon- Files regarding the Formation of the Government, ISA, N/571/6 75 “Labor Party Seeking Rabbi Goren’s OK of Formula for NRP to Join Rabin Govt,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI: 125 (July 1, 1974), 2.

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Vermus recalls that the Zeirim opposed any compromise on “who is a Jew?” that would

enable the NRP to participate in the government. Their “task was to work in the opposite

direction – to bring the NRP ministers out of the coalition.”76 Indeed, Vermus’ account depicts

the rabbinic world as united against the NRP joining the Rabin government. However, Vermus makes no mention of behind-the-scenes efforts by R. Goren, R. Soloveitchik, and others to find a solution and bring the NRP into the government.

3.A “Our Problem Is the Chief Rabbinate”

On April 29, 1974, Alignment negotiators began talks with the Independent Liberals and

the NRP over forming a coalition under Prime Minister-Designate Yitzhak Rabin.77 Many within

the Alignment doubted Rabin’s ability to form a stable government and expected new elections

sooner rather than later. The top echelon of the Alignment leadership had been forced from

office in the wake of the Agranat Commission’s interim report, leaving the Alignment unnerved

and vulnerable.

The Agranat Commission’s final report, which was yet to be released, hung over the

Alignment like a Sword of Damocles. The Independent Liberals and Shulamit Aloni’s Citizen’s

Rights Movement (CRM) tried to inoculate themselves from the expected political fallout. They pledged that they would only join the government if it called new elections after the publication

of the Agranat Commission’s final report.78 Rabin’s objective, then, was to form a government

quickly, in order to enter any election contest as an incumbent prime minister backed by a

credible slate of Labor ministers. Moreover, neither Rabin nor the party was particularly keen on

76 Vermus, 97. 77 “Rabin opens talks with ILP, NRP,” Jerusalem Post (April 30, 1974), 1. 78 See, “Rabin coalition bid starts Friday, NRP offers compromise,” Jerusalem Post (April 24, 1974), 1-2; Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Israeli Domestic Political Situation,” 1974TELAV02510, (April 29, 1974); Jerusalem Post, (April 30, 1974), 1.

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reliving the protracted struggle with the NRP that Meir had endured. Rabin pledged that there

would be no more “symposia” over “Who is a Jew.”79

The next day, Keating cabled Secretary Kissinger, who was shuttling between Geneva

and Algiers.80 The ambassador reported that coalition talks were underway. Kissinger’s visit to

the Middle East was not expected to interfere, though coalition negotiators might use the

secretary’s visit as a pretense for delay if talks reached an impasse. If the talks did, in fact, stall,

the cause would likely be what Keating saw as Rabin’s “most problematic issue”: the “great gap

between the NRP and the ILP on religious issues.” To further complicate matters, the Zeirim

made it plain that, even if the issue of “Who is a Jew” were resolved, they would only participate

in a government of national unity. It was “unlikely,” then, “that more than a portion of the NRP

would join Rabin’s government.” A “usually well-informed journalist” had told Keating that the

Labor leadership would “make a strong effort” to form a government without the religious party,

should the NRP’s “intransigence” stymie the process. Within the Alignment, MaPaM announced

its opposition to any additional concessions on halakhic conversions and it’s rejections of a unity

government with Likud.81

Labor and the NRP held ongoing, informal discussions. Following a meeting of the

Knesset Finance Committee on April 23, NRP Faction Chairman Avraham Melamed and

Coalition Chairman Moshe Baram conducted informal talks in the Knesset over “Who is a

Jew.”82 Afterwards, Melamed told a reporter for the Jerusalem Post that while the NRP would

attempt to facilitate a national unity government, this would not be a deal-breaker. Melamed

79 “Rabin coalition bid,” Jerusalem Post (April 24, 1974), 1-2; Jerusalem Post, (April 30, 1974), 1. See, also: Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “1sraeli Domestic Political Situation.” 80 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “1sraeli Domestic Political Situation.” 81 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “1sraeli Domestic Political Situation.” 82 “Jerusalem Post, (April 24, 1974), 1.

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believed that a majority of the NRP would support joining Rabin’s government if progress could

be made on halakhic conversions. Although the Zeirim were unlikely to join any Labor

government, Melamed was confident that “we can outvote the Young Guard.” “Our problem,”

Melamed said, “is the Chief Rabbinate.”83

The NRP’s hands were tied by “the previous objections of the Chief Rabbinate,” but the

party leadership was willing to join the coalition without the Zeirim if the Alignment agreed to

amend the Law of Return. Furthermore, Melamed believed that R. Goren would “give the NRP

the green light to join a coalition” even if the Law of Return made no explicit reference to

Halakha. It would be sufficient if the law was amended to recognize conversion “as was the

practice from generation to generation.” Melamed felt that this formula was something that the

Independent Liberals could accept, because it did not legislate a formal Orthodox monopoly over conversions. A majority of the NRP would support such a compromise, so long as R. Goren gave his blessing. Baram, for his part, stated that “a gesture to the Chief Rabbinate” was essential, hinting at efforts underway with Rav Goren to resolve the matter.

3.B The Search for a Solution: R. Goren Turns to Rav Soloveitchik

As it happened, Rav Goren was eager for the NRP to join the government and end the rift

between the Chief Rabbinate and the NRP, which hurt both sides. The NRP could best prevent

territorial withdrawal from within the government, and Rabbi Goren resolved to formulate a

compromise amendment to the Law of Return that both Labor and the NRP would accept. Once

the two parties reached an agreement, R. Goren would bring the compromise before the CRC,

allowing the NRP to join the government with the Rabbinate’s blessing.

83 “Jerusalem Post, (April 24, 1974), 1.

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Goren phoned R. Soloveitchik on April 29, as coalition negotiations formally got

underway. R. Goren suggested that the Law of Return recognize “conversion as has been

accepted by the People of Israel over the generations.” R. Soloveitchik, “thinking out loud,”

wondered if this formulation might, in fact, be preferable to “conversion according to Halakha.”

His main objective was to prevent the State of Israel from recognizing Reform and Conservative conversions performed in the US.84 The Rov feared that Americans looking to convert to

Judaism in order to marry a Jewish spouse would opt for a speedy, halakhically-invalid conversion with a Reform or Conservative rabbi. Recognition of such conversions by the State of

Israel, he feared, would afford them greater legitimacy.

R. Soloveitchik evaluated Goren’s proposal in light of American Jewry’s inter-

denominational disputes. Should the Law of Return be amended to specify “giyur ke-Halakha,”

then the Conservative and Reform movements could both seek recognition of their conversions

by claiming that they, too, performed conversions according to Halakha.85 However, they could not claim that their conversions were the same as those practiced by traditional rabbinic Judaism for centuries. R. Soloveitchik told Goren that he needed some time to consider the matter. He wondered why the NRP’s potential coalition partners “would not accept ‘ke-Halakha.’” Still, his

“first reaction” was that “the language doesn’t seem bad at all,” and that it “would be a victory for observant Jewry” if Labor agreed to it.86

84 R. Shlomo Goren, Handwritten notes entitled “Conversation with Rabbi Soloveitchik, Personal – 29.4.74,” ISA, P/5054/11 85 The Conservative movement maintained that “conversion must be performed in strict compliance with Halakhic requirements,” and all conversions in the movement “compl[ied] in full with the Halakhic tradition.” While the Reform Movement did not accept Halakha as binding, Rabbi Richard Kahn, President of the movement’s Central Conference of American Rabbis, announced the movement’s willingness to perform conversions “guided by Halakha.” “Conservative Leaders Reiterate Opposition to Changes in Law of Return,” JTA Daily News Bulletin, XLI:125, (July 1, 1974); “CCAR to seek dialogue with other Jewish branches on conversion issue,” JTA Daily News Bulletin, XLI:54 (March 19,1974), 2. 86 R. Goren, Handwritten notes “Conversation with Rabbi Soloveitchik, Personal – 29.4.74,” ISA, P/5054/11.

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On the evening of May 5, Goren and Soloveitchik again spoke by phone, with Goren suggesting a slightly different formula calling for “conversion as practiced and as accepted among the People of Israel over the generations.” R. Soloveitchik did not see the difference between this and R. Goren’s proposal the previous week. Both versions, though, seemed as good,

if not “better[,] than giyur ke-Halakha,” and Rav Soloveitchik would be glad if the parties

accepted the language. The Rov figured that Goren’s proposal was a reasonable compromise,

and, if the Alignment rejected it, then “the blame would fall on their shoulders.” However, “if we

refuse, then the blame will fall on our shoulders.”87

Rav Goren was scheduled to meet with Hammer, Ben Meir, and Zvi Bernstein the next

day, and tried to close the deal.88 He proposed calling R. Soloveitchik within 24 hours, at which

time the Rov would allow Goren to publicize his support for the compromise. The Rov declined,

however, saying that he was “unwilling to permit anyone else to speak on his behalf.”89

Apparently, the Rov was now wary of expressing his views publicly.

R. Soloveitchik’s refusal to allow others to speak on his behalf, as well as his reluctance

to speak publicly about “who is a Jew” and Israeli issues in general, was based on both principle and prudence. R. Soloveitchik repeatedly stressed, publicly and privately, that he would not intervene in internal Israeli affairs in a rabbinic capacity. The Rov did not live in the country, and it was for Israeli rabbis to rule on Israeli matters.90 R. Soloveitchik’s silence, though, did not

87 R. Goren, Handwritten note “Night before Monday, 14 Iyar 5734: Conversion with Rav Soloveitchik”, Rabbi Shlomo Goren - Correspondence with Important People, Personal Archive of Rabbi Shlomo Goren, Israel State Archives, P/5054/11. 88 Katz, Yoman Peulot, 1413. 89 R. Goren, Handwritten note “Night before Monday, 14 Iyar 5734.” 90 R. Goren, handwritten notes entitled “Conversation with Rabbi Soloveitchik on Monday, 26 Shevat at 16:30,” (February 18, 1975); Goren, handwritten notes “Rabbi Soloveitchik – Monday at 11:45 in the Evening” ISA, P/5054/11; “Rabbi Soloveitchik: I do not issue rulings on the State of Israel’s issues,” Davar (March 27. 1974), ISA, P/5072/6.

116 prevent others from repeating what the Rov allegedly told them in private, thereby spreading confusion over the Rov’s stance on amending the Law of Return and the NRP’s participation in the government.91

3.C “They Might Get Used to the Idea that there’s No Need for the NRP”: Burg Consults with R. Goren as Labor Considers Going It Alone

In addition to his meetings with Hammer, Ben-Meir, and Bernstein, Goren also met with

NRP Chairman Yosef Burg on May 1, 1974.92 Goren’s notes of the meeting suggest that Burg’s aim was to persuade him that the NRP’s should participate in the government. After complimenting Goren on his astute reading of the political situation, Burg told the Chief Rabbi that Labor’s new leadership was extremely weak and likely to fall even more quickly than Meir had. Burg reported that Rabin “didn’t care if his government fell.” For Rabin, the “main thing”

“Hapardes,” an ultra-Orthodox rabbinic periodical based in NY, reported that R. Soloveitchik’s opinion remained unchanged. In its April edition, it reported that R. Moshe Feinstein called Burg in early March. On behalf of himself and R. Soloveitchik, Rav Moshe reportedly forbade the NRP from joining the coalition without amending the law of Return. He also called upon Burg to reject any compromise, and “expressed appreciation” for the NRP’s resolve. In July, Hapardes reported that, during a “consultation with R. Soloveitchik, he expressed ignorance of “any formulations other than ‘giyur ke-Halakha.’” Moreover, he reportedly said that “no one [had] approached [approached him], and it is regrettable that certain people speak in my name … that I have no connection with at all.” See, Hapardes 48:7 (New York: Union of Orthodox Rabbis, April 1974); Hapardes 48:10, (NY: Union of Orthodox Rabbis, July 1974), 22. These accounts, which portray R. Soloveitchik and R. Moshe Feinstein as acting in lockstep, consistently opposing anything less than including “ke-Halakha” in the Law of Return, are highly dubious. Goren’s contemporaneous, handwritten notes, as well as transcripts of Goren’s confidential discussions with the CRC, all indicate that R. Soloveitchik was willing to support a compromise that could garner the support of the CRC. See, “Protocol of the Meeting of the Chief Rabbinical Council of Israel: Jerusalem, 5 Av 5734 [July 24, 1974],” 2-8, Chief Rabbinate - protocols; Tamuz 5736- Av 5734, Bureau of the Chief Rabbi, ISA, GL/43551/14; and “Rabbi Soloveitchik: I do not issue rulings on the State of Israel’s issues,” Davar (March 27. 1974), ISA, P/5054/11. Moreover, this evidence is corroborated by R. Soloveitchik’s own statement on February 20, 1974, the day of the CRC’s ruling. The Rov’s statement, delivered by Rabbinical Council of America Executive Vice President Fabian Schonfeld, called for the Chief Rabbinate to approve all conversions, or for the Prime Minister to issue “an instruction from the government” to the Interior Ministry that the term “giyur” in the Law of Return was to be interpreted as “giyur ke-Halakha.” Thus, The Rov had, in fact, been willing to accept less than an amending the Law of Return to read “giyur ke-Halakha” as early as February 1974. Moreover, The Rov’s statement of Feb 20 illustrates his preference to defer to the Chief Rabbinate on matters facing the State of Israel. R. Goren, handwritten note “announcement of Rabbi Schonfeld of 28 Shevat 5734 [Feb. 20, 1974] at 12:45,” ISA, P/5084/17. 92 Goren, Handwritten note- “Conversation with Dr, Burg at Home- 5.1.74,” ISA, P/5084/17.

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was “to go into elections as the prime minister.” Thus, Rabin was doing everything possible to form a “government of 61” without the NRP.93

Burg painted a bleak picture for Rav Goren. In a matter of months, the Independent

Liberals would take over the Interior Ministry, while Shulamit Aloni would become the Minister of Social Welfare. The NRP’s third fiefdom, the Ministry of Religion, might well go to

Alignment MK Rabbi Menachem Hacohen. “We need to be in the government,” Burg insisted, lest the “doves” and secularists run rampant. Indeed, Burg claimed that he was already struggling

against doves in the cabinet over the Syrian disengagement talks. It was therefore vital, “from both a security perspective and a religious perspective,” that the NRP to join the government.

Moreover, Burg feared that if the NRP went into the opposition, Labor might “become accustomed” to governing without the NRP and conclude that “they don’t need the NRP; it’s possible to manage without it.”94

While Burg may have been exaggerating for rhetorical effect, the gist of his argument

was on point. While many in Labor opposed forming a narrow coalition with the ILP and CRM,

the Alignment leadership was mainly concerned with swiftly establishing a government. On May

9, the Alignment’s Knesset faction and leadership convened to discuss forming a 61-member

coalition without the NRP ahead of Rabin’s May 17 deadline. Golda Meir came out forcefully

such a coalition. Although Meir was determined to end her caretaker government’s tenure as

quickly as possible, she insisted that Israel could not afford such a dovish cabinet with “critical

negotiations underway.” The doves in Meir’s current cabinet were already “more influential,”

and adding the CRM without the NRP would “change [Israel’s foreign] policy altogether.” While

93 Goren, “Conversation with Burg,” ISA, P/5084/17. 94Goren, “Conversation with Burg,” ISA, P/5084/17.

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Meir stressed that she would vote confidence in such a government, she moved that the Knesset

Faction rule out a narrow coalition with the CRM. The chair refused to put Meir’s proposal to a

vote, and she walked out of the meeting.95

3.D The NRP Offers to “Give Up the Struggle over ‘Who Is a Jew’” for a Unity Government

The Labor Party Central Committee was set to convene on May 12 to vote on forming a

narrow coalition. The meeting was postponed, as many in Labor worried that if the NRP went

into the opposition, it would “send the NRP into the arms of the Likud” and put an end to the

historic alliance between the two parties.” Nevertheless, there was a general consensus that time

was of the essence.96 For its part, the NRP continued to publicly insist that it would not join the

government without an amendment to the Law of Return.

Twice, President Katzir extended Rabin’s mandate to give the parties more time to

hammer out a deal.97 On May 17, Katzir met with an NRP delegation consisting of Bernstein and

MKs Hammer, Warhaftig, and Pinchas Scheinman. The purpose of their visit was to persuade

Katzir to encourage Labor to form a national unity government. Bernstein informed Katzir that

“if we get the sense that we are in an emergency situation and we need to take emergency

measures, then we will give up the struggle over the issue of ‘who is a Jew.'”98 Of course, the

NRP would still work to amend the Law “within the framework of the government.”

Katzir “very much respect[ed]” the NRP’s willingness to defer the issue of “who is a

Jew” for the sake of a unity government. From Katzir’s remarks, it emerges that this was the first

time that the NRP formally offered to concede the issue. “I assume,” the president told the NRP

95 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Syrian-Israeli Negotiations and Domestic Coalition Talks,” 1974TELAV02629, (May 10, 1974). 96 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Israeli Domestic Political Situation,” 1974TELAV02673 (May 14, 1974). 97 Ephraim Katzir, “Extension of the Period to Form a Government,” (May 24, 1974), ISA, N/571/6. 98 Protocol of the Meeting with Representatives of the National Religious Party on May 17, 1974, 1, ISA, N/571/6.

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representatives, “that you will publicly announce that you are giving up the struggle."99

Bernstein replied, however, that the NRP would only do so in the event of a serious effort to

form a unity government.

Katzir also questioned the feasibility of a unity government, asking the NRP delegation

whether a unity government could function effectively. Many in Labor considered Likud too

extreme, and a partnership with Likud would risk splitting the Alignment.100

Hammer replied that the Arabs and the Americans saw Israel’s coalition woes as a sign of weakness and the country therefore needed a unity government to strengthen its hand at the peace table.101 For his part, Warhaftig noted that he had served in a national unity government

for three years, and it been perfectly able to govern. Warhaftig insisted that Likud would

moderate its stance if it joined the cabinet, noting that “when the NRP sits in the government, it’s

also not so extreme.”102 Scheinman echoed the sentiment, asserting that Likud took a harder line when part of the opposition. In 1967, the unity government with Herut had performed well during the crisis; while the situation was not so dire as in 1967, it was still preferable to have a strong government.103

Hammer asked Katzir to use the prestige of his office to publicly urge the parties to form a unity government. Katzir declined, though he took note of the NRP’s willingness to set aside

“who is a Jew?” and preserve Labor’s parliamentary hegemony should it form a unity

government with Likud. Katzir was willing to hold talks with Labor and Likud over a unity

government, but not in an official capacity and not in public. However, Katzir was willing to

99 Protocol of May 17, 1974, 2. 100 Ibid, 2-5. 101 Ibid, 4. 102 Ibid, 2. 103 Ibid, 2-3.

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announce that he “appreciate[d]” the NRP’s flexibility and “was attentive to the NRP’s position”

should the party announce its readiness to set aside the “who is a Jew?” issue.104

3.E Yitzhak Rabin’s Old-New Coalition: 61 MKs and an “Open Door”

Two days later, Labor’s Central Committee empowered Alignment negotiators to form a

coalition with the Independent Liberals and the Citizens’ Rights Movement based on the

Coalition Agreement and Government Guidelines of March 10, 1974. The committee also

resolved to keep “a door open for the NRP.”105 However, with neither the ILP nor CRM willing

to amend the Law of Return, the NRP was unable to join. Meir, in the final stages of negotiations

over a disengagement agreement with Syria, was eager to seal the deal, secure the release of

Israel’s remaining POWs from the Yom Kippur War, and hand the reins of power to the next generation. With 61 votes, Rabin and his supporters could at least rest easy in the knowledge that, whether or not the new government fell, Rabin would stand for elections as a sitting prime minister. In addition, Labor would also have demonstrated its ability to put together a credible leadership team after following the resignation of Meir, Dayan, Eban, and most of its old guard.

On May 23, the Alignment, the ILP, and the CRM signed a coalition agreement that was virtually identical to that of March 10.106 The Labor-led government committed itself to

maintaining the status quo on religious and state, and reiterated the understandings reached between Labor and the NRP on halakhic conversions: The government recognized that conversion was a “halakhic concept,” acknowledged the NRP’s demand to amend the Law of

Return, and provided for a ministerial committee to resolve the matter within a year. Even with

104 Ibid, 5. 105 “Decision of the Labor Central Committee of 5.19.74,” Coalition Negotiations for Forming the Government. ISA, A/7025/18. 106 “Coalition Agreement Between The Alignment (The Labor Party- MaPaM- Arab Lists), The Independent Liberal Party, and the Movement for Citizen’s Rights Signed on 2 Sivan 5734 – 23 May 1974,” ISA, A/7025/18

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Yosef Burg in the opposition, the Interior Minister would declare that no non-Jew had been

registered as a Jew, and that this policy would continue. Moreover, the windfalls for religious

education and Hesder Yeshivot remained, as did the Judea and Samaria proviso, which obligated the Rabin government to call elections over any territorial concessions in the West Bank.107

However, it was unlikely that a coalition party would invoke the proviso if the NRP remained in the opposition, since the ILP and CRM both supported territorial compromise in the

West Bank. The coalition pact also contained a side agreement with both a carrot and a stick for

the NRP. Labor would set aside the NRP’s ministries, preserve the budgetary allotments agreed

upon with Golda Meir, and exempt the NRP from coalition discipline if an amendment to the

Law of Return came up for a vote. The stick, however, was a stipulation that any coalition party

would be permitted to propose changes to the coalition agreement on religion and state after

three to six months. The coalition leadership would put all such proposals up for debate, though

any changes would require the agreement of all coalition parties. This meant that if the NRP

remained in the opposition, Shulamit Aloni’s CRM and the Independent Liberals, both ardent

secularists, could re-negotiate the sacred “status quo agreement.”

3.F Yitzhak Rabin Presents His Government to the Knesset

On June 3, 1974, Rabin presented his government and its policy guidelines for a vote of

confidence. The fact that this was also Rabin’s first address as a member of Knesset highlighted

the new prime minister’s lack of political experience.108 As with the coalition agreement, the

Rabin government’s policy guidelines were nearly identical to those of the Meir government.

107 “Coalition Agreement of 23 May 1974,” ISA, A/7025/18. 108 Divrei Knesset v.70 (June 3, 1974), 1514-1564; “Guidelines for the Government Program, As Approved by the Knesset On the Day of the Presentation of the Government, 13 Sivan 5734 (3.6.74),” in Coalition Negotiations For the Formation of a Government – 1/1974-12/1974, Israel State Archives, A/7025/83; “Guidelines for the Government Program, As Submitted for approval by the Knesset with the Presentation of the Government on 15 Adar 6734 (10.3.74),” ISA, A/7025/83; “Rabin Cabinet gets 61 votes; to seek ‘peace in stages,’” Jerusalem Post (June 4, 1974) 1.

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Rabin made his mark, though, by presenting the Knesset with a systematic assessment of Israel’s

strategic and diplomatic situation. Rabin held the Yom Kippur War created a new reality in

which the Arab states had softened their opposition to negotiating with Israel. This new reality

had already led to the successful conclusion of bilateral disengagement agreements with Egypt

and Syria.109 However, Rabin also held that contractual agreements between governments could

not provide “true peace,” which demanded the normalization of regular interaction between

societies. Thus, “true peace” could only be achieved through a gradual, organic process that

would take decades to unfold. In the meantime, Rabin’s government would prioritize the present

by adopting an incremental strategy. Israel would negotiate bilateral “partial agreements,”

allowing it to test the Arabs’ intentions while “progress[ing] toward peace in stages.”110

Rabin announced that his first priority was reaching an accord with Egypt. This was based on his strategic assessment that just as there could be no Arab–Israeli War without Egypt, so, too, there could not be “an end to war” without Egypt. Rabin expressed pessimism with regard to Syria but announced that his government was “ready” and “interested in conducting peace negotiations with Jordan.” The basis for a peace treaty with Jordan would be “two independent states:” the Jewish State of Israel with a “united Jerusalem” as its capital, alongside a “Jordanian-Palestinian State” to the east. Israel “reject[ed] the establishment of an additional, separate Arab State west of The Jordan.” However, the Palestinians would find an “expression of their independent identity” within the “Jordanian-Palestinian state.111

Rabin also reiterated the formula agreed to by Meir and the NRP, in which the

government was empowered to negotiate an accord, but would hold elections before signing an

109 Divrei Knesset, v. 70 (June 3, 1974), 1514. 110 Divrei Knesset, v. 70 (June 3, 1974), 1514-1515. 111 Divrei Knesset, v. 70 (June 3, 1974), 1515.

123 agreement to withdraw from any part of the West Bank.112 Toward the end of his 40-minute address, Rabin expressed “regret” that efforts to bring the NRP into the government had been unsuccessful. He lauded the “historic partnership” between the two parties, and expressed his hope that “a way will be found for the NRP to join the new government.” Toward that end, the

NRP’s thee ministerial portfolios would be set aside, and the coalition would “make additional efforts to find an agreed solution to the subject that prevents their entry into the government.”113

Menachem Hacohen, a Labor MK and rabbi who had served under Goren in the IDF rabbinate, would become a key player in efforts to find the “agreed solution” which Rabin hoped for. Hacohen was an Orthodox rabbi with particular interests in matters of religion and state. Yet, he was also a religious-political actor within the framework of the secular Labor movement. Not surprisingly, his perspective differed from that of the NRP establishment. HaCohen shared this perspective during the Knesset debate over the Rabin government, using the occasion to reflect on a variety of issues. His remarks, therefore, warrant a brief examination.

Hacohen viewed the inauguration of the Rabin government as a changing of the guard: a transfer of power from the generation of Ben-Gurion, Sharett, Eshkol, and Golda to the next generation of leaders who had been born and raised in the Land of Israel. The new government, he declared, would be one characterized by “continuity and change”; it would be faithful to the principles of the Labor Zionist movement while adapting to confront new challenges in the areas of “security and peace,” “society and social inequality,” and “education and values.”

Hacohen maintained that Israeli society was in the grip of a “social-spiritual crisis,” which was particularly acute among the youth. Young Israelis had come to doubt “the value of

112 Divrei Knesset, v. 70 (June 3, 1974), 1515. 113 Divrei Knesset, v. 70 (June 3, 1974), 1517.

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our Jewishness and the very essence of our historical, national right to this land, and to the

Zionist project.”114 Hacohen held that this crisis stemmed from the divide between members of

the generation that founded the State and the generations born and raised in it. The former came

to Palestine during the Second and Third Aliyot as “revolutionaries.” These pioneers were a

“direct continuation of the Jewish nation” as it existed “through the ages” in the diaspora, even

though they rejected and rebelled against centuries of Jewish tradition and culture. Israeli youth,

however, were unfamiliar with the traditional Judaism handed down through the ages in the

Diaspora. While this new generation was inculcated with civic and national values, it was

unfamiliar with the Jewishness that was the foundation of those values.115

Strikingly, Hacohen held that the Historic Alliance between Labor Zionism and religious

Zionism, had, in fact, contributed to this crisis. During the pre-state period, the partnership between these two pioneering and political movements was based on shared values, and a commitment to building a new society and achieving independence. Over time, however, the partnership between Labor Zionism and religious Zionism became one of political expediency.

The relationship between the two movements was no longer based on shared ideas and ideals but on “political gain and loss.” Hacohen placed the blame on both sides: Labor had benefitted from the partnership by using it to ensure its political dominance, while the NRP profited from sectoral influence and patronage. However, this self-interested political arrangement came at the expense of the Jewish religion and Israel’s national character.

Hacohen charged that Labor and religious Zionism had committed “an historic mistake by turning the Jewish heritage and the tradition of Israel into matters [of concern to] a minority

[group within Israeli society].” The NRP, he claimed, had appointed itself the “custodian of the

114 Divrei Knesset, v. 70 (June 3, 1974), 1548-1549. 115 Divrei Knesset, v. 70 (June 3, 1974), 1549.

125 religious-spiritual tradition of the nation” and had come to dominate the country’s religious institutions. In so doing, the NRP had deprived Israelis of the chance to “grapple with their

Jewishness” as well as “the Jewish character of the State.”116

Hacohen’s remarks on Israel’s spiritual crisis echoed some of the Zeirim’s critiques of the

NRP establishment and the Historic Alliance. They also believed that the NRP establishment had come to prioritize ministries over ministering, guarding narrow sectoral and partisan interests while neglecting the spiritual needs of Israeli society as a whole. Moreover, the Zeirim saw the

Historic Alliance as an anachronism that relegated the NRP to a supporting role on the Israeli stage.

While Hacohen’s critique of the Historic Alliance echoed the Zeirim, his perspective on issues of “security and peace” was another matter entirely. He urged the new government to reject extremist positions from doves and hawks alike, forswearing both intransigence and acquiescence. Hacohen harkened back to the Labor Movement’s commitment to “the Land of

Israel in its historic borders,” as well as its “acceptance of reality” by establishing the state in what was “only a portion of the patrimony of our forefathers.” Looking to the future, he hoped that the Rabin government would continue on this path by seeking “security that includes peace, and peace that includes security.”

Menachem Begin interrupted Hacohen, shouting that “today, all of Western Eretz

Yisrael is in our hands!” Labor, then, should “accept [the] reality” of Israel’s control over the entire Land of Israel.

In response, Hacohen agreed that, indeed, “Eretz Yisrael is in our hands, and we hope that it will remain in our hands.” That said, Hacohen envisioned an “Eretz Yisrael of life and

116 Divrei Knesset, v. 70 (June 3, 1974), 1550.

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peace.” Hacohen saw the “possibility for an arrangement” between Israel and the Arab states and

urged the government to explore that possibility. Moreover, he called on the incoming

government to stand fast against those who would undermine its authority from both within and

without.117

Hacohen’s was but one of many voices in a lengthy debate that touched upon Israel’s

core values and competing visions for the country’s future. In many ways, that debate began long

before Rabin presented his government on June 3, 1974, and continued long after. The Yom

Kippur War swept away the euphoria and complacency that followed Israel’s stunning victory in

1967, leaving behind a sense of apocalyptic dread and a crisis of confidence.

That day, however, there was no crisis of confidence in the parliamentary arena. The

Knesset voted confidence in Rabin’s government by a margin of 61-51 with four abstentions.

This time, the vote of every coalition MK was accounted for, and Likud declined to force a roll

call vote.118 The coalition’s one-seat majority in the Knesset made governing difficult, with some

Knesset committees evenly split between the coalition and the opposition. The opposition even

enjoyed a slim majority on other committees. Each and every coalition MK had to be on-call for

an unexpected vote.

Not surprisingly, reports spread that the NRP would soon join the government with the

support of the Zeirim. Melamed denied these rumors, announcing that all of the NRP’s 10 MKs

would “devote [their] efforts to toppling Rabin’s coalition.” Ben-Meir and Hammer released a statement that the Zeirim had “neither softened [their] stand nor changed it in the slightest.119

117 Divrei Knesset, v. 70 (June 3, 1974), 1549. 118 Divrei Knesset, v. 70 (June 3, 1974),1562. 119 “NRP Likely to Join Rabin Govt,” Jerusalem Post (June 11, 1974), 1; “NRP denies it will join gov’t,” Jerusalem Post (June 12, 1974), 2.

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Still, contacts between the two parties continued, and some Alignment leaders turned to R.

Goren to facilitate the NRP’s entry into the coalition. Weeks later, Rav Goren departed for a

three-week tour of the US. There, Goren would attempt to broker a rabbinic compromise over

amending the Law of Return in order to facilitate the NRP’s entry into the coalition. Months

earlier, Melamed had observed that the NRP’s “problem” was the Chief Rabbinate. Now, R.

Goren was determined find a solution.

Chief Rabbi Goren’s ‘Ultimate Deal’? 4.A Rav Goren’s “Shuttle Diplomacy”

On June 18, 1974, R. Goren touched down in New York.120 The next day, he met with

Terrence Cook, Archbishop of New York, whom he urged to take up the cause of Syria’s

embattled Jewish community. Goren also brought to the Archbishop’s attention the fact that,

under Israeli sovereignty, Jerusalem and its holy sites were open to members of all faiths. This

was in stark contrast to the Jordanian occupation, during which Jewish holy sites and cemeteries

were vandalized and desecrated.121 With increased chatter about possible Jordanian–Israeli negotiations, the political implications of R. Goren’s comments were clear. Following a night at the Waldorf Astoria hotel, Goren received an honorary doctorate from Yeshiva University on

June 20.122 Later that day, he told the press that he was willing to meet with Reform and

Conservative rabbis over “Who is a Jew” should they request such a meeting.123

120 JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:117 (June 18, 1974) 2. 121 “Cardinal Cooke promises to intervene for Syrian Jews,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:119, (June 20, 1974), 3. 122 “Chief Rabbi Goren Seeks Meeting with Nixon on Israel’s Spiritual Role,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:120 (June 21, 1974). Rabbi Simcha Elberg of Brooklyn wrote a scathing editorial in HaPardes, denouncing Goren as a stooge of the Labor Party who had been “cast out from the Torah world.” Simcha Elberg, “Rabbi ‘Doctor’ Shlomo Goren,” HaPardes 48:10 (New York, July 1974), 3-4. 123 “Chief Rabbi Goren Seeks Meeting with Nixon on Israel’s Spiritual Role,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:120 (June 21, 1974)..

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On June 27, Goren addressed the Rabbinical Council of America (RCA) during the

modern-Orthodox group’s annual convention. He and the RCA leadership discussed prospects

for increased cooperation between the RCA and the Chief Rabbinate. The Israeli political

controversy over halakhic conversion put “personal status” issues such as marriage and religious

divorce at the top of the conference agenda. Rabbi Fabian Schonfeld, the RCA’s incoming

president, met with R. Goren to discuss a joint project to train American rabbinic judges and

establish institutionalized rabbinic courts in the US to adjudicate divorces, oversee halitza

ceremonies, and perform conversions. The RCA also passed a resolution opposing “the presence

of nuclear weapons” in the Middle East, a thinly veiled critique of the Nixon administration’s

nuclear accord with Egypt.124

Back in Israel, the NRP, Likud, and Agudah failed to establish a united front in the

opposition. Likud refused the NRP’s demand to block electoral reforms that would benefit larger

parties. The NRP, for its part, rejected Likud’s demand to foreswear joining the Rabin

government until the latter amended the Law of Return.125 The opposition parties did, however,

agree to coordinate their activities on an ad hoc basis, which enabled them to stymie budget

legislation in the Knesset Finance Committee.126 The NRP’s objective, though, was to make it

difficult for Rabin’s coalition to govern without the party.

As the NRP harangued the government from the opposition, Burg, Raphael, and Justice

Minister Haim Zadok intensified their efforts to bring the NRP into the government. As senior

Israeli officials traveled to the US in a bid to secure military aid and coordinate policy on the

124 “Goren Tells Orthodox Rabbis Jewish Zpg ‘Critical Threat’ to Israel and World Jewry,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:125 (June 28, 1974), 4; “Protocol of the Meeting of the Chief Rabbinical Council of Israel: Jerusalem, 5 Av 5734 [July 24, 1974]”, 2-3, ISA, GL/43551/14. 125 “Opposition Parties Agree to Cooperate; Won’t Form Bloc,” JTA Daily News Bulletin, XLI:119, (June 20, 1974). 126 “Opposition Parties Block Budget,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:122 (June 25, 1974), 3.

129 peace process, the Alignment leadership dispatched Menachem Hacohen to the United States.

Shimon Peres and Yigal Allon were in Washington to negotiate debt forgiveness and the purchase of advanced American fighter planes.127 Hacohen, by contrast, was tasked with meeting

R. Goren and closing a deal to amend the Law of Return and bring the NRP into the coalition. R.

Goren, in turn, consulted with R. Soloveitchik on multiple occasions until the latter agreed to publicly support the compromise once the CRC gave its approval.128 For its part, the Allon-

Peres-Rabin triumvirate received $1.1 billion in loan forgiveness from the Nixon administration.129

4.B “Next Week You’ll be a Minister in the Government of Israel”: Rav Goren’s Voyage Home

By July 7, NRP Secretary-General Zvi Bernstein was optimistic that a deal would be reached, telling journalists to expect movement upon R. Goren’s return from the US.130

Meanwhile, R. Goren gave a taped interview to Israel Radio in the US, telling listeners that the press had exaggerated Rav Soloveitchik’s involvement in the “Who is a Jew” affair: “It is in

Israel,” the Chief Rabbi declared, “that things will be decided.” 131

127 The summer of 1974 was a busy time for Israeli officials overseas. Prime Minister Rabin was also abroad for a meeting of International Socialist Party leaders in the UK. Rabin also met with British PM Harold Wilson, and expressed Israel’s willingness to concede territory to a group of British Lawmakers that Israel was ready to make territorial concessions. The formula for Rabin’s incremental approach was “a piece of peace for a piece of territory.” Defense Minister Peres also visited the US for talks over purchasing new U.S. fighter planes, in order to counter the Soviet MIG-23 being supplied to Syria. “Bilateral Talks, Reciprocity, Keys to Middle East Peace, Rabin Says,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:125 (July 1, 1974), 1; “Peres Discloses Israel to buy advanced U.S. planes – answer to Russian MIG-25,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:125 (July 1, 1974), 1; “Israel to Purchase U.S. Combat Aircraft as Part of Program to Strengthen, Modernize its Air Power,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:129, (July 8, 1974), 1. 128 Mescheloff, 55-56; “Labor Party Seeking Rabbi Goren’s OK of Formula for NRP to Join Rabin Govt,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:125 (July 1, 1974), 1; “NRP Expected to Join Government,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:129, (July 8, 1974), 1; “Rabbi Goren to Zevulun Hammer: Next week you will be a minister,” Davar (July 11, 1974), 2. “Protocol of the Meeting of the Chief Rabbinical Council of Israel: Jerusalem, 5 Av 5734 [July 24, 1974],” 2-8, ISA, GL/43551/14. 129“Israel Thanks Nixon for decision to award $1.1 billion aid in grant form,”JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:125 (July 1, 1974), 1. 130 “Nrp Expected to Join,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:129, (July 8, 1974), 1. 131 “Nrp Expected to Join,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:129, (July 8, 1974), 1.

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Goren touched down in Israel on July 10, 1974, and was met by colleagues, friends, and

supporters as he stepped off an El Al plane. Goren announced his intent “to sit down with all of

the relevant actors, together with the main mehutan (in-law), which is the NRP.” He expressed

hope that “we will be able to achieve unity in the state.” While Rav Goren was willing to

convene the CRC “as soon as possible,” it would not take up the matter without a request to do

so from Labor and the NRP.132

Goren noted that Menachem Hacohen had been sent to meet with him in the United

States and had warm words for the rabbi-cum-parliamentarian. He viewed Hacohen’s mission on behalf of the Labor Party as “an important change” that would “contribute to greater unity” between Israeli and American Jewry. In Goren’s view, Hacohen had “faithfully fulfilled his mission.”133

Goren also commented on his consultations with “Rabbi Soloveitchik of Boston,” stating

that the two had discussed language for amending the Law of Return to “meet all of the

demands.” In accordance with the private understanding reached between the two, Goren

emphasized that he was “not Rabbi Soloveitchik’s spokesman.” Moreover, “the words

themselves…were not the main thing, but rather the substance.” The gist of the Amendment

would be its recognition that “conversion must be according to the Halakha, which is to say,

according to the Torah of Israel.” Still, Goren told reporters that he was “convinced” that Rav

Soloveitchik would “express his opinion” when the time came.134

132 “Rav Goren to Zevulun Hammer,” Davar (July 11, 1974), 2. 133 Davar (July 11, 1974), 2; “NRP to Decide at the End of the Coming Week On the issues of Conversion and Joining the Government,” Ma’ariv, (July 11, 1974), 1. 134 Davar, (July 11, 1974), 2. Goren later told the CRC- in confidence, that R. Soloveitchik had agreed that R. Goren could send a journalist to ask his opinion if the CRC approved the compromise. The Rov would then endorse the deal on the record. Protocol, CRC Meeting, July 24, 1974, ISA, GL/43551/14.

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Goren refused to state explicitly that his work on the Law of Return was aimed at

facilitating the NRP’s entry into the government. However, he held that “it would be a good

thing for the government to be broader,” not only so that the Law of Return could be amended,

but also to prevent any withdrawal from the West Bank:

The issue of Judea and Samaria must not be forgotten, and I have also expressed my opinion to the Alignment leadership on this subject as an Israeli citizen. The integrity of Judea and Samaria must be guaranteed.135 Any lingering doubts about Goren’s intentions were put to rest, however, when he greeted

Zevulun Hammer with a smile, asking “What, you’re still not a minister [in the government]?”

When his jovial comment was met with silence, Goren continued, stating “No matter, it’s almost

certain that next week you’ll be a minister in the Government of Israel.”136

4.C “Judea and Samaria Mustn’t Be Forgotten”: Controversy over the West Bank in the Summer of 1974

Hammer’s silence reflected the Zeirim’s misgivings about joining the Rabin government.

According to Vermus, they sensed that the public was uneasy about the new government and

ready for an alternative to Labor’s monopoly on the reins of power. The Zeirim’s ultimate aim

was for the NRP to join a Likud-led government that shared their opposition to territorial

withdrawal.137 As the question of the West Bank and the future of its Palestinian inhabitants

became more acute, the divide between Labor and the NRP widened, while the NRP and Likud

cooperated in the opposition.

During the summer of 1974, small groups of religious would-be settlers attempted to

“create facts on the ground” in the Samaria region of the West Bank, where Labor governments

mindfully avoid settlement construction due to the dense Palestinian population. The presence of

135 “Rav Goren to Zevulun Hammer,” Davar (July 11, 1974), 2; “NRP to Decide,” Ma’ariv (July 11, 1974). 136 “Rav Goren to Zevulun Hammer,” Davar (July 11, 1974), 2; “NRP to Decide,” Ma’ariv (July 11, 1974). 137 Vermus, The Knitted Revolution, 84.

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MKs from Likud and the NRP Zeirim at Gush Emunim’s settlement bids, was seen by some as

crossing the line from legitimate parliamentary opposition to unlawful defiance of government

authority.138 Indeed, the government’s stated policy was that this area should eventually be

returned to Jordanian governance as part of a peace accord.139

Hammer, in contrast, argued that the would-be settlers’ actions were lawful, because,

“thank God, there is still no law in the State of Israel which prohibits settling in the Land of

Israel.” He rejected charges that the settlers and their supporters, him included, were

undermining the rule of law and the foundations of Israeli democracy. To the contrary, Hammer

held that staking out locations for Jewish settlement in the West Bank was a “democratic act.”

By taking grassroots action to lay claim to the Land, the settlers and their supporters were

stimulating public debate over “the settlement enterprise, the future of Eretz Yisrael, and the fate

of Judea and Samaria – the bequest of our ancestors” – and what better measure of the vitality of

Israeli democracy than robust public debate?140

The debate was joined by the Left as well as the Right. Amnon Rubinstein formed a new movement for Social and Political Reform (Shinui), which put out a manifesto calling for Israel to “speedily” reach an accord with the Palestinians. Four Labor MKs signed onto the manifesto,

while the ILP executive called on the government to open negotiations with Jordan as well as

“other Palestinian entities.” On television, former intelligence officials called for the government

to recognize Palestinian peoplehood and proactively seek an accord over a Palestinian “entity” in

the West Bank.141

138 Knesset, v.71 (July 31, 1974), 2536-2569. 139Divrei Knesset, v. 70 (June 3, 1974), 1514. 140 Divrei Knesset, v.71 (July 31, 1974), 2543. 141 Veliotes, Emb. Tel Aviv to State,” Israel’s Palestinian Week,” 1974TELAV03906 (July 12, 1974).

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While settlement activity brought the fate of the West Bank to the attention of the Israeli public, it also drew the attention of other actors in the region. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia sent word to the U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, James E. Akins, that the Kingdom was alarmed by reports that Israel planned to rapidly expand settlements in the Golan, West Bank, Sinai, and

Gaza. Faisal had heard that Israel would develop 20 cities in the territories, which would require an investment of over 1.2 billion Israeli pounds. According to Saudi Oil Minister Yamani, the king was also deeply “disturbed” by statements attributed to Rabin and his ministers that Israel would never withdraw from the West Bank.142

Yamani told Akins that Faisal would soon summon him to discuss the matter. Faisal had personally promised the U.S. ambassador that he would “make oil available to meet the world’s needs as long as progress toward a just peace in the Middle East continued.” The king was likely to ask, then, why the US had not condemned “these Israeli provocations.” Moreover, did the US seriously believe that Israel would “invest this effort and money into development in the occupied lands if it ever intended to relinquish them?”143

Akens had attempted to reassure Yamani that “Rabin has a shaky majority” in the Israeli parliament and that any bellicose statements attributed to him were merely “campaign talk.”

Yamani was unsatisfied with this answer and told the ambassador that King Faisal would be similarly displeased. Akins cabled Washington, asking whether Rabin and others had, in fact, made the statements attributed to them. He also requested information on whether Israel would implement such far-reaching development plans in the Territories. In anticipation of his meeting

142 Akins to Kissinger, “Reinstitution of oil boycott: King Faisal’s displeasure with progress toward peace” 1974JIDDA03959 (July 10, 1974). 143 Akins to Kissinger, “Reinstitution of oil boycott: King Faisal’s displeasure” (July 10, 1974).

134 with the Saudi king, he asked, “What can I tell Faisal about our policy on further Israeli withdrawals from Arab lands?144

Kissinger forwarded these queries to the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, where Ambassador

Keating was absent. In his place, Deputy Chief of Mission Nicholas Veliotes replied that the reports Faisal had heard were incorrect:145 “The Rabin government ha[d] not, repeat, not, said it would not relinquish any part of the West Bank.” Rather, this was the stance of the “most hardline elements” in the opposition Likud and NRP parties. The Rabin government was prepared to concede territory in the West Bank but rejected a withdrawal to the 1967 borders, as well as concessions over Jerusalem.

Regarding settlements, Veliotes wrote that the reports Faisal had received were greatly exaggerated. The U.S. Embassy had “found no, repeat no, statement by Rabin or any other GOI

Minister that Israel intends to build 20 new cities in occupied territories, and spend 1.2 billion

Israeli pounds on construction projects.” Israeli settlement plans were, in fact, relatively modest.

The Labor-affiliated affiliated Ihud HaKibbutzim Movement was considering the establishment of seven collective farms in the Golan, Jordan Valley, and Rafiah areas. In addition, the quasi- public Jewish Agency had called for “50 new villages in areas vital for the Security of Israel,” mostly in Israel proper. While visiting the Gush Etzion settlement bloc, Yigal Allon stated that settlement activity would be “selective and strategic.146 Veliotes also wrote that the embassy was

“impressed” by the “vigorous action [taken] by the Rabin government” against wildcat settlers in the West Bank.

144 Nicholas Veliotes, Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Recent GOI Statements on Peace Negotiations,” 1974TELAV03874 (July 11, 1974). 145 Veliotes, Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Recent GOI Statements,” (July 11, 1974). 146 Ibid.

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Kissinger forwarded Veliotes’ reply to Ambassador Akins in Jedda, concurring that Israel had “no grandiose plan” for new settlements and that “budgetary constraints” would limit Israeli spending in the territories. Kissinger imagined that Faisal might not be satisfied with these explanations, but Akins could tell the Saudi king that the US would continue to pursue a

“comprehensive Middle East peace settlement.” The disengagement agreements were but the first steps toward achieving this goal, which also applied to the Jordanian front. Moreover, the

US believed that “any peace settlement must take into account the legitimate interests of the

Palestinian people.”147

Secretary Kissinger also informed the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv that the “publicity” over settlement activity in the Israeli press was creating “difficulties… in U.S.–Arab Relations.”

Kissinger wanted to “take another look” at the settlement issue and asked for a report on any new

Israeli settlement activity since the Yom Kippur War along with the Embassy’s assessment of the

Israeli government’s policy on future settlements. In addition, Kissinger was open to any ideas they might have “on ways [the Government of Israel] might be induced to turn off public comments on expanding settlements in [the] territories.” 148

4.D The Goren Compromise and Labor’s “Double Dilemma”

The Rabin government’s stated policy of limited settlement activity consistent with territorial compromise was the key reason the Zeirim were loath to join the coalition. Goren, in contrast, believed that NRP could best prevent a withdrawal from sacred ground by influencing government decisions from within. Following Goren’s return to Israel from the US, Veliotes cabled Washington that prospects for the NRP’s entry into the government had improved. The

147 Kissinger to Akins, “GOI Posture RE Settlements In, and Retention of, Occupied Territories,” 1974STATE151938, (July 13, 1974). 148 Kissinger to Emb. Tel Aviv, GOI Posture RE Settlements In, and Retention of, Occupied Territories,” 1974STATE15916 (July 23, 1974).

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Embassy’s assessment was that the NRP remained outside the government due to the “position

taken by the Rabbinate under…Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren” that the “Law of Return [must] be

amended to specify that only recognized conversions to Judaism are those made in accordance

with Orthodox procedures (Halacha).” While the NRP had joined the previous government

despite the Rabbinate’s opposition, it could not do so again due to “increased dissention” in the

NRP over a “variety of issues.”149

Now, Goren was credited as being “at the center of efforts” to seek a compromise in

which the Law of Return would be amended without referencing Halakha. The Embassy’s

assessment was that the NRP’s entry into the government would create a “more hawkish tone on

foreign policy.” While “religious issues” had been the focus of coalition negotiations, Veliotes

noted that “a key plank in the NRP platform is opposition to the return of any part of the West

Bank.” Thus, the NRP’s presence in the government would “complicate prospects” for

negotiations with Jordan over the West Bank, although it “would not necessarily constitute a

barrier” to such negotiations.150

The progress in talks between Labor and the NRP was driven by three factors: First, the

“consolidation of public support for the new government” let the NRP to realize that the Rabin

government could make do without them. Second, the longer the NRP stayed in the opposition,

the less political influence it could exert and the less patronage it could dispense. Third, Rabin

sought to broaden his Knesset majority and balance out “dovish elements in the cabinet.” In

addition, some in Labor worried that the NRP might form “a permanent opposition bloc with

Likud at some future date, endangering Labor’s hegemony in Israeli political life.”151

149 Veliotes, Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Internal Political Scene: Prospects for National Religious Party Joining Coalition,” 1974TELAV03904 (July 12, 1974). 150 Veliotes, Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Internal Political Scene,” (July 12, 1974). 151 Veliotes, Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Internal Political Scene”

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The concern that the NRP might align with Likud was shared by Moshe Baram, the new

Minister of Labor. In his experience as a former coalition whip, Baram had learned that “it was

harder to maintain a broad coalition than a narrow one.” The ongoing challenge of governing

with a one-vote majority “created motivation” in the coalition ranks and kept lawmakers on their

toes. Nevertheless, Baram was “in favor of bringing the NRP into the government.” In Baram’s

view, “the main thing” was to “not push the NRP into right-wing streams in a few years.”152

While Baram feared that the NRP might move to the right in the opposition, others were concerned that bringing the NRP into the coalition would push the government to the right. Levi

Yitzhak Yerushalmi, a veteran journalist with expertise in religious politics, summed up the situation well in a column for Ma’ariv.153 In Yerushalmi’s view, Labor faced a two-fold

dilemma: From a parliamentary perspective, it would be forced to choose between its partnership

with the NRP and its partnership with the ILP, the dovish remnant of the General Zionists.

Substantively, Israel was on the cusp of a period of intense diplomacy – and intense international

pressure. After signing an accord with both Egypt and Syria, Israel might soon find itself in

negotiations with Jordan over the West Bank. Despite its hawks, Labor was “generally inclined”

toward territorial compromise, and MaPaM- the junior partner in the Alignment- was decidedly

dovish, along with the ILP and CRM.

Under the present circumstances, Yerushalmi argued, the government had a 61-vote majority that would support some form of territorial compromise in the West Bank. However, if the Alignment decided to accept Goren’s compromise on “who is a Jew?” it would likely lose the support of the ILP and the CRM, who vehemently opposed formalizing the Orthodox monopoly

152 “Moshe Baram: It is easier to maintain a narrow coalition than a broad one,” Davar (July 11, 1974), 7. 153 Levi Yitzhak Yerushalmi, “Labor's Double Dilemma,” Ma’ariv (July 11, 1974) 5.

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over conversions. Thus, the price of bringing the NRP into the government through Goren’s

compromise would be the loss of the ILP and CRM.

Losing the small, secularist factions would also leave Rabin without a parliamentary

majority for territorial compromise within the coalition. The NRP would accept the

government’s authority to conduct negotiation over the West Bank pending elections to ratify an

Accord. However, the NRP’s presence in the cabinet would also allow it to undermine those

negotiations from within. Ultimately, R. Goren’s compromise formulation for amending the Law

of Return would also tie the government’s hands over the West Bank.

Thus, the Labor Party faced a “two-fold dilemma”: On the one hand, the NRP would

likely shift further to the right and grow closer to Likud in the opposition. Such a shift would

signal the end of Labor’s political hegemony. On the other hand, if Labor brought the NRP into

the coalition under terms that would force out the ILP and the CRM, the government would be

completely dependent on the NRP for its survival, limiting its room to maneuver on the

diplomatic front.154

Shortly after Goren’s return on July 10, the NRP’s Zvi Bernstein expressed the party’s

willingness to accept Goren’s compromise. Badly shaken by the bitter controversy over joining

the Meir government, the NRP needed the Alignment and the Rabbinate to accept Goren’s

compromise before the NRP Executive would take up the issue.155 Still, Bernstein was optimistic and expected the NRP to receive four seats around the cabinet table, taking the Ministries of

Social Welfare, Religion, and Interior in addition to one minister without a portfolio. Burg,

Raphael, Warhaftig, and Hammer were expected to fill the seats, and the issue of West Bank would be discussed during informal talks with Labor.

154 Yerushalmi, “Labor’s Double Dilemma.” 155 “NRP To Decide,” Ma’ariv, (July 11, 1974) 4.

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4.E “The Real Issue is not Religious but Political”: The Alignment Rejects Rav Goren’s Grand Bargain

With the Alignment leadership set to decide whether to accept R. Goren’s compromise on

July 16, 1974, the ILP and CRM informed Labor Secretary General and Minister of Education

Aharon Yadlin that if Labor brought the NRP into the government on those terms, the two parties would bolt the coalition.156 Within Labor, those who opposed amending the Law of

Return collected enough signatures to convene the Central Committee.

The Alignment executive met on July 16, and Justice Minister Zadok – who had been the

point man in talks with the NRP – proposed the creation of a formal negotiating committee to

conclude an agreement with the NRP.157 In response, MaPaM leaders Meir Talmi and Yaakov

Hazan moved to include representatives of the ILP and CRM on the committee, thereby

guaranteeing that any negotiations with the NRP based on the Goren formula would fail. As the

meeting became “stormy,”158 Rabin declared that “the time was not ripe for a decision” on R.

Goren’s formula. In Rabin’s view, it was not worth destabilizing the coalition in order to expand

it. Thus, he rejected any proposal to begin formal negotiations with the NRP on the grounds that

it would call into question the government’s ability to “conduct affairs of state.”159 In light of

Rabin’s decision not to decide, Zadok withdrew his motion to form a negotiating committee with the NRP, and the meeting adjourned.

During the debate, Goren came under intense criticism from Zadok and others who accused him of politicizing the Rabbinate. It was unacceptable, in their view, that the Rabbinate

156 “Coalition Partners Oppose Compromise Offered by NRP,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:135 (July 16, 1974), 3. 157 “Labor Alignment Blocks Move to Bring NRP into Coalition Government: Rabin Says Issue Not Ripe for Decision, JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:137 (July 18, 1974), 3. 158 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Internal Political Situation: Coalition talks Suspended,” 1974TELAV04086 (July 20, 1974). 159 “According to Rabin’s Proposal – Resolved: The Matter of Bringing the NRP into the Government is “Not Ripe for Decision,” Ma’ariv (July 19, 1974) 7.

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involve itself in coalition negotiations. Zadok also charged that Hacohen’s trip to the US to

consult with Goren and R. Soloveitchik was a “grave error.” Hacohen replied that his trip to the

US was a “shlihut” undertaken on behalf of others, not his own personal initiative. Though

Hacohen was reluctant to name names, Labor Secretary General Aharon Yadlin came forward

and announced that he had dispatched Hacohen in support of the ongoing effort to reach a deal

with the NRP. For his part, Hacohen asserted that while the Rabbinate should be kept out of politics, political parties should not intrude into “the work of the Rabbinate and demand halakhic rulings to their liking.” If politicians chose to involve themselves in rabbinic matters, then they had no cause to complain when rabbis became involved in political matters.160

The NRP reaction to Labor’s decision was “rapid and sharp.”161 Raphael angrily

announced that the NRP was terminating all contacts with Labor, and would act as a full-fledged

opposition party.162 The NRP Knesset Faction issued a statement condemning Labor for

“bow[ing] to the dictates of anti-religious elements and circles which were hastening to make

dangerous and far-reaching political concessions [as part of the peace process].” Bernstein

proclaimed that Labor’s rejection of Goren’s compromise demonstrated that “the real issue [was]

not religious but political.” MaPaM and Labor’s left flank wanted to keep the NRP out of the

cabinet, because it would side with those who “want Eretz Yisrael to remain undivided.” Not to

be outdone, Ben-Meir announced that the time had come for the NRP to unite around the task of

toppling the Rabin government.163

160 Ma’ariv (July 19, 1974), 7. 161 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Internal Political Situation,” (July 20, 1974). 162 “Labor Alignment Blocks Move to Bring NRP into Coalition Government,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:137 (July 18, 1974), 2. 163 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Internal Political Situation,” (July 20, 1974).

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In his report on the breakdown, Ambassador Keating commented that “hardline elements” in the NRP would likely “exploit the current rift” with Labor to push the NRP “firmly

into the opposition camp.” Within the Alignment, the doves who wanted the NRP out of the

coalition also “seem[ed] to have the upper hand.” In Keating’s view, Labor and R. Goren

“handled the entire matter poorly, particularly by allowing [their] negotiating positions to surface

prematurely.” The subsequent rejection of R. Goren’s compromise proposal only exacerbated the

rift between Labor and the NRP, which was “precisely what Rabin had hoped to avoid.”

Keating predicted that the NRP would resume informal discussions with Labor about

joining the government in a few months and that the Rabin government would remain stable. The

NRP seemed to be “caught between its eagerness to re-acquire influence and patronage on the

one hand, and its commitment to the Rabbinate” on the other. Moreover, with regard to the

Labor–NRP relationship, he observed that the “process of alienation, once begun, has

momentum of its own and will be difficult to reverse.”164

While Keating’s observation as to the “process of alienation” was prophetic, he misread

the NRP’s situation. The NRP was not caught between the desire for patronage on the one hand, and its commitment to the rabbinate on the other. As far as Goren was concerned, the NRP

leadership had “repented” by staying out of the Rabin government over ‘Who is a Jew,’” and had

therefore “atoned for their earlier transgression against [the CRC’s] halakhic ruling.”165

In fact, Goren hoped that the NRP would rejoin the government and prevent territorial compromise from within the cabinet. Goren was “not ashamed to admit” that he “want[ed] to see the NRP inside the government” in order to strengthen the hawks who “oppose[d] withdrawal

164 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Internal Political Situation,” (July 20, 1974). 165 “Question of Marriage,” Jerusalem Post (July 19, 1974), 5, A7.

142 from Judea and Samaria.” According to R. Goren, preventing a withdrawal from territory in the

West Bank was “an integral part of Torah observance.”166

4.F “‘Who is a Jew’ Was of No Importance to Them:” R. Goren Faces the Chief Rabbinical Council

On July 24, the CRC convened to receive a report from R. Goren on his U.S. trip and the latest developments in the “Who is a Jew” saga.167 Goren had endured a difficult – and public – defeat and had received considerable criticism. Now, he faced the unenviable task of explaining to the CRC why he had championed a compromise amendment to the Law of Return after insisting that there would be no compromise.

After cautioning the CRC that his comments were confidential and “not for publication,”

Goren revealed that he had been conducting covert talks with Labor leaders over a compromise amendment to the Law of Return since the beginning of coalition negotiations under Meir.168

The compromise, he said, was actually “the original proposal of Rabbi Soloveitchik,” though

Goren “changed it afterwards in order to improve it very much.” During his trip to the US, Goren and Soloveitchik settled on the language “as has been practiced and accepted in Am Yisrael from generation to generation.” Soloveitchik agreed that, should the CRC accept the proposal, Goren would be authorized to send a journalist to R. Soloveitchik, and the Rov would go on record as endorsing the deal.169

Goren told the CRC that amending the Law of Return would have no legal effect; its significance was symbolic. After meeting with legal experts, Goren was convinced that the

Israeli High Court of Justice would not read the amendment to exclude Conservative and Reform

166 “Question of Marriage,” Jerusalem Post (July 19, 1974), A7. 167 “Protocol of the Meeting of the Chief Rabbinical Council of Israel: Jerusalem, 5 Av 5734 [July 24, 1974]”, ISA, GL/43551/14 168 “Protocol of CRC Meeting,” 3. 169 “Protocol of CRC Meeting,” 4.

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conversions per se. While Goren had attempted to formulate the language so as to exclude such

conversions, he was convinced that “nothing would hold up before the High Court of Justice.”170

Ultimately, Goren argued, amending the Law of Return was less a matter of substance

than of symbolism. It was not the task of the Rabbinate “to prevent BaGaTZim” (cases before the

High Court of Justice); rather, the Rabbinate’s purpose was to prove that “the State of Israel is not a state of laws but a state of Halakha.” Insofar as the Law of Return was Israel’s “first

constitutional law,” amending the law to provide for conversion “as practiced by the People of

Israel from generation to generation” would afford “satisfaction” and “recognition” of the

“authority of the Halakah.” That said, Goren maintained that “the final decision would have to

be made by the Chief Rabbinical Council.”171

Rabbi Binyamin Aviad interjected, claiming that the CRC had already rejected the

language “from generation to generation” and that accepting it now would “disgrace [the

Rabbinate] before the People of Israel from generation to generation.” Goren angrily denied that

the CRC ever rejected such a formula, because “at no time have we deliberated over this

language.” Goren had never formally proposed his compromise formula to the CRC. He had

merely “reported developments on the matter to the council, just as [he was] doing [that] day.”

Neither the Alignment nor the NRP had accepted Goren’s formula; therefore, he had no reason to

bring it before the CRC for a vote. Indeed, Goren had insisted from the beginning that the

Council would only take up the matter at the request of Labor and the NRP.172

Goren told the Council that he raised the issue “in order to inform you, not to argue about

it now.” He bitterly recounted how Labor strongmen Sapir and Baram led him to believe that

170 “Protocol of CRC Meeting,” 4-5. 171 “Protocol of CRC Meeting,” 5. 172 “Protocol of CRC Meeting,” 5-6.

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MaPaM would accept the language. However, when it seemed like the proposal would be voted

down by the Alignment leadership, they absented themselves from the meeting, where Rabin announced that the proposal “was not ripe” for a decision.173 In Goren’s view, “what happened

proves how close we were to victory.” “It would certainly have been considered a victory for us,

if they would have changed the law…it could have been a great victory for the Torah of Israel.

Not for ‘us,’ as rabbis or as individuals, but for the light of Judaism.”174

Goren opened the floor to questions, and Rabbi Binyamin Aviad again emerged as

Goren’s chief antagonist. Rav Aviad asserted that the CRC had been discredited by the whole

affair and should refuse to deliberate over the NRP’s participation in the government and “Who

is a Jew.” Instead, the CRC should gather “the cream and the crop” of Israeli Rabbis – such as R.

Zvi Yehuda Kook – to issue a credible ruling. Of course, nothing short of amending the law to

call for conversion “according to the Halakha” could even be discussed.175

R. Goren balked at the suggestion that the Chief Rabbinate lacked credibility and needed

the support of R. Zvi Yehudah (or anyone else). Besides, the Zeirim had been involved at every

step of the way, as had Gush Emunim and Rav Zvi Yehudah. Goren told the CRC that R. Zvi

Yehudah and his followers were “not interested in this issue of ‘Who is a Jew.’”176 Goren told the CRC that he and the elderly rabbi had met for hours on end, and R. Zvi Yehudah had told

Goren that “the issue of ‘who is a Jew?’ was of no importance.” Goren had met with “the whole group,” and “they would not agree to enter [the government] without a guarantee on Judea and

Samaria.” In Goren’s view, however, the cause of retaining Judea and Samaria would have been best served by the NRP joining the government on the basis of his compromise amendment to

173 “Protocol of CRC Meeting,” 6. 174 “Protocol of CRC Meeting,” 6. 175 “Protocol of CRC Meeting,” 6-7 176 “Protocol of CRC Meeting,” 7.

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the Law of Return. Goren claimed that it was “davka because of Judea and Samaria that [Goren] had been in favor of accepting this agreement. More for Judea and Samaria than for any other

177 reason.”401F

Again, Aviad interjected, proposing that the CRC issue a proclamation forbidding any withdrawal from Judea and Samaria.

“Don’t mix up the two issues,” Goren replied, “and I don’t think that we should turn the

Chief Rabbinical Council into a convention of rabbis and invite all the rabbis.” Goren was

emphatic that the CRC, and the CRC alone, had the authority to issue rulings on questions

brought before it.178

Aviad reiterated his proposal to hold a large gathering of Israeli rabbis and charged Goren

with having capitulated to pressure from the Alignment. Growing agitated, Goren fiercely denied

having succumbed to political pressure and returned to the subject of R. Zvi Yehudah. Goren

told the CRC had sat with R. Zvi Yehudah for hours, and “the issue of the settlements was at the

center for him.” According to Goren, R. Zvi Yehudah was uninterested in solving the issue of

halakhic conversion or in aiding the Chief Rabbi’s efforts to find a compromise that would

enable the NRP to join the government.179

Goren explained the difference between him and R. Zvi Yehudah: Practically, Goren

realized that he could not “get everything we wanted” on Judea and Samaria and had to settle for

“defer[ing] the evil decree” for the duration of the government’s tenure. While R. Zvi Yehudah’s

obstructionism was intended to keep the NRP out of the government, Goren was working to

formulate a compromise to bring the NRP into the cabinet room.180

177 “Protocol of CRC Meeting,” 7. 178 “Protocol of CRC Meeting,” 7. 179 “Protocol of CRC Meeting,” 7-8. 180 “Protocol of CRC Meeting,” 8.

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Goren asserted that, for Rav Zvi Yehudah, “settlement is the main thing” both philosophically and ideologically. Goren’s position was the exact opposite: “Amending the Law of the State according to the Law of the Torah,” he held, was “far more in accordance with the spirit of Rav [Abraham Isaac] Kook” than a single-minded focus on settlement. Goren sought nothing less than the “contiguity” between the Halakha, the “People of Israel,” and “the Eternal

God of the People of Israel.”181

“Their Religion Says They Must Have All of Israel to Govern:” The Judea and Samaria Proviso, the NRP, and the Decision to Pursue a “Next Step” with Egypt. Goren was correct that the NRP could do more to prevent territorial withdrawal from within the coalition – at least for the duration of Rabin’s term. The Rabin government took power three days after the Syrian–Israeli disengagement accord was signed in Geneva.182 After brokering disengagement agreements between Israel, Egypt, and Syria, Secretary Kissinger was considering the next step in the peace process. Would the US aim for another “military” disengagement on the West Bank with Jordan or a second deal between Egypt and Israel?

Consequently, the fate of the West Bank and its Palestinian inhabitants featured prominently in both closed-door consultations and Israeli public discourse during the summer of 1974.

5.A “The Future Map of Israel”

As the peace process moved forward, Israeli settlement activity in areas ostensibly on the negotiating table attracted greater attention. On July 24, the same day the CRC discussed

Goren’s abortive compromise, Allon met with Ambassador Keating. With Allon set to visit

181 “Protocol of CRC Meeting,” 8. 182 “Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement,” (Agreement on Disengagement Between Israeli and Syrian Force, Geneva, May 31, 1974) Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, ed. Adam M. Howard (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011), Doc. 88.

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Washington, Keating conveyed his government’s concerns over “publicity” surrounding settlement construction. Keating requested current information on West Bank settlements, which

Allon promised to provide. Allon also promised to ask Israeli newspaper editors to treat settlements as a “sensitive” issue as the peace process entered a new stage.183

The next day, a group of 35 young religious families set out for an abandoned railroad station at Sebastia, near Nablus. This was the second attempt by wildcat settlers to gain a foothold in Samaria – a mountainous region densely populated by Palestinians. Ben-Meir,

Hammer, and a litany of Likudniks trekked out to the settlers’ West Bank hilltop in a show of support – as well as defiance.184 It was the unspoken policy of Labor governments to preserve the region for a potential compromise with Jordan. The Cabinet exercised direct authority over settlement and promptly ordered the settlers to leave or be removed by force. After a few nights, the settlers left voluntarily…this time.185

The architect of the policy the settlers were protesting was Yigal Allon, who traveled to

Washington for talks with Kissinger over possible diplomatic moves with Jordan and Egypt.

Over dinner at Camp David, Allon and Kissinger discussed “the future of Israel’s borders.”186

Allon asked Kissinger to “envisage Israel’s map within the context of peace and security arrangements” that a “responsible” Israeli government could present to the public. Kissinger gave his “personal opinion” that the “1967 frontiers” in the West Bank and the Golan would be

183 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “GOI Posture RE Settlements in and Retention of Occupied Territories,” (July 25, 1974). 184 Gershom Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, (New York: Times Books, 2006), 293-29). “Settlers Quit Illegal Settlement to Avoid Confrontation with Gov’t,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:144 (July 29, 1976); Photograph “Elon Moreh: MKs Menachem Begin, Zvulun Hammer and Yehuda Ben-Meir with settlers, 26.7.1974,” https://www.knesset.gov.il/history/images/149.jpg [accessed July 8, 2018]. 185 Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 295-297. 186 “Memorandum of Conversation” [Subject: The Future Map of Israel] (Camp David, August 1, 1974),” FRUS XXVI, Document 94.

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“impossible to accept.” At the same time, Kissinger warned that Sadat would not “give up an

inch of Egyptian territory without another war.”

Most of the dinner was spent discussing territorial scenarios in the Sinai Peninsula. Allon, though, pressed Kissinger for his views on the West Bank before they were seated at the table.

Kissinger attempted to demur, saying that he “hadn’t thought it through,” but Allon persisted.

After trying to steer the conversation back to Sinai, Kissinger replied that Jordan was “a special problem.” If Israel raised the “final frontier question” in the West Bank, then Jerusalem would be on the table. “You are not ready,” Kissinger told Allon, “to discuss Jerusalem.”

Allon went on to ask about security guarantees, with Kissinger under the impression that

Allon had moved on from the West Bank and was asking about an Egyptian accord. Kissinger replies that US would be willing to provide such a guarantee, but he warned that if Israel asked for a mutual-defense pact with the United States, then “the Arabs might want one.”

Kissinger’s response confused Allon, who was still fixated on the West Bank. “With you?” he asked. “Against whom? The Jordanians would want one?”

“No,” Kissinger replied. “The Egyptians would want one.”

With that, the group moved to the dinner table, and Allon refocused on the Sinai

Peninsula.187

Allon and Kissinger discussed a disengagement agreement with Jordan during another

conversation on August 1, 1974.188 While the Jordanians demanded an Israeli pullback along the

length of the Jordan Valley, Allon, speaking personally and not on the government’s behalf,

suggested a Jordanian enclave in Jericho. The scheme met with Kissinger’s approval, and he

187 “Memcon” FRUS, Doc. 94. 188Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 296 n52.

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agreed to convey it to the Jordanians as an American idea. The prospect of progress on the

Jordanian front made Allon “very happy.”189

Rabin, who was attempting to negotiate a coalition deal with the NRP, was not happy.

After learning of Allon’s “personal suggestion,” Rabin swiftly sent word to Kissinger that “any territorial concession by Israel in the West Bank require[d] election,” as the Secretary was well aware. The Cabinet, Rabin stressed, was “not prepared to call an election involving territorial concessions within the context of an interim agreement.”190 As Rabin worked to add the NRP to

his coalition, the “Judea and Samaria Proviso” he inherited from Golda Meir helped steer the

peace process away from the West Bank, to Sinai.

5.B “The Middle East is the Worst Problem We Face:” Kissinger Briefs President Gerald Ford

As Kissinger calibrated American diplomatic strategy to accommodate Israeli coalition

politics, the Watergate scandal upended the American political scene. On August 9, 1974, shortly

before noon, Kissinger accepted President Richard Nixon’s resignation.191 Three days later,

Kissinger and Gerald Ford met in the Oval Office. Kissinger explained the logic of his “step-by-

step” diplomatic strategy as he briefed the new president on the Mideast, arms sales, oil, and the

Soviet angle.192

Kissinger explained that main actors in the “Middle East problem” were Israel, Egypt,

Syria, and Jordan, with the other Arab states playing supporting roles. The Soviets sought to

189 Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 296. 190 Dinitz to Allon and Gazit, Cable 62 (6 August 1974), ISA, HZ/6858/3; See, also, Gazit to Allon, Telex (Aug. 2, 1974), ISA, HZ/6858/3; Gorenberg, 296 n53; Louise Fischer, “Turning Point on the Road to Peace: The Government of Yitzhak Rabin and the Interim Agreement with Egypt (Sinai II),” Israel Studies, Volume 19, Number 3, (Fall 2014), 55-80, 62 n48. 191 Richard Nixon to Henry Kissinger, Letter of Resignation (August 9, 1974), National Archives Foundation, https://www.archivesfoundation.org/documents/richard-nixon-resignation-letter-gerald-ford-pardon/ [accessed July 8, 2018]. 192 “Memcon, Washington, August 12, 1974 9am” FRUS XXVI, Doc. 95.

150 regain lost influence in the region, while Europe and Japan fretted over the prospect of a renewed oil embargo.

Speaking bluntly, Ford observed that “heavy Israeli losses” during the Yom Kippur War

“helped” create favorable conditions for American mediation.

“We couldn’t have done better if we had set the scenario,” Kissinger agreed.

Kissinger expected the Soviets to push for convening the Geneva Peace Conference because they had “lost Egypt” and were “in trouble in Syria.” The Soviets would back Arab demands for a comprehensive accord based on the 1967 borders and “Palestinian rights,” forcing the US to become “Israel’s lawyer.” This would alienate the Arabs, resulting in “stalemate and a war.” “We must move step by step,” Kissinger insisted, with each step “mak[ing] further steps possible.” Syria was the most “erratic” Arab state, and there was little maneuvering room on the

Golan. Kissinger therefore advised stalling the Syrians but stressed that the US “must move with

Jordan or Egypt.”193

Regarding Egypt, Kissinger believed that Sadat could not “formally end belligerency” in an interim accord and that the Israelis would have to settle for “appropriate steps” to take Egypt’s military option off the table. To that end, Sadat had already begun to clear the Suez Canal.

Kissinger considered Sadat “a decent, competent” military commander and a “wise” leader. They had “a fine relationship,” and Kissinger expected Sadat to be patient if the US pursued a

Jordanian accord first.

Indeed, Kissinger claimed to prefer a Jordanian accord. The Jordanians were the “most moderate Arabs,” while the PLO was “backed by the radical states.” Kissinger had been “trying to get Israel to negotiate with Jordan and give back some of the West Bank” to strengthen King

193 “Memcon, Washington, August 12, 1974,” FRUS XXVI, Doc. 95.

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Hussein and undermine the PLO. While there was “progress on a scheme which might work,”

Rabin was constrained by coalition politics. Kissinger explained that “the Israeli Government need[ed] the Religious Party [sic] to govern.” However, “their religion says they must have all of

[The Land of] Israel to govern.” Therefore, Labor had pledged to call elections over territorial withdrawal, but “the government [was] afraid of the results.” Still, Israel’s request for a $5 billion military aid package, gave the US leverage.

Foreshadowing later events, Ford agreed that military aid was America’s “hole card,” and

Kissinger suggested telling the Rabin government that an aid package for Israel would set off “an explosion in the Arab World” without “negotiations and getting back Arab territory.”

That said, convincing Rabin to negotiate an accord that would topple his new government would be a tall order. While a Jordanian disengagement in the West Bank would be preferable, an Egyptian accord would be “okay” as long as Sadat could “keep the Palestinians quiet.”

Kissinger warned that failure would come at a high cost: “The Middle East is the worst problem we face,” he told Ford, particularly given the “oil situation” in the region. A breakdown in Arab–

Israeli negotiations could trigger a renewed Arab oil embargo, which would compel the US to forcibly seize Mideast oil fields. The Pentagon was already drawing up contingency plans, but it was essential that the US succeed in mediating an Israeli-Egyptian accord.194

5.C The Zeirim Soften their Opposition to Joining the Coalition

As the US and Israel contemplated their next diplomatic steps, negotiations to bring the

NRP into the government finally bore fruit. On September 4, 1974, the Alignment leadership and

Knesset faction tasked Rabin with negotiating the NRP’s entry into the coalition. Rabin would offer a one-year moratorium on registering Jewish converts from abroad while a ministerial

194 “Memcon, Washington, August 12, 1974,” FRUS XXVI, Doc. 95.

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committee worked to resolve the issue.195 In MaPaM, some called for the NRP to declare its

willingness to cede territory in the West Bank. In response, Burg argued that negotiations with

Egypt should take precedence. Afterwards, should the government reach an agreement with

Jordan, the public would decide whether to concede territory at the polls.196

As Labor and the NRP inched toward an agreement, Hammer softened his opposition to

joining the government in an interview with Ma’ariv. Hammer reiterated the Zeirim’s demands

for a unity government and an amendment to the Law of Return.197 While the Zeirim would keep

up the struggle, Hammer made it clear that they would not split the party over joining the Rabin

government. The Zeirim drew a red line, however, at “any concessions whatsoever in Judea and

Samaria.” Indeed, Hammer asserted that Burg and Raphael sought to join the government in

order to prevent such concessions from within the cabinet. This was a sharp departure from the

Zeirim’s usual denunciation of the Old Guard as being “glued” to their cabinet seats and signaled

that Hammer was more concerned with shaping the NRP’s behavior in the cabinet than with

obstructing the party’s entry into the coalition.

Throughout the interview, Hammer emphasized the need to prevent territorial withdrawal in the West Bank. He stressed that the NRP was obligated not to serve in a government that would “compromise over our sovereignty in Judea and Samaria.” Therefore, it stood to reason that the party would only join the cabinet if its influence would prevent territorial concessions in the West Bank. For his part, Hammer would push the party to demand “massive” settlement

195 “Decision of the Alignment Leadership and the Members of the Alignment Faction in the Knesset of Sept. 9, 1974,” ISA, A/7025/18. 196 JTA Daily News Bulletin XLI:184 (Sept. 30, 1974), 2. 197 Zevulun Hammer and Yehoshua Bizur (Interview) “Participation in the Government will Become a Reality- If it’s up to the NRP,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 11, 1974), 17.

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expansion in exchange for joining the coalition. The Zeirim, he promised, would continue their

join efforts with Gush Emunim, R. Kook, and R. Goren to advance the settlement enterprise.

When asked about halakhic conversion, Hammer expressed reservations about Labor’s

offer and indicated that he, personally, would continue to consult the Rabbinate. Though

Hammer believed that the entire NRP should do so, he did not force the issue. Hammer also

observed that the NRP, Likud, and Agudah had been unable to form a united front in the

opposition, making it impossible to force Labor into a unity government. Hammer’s main

objection to the NRP joining the coalition was that it would make a unity government even less

feasible. That said, Hammer hoped that the NRP’s entry into the coalition would “strengthen the

camp in favor of conducting negotiations with Egypt first, and not with Jordan.”

A few weeks later, he and Ben-Meir began their efforts to do just that. On October 20,

1974, the two met with Moshe Dayan, the recently ousted Defense Minister. Dayan was still the leader of the Alignment’s Rafi group – the party’s hawkish wing. The Zeirim hoped that the two

groups could work together and discussed coordinating their positions on diplomacy and

settlements. While preliminary, the meeting demonstrated that the Zeirim were already mapping

out a strategy for after the NRP joined the coalition.198

“It Will Require a Hell of a Lot of Work to Keep it Together”: The Peace Process Focuses on Egypt as the NRP Joins the Government Back in Washington, Kissinger briefed the National Security Council on October 18,

1974. He anticipated “a difficult week next week with the [Arab League] Summit in Rabat.”199

Afterwards, the US would push hard for an Israeli–Egyptian agreement, which was “the easiest”

198 “The heads of the NRP Zeirim Met with Moshe Dayan,” Ma’ariv (Oct. 20, 1974), 1. 199 “Minutes of a National Security Meeting” (Washington, October 18, 1974) FRUS XXVI, Document 11.

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option. The West Bank, however, was the “next easiest, [but] only if Jordan is the one

negotiating.”

Kissinger’s main concern was providing Sadat with political cover for signing an accord

with Israel. The Egyptian–Israeli track would take center stage, with the West Bank as a

sideshow. Once Israeli–Egyptian talks were underway, then “talks on the West Bank must follow

shortly” to keep Sadat from becoming isolated in the inter-Arab arena. The problem, though, was

that “the [Israeli] religious group oppose[d] any West Bank talks.” Kissinger warned the NSC

that “if [the NRP] holds a balance in the Israeli cabinet, the government will be out.”200

When Ford remarked that “Dayan seem[ed] to be going off on a tangent,” Kissinger

attributed Dayan’s recent bellicosity to Israeli domestic politics, which the Secretary found

“absolutely disgusting.” Dayan had been “the leading dove,” Kissinger remarked, but seemed to

have “moved totally to the right.” Still, Kissinger viewed Rafi as the key. He noted that the

“Defense Minister of the present government [was] the second man in the Rafi faction,” telling

the NSC that “it is important that the seven from this group stay in power.” “We are making

good progress,” Kissinger told the group, “but it will require a hell of a lot of work to keep it

together.”

On October 28, 1974, the Arab League recognized the PLO as “the sole legitimate

representative of the Palestinian people” during its summit in Rabat, Morocco.201 In an address

to his subjects, King Hussein of Jordan publicly accepted the decision of “the Arab Brothers,”

200 i.e., The NRP. 201 The League of Arab States, “Resolution on Palestine Adopted at the Seventh Arab League Summit Conference,” (Rabat, Morocco, Oct. 28, 1974), Pre-2017 Document Collection, United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/63D9A930E2B428DF852572C0006D06B8 [Accessed July 9, 2018].

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pledging his support for an “autonomous [PLO-controlled] entity in their land when it is liberated, or part of it is liberated.”202 In the West Bank, American diplomats reported

widespread support for the Arab League’s recognition of the PLO. In Jerusalem, even moderate,

pro-Hashemite notables accepted the Rabat decision.203

Within Israel, the NRP Central Committee voted to join the Rabin government. The

Committee resolved that settling “all parts of the homeland” would be the “first duty” of the

NRP representatives in the government, thereby fulfilling the commandment to settle the Land of

Israel. In addition, the NRP pledged to “vote against any territorial concessions in the Historical

Land of Israel, the patrimony of our forefathers.”204 On October 30, 1974, Burg, Raphael, and

Hazani were sworn into the cabinet. Hammer and Ben-Meir abstained from the Knesset vote with Rav Zvi Yehudah’s blessings and a “yasher koach.”205

On November 7, Rabin and Kissinger met for dinner in Jerusalem.206 Kissinger “painted

a somber picture,” telling the Israelis that “the opportunity…had been lost to preempt the PLO”

by presenting Hussein with a serious offer on the West Bank. Moreover, Kissinger “made [it]

clear that Israel bears the main responsibility for this.” He also raised the prospect of further

negotiations over the Golan Heights.

It seemed to Kissinger that “the Israelis were united in their adamant and emotional

opposition” to dealing with the PLO. Although the Secretary insisted that the US would not

202 Thomas Pickering to Kissinger, “King Hussein’s Post-Rabat Conference Speech,” 1974AMMAN06469 (October 31, 1974). 203 Day to Kissinger, “West Bank Reaction to Rabat Conference,” 1974JERUSA01886 (Oct. 30, 1974); See also, Day, “Nuseibeh Accepts PLO Representation,” 1974JERUSA01918 (Nov. 4, 1974). 204 “Decision of the NRP Central Committee of October 24, 1974,” ISA, A/7025/18. 205 Divrei Knesset, v.71 (Oct. 30, 1974), 130-167; Zvi Yehudah Kook, Digital Facsimile of Letter dated 13 Heshvan, 5735 [October 29, 1974], CD-ROM disc accompanying Vermus, The Knitted Revolution (2016). file 65.jpg. Copy in possession of the author. See also, Vermus, Knitted Revolution, 104. 206 Telegram from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford (Washington, November 8, 1974), FRUS XXVI, Document 119.

156 pressure Israel to enter into negotiations with the PLO, Rabin and his advisors still “displayed a state of high anxiety that [the US might] make some move toward the PLO.” However, Kissinger later advised the President that “all in all, with luck and discipline, we may be able to bring off a successful Egyptian–Israeli negotiation by the end of February.207

Later that month, Ford penned a handwritten letter to Rabin, cautioning the prime minister that “if we cannot give [a] realistic promise of progress very soon… this would have serious consequences for Israel and for the United States.” Ford warned that, due to the “failure to start the Jordan negotiation on time,” it was imperative that Israel put forward a “proposal that can promptly become the basis for a realistic negotiation with Egypt.”208

Summation The Zeirim’s campaign against the party leadership – particularly Burg, Raphael, and

Hazani – marked a dramatic escalation of inter-factional competition within the NRP. The Zeirim were determined to base political practice on religious principles, and the Old Guard’s entry into the government gave the Zeirim an opportunity to do just that. The Zeirim’s propaganda campaign invoked two potent religious principles, Kavod HaTorah (the dignity of the Torah), and Hillul Hashem (the desecration of [God’s] Name, or blasphemy), to delegitimize the party leadership and its decision to join the government.

While their immediate objective was to persuade a majority of the NRP Central

Committee to leave the coalition during its special session on March 31, the Zeirim’s pressure campaign was also part of their larger struggle to seize control of the party. The public rift between the NRP Old Guard and rabbinic circles lent credibility to the Zeirim’s charge that Burg

207 Ibid. 208 Letter from President Ford to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin (Washington, Nov. 26, 1974), FRUS XXVI, Document 120.

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and Raphael had defied the rabbinate for personal political gain. In the process, the Zeirim also

put forward a vision for more expansive rabbinic influence over religious-Zionist party politics.

The Zeirim succeeded in shaping the narrative of the Old Guard’s decision to consult

with the Rabbinate only to defy its injunction against joining the government. Burg argued –

correctly – that the story was more complex. While R. Goren and the CRC had forbidden the

NRP to join the government, Rav Ovadia had instructed them to use their own judgement.

Moreover, Rav Ovadia had publicly charged R. Goren and the CRC with improperly involving

the Rabbinate in matters beyond its purview.209 Furthermore, the NRP leadership joined the

government under different circumstances and on different terms than those prevailing when the

CRC issued its ruling.

Burg’s argument, though, rang hollow. Rav Ovadia’s opinion carried little sway amidst

his ongoing feud with Rav Goren, who successfully marginalized his Sephardic counterpart.

Rabbinic criticism of the NRP also lent credibility to the Zeirim’s charge that the Old Guard had

sacrificed the dignity of the Torah for the sake of ministerial portfolios. To be sure, the NRP was

not an ultra-Orthodox party bound by the edicts of a “Council of Great Torah Sages.”210 Still,

rabbinic figures commanded influence and respect among NRP politicians and voters, and

provided a degree of religious legitimacy to politicians claiming to represent the national-

religious camp. Moreover, the Chief Rabbinate was particularly significant for religious Zionists

by virtue of its status as an institution of the state, which had its own religious significance.

209 Ironically, Rav Ovadia, himself, would later become the spiritual leader of his own political party and a kingmaker in Israeli coalition politics. 210 For a discussion of the basis for the authority of Torah sages – “Gedolim” – over ultra-Orthodox political parties, see: Lawrence Kaplan, “Daas Torah: A Modern Conception of Rabbinic Authority,” Rabbinic Authority and Personal Autonomy, Moshe Sokol, ed., (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1992), 1-59; Jacob Katz, “Da‘at Torah: The Unqualified Authority Claimed for Halakhists” Jewish History 11.1 (Spring 1997), 41–50.

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The Zeirim successfully used the Old Guard’s disobedience of the Rabbinate – and the

rift between rabbinic figures and the NRP leadership – to control the narrative. In the Zeirim’s

telling, the NRP leadership joined the government in brazen defiance of explicit instructions

from the CRC, as well as a broad array of rabbinic luminaries as Rav Goren, Rav Ovadia Yosef,

Rav Soloveitchik, and Rav Zvi Yehuda Kook. Through their public act of defiance, Burg and

Raphael shamed these eminent rabbinic leaders, thereby perpetrating an affront against the Torah

itself. Indeed, the dignity of rabbinic personalities – whose authority is derived from their

mastery of Jewish law and lore – is traditionally referred to as Kavod HaTorah, the dignity of the

Torah. Moreover, insofar as the NRP leadership’s conduct was brazen and in full view of the

public, it constituted a Hillul Hashem – an affront against God Himself.

Ultimately, this narrative failed to sway a majority of the NRP Central Committee to

leave the coalition. However, the accusations leveled against the NRP leadership resonated with

many and severely undermined party cohesion. Even within the party leadership, many felt that

the NRP had committed a grave error by violating the CRC’s instruction. Thus, Warhaftig and

HaKibbutz HaDati representatives sided with the opposition, and Michael Hazani eventually quit

the government. Moreover, the Zeirim’s propaganda campaign drew further attention to the

dispute between the NRP leadership and prominent rabbinic figures, and the spectacle of feuding

rabbis and NRP ministers alienated a broad spectrum of the party’s constituents. Thus, when

Meir resigned and the process of forming a government began anew, neither the NRP leadership

nor Rav Goren was eager for a repeat performance. Labor, for its part, could not afford another

protracted struggle over forming a government.

Rabin and Labor negotiators understood that the NRP leadership could not defy the

Chief Rabbinate a second time. Racing against the clock, Rabin assembled a narrow 61-member

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coalition. When the new government took over on June 3, 1974, Rabin kept the door open for the

NRP. For its part, the NRP leadership signaled its desire to join Rabin’s government as early as

April 1974.

The NRP leadership was willing to “outvote the Young Guard” and join a Labor

coalition. However, for reasons of both prudence and principle (and, perhaps, penitence), they

needed the Rabbinate’s approval. Thus, the Alignment and the NRP turned to Rabbi Goren to

broker a compromise over “who is a Jew?”. Goren agreed, realizing that the NRP could best

prevent territorial withdrawal and invoke the Judea and Samaria proviso from within the

coalition. However, by the time R. Goren’s back-channel contacts with the RCA, R.

Soloveitchik, and Labor’s Menachem Hacohen yielded a compromise formulation for amending

the Law of Return, halakhic conversion was no longer the obstacle to the NRP joining the coalition. The Zeirim’s demand for a unity government with Likud, irrespective of any amendments to the Law of Return, made “who is a Jew?” and “the dignity of the Torah” appear to be convenient pretexts for opposing the NRP’s participation in a Labor-led government under

any circumstances. Indeed, when the NRP met with President Katzir on May 17, 1974, the party offered to drop the issue of “Who is a Jew” in exchange for a unity government.

The collapse of Goren’s grand bargain in July 1974 paralleled a significant shift in the discourse surrounding the NRP’s (non-)entry into the government. NRP Secretary General Zvi

Bernstein accused Labor of rejecting Goren’s compromise due to the NRP’s stance on the

“political” question of territorial compromise, and not the “religious” issue of halakhic conversion. By the same token, though, the NRP Zeirim were just as guilty of using halakhic conversion as a “religious” pretense for their opposition to Labor’s stance on the “political” question of territorial compromise. Moreover, the Zeirim’s linkage of halakhic conversion with

160 the territorial issue blurred the distinction between the “religious” and the “political,” complicating Rav Goren’s efforts to facilitate the NRP’s return to the Government.

Rav Goren had three main objectives: to rehabilitate the Rabbinate’s credibility; to symbolically enshrine Torah law in the laws of the State by amending the Law of Return; and to prevent withdrawal from sacred territory. Ultimately, Rav Goren’s efforts proved self-defeating.

When the Alignment rejected the compromise, the credibility of the Chief Rabbinate was dealt yet another blow, and amending the Law of Return fell by the wayside. Adding insult to injury, the NRP was left outside the cabinet while Israel and the United States held fateful consultations with the potential to determine the fate of the West Bank. Thus, Rav Goren expressed bitterness toward the Zeirim, Gush Emunim, and R. Zvi Yehuda.

While Goren failed to bring the NRP into the government, both Kissinger and Rabin essentially acted as though it had never left and would force early elections were Israel to reach an agreement with Jordan. Rabin had inherited both the Historic Alliance with the NRP as well as Meir’s coalition agreement and government guidelines, including the Judea and Samaria proviso. This proviso posed no immediate danger to Rabin’s government, although it would ultimately constrain Rabin until the end of his term. In 1974, though, Rabin’s priority was an accord to take Egypt’s military option off the table. With the largest Arab military out of the fight, Israel could neutralize the risk of another multi-front war. It is a testament to the durability of the Labor–NRP Historic Alliance that Rabin acted as though the Judea and Samaria proviso was in force, despite the NRP’s sojourn in the opposition. Indeed, Rabin and his allies fully expected the NRP s to rejoin the coalition and continue the Historic Alliance.

Thus, Rabin made it clear to Kissinger that the proviso remained in force while the NRP was in the opposition. This reinforced the perception that “the problem is the Religious Party,”

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which took hold as early as February 1974. When Allon and Kissinger formulated a back- channel proposal for Jordan, Rabin reiterated that the cabinet was unwilling to call elections over a Jordanian accord. Days after Gerald Ford took office, Kissinger briefed the new president accordingly.

Though the Zeirim rejected the Labor–NRP “Historic Alliance,” it served as the conduit through which the Zeirim succeeded in shaping perceptions in Washington and directing the

peace process toward Sinai. By taking a hardline early in the coalition talks, the Zeirim forced

Labor and NRP negotiators to adopt the Judea and Samaria proviso. Following Meir’s

resignation, Rabin inherited the proviso with the rest of Meir’s coalition agreement. Rabin,

determined to maintain Labor’s historic alliance with the NRP, successfully invoked the proviso

to persuade Kissinger to defer a Jordanian disengagement and to pursue negotiations with Egypt.

Thus, the Zeirim’s across-the-board obstructionism, along with their campaign against the NRP

leadership, cemented the perception that the (hitherto moderate) NRP was a genuine impediment

to a Jordanian accord. Perception, in turn, shaped reality.

Ultimately, the Zeirim’s “linkage” strategy proved to be a double-edged sword. The

Zeirim’s pressure campaign against the NRP leadership used an alleged affront to the “dignity of

the Torah” forced the party into the opposition. However, they failed to achieve their ultimate

objective: forcing Labor into a unity government with Likud. Moreover, the Zeirim’s “linkage”

ultimately harmed the very principles they sought to uphold. The credibility of the Chief

Rabbinate suffered a heavy blow, and the failure of Rav Goren’s compromise only compounded

the affront to the dignity of the Torah. Furthermore, “Who is a Jew” became a lost cause when it

was exposed as a pretense for opposing a Labor-led government. In addition, the NRP was

unable to influence cabinet deliberations over possible territorial concessions from the

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opposition. While the Zeirim succeeded in disrupting the Labor-NRP partnership for a time, they

also jeopardized the NRP’s influence on cabinet deliberations over land-for-peace. Ironically, it

was the NRP-Labor alliance, which the Zeirim fervently opposed, that preserved the NRP’s influence over the peace process. Due to that alliance, Rabin adhered to a strict interpretation of the “Judea and Samaria proviso” and steered the peace process away from the West Bank, toward the Sinai Peninsula.

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Chapter 3: Discourse, Debate, and Dissent: NRP Responses to the Breakdown of Negotiations Over an Israeli–Egyptian Interim Accord (March–July 1975)

This chapter examines the range of reactions by the NRP to the breakdown in talks over

Sinai II and the Ford Administration’s “reassessment.” The chapter begins with the initial

response to the failure of Kissinger’s March 1975 “shuttle.” Within the NRP, Raphael expressed

strident support for Rabin, while Burg feared a rupture in US–Israel relations. In the Knesset,

Zevulun Hammer was sharply critical of the cabinet’s willingness to compromise, but praised it

for standing firm in the end. Hammer recognized that Israel would soon come under withering

American pressure, but declared that spiritual fortitude, not American weapons, was the true

source of Israel’s strength in the face of implacable enemies.

The chapter continues with the American response to the breakdown in talks. Furious at

the Rabin government and wrestling with his own Jewishness, Kissinger blamed the impasse on

the Israeli demand for nonbelligerency. Ford and Kissinger declared a “reassessment” of

American Mideast policy, holding up military aid and freezing the sale of F-15 warplanes.

Though reassessment was mainly a pressure campaign, it clarified the two alternative trajectories

for the peace process. Under the “comprehensive” approach, the US (and possibly the Soviets)

would seek a final peace accord between Israel and the Arabs, based on an Israeli withdrawal to

the 1967 lines and a PLO-governed state. The alternative was a return to “step-by-step diplomacy,” enabling the US to corner the market on Mideast peacemaking while marginalizing

Soviet influence in the region.

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The third section of this chapter investigates how the U.S. reassessment stimulated Israeli

debate over alternative strategies for peacemaking. The apparent failure of step-by-step

diplomacy created an opening for dissent for “doves” and “hawks” alike. Labor’s Abba Eban

came out for a comprehensive peace, leading Ben-Meir and Hammer to conduct their own brand of “national-religious public diplomacy” in the United States. Although Israelis bemoaned the country’s ineffective public diplomacy- “hasbara,” the mixed messages of Israeli spokesmen reflected the discourse back home.

The fourth section of this chapter examines the discourse within the NRP. Burg confined his criticism of Israeli public diplomacy to the cabinet, while Raphael took a public stance against overly “dovish” Israeli spokespeople in the US. Echoing Rabin’s Egypt-first doctrine,

Raphael argued for a return to incremental diplomacy, rejecting calls by the “doves” for a comprehensive, Israeli peace plan. The NRP’s leading dove, Avraham Melamed, based his support for a comprehensive peace on the “moderate Judaism of Rabbi Yohanan Ben Zakai,” which prioritized the principle of “pikuah nefesh” – safeguarding human life. Melamed acted on these views by co-founding the “Intellectual-Political Circle for Balanced Religious Zionism,” which eventually became the religious-Zionist peace movement “Oz VeShalom.” The Circle argued that Gush Emunim had abandoned the ideology of “Torah ve-Avodah” in favor of a messianism foreign to halakhic Judaism. While the Circle met with approval from some

Laborites, it could not generate the “kinetic energy” of Rav Zvi Yehuda’s call for a rebellion against “coercion” to surrender the God-given patrimony of the Jewish people.

The fifth section of this chapter focuses on the divide between the NRP Zeirim and the

“Old Guard” over Israeli–American relations as the peace process resumed in June 1975. Burg was guided by military and diplomatic considerations, arguing that great-power support was vital

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to Israel’s survival, making Israeli–American relations a core national interest. Additionally, the

only alternative to an interim accord was a return to the Geneva Peace Conference and pressure

to withdraw to the 1967 lines. Therefore, Burg called for mending fenced with the US

administration. The Zeirim, though, stressed adherence to principles and the primacy of spiritual

concerns. They argued that concessions in Sinai in response to U.S. pressure would harm the

nation’s spiritual resolve and compromise its independence. Rather than end the confrontation

with the U.S. administration, the Zeirim intended to win it. Thus, they orchestrated a

parliamentary gambit to fund domestic production of advanced weapons systems rather than rely

on American aid. Additionally, Hammer and Ben-Meir headlined a rally against the accord that

devolved into an anti-American protest and a march on the U.S. Embassy, foreshadowing events

to come.

“Greek Tragedy”: The Breakdown of Negotiations Over an Israeli-Egyptian Interim Agreement 1.A Kissinger’s Failed Shuttle (March 9–23, 1975)

On March 9, 1975, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger arrived in the Middle East to

mediate an Egyptian-Israeli interim accord. As Kissinger shuttled between Israel and Egypt, with

side trips to Saudi Arabia and Syria, his mediation efforts unexpectedly deadlocked. Egyptian

President Anwar Sadat insisted that an interim agreement include an Israeli withdrawal from the

Gidi and Milta mountain passes in Sinai, as well as from the Abu Rhodeis oil fields. In exchange, he offered a series of military steps that would effectively take Egypt’s military option off the table, along with limited “political” gestures indicating his peaceful intentions. Rabin, though, insisted that the price for Israel’s complete withdrawal from these strategic locations was an

Egyptian declaration of “nonbelligerency.” In Rabin’s view, this would fundamentally alter the

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nature of Israeli-Egyptian relations, ending the state of war between the two countries and

paving the way for peace.1

On March 17, Minister of Religion Yitzhak Raphael told the NRP Knesset Faction that

there were three “main problems” in the negotiations: nonbelligerency, the duration of the

agreement, and an Egyptian commitment not to intervene in a Syrian conflict.2 Kissinger,

meanwhile, grew frustrated with the Israeli government and began to contemplate the failure of

his diplomatic mission.

In a cable to President Ford, Kissinger warned that negotiations “had reached a critical

stage, with the strong possibility that the talks could fail in the next 48 hours.”3 Egypt had made

a number of “helpful” concessions that went “further than any previous Arab position.” Among

other things, Sadat was willing to “renounce the use of force unconditionally,” declare that the

agreement was “a major step toward peace,” and “selectively” end Egypt’s boycott of countries

doing business with Israel. “Sadat,” Kissinger told Ford, was “conceding more than [Kissinger]

ever thought possible.”4

The Rabin government, though, was insisting on formal nonbelligerency, despite

Kissinger’s prior warnings that this was “politically impossible” for Sadat. The Israelis had

“strongly encouraged” Kissinger’s shuttle, leading him to believe that Israel would accept “a

formula less than nonbelligerency.” In the secretary’s view, the Rabin government was being

1For a study of the Sinai II negotiations based on Israeli documentation see: Louise Fischer, “Turning Point on the Road to Peace: The Government of Yitzhak Rabin and the Interim Agreement with Egypt (Sinai II),” Israel Studies 19:3 (Bloomington: Ind. Univ. Press, Fall 2014), 55-80. 2Protocol of NRP Knesset Faction Meeting (March 17, 1975), NRP Knesset Faction Protocols from 5735, File 26, Box 4, Series A, NRP Knesset Faction (R.G.003), Archive for the Study of Religious Zionism, Central Library, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan. [hereinafter, Bar Ilan Archive] 3 “Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford – Washington, March 18, 1975,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, ed. Adam M. Howard (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011) [Hereinafter FRUS XXVI], Document 149. 4 Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford – Washington, March 18, 1975. FRUS XXVI, Doc. 149

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unreasonable and irrational. Therefore, Kissinger believed it was necessary to take a “hard line”

with the Israelis to avert a breakdown in talks, which would be seen as “a sign of U.S. decline

and impotence.”5

President Ford replied via Deputy National Security Advisor Brent Scrowcroft that the

United States would not “stand behind the intransigence of Israel.” The president assured

Kissinger of his “total support” and the “overwhelming support of the American people.”6

Kissinger conveyed Sadat’s latest offer to Rabin, Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, and

Defense Minister Shimon Peres, who were conducting the negotiations on behalf of the Cabinet.

Kissinger urged them to accept the offer, or “Israel would face a much more dangerous

situation.” Peres replied that capitulating to excessive Egyptian demands would only invite

pressure to make unreasonable concessions on other fronts. Rabin met with Kissinger privately,

promising to encourage the cabinet to soften its position. Kissinger, for his part, decided not to

use the “strong language” President Ford had authorized, since Rabin seemed serious about

making a deal.7

To Kissinger’s dismay, Rabin was unable to sway the cabinet during a marathon, 10-hour

session on March 20. The Secretary responded by taking the hard line approved by Ford, telling

Rabin that rejecting the proposed accord amounted to “a strategic decision [by Israel] to go to

war in 1975, and to confront the United States.”8 Kissinger warned the Israelis that “a

reassessment of American [Mideast] policy... was now inevitable.”9

5 Ibid 6 “Telegram from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford – Washington, March 18, 1975, 1412Z” FRUS XXVI Doc 150. 7“Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford – Washington, March 19, 1975,” FRUS XXVI, Doc 152. 8 “Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford – Washington, March 20, 1975,” FRUS XXVI, Doc 153. 9 “ Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford – Washington, March 20, 1975,” FRUS XXVI, Doc 154.

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Kissinger shuttled back to Aswan for a “somber” meeting with Sadat. The Egyptian

President continued to demand a full Israeli withdrawal from the mountain passes, but agreed to

include the passes in a buffer-zone free of Egyptian troops. Sadat also agreed to a demilitarized

area around the oil fields, and would provide the United States with an “oral assurance” that

Egypt would not join a Syrian attack on Israel.10

Kissinger considered these concessions significant and helpful, and conveyed Sadat’s

offer to Rabin and Peres in the early afternoon of Friday, March 21. Kissinger agreed to remain

until the cabinet had a chance to consider the proposal, but held out little hope of success. It

seemed to Kissinger that the cabinet was “not functioning as a rational actor,” thereby

“jeopardizing [America’s] entire position in the Middle East” over “marginal” issues.11

An urgent letter from President Ford reached Rabin on Friday, March 21 as the cabinet

debated the latest proposal. In the letter, which Rabin read aloud in the cabinet room, Ford

“convey[ed] [his] deep disappointment over the position taken by Israel.” Rabin was well aware

of “the importance [Ford] attached” to Kissinger’s mission, and its failure would jeopardize

“vital interests of the United States” and have “far-reaching effects” on the Middle East, as well

as US–Israel relations. Therefore, the President had ordered “an immediate reassessment of U.S.

policy in the area, including [U.S.] relations with Israel.”12

Kissinger observed that Rabin, Allon, and Peres emerged from the meeting “shaken” by

the President’s letter, taking this to mean that they finally “realize[d] the consequences of Israeli

intransigence.” Rabin asked Kissinger to give the cabinet one last chance to meet on Saturday,

10 “Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford – Washington, March 18, 1975,” FRUS XXVI, Doc 155. 11 Ibid. 12 Letter from President Ford to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin – Washington, March 21, 1975” FRUS XXVI, Doc. 156; Rabin, 256; Quandt, 23.

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March 22 to discuss the latest proposals. The Secretary agreed to remain in the region since

Rabin, Allon, and Peres seemed to genuinely want a deal, but were trapped in “the hole

domestically they [had] dug for themselves.” There was no other plausible explanation for the

cabinet’s rejection of the offer on the table.13

Ford’s letter certainly left an impression on Interior Minister Yosef Burg, who realized

that “reassessment” was a “very significant word.”14 The cabinet meeting lasted well into Friday

night, forcing Burg to return home by foot rather than desecrate the Sabbath by riding in a car.

When Burg finally sat down at the Sabbath table, Burg asked his wife Rivkah to skip the

traditional hymn “Shalom Aleichem” – “Peace Unto You.” The hymn welcomes the angelic

“messengers of peace” said to escort those returning from synagogue on Sabbath evening,15 but

Burg’s mind was on Ford’s letter and the President’s “messenger of peace.”16

The next day, Kissinger conveyed a message from Sadat to Rabin, Allon, and Peres.

Egypt rejected Israel’s proposal that each country maintain an electronic monitoring station, and

insisted that Israel completely withdraw from the passes. Moreover, Egypt held that rejecting the

elements of non belligerency offered by Sadat would deal an “irrevocable and fatal blow to the

step-by-step process.” Absent a “marked changed” in Israel’s position, Sadat would publicly

announce that the talks had failed and call for reconvening the Geneva conference. Lest anyone

doubt that Israel was the recalcitrant party, Sadat suggested that Kissinger return to Washington

directly from Tel Aviv.17

13 Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford – Washington, March 22, 1975,” FRUS XXVI, Doc 157. 14 Burg Oral History 41 (Aug. 14, 1990), 2, ISA, A/7781/2. 15 B.T. Shabbat 119b. 16 Burg Oral History 41 (Aug. 14, 1990), 2, ISA, A/7781/2;. See, also Burg Oral History 5, (Aug. 19, 1976), ISA, A/7780/9. 17 “Memorandum of Conversation - Jerusalem, March 22, 1975, 6:35-8:15pm” FRUS XXVI Doc 158.

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The next morning, Kissinger did exactly that. In his view, the Israelis had led him to believe they would eventually agree to cede the passes without non-belligerency from Egypt.

The lack of “agreement on the basic points,” Kissinger believed, made it pointless to haggle over

“little concessions.” Allon asked the secretary to keep the step-by-step process alive by telling the press that contacts were ongoing and that he would return after Passover. Kissinger flatly refused. The Israeli government, he charged, had discredited him and Sadat, and further

“bilateral diplomacy” was “totally out of the question.”18 Following a tearful farewell at the airport, Kissinger departed for Washington.19

1.B Initial Reactions to the Diplomatic Impasse within the NRP (March 24, 1975)

NRP reaction to the breakdown in talks reflected both internal divisions within the party and the imperative to rally around the flag during a time of crisis. NRP Secretary-General Zvi

Bernstein called for the immediate establishment of a national unity government, on the basis of the “general, national consensus against the Egyptian conditions for a partial agreement.”20 The editorial page of Ha-Tsofeh echoed the sentiment, though it lauded the current government’s

“brave decision” not to change its position in the face of US pressure. Sadat’s rejection of far- reaching Israeli proposals demonstrated that Egypt was not ready to conclude an interim accord with Israel, let alone a full-fledged peace treaty.21

The NRP Knesset Faction convened that same day to discuss the diplomatic deadlock.

Yosef Burg opened the meeting with a report on the latest developments. “The Government of

Israel,” he said, “went very far in its willingness to make concessions.” “Perhaps,” Burg mused,

18 Ibid. 19 Department of State Bulletin, LXXII:1868 (April 14, 1975), 489. 20 Ha-Tsofeh, (March 24, 1975), 1. 21 Ha-Tsofeh, (March 24, 1975), 2.

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the Government had “even [gone] too far.” Ultimately, though, there came a point when the

Cabinet was simply “not able to go any further.”

That said, Burg viewed Israel’s relationship with the United States as a vital national interest, and somberly observed that the breakdown did not bode well for US–Israel relations.

“The America of today,” Burg warned, “is not the America of tomorrow.” Kissinger was “the last remnant of the Nixon administration,” and whomever followed him would be “even worse.”

Burg also stressed that he was “very sensitive to Jewish figures” (i.e., Secretary Kissinger) who found themselves embroiled in “Israeli politics.” A rupture in US–Israel relations, Burg feared, would “be reflected in many different areas, [particularly] economic and military assistance,” and might event spark an anti-American “counter-reaction” among the Israeli public.22

Raphael spoke next, commenting that the Egyptians simply “did not want an agreement.”

The Government had been subjected to intense pressure, he reported, and “withstood it well.” In

Raphael’s view, this was “first and foremost, thanks to Rabin.” Aside from expressing his

support for the government, Raphael wished to clarify two points. First, he wanted to give

context to press reports that he abstained from a crucial cabinet vote to protest one of the

Cabinet’s decisions. The previous Friday, Raphael had proposed that the Government empower

Rabin, Allon, and Peres to continue negotiating based on the following terms: the accord would

be in force for seven years, Egypt would pledge not to intervene in a Syrian–Israeli conflict, and

UN peacekeepers would be deployed in all areas to be evacuated by Israel.23

Raphael’s proposal, though, failed to garner support in the cabinet beyond the three NRP

ministers. When the Government later decided to offer different terms, Raphael abstained to

demonstrate that he stood by his proposal. In any event, Raphael recounted, the truly “fateful

22“Protocol NRP Faction Meeting (March 24, 1975),” 3, File 26/4/A, R.G.003, Bar Ilan Archive. 23 Protocol, (March 24, 1975), 3.

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meeting” of the cabinet was not its Friday session, but the meeting held on Shabbat. It followed,

then, that Raphael could not be accused of dissenting from the government line at the moment of

truth. Furthermore, Raphael also made a point to support the prime minister’s decision to

convene the cabinet on the Sabbath. That meeting, Raphael assured them, had involved

significant issues of “pikuah nefesh” (safeguarding human life), which superseded Sabbath

restrictions.24

Ben-Meir expressed the view that the NRP should be first to “take the initiative” and

begin working to form a National Unity Government. Raphael, who had just come out in strong

support of Rabin and his government, was cool to the idea. If the Zeirim wanted to hammer out a

unity government, then they could feel free to give it a try. That said, it would not do to

embarrass the Rabin government, and the Zeirim “need[ed] to do it quietly and not shout in the

streets.”25

Raphael’s support for the Rabin government went hand-in-hand with his efforts to curry

favor with Gush Emunim. During Kissinger’s shuttle, the group had protested by sending groups

of would-be settlers into the Samaria region of the West Bank. The wildcat would-be settlers,

though, had been evacuated by security forces; their flagrant disregard for the Government’s

settlement policy was an embarrassment for Rabin. Although Kissinger had departed, Gush

Emunim planned a march deep in the West Bank, as part of its “just and vital struggle against the

indecision and callousness” of those who blocked Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria.26

Raphael brought up the planned march during the faction meeting, proposing that all his

NRP colleagues in the Knesset Faction take part. Raphael also planned for his Likud U’Temurah

24 Ibid, 3-4. 25 Ibid, 4. 26 “The Chief Rabbis and MK’s From All the Factions Announce their Participation in the Shomron March,” Ha- Tsofeh (March 25, 1975), 1.

173 faction to be represented in the march, earning a rebuke from Party Secretary-General Bernstein that the march was not an “internal-factional matter.”27 Later, in comments to the press,

Bernstein called for the NRP, in its entirety, to participate in the “March for Samaria.” He went on to promise that MaFDaL chapters across the country would “provide the marchers with any assistance they might need.” Gush Emunim’s influence on the NRP, including the “Old Guard,” was growing, and with the Chief Rabbis and numerous MKs lending their support for the march,

Bernstein had little choice but to endorse the march when cornered by journalists.28 Raphael, for his part, was hedging his bets: on the one hand, he expressed staunch support for the Rabin government (which the Zeirim and Gush Emunim held in contempt). On the other hand,

Raphael’s enthusiastic, public support for the march signaled that, while he was pro-Rabin, he also backed the new settlement movement.

1.C Zevulun Hammer’s Knesset Address on the Breakdown of Talks: “In every generation they Rise Up to Destroy Us” (March 24, 1975)

While Gush Emunim struggled against the Rabin government’s foreign and settlement policy, the Zeirim waged their struggle in the parliamentary arena. The day after Kissinger’s departure, Rabin summoned the Knesset for a special session during the Passover recess.29 The

Israeli premier delivered the government’s formal statement on the suspension of negotiations.

Rabin blamed the Egyptians for the impasse, alleging that Sadat had been the one to break off the negotiations by refusing to make a counterproposal to Israel’s most recent offer. The prime minister stressed that his government was prepared to make substantial territorial concessions.

27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Divrei Knesset v. 73, (March 24, 1975), 2307-2323.

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However, the extent of those concessions would be proportionate to the degree to which Egypt

moved from a state of war to normal, peaceful relations with Israel.30

Following Rabin’s presentation of the Government’s position, a representative of each

Knesset faction addressed the plenary to present their party’s reaction to the breakdown in talks.

Zevulun Hammer spoke for the NRP, commending the Rabin government for resisting U.S.

pressure. At the same time, he looked askance at the cabinet’s willingness to make far-reaching concessions. Hammer acknowledged that the Government had “faced difficult and dangerous choices” during the negotiations.31 However, Hammer believed that a state such as Israel, which

was constantly under threat, could not rely upon the guarantees of other countries to guarantee its

security. Tellingly, Hammer invoked Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Kurds of Iraq. In each case, an

ethnic or national group backed by the US suffered a brutal defeat after being left to stand alone.

This, Hammer proclaimed, would be the fate of any nation “not strong enough to take a stand

and fight for its survival.”32

Hammer believed that the cabinet had been too quick to offer concessions in the last

round of talks and too willing to place its trust in the promises of Egypt and the US. Moreover,

had those concessions been accepted and implemented, they would have triggered “a bitter

dispute” and a “scathing internal conflict” among Israelis.33 Still, Hammer “lauded” the

Government for standing firm in the end, even if it had previously gone too far toward meeting

Egyptian demands. By ultimately standing fast, the Government “exposed Egypt’s true face”

and, by defying American pressure, demonstrated that Israel was “not in the pocket of any actor

[i.e., the US].” “The enemy,” Hammer claimed, “made a mistake when it interpreted our desire

30 Ibid, 2707 31 Divrei Knesset v. 73, 2312. 32 Ibid, 2313. 33 Divrei Knesset, v.73 (March 24, 1975) 2313-2314.

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for an agreement and for peace as weakness, and our far-reaching concessions – as concessions

stemming from fear.”34 “Egyptian intransience” in response to “concession after concession”

from the Israeli side proved that Sadat was no different from Nasser. Interested only in

hegemony over the Arab world, Sadat had refused to budge from his initial positions, counting

on the US to “deliver the goods” from the Israelis.35

Hammer predicted that Israel would, “in the not too distant future, face difficult – very difficult – situations.” However, the situation would have been far worse had the government ceded wide swaths of territory without satisfactory compensation from Egypt. Capitulating to

Egyptian demands would have robbed Israel of “what remain[ed] of [its] self-confidence,” leaving the country irresolute as it navigated the next steps in the peace process. Hammer predicted that, in such a scenario, Sadat would pressure Israel for concessions on other fronts to maintain Egypt’s credibility in the Arab world. Additionally, Israel would find itself in a more difficult confrontation with the U.S. Administration than it now faced.

Hammer took no joy from the situation, admitting that “Dr. Kissinger’s tears certainly

touched the heart.” However, “in the event of capitulation, our tears would have been all the

more bitter.” Surrendering to American pressure would have led to a total Israeli capitulation at a

reconvened Geneva conference, where it would have faced pressure to withdraw “to the borders

of 1967, or the borders of 1947, and who knows what else.” Now, however, after demonstrating

the “political and moral strength to say ‘no’,” Israel would face the prospect of a reconvened

Geneva conference from a position of strength. The Israeli people would remain steadfast so

long as its leaders remained steadfast and would “become weak [only] when its leaders become

weak.”

34 Ibid, 2314. 35 Ibid, 2314.

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Hammer articulated a foreign policy doctrine that favored spiritual considerations over material concerns. Implicitly acknowledging that a confrontation with the United States might jeopardize American military aid, Hammer declared that the source of Israel’s strength was not

“technological advantage,” but rather the people’s “resolve and faith in the justness [of its cause], in [its] capabilities, and the stance of the government during difficulty and pressure.”36 The present crisis, he argued, offered “an extraordinary opportunity” to put aside squabbles over

“marginal and tangential issues,” and unite in the face of existential challenges at home and abroad. The government’s rejection of the proposed accord might well augur the beginning of a national revival, with the US, Europeans, and Arab world taking notice of the country’s new- found strength and resolve.37

Hammer argued that Israel faced domestic crises no less critical than its foreign policy challenges. “Is this not the best time,” asked Hammer, “to establish an emergency government of national unity? Is this not what every true Jew in the Land of Israel expects from us at this time?”38 A national unity government would demonstrate to both friends and foes that the country stood united against capitulating to Egyptian demands. Moreover, a united Israel would garner more support from Diaspora Jewry, whose assistance was more vital than ever. Hammer called on the Prime Minister, and the leaders of both coalition and opposition parties to form a unity government forthwith, “without [political] calculation, without preconditions, through mutual comprise in the event of a peace agreement, or, Heaven Forbid, war.” “There is no substitute,” he declared, “for the value of unity.”39

36 Ibid, 2314. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid, 2314. 39 Ibid, 2315.

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Hammer turned to the issue of Jewish settlement in the Territories. Hammer knew that

settlement skeptics considered unauthorized settlement bids as “a distraction” at best, and a sign

that Israel was not a “full partner” in the peace talks at worst. Hammer fervently disagreed. “The

deep yearnings of thousands of young men and young women to settle throughout the land of

Israel,” were, in Hammer’s view, “the most exalted expression of the justness” of the Jewish

People’s claim to its homeland. The settlers were “not the enemies of the nation,” he declared.

To the contrary, their “special spirit” was precisely what the country needed, and the government

would do well to support the settlement enterprise. The “most fitting response” to Arab

rejectionism was “to settle thousands of settlers throughout Judea and Samaria.” Rather than a

source of “friction” between the government and these young idealists, the settlement enterprise

could boost morale and build character in Israeli society.40

Hammer concluded by taking note of the coming Passover holiday, “the festival of liberty

and redemption for the People of Israel.” The traditional liturgy of the Passover Seder called for

each participant, “in every generation,” to see themselves as having experienced the biblical

Exodus from Egypt firsthand. Like the ancient Israelites, Hammer declared, the Jewish nation

was now experiencing “the stages of the redemption,” with all the hardships that entailed.

Hammer invoked the traditional liturgy of the Seder once more, declaring that “in every

generation [our enemies] rise up against us to destroy us, and the Holy-One-Blessed-Be-He rescues us from their hands.” This time, as well, the nation would triumph over its enemies by virtue of “faith, unity, courage, and devotion to our land.”41

40 Ibid, 2315. 41 Ibid, 2315.

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In his remarks to the Knesset, Hammer’s expressions of support for the Rabin

government went hand-in-hand with a challenge to that same government. In light of the balance

of power in the Knesset, calling for a unity government was tantamount to asking Labor to share

power with Likud on an (almost) equal basis.42 Although Hammer gave the government credit

for rejecting the proposed accord with Egypt, he also threatened a “bitter dispute” and “scathing

internal conflict” should the government cede the passes and oil fields if negotiations resumed.

Furthermore, Hammer’s open support for unauthorized settlement posed a direct challenge to the authority and legitimacy of the government, to say nothing of coalition discipline.

Even as Hammer articulated a foreign policy doctrine that emphasized the spiritual over

the material, he did not dismiss material concerns or suggest reliance upon Divine intervention.

The honor and unity of the nation were, for Hammer, necessary preconditions for the nation’s

physical and spiritual well-being. The national spirit, in turn, would ensure its security in the face

of regional adversaries, and allow Israel to resist capitulating to unreasonable demands.

Hammer’s call for action conflated the national with the divine as Israel’s transcendent

source of strength. On the one hand, he articulated a deterministic understanding of Jewish

history. “In every generation,” one adversary or another would seek the Jewish people’s

destruction. And, in every instance, God would emerge as their redeemer. Indeed, Hammer

stressed that the State of Israel was, itself, undergoing a process of redemption analogous to the

Exodus from Egypt. However, salvations would come not only from “The Holy One, Blessed-

Be-He,” but also from the nation’s “faith, unity, courage, and devotion to [its] land.”

Consequently, Hammer’s call to action aimed at mobilizing the nation on the basis of tradition, as seen through a nationalist-Orthodox prism. Indeed, Hammer saw the young, religious youth

42 “Gachal,” Elections and Parties, Israel Democracy Inst. https://en.idi.org.il/israeli-elections-and- parties/parties/gachal/ [Accessed 12 May 2019];

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drawn to Gush Emunim as paragons of paragons of the grassroots activism necessary to bolster

the national spirit and reject a dishonorable accord. As the U.S. Administration ratcheted up the

pressure on Israel as part of its “reassessment,” Hammer’s emphasis of the “spiritual” element of

statecraft would only grow stronger.

Reassessment: “Policy Examination” or Pressure Campaign? 2.A “I am Jewish, how can I want this?”: Kissinger Reacts to the Breakdown in Talks

The “very difficult situation” that Hammer anticipated in his address to the Knesset had

already begun. Upon his return to Washington, Kissinger and Ford met in the Oval Office to

prepare for a briefing with the Congressional leadership.43 Kissinger told the president that he and his entire team were “outraged at the Israelis,” whom he accused of rejecting the land-for- peace formula that was the basis for the peace process.44 Angry and frustrated, Kissinger accused

the Israelis of cynically playing for time, hoping to bypass the Ford Administration and obtain

military and economic aid straight from Congress. As Ford and Kissinger discussed how they

would frame the coming “reassessment” to the Congressional leadership, Kissinger repeatedly

came back to the idea that the Israelis had torpedoed American foreign policy to the detriment of

their own interests. Kissinger had “bent over backward” to accommodate the Israelis, yet they

had let the U.S. down “at a moment when we need[ed] this.” “We had it won,” Kissinger

lamented. “The Soviet Union was out of the Middle East.”

Ford asked what action he should take next, and Kissinger replied that the Israelis

thought they could “outbest” the president on military aid. The thing to do, then, was to hold up

arms shipments. The Administration’s “fatal mistake,” Kissinger said, “was all the equipment we

43 Memorandum of Conversation – Washington, March 24, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc 159. 44 Memcon, March 24, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc 159.

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gave them” prior to the negotiations. “Every department,” he recommended, “should put Israeli

activities at the bottom of the list,” and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger should “slow” the

delivery of laser-guided bombs and lance missiles. Moreover, Peres’s visit to Washington should

be canceled, and the sale of F-15 fighter planes put on hold.45

Ford suggested that they convene the National Security Council to coordinate the military

aid freeze, but Kissinger seemed not to hear:

I am Jewish, how can I want this? I have never seen such cold-blooded playing with the American national interest. Every Arab was looking to us; we had moved the Soviet Union out of the Middle East; even Iraq was being moved. What they [the Israelis] have done is destroy this.46 With the Congressional leadership waiting, Kissinger and the President set out to meet them in

the Cabinet Room. As they left the Oval Office, Kissinger rued “the crisis created by eight lousy

kilometers in a pass that nobody knows.”47

In his briefing to the Congressional leadership, Kissinger guided them toward the

inevitable conclusion that the Rabin government’s irrational intransigence scuttled the talks. The

Administration had designed the step-by-step strategy “to reduce soviet influence and protect the

Israelis from having to take final decisions on Jerusalem, borders, the West Bank and Gaza.”48

More to the point, the Israelis had urged Kissinger and Ford to pursue an interim accord on the

Egyptian track. Kissinger recounted that “the dilemma we faced was that the political situations

in which each government had room to maneuver were limited.” Sadat could only go so far

without incurring the wrath of his Arab rivals, and Israeli domestic politics were “difficult.” Still,

45 Ibid. 46 Ibid, 47 Ibid. 48 “Memorandum for the Files – Washington, March 24, 1975, 8 a.m.; Subject: President’s Meeting with the secretary and Congressional Leadership – Monday March 24, 8:00 a.m.,” FRUS XXVI, doc. 160.

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the US had undertaken the task of brokering an accord between Egypt and Israel “on the basis of

a genuine expectation of the possibilities for peace.”

This “genuine expectation” was based on Kissinger’s consultations with the Israelis, during which he was led to believe that Israel would eventually agree to cede the mountain passes in exchange for many, but not all, elements of nonbelligerency. At the moment of truth, though, the Israeli government had tied its own hands by publicly insisting on nothing less than full nonbelligerency in exchange for a full withdrawal from the passes. Kissinger stressed that the Israeli government’s position was both imprudent and inexplicable both militarily and politically. In the near future, Israel would likely come under immense pressure to settle the very issues it hoped to avoid: Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza, and recognition of the PLO.49

Kissinger argued that Israel’s rejection of the proposed interim accord had fundamentally altered the geopolitical dynamic in the region, thereby forcing the administration to reassess its Middle

East policy. Moreover, the breakdown in negotiations increased the risk of a military conflict when the mandates for UN peacekeepers in Sinai and the Golan ended in the summer.

Kissinger’s presentation was well received by the Congressional Leadership. When asked

about the scope of the Administration’s planned reassessment, Kissinger replied that “nothing

can be ruled out; it would be a broad, across-the-board reassessment.”50 Some in the room

cautioned against overreacting, whereas others urged the congressional leadership to

unequivocally back the Administration. They believed that “the Israelis just assume we will be

supporting them no matter what,” and that only a clear and unequivocal stance would disabuse

them of that notion.51

49 Ibid. 50Ibid. 51 Ibid.

182

Decades later, Kissinger would remark that the reassessment had been nothing but

“theater” since “there was nothing to reassess.”52 It had merely been a pressure campaign in the

guise of a policy-making exercise aimed at changing Israeli behavior. In addition,

“reassessment” was meant to send the message to Israel and others that defying the US came

with a price.53 That said, the reassessment was not only a product of American national interests.

Kissinger took the breakdown in talks personally, and, as Quant observes, “reassessment,

however justified, became in part an instrument for Kissinger to vent his exasperation with

Israel.”54

To the extent that reassessment was, indeed, “theater,” it was a production on the global

stage. Kissinger and Ford met with a wide array of foreign leaders, including those from Tunisia,

the UK, the USSR, New Zealand, Iran, Senegal, Belgium, Canada, Norway, Austria, Italy, the

Vatican, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Romania. The American ambassadors to Israel, Egypt, Syria,

and Jordan were summoned to Washington simultaneously to great dramatic effect. Kissinger

and Ford also consulted with private citizens, including subject matter experts such as Eugene

Rostow, a Professor of Law at Yale University who favored a comprehensive solution, as well as

with prominent members of the Jewish community such as Eli Wiesel and Hans Morgenthau.

Max Fischer, President Ford’s long-time friend and a prominent Republican fundraiser, played a

52 Aaron David Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace, (New York: Bantam Dell, 2008) 148. 53 Bernard Gwertzman, “Ford Says Israel lacked Flexibility in Negotiations: In Interview, President Seems to Chide Tel Aviv for Collapse of Kissinger’s Effort to Achieve a Sinai Accord,” New York Times (March 27, 1975), 1; William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993), 235-243. 54 Quandt, 235.

183 critical role as a liaison to the American Jewish establishment and back channel with Israeli officials.55

2.B “Step by Step” vs. “The Comprehensive Approach”: Alternative Strategies for Middle East Peace-making

In mid-May, the U.S. National Security Council met to discuss the conclusions reached during the policy review conducted as part of the Administration’s reassessment. The policy review identified several alternative strategies for American Mideast diplomacy, which were to be presented to the President for his consideration and, eventually, his decision.56 President Ford opened the meeting with a few comments on the political situation, noting that he was set to meet with Rabin and Sadat, after which he would decide the way forward.

In the meantime, the President directed the administration to “treat Israel as a friend… like [the US’s] other friends, and no more.” This would entail a “suspension of certain deliveries and contacts” with the Jewish State. In the face of mounting domestic pressure on the

Administration,57 Ford reiterated that he expected all departments to give a cold shoulder to the

Israelis. The President alleged that “professional members of the American Jewish Community” were orchestrating a “nationwide campaign” to depict him as abandoning the pro-Israel stance he had taken as Speaker of the House. Ford adamantly denied this, insisting he remained deeply committed to “Israel’s survival.” Ford made a point of referring to Israel’s “survival” without using the word “security,” lest this be construed as implicit U.S. approval for Israel to retain

55 “Memorandum of Conversation - Washington, March 27, 1975, 3:10 p.m.” FRUS XXVI 165 “Israeli Leaders, Top US Jewish Leaders Discuss Ways to Ease Strained Relations between Israel and the U.S. JTA Daily News Bulletin XLII:67 (April 8, 1975), 1; “Memorandum of Conversation (Washington, June 13, 1975, 10-10:15AM),” FRUS XXVI, Doc 186; Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 427. 56 “Minutes of National Security Council Meeting – Washington, May 15, 1975, 5:30 p.m.” FRUS XXVI, 174. 57 Ibid.

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territories for supposed “security purposes.” Ford stressed that every member of his

administration was expected to support this policy fully and unequivocally.58

After concluding his introductory remarks, Ford gave the floor to Kissinger. As both

National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, Kissinger not only oversaw the process of generating policy alternatives, he also served as the President’s principal advisor in deciding which alternative to pursue. To maintain the pressure on the Rabin government, Kissinger announced that the Administration’s “policy examination” was ongoing, and would continue.

The reassessment had thus far yielded four basic options. The first, and easiest, option, was to restart talks with Egypt and Israel over an interim accord. However, both sides were “dug in” on the positions they had taken when negotiations broke down. The second alternative was to push for an Egyptian–Israeli agreement on a larger scale, with Israel ceding “a bigger piece of territory for a bigger political concession from Egypt.” This, Kissinger observed, would lead Syria to demand more territory than Israel could afford as part of an interim accord. Moreover, the

Israelis would demand formal non belligerency, which Sadat could not offer without a “total, or almost total, withdrawal” in return.

The alternative to the bilateral Israeli–Egyptian track was a return to the Geneva Peace

Conference, a multilateral forum chaired jointly by the United States and the Soviets, with a mandate to reach a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Kissinger had worked to bypass

“Geneva” in favor of US-mediated “step-by-step” diplomacy, and the conference primarily served as a venue for signing American-brokered accords. However, the Conference could be reconvened as a negotiating forum, with the United States, or a proxy, introducing a peace plan to be imposed on the parties. While there were “many possible combinations of the

58 Ibid.

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comprehensive approach,” including coordination with the Soviets and/or the Israelis, all of them

would be “difficult for Israel.” The fourth option, then, was to reconvene the conference as a

ploy, “let a stalemate develop,” and then “try to move back to a U.S. [mediated] interim

agreement.” Kissinger warned, though, that “a stalemate at Geneva without prior progress

[would be] very dangerous and could lead to war as easily as to an interim agreement.”59

Israeli Reactions to Reassessment The breakdown of Kissinger’s step-by-step diplomacy, in and of itself, created an opening for Israelis to reconsider alternative approaches to peacemaking. The “suspension” of talks could easily be interpreted as a failure of the “step-by-step strategy,” inviting a search for alternatives. In addition, the crisis in US–Israel relations left the Rabin government vulnerable to criticism of its (mis)handling of Israel’s relationship with the US. Moreover, the

Administration’s elaborate, public staging of a “policy examination” was, by its very nature, an invitation to discourse, debate, and dissent that reverberated far beyond Washington. As the U.S.

administration reconsidered the “comprehensive” approach, “dovish” Israelis also began to make the case for a comprehensive peace, inviting rebuttal. In addition, Israelis traveled to the US to conduct public diplomacy, bringing the internal Israeli debate with them. This, in turn, invited criticism of the “hasbara shlihim” on both the Left and the Right.

The main alternative to the incremental, step-by-step strategy was the “comprehensive” approach. While “step-by-step” aimed at bypassing the most difficult and intractable issues, searching for common ground in other areas, a comprehensive approach would focus on those very issues with the aim of resolving all outstanding claims by and against all parties: the status of Jerusalem; boundaries; the fate of Palestinian refugees; the disposition of the territories; and

59 “Minutes of National Security Council Meeting – Washington, May 15, 1975, 5:30 p.m.,” FRUS XXVI, Doc. 174.

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the political future of the Palestinians would all be up for negotiation. Proponents of the

comprehensive approach argued that the conflict could not be solved by bypassing the issues at

the heart of the dispute. Incremental, step-by-step diplomacy not only missed the point, it was a recipe for deadlock. “Step-by-step” encouraged the parties to withhold concessions to save them for the next “step,” when the stakes would, presumably, be higher.

3.A “A Pulitzer Prize for Fiction”: Abba Eban Goes to Washington

Israeli “doves” in both the Alignment and the NRP were able to make their dissenting

voices heard. In an April 1975 trip to Washington, Abba Eban addressed the 1,100 participants at

the 16th annual AIPAC Policy Conference. The majority of his remarks were standard fare. The

former Israeli foreign minister called for Israeli–American solidarity, proclaiming that “freedom” did “not have many defenders in the world,” and that Israel was “among the surest of them all.”

The US–Israel relationship, moreover, was fundamentally strong. Indeed, the US had “stood by

Israel in the past eight years and particularly in the last 18 months.” Eban urged the two countries not to “search for what went wrong in March,” but to focus on “what we have to do in April,

May and June.”60

The “spectacle of rift and contention,” Eban argued, undermined the peace process by

giving Arab states “a vision of differences” between Israel and the United States, which

encouraged the Arabs to take a harder line. Thus, Eban called for the two countries to “repair the

texture of our relations.” Eban believed that with “American power and Kissinger’s talents,” this

could certainly be done.

Departing from the government line, Eban implied that the way forward was to convene

the Geneva peace conference. The conference, Eban argued, could serve as a forum for separate,

60 JTA Daily News Bulletin, XLII:73 April 16, 1975, 3.

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bilateral negotiations over incremental agreements between Israel and each of its Arab

neighbors. While Eban stopped short of fully embracing the “comprehensive” approach, he

veered sharply to the left of the government line by providing an opening for Palestinian

participation in the peace process. Eban declared that if the Palestinians recognized “Israel’s

sovereignty and national personality,” then “Israel and Palestine side-by-side can be

negotiated.”61 However, Eban neglected to mention that the Israeli government was, at the time,

officially and unequivocally opposed to a Palestinian State.

The next morning, Eban and Kissinger met in Foggy Bottom for a tête-à-tête. The

Secretary remarked that Eban’s speech deserved “a Pulitzer Prize for fiction.”62 The Israeli government, Kissinger charged, was deliberately spreading “misleading accounts of the negotiations.” If this did not stop, Kissinger warned, the Administration would be forced to set the record straight by publicly and unequivocally faulting Israel for the breakdown in talks.

“The issue isn’t what went wrong in March,” Eban told the secretary, “but what we do now, in April and May.”

Kissinger, however, was unwilling to simply forgive and forget. He was infuriated that his 18-month effort, “encouraged by the Israeli Government, on a schedule concurred in [sic] by the Israeli Government… [failed to] amount to anything.” The United States put its prestige and credibility on the line, only to be undercut by the Rabin cabinet. In Kissinger’s view, such behavior demanded a forceful response from the Administration.63

Eban tried to mollify Kissinger, urging him to keep the reassessment “in proportion.”

Kissinger’s shuttle had been aimed at an interim agreement, not a full peace treaty. Just as the

61 Ibid. 62 “[Discussion with Abba Eban] Memorandum of Conversation – Discussion with Abba Eban – April 16, 1975,” 1, The Kissinger transcripts: a verbatim record of US diplomacy, 1969-1977, Digital National Security Archive. 63 Ibid, 1

188

success of Kissinger’s shuttle would not have brought peace, its failure would not lead to war.

All sides, Eban argued, should exercise restraint in their public statements. Eban went on to tell

Kissinger that he had been up on Capitol Hill, and lauded American policy since the Yom

Kippur war as “a success.” Kissinger had not only won favorable terms for a ceasefire; he had

also brokered two disengagement agreements. “One disappointment,” Eban said, did not negate

Kissinger’s success. “You are too modest,” he told the secretary, “a quality not historically

associated with you.”64

The conversation turned to the breakdown in talks, with Eban reminding Kissinger of the flexibility the Israeli government had shown. He also urged Kissinger to bear in mind the limits of Israel’s “domestic consensus.”65 The two went on to discuss the risks and rewards of U.S.

mediation, possible Egyptian steps to restart the process, and healing of the rift in US–Israel

relations.66 When Kissinger denied that the US was withholding military aid, Israeli Ambassador

Simcha Dinitz interjected, noting that the US had frozen the sale of Lance Missiles, laser-guided

bombs, and F-15s.

Eban replied that “linkage” – conditioning US military aid on Israeli flexibility in

negotiations – was bad enough. What was worse, however, was making this public knowledge,

thereby giving the impression that the Administration was punishing Israel for causing the

breakdown in talks. This created the image of a crisis in US–Israel relations, and the optics of a

rift between the two countries would turn perception into reality.

Kissinger responded sharply, telling Eban of his warning to Rabin that Israel’s

“immediate problem in America would be severe.” President Ford, he said, felt betrayed by the

64 Ibid, 2 65 Ibid, 3 66 Ibid, 4-5

189

Rabin government, which had led him to believe that Israel would trade the passes for something

less than non belligerency. Kissinger felt that he, too, had been “brutally treated” by the Israelis,

“so there was no distinction between the President and [him]” in their attitude toward the Rabin

government. That said, “certain realities,” and not personal feelings, would dictate the course of

events moving forward. 67

Kissinger warned Eban that Sadat and the Soviets were pushing him to reconvene the

Geneva Conference. He, himself, could only stall for so long. Furthermore, the mandate for the

UN peacekeepers enforcing the disengagement agreements on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts

was set to expire that summer. Neither Arab state would agree to renew the peacekeepers’

mandate if the peace process remained deadlocked, and the US could not accept the increased

risk of another Mideast war. The United States would convene the Geneva Conference, “taking

positions” that would not be to Israel’s liking. Moreover, the United States would be forced to

fully implement “linkage” by cutting off military aid to Israel rather than “underwriting a

stalemate.”

Eban was unfazed by the threat of Geneva. Speaking as a “dissentient,” Eban confessed

that he had “never thought [Israel] could get a separate deal” with Egypt. “Sooner or later,

[Israel] had to deal with the main issue,” and that would mean convening the Geneva

Conference.

Kissinger was apparently caught off-guard by Eban’s departure from the Israeli government’s position, replying that “if [the US] got Syria in a separate negotiation with Israel, then [Israel and the US] could go for a separate peace with Egypt.”

67 Ibid, 5

190

For a moment, Kissinger was in the awkward position of debating against himself. He

had laid out a nightmare scenario, arguing that Israel’s alleged intransigence had completely and

utterly scuttled the step-by-step approach, forcing a return to “comprehensive” peacemaking in

Geneva. When Eban embraced the comprehensive approach, Kissinger replied by championing

the benefits of his “step-by-step” strategy, which was supposedly off the table.

Kissinger recovered quickly, stating that whatever advantages there might have been to

“step-by-step” diplomacy with Egypt and Syria, “it [was] too late now.”

Eban, though, urged the secretary to reach “an understanding” with Israel on a joint

strategy for the Conference. The two countries, Eban believed “could reach an agreement” on a

number of issues. He suggested that participation be limited to a “compact, consensual group,” with Palestinian representation. With regard to boundaries, Eban believed that the two countries could successfully maneuver to ensure that “any changes [to the 1967 frontiers] shouldn’t be considerable…. Even if they are small, they are significant for [Israel].”68

As Eban spoke, Kissinger bitterly remarked that, “eight months after the event, Israel tells

us to go to hell.”

Sensing that his enthusiasm over Geneva was rubbing Kissinger the wrong way, Eban

asserted that, even if Kissinger’s mission had succeeded, “in a few months [they] would have to

face these issues” in Geneva.

“No question,” Kissinger replied, “I have always said that.”

Kissinger asked the others present clear the room, including the notetaker. After a private,

15-minute discussion with his former counterpart, Eban left.

68 Ibid, 6.

191

The next day, Eban addressed the National Press Club’s annual luncheon. Once again, he

championed the Rabin government’s handling of the talks. “Israel,” he declared, “does not have

any guilty conscience” over the breakdown in talks. Notably, Eban also argued that step-by-step diplomacy was “not dead,” as it was possible that Egypt might “become more flexible.” When asked why the US seemed to blame Israel for the breakdown, Eban deflected the question. He remarked that, while it was vital to ease tensions between the US and Israel, “America needs an independent Israel as a friend, not a subservient Israel.” Furthermore, Israel was obligated to draw its own conclusions on security issues, since Israeli lives were at stake. “No outside advice, no matter how friendly, can substitute for an Israeli assessment of itself.”69

While he still defended the cabinet’s handling of the talks, Eban again veered far to the

left of the government line. The Arabs could have peace with Israel tomorrow. All they had to do

was pick up the phone, and dial “Geneva 242-338,” he quipped, referring to the UN Security

Council resolutions after the 1967 and 1973 Arab–Israeli wars.70 Israel would eagerly enter into

direct negotiations. Eban expected that Moscow would serve as the “unconditional lawyer” for

the Arabs; therefore, it was vital that the US and Israel coordinate their strategy in Geneva. When

asked about the PLO’s participation, Eban indicated that Israel was prepared to reach an accord

with the Palestinians. However, the PLO would have to recognize Israel’s right to exist and agree

to abide by existing UN resolutions. “If the PLO wants to enter the club,” Eban quipped, “let

them read the membership rules.”71

69 JTA Daily News Bulletin XLII:75 (April 18, 1975) 2-3. 70A reference to United Nations Security Resolutions 242 and 338; JTA Daily News Bulletin XLII:75 (April 18, 1975) 2-3. 71 Ibid, 3.

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3.B Eban Stirs Up Israel’s “Dissentient” Doves

While in the US, Eban had forcefully defended the government’s handling of the talks,

even as he expressed his “dissentient” argument for a comprehensive peace. Upon his return to

Israel, Eban reversed his position, blaming the Rabin government for the breakdown of

negotiations in an interview with Ma’ariv.72 Eban went further, charging that the Rabin

government’s brief tenure marked a nadir in Israeli diplomacy. In Eban’s view, step-by-step

diplomacy should have been aimed at brokering full-fledged peace treaties, reached through direct, bilateral negotiations between Israel and each of its neighbors. It made little sense to sacrifice the oil fields and mountain passes for an interim accord when such strategic assets could be used in the bargaining over a final, comprehensive settlement.

That said, once the government decided to pursue an interim accord with Egypt, it should have adjusted its expectations, and dropped its demand for non-belligerency. The proposed

accord on the table in March might have been “horrible,” but the consequences of rejecting it

were even worse. With American foreign policy coming apart in Indochina, Kissinger and Ford

needed a win, and the Rabin government failed to deliver.

Eban argued that by insisting on non-belligerency, the Rabin government allowed the blame to fall on Israel’s shoulders and triggered an unnecessary crisis with the Ford

Administration. The government then added insult to injury by downplaying the rift with the

United States as a “quarrel in the family,” making Israel seem indifferent to American loss of face resulting from the breakdown in talks.

Eban believed that mending fences with the US should be Israel’s top priority, and that the government needed to propose new ideas to demonstrate its commitment to the peace

72 “Interview of the Week: Eban Attacks the Government,” Ma’ariv (May 9, 1975), 1, 22, 28.

193 process. In Eban’s view, getting the peace process back on track meant switching tracks from

Sinai to Geneva, and reconvening the peace conference demanded that Israel propose its own comprehensive peace plan, included a resolution of the Palestinian issue at the heart of the conflict. Eban believed that this proactive approach would demonstrate Israel’s commitment to striking a deal, thereby cultivating goodwill in Washington and placing the onus on the Arabs to demonstrate their readiness for a genuine peace.73

3.C “Quarrel in the Family”: Labor Reacts to Eban’s Criticism

Eban’s criticism of the cabinet’s policy toward the peace process and its basic capacity to govern sparked an uproar in Labor.74 The party leadership rushed to denounce his interview.75

Rabin announced that he stood by “the government’s decision, after which Egypt decided to halt the talks.”76 Without mentioning Eban by name, Rabin lamented that there were those who

“exaggerate[ed]” the disagreement between Israel and the US, stressing that military aid continued, and that only new purchases had been delayed. He also noted that he would soon meet with President Ford, after which the US would conclude its reassessment.77

Although Rabin downplayed Eban’s dissent, the former Foreign Minister successfully put the Rabin government’s policy up for debate. Eban had defended the Rabin conduct of the negotiations during his trip to the US, even as he broke with the government by championing a comprehensive approach, proposing terms for engaging with the PLO, and accepting the establishment of a separate Palestinian entity. However, Eban’s critique of the government’s underlying approach to the peace process had little impact back in Israel. It was only after his

73 Ibid. 74 JTA Daily News Bulletin XLII:1 (May 12, 1975), 2. 75 Davar (May 12, 1975), 1-2. “Resentment over Eban's Remarks on the Issue of Israel’s Position in the Negotiations with Kissinger” Ha-Tsofeh (May 12, 1975), 2. 76 “Rabin Responds to Eban’s Comments” Ha-Tsofeh (May 13, 1975), 1-2. 77 Ibid.

194

interview with Ma’ariv, in which Eban blamed the government for rejecting the proposed interim accord, that his call for a comprehensive peace, including the Palestinians, finally attracted attention. Eban’s dramatic reversal over the government’s (mis)handling of the negotiations

sparked outrage in Labor, leading the Alignment to convene the Knesset Faction and party

leadership, putting the government’s approach to the peace process up for debate.78

While the majority supported the government’s approach, Eban and other doves such as

Pinhas Sapir pushed the government to propose a comprehensive Israel peace plan. While

outnumbered, the Labor doves gave Eban enough political cover to propose his own plan for a

comprehensive peace. Eban’s plan involved withdrawing from most of the Territories, with small

but significant changes to the 1967 lines, particularly in and around Jerusalem, the Rafah area

south of Gaza, the Golan Heights, and Sharm El-Sheikh. In exchange for Israeli withdrawals, the

Arabs would sign a full peace treaty; grant Israel political recognition; end the state of war

(including attacks by terrorist groups); demilitarize; guarantee freedom of the seas; end the

boycott and anti-Israel propaganda; normalize relations; and pay compensation for Palestinian refugees as well as Jewish refugees from Arab states.79

By raising these ideas in an internal party forum, Eban avoided accusations of disloyalty

to the Labor-led government. Eban had every right to propose new ideas during an internal

discussion over what the party’s stance should be. Moreover, after Eban had presented a detailed

alternative to the government’s policy, the dovish MaPaM faction was emboldened to demand

that Foreign Minister Allon present the government’s vision for the West Bank and resolving the

78 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Labor Party Debate on GOI Approach to Negotiations Gets underway,” 1975TELAV02947 (May 14, 1975); Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Labor Alignment Begins Debate on Eban Criticism of GOI Foreign Policy,” 1975TELAV02904 (May 15, 1975). 79 Dov Goldstein, “Interview of the Week: Eban Attacks the Government,” Ma’ariv (May 9, 1975), 1, 22, 28; Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Labor Alignment Begins,” 1975TELAV02904 (May 15, 1975).

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Palestinian issue. 80 Allon, though, toed the government line and backed Rabin’s step-by-step,

Egypt-first strategy.

3.D “A Fundamentalist Interpretation of Israel’s Right to the Land of Israel”: Eban’s Critique of the NRP as a Coalition Partner

In Eban’s view, Rabin and Allon clung to the “Egypt-first doctrine” and the “non- centrality” of the Palestinian issue due to the government’s dependence on the NRP.81 Eban had

supported Peres’s campaign for party leadership and held a dim view of Rabin. In his memoirs,

Eban writes that Rabin’s government came to power “with a mouth full of silver spoons.

Everything was going for it. It was headed by a Sabra born in Jerusalem who had achieved the

highest rank…” However, Rabin was unable to “bring these advantages to fulfillment” due to his

rivalry with Peres and his dependence on the NRP.82

Eban believed that Rabin’s original sin was his capitulation to a “small religious splinter

party” in the summer of 1974, thereby squandering Israel’s “last realistic possibility for a

Jordanian solution” to the West Bank.83 According to Eban, Kissinger had been ready to broker

an Israeli–Jordanian accord, telling the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that an agreement

with Jordan was “the “sensible next step.” However, Kissinger ultimately ruled out negotiations

on the Jordanian front out of consideration for Rabin and Allon, telling the Senate Committee

that “they need[ed] the National Religious Party in order to support the government.”84

80 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Labor Party Debate,” 1975TELAV02947 (May 14, 1975). 81 Abba Eban, Personal Witness: Israel Through My Eyes (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1992.), 576. 82 Eban, 580 83 Eban,576 84Eban, 575-576, 578-579. Eban provides a rich account of the challenges facing a former minister serving in the Knesset. Particularly noteworthy, is his observation that “the Knesset rules afford unlimited speech to ministerial spokesmen, while other members are condemned to a brevity of utterance for which Israeli politicians have no previous training.”

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The NRP, Eban believed, had “lurched toward a fundamentalist interpretation of Israel’s

right to the Land of Israel” after the 1967 war.85 Under this new dogma, “everything belonged to

Jews, nothing to Arabs.” Eban lamented that “the pragmatism of Moshe Shapira and his

colleagues, Yosef Burg and Yitzhak Raphael” was no more. Instead, Labor’s traditional ally had

been overtaken by the “ardent and undisciplined ardor” of Yehudah Ben-Meir and Zevulun

Hammer, who had yet to “outgrow their militant passions” and “return to realism.” This rendered

the Rabin government “unable and even unwilling to tackle the central core of the Palestinian

problem.” Thus, Rabin put the Palestinian issue aside, focusing instead on advancing the peace

process with Egypt. Reassessment, then, allowed Eban to try refocusing the peace process on the

West Bank and the Palestinians.86

3.E Ben-Meir’s Rebuke of Eban and “National-Religious” Public Diplomacy

Ben-Meir, about to embark on his own public-diplomacy trip to the US, had harsh words

for Eban. Ben-Meir condemned Eban’s interview as “an irresponsible act.” Ben-Meir noted that he, himself, had “harsh criticism for the government and its actions.” However, in light of the diplomatic situation, “[he] did not permit [him]self to go out and attack the government like Mr.

Eban did.”87

Ben-Meir also told journalists that he would convey a message very different than Eban’s while in the United States. Together with Zevulun Hammer, who was already in New York as a guest of Yeshivah University, Ben-Meir planned to meet with Members of Congress, Senators, and Administration officials. The two would also speak at Jewish community centers and synagogues and visit opinion-makers and community leaders. Their objective was to “explain to

85 Eban, 580. 86 Eban, 580. 87 Ha-Tsofeh (May 12, 1975), 2; Davar (May 12, 1975), 1-2.

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the Jewish [public] and the general public, from a national-religious perspective, our historic

right to the Land of Israel.” This, he argued, was a “vital necessity” to combat “the Palestinian

propaganda.”88

After returning to Israel, Ben-Meir announced that he and Hammer were “gratified to

find Israel’s position as strong as ever in the hearts of Senators and Congressmen.” During a

breakfast with members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the two MKs “explained the

NRP’s position on Judea and Samaria” to their American colleagues. This meant emphasizing

not only the “strategic value” of the territories but also “the historic tie of the West Bank with

Eretz Yisrael.”89 Their meetings with American Jewish leaders, however, were not as gratifying.

According to Ben-Meir, the two “kept on meeting American Jews who complained they are not

getting clear guidance from Israel” on the Jewish state’s position on core issues. Some U.S.

Jews, he reported, were “more than confused; they [were] frustrated.”90

3.F Mixed Messages: The Israeli Debate Over the Territories Reaches the United States

Although Ben-Meir and Hammer expressed alarm over the conflicting messages being put

out by Israeli emissaries, they also contributed to the confusion. They traveled to the US not to

parrot government talking-points, but to present the “National-Religious perspective.”

Consequently, Ma’ariv columnist Shmuel Segev considered Hammer and Ben-Meir no less culpable than Eban for undermining Israeli public diplomacy.91

Segev observed that Israeli public diplomacy in the US had gone a long way toward

rebutting the Ford Administration’s campaign to blame Israel for the breakdown of talks in

88 Ha-Tsofeh (May 12, 1975), 2; Davar (May 12, 1975), 1-2. 89 “MKs: Still need to improve information drive in U.S.,” Jerusalem Post (June 8, 1975), 3. 90 Ibid. 91 Shmuel Segev “Hasbara Messengers – And Spoilers,” Ma’ariv (May 28, 1975), 5.

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March. However, this achievement was now being undermined by the cacophony of conflicting messages being delivered by Israeli emissaries to the US. These mixed, and often contradictory, messages were being presented to Members of Congress, Senators, journalists, and Jewish communal leaders.

In the wake of Kissinger’s failed shuttle, Israelis had rallied around the flag and adopted a united front. However, the U.S. reassessment and the prospect of reconvening the Geneva conference sparked renewed debate over the territories captured in 1967, particularly the West

Bank. Internal divisions over the future of “Judea and Samaria,” the Palestinian issue, and the way forward with the peace process were now spilling over into Israel’s public diplomacy. The result was that the Jewish community in the US, as well as pro-Israel member of Congress, were unsure of what, exactly, the “pro-Israel’ position was.

The deterioration had begun with Abba Eban when he called for Israel to propose new ideas to restart Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy. Eban had essentially corroborated the Kissinger–

Ford version of events, which blamed the Rabin government for the breakdown in talks. Eban also raised the profile of the Palestinian issue within the Israeli debate, bringing dormant disagreements to the surface, undermining Israel’s united front in the critical days and weeks ahead of a fateful meeting scheduled between Rabin and Ford.92

Moreover, while Eban was proclaiming Israel’s willingness to trade territory, Menachem

Begin was making his case against partitioning “Western Eretz Israel” to the National Press

Club. As Eban enumerated the conditions under which Israel and the Palestinians could begin talks, the Likud leader also proclaimed his categorical opposition to recognizing the Palestinians.

92 Segev, “Hasbara Messengers.”

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Other Israeli emissaries further muddied the waters. Jerusalem mayor Teddy Kollak told an audience in Chicago that, ultimately, Israel would find itself recognizing the PLO. Ben-Meir and Hammer, meanwhile, were preaching to members of Congress and the U.S. Jewish community that Israel would never recognize the PLO, there could be no partition of the West

Bank, and an interim agreement with Syria was impossible. Meanwhile, former Chief of Israeli military intelligence, Meir Amit, reportedly told American military correspondents that in exchange for a complete and lasting peace, Israel should be willing to recognize the PLO, and even withdraw to the 1967 borders (more or less).93

Segev argued that these contradictory messages undermined the U.S. Jewish community’s ability to advocate for Israel. Moreover, Prime Minister Rabin needed the country behind him, united around Israel’s commitment to strive for peace, on the one hand, but not to sacrifice its vital security interests, on the other. To be sure, Segev wrote, the “complexity” of the

Middle East conflict made it only natural that Israelis would have differences of opinion over how the conflict should be resolved. At the same time, it was imperative that Israel speak with one voice in its public diplomacy, adopting the official position of the government. Instead,

Israelis seemed to be exporting their perennial debate over the conflict to the United States.

The U.S. Reassessment as a Driving force for Discourse in the NRP The incoherence of Israeli public diplomacy during the “reassessment” reflected fundamental differences in perspectives among Israeli “hasbara” emissaries. Amit, Eban, and

Kollek emphasized the tangible, material importance of the territories captured in 1967. On the battlefield, territory provided security and military advantage, while on the negotiating table it

93 Segev, “Hasbara Messengers.”

200 was an asset to be bartered away. For Hammer and Ben-Meir, territory had both material and spiritual significance. In the West Bank, this spiritual significance was vested in the territory itself. In Sinai, though, the spiritual element had less to do with the territory itself and more to do with the way Israel conducted foreign policy.

Israeli soldiers had fought and died to capture and hold the Sinai Peninsula, but it was not generally regarded as part of the Land of Israel. Ben-Meir and Hammer objected to the proposed

Interim Accord because they viewed the terms as an affront to national honor. As a proud and independent nation, Israel could not agree to turn over strategic mountain passes and oil fields without significant consideration from Egypt in the form of non-belligerency. Accepting the accord under such terms would constitute an act of surrender to Egyptian demands.

To the Zeirim, the Rabin government demonstrated that Israel was self-reliant and independent by rejecting such terms in March 1975. Thus, when the Ford administration leveraged military aid to pressure the Rabin government, American arms became the fruit of the poisonous tree. Ceding the mountain passes and oil fields would amount to capitulation to

American pressure and demonstrate Israel’s susceptibility to American influence. Adding a military aid package to the agreement would only add insult to injury, further demonstrating

Israel’s dependence on the US.

4.A The Reaction of the NRP’s “Old Guard” to the Comprehensive Approach and Israeli Public Diplomacy

While Ben-Meir had condemned Eban’s dissent in the press, Burg took up the issue discreetly, within the cabinet. Burg was concerned with the state of Israeli public diplomacy in general, and asked Foreign Minister Allon for a list of emissaries sent abroad in coordination

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with the Foreign Ministry. Burg also asked Allon for the talking points and any other guidance

from the Foreign Ministry over the message these emissaries were expected to convey.94

Raphael, on the other hand, opted for a more public approach. On May 23, when reports began to circulate that Amit had come out for withdrawing from the Golan and recognizing the

PLO, Raphael swiftly put out a statement that Amit should be recalled (if the reports of Amit’s statements were accurate). Raphael declared that he would “propose to the cabinet that all information emissaries sent abroad by the government must restrict their statements to agreed government policy as approved by the Knesset.”95 Burg’s political allies viewed Raphael’s press

release as an attempt to steal the spotlight from Burg, who had been working quietly on this

delicate issue. They also cautioned that Raphael’s publicity-seeking might, in fact, lead Rabin to exclude the item from the cabinet’s agenda.96

This incident illustrates that taking a stance against relinquishing territory offered

political advantage within the NRP. In just over a year, Gush Emunim had become increasingly

powerful and influential. While some in Gush Emunim opposed an interim accord with Egypt

per-se, many of its NRP sympathizers were more concerned that withdrawal in Sinai would set a

precedent for withdrawal on other fronts. Indeed, Gush Emunim’s advertisements in Ha-Tsofeh

proclaimed: “Today, Sinai. Tomorrow, The Golan. The next day, Judea and Samaria, and in the

end, Jerusalem.”97

94 “Dr. Raphael Demands Recalling Amit Meir from his Hasbarah Mission,” Ha-Tsofeh (May 25, 1975), 2; “Cabinet query on information line,” Jerusalem Post (May 25, 1975), 1. 95 “Dr. Raphael Demands,” Ha-Tsofeh (May 25, 1975), 2. 96 “Cabinet query,” Jerusalem Post (May 25, 1975), 1. 97 See, Gush Emunim advertisements in Ha-Tsofeh, (August 26, 1975), 2; Ha-Tsofeh (August 28, 1975), 5.

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In a meeting with NRP activists in Tel Aviv, Raphael displayed the “pragmatism” Eban

appreciated in the NRP’s Old-Guard politicians. With Rabin set to meet with Ford in a couple of

weeks, Raphael thought it important to announce the position the NRP would put forward in the

cabinet. On the one hand, Raphael expressed support for a return to US-brokered, step-by-step diplomacy. On the other hand, he came out forcefully against those – like Eban – who called for

Israel to put forward a detailed, comprehensive peace plan of its own.98 Raphael argued that, at

this stage in the peace process, proposing “a detailed, comprehensive plan delineating lines of withdrawal” would be disastrous. According to Raphael, even the most far reaching, generous

Israeli plan would “have no chance of being accepted,” because “even the most moderate Arabs, if, indeed there [were] such people, would not be satisfied with anything less than the 1967 borders” on all fronts.99

Raphael knew of “no responsible public figure” in Israel who would accept a complete

withdrawal to the 1967 lines on all fronts. Therefore, any “reasonable” Israeli proposition would

be “unequivocally rejected” by the Arabs. This rejection of an Israeli peace initiative would, in

turn, “strengthen extremists” in the Arab world while eliciting a counterproposal from the

Americans. Raphael feared that the US would put out another “Roger’s Plan:” a comprehensive

peace plan involving a near-total Israeli withdrawal on all fronts.100 Israel had rejected such

98 “Raphael: Don't Put forward Maps of Comprehensive Peace Plans,” Ma’ariv (May 25, 1975); “Dr. Y Raphael rules out Proposing Peace Plan with Maps and Lines of Withdrawal,” Ha-Tsofeh (May 25, 1975), 1-2. 99 Ha-Tsofeh (May 25, 1975), 1. 100 The “Roger’s Plan” was put forward in a speech by US Secretary of State William P Rogers on Dec. 9, 1969. It contained a ten-point plan for a comprehensive settlement to the Mideast Conflict. The speech contained little new ground, as it merely reiterated a Joint US-USSR working paper. The architect of the speech, and the working-paper, was Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, who informed Rogers that the “principle purpose” was to “ease some of the increasing pressures in the Arab world” by “placing on record our views on the question of withdrawal.” Thus, the plan envisioned “insubstantial alterations” to the 1967 borders for the purpose of “mutual security.” In his remarks, Roger’s firmly states that the “we do not support expansionism.” It is unsurprising, then, that the plan was remembered by Raphael as a dictate for a near total withdrawal to the 67 lines. FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume. XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969-1972, [Hereinafter, FRUS XXIII] Ed. Steven Galpern (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Doc, 73; “Paper Prepared in the Department of State: Joint US-USSR Working Paper, Washington, undated,” FRUS XXIII, Doc. 58.

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terms then, and would reject them again, thereby “deepen[ing] the disagreement between us and

between our single, greatest ally, the American People.”

Raphael called for a “realistic policy aimed at reaching a settlement in stages.” The first

stage would be to move “step-by-step, with American mediation” toward a “full, separate peace

with Egypt,” the most powerful Arab state. An interim accord would require both sides to make

“partial concessions,” but Israel would insist on “reciprocity,” and that the agreement would constitute “progress toward a comprehensive agreement” with Egypt.101

Raphael framed a return to step-by-step diplomacy as the alternative to a “comprehensive peace” involving a near-total Israeli withdrawal, while Gush Emunim and the Zeirim framed an interim accord as the prelude to such a withdrawal. Raphael’s argument was meant to assuage

NRP members sympathetic to Gush Emunim while preserving his freedom of action. While

Raphael did not rule out future concession in the West Bank, he criticized doves like Eban for publicly agreeing to such concessions, preserving his image as a tough pragmatist.

4.B “The Judaism of R. Yohanan Ben Zakkai” vs. “The Judaism of Abba Sikra”: Avraham Melamed and the Dissenting Doves within the NRP

Within the NRP, some shared Eban’s “dovish” critique of Rabin’s foreign policy. They

held that incrementalism would not bring a final peace. Interim accords avoided the issues at the

core of the conflict, and encouraged the parties to withhold concessions for future bargaining.

These doves, though, saw their influence and ideology being increasingly eclipsed by the Zeirim

and Gush Emunim. Thus, the March 1975 failure of Kissinger’s shuttle and the American

“Reassessment” created an opening for dissent in the NRP just as in Labor. In the NRP, though,

101 “Dr. Y Raphael rules out Proposing Peace Plan with Maps and Lines of Withdrawal,” Ha-Tsofeh (May 25, 1975), 1-2.

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the debate over the government’s foreign policy paralleled a more a fundamental debate over the

NRP’s guiding theological and ideological principles.

The dominant position within the NRP leadership was opposition, to one degree or

another, to the comprehensive approach. As we have seen, Ben-Meir and Hammer brought (their version) of “National-Religious” public diplomacy to the US, stressing Israel’s historic and religious claims to the Land. This was in stark contrast to Eban and others who favored withdrawing from the biblical heartland of Eretz Yisrael in exchange for a comprehensive peace.

Burg, however, objected to these dissenting doves on the grounds that they undermined Israeli efforts at public diplomacy. Raphael loudly and publicly opposed an Israeli peace plan “at this stage,” but did not rule out a broader settlement in the future.

The most prominent dissentient “dove” in the NRP was Avraham Melamed, Chairman of the NRP’s Knesset Faction and a leading member of Burg’s LaMifneh faction. Another leading dove was former-NRP Knesset Member Moshe Unna, a founding member of LaMifneh, and a prominent intellectual from Kibbutz Sde Eliyahu. The two lawmakers were leading members of a

“moderate, intellectual circle” within religious Zionism, who were struggling to organize a movement to counter Gush Emunim.102 In the summer of 1975, Unna published a series of

essays in Ha-Tsofeh critiquing the current direction of the NRP, religious Zionism, as well as the

Rabin government.103 Melamed, though, found a platform in Davar, the Labor-affiliated

newspaper.

On May 25, 1975, the same day that Ha-Tsofeh and Ma’ariv reported Raphael’s

renunciation of the “comprehensive” approach to Mideast peacemaking, Davar published an

102 “Meeting of Intellectual-Political Circle for a Balanced Religious Zionism,” Ha-Tsofeh (July 4, 1975), 1; Hillel Danzig, “The ‘Doves’ in the Religious Camp Make their Voices Heard,” Davar (July 10, 1975), 9. 103 “Meeting of Intellectual-Political Circle,” Ha-Tsofeh (July 4, 1975), 1; Danzig, “The ‘Doves’,” Davar (July 10, 1975), 9.

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interview with Melamed.104 The NRP MK stood out as one of the most prominent doves in

Israeli politics, which was an “unusual and unpopular” position in his party. For instance,

Melamed had opposed settlement in Hebron, arguing that the euphoria following the Six-Day

War had been a passing phenomenon, and that Israelis would one day face the reality of

relinquishing nearly all the West Bank.

Melamed had harsh criticism for the governing coalition as well as his political party, though he held key positions in both. When the NRP had gone into the opposition, Melamed had dutifully become one of the most active opponents of the Rabin government. Moreover, after the

NRP joined the Government, Melamed continued to support his party’s call for a national unity government. This seemed to be more in line with the Zeirim’s opposition to a government

willing to withdraw from territory, rather than Melamed’s dovish views.

When asked to justify these apparent contradictions, Melamed displayed an impressive

ability for spin. Yes, he had opposed the Rabin government when the NRP was in the opposition.

Moreover, he did, indeed, continue to support the formation of a national unity government.

When labor had chosen Rabin to succeed Golda, Melamed had hoped the new prime minister

“would bring about a positive change” in Israeli foreign affairs as well as domestic policy.

However, Melamed became “disappointed” by the Rabin government soon after it took office

and began “to have doubts whether the Rabin government would, indeed, be better than its

predecessor.” Thus, he had no qualms about fighting the government in the opposition. When the

NRP joined the government, it did so, Melamed claimed, to preserve the “fragile balance between religion and state.”105

104 “MK A. Melamed In Conversation with ‘Davar’: The Majority of the NRP- Doves,” Davar (May 25, 1975), 6. 105 “MK A. Melamed,” Davar (May 25, 1975), 6.

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Melamed believed that, for domestic political reasons, the Rabin government was stalling

for time rather than striving for peace. The government was unelected and weakened by the

decapitation of Labor’s top leadership following the Agranat Report. Thus, Rabin’s Egypt-first,

step-by-step strategy was, in fact, an attempt to avoid the core issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict

until the government could “establish a [political] base.” In Melamed’s view, the only “real

[peace] agreement” was a “comprehensive agreement.” Rabin’s incremental peace strategy had not, and would not, bring Israel any closer to an accommodation with its neighbors. To the contrary, Rabin’s foreign policy brought about a stalemate, as the internal contradictions of the incremental approach caused the government to “flip-flop” during Kissinger’s shuttle. The result was both a breakdown of the peace process and a crisis in Israeli’s relations with its most important ally.106

In addition to its foreign policy woes, Israel faced growing “socio-national and economic

crises.” In Melamed’s view, the government’s narrow base limited its ability to manage the

country’s domestic affairs. A national unity government would enjoy broader public support and

would, therefore, be better able to confront these crises. Melamed’s political calculus would

change should Rabin alter course and begin working toward a “real” peace. Melamed considered

this unlikely, because it was impossible to negotiate a “real” peace without “a mandate to

negotiate over everything.” The Rabin government, though, had “renounced such a mandate

regarding negotiations over Judea and Samaria” from the moment it came to power.

Melamed was forced to acknowledge that the NRP was responsible for “tying the

government’s hands” over the West Bank by insisting that any withdrawal be ratified by calling

new elections. At the NRP party convention in 1973, the Zeirim had pushed through resolutions

106 Ibid.

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on Judea and Samaria that were binding on the party. Melamed fervently disagreed with those

resolutions, and believed that a growing number of NRP members were “reconsidering” those

resolutions in light of the post-Yom Kippur War reality. After speaking at parlor meetings and local NRP branches across the country, Melamed had come to believe that “a majority of [NRP]

members [now] agree[ed] that the convention resolutions, which tied the party’s hands, [had

been] mistakes.” To be sure, Gush Emunim was growing in influence, and the Zeirim posed a

growing challenge to the party’s veteran leadership. However, Melamed claimed that his “close

ties” to the Zeirim would prevent any split in the party if it repealed the 1973 convention

resolutions.107

In Melamed’s assessment, the Zeirim were well positioned to seize more of the top

leadership positions in the party. However, he did not believe that they would conquer the party

on the ideological front. Given time, religious Zionism would undergo “a process of

disenchantment” with the messianism that was spreading through its ranks and a “new

generation of young intellectuals” with moderate political views would challenge the ideological

positions of the Zeirim and their supporters.

The time had come, Melamed argued, for “Halakhic Judaism” to retake its rightful place

from the messianic, “esoteric Judaism” of Gush Emunim and the Zeirim. “Halakhic Judaism,” he

explained, was “the moderate Judaism of Rabbi Yohanan Ben Zakai and not of Abba Sikra.” It

valued “pikuah nefesh” and peace-making over the militarism and fatalism of “Masada.”

Halakhic Judaism, Melamed declared, viewed “human life as the supreme value.” While the

Jewish state certainly had religious significance, it was not an end in and of itself. Rather,

107 “MK A Melamed,” Davar (May 25, 1975), 6.

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statehood was the means by which the nation would achieve “spiritual independence,” which

was the ultimate purpose of religious Zionism.

The contest of ideas between “halakhic” and “esoteric” Judaism would unfold during the

next general election campaign, and was inexorably linked to the Israeli debate over land-for- peace. The NRP had made a two-fold mistake by resolving not to sit in a government that withdrew from territory. It contributed to diplomatic paralysis by “tying this government’s hands” over the West Bank and it also caused religious voters to focus on territory rather than

“the state’s spiritual and material problems, for which the NRP exists.” The next election campaign, then, would provide an opportunity for NRP voters to see the error of their ways, and refocus on the party’s traditional priorities in areas such as religion, education, social welfare, agricultural settlement, and more.108

4.C “The Intellectual-Political Circle for a Balanced Religious Zionism”

Melamed’s prediction that opinion in the NRP would shift back toward moderation

proved to be incorrect. Gush Emunim was able to mobilize thousands, even tens of thousands,

for demonstrations, rallies, and protests. However, the inaugural conference of the “Intellectual-

Political Circle for a Balanced Religious Zionism” attracted no more than a few dozen

participants.109 Most were intellectuals, educators, and university lecturers, along with activists

from the religious Kibbutz movement. Among their ranks were Aviezer Ravitzky, Charles

Liebman, and Uriel Simon, a bible scholar and son of the German-Jewish religious philosopher

108 Ibid. 109 “Meeting of Intellectual-Political Circle,” Ha-Tsofeh (July 4, 1975), 1; “The Decision Depends on What Position Rabin Takes: It’s Expected that He’d have Majority Support both for and against,” Ma’ariv (June 4, 1975), 3.

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Ernst Simon.110 Melamed and Unna, along with Zvi Yaron, a senior Jewish Agency official, were the only notable political figures in attendance.111

Months earlier, efforts had been underway to mobilize the “doves” within the religious camp. However, those efforts had been on hiatus until a survey of NRP members revealed a demand for moderate voices.112 The new “Circle,” then, would “work for a balanced policy in foreign affairs and defense in accordance with the ideal of ‘Torah ve-Avodah’ which [had been] neglected in recent years.”113 Gush Emunim had “taken over the religious public,” leading them astray from “the traditional, political approach of Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi.”114 The Circle, in turn, would “carry the flag of the ‘Doves’ in the religious camp” and serve as a counterweight to Gush

Emunim, meeting each of Gush Emunim’s wildcat settlement attempts and protest marches with counter-demonstrations. The “Circle” was to remain nonpartisan, even as it pushed for the NRP to take a “balanced” position on matters of foreign affairs and defense while investing more political capital in domestic issues. The conference participants appointed an organizing committee led by Melamed and tasked it with disseminating the group’s message. To that end, the group resolved to compose a detailed manifesto with a plan of action to present to the public.

The group also decided to publish a bulletin and establish three main loci of activity in

Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, and Haifa.115

4.D The Voice of Reason? A Laborite Perspective on “Balanced Religious Zionists”

110 “Meeting of Intellectual-Political Circle,” Ha-Tsofeh (July 4, 1975), 1; “The Decision Depends,” Ma’ariv (June 4, 1975), 3. 111 “Meeting of Intellectual-Political Circle,” Ha-Tsofeh (July 4, 1975), 1. 112 Ha-Tsofeh (July 4, 1975), 1; Ma’ariv (June 4, 1975), 3. 113 “The Decision Depends,” Ma’ariv (June 4, 1975), 3. 114 Ma’ariv (June 4, 1975), 3; Ha-Tsofeh (July 4, 1975), 1. 115 Ha-Tsofeh (July 4, 1975), 1; Ma’ariv (June 4, 1975), 3.

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The “Circle for Balanced Religious Zionism” met with the approval of Hillel Danzig, a

Labor-affiliated journalist and publicist.116 Writing in Davar, Danzig pondered the political

implications of the NRP’s apparent turn to the Right, particularly with regard to the historic

alliance between Labor and Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi-cum-NRP. At the same time, Danzig took note of Labor’s own ideological and generational crises. In this embryonic group of religious Zionists with “dovish tendencies,” Danzig saw not only the potential for ideological revival in religious

Zionism but also a possible catalyst for restoring the crown of “pioneering, Kibbutz socialism” to its former glory. While Melamed’s group had yet to become a major political force or garner much attention in the press, Danziger believed that, at minimum, it warranted close attention for demonstrating that “not everyone in the religious-Zionist camp is a hawk.”117

Danzig observed that, in recent years, the voice emanating from the religious camp had

been that of “the hawks and hasidim of the Whole Land of Israel.” The “voice of political

pragmatism,” however, “had either gone silent or become quiet as a whisper” among NRP

leaders and parliamentarians. This was lamentable, since religious Zionism’s “voice of political

realism” had “filled a vital role” in the national leadership of both Yishuv the state.

Religious Zionism’s “pragmatism in affairs of state” had been “one of the shared

principles” at the heart of the Historic Alliance with Labor. That partnership, in turn, had been a

cornerstone of Israeli governance, bringing together “the two, main popular-movements of

[Jewish] national renewal.” Leaders such as Ben-Gurion, Eshkol, and Sharett of Labor had forged an historic “covenant” with Mizrahi/Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi under R. Maimon and Haim

Moshe Shapira.

116 Danzig, “Doves in Religious Camp,” Davar (July 10, 1975), 9. 117 Danzig, “Doves in Religious Camp,” Davar (July 10, 1975), 9.

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With the passing of these leaders, the national and party leaderships found themselves without a political base. In Danzig’s view, this left the Alignment as the main force for

“responsible, realist statecraft” in Israeli coalition governance. While Labor sought to continue its alliance with the NRP, it lacked a “religious partner” that was “pragmatic, realistic, and responsible.” Unna and Melamed’s “Circle for Balanced Religious Zionism,” he hoped, would restore religious Zionism and its partnership with Labor to their former glory.

That they would succeed, however, was far from certain. The NRP had certainly moved from dovishness to hawkishness. Danzig observed that “all of the prominent members of the

NRP leadership [were] hawks.” To be sure, they certainly harbored “dovish tendencies on political-territorial questions.” However, these pragmatic inclinations had been eclipsed by

“internal pressures from the religious right.” At the heart of this shift, however, was ideological change.

The NRP had not merely shifted from a dovish stance to a more hawkish one. Rather, it had abandoned reason and realism in affairs of state. Maimon had been a “stalwart man of the right,” while Shapira had been a “moderate statesman with an affinity for Labor.” However, both men had been pragmatists and “realistic partners when it came to diplomatic decisions involving the portioning of the Land of Israel during the time of Ben Gurion.” In the Israel of 1975, however, Labor could no longer count on the NRP as a “responsible” partner able to make

“realistic decisions” on territorial issues.118

The growing rift between Labor and the NRP was both political and ideological. In

Danziger’s view, the “historic alliance” had ceased to be a “natural partnership,” because the

“pioneering” and “socialist” elements of religious-Zionist ideology had fallen out of favor. The

118 Ibid.

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driving political force in religious Zionism had been Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrachi, whose ideology of

Tora ve-Avoda (Torah and Labor) had been a synthesis of socialism with religion. This had

created common ideological ground between the religious-Zionist and Labor camps, providing a foundation for the political partnership between the two movements.

Danzig hoped that Melamed and Unna’s “balanced religious Zionism” would provide the ideological basis for renewing the partnerships between the two movements. Danzig observed that throughout the world, religious circles were finding common cause with the Left. The

Middle East was becoming a “religious-revolutionary region” as masses of religious Muslims increasingly harbored “leftist tendencies, particularly the younger generation.” Should Israel achieve peace with its neighbors, the Jewish state might then be able to offer “a functional model” of “pioneering” development based on new ways of thinking about religion and socialism.

That said, Danzig saw no “strong and active pioneering-socialism” in Israeli society writ-

large, and was unsure if there remained any vestiges of religious socialism. If so, then religious

socialism had been relegated to the “political and public ‘underground’.” The implications for

Israeli society, he believed, were grave. The country lacked the ideological tools to “fix the state

of society and secure [Israel’s] national future.” A national revival was needed in both statecraft

and ideology. “It [was] no coincidence that the dovish camp mostly belonged to the Left,” and

that the push for peace within “the religious camp [was] concentrated in the Religious Kibbutz

[Movement] and intellectual circles close to it.”119

Defeating Gush Emunim required that “balanced” religious Zionists openly confront

“rightist-religious extremism.” The mix of right-wing nationalism with religious

119 Ibid.

213 fundamentalism, Danzig observed, was a powerful engine of grassroots mobilization, particularly among the youth – both secular and religious. Danzig hoped that Melamed and

Unna’s “Circle” would, together with like-minded allies, build an ideological basis for

“rehabilitating the pioneering camp in general, and for renewing the socialist-religious partnership between its leaders, in particular.”120

Ultimately, Melamed and the “Intellectual-Political Circle for Balanced Religious

Zionism” were unable to compete with R. Zvi Yehudah and Gush Emunim in grassroots mobilization. However, the two groups did share one critical feature: both called for concrete political action in light of the American “reassessment” on the basis of their theological and ideological approaches to the political process. This illustrates the manner in which the reassessment acted as a catalyst for debate over both policy and theo-political ideology within the NRP and religious-Zionist circles. The US-mediated peace process forced elements within the NRP to confront fundamental questions about the peace process: Would the NRP back a comprehensive peace accord or aim for a partial agreement with Egypt? Did the NRP consider the Wholeness of the Land as its supreme ideational imperative, or would the territories be treated as material, strategic assets up for negotiations? The battle of ideas surrounding these questions would only intensify as “reassessment” wound down and the diplomatic process began to pick up steam. This battle would be fought on multiple fronts, including Knesset committees, the media, and the street.

4.E Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook Reacts to the Soviet–American Communique of March 20, 1975

120 Danzig, “Doves in Religious Camp,” Davar (July 10, 1975), 9.

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The diplomatic maneuvering during the hiatus in Egyptian–Israeli negotiations provided

the impetus for religious-political action on the Right with greater effect than on the Left. Rabbi

Zvi Yehudah Kook’s reaction to a Soviet–American communique illustrates an extreme version

of the former. Following a two-day summit in Vienna between Kissinger and Soviet Foreign

Minister Andrei Gromyko, The United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint communique

on May 20, 1975. The terse communique announced that “an exchange of view” had taken place

on a “number of international problems of mutual interest.” This included “the situation with

regard to a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East, including the question of

resuming the Geneva Peace Conference.”121

Given the paucity of detail in the communique, the press tried to fill in the details with

statements by “unnamed sources” and “senior officials” in Kissinger’s party who briefed the secretary’s traveling press corps. Press accounts differed dramatically over what, if anything, the

US and Soviets had agreed upon during the 11 hours of talks. However, it was clear that the

Administration would conclude its Mideast policy reassessment after Ford met with Sadat and

Rabin in early June. Reassessment would then be followed by a renewed attempt at Arab-Israeli

peacemaking, either by reconvening the Geneva peace conference in pursuit of a comprehensive

122 peace, or a resumption of US-brokered “step-by-step” talks. 556F

Ha-Tsofeh published a Hebrew translation of the U.S.-Soviet communique on May 21, which Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook read in his modest apartment in the Geula neighborhood of

Jerusalem. Rav Zvi Yehudah took exception to the communique as well as reports of the first

121 “Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R Statement, Vienna, May 20,” Department of State Bulletin LXII;2877 (June 16, 1975), 810- 11. 122 “Kissinger, Gromyko End Talks; Signs Encouraging,” Los Angeles Times (May 21, 1975), B4; “Soviets agree to renewed US Mideast move,” Jerusalem Post (May 21, 1975), 1; “US-Soviet Effort on Mideast is Set,” New York Times (May 21, 1975), 89; “Kissinger-Gromyko Vienna Talks End Without Much Accord on Mideast, SALT,” Wall Street Journal (May 21, 1975), 7; “USSR Promises not to Pressure Arabs on Achieving a ‘Radical Solution’ in the Middle East,” Ha-Tsofeh (May 21, 1975), 1-2.

215 flowering of renewed Mideast diplomacy. In response, he penned a declaration that featured on

Ha-Tsofeh’s front page the next morning.123

R. Zvi Yehudah’s declaration was both a theological statement and a call to action, which he addressed to “the entire nation and the whole world!” A writer for Ha-Tsofeh described Zvi

Yehudah’s statement as an “order of the day in preparation for [peace] talks,” which had been written due to “reports about deliberations, maps, and peace talks.” The declaration’s apparent purpose was “to bring about developments in… the struggle over the Wholeness of the Land.”124

R. Zvi Yehudah invoked the “Divine commandment” to “inherit” and “dwell” in the

Land of Israel, which was a directive to settle the Land and an “eternal promise” that the Land of

Israel would “be under our governance.” This promise was absolute, and applied to the entire land. First, it was an “eternal promise” to the Patriarch Abraham and his progeny that The Land of Israel would “be under our governance.” This promise was absolute, and applied to the entire

Land. Thus, the people of Israel were obligated to “conquer” and to “settle” all of the territories captured in 1967. This obligation “stands and is in force for all generations,” and was as eternal as God, Himself – “The Rock of Israel and its Redeemer.”

Insofar as the entire Land of Israel, must forever remain under Jewish rule, R. Zvi

Yehudah took a dim view of any negotiations involving territorial concessions. He rejected

“coercion” regardless of the source, whether by the Israeli Government, or from a “government of gentiles.” Alluding to the US and the Soviet Union, R. Zvi Yehudah asserted that it made no difference whether such “gentiles” were “friends or enemies.” Moreover, the eternal, divine bequest of the Land and the imperative that it always remain under Jewish governance demanded resistance to any and all political pressure to cede territory. “The entire people of Israel, young

123 “Gilui Da’at – Yisrael - Torah (11 Sivan 5735),” Ha-Tsofeh (May 22, 1975), 1. 124 “Gilui Da’at,” Ha-Tsofeh (May 22, 1975), 1.

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and old, man or woman, shared the obligation to “revolt against [coercion] with all of our lives

and all of our souls.”

In addition to calling for popular resistance to “coercion,” R. Zvi Yehudah rejected any

“resolutions” calling for Israeli withdrawal from territory. In what was clearly a response to the

American–Soviet communique issued the previous morning, R. Zvi Yehudah denounced such

resolutions as acts of “theft,” perpetrated against “all the millions of Jews in Russia and

America” who were the true owners of the land. In such instances, international law was “null

and void, [of] less [consequence] than all the dust of the earth.”

Toward a Resumption of Talks and the Problematics of Military Aid as Compensation For Territorial Withdrawal 5.A The Ford–Sadat Meeting as a Turning Point Toward the Resumption of Negotiations

On June 1, 1975, President Gerald Ford stumbled into Salzburg for a NATO summit.125

On the sidelines, Ford met with Sadat, who expressed his desire to resume Kissinger’s step-by- step diplomacy. “I want us to make progress,” Sadat told Ford and Kissinger. “And I want the

United States only to achieve it, not the Soviet Union, not through a Geneva Conference, where the USSR is sitting."126 Kissinger was happy to oblige, but pressed Sadat for some small changes

to his negotiating position, which Kissinger could present to the Israelis. Sadat offered limited, private commitments, having already committed to a dramatic public gesture by announcing the reopening of the Suez Canal.

125 Ford, A Time To Heal, 289; Quandt, Peace Process, 166. While disembarking from Air Force One, President Ford slipped, falling down the last few steps from the Presidential plane to the red carpet. While Ford walked away unscathed, the event was memorialized in the sketches of the American comedian Chevy Chase on the “Saturday Night Live” variety program. 126 “Memorandum of Conversation - [Meeting with Anwar Sadat and Gerald Ford] - Salzburg, June 1, 1975,” Office of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, United States Department of State, The Kissinger Transcripts, 1968- 1977, Digital National Security Archive.

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Shortly after Kissinger’s failed “shuttle” to the Middle East in March, Sadat had shrewdly

announced that Egypt would re-open the Suez Canal on June 5, 1975—the eighth anniversary of

the 1967 war.127 This put the onus on Israel to make a reciprocal gesture and signaled Egypt’s

desire to rebuild the canal zone. Reopening the canal and repopulating the nearby cities would

imperil hundreds of thousands of civilians and critical infrastructure in the event of an Egyptian

attack across the canal. Moreover, a war would bring traffic through the canal to a halt, depriving

the cash-strapped government of vital revenue. In short, Sadat was intentionally creating the

conditions under which war with Israel would come at a cost that Egypt could not afford. And, in

so doing, he signaled to the Israelis that while he would not formally end the state of war and

normalize relations as part of the interim agreement, he would provide de-facto nonbelligerency.

The Salzburg meetings between Ford and Sadat were a turning point in the shift from

“reassessment” to a resumption of negotiations. This was evident, as well, to the NRP cabinet

ministers. In a speech to activists from his Likud U’Temurah faction during a Sabbath retreat,

Raphael opined that the breakdown of talks in March had been a learning experience for all

sides. According to Raphael, there was now a greater chance for success. Rabin, he predicted,

would bring new ideas and proposals to his June 11 meeting with President Ford. However,

those proposals would be limited to the Egyptian track. In Raphael’s view, it would be self-

defeating for Israel to propose a comprehensive peace plan as Eban and Melamed were arguing.

An Israeli initiative addressing the broader conflict, especially the Palestinian issue, would do

more harm than good.128

127 Ibid. 128 “Dr. Raphael: Ford's Talks with Sadat and Rabin May Bring a New Attempt at American Mediation,” Ha-Tsofeh (June 1, 1975).

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As talks continued between Ford and Sadat on June 2, Rabin announced a unilateral

reduction of Israeli forces in Sinai in response to the reopening of the Canal. The IDF would

remove all artillery and missiles within 32 kilometers of the canal and reduce by half the number

of tanks within 30 kilometers. This unilateral reduction of forces went above and beyond Israel’s

obligations under the Separation of Forces Agreement.129

Menachem Begin denounced the move as a diplomatic blunder. Sadat’s reopening of the

Canal excluded Israeli shipping, yet the Rabin government had chosen to reward Sadat for

barring Israeli vessels from an international waterway. Zerach Warhaftig, though, supported the

move support of the move, arguing Rabin’s bold step demonstrated confidence and strength.

Warhaftig hoped that both the Israeli public and the international community would see the

reduction of forces near the Canal as an expression of Israel’s desire for peace, and, with a bit of

luck, it would help restart negotiations over an interim accord.130

On the eve of Rabin’s departure for his own meeting with Ford, the U.S. embassy echoed

Warhaftig’s assessment that the Rabin government was stable and strong. Unlike Warhaftig,

though, the embassy attributed Rabin’s strength to public support for the prime minister’s

resistance of American pressure, not conciliatory gestures. 131 Indeed, Rabin’s refusal to withdraw from the mountain passes and oil fields without non belligerency in return, a position the cabinet reiterated on June 9, “was seen by most Israelis as [the] high water mark” of his premiership. By rejecting the proposed accord, Rabin demonstrated his strength as a leader, capable of standing fast against Egyptian intransigence and American pressure.132 Even Hammer

129 “Prime Minister’s Announcement at a Press Conference in Jerusalem: Israel has decided to thin out its forces in Sinai, as a contribution to reducing the military tension in the region,” Ha-Tsofeh (June 3, 1975), 1. 130 “MK’s reactions to the Government Announcement,” Ha-Tsofeh (June 3, 1975), 1. 131 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Rabin As Negotiator; An Assessment,” 1975TELAV03563 (June 9, 1975). 132 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Rabin As Negotiator.”.

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lauded the Prime Minister for his resolute stance, although he went on to caution that any

readiness to withdraw from the passes and oil fields would provoke fierce opposition. Thus,

Rabin’s political strength and the stability of his government depended upon his continued

resistance to American pressure.

5.B A Blessing and a Curse: The Zeirim Respond to the Use of American Military Aid as Leverage

As the peace process showed renewed signs of life in the summer of 1975, the Zeirim

resumed their struggle against an interim accord within NRP institutions, in the Knesset, and on

the street. In the Knesset, the Zeirim and others set out to dissuade the government from

“capitulating” to American “dictates.” In the process, US-Israel relations, especially military aid,

became a central focus of the Zeirim’s campaign against the accords.

Reassessment offered the US administration a pretense for restricting military aid as

punishment for the Rabin government’s part in the breakdown of Kissinger’s March 1975

shuttle. It was reasonable to argue that the US should not introduce additional arms into the

Middle East until it had clarified its strategy in the region. Thus, the Administration “cut back”

intelligence cooperation, cancelled a planned visit by Defense Minister Peres, and “slowed” the

delivery of advanced weapons systems, including Lance ground-to-ground missiles and laser-

guided bombs.133

Critically, the US also froze negotiations over the sale of F-15 warplanes. In September

1974, IAF pilots were invited to conduct test flights of the F-15 out of Edwards Air Force Base

133Aaron David Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace, (New York: Bantam Dell, 2008) 148; Memorandum of Conversation (Washington, March 31, 1975), FRUS, 169; “Two Super-Powers Criticized,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLII, 57 (March 24, 1975), 2; “Israel Tightening Defense Belt In View of Probable Delays in Further Shipment of U.S. Arms,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLII:68 (April 8, 1975), 1; “Dayan Criticizes Linking of U.S. Arms Aid to Israel with Its Negotiating Efforts in the Mideast,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLII:79 (April 24, 1975).

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in California.134 By February 1975, the sale was pending State Department approval as Kissinger

began his mediation efforts. When Kissinger’s “shuttle” broke down, the US revoked an

invitation for the IAF to conduct additional test flights and discuss modifications ahead of the

final sale.135 While the freeze had no immediate impact on the IAF’s operational capabilities,

Israeli defense planners coveted the next-generation warplane to guarantee Israel’s military

advantage for the next decade.136

The Zeirim, though, correctly understood that Israeli dependence on American aid meant that arms sales could serve as either a “carrot” or a “stick,” depending on Israel’s willingness to concede territory. Thus, dependence on American weapons made Israel susceptible to pressure to

withdraw from territory. Although Sinai was not particularly sacred to the Zeirim, they feared

that accepting weapons to offset the military value of territory would foster a mindset that saw

territory as a fungible, material commodity. That mindset, in turn, would invite future

withdrawals from sacred ground in the West Bank by ignoring Judea and Samaria’s spiritual significance. In addition, the Zeirim objected to succumbing to U.S. pressure, per se, as an act of

“capitulation” that impugning the national honor. Thus, agreeing to the interim accord also

entailed sacrificing the nation’s spiritual resilience for transient, material gain.

134 “Israel: Need F-15,” Chicago Tribune (Dec. 13, 1975), N15. 135 Kissinger and Ford decided to revoke the invitation during their meeting on the morning of March 24, 1975. “Memorandum of Conversation – Washington, March 24, 1975,” FRUS XXVI, doc 159. See, also: Wolf Blitzer, “Israeli pilots’ visit to U.S. base postponed,” Jerusalem Post (March 23, 1975), 1; Drew Middleton, “Soviet MIG-23 Shipment to Egypt Is Reported,” New York Times (Feb. 19, 1975), 1. 136 The Syrian and Iraqi air-forces flew Soviet-manufactured MIG-23’s, and would begin taking delivery of the MIG-25 by the end of the year. For its part, the Egyptian Airforce relied mainly on the older MIG-21, but reports circulated in February 1975 that Egypt had received its first shipment of MIG-23s. While the IAF could boast better pilots, it’s fleet of American-manufactured F-4’s was now at risk of being outmaneuvered and out-gunned. “Memorandum of Conversation – Washington, March 24, 1975,” FRUS XXVI, doc 159. See, also: Blitzer, “Israeli pilots’ visit,” Jerusalem Post (March 23, 1975), 1; Middleton, “Soviet MIG-23,” New York Times (Feb. 19, 1975), 1.

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As part of the festivities surrounding Israel’s 27th Independence Day, the IAF unveiled a

fighter plane of its own: the Kfir (Hebrew for ‘Lion Cub’). Combining design elements of the

French Mirage and the American Phantom, the Kfir would bolster Israeli airpower until the

country could procure the next-generation F-15.137 Gen. Motti Peled, commander of the Israeli

Air Force, extolled the Kfir’s virtues in the press, proclaiming it a “first-rate plane,” albeit less

advanced than “next generation” aircraft such as the F-15. Peled “would be very sorry” if the US

refused to sell Israel the F-15, but reassured the press that the Kfir was more than adequate for

meeting the IAF’s operational needs for a few years. Therefore, Israel “need not capitulate to

anyone,” Peled declared, hinting at the American freeze on the F-15 sale. “It is within our power,” Peled boasted, “to enable the government to say ‘yes’ out of strength, and also ‘no’.”138

5.C Protest in the Parliamentary Arena: Ben-Meir’s Gambit to Rewrite the Defense Budget

To encourage this “no,” Ben-Meir hatched a plan that would wreak havoc in the coalition

and articulate the Zeirim’s critique of the Rabin government’s approach to US–Israel,

particularly American military assistance. Rather than restart the diplomatic process to unfreeze

American aid, the Zeirim proposed that Israel develop the capability to meet its own military

needs.

In the wake of Rabin’s return from the US, the Knesset Finance Committee and the

Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee convened in a special session on June 17. The 44-

member “Joint Committee” met on behalf of the Knesset as a whole to debate and pass the

137 “Peres Says Israel’s Armed Forces in Better Shape Than Ever,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLII:73 (April 16, 1975) 1. 138 “General Peled: We Will Not Have to Capitulate to Anyone, even if We Don't Receive the 'F-15' in the Coming Years,” Ha-Tsofeh (July 14, 1975), 1-2.

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second reading of the defense budget.139 The defense budget was traditionally regarded as a

legislative sanctum sanctorum, and the Joint Committee was expected to refer the government’s

budget proposal to the plenum by unanimous vote.140

At the beginning of the meeting, the committee took up four proposals for the defense

budget. The government proposal totaled some IL 22 billion, while the opposition Likud

proposed a budget of 24 billion.141 MK Meir Pail of the far-left Moked Party, who was not a member of the committee, submitted a written proposal to slash IL 1 billion from the defense budget.

The fourth proposal was put forward by the NRP’s Yehudah Ben-Meir. Ben-Meir’s legislation added three clauses to the Government’s budget, totaling an additional IL 500 million.

He proposed using the extra funds for three purposes: “additional training for [soldiers] in special combat roles; In-country manufacturing of weapon systems (such as the ‘Kfir’ plane); [and] the development of military research [and development].”142 To offset the additions to the IDF

budget, Ben Meir’s proposal called on the Government to deduct IL 500 million from elsewhere

in the budget.

After Ben-Meir submitted his proposal, Committee Chair Yisrael Kargman announced

that the committee would vote on each proposal, with those in favor raising their hands. The

budget proposal receiving the most votes would be deemed to have passed its second reading and

139 This reconstruction of the Joint Committee meeting of June 17, 1975 is based on journalistic accounts, as well as reporting from the American Embassy. See “'Gift for the IDF’: Budgetary Addition of 1/2 a Billion ILP, Against the Wishes of the Government,” Ma’ariv (June 18, 1975), 4; “NRP Rebels in joint c'ttee raise Defense Budget by IL500m,” Jerusalem Post (June 18, 1975), 1; “Great Tension Prevails within the Coalition,” Davar (June 18, 1975), 1-2; Yonah Cohen, “'Parliamentary Defeat' For the Government: The Joint Committee accepted the Proposal of MK Ben-Meir to Add Half-Billion Lirot to the Defense Budget,” Ha-Tsofeh (June 18, 1975), 1; Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Coalition Dissidents” 1975TELAV04105 (June 27, 1975). 140 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Coalition Dissidents” 1975TELAV04105 (June 27, 1975). 141 Ma’ariv, (June 18, 1975), 1; Ha-Tsofeh, (June 18, 1975), 1. 142 “Gift for the IDF,” Ma’ariv (June 18, 1975), 4; Cohen, “Parliamentary Defeat,” Ha-Tsofeh (June 18, 1975), 1.

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referred to the Knesset Plenary for a final up-or-down vote. The Likud proposal was considered first, garnering the votes of the 15 Likud representatives on the committee. After Pa’il’s proposal failed to garner a single vote, the committee voted on Ben-Meir’s proposal. The 15 Likud MKs

again raised their hands, along with Ben-Meir and Hammer. Zerach Warhaftig abstained, but

NRP lawmaker Eliezer Avtabi, who was temporarily filling in for the dovish Avraham Melamed, voted for Ben-Meir’s budget add-on, which received a total of 18 votes.143

Lastly, the government’s proposal for the defense budget was put forward. Warhaftig and

Shlomo Lorincz of Agudath Israel raised their hands, as did the two Independent Liberals and 13

Alignment MKs.144 The Chair counted 17 votes for the government’s budget proposal, paused,

and then counted again. The Alignment MKs on the committee were befuddled. Passage of the

government’s budget proposal for the military was generally seen as both essential and,

therefore, inevitable. Yet, the government’s proposed defense budget had fallen one vote short of

a plurality. Instead, the committee had passed Ben-Meir’s budget proposal in its second reading

and referred it to the plenum for a final up-or-down vote.

Surprise gave way to anger as lawmakers and party leaders scrambled to get a handle on the situation. It quickly became apparent that six Alignment MKs were absent from the committee meeting. Yitzhak Navon was known to be ill at home, while another lawmaker’s car had broken down. Abba Eban and Moshe Carmel, both senior Alignment members of the

Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, were accused of giving “short thrift to their

143 “Gift for the IDF,” Ma’ariv (June 18, 1975), 4; Cohen, “Parliamentary Defeat,” Ha-tzofeh (June 18, 1975), 1. 144 “Great Tension,” Davar (June 18, 1975), 1-2; “Gift for the IDF,” Ma’ariv (June 18, 1975), 4; “NRP Rebels,” Jerusalem Post (June 18, 1975), 1.

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parliamentary duties.”145 However, Carmel was apparently in the Knesset library and had not

received word of the Joint Committee meeting.146

The final two Alignment absentees were Mordecai Ben-Porat and David Cohen, both members of the Alignment’s hawkish “Rafi” branch, which included Moshe Dayan and Shimon

Peres, his successor as Defense Minister. Ben-Porat and Coren announced ahead of time that they would boycott the meeting over the defense budget’s shortcomings, and likely colluded in

Ben-Meir’s gambit.147

The prevailing wisdom in the Knesset cafeteria was that Ben-Porat and Coren were out to

strike a blow against Rabin on behalf of his archrival, Shimon Peres.148 Ben-Porat had abstained

from voting confidence in Rabin’s government, and operated, along with Hammer and Ben-

Meir, “as a kind of permanent opposition within coalition ranks.” They were particularly inclined

to break coalition discipline over settlements and the future of the West Bank.149

5.C.1 The Fallout from Ben-Meir’s Gambit

The fiscal impact of Ben-Meir’s maneuver on Israeli defense spending was unclear. Burg,

a champion of the NRP’s Historic Alliance with Labor, asked Kargman, the committee

chairman, to hold a new vote and restore the original budget.150 Kargman, though, questioned the

legality of a revote in the Joint Committee due to its unique status as a proxy for the Knesset on

defense spending. A safer option might be to simply pass the budget as-is, and have the government refrain from spending Ben-Meir’s add-on.151

145 “Coalition Dissidents Challenge GOI on Defense Budget” 1975TELAV04105 (June 27, 1975). 146 “Bid today to restore original defense budget,” Jerusalem Post (June 24, 1975), 2. 147 “Bid to reverse Gov’t defense budget fails,” Jerusalem Post (June 19, 1975), 3; Ma’ariv, (June 18, 1975), 1. 148 “Great Tension,” Davar (June 18, 1975), 1-2. 149 Ibid. 150 “Great Tension,” Davar (June 18, 1975), 1-2; “Gift for the IDF,” Ma’ariv (June 18, 1975), 4; “NRP Rebels,” Jerusalem Post (June 18, 1975), 1 151 “Gift for the IDF,” Ma’ariv (June 18, 1975), 4.

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Finance Minister Yehoshua Rabinovitch, though, was genuinely alarmed by the fiscal consequences of the budget amendment. Rabinovitch rushed to the Knesset after learning of the vote, where he found Ben-Meir and was overheard rebuking the rogue NRP lawmaker: “What have you done?” Rabinovitch exclaimed. “This is serious. From where [sic] am I supposed to take these half-billion Lirot?”152

While Rabinovitch rushed to assess the fiscal situation, others confronted the legal and parliamentary dilemmas over whether a revote was permitted. Ha-Tsoefeh’s parliamentary correspondent, Yonah Cohen, reported that because “the joint committee [had] the authority of a

‘mini-Knesset,’ the outcome of the vote was final.”153 Davar, though, reported both sides of the story: Some held that the Joint Committee was governed by the same rules and procedures as any other Knesset committee, and could revise its decision like any other committee. Others, however, argued that because the Joint Committee operated on behalf of the Knesset as a whole, the vote was tantamount to a vote in the Knesset plenary, and could not be undone.154

This procedural dilemma had the potential to imperil the coalition, leading Alignment

Whip (and Coalition Chairman) Moshe Wertman to dispatch urgent letters to the prime minister and the secretary-general of the Labor party. One letter addressed the absenteeism and defiance of the Alignment MKs who failed to support the Government’s budget proposal. The other brought the conduct of the NRP lawmakers who orchestrated the maneuver to the prime minister’s attention.

While Labor would deal with Ben-Porat and Coren, Wertman urged Rabin to hold

“clarifications” with the NRP leadership.155 Coalition parties were bound to support the

152 “'Gift for the IDF,” Ma’ariv (June 18, 1975), 4. 153 “Parliamentary Defeat,” Ha-Tsofeh (June 18, 1975), 1. 154 “Great Tension,” Davar (June 18, 1975), 1-2. 155 “‘Re-vote' - Demand Opponents of Addition to the Defense Budget,” Ma’ariv (June 19, 1975), 4.

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government’s budget, and a party’s failure to do so could be tantamount to the resignation of its

ministers from the government.156 In Wertman’s view, the failure of three-quarters of the NRP

committee members to support the government’s budget amounted to “proposing a motion of no-

confidence in a government of which [the NRP] was a member.”157 With additional budget

legislation still on the table, Wertman warned of a “severe parliamentary crisis in the not-too-

distant future.”158 “The severity of the matter,” Wertman wrote, “demand[ed] an urgent

discussion with the NRP ministers and Knesset Faction.”159 As for the Zeirim, Wertman told the

press that he would demand that Ben-Meir and Hammer lose their assignments on the Foreign

Affairs and Defense Committee and the Finance Committee. Those committees were reserved

for “large [coalition] factions,” but Hammer and Ben-Meir “represent[ed] themselves, not the

National Religious Party.”160

Indeed, Ben-Meir admitted that the Zeirim did not consider themselves part of the

coalition. In this instance, though, Ben-Meir was not struggling against the government. His only

intention was to address substantive and vital security needs. Surely, Ben-Meir argued, the

Knesset could allow the government the extra half-billion Lirot.161 Despite his protestations,

though, Ben-Meir’s gambit was straight out of the Zeirim’s oppositional playbook.162 Ben-Meir clearly colluded with the absent Rafi MKs and the opposition Likud ahead of time. Apparently awake to the possibility that Ben-Meir might have had something brewing, Wertman had asked

156 “Great Tension,” Davar (June 18, 1975), 1-2. See, also “NRP Rebels,” Jerusalem Post (June 18, 1975), 1. 157 “Gift for the IDF,” Ma’ariv (June 18, 1975), 4; “Great Tension,” Davar (June 18, 1975), 1-2. 158 Ibid. 159 “Gift for the IDF,” Ma’ariv (June 18, 1975), 4; “Great Tension,” Davar (June 18, 1975), 1. 160 “NRP Rebels,” Jerusalem Post (June 18, 1975), 1. 161 Ibid. 162 “Great Tension,” Davar (June 18, 1975), 1-2.

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Ben-Meir if he would support the government’s budget proposal just prior to the joint committee

meeting, but the NRP lawmaker refused to give a straight answer.163

Avtabi, who was neither affiliated with the Zeirim nor a permanent member of the joint committee, also asserted that he voted based on the merits of the issue, and that Defense Minister

Peres’s testimony before the committee had persuaded Avtabi that the IDF needed the additional

funds. It had never been Avtabi’s intention to undermine the government. Moreover, Avtabi was

not reported to have been involved in the covert efforts to muster a plurality for Ben-Meir’s

proposal. Moreover, Avtabi was not, in fact, a permanent member of the committee. He was

merely filling in for the dovish Avraham Melamed, who was in Germany as part of a Knesset

delegation.164

Ultimately, Ben-Meir and Wertman were each trying to have it both ways. Ben-Meir

argued that the Joint Committee vote was tantamount to a vote in the Knesset plenary, where the

results were final and could not be overturned. At the same time, Ben-Meir argued that the NRP

lawmakers’ failure to support the government’s budget in committee was not grounds for

ejecting the NRP ministers from the government under Israel’s quasi-constitutional Basic Laws.

While the law obligated coalition parties to support the government’s budget, Ben-Meir argued

that this rule did not apply to votes in the joint committee, but only in the plenary.

Wertman, in contrast, argued that the NRP’s failure to support the budget in the joint

committee was a violation of coalition discipline of the highest order, and made no distinction

between the joint committee and the plenary. At the same time, Wertman also maintained that

163 “Gift for the IDF,” Ma’ariv (June 18, 1975), 4. 164 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting, May 19, 1975, NRP Knesset Faction Protocols from 5735, File 26, Box 4, Series A, NRP Knesset Faction (R.G.003), Bar Ilan Archive; “Six MKs leave for Germany,” Jerusalem Post (June 4, 1975) 3; “Bid to reverse Govt budget fails,” Jerusalem Post (June 19, 1976) 3; “Knesset Finance Committee to Debate New Vote on the Defense Budget,” Ha-Tsofeh (June 19, 1975), 1.

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the joint committee could hold a revote, because its decisions did not have the legal status—and finality—of a vote in the plenum. Rather, the vote was of a kind with the routine decisions taken

by Knesset committees during the preliminary stages of the legislative process, and which could

be revised by majority vote.

5.C.2 Procedural Purim Schpiel: The Rabin Government Responds to Ben-Meir’s Gambit

This tangle of procedural arguments illustrates the extent to which Ben-Meir was able to ensnare coalition leadership, the cabinet, and the prime minister. Coalition lawmakers from the

NRP, aided and abetted by absenteeism and passive rebellion in The Alignment, had colluded

with the opposition to defeat the government in a critical vote on the defense budget, the “holy-

of-holies” of budget legislation. It was beside the point that the budget passed in the committee

was nearly identical to the government’s proposal, nor did it matter that the government could

simply decline to spend the additional funds. The government’s budget proposal had failed to

pass the Joint Committee, and a government unable to pass a budget on its terms could not

govern. With continued U.S. aid in doubt and the Israeli economy reeling from the Yom Kippur

War, the Rabin government could not afford to be seen losing control of the country’s military

and fiscal policy.

Thus, the coalition leadership pushed for a revote, investing precious time and energy to convince lawmakers that a revote was not only permissible under the law, but also their legal obligation under coalition discipline.165 This was not an easy task, as holding a revote struck many as distasteful, if not underhanded. Not surprisingly, Ben-Meir opposed holding a new vote

to overturn his own budget proposal. Shlomo Lorincz, who had supported the government’s

165 “The Alignment will wage a 'war for its authority' Today to cancel the addition to the Defense Budget,” Ma’ariv (June 24, 1975), 4.

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budget proposal, opposed holding a revote on principle. Knesset votes were not “purim schpiel,”

and the joint committee’s decision was binding and final. “This is a game for prestige,” Lorincz

said, “and if we’re talking about prestige, then the prestige of the Knesset and the two important

committees is no less important than that of the government.”166

Within the Alignment, as well, many opposed holding a revote. During a faction meeting

on June 23, the issue became a hot topic of debate; some saw a revote as entirely appropriate and

necessary, because some Alignment MKs had been absent due to circumstances beyond their

control, and deserved a vote. Finance Committee Chair Yisrael Kargman declared that coalition

MKs could not be allowed to simply “make it Shabbat for themselves” and ignore their

obligation to support the government’s Budget. Others argued that it was better to undertake

questionable parliamentary maneuvers than pass a budget with ambiguities and unfunded

mandates.167

Yitzhak Navon, chair of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, suggested that the

government simply raise the budget by 500 million Lirot out of its own initiative. Within

MaPaM, some viewed overturning the committee decision as a “disgrace to the Knesset,” but held that it was preferable to passing legislation with the intent to then flagrantly disregard its provisions. The final word went to Finance Minister Yehoshua Rabinovitch, who secured a large majority in favor of holding a new vote.168

Meanwhile, the NRP cabinet ministers came under pressure from Rabin to get their

faction in line. The night of the vote, NRP Faction Chairman Avraham Melamed returned from

West Germany, where a Knesset delegation was lobbying their German colleagues to oppose

166 “’Re-vote' - Demand Opponents of Addition to the Defense Budget,” Ma’ariv (June 19, 1975), 4. 167 “The Alignment will wage a 'war for its authority',” Ma’ariv (June 24, 1975), 4. 168 “The Alignment will wage a 'war for its authority',” Ma’ariv (June 24, 1975), 4.

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PLO participation in an interparliamentary conference. After reclaiming his seat on the finance

committee from Avtabi, Melamed announced that he preferred a smaller defense budget, not a

larger one, in light of the economic situation.

Burg and Melamed accepted responsibility for the actions of their faction members, and

committed to aid in the coalition’s efforts to revise the budget vote.169 On June 23, the night

before the Joint Committee was set to reconvene and take up the issue, Rabin leaned on Yitzhak

Raphael, who conveyed the message to Melamed in an urgent letter sent by courier. As faction chairman, Melamed was formally responsible for overseeing the party’s legislative and parliamentary activities and represented the faction at meetings of the coalition leadership. It was also Melamed’s job to enforce party discipline and, by extension, coalition discipline.

Melamed’s influence, though, was limited by the NRP’s inter-factional dynamic.170

Knesset seats, parliamentary appointments, and ministerial positions were distributed in

proportion to the relative strength of each faction. Melamed was a senior member of Burg’s

LaMifneh faction, which, along with Raphael’s Likud U’Temurah, controlled a majority of the

NRP. The Zeirim, though, refused to abide by the “regime of the factions,” forcing Melamed to

mediate between the coalition’s parliamentary leadership and the Zeirim, who were beyond reach

of the NRP’s own internal “governing coalition.” Hammer and Ben-Meir’s political base was independent of Burg’s LaMifneh, enabling them to disregard Melamed’s instructions with near-

impunity. Thus, Melamed could deliver no more than one additional vote for the government’s

budget by reclaiming his seat on the joint committee from Avtabi.

169 “Re-vote' - Demand Opponents of Addition to the Defense Budget,” Ma’ariv (June 19, 1975), 4 170 “The Alignment will wage a 'war for its authority',” Ma’ariv (June 24, 1975), 4.

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5.C.3 The Joint Committee Revises the Defense Budget, Again

When the Joint Committee reconvened on June 24, Melamed, Warhaftig, Ben-Meir, and

Hammer represented the NRP. Burg waited just outside the committee room, keeping a close eye

on proceedings.171 The meeting opened with Kargman reading from a letter from Wertman, who requested a new vote on the defense budget, out of consideration for those Alignment MKs unable to attend the Joint Committee’s meeting the previous week. Moshe Carmel seconded the request, explaining that he had never received the invitation to the previous session and had been in the library. The two Independent Liberals on the committee also backed a revote, arguing that

the government lacked the funds to pay for Ben-Meir’s additional IL500 million.172

As the meeting progressed, the two sides exchanged insults as hecklers interrupted the

speakers. Opposition Leader Menachem Begin took the floor, arguing that it was illegal to set

aside the committee’s decision and hold a new vote.173 The Joint Committee, he explained, had

adopted Ben-Meir’s proposal in its capacity as a “mini-Knesset,” and had passed the budget

legislation in its second reading. Just as votes in the Knesset plenum were binding and final, so

too were votes taken by the Joint Committee. The committee’s legal advisor, however,

disagreed. He argued that sessions of the Joint Committee did not follow the rules of procedure

for the plenary. Rather, it functioned as a committee like any other, and was permitted to conduct

another vote if the majority of the committee approved.174

171 “The War of Attrition’ Has Ended: Defense Budget – Without Add-Ons,” Ma’ariv (June 25, 1975), 4 172 “War of Attrition,” Ma’ariv (June 25, 1975), 4. 173 “War of Attrition,” Ma’ariv (June 25, 1975), 4; “Government parties reverse vote that increased defence budget,” Jerusalem Post (June 25, 1975), 3; Yonah Cohen, “Addition to Defense Budget Canceled in Fresh Vote” Ha-Tsofeh (June 25, 1975), 1 174 “War of Attrition,” Ma’ariv (June 25, 1975), 3; Cohen, “Addition to Defense Budget Canceled,” Ha-Tsofeh (June 25, 1975), 1.

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Begin also took issue with the Alignment’s claim that the circumstances of the previous

week’s vote had created a “coincidental majority,” which justified repeating the vote.175 Begin

rejected this line of reasoning insofar as a majority is a majority. A “coincidental majority,” he

quipped, “[was] any majority that the Alignment was not part of.”176

When Ben-Meir spoke, he reminded the committee that his proposal addressed vital

Israeli security needs. His budget add-on would fund additional training for combat soldiers,

domestic manufacturing of advanced weapons systems, such as the Kfir warplane, and research

and development in the military sector. Were the committee members truly willing to defund

these initiatives?177 Likud’s Moshe Arens echoed the sentiment. He argued that the security

implications of Ben-Meir’s proposal demanded that Defense Minister Peres and Chief of Staff

Mordechai “Motta” Gur provide their expert assessments of Ben-Meir’s add-on. Only then could

the committee make an informed decision about whether to hold a new vote.178

Shlomo Lorincz opposed a revote on principle. Though he did not support Ben-Meir’s add-on, Lorincz believed that Knesset votes would be meaningless if the outcomes were not honored. It was a “disgrace to the Knesset” to reject a vote because the outcome was undesirable.179 One of the Independent Liberals disagreed, arguing that, as a matter of law, budget legislation remained “in committee” until it was tabled in the plenum, and could be altered.180

175 Cohen, “Addition to Defense Budget Canceled,” Ha-Tsofeh (June 25, 1976), 1. 176 “War of Attrition,” Ma’ariv (June 25, 1975), 4; “Government Parties Reverse Vote,” Jerusalem Post (June 25, 1975) 3. 177 “War of Attrition,” Ma’ariv (June 25, 1975), 4. 178 “War of Attrition,” Ma’ariv (June 25, 1975), 4. 179 “War of Attrition,” Ma’ariv (June 25, 1975), 4; “The Alignment will wage a 'war for its authority',” Ma’ariv (June 24, 1975), 4. 180 “War of Attrition,” Ma’ariv (June 25, 1975), 4.

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Begin stepped in, moving to refer the question of the legality of a revote to the Knesset

“Interpretations Committee.”181 Begin’s motion failed while the motion to hold a new vote

carried, clearing the way for the committee to adopt the government’s budget proposal.182

Ben-Meir rose, announcing that he and Zevulun Hammer would boycott the revote,

which they considered illegal. Begin, too, announced that Likud agreed and would also boycott

the vote. Addressing the Alignment MKs directly, Begin urged them not to approve the defense budget “with nearly half” of the committee boycotting the vote. Begin reiterated his proposal to refer the matter to the Interpretations Committee.183

Begin’s argument apparently swayed Warhaftig, a jurist and scholar who chaired the

Constitution, Law and Justice Committee. Warhaftig feared that proceeding with the vote would

only exacerbate the rift over the defense budget, which was generally a cause for unity in Israel’s

fractious parliament. He cautioned that the majority could not ignore the objections of such a

large group of lawmakers. A boycott of the vote on the defense budget was unprecedented and to

be avoided if possible. Why not wait, then, until the procedural issue could be resolved? Shlomo

Lorincz was similarly moved and joined Warhaftig in calling for a postponement of the revote.

Coalition Chairman Wertman, along with Finance Committee Chairman Kargman, responded by

pushing for an immediate vote to pass the government’s defense budget and put an end to the

entire affair.184

Yitzhak Navon, who chaired the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, stepped in to

calm tensions in the room. He suggested that the Joint Committee take a brief recess so that the

181 “War of Attrition,” Ma’ariv (June 25, 1975), 4; “Government Parties Reverse Vote,” Jerusalem Post (June 25, 1975), 3. 182 “War of Attrition,” Ma’ariv (June 25, 1975), 4; “Government Parties Reverse Vote” Jerusalem Post (June 25, 1975) 3; “Addition to Defense Budget,” Ha-Tsofeh (June 25, 1976), 1. 183 “War of Attrition,” Ma’ariv (June 25, 1975), 4. 184 “War of Attrition,” Ma’ariv (June 25, 1975), 4.

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coalition MKs could discuss how to proceed. The Likud members obliged and rose from their

chairs to leave the room, giving the coalition MKs privacy to discuss what to do next.185

When the Likud members left, Alignment MK Esther Herlitz, a former diplomat serving

on the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, asked Ben-Meir and Hammer to leave the room as well. Herlitz’s request was understandable insofar as the coalition MKs were discussing strategy to defeat Hammer and Ben-Meir’s budget legislations. In Herlitz’s view, the two rouge

MKs had no business taking part in the coalition discussions since they were clearly playing, and voting, for the other side.

Hammer reacted angrily, exclaiming, “You get out of here! We don’t want you sitting here.”

Ben-Meir exclaimed, “you wanted the NRP to take part in these consultations… We are part of the NRP Faction!”186

With one foot in the coalition, and the other in the opposition, Hammer and Ben-Meir

were able to obstruct the proper functioning of the government. However, they could also serve

as a bridge between the coalition and the opposition. Navon feared the repercussions should

nearly half of the Joint Committee boycott the defense budget. To prevent this, he needed the

maverick NRP lawmakers in the room.

Navon proposed that the Alignment MKs accede to Begin’s request and delay the revote

until the Interpretations Committee could rule on its legality. He also asked Ben-Meir and

Hammer if they would commit to supporting the government’s budget proposal should a revote be permitted. The Zeirim agreed, on the condition that the committee first meet with Defense

Minister Peres and the Chief of Staff to clarify the IDF’s budgetary needs.

185 “War of Attrition,” Ma’ariv (June 25, 1975), 4. 186 “War of Attrition,” Ma’ariv (June 25, 1975), 4.

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Other Alignment MKs expressed support for Navon’s proposal, as did Melamed and

Warhaftig. However, Kargman and Wertman were adamantly opposed to it. The coalition whip

and the chairman of the Joint Committee argued that referring the issue to the Interpretations

Committee was a Likud ploy designed to obstruct the legislative process and prevent the

coalition from governing. Accepting Begin’s proposal would simply invite more delay tactics

and parliamentary tricks from the opposition, putting the entire budget at risk. Moreover,

dragging out the matter would only exacerbate the damage to the government’s prestige.

Ultimately, Kargman and Wertman prevailed. The Joint Committee proceeded to an

immediate vote on the budget, which the opposition (and the Zeirim) boycotted in an

unprecedented move.187 The government’s budget proposal was adopted, along with several other resolutions. The Joint Committee resolved to reconvene in several months to ensure that no urgent military needs went unfulfilled. In addition, a subcommittee was formed to oversee the

disbursement of funds for individual budget items.188 For the first time anyone could remember,

the defense budged was referred to the Knesset plenum without unanimous support.

The US Embassy reported the parliamentary imbroglio to Washington.189 In its

assessment, the ruckus over the defense budget did not pose a threat to the government’s

survival. It did, however, expose cracks within both the Labor Party, as well as in the coalition.

The Zeirim, together with Rafi’s Ben-Porat, operated as “a kind of permanent opposition within

coalition ranks.” Indeed, Ben-Porat had abstained from the vote of confidence when Rabin first

187“War of Attrition,” Ma’ariv (June 25, 1975), 4; See, also “Government Parties Reverse Vote,” Jerusalem Post (June 25, 1975) 3; “Addition to Defense Budget,” Ha-Tsofeh (June 25, 1976), 1; Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Coalition Mavericks Challenge GOI on Defense Budget,” 1975TELAV04105 (June 27, 1975). 188 “War of Attrition,” Ma’ariv (June 25, 1975), 4; See, also “Government Parties Reverse Vote” Jerusalem Post (June 25, 1975) 3; “Addition to Defense Budget,” Ha-Tsofeh (June 25, 1976), 1; “Coalition Mavericks,” 1975TELAV04105 (June 27, 1975). 189 “Coalition Mavericks,” 1975TELAV04105 (June 27, 1975).

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presented his government in June 1974, while the Zeirim had struggled against the NRP joining

the coalition. The three often “felt free to break coalition discipline,” particularly on issues

relating to “unauthorized settlement in the West Bank.”

In this instance, the Zeirim were able to hamstring the government by “exploit[ing] a

combination of circumstance.” The Alignment held fewer seats than in previous Knessets. At the

same time, its 10 ministers often missed votes in the plenum, and did not serve on Knesset

committees. A number of senior Labor MKs were less than punctilious in meeting their parliamentary obligations. Many were former ministers and their allies in Labor’s old guard, which had been swept from power over the government’s failures during the Yom Kippur

War.190 For all these reasons, the embassy warned that the Israeli government might continue to

have difficulty “in assuring [the] necessary parliamentary majority on certain issues.”191

5.D Between Confrontation and Conciliation: The Divide in the NRP over US– Israel relations

The Embassy’s assessment of Ben-Meir’s parliamentary maneuver offers an illuminating

analysis of the circumstances that made his gambit possible and its ramifications for the

coalition. Indeed, the affair was viewed as a part of the Zeirim’s ongoing attempts to destabilize

the government by acting as an “opposition from within.” Labor’s internal squabbles and the

parliamentary balance of power created an environment in which Ben-Meir’s gambit had a

chance of success, and the incident signaled that the Rabin government could not expect an

automatic coalition majority “on certain issues.” While the Embassy framed the Zeirim’s

defense-budget gambit as part of their opposition to the Rabin government, the incident must

190 Abba Eban was particularly resentful of being left out of the government and was conspicuous in his absence from the June 17 committee meeting. “Coalition Mavericks,” 1975TELAV04105 (June 27, 1975); Eban, Personal Witness, 569, 574-575, 578-580. 191 “Coalition Mavericks,” 1975TELAV04105 (June 27, 1975)

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also be seen in the context of Ben-Meir and Hammer’s attitude toward US–Israel relations. 192

Hammer and Ben-Meir’s adversarial approach to US-Israel relations paralleled their relations with the NRP leadership and the Rabin government. For Hammer and Ben-Meir, mending fences and with the Ford Administration meant capitulating to an American dictate.

Doing so would undermine the nation’s resolve, weaken its spiritual strength, and invite further demands for territorial concessions. Therefore, Hammer and Ben-Meir believed that Israel should not strive to end the confrontation with the Administration, but to win it. Israel’s key vulnerability, in that regard, was its dependence on American aid, particularly advanced weapons to counter the Arabs’ soviet-supplied arsenals. Enduring a prolonged confrontation with the U.S.

Administration would require Israel to develop its own capacity to design and produce advanced

weapons.

Ben-Meir’s budget amendment was an attempt to do just that, earmarking additional

funds for research and development in general, and for the Kfir fighter plane in particular. While

the gambit was ultimately unsuccessful, it drew attention to the Zeirim’s call for self-reliance,

particularly among hawkish elements in the Alignment. The budget amendment was also a

challenge to the government’s authority, as well as its policy of meeting Israel’s military needs

by procuring arms from the Americans.

In his budget amendment, Ben-Meir singled out the Kfir warplane for additional funding.

Ford and Kissinger had used the impending sale of F-15 aircraft as leverage by freezing the sale

under the pretext of reassessment, exploiting a key Israeli vulnerability. The F-15 purchase was

at the center of the Rabin government’s strategy for ensuring Israel’s qualitative military edge

well into the 1980s. Ben-Meir, however, was signaling that Israel had another path open to it,

192 “Coalition Mavericks,” 1975TELAV04105 (June 27, 1975)

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namely accelerating production of the Kfir until either the Administration lifted the freeze or

Israel developed further technology of its own.

Later that summer, Hammer expanded on this argument in a discussion with

journalists.193 In his view, the Yom Kippur War had “weakened [Israel’s] physical and spiritual

situation. After the 1967 war, Israel had stood firm on the principle that it would only cede

territory in exchange for peace. Indeed, Hammer approved of this position on the Egyptian front,

favoring a “comprehensive peace with Egypt,” so long as it was a “separate peace.” However,

the spiritual malaise of the Yom Kippur War had led Israel to abandon its insistence on “land for

peace” in favor of “a piece of land for a piece of peace.”

Still, Hammer was prepared to trade that piece of land in exchange for Egyptian non

belligerency. Formal non belligerency would come with a political cost to Sadat and, therefore,

was a meaningful Egyptian concession. Without that concession, though, the accord was not a

reasonable bargain between two states, but an “American dictate” that would “reduce, even

more, the independence of a small country like [Israel].” American aid could not serve as a

meaningful substitute for Egyptian concessions, which national honor demanded.194 Therefore,

Hammer rejected any withdrawal without specific compensation from Egypt.

This meant, though, that Israel would continue to face increased American pressure. In

Hammer’s view, though, the very act of resisting pressure would strengthen the country.

Necessity, after all, was the mother of invention. Although Hammer was certainly “not happy”

about the prospect of not receiving U.S. weapons, he believed that the people of Israel was fated

to “live by its own strength,” and that a show of national resolve would bolster that strength.195

193 “Days of Trial at Home and from Abroad,” Ha-Tsofeh Rosh Hashanah Supplement (Sep. 5, 1975), 5; The interview was conducted on the eve of Secretary Kissinger’s final shuttle in late August, 1975. 194 Ibid. 195 Ibid.

239

Invoking the author Ephraim Kishon, Hammer argued that during its War of

Independence, the nascent State of Israel was basically “a bunch of crazy people with a few weapons.” In the Yom Kippur War, though, the Jewish State “had a ton of weapons, and the

Generals fell asleep on the weapons.” Ensuring the supply of American weapons would not,

Hammer believed, strengthen the nation. In fact, an arms embargo on the part of a great power was a sign that the People of Israel had taken a proper stand on a matter of principle.

After the 1967 war, France, which had been Israel’s main arms supplier, declared an arms embargo. This, Hammer believed, provided the impetus for developing the Kfir, which Israel could manufacture itself. Thus, scarcity would strengthen the nation by forcing it to look inside itself for the solutions to its problems. Standing up to American pressure now would also prepare

Israel to withstand such pressure in the future. Moreover, the US was a “pluralistic country” in which the people’s representatives of in Congress held considerable power and a multiplicity of views on foreign policy. Indeed, Israel had enjoyed success on that front, as evidenced by the letter of support it received from 76 U.S. Senators. Therefore, Hammer believed that Israel was

“capable of struggling with the United States.”196

196 “Days of Trial,” Ha-Tsofeh Rosh Hashanah Supplement (Sep. 5, 1975), 5. In May 1975, over three-quarters of the United States Senate signed a letter urging President Ford to “be responsive to Israel's urgent military and economic needs.” Initiated by Jacob Javits (R-NY), the letter declared that “the United States[,] acting in its own national interests[,] stands firmly with Israel in the search for peace in future negotiations.” In addition, it was incumbent upon The President to “make it clear... that this premise [was] the basis of the current reassessment of U.S. policy in the Middle East.” The Senators urged the Administration to strengthen ties with democracies that shared American values and interests. Israel, they argued, was the “most reliable barrier” to Soviet encroachment into the Middle East. Thus, it was imperative to provide the military and economic aid necessary to ensure Israel’s qualitative military advantage over its Soviet-armed Arab adversaries. Furthermore, the letter reaffirmed the canonical (albeit amorphous) U.S. commitment that any peace accord must include “secure and recognized boundaries” for Israel. As for an interim agreement with Egypt, “any Israeli withdrawal must be accompanied by meaningful steps toward peace by its Arab neighbors.” The letter implicitly censured the Administration for using aid to Israel as leverage, arguing that U.S. generous US assistance would give Israel the sense of security needed to concede territory. Sen. Javits, the letter’s sponsor, explained that “if Israel's people feel secure, they will be more relaxed on concessions rather than being uptight.” Sen. Richard Stone, a Florida Democrat, argued that “by supporting Israel [the United States made] chances for peace greater and the need felt by Israel for (defensible) borders less severe.” According to this logic territory, was

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The Zeirim’s argument that scarcity would spur Israeli innovation, that the US–Israel relationship could be maintained via Congress, and that accepting US aid meant “surrender” was the polar opposite of the view taken by the rest of the NRP leadership. Consequently, Israel’s relationship with the United States became yet another bone of contention between the Old

Guard and the Zeirim.

Burg offered his perspective on American–Israeli relations during a speech marking the end of the school year. “Dark clouds,” Burg said, were “darkening the sky during these times.”

Israel found itself at a caught between two critical imperatives. Israel, he declared, desired a

“relationship of deep friendship with the United States.” Securing great-power support was a central pillar of Israeli foreign policy doctrine, yet Burg feared that Israel might “be unable to

continue [its] traditional friendship with the greatest Western power in the world.” Although

superpower support was vital, securing Israel’s core security and strategic interests on the ground was equally important.

Thus, Israel found itself locked in a two-fold struggle. On the one hand, it was struggling

to preserve its friendship and alliance with the U.S. Administration. On the other hand, the

government had no more fundamental obligation than the “struggle for the security of Israel” in

its sacred homeland. The challenge before the government, Burg declared, was to balance its

primarily a tangible, material commodity, which the Israelis valued as a source of military and political advantage. Therefore, it could be acquired with military technology and political commitments that offered an equivalent advantage. Letter from 75 Senators to President Gerald Ford in Support of Israel; 5/21/1975; Collection GRF-0056: White House Central Files Subject Files (Ford Administration). [Online Version, https://www.docsteach.org/documents/document/letter-from-75-senators-to-president-gerald-ford-in-support-of- israel, October 14, 2020]; “Senators Explain Letter’s Purpose,” JTA Daily News Bulletin, XLII:100 (May 23, 1975), 3.

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effort to meet the country’s immediate and long-term security needs on the ground, while simultaneously strengthening its friendship with the U.S. Administration.197

In a speech of his own to a group of immigrant activists, Ben-Meir spoke neither about

balancing vital yet conflicting necessities, nor of the value of the U.S. Administration’s

friendship. Rather, he conveyed a bold, even messianic, vision of national revival. His

unconventional, activist approach to parliamentary politics placed its faith in the general public

and its elected, legislative representatives. This faith extended to the U.S. Congress and the

American people as well, and was in stark contrast to Burg’s traditional approach, which

emphasized high-level diplomacy and statecraft. For Burg, maintaining the US–Israel alliance

depended upon reconciling with the U.S. Administration. For Ben-Meir, however, the operationally determinative element in the alliance was the bond between the American and

Israeli peoples.

Ben-Meir emphasized that he had “no quarrel” with the US or the American people.

Indeed, he held them in the highest regard. However, Israel found itself in conflict with “two men in the American Administration”—the president and the secretary of state. For Ben-Meir, it

was vital that Israel “reject the Kissinger-Ford dictate” and take “the firm decision to preserve our independence at any price.” This would “strengthen national pride” and “remove the [threat of] war with [Israel’s] enemies far more than capitulation and groveling by accepting Kissinger’s conditions.”198

197 “The Minister Dr. Yosef Burg: 'We are in a struggle for our security and our continued friendship with the US,” Ha-Tsofeh (June 19, 1975), 1. 198 “Dr. Ben-Meir: Rejecting the American Dictate Will Strengthen the State,” Ha-Tsofeh (July 13, 1975), 3. A month later, during a Knesset debate on corruption, Ben-Meir reiterated this linkage of social issues with the peace process. Corruption, he said, was “likely to damage the State of Israel more than entire Egyptian brigades.” Israel’s resilience, he declared, “depends on us, and on aid from outside powers.” Israel’s “ability to withstand outside

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In Ben-Meir’s view, Israel was negotiating not with Egypt, but with a U.S. administration

out to achieve Egypt’s objectives. Rather than mend fences with a hostile President and

Secretary of State, Ben-Meir argued that Israel should place its faith in the “vast majority

Congress and the American People,” who would see Israel’s rejection of the accord as “good for

the United States’ global interests.” The Rabin government, then, was faced with the “historic

responsibility to shape the future” of the Jewish State both spiritually and politically. By

rejecting the accord, the Rabin government could ensure that Israel remained the “master of its

own destiny.” However, agreeing to unacceptable terms would turn Israel into “a vassal state

dependent on the kindness of foreigners and begging for handouts.”199

Ben-Meir’s vision for the future was not limited to Israel’s geopolitical standing.

Rejecting the interim accord would help create a future in which the Jewish State would “serve

as the guiding spiritual and moral force for every nation in the entire world.” Moreover, the NRP

would serve as Israel’s “Guide for the Perplexed.” The NRP, he believed, had the potential to be

“the most influential force” in government and society. “[The National-Religious] ideal has vitality and an ‘additional soul’” which the “secular public” lacked. Therefore, the NRP needed to “stand for our principles,” model “devotion to ideals,” and lead “the faithful struggle” against

“withdrawal from certain, special territories.”200

pressure depends on us.” The Government, he argued, was not a mere “council of administrators,” but role models for society. “No legislation and no reports” would effect change in Israelis society. On the one hand, it was vital to stress Jewish values, and for the government to model proper behavior. On the other, it was vital to strengthen those institutions of the state which checked government power and provided independent oversight, exposing instances of corruption and regaining public trust. “Dr. Ben Meir: The Integrity of Society is a Matter Connected to the Proper Moral Environment,” Ha-Tsofeh (July 16, 1975), 2. 199 Ibit. 200 Dr. Ben-Meir: Rejecting the American Dictate,” Ha-Tsofeh (July 13, 1975), 3.

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5.D.1 The NRP Executive Meeting of July 10, 1975

The differences between the Zeirim and the Old Guard over the US–Israel relationship came into stark relief on July 10, 1975 when the NRP Executive met to debate the peace process.201 With efforts underway to break the deadlock on the Israeli–Egyptian track, the nature and significance of Israel’s relationship with the US became a point of contention. In both style and substance, the Zeirim’s spiritual/religious nationalism was at odds with both Burg’s pragmatism as well as Melamed’s dovishness. Consequently, the party was unable to reach a consensus position on the increased contacts between Kissinger and Israeli and Egyptian representatives in Washington.

Burg played a leading role in the debate, after providing an overview of Israel’s foreign policy situation. For Burg, maintaining Israel’s relationship with the US was of critical importance. “It is forbidden,” Burg declared, “for Israel to detach itself from the United States’

[foreign] policy.” The Jewish state was “tied to the United States whether it want[ed] it, or not.”

Affairs of state, Burg argued, must be considered in terms of their long-term consequences.

Without “political support,” no state could hope to maintain its achievements, including military gains. Burg argued that, insofar as the US was the Jewish State’s main supporter, Israel had to

“show restraint” and in consideration of American interests.

That said, resuming negotiations over an Egyptian–Israeli agreement was in Israel’s interest no less than the U.S. “Anyone who speaks against the proposed interim accords,” Burg asserted, “must know that the alternative is going to Geneva.” There, Israel would encounter a

Soviet-backed “Ishmaelite Chorus” and an unsympathetic United States. In the face of such

201 “NRP Executive Opens Debate on Proposals for Interim Accord - Dr Burg: It is forbidden for Israel to Detach itself from the Policy of the United States,” Ha-Tsofeh (July 11, 1975), 1-2.

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concerted pressure, Israel might well be forced to concede far more territory than was presently

up for negotiation.

Military realities, no less than diplomatic strategy, also dictated a resumption of step-by-

step negotiations with Egypt. Burg argued that the Jordan Valley was vulnerable “from Jericho

to Tirat Zvi,” even if it was “quiet” for the moment. In his assessment, “there [was] danger and

risk on the Jordanian-Syrian front.” Thus, “if it [was] possible [for Israel] to reach an interim

arrangement in a particular area, [it had] to do that.”202

None of this meant that Israel should not seek to strengthen its position. In Burg’s view, it

was vital for Israel to exert “maximum effort in public diplomacy” to influence American public

opinion. Moreover, the “plague of leaks” afflicting the Israeli cabinet had to stop, lest everything

said in cabinet deliberations be heard in the “House of Pharaoh.” The circumstances demanded that the government “constantly assess the situation,” as the “fateful decision over going with the

United States” or creating “a visible rift with them” was fast approaching.

Melamed echoed Burg’s call for mending fences with the US, though he was far more critical of the Rabin government. Time, Melamed believed, was working against Israel. By rejecting the U.S. proposal in March, the Rabin government was now forced to repair Israel’s relationship with the United States instead of investing its energies on forging new, peaceful relationships with its neighbors. Melamed reiterated his view that the territories were “bargaining chips for a final accord,” and that interim agreements would only weaken Israel’s hand in final status negotiations. Still, once government decided to pursue an interim accord, it should have concluded one. The breakdown in talks had caused “serious embarrassment” and “deepen[ed] the

202 Ibid.

245 rift with the United States.” Thus, Israel found itself in a diplomatic position of “eyn breira” (no choice).203

Zevulun Hammer took issue with Burg and Melamed. Although he did not discount the significance of an interim accord with Egypt, Hammer’s “main concern” was that Israeli concessions in the face of “pressure and dictates” would invite future withdrawals. Furthermore,

Israel “would not enjoy quiet” if it ceded the Sinai mountain passes and oil fields. In Hammer’s view, no matter what the Egyptians promised, they would strike from the south should conflict erupt on the Syrian front in the north. Therefore, Israel should take a diplomatic stand while it still enjoyed a military advantage. “With proper preparation,” Israel could “withstand U.S. pressure” over arms, oil, and economic assistance. Moreover, Hammer believed that Israel could make better use of American Jewry to apply counter-pressure to the Ford Administration.204

The contrast between the foreign-policy approach of the Zeirim and that of the “Old

Guard” is reflected in their attitudes toward the US Administration. The NRP veteran leadership adhered to a traditional diplomatic approach bequeathed by David Ben-Gurion. Under this approach, super-power support was, in and of itself, a central objective of Israeli diplomacy.

While arms sales and economic aid were key elements of the bilateral relationship between Israel and the US, the bilateral relationship was, in and of itself, a vital Israeli interest. Moreover,

American military technology was an indispensable ingredient in the peace process, offsetting the military risk of ceding territory, thereby allowing Israel to be more forthcoming in negotiations. Most critically, US weapons ensured Israel’s qualitative military edge in any future conflict.

203 “NRP Executive Opens Debate,” Ha-Tsofeh (July 11, 1975), 1-2. 204 Ibid.

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The Zeirim, however, saw the US–Israel relationship differently. For them, super-power support was a double-edged sword. The US might provide weapons, economic aid, and diplomatic backing, but American support also left Israel vulnerable to pressure. They feared that

U.S. efforts to coopt the USSR’s Arab client-states in the region would come at Israel’s expense.

Israel’s alliance with the US invited inducements to make concessions under dishonorable terms, or perhaps even to concede sacred territory not up for negotiation. What the Old Guard saw as an alliance, the “Young Guard” saw as subservience. While the Old Guard called for reconciling with the American Administration, the Zeirim advocated confrontation. With the peace process getting back on track, this confrontation would only escalate.

“This Nation Will Never yield”: The Zeirim, Gush Emunim, and Anti-American Protests of July 1975 6.A The New American Ambassador to Israel: “A Tough-Minded S.O.B.”

On July 10, 1975, Amb. Malcolm Toon presented his credentials to the President of the

State of Israel. A career diplomat who would go on to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the

Soviet Union, Toon replaced Kenneth Keating, who died suddenly in New York after being

recalled for consultations as part of the Ford Administration’s “reassessment.”205 Kissinger

wanted “a tough-minded S.O.B.” posted to Tel Aviv as he maneuvered to restart the peace

process, selecting toon for his reputation “of being rather blunt, outspoken, [and] tough.”206

Before departing for Israel, Toon met with President Ford and Kissinger in the Oval

Office. The president informed Toon that he would play a more active role in the peace process

205 “Memorandum of Conversation - Washington, June 26, 1975, 10:10-10:25 a.m.,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, ed. Adam M. Howard (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011), Document 198; United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1982, Dept. of State, (Washington D.C.: Historical office, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1982), 182. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951p00994756v [Accessed 4/12/2019]; 206 “Ambassador Malcolm Toon (interview)” Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, VA, www.adst.org, 3.

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than Keating. Toon was instructed to “keep [the Israelis] at arm’s length, but on a friendly basis.”

Ford warned that a “confrontation” with the Israelis (and the U.S. Jewish community) was a distinct possibility, which would make Toon’s job more difficult. Ford assured Toon that he and

Kissinger had “recognized this possibility when we picked you,” and that the new ambassador enjoyed their full confidence.207

Toon arrived as the diplomatic process was picking up steam. Tensions between the US

and Israel remained high, but a process of de-escalation was underway. Tensions within Israel,

however, were heating up. Opponents of the interim accord in-the-making, particularly the Gush

Emunim movement and their parliamentary allies in Likud and NRP Zeirim, came out forcefully

and loudly against both the Rabin government and the U.S. Administration.

While Toon presented his credentials to President Katzir, members of Gush Emunim –

identified by the embassy as “associated with, but not an integral part of, the National Religious

Party” – began demonstrating across the street from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv. Outside the

Prime Minister’s office in Jerusalem, a small group of protesters went on a hunger strike, leading

to a rabbinic ruling that the protesters must break their fast to eat on the Sabbath. On July 14, the

Embassy reported that demonstrators outside remained peaceful, and were mainly occupied with

collecting petition signatures. One person approached an embassy official with a letter, addressed

to Toon, “on the subject of withdrawal.” The embassy also reported that the Gush Emunim protesters’ “main objective is retention of the West Bank under Israeli control.” The movement

“[did] not regard Sinai as an area of religious significance.” Rather, the protests were rooted in

207 “Memorandum of Conversation - Washington, June 26, 1975, 10:10-10:25 a.m.,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, ed. Adam M. Howard (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011), Document 198.

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the “concern that withdrawal now could be a precedent for future disposition of the West

Bank.”208

6.B The “Am Yisrael Hai” Rally (July 14, 1975)

That evening, between 15,000 and 20,000 people gathered in the heart of Tel Aviv to

protest against a possible withdrawal from Sinai.209 The rally was organized by Gush Emunim,

together with other groups such as the Movement for the Whole Land of Israel, the NRP Zeirim,

Likud, and “The Women’s Circle for Israel’s Security.” Hanan Porat, a leading Gush Emunim activist, served as master of ceremonies for the two-and-a-half-hour event, in which no fewer than a dozen speakers delivered remarks from atop a large, brightly lit stage. In addition to reading letters of support from Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook, the Grand Rabbi of Viznitz, and the

President of the Rabbinical Council of America, Porat phoned settlers in the Golan, Sinai, and

West Bank who addressed the crowd remotely.210

The demonstration took on a distinctly anti-American tone. Banners and placards in

Hebrew and English denounced the Rabin government along with the U.S. Administration,

particularly Secretary Kissinger. One sign depicted the likeness of Henry Kissinger coming at the

Statue of Liberty from behind, warning “Liberty, Watch out!” Another, denouncing the Ford

Administration’s pressure campaign, asked “With friends like these, who needs enemies?”211 Yet

another placard read, “Yankees, Go Home!”212

208 “Demonstrations Against Withdrawals,” 1975TELAV04468 (July 14, 1975). While the central concern of many opponents of withdrawal in Sinai was, indeed, that it would create a precedent for the West Bank, many also held that the Sinai was, at least in part, within the boundaries of the Land of Israel. 209 “During ‘Protest of the Nation’ in Tel Aviv – Brawling and Arrests,” Ma’ariv (July 15, 1975), 3; “Mass Protests Against The Withdrawal in Malkhei Yisrael Square in Tel Aviv” Ha-Tsofeh (July 15, 1975), 1-2; “20 Thousand Protest Against Withdrawal in Tel Aviv,” Davar (July 15, 1975), 1; “20,000 protest against pullout,” Jerusalem Post (July 15, 1975), 1; “Demonstration Against Withdrawals” 1975TELAV04490 (July 15, 1975). 210 “During Protest,” Ma’ariv (July 15, 1975), 3; “Mass Protests,” Ha-Tsofeh (July 15, 1975), 1-2 211 “Mass Protests,” Ha-Tsofeh (July 15, 1975), 1-2 212 “Demonstration Against Withdrawals” 1975TELAV04490 (July 15, 1975).

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The speeches were no less confrontational. Zevulun Hammer was the first to speak,

telling the crowd that their presence, in the tens of thousands, was proof enough that the nation

was unphased by the American Administration’s “treachery.” Hammer declared that Israel would

“assess” its own foreign policy and take appropriate action, bearing in mind the biblical

prophecy that Israel was fated to remain “a nation that dwells alone” (Numbers 23:9). The Rabin

government, “which ha[d] stood fast” against American pressure, was starting to buckle and

would “likely capitulate.” Hammer called on the crowd to pressure the government into taking a

hard line, declaring that with the public’s help, “we can take a stand and go up against the United

States and all those who rise up against us.”213

Opposition Leader Menachem Begin called on the government not to concede the mountain passes and oil fields unless Egypt agreed to end the state of war. Capitulating to the

“Egyptian dictate” would only invite further demands, while squandering the “fruits of our victory in the Six-Day War.” Therefore, Begin called on Israelis to “overcome Dr. Kissinger’s pressure.”214

Ben-Meir sounded a similarly defiant tone. The mass rally, he declared, demonstrated the

nation’s resolve in the struggle for “its right to independence, sovereignty, and security in the

liberated land of Eretz Yisrael.” Moreover, it was a “living expression” of the national will,

shared by the “Multitudes of the House of Israel.” Israel, he declared, would not “yield to the

threats of those who conspire to annihilate us or to the dictates of those who make demands that

are supposedly in our best interest.” The country would resist American pressure, drawing

strength from “justice” and the “Divine Promise.”

213 “Mass Protests,” Ha-Tsofeh (July 15, 1975), 1-2. 214 “During Protest,” Ma'ariv (July 15, 1975), 3.

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Ben-Meir had harsh words for Kissinger, “a Jew born in the Exile and who live[d] in the

Exile.” Therefore, the American Secretary of State failed to understand that “here, on the soil of

its homeland, this nation will never yield and will never concede its sovereignty and freedom.”

Israel, Ben-Meir proclaimed, would not be another “Vietnam, nor Czechoslovakia.” Kissinger,

he declared, would “not receive another Nobel prize at the expense of our security.”215

6.C “Yankees Go Home”: Violence Outside the American Embassy in Tel Aviv

The speeches continued for over two hours, with the crowds chanting “No withdrawal!”

and “The Nation of Israel Lives!”216 Meanwhile, organizers tried to persuade the police to allow

a protest march on the American Embassy after the rally. The police refused, but eventually

agreed to permit a march along a circular route, along the streets surrounding Malkhei Yisrael

Square, giving the U.S. Embassy a wide berth. After the singing of Hatikvah, Hanan Porat

announced that the march would begin, instructing the demonstrators to march around the square

along the approved route.217 At some point, though, Porat reportedly alluded to a “protest march

in front of the American Embassy building on HaYarkon Street.”218

The overwhelming majority of demonstrators kept to the route and remained peaceful.219

Youths in skullcaps sang and danced through the streets, while others brandished placards denouncing Kissinger and the Rabin government’s “capitulation” to American pressure. When the time came for the protest march to circle back to Malkhei Yisrael Square, a group of demonstrators broke away, heading in the general direction of the US Embassy. Chanting and singing, they ignored warnings orders to turn back and easily pushed past the small group of

215 “Mass Protests,” Ha-Tsofeh (July 15, 1975), 1-2. 216 “During Protest,” Ma’ariv (July 15, 1975), 3. 217 “Mass Protests,” Ha-Tsofeh (July 15, 1975), 1-2; “During Protest,” Ma’ariv (July 15, 1975), 3; “20 Thousand,” Davar (July 15, 1975), 1 218 “During Protest,” Ma’ariv (July 15, 1975), 3. 219 “Demonstration Against Withdrawals” 1975TELAV04490 (July 15, 1975); “Mass Protests,” Ha-Tsofeh (July 15, 1975), 1-2; “During Protest,” Ma’ariv (July 15, 1975), 3; “20 Thousand,” Davar (July 15, 1975), 1.

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police officers.220

The police commander on-scene turned to a Gush Emunim spokesperson and condemned

the group’s behavior as “a disgrace.”221 He had permitted the march at the last minute after

“those Members of Knesset at the rally guaranteed” that demonstrators would adhere to the approved route. “Where’s the guarantee!?” he exclaimed. 222

The Gush Emunim spokesperson had a quiet talk with the police commander, before

picking up a bullhorn and instructing the marchers to go back the way they came.223 Most

complied, but the commander called for reinforcements. Officers were outfitted with riot gear

and truncheons, squad cars blocked key intersections, and water cannons were brought to the

scene. As the hour approached midnight, most of the demonstrators went home, but others

pressed on. Several hundred managed to congregate near the U.S. Embassy as police hastily

assembled a barricade between the building and demonstrators.224 Although most of the

protesters remained peaceful, the situation remained volatile and the police grew more insistent

that the demonstrators disperse.225

Glass shattered loudly as a stone was hurled through a window on the second floor of the

Embassy.226 The police moved in, forcibly dispersing the demonstrators with support from the

border guard. Staff from the American Embassy were seen climbing down from the roof of the

220 “During Protest,” Ma’ariv (July 15, 1975), 3. 221 “During Protest,” Ma’ariv (July 15, 1975), 3. 222 “During Protest,” Ma’ariv (July 15, 1975), 3. 223 “During Protest,” Ma’ariv (July 15, 1975), 3. 224 “During Protest,” Ma’ariv (July 15, 1975), 3. 225 “20 Thousand,” Davar (July 15, 1975), 1; “During Protest,” Ma’ariv (July 15, 1975), 3. 226, “Demonstration Against Withdrawals” 1975TELAV04490 (June 15, 1975); “20 Thousand,” Davar (July 15, 1975), 1; “During Protest,” Ma’ariv (July 15, 1975), 3; “20,000 protest against pullout,” Jerusalem Post (July 15, 1975), 1.

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building, where they had apparently sought safety. Approximately 10 people were arrested,

including the Bar-Ilan University librarian who stoned the Embassy window.227

The Embassy reported that most of the demonstrators remained peaceful,228 and that

“several Israeli officials” brought it to the Embassy’s attention that “the Cabinet unanimously condemned” the incident. The Israeli press also condemned slogans such as “Yankees, Go

Home” as contrary to Israeli public opinion and the national interest.229 The Embassy also

reminded the Foreign Ministry’s Chief of Protocol that “it is [the Government of Israel’s]

responsibility to protect embassy property and personnel.”230

However, embassy officials were hardly sanguine. In polished diplomatic prose, the

Embassy reported that Ambassador Toon also “advised” the Foreign Ministry that it would

receive a bill for repairs “in accordance with international practice.” The MFA’s Chief of

Protocol, in turn, “expressed his shock at ‘this outrage’,” conveyed his “sincere apologies,” and

assured that the Foreign Ministry would “of course” pay for the repairs. As far as the Embassy

was aware, “this [was the] first time USG property in Israel ha[d] been attacked in [the] course of

[a] demonstration.” The Embassy would “appreciate confirmation of this” from Foggy

Bottom.231

Summation In cables to Washington, U.S. diplomats reported that while the NRP Zeirim were co-

organizers of the rally, none of the NRP ministers or party leadership were in attendance. Still,

227 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Demonstration Against Withdrawals,” 1975TELAV04490 (June 15, 1975); Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Demonstrator Punished,” 1975TELAV04574 (July 18, 1975); Toon, “Follow Up on July 14 “Demonstration at Embassy,” 1975TELAV04756 (July 24, 1975). 228 Emb. Tel Aviv to State. “Demonstration Against Withdrawals,” 1975TELAV04490 (July 14, 1975). 229 “Follow Up on July 14 Demonstration at Embassy,” 1975TELAV04756 (July 24, 1975). 230 “Demonstrations Against Withdrawals,” 1975TELAV04490 (June 15, 1975). 231 Ibid.

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Hammer and Ben-Meir were conspicuous in their participation alongside Begin and Likud. In the

Embassy’s assessment, the absence of the NRP leadership indicated that it had “apparently declin[ed] to involve itself directly” in organizing or supporting the protest.232 In truth, the

NRP’s veteran leadership staunchly opposed the Zeirim’s confrontational stance toward the U.S.

Administration, and the rally laid bare the deep divisions between the Zeirim and the party’s veteran leadership over US–Israel relations, the proposed interim accord, and Israeli foreign policy more broadly.

The NRP rallied around the flag in the immediate aftermath of the March 1975 breakdown, and even the Zeirim tempered their criticism and concern. Raphael was effusive in his praise for Rabin, Burg feared a rupture with the Americans, and both staunchly supported the government. Hammer and Ben-Meir, for their part, softened their criticism of the Rabin government to support its stance against the “American dictate.” Nevertheless, the fault lines within the party were already apparent: Burg feared a confrontation with the United States and spoke of reconciling with the Administration, while Ben-Meir and Hammer called for national resolve and spiritual fortitude. Their objective was not to deescalate the confrontation with the

U.S. administration, but rather to win it.

The U.S. administration’s “reassessment” was met in Israel by a dramatic rise in support for the Rabin government, which was seen as taking a resolute stance against foreign pressure to compromise Israeli security interests. Concomitantly, the policy-making dimension of reassessment stimulated debate over the government’s policy, as well as dissent. Regardless of whether Kissinger’s “policy examination” was, in fact, “theater,” it was certainly a performative exercise, with the Administration’s national-security apparatus visibly and publicly exploring

232 Ibid.

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alternative approaches to Middle East peacemaking. Insofar as the “step-by-step” approach sought limited, incremental accords, the main alternative was a comprehensive approach aimed at resolving all claims and grievances, including the disposition of the West Bank and the political future of its Palestinian inhabitants.

By putting the West Bank on the (theoretical, yet possible) negotiating table, the Ford administration created an opening for dissent in Israel by both doves as well as hawks. The administration’s consideration of the “comprehensive” option, no less than Egyptian and Israeli saber-rattling, pushed mainstream Israeli “doves” – such as Eban and Melamed – to challenge the “step-by-step” orthodoxy. Hawks, as well, made their case against territorial concessions.

These twin reactions to Kissinger’s reassessment merit further discussion, beginning with the hawks. When Ben-Meir and Hammer traveled to the US in May, their public diplomacy focused on Israel’s claim to retain territory captured in 1967. Reassessment placed Judea and

Samaria back on the table, and the Zeirim’s aim was to convey the “national-religious” argument for Israeli sovereignty over these areas. It was insufficient, they believed, to put forward the argument that Israel needed the territories for security purposes; the true basis for Israel’s claim was the Jewish People’s historic and religious connection to the Land.

The logic inherent in the “land for peace” formula was that territory (land) was a tangible, material asset to be bargained in exchange for political commitments, security arrangements, and other elements of “peace.” The proposed interim accord was proof-of-concept for the fungibility of territory: the tangible, security value of mountain passes in the Sinai would be offset by peacekeeping arrangements, early-warning stations, demilitarized zones, and, above all else, advanced military technology from the US. If it could be demonstrated that collective-security

255 mechanisms and American arms sales could compensate Israel for the material, security value of territory in Sinai, then that could serve as the model for striking bargains on other fronts.

For the Zeirim, as well as many other Israelis, territory not only had a tangible, material dimension but also a spiritual one. This was particularly true regarding the West Bank, as its

“Judea” and “Samaria” regions were the biblical heartland of the Land of Israel. The Zeirim felt it necessary to remind Israel’s American supports of the West Bank’s spiritual value, which was a product of the historic and religious connections between the Jewish People and this sacred ground. This connection both justified and necessitated Israel’s retention of these territories. It was conceivable that security guarantees, political concessions, and American arms could compensate for the material, security value of the West Bank. Its spiritual value, however, was unexchangeable.

Whereas the West Bank’s spiritual significance was a product of the territory’s innate sanctity, the Sinai was a different matter. Indeed, Kissinger had selected the Israeli–Egyptian track with the express purpose of avoiding the problematics of the West Bank. While the Zeirim thought in terms of the West Bank’s sacred, spiritual character, Kissinger understood the constraints of Israeli coalition politics: Rabin needed the NRP to govern, and the NRP would force Rabin to call elections over a West Bank withdrawal. Indeed, what galled Kissinger following the March 1975 breakdown was that he undertook the Egyptian negotiations to accommodate Rabin’s dependence on the NRP, only for the Rabin government to renege on its commitment to accept political commitments short of formal non-belligerency in for the Sinai passes and oil fields. Thus, both Kissinger and Ford treated the breakdown in talks as a personal betrayal no less than a diplomatic crisis.

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Kissinger writes in his memoirs that the diverging American and Israeli perceptions of

territory was, and remains, a “core reality” of US–Israel relations. “Americans,” Kissinger observed, “considered trivial the territorial changes Israel was resisting; Israel, absorbed in a struggle for its very existence, had difficulty understanding the scale by which a superpower measures a requirement of survival.”233

This prescient observation from the maestro of realpolitik sheds light, in fact, on two

sources of tension between Israel and the US during “reassessment.” Kissinger appreciated the

quantitative difference between the Israeli and American perspectives on territory. However, he

was either unable or unwilling to consider qualitative, conceptual differences in how the two

countries related to territory. For many Israelis, territory was not only a material, strategic matter,

but a spiritual one. Whether framed in terms of nationalism, religion, or both, territory was

central to the Zionist-Israeli narrative, and many Israelis also viewed the homeland/holy-land

through a spiritual prism.

The Zeirim’s opposition to ceding the passes and oil fields in Sinai became inexorably linked to the diplomatic confrontation between the Ford administration and the Rabin

government. The Zeirim had no objection, in principle, to ceding territory in Sinai; the peninsula

had no intrinsic spiritual significance because it was not generally regarded as part of the Land of

Israel. Rather, their opposition was based on the terms of the accord and the context in which it

was proposed. In the separation of forces agreement with Egypt, both sides had given ground as

part of mutual concessions. The paradigm for the interim accord, however, was different: Israel

would make concessions to Egypt, but Egypt would make only minor, token concessions to

233 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 427.

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Israel. The US, however, would cover the difference by supplying Israel with weapons, economic aid, oil, and other commitments.

The Zeirim’s argument against the interim accord focused on the imbalance between

Israeli and Egyptian concessions. Sadat would not formally end the state of war with Israel while

Israel continued to hold the vast majority of the Sinai. To do so would sully Egypt’s national honor and undermine its position vis a vis its Arab rivals. While it would cross the line for Egypt to end the state of war with Israel, the Zeirim saw ending the state of war as necessary in order to satisfy Israel’s national honor. The issue was neither sacred territory nor military advantage, but national honor. Withdrawing from valuable positions in the Sinai without meaningful concessions by Egypt was tantamount to “surrender” and “capitulation.” The American offer of economic and military aid added insult to injury, as the Zeirim perceived it as an attempt to bribe

Israeli into committing an act of national dishonor. Capitulating to an unfair exchange with

Egypt was dishonorable in and of itself, but to accept guns and dollars in return meant putting a price on national pride.

The use of American military aid as leverage against the Rabin government only intensified the Zeirim’s opposition to the interim accord. The Rabin government had already rejected a withdrawal from the passes without non belligerency. To accept a substantially similar deal after the U.S. Administration’s pressure campaign would not only entail capitulating to the

Egyptians – it also meant surrendering to American pressure. This, the Zeirim argued, would only invite Egypt and the other Arab states to demand further withdrawals, with the Americans

“delivering the goods.”

The Zeirim’s proposed alternative, then, was to recognize that Israel would always be a

“nation that dwells alone,” and that its adversaries would “rise up to destroy it in every

258 generation.” In order to survive, the People of Israel would have to unite around the nation’s traditional values, adopt a lower standard of living in response to economic hardship, and develop their own advanced military technology rather than rely on the Americans. The alternative to confronting the U.S. administration, they argued, was to share the fate of the south-

Vietnamese, the Cambodians, and the Kurds.

The Zeirim articulated and advocated for this approach in multiple fora. As the summer of ‘75 progressed, it became increasingly apparent that “step-by-step” diplomacy was picking up steam on the Israeli–Egyptian track. The Zeirim, then, intensified their campaign against the interim accord and resumed their crusade against the Rabin government. In the parliamentary arena, Ben-Meir and Hammer nearly succeeded in rewriting the defense budget, managing to sow chaos in the governing coalition. In the arena of public protest, the Zeirim successfully co- organized a massive rally in the heart of Tel Aviv. While their message was largely overshadowed by the militant extremists who marched on the American Embassy, the demonstration was still a significant show of force by the Zeirim, Gush Emunim, and Likud.

As step-by-step diplomacy resumed, it became increasingly clear that the US reassessment had not led Kissinger to shift to the “comprehensive” approach favored by Israeli doves such as Eban and Melamed. Moreover, with step-by-step underway, it was both imprudent and counterproductive to criticize the process, which they hoped would succeed. The

“comprehensive” approach became the road not taken, but this brief episode of discursive revival merits examination.

When Eban came out against the Rabin government in May 1975, he took Rabin to task on two accounts: First, Eban charged that the Prime Minister and his team mishandled the negotiations during Kissinger’s shuttle, and were at fault for the ensuing crisis in US–Israel

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relations. Second, Eban also argued that the government’s “step-by-step” strategy was

fundamentally flawed, and that Israel should put forward a “comprehensive” peace plan of its

own. The firestorm that erupted over Eban’s comments, both within Labor and without, was the

product of his dramatic volte-face from defending the cabinet’s rejection of the proposed interim accord to blaming the Rabin government for the breakdown in talks.

While in the US, Eban had violated Israeli taboos over Palestinian statehood and

recognition of the PLO as part of his argument for the “comprehensive” approach to

peacemaking. Yet, Eban’s departure from the government line, as well as the general Israeli

consensus, attracted little attention compared with the controversy surrounding his Ma’ariv

interview. By reversing his position on the Rabin government’s culpability for the diplomatic

breakdown, Eban also called attention to his alternative approach to peacemaking.

The ensuing controversy forced Labor to convene the party leadership and Knesset

faction to discuss Eban’s public criticism of the government, thereby providing Eban with a

forum to present his own comprehensive peace plan for debate. While Eban’s proposal garnered

limited support, it encouraged a broader group of Labor MK s to demand that the government

articulate its vision for Mideast peace or, at the very least, propose specific ideas to end the

deadlock over an interim accord with Egypt.

Eban viewed the government’s refusal to share its vision for Mideast peacemaking, its

rejection of the “comprehensive approach,” and its avoidance of the Palestinian issue as the

product of a fundamental flaw of the Rabin government: its dependence on the NRP. The NRP,

Eban believed, had long been a reliable, pragmatic partner in Labor coalitions. The rise of the

Zeirim, however, was transforming Labor’s traditional ally both ideologically and politically.

The centrality of territorial maximalism to the Zeirim’s ideology pushed the NRP to take

260 increasingly hardline positions which hampered Labor’s ability to conduct foreign relations.

Indeed, the “Judea and Samaria proviso” in the coalition agreement constrained the government’s ability to conduct diplomacy over the fate of the West Bank, which Evan viewed as the central issue in the political process following the Yom Kippur War. Moreover, the Rabin government’s fatal flaw, entrenched in the coalition agreement with the NRP, forced it to adopt an unsound, step-by-step strategy aimed at avoiding, rather than resolving, the core of the Arab-

Israeli conflict.

Within the NRP, Melamed shared Eban’s preference for the “comprehensive” approach, taking a dim view of the Rabin government’s will and capacity to make “real” peace. Unlike

Eban, Melamed lacked a ready-made party forum in which to express his dissent from the diplomatic strategy of the government and his party. At the NRP convention, the Zeirim had used their acumen for grassroots organizing to pass resolutions that prevented the NRP from being a party to withdrawal in the West Bank. Melamed believed that these resolutions were anachronistic as they predated the Yom Kippur War and the post-war political process. The majority in the NRP, he believed, would now support a reasonable medini platform that reflected the new reality.

Melamed’s response then, was to mobilize party members to counter the Zeirim and Gush

Emunim both operationally and ideologically. Thus, the “Intellectual and Political Circle for

Balanced Religious Zionism” was born. Politically, the Circle stood for a return to the NRP’s traditional priorities in education, social welfare, and the crisis of values in Israeli society. It favored a return to “Torah and Labor,” productive cooperation with the Labor Party in the spirit of Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi, and a conciliatory foreign policy platform. In support of these

261 principles, the Circle would advocate and organize both within and outside of the NRP framework to mobilize support in response to (and in emulation of) Gush Emunim.

The degree to which the Circle succeeded in the political arena is easily measured. The

Circle aimed at matching Gush Emunim tit-for-tat, protest by protest. Yet, while Gush Emunim could mobilize upwards of 10,000 in July 1975, the Circle was able to muster only a few dozen participants for its inaugural conference. The conference, in turn, received minimal press attention, save for Hillel Danzig, a columnist in Davar who viewed the Circle as the best hope for the ideological rejuvenation of pioneering, religious-Zionist socialism; the Circle might also serve as a source of inspiration and new ideas as Labor confronted its own ideological crises.

This, Danzig hoped, might lead to the rejuvenation of the Historic Alliance between Labor and the NRP, as well as a shared, morderate line on foreign policy. Moreover, Danzig saw an opportunity in the regional arena. With religion and socialism finding common cause throughout the developing world, a combination of secular, Labor-Zionist kibbutz socialism with the pioneering-religious Kibbutz movement might allow Israel to find a common language with

Muslim-majority countries governed by revolutionary regimes that adhered to one form or another of Arab socialism.

Politically, the Circle did not live up to Danzig’s expectations. It had no appreciable impact on NRP policy during the negotiations over the Egyptian–Israeli interim accord, while the inter-factional balance of power within the NRP continued to shift in favor of the Zeirim.234 The

Circle did, however, serve as an incubator for an ideological and theological critique of the

234 In January of 1976, Zvi Yaron wrote to a fellow activist that he wondered whether there was any “reason to take part in meetings of ‘The Circle,’” which was rebranding itself as “Oz VeShalom.” Yaron claimed that The Circle was being “vilified” and “abused” by Ha-Tsofeh, while he, himself had been “bann[ed]” from its pages. He had spoken to Burg about the matter, but “nothing [had] changed,” and the situation remained unresolved. Zvi Yaron to Mordecai Avigdor (Jan. 27, 1976), The Minister’s Activities in the MaFDaL and the Mizrahi Movement 1974-1983 (vol 2), Bureau of Minister Yosef Burg, Ministry of the Interior, Israel State Archives, A/4132/8.

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“mystical” religious-Zionist ideology championed by Gush Emunim and the Zeirim. “Halakhic

Judaism,” the Circle argued, called for moderation and realism in foreign policy.

In his interview with Davar, Melamed alluded to this political tradition as “the Judaism of Rabban Yohanan Ben-Zakkai.” A leading Talmudic sage, Ben-Zakkai is credited with the survival of Rabbinic Judaism after the destruction of the Second Temple. Ben-Zakkai staunchly opposed the revolt against the Roman Empire, defying the militant zealots to hold talks with the

Roman general commanding the siege of Jerusalem. The negotiations bore fruit, and while the zealots perished, the rabbis were given a safe haven in which to study and teach.

While Melamed did not mean to suggest that the crisis in US–Israel relations was comparable to a First-Century Judean rebellion against the Roman Empire, he and others viewed the Ben-Zakkai story as a paradigm for the approach of “Halakhic Judaism” to relations with a great power. National survival came before national pride, and foreign policy was to be conducted on the basis of level-headed assessments of the strategic environment. Moreover, the spiritual strength of the nation was neither a product of its diplomatic strategy nor a foreign policy objective. Rather, the country’s spiritual well-being depended on education and the inculcation of traditional values, a well-defined place for religion in public life, integrity in government and commerce, and care for the most vulnerable in society.

Melamed and his circle also rejected territorial maximalism, arguing that the realities of

Arab–Israeli peacemaking would inevitably require Israel to cede the majority of the West Bank.

The growing preoccupation with the “wholeness” of the Land of Israel, they argued, must not come at the expense of peace. Peace was a central religious value in and of itself, but it was also a means of preventing bloodshed and upholding the cardinal principle of “pikuah nefesh,”

263 safeguarding human life. This principle, on a collective level, should be the central aim of foreign policy.

Treating foreign policy as a “spiritual” issue, as the Zeirim did, was dangerous on two accounts. First and foremost, it would result in poor statecraft, unable to cope with objective realities that failed to conform to messianic hopes and expectations. Second, using foreign policy to address spiritual concerns was diverted attention from the country’s actual, spiritual needs.

The country’s spiritual well-being was largely a matter of domestic policy in areas such as education, the economy, social welfare, and religion. Taking a stand against the Americans did nothing to address the indulgent consumerism, poverty, corruption, and ignorance of traditional

Judaism among the youth. Moreover, preoccupation with the messianic process distracted religious Jewry from its traditional task of finding answers to contemporary crises of values.235

The positions of the NRP’s veteran leadership fell out on a spectrum between both doves and hawks. While they subscribed to the realist approach of Unna and Melamed, the NRP Old

Guard did not embrace the idea of withdrawing from the West Bank. That said, the Zeirim’s methods, no less than their message, were sharply at odds with the NRP’s veteran leadership.

Burg, Raphael, and Warhaftig certainly had their differences. Burg took a more elitist approach to foreign policy, preferring high diplomacy and discrete deliberations to pomp and protest.

235 Moshe Unna expounded upon these arguments a series of articles published in the Spring and Summer of 1975. In “The Masada Complex,” without referring specifically to the Zeirim, Gush Emunim, or other groups and individuals, Unna compares their approach to statecraft to a psychological disorder in which unrealized Messianic expectations and military setbacks create a cognitive prism blind to the possibility of making peace with enemies, in which the undesirable is seen as catastrophic, the “honor of the nation” is put before its survival, and the only alternative to victory is national suicide. Mosh Unna, “The Masada Complex,” Ha-Tsofeh (May 30, 1975), 5. For a critique of messianism ans an impediment to solving contemporary religious problems see Unna, “Does Judaism Have an Answer to the Crisis of Values? [Lecture to The Conference on Jewish Thought],” Ha-Tsofeh (July 18, 1975), 3; For Unna’s critique of Israel’s leadership for refusing to develop a comprehensive peace plan see “In the Absence of a Medini Program,” Ha-Tsofeh (August 22, 1975), 3.

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Raphael was a consummate politician, cultivating relationships with Rabin and Labor while also

reaching out to Gush Emunim, which was emerging as an influential constituency. Warhaftig’s

political base within the NRP was in steep decline, leading him and the Zeirim to form an ad-

hoc, tactical partnership despite their ideological differences.

All three, however, supported the Rabin government following the breakdown in talks

and when it endeavored to revive the process. Burg emerged as the NRP’s most prominent

advocate for reconciling with the American administration; Raphael staunchly supported the

government while occasionally adopting a hardline posture in cabinet deliberations and press

releases. Warhaftig, who had declined seat in the cabinet, remained faithful to party and coalition

discipline, supporting the government in key votes during Ben-Meir’s short-lived revolt over the

defense budget.

The NRP Old Guard, moreover, was invested in the success of step-by-step diplomacy for two reason. First, they viewed it as the alternative to the comprehensive approach, with its risk of painful concessions in the West Bank. This was in stark contrast to the Zeirim, who saw the interim negotiations as the prelude to further concessions. Second, the party leadership was

invested in the success of the Rabin government, of which they were members. Hammer and

Ben-Meir, though, were staunch (and clever) opponents of the Rabin government, unfettered by

coalition discipline or party loyalty.

The Zeirim occupied a liminal space, neither fully outside the coalition, nor fully inside.

This liminal position had its advantages. For one thing, the Zeirim could organize rallies against

government policy. With an independent and growing base of support in the Party, Hammer and

Ben-Meir were largely immune to the NRP leadership’s enforcement of coalition discipline. At the same time, the Zeirim were able to avoid sanctions from the coalition leadership, lest the

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NRP leave the government. Consequently, the Zeirim were able to wreak parliamentary havoc

within the coalition with near impunity. When Hammer and Ben-Meir revised the defense

budget, Avraham Melamed was tasked with bringing them to heel. Not only did Melamed fail to

do so, back in line. Not only was he unable to do so, but he was also compelled to defend Ben-

Meir and Hammer against the charge of violating coalition discipline in a budget vote, which

could potentially constitute grounds for sacking the NRP cabinet ministers.

While Hammer and Ben-Meir’ insider/outsider status gave them ample room to maneuver, their influence on policy decisions was limited by Hammer’s refusal of a cabinet portfolio in deference to the Chief Rabbinate’s 1974 edict prohibiting the NRP’s participation in the government.236 The limits of the Zeirim’s influence from outside the government came into

stark relief when Israel, Egypt, and the US began inching toward a resumption of talks in July

1975.

As the Zeirim realized the limits of their influence, an unexpected cabinet vacancy would

force them to conduct a reassessment of their own. Although membership in the government

would allow the Zeirim to participate in decisions at the highest level, it also demanded

collective ministerial responsibility. It was one thing to harangue the government from the

margins of the coalition, but violating coalition discipline from within the cabinet was a more

problematic proposition. Moreover, the Zeirim remained fundamentally at odds with the Rabin

government. After relentlessly castigating the NRP Old Guard for being glued to their cabinet

236 Chief Rabbi Goren had long come to regret that edict, it had never been rescinded by the Chief Rabbinical Council. Neither the Chief Rabbi, nor the NRP leadership, though, were keen on calling attention to this rather awkward situation.

266 chairs rather than sticking with their principles, would it be any less cynical and opportunistic for the Zeirim to join a government they continued to oppose as a matter of principle?

These dilemmas would only become more urgent and complex as Egypt and Israel moved closer toward an agreement. With Secretary Kissinger preparing to undertake a final round of shuttle diplomacy, Gush Emunim realized that their protest marches through the West

Bank had been ineffective during Kissinger’s previous visit. Mountain passes in the Sinai were too far away, too abstract, to capture the public’s attention. This time, the group would act in plain sight and close to home, focusing on the visible, tangible manifestation of what they were protesting: Henry Kissinger.

As the Zeirim searched for a way into the government, their allies in Gush Emunim planned rallies, demonstrations, and civil disobedience in the heart of Israeli cities. The “Am

Yisrael Hai” rally was but a preview of the main event, which promised to catch the attention of the Israeli public and catch the government off-guard and unprepared. The Zeirim, along with the rest of the NRP, would find themselves caught in the eye of the storm – pushed to the brink.

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Chapter 4 “A Ticklish Domestic Problem Having Foreign Policy Overtones”: the NRP, Gush Emunim, and the Sinai II Accords (June–November 1975)

This chapter examines the resumption of negotiations over an Israeli–Egyptian interim

accord, the shock of Gush Emunim’s unprecedented anti-Kissinger protests, and Zevulun

Hammer’s appointment to the cabinet. The first section begins with the sudden death of Welfare

Minister Michael Hazani, which put Hammer in line for the vacant cabinet seat. With R. Goren’s

encouragement, the Zeirim reconsidered their refusal to join the government. Hammer and Ben-

Meir came around to R. Goren’s view that Hammer should enter the cabinet to strengthen the

“hawks” and prevent territorial withdrawal. The Zeirim’s Central Committee endorsed

Hammer’s cabinet bid, and the Chief Rabbinical Council gave its blessings, but Hammer’s appointment fell by the wayside after the announcement of Kissinger’s return in August 1975.

The second part of this chapter examines Gush Emunim’s anarchic demonstrations against Kissinger, the interim accord, and the Rabin government, including Burg and Raphael.

This section begins with an account of growing concerns for Kissinger’s personal safety and the demonstrations upon his arrival in Jerusalem. Civil disobedience, as well as violence by

protesters and police, generated controversy that became intertwined with the NRP debate over

the interim accord, exacerbating divisions within the party. The section continues with an

examination of peaceful protest through religious ritual, police conduct, and R. Shlomo Goren’s

role in de-escalating the violence.

Although mass protest continued, Gush Emunim’s largest demonstration was characterized by performative civil obedience, with organizers instructing demonstrators to punctiliously comply with police instructions. Additionally, the conspicuous presence of young,

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religious students reflected the influence of Rabbi Moshe Zvi Neriah, head of the Bnei Akiva

yeshivot. In Tel Aviv, supporters of the interim accord denounced Gush Emunim, whom they

considered lawless and fanatical.

The third part of this chapter focuses on the NRP’s participation in the final decision over

the Sinai II Accords, which dovetailed with the debate over Gush Emunim’s conduct and

subsequent police response. While the Zeirim staunchly opposed the accords and blamed the

police for the violence, Burg and Raphael were mortified by the vitriol directed at Kissinger (and

at them). Though Raphael and Warhaftig tried to engage with Gush Emunim, threats against

Burg forced him to accept police protection. When the time came to vote on the accord, the

Knesset factions convened the governing bodies of their respective political parties,

demonstrating the centrality of domestic, party politics in Israeli foreign policy. Within the NRP,

the issue came before the NRP Executive, which fell in line behind Burg and Raphael, and

instructed the Knesset Faction to support the Accord. Hammer and Ben-Meir, though, were permitted to vote against the accord as a matter of conscience.

The final part of this chapter examines the effort to mend inter-factional fences within the

NRP and fill its vacant cabinet seat. While the Alignment’s left-flank opposed Hammer’s appointment, the NRP Old Guard saw an opportunity for reconciliation by coopting the Zeirim into the government. Hammer joined the cabinet in November 1975 while the Zeirim’s acceptance of coalition discipline and collective, ministerial responsibility remained an open question.

Another Reassessment: Efforts to Appoint Zevulun Hammer to the Cabinet Prior to Secretary Kissinger’s Return (July–August 1975) 1.A The NRP Faces an Unexpected Cabinet Vacancy

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The divisions between the Zeirim and the Old Guard over US–Israel relations and an

Egyptian interim accord took on new urgency in July of 1975. Kissinger mediated from

Washington, narrowing the gaps between the Israeli and Egyptian positions while steering clear

of the Middle East. The secretary would return only when an accord was close at hand, bringing

American aid and other inducements to close the deal.1

As the Zeirim renewed their campaign against the Rabin government and the interim

accord, the unexpected death of Michael Hazani complicated the already volatile situation in the

NRP.2 In his memoirs, Rabin stresses that he was “not free to nominate the ministers of his

choice.” Coalition parties chose their own representatives in the government and were “not even

bound to consult the prime minister, let alone seek his consent.”3 Selecting the new welfare

minister, then, was an internal NRP affair complicated by the growing prospect of Kissinger’s

return and the Zeirim’s struggle against the interim accord in the making.

Storm clouds gathered as the NRP contemplated Hazani’s successor. Avraham Melamed,

former MK Moshe Unna, and others were rumored to be under consideration, but Zevulun

Hammer quickly emerged as the front-runner.4 It was unclear, however, whether Hammer would

take the job less than a year after the Zeirim’s relentless campaign against joining the

government. The Zeirim remained antagonistic toward the Rabin government and were fiercely critical of the Old Guard for enabling Labor hegemony in exchange for ministerial fiefdoms.

1 Quandt, 239-240. 2 On July 2, 1975, Hazani suffered a heart attack while speaking at a ribbon-cutting ceremony for a new vocational rehabilitation institute for women, in the West Bank city of Jenin. “Michael Jacob Hazani Dead at 62” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLII:27 (July 3, 1975), 2; Ma’ariv (July 3, 1975), 1-2; “Michael Hazani dies of Heart Attack at 62,” Jerusalem Post (July 3, 1975), 1-2; Veliotes, Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Death of NRP Minister Hazani 1975TELAV07357 (July 2, 1975). 3 Rabin Memoirs, 241. Indeed, Rabin had been forced to swallow the bitter pill of appointing his rival, Shimon Peres as Defense Minister. 4 “Not Yet Decided in the NRP Who will be Hazani’s Heir,” Ma’ariv (July 3, 1975), 2; “Michael Hazani dies of Heart Attack at 62,” Jerusalem Post (July 3, 1975), 1-2; Veliotes, Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Death of NRP Minister Hazani 1975TELAV07357 (July 2, 1975).

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Moreover, the Chief Rabbinate had never rescinded its ruling that the NRP must not join the

government without amending the Law of Return.

The surprise cabinet vacancy in July 1975 threatened to reopen old wounds. The NRP’s

presence in the Rabin government was an ongoing violation of the CRC’s edict, though neither

the Rabbinate nor NRP was particularly keen to call attention to the issue.5 Hazani’s death,

though, left the NRP under-represented in the cabinet, tilting its delicate balance toward the

doves. With the peace process picking up steam, Rav Goren was eager to see the NRP’s cabinet

vacancy filled. Hammer and Ben-Meir were coming to a similar conclusion, but the CRC’s edict prevented Hammer from accepting the cabinet seat. As one American diplomat put it, the unexpected cabinet vacancy presented “a potentially ticklish domestic problem having foreign policy overtones” at a critical moment in the peace process.6

1.B Hammer Makes the Case for Joining the Government: “Where Can We Contribute the Most to the Struggle for the Land of Israel and Jewish Values?”

Faced with a sudden cabinet vacancy and the prospect of renewed diplomacy, Hammer

and Ben-Meir conducted their own “reassessment” of the Zeirim’s opposition to joining the

government. Serving in the cabinet would elevate the Zeirim to the highest echelon of national

leadership, expand their involvement into additional areas of governance, and allow Hammer to

forestall overly generous concessions. Moreover, Hammer’s mere presence would pull Burg and

5 R. Goren found himself in need of allies in the Knesset during the summer of 1975. A dispute over the appointment of rabbinic judges caused an uproar, when Agudah M.K. Shlomo Lorincz compared R. Goren to the Ugandan dictator Idi Amin from the Knesset rostrum. R. Goren responded by convening the CRC, and excommunicating Lawrence. Goren came under sharp criticism in rabbinic circles, with leading Halakhists declaring that Goren’s herem had no force and effect. Many within the broader public, along with their elected representatives Knesset, considered the entire affair an embarrassment. The Zeirim, however, came to R. Goren’s defense, as did Raphael, who, as Minister of Religion, could not remain silent over this affront to the dignity of the State Rabbinate. (add citations) “Raphael defends Goren and courts” Jerusalem Post (Aug 5, 1975), 1. 6 Emb. Tel-Aviv to State, “Death of NRP Minister Hazani” 1975TELAV04210 (July 2, 1975).

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Raphael to the right, further strengthening the cabinet’s right flank.7 On the other hand, joining a

government they so publicly opposed could be seen as opportunism and cooption by the party

elite.

The Zeirim conferred among themselves and consulted with other NRP activists, allies,

Gush Emunim, and, most importantly, Rav Goren and R. Zvi Yehudah. After declining a cabinet

seat out of deference to the Rabbinate and the “dignity of the Torah,” Hammer needed rabbinic

support to legitimize his presence in the cabinet. First, though, the Zeirim would have to make

their case to the public.

On July 14, the day of Gush Emunim’s “Am Yisrael Hai” rally, Ma’ariv published an

interview with Hammer – Hazani’s likely successor.8 Hammer confirmed that the Zeirim was

considering whether to join the government, since “ all of the central players in the NRP [had]

asked [the Zeirim] to accept the [cabinet] position.” The Zeirim were consulting with allies and

supporters about whether their reasons for declining a cabinet seat the previous year remained

valid, and how they could “most decisively influence the issues of the day.”

Hammer claimed that the Zeirim’s 1974 campaign to keep the NRP out of the government was meant to force Labor into a unity government with Likud. The effort would have succeeded, Hammer believed, if the “Old Guard” had taken a “resolute stance for the

NRP’s principles.”9 Now that the NRP was in the government, which faced “important and

immediate decisions,” “hawks from all the [political] camps” were urging the Zeirim to

“strengthen the ‘hawkish’ elements in the government.” Consequently, the Zeirim were asking

7 “NRP Youth Group Leader Zevulum [sic] Hammer to be Minister of Social Welfare” 1975TELAV06756 (Oct 24, 1975). 8 “MK Zevulun Hammer: Many are Asking That we Strengthen the 'Hawks' in the Government,” Ma’ariv (July 14, 1975), 13. 9 “MK Zevulun Hammer,” Ma’ariv (July 14, 1975), 13.

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themselves, “Where can we best contribute to the struggle for the Land of Israel and Jewish

values? And is the matter consistent with our principles and our commitments?”10

Under pressure, Hammer admitted that “personally, [he] favor[ed] leaving the

government in the current situation.” However, if the Zeirim decided to join, the faction would

push for an additional cabinet seat for Warhaftig. Should the Zeirim not join the cabinet, then

they would “obviously return to struggling against the government.”

Hammer was forced to address the thorny issue of “who is a Jew?” which, along with the

“dignity of the Torah,” had been a central theme in the Zeirim’s campaign against joining the

government. Hammer recalled that the Old Guard had agreed to give a ministerial committee one

year to propose a compromise amendment to the Law of Return. While not a party to that

agreement, Hammer observed that the committee was defunct, and the deadline was

approaching. Ultimately, the party would judge whether the leadership had lived up to its

commitments.11

The interview turned to the NRP’s internal divisions, forcing Hammer to justify voting with the opposition while the NRP was a member of the coalition. Moreover, the Zeirim were

rumored to be “laying the groundwork for splitting from the NRP.” Hammer insisted that the

Zeirim would continue “struggling for the direction of the NRP” against the Burg-Raphael entente. The Zeirim saw themselves as an oppositional faction within the party, and while they disagreed with “some of the NRP’s actions as part of the coalition,” the Zeirim were committed to the party’s core values. Their grassroots organizing was aimed at revitalizing the NRP, not

10 Ibid. 11 Ibid.

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splitting it. Moreover, it seemed to Hammer that after losing two Knesset seats under the

“traditional leadership,” the NRP was increasingly receptive to the Zeirim’s message.12

1.C The Zeirim’s Relationship with Gush Emunim

When asked about the Zeirim’s relationship with Gush Emunim, Hammer expressed

pride in the group’s efforts to settle the Land of Israel. He was glad that many in Gush Emunim

saw the Zeirim as “their political representatives,” and saw the two groups as natural allies and

ideological fellow-travelers. While the two groups maintained close ties and “coordinated [their]

activism,” they still had their differences. Gush Emunim was non-partisan and single-minded in struggling for settlements, while the Zeirim were concerned with other areas of governance, such as “foreign affairs, educational, and social issues.” Most importantly, they aspired to the

“political leadership…of the national-religious and traditional public.”

The two groups found common ground in their opposition to the Rabin government, which Hammer accused of deliberately dragging its feet on settlements, especially in Samaria. If the government wanted the support of “those who believe that Judea and Samaria must remain within the borders of Israel,” then it had to undertake “rural and urban settlement” throughout the

West Bank. The Zeirim would also be more inclined to support the government if it stood up to

American pressure during negotiations over an interim agreement with Egypt.13

1.D The Zeirim seek a modus vivendi with Rabin while Continuing to Oppose the Interim Accords

Although the Zeirim were considering Hammer’s entry into the government, he and Ben-

Meir remained vocally opposed to the interim accord and staunchly critical of the government.

During a Knesset debate on corruption, Ben-Meir continued to insist that the nation’s strength in

12 “MK Zevulun Hammer,” Ma’ariv (July 14, 1975), 13. 13 “MK Zevulun Hammer,” Ma’ariv (July 14, 1975), 13.

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foreign affairs and defense depended on its spiritual strength.14 Corruption, he said, would

“damage the State of Israel more than entire Egyptian brigades.” Israel’s resilience, he declared,

“depends on us, and on aid from outside powers.” The country needed to resist outside pressure,

and “the ability to withstand outside pressure depends on us.” The government, he argued, was

not a mere “council of administrators,” but role models for society. “No legislation and no reports” would effect change in Israeli society. On the one hand, it was vital to stress Jewish values and for the government to model proper behavior. On the other, it was vital to strengthen those institutions of the state that checked government power and provided independent oversight, thereby exposing instances of corruption and regaining public trust.15

Ben Meir ’s linkage of social issues and government corruption with Israel’s ability to

withstand international pressure dovetailed with the Zeirim’s argument that agreeing to the accord would constitute an act of capitulation, thereby injuring the national spirit. From this perspective, American military aid was fruit of the forbidden tree - a material inducement to accept spiritual harm. By accepting it, the Israeli government would only compound the damage that materialism was inflicting on the fabric of Israeli society.

The following day, Hammer conveyed a similar message before a gathering of Zeirim activists. He, too, linked Israel’s domestic maladies with its foreign policy. The state faced

“fateful decisions both at home and abroad,” while its citizenry was afflicted with “[false] calm and delusion.” In order to put its house in order, Hammer argued, the country needed a “national

unity government that [would] win the confidence of a majority of the nation.” Such a

government would “operate with courage and effectiveness,” as opposed to the Rabin

14 “Dr. Ben Meir: Purity of Character in Society is an Issue Connected to an Environment of Proper Moral Attitude,” Ha-Tsofeh (July 16, 1975), 2. 15 Dr. Ben Meir: Purity of Character,” Ha-Tsofeh (July 16, 1975), 2.

275 government, which was incapable of making a clear decision on settling the West Bank. Instead, the cabinet avoided a serious debate over settlement policy while preventing settlement in

Samaria. “The government,” he argued, “must take up the issue of settlement in the Land of

Israel with more drive…in order to strengthen the security of the State.” Moreover, it should also

“reject the American dictate,” which would serve both Israeli and US interests in the long run.16

1.D.1 Hammer and Ben-Meir meet with Rabin (July 31, 1975)

As the month-long period of mourning for Michael Hazani neared its end, Hammer and

Ben-Meir met with Rabin to discuss their differences over the peace process, settlements, and the prospect of amending the Law of Return.17 Hammer and Ben-Meir were not against an interim accord with Egypt in principle,18 but they “fiercely opposed” 19 ceding territory in response to an

American dictate, without sufficient Egyptian concessions in return.20 While the Zeirim could stomach concessions in Sinai under the right circumstances, they vowed to “stand firm as a mountain” against any concessions in the West Bank or the Golan Heights.21 Stressing that every

Jew had the right to settle anywhere in the Land of Israel, the Zeirim demanded that the government expand the West Bank settlement enterprise.22

16 “MK Z. Hammer: Reject the American Dictate,” Ha-Tsofeh (July 17, 1975), 2. 17 “Rabin Meets with Hammer and Ben-Meir,” Davar (August 1, 1975) ISA, P/5079/7; “Rabin Met Yesterday with Hammer and Ben-Meir on the Subject of the Zeirim Joining the Government,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 1, 1975) 1; “NRP Youth to Meet in order to Decide on their Representative Joining the Government as a Minister: Conditioning their Entry on the Entry of Dr. Z Warhaftig as the Fourth Minister,” Yedioth Aharonot (Aug. 1, 1975) ISA, P/5079/7; “Zevulun Hammer and Zerah Warhaftig Join the Government - Rabbis and Leaders of Emunim Approve the Decision,” Ha’aretz (August 1, 1975) ISA, P/5079/7; “Warhaftig, Hammer seen joining Cabinet,” Jerusalem Post (Aug 1, 1975), 1. 18 “Rabin Met Yesterday,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 1, 1975), 1; “Zevulun Hammer and Zerah Warhaftig,” Ha’aretz (August 1, 1975) ISA, P/5079/7. 19 “NRP Youth to Meet,” Yedioth Aharonot (Aug. 1, 1975), ISA, P/5079/7. 20 “Rabin Met Yesterday,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 1, 1975), 1; “Zevulun Hammer and Zerah Warhaftig,” Ha’aretz (August 1, 1975) P5079/7. 21“Rabin Met Yesterday,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 1, 1975), 1; See, also: “Hammer and Warhaftig,” Ha’aretz (August 1, 1975), ISA, P/5079/7; “NRP Youth to Meet,” Yedioth Aharonot (Aug. 1, 1975) ISA, P/5079/7. 22 “Rabin Met Yesterday,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 1, 1975), 1; “NRP Youth to Meet,” Yedioth Aharonot (Aug. 1, 1975), ISA, P/5079/7.

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Tellingly, Hammer and Ben-Meir met Rabin without consulting Burg and Raphael – both

of whom found out about the meeting on the radio. 23 As the Zeirim signaled their independence

from Burg and Raphael, they also demonstrated their growing ties with Warhaftig, demanding a

fourth cabinet seat for the NRP’s elder statesman.24 In deference to the Chief Rabbinate, Ben-

Meir and Hammer also asked Rabin to use his influence to muster a majority for amending the

Law of Return.25

1.E The Zeirim Consult with Allies and Supporters to Garner Support for Joining the Government

After apparently concluding that they could reach a modus vivendi with Rabin, Hammer and Ben-Meir announced their intent to convene the Zeirim’s Central Committee to vote on

Hammer joining the cabinet. As promised, he and Ben-Meir consulted with leading stakeholders

in the national-religious camp, including academics affiliated with Bar Ilan University, leading

figures in the Bnei Akiva youth movement, and veteran NRP members. The Zeirim also lobbied

the secretariat of Gush Emunim, whose influence was on the rise in the national-religious camp.26

After meeting with Rabin, Hammer and Ben-Meir visited the home of R. Zvi Yehudah.

While Gush Emunim’s spiritual leader had severed ties with the NRP leadership when it joined

the Meir government, he remained close to the Zeirim. The rabbi indicated that, under the right

circumstances, it would be proper for the Zeirim to examine the possibility of joining the government. Despite his reservations, R. Zvi Yehudah gave Hammer his blessing (literally),

23 “Rabin Meets with Hammer and Ben-Meir,” Davar (August 1, 1975), ISA, P/5079/7. 24 “Rabin Met Yesterday,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 1, 1975), 1; “NRP Youth to Meet,” Yedioth Aharonot (Aug. 1, 1975) ISA, P/5079/7; “Warhaftig, Hammer seen joining Cabinet,” Jerusalem Post (Aug 1, 1975), 1. 25 “Rabin Met Yesterday,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 1, 1975), 1; Zevulun Hammer and Zerah Warhaftig,” Ha’aretz (August 1, 1975), P/5079/7; “NRP Youth to Meet,” Yedioth Aharonot (Aug. 1, 1975), ISA, P/5079/7. 26 “Warhaftig, Hammer seen joining Cabinet,” Jerusalem Post (Aug 1, 1975), 1; “Rabin Meets with Hammer and Ben-Meir,” Davar (August 1, 1975) P5079/7.

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reciting the priestly benediction.27 R. Goren, for his part, was eager to see Hammer in the

cabinet.28

1.E.1 The Zeirim’s Central Committee Votes to Join the Government (August 7, 1975)

Opposition to joining the government persisted in religious circles as the Zeirim’s Central

Committee convened on August 7.29 Rav Zvi Yehudah had his doubts, and R. Goren was under

pressure to retract his statement of support.30 Nevertheless, Hammer reported that, according to

R. Goren, the “circumstances [had] changed,” and that “shleymut ha’aretz” – the Wholeness of the Land – had become the priority. The CRC still needed to discuss the issue of halakhic conversion, but Rav Goren had promised a swift decision.31 Hammer also spoke at length with

R. Zvi Yehudah the previous day, and Gush Emunim’s spiritual leader remained supportive of

Hammer joining the government, despite his reservations.32

Hammer had also consulted with a wide array of elected officials, NRP members, Bnei

Akiva and Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Dati activists, and intellectuals.33 These consultations led Hammer to

conclude that the Zeirim should join the government in order to prevent concessions in the West

Bank and Golan Heights, as long as it was consistent with their principles. The Zeirim could also

27 “NRP Youth to Decide Tonight; Hammer: Without Warhaftig We Won’t Join the Government,” Davar, (August 7, 1975), ISA, P/5079/7; “Decision of the Central Committee of the NRP's Youth Circles: We are Considering Hammer Joining the Government Together with Dr. Warhaftig in a Positive Light,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 8, 1975),1. See, also: “NRP Youth to Decide Today on Question of Joining Government,” Ha’aretz (August 7, 1975). 28 “NRP Youth to Decide Today,” Ha’aretz (August 7, 1975), ISA, P/5079/7; “NRP Youth to Decide Tonight,” Davar, (August 7, 1975), ISA, P/5079/7; “Mapam opposed to NRP having four ministers,” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 6, 1975) 3. 29 “NRP Youth to Decide Today,” Ha’aretz (August 7, 1975), ISA, P/5079/7. 30 “NRP Youth to Decide Today,” Ha’aretz (August 7, 1975), ISA, P/5079/7. 31 Ibid. 32 “Decision of the Central Committee,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 8, 1975), 1; “NRP Youth Leaning Toward Hammer Joining the Government,” Ma’ariv, (Aug. 8, 1975), 1; “NRP Youth to Decide,” Ha’aretz (August 7, 1975) ISA, P/5079/7 33“Decision of the Central Committee,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 8, 1975), 1.

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influence negotiations over an interim accord with Egypt, and push for Warhaftig to receive a

cabinet seat of his own.34

Most of the Central Committee supported Hammer’s position. Many agreed that the

diplomatic situation demanded Hammer’s presence in the cabinet room, while others noted that

Hammer would be in a position to fill the NRP’s seat on the Ministerial Committee on

Settlement (temporarily held by Burg). Many were prepared to temper parliamentary agitation

and publicity campaigns against the government in order to restore the balance between hawks

and doves in the cabinet.35 Thus, the Central Committee voted – 100 to 2– to negotiate the

terms of Hammer’s appointment to the cabinet “in accordance with nationalist and Jewish

principles.”36 The committee also reiterated the Zeirim’s commitment to a fourth cabinet seat for

Warhaftig, in the face of opposition from MaPaM.37 The Zeirim also voted to establish a joint

committee with Warhaftig’s “Center Faction” to coordinate their positions on entering the

government.38

The next day, Hammer explained the Zeirim’s decision on Israeli radio. The Zeirim had

campaigned against the NRP joining the coalition in order to force a unity deal with Likud or

topple the government outright. In the interim, the NRP had re-joined the coalition, and there

was no prospect of forcing a unity government with Likud. Therefore, during this “time of urgent

and important decisions,” the Zeirim were “examining whether [it would be] possible to concentrate their efforts on bringing [the Rabin government] closer to [the Zeirim’s] positions on

34 “Decision of the Central Committee,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 8, 1975), 1. 35 “NRP Youth Leaning,” Ma’ariv, (Aug. 8, 1975), 1; “Decision of the Central Committee,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 8, 1975), 1 36 “NRP Youth Leaning,” Ma’ariv, (Aug. 8, 1975), 1; “Decision of the Central Committee” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 8, 1975), 1. 37 “NRP Youth to Decide Tonight,” Davar, (August 7, 1975), ISA, P/5079/7; “NRP Youth Leaning,” Ma’ariv, (Aug. 8, 1975), 1. 38 “Central Faction Talks with Zeirim,” Ha-Tsofeh (August 8, 1975), 1.

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the important issues.”39 Hammer would focus on expanding West Bank settlements, opposing

territorial concessions in the Golan Heights or West Bank and forestalling an unfavorable interim

accord with Egypt. Should Hemmer come to believe that he lacked “influence over…matters of

principle,” then he would quit the cabinet.40

1.F Rav Goren Secures the Chief Rabbinical Council’s Support for Hammer’s Entry into the Cabinet

After the Zeirim’s Central Committee endorsed Hammer’s cabinet bid, R. Goren worked

quickly to secure the Chief Rabbinical Council’s approval.41 While the council was expected to

follow R. Goren’s lead, some of the members were irked that R. Goren publicly supported

Hammer’s bid without first consulting with them. Rabbi Shlomo Yosef Zevin, a prominent

scholar and editor of the Talmudic Encyclopedia, dryly recalled that the council had

unanimously forbidden the NRP to join the government. Surely, R. Zevin would have heard if

the council had reconsidered.42

Rav Goren brought the matter before the CRC on August 13, without adding it to the

agenda beforehand.43 Rather than ask the council to recant its previous ruling, R. Goren

proposed that the council provide specific dispensation for Hammer, who heeded the CRC’s

39 “MK Z Hammer on IDF Radio: If I enter the Government, I will try to influence from within over matters relating to Settling the Land of Israel” Ha-Tsofeh (August 10, 1975), 1; “Stir in the NRP over fourth seat as MaPaM protests,” Jerusalem Post (August 10, 1975), 2. 40 Ibid. 41 “Chief Rabbinical Council will Apparently Decide In Favor of Hammer Joining the Government,” Ha’aretz (Aug. 11, 1975), ISA, P/5079/7; “The NRP will not Insist on the matter of a Fourth Minister,” Davar (Aug. 11, 1975), ISA, P/5079/7; “Out of consideration for National needs”: The Chief rabbinate Approves Hammer Joining the Government,” Davar (Aug. 14, 1975), 3; “Hammer and Ben-Meir Joining the Coalition Approved by Rabbinical Council,” Ha’aretz (Aug 14, 1975), ISA, P/5079/7; “In consideration of the Medini and religious decisions on the Agenda; The Chief Rabbinical Council Approves NRP Youth Joining the Government,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 15, 1975), 1. 42 “’Out of consideration for National needs’: The Chief rabbinate Approves Hammer Joining the Government,” Davar (Aug. 14, 1975), 3. 43 “Out of consideration for National needs” Davar (Aug. 14, 1975), 3.

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1974 edict. The CRC concurred, acknowledging Hammer and Ben-Meir for seeking the

council’s approval before joining the government.44

In its decision, the CRC observed that the government faced fateful decisions, “upon

which the future of our state and the Land of our Forefathers depend.” First and foremost, then, it

was vital to “trust in the Holy One Blessed Be He, the Hope of Israel and its Salvation.” In

addition, it was necessary to strengthen the government by expanding its base,

“thereby…strengthen[ing] the internal unity of the Nation and re-invigorat[ing] its spirit, its strength, and its hope.”45 Therefore, the CRC expected Ben-Meir and Hammer to work with their

colleagues “for the sake of the Torah, the People, and the Land,” as well as amend the Law of

Return to define Jewishness according to “the sacred Halakha.” The CRC’s decision concluded

with a prayer that Israel “merit peace in the Land and the fulfillment of the Word of the Lord in

His Torah: ‘and I shall separate you from the nations so that you will be mine,’ and in our days

may Judah be saved, and may Israel dwell securely in its land.”46

The editorial page in Ha-Tsofeh welcomed the CRC’s decision as a necessary and

positive development for both the country and the NRP.47 The NRP could now restore its cabinet

representation to full strength, as well as broaden the government’s base by including the Zeirim.

The editorial acknowledged that the CRC expected the NRP ministers to safeguard the Land of

Israel as well as work from within the government to resolve the “halakhic conversion” issue.

Furthermore, the editorial called for cabinet ministers to cooperate on diplomatic policy for the

44 “In consideration of the Medini and religious decisions on the Agenda; The Chief Rabbinical Council Approves NRP Youth Joining the Government,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 15, 1975), 1. 45 “In consideration,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 15, 1975), 1. 46 “In consideration,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 15, 1975), 1. 47 “The Decision and its Significance – Editorial,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 15, 1975), 2.

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good of the country and on Hammer to collaborate with his ministerial colleagues to amend the

Law of Return.

Although the CRC ruling was specific to Hammer and the Zeirim, Ha-Tsofeh’s editorial

inferred that NRP’s past disobedience was forgiven. The CRC had given an “authoritative Torah

stance” that enabled the entire party to participate in the government and restore “proper

relations…within the religious public.” Thus, the editorial asserted that the CRC’s ruling would

enable the NRP’s decision-making bodies to appoint new cabinet members in the future, in

accordance with its principles on foreign policy and religious issues.

1.G “The NRP, Troublesome Ally?”: Change and Continuity in the Zeirim’s Practice of Politics

Hammer’s candidacy for welfare minister illustrates the challenges facing the Zeirim as their movement matured, both figuratively and literally. The Zeirim’s practice of politics reflected their origins as a small group of young activists fighting their marginalization by the party establishment. They flouted coalition discipline in the Knesset and railed against capitulating to American pressure on the streets.

Nevertheless, the Zeirim lacked the power to replace the Old Guard outright, even as the highest echelons of leadership came within their grasp. Success forced the Zeirim to adapt their tactics, to coopt as well as confront. By joining the cabinet, the Zeirim would effectively acknowledge the futility of their struggle for a national unity government, while legitimizing the

Old Guard’s decision to join the coalition. Hammer would join a government he staunchly opposed, in service to the ideological imperative of preserving the “wholeness of the Land of

Israel.” At the same time, the Zeirim inched toward an alliance with Warhaftig despite significant ideological differences. These changes, however limited and tactical, reflected an ongoing

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process in which the Zeirim’s struggle to overthrow the establishment came to include cooptation

into that establishment.

As the Zeirim and the Chief Rabbinate conducted their own “reassessment” of the NRP’s

participation in the Rabin government, the Ford administration’s reassessment of American

policy came to an end. Kissinger announced his return to the Middle East for one final “shuttle”

to seal the deal between Egypt and Israel. The gap between the two sides had narrowed, and an

accord was just over the horizon, with votes in the Cabinet and the Knesset likely to follow.

Hammer and Ben-Meir intensified their campaign against the interim accord ahead of

Kissinger’s trip, seeking allies in the hawkish Rafi branch of the Alignment. While five of Rafi’s eight MKs opposed the agreement in the making, they would likely fall in line with Peres and

Ya’acobi, Rafi’s cabinet ministers.48 Daniel Vermus forced a meeting of the NRP presidium,

hoping to convene the Central Committee to vote on the accord. Burg and Raphael, though, were

determined to keep the issue in the hands of smaller, elite forums under their control.

Before Vermus could take the floor, a member of the presidium moved to appoint Geula

Raphael (Yitzhak Raphael’s spouse) as chairperson of the presidium. After an hour of pro-forma

debate over appointing a chairperson, the meeting was dissolved due to the lack of a chairperson.

Vermus angrily denounced the Old Guard’s transparent obstructionism, which prevented the

Zeirim from introducing a motion to convene the Central Committee.49 While Burg and Raphael

preserved their freedom of action, Hammer and Ben-Meir declared that they would be free from

48 “NRP Youth Trying to Convince Rafi Against the Interim Accord,” Ma’ariv (Aug. 18, 1975), 12. 49 “Young Guard thwarted by NRP Leaders,” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 20, 1975), 2.

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party discipline in the Knesset. The Old Guard accused the Zeirim of threatening to split the

party, and the atmosphere of mutual distrust put Hammer’s cabinet appointment on hold.50

As Foggy Bottom prepared for Kissinger’s trip, the Bureau for Intelligence and Research

(INR) circulated a report entitled “The NRP: Troublesome Ally in the Rabin Coalition.”51 The

report noted the NRP’s outsized, “pivotal role” in Israeli coalition governance and Labor’s

willingness to pay a “burdensome price in political patronage and religious influence” for the

NRP’s support. While a cabinet seat for the “hawkish Hammer” would “probably be worked

out,” the NRP’s alleged “insistence on the preeminent status of religious law in Israeli civil life”

made the party a “troublesome ally” for Rabin.52

Regarding the interim accord, the report noted that Burg and Raphael shared Rabin’s

preference for a partial agreement with Egypt over a return to Geneva. However, the NRP

ministers were expected to demand a high price for concessions. Within the Knesset Faction,

though, Hammer was “adamantly opposed to any ‘US-dictated’ Agreement,” and could be

expected to “back renewed activism by religious groups” to settle the West Bank and support

“anti-agreement demonstrations within Israel's major cities.”53

INR had good reason to expect “renewed activism” in the West Bank since Gush

Emunim had greeted Kissinger with wildcat settlement bids in the past. This time, however,

Gush Emunim decided to change its strategy. Pitching tents on windswept hills in the West Bank

50 “NRP Youth Trying to Convince,” Ma’ariv (Aug. 18, 1975), 12. 51 Theodore Feifer, “The NRP: Troublesome Ally in the Rabin Coalition,” August 18, 1975, Bureau of Intelligence and Research P750139-1402, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-1975/ P-Reel Printouts, RG 59; General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives. The report was authored by Ted Feifer, a newly minted Foreign Service Officer posted to INR’s Near East Division. Feifer was responsible for Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians, though most of his work at the time focused on the Lebanese Civil War. Feifer also provided “back-up” on Israel for Kissinger’s aid Peter Rodman, who accompanied the Secretary on his Mideast Shuttles. See, “Feifer, Theodore” Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, VA, www.adst.org, 19-22. 52 Feifer, 1-2. 53 Feifer, 1.

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had little impact on public opinion during Kissinger’s previous shuttle. The proposed interim

accord involved Sinai, not the West Bank. Consequent, many in Gush Emunim did not

necessarily oppose a redeployment of Israeli troops in Sinai, in principle.54 However, they feared that the interim accord would invite further American pressure for withdrawals on other fronts.

Thus, Gush Emunim made Henry Kissinger – the architect of the U.S. pressure campaign and the embodiment of American foreign policy – the target of their protests, investing the bulk of their resources in Jerusalem, where Kissinger would hold talks with the Israeli government.55

The first flowering of the Zeirim’s moderation was overshadowed by Kissinger’s return.

With Rav Goren’s support, the Zeirim were ready to join Rabin’s cabinet, effectively giving up

their struggle for a unity government and an amendment to the Law of Return. Their priority was

to safeguard the Land of Israel by bolstering the hawks in the cabinet. Before Hammer could join

the cabinet, though, the prospect of Kissinger’s return inflamed inter-factional tensions and put

Hammer’s appointment on hold.

The next part of this chapter examines Gush Emunim’s unprecedented protests against

Kissinger, the interim accord, and the Rabin government – including Burg and Raphael. While

most of the protests were peaceful, the initial violence upon Kissinger’s arrival put Gush

Emunim’s conduct, and the police response, up for debate. Gush Emunim succeeded in seizing

the agenda for opponents of the accords, overshadowing the Zeirim and unsettling Burg and

Raphael. All the while, tensions in the NRP continued to rise.

“Operation Kissinger”: Gush Emunim Enters the Fray over the Sinai II Accords upon Kissinger’s Return

54 Gorenberg, 308-311; Drezon-Tepler, 182-183. 55 Drezon-Tepler, 183.

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2.A The First Flowerings of the Opposition

Gush Emunim’s campaign against Kissinger, the interim agreement, the Rabin

government began prior to Kissinger’s arrival. Gush Emunim, the NRP Zeirim, and other groups

began preparations for a “trial” to establish whether Kissinger posed a “danger to the free

world.” Kissinger’s Jewishness was on trial as much as his diplomatic record in Vietnam and

Cambodia. Kissinger was also “charged” with being “a traitor to the Jewish People.”56 Small groups protested peacefully outside the American Embassy in Tel Aviv, passing along letters and petitions informing the secretary that he was “not welcome in Israel.” Some carried placards reading “Hitler spared you so you could finish the job,” to make sure Kissinger got the message.57

On the afternoon of August 20, several hundred people gathered in Independence Park

near the American Consulate in Jerusalem. Police looked on as their numbers swelled, and

teenage girls from religious high schools danced in circles. Hanan Porat and Moshe Shamir

addressed the group while young people waved signs and placards – “We Don’t Want a Peace

Like Vietnam!”– as television crews filmed the spectacle.58 American diplomats noted the

ubiquitous presence of religious teenagers in the crowd, which remained peaceful and gave the

consulate a wide berth.59 More worrying, though, were reports that Rabbi Moshe Levinger and

Gush Emunim were organizing demonstrations aimed at disrupting Kissinger’s arrival. The

militant Jewish Defense League was reportedly involved, and protesters were expected to

provoke clashes with police to attract attention to their cause.60

56 “Preparing a Public Trial Against K,” Ma’ariv (August 17, 1975), 1. 57 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Demonstration at Embassy” 1975TELAV05418 (August 19, 1975). 58 “7 held in anti-pact rallies,” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 21, 1975), 1. 59 Con. Gen. Jerusalem to State, “Secretary’s Visit – Demonstrations,” 1975JERUSA01326 (Aug. 20, 1975); “'Gush Emunim' Protested in Jerusalem Against Signing the Interim Accord with Egypt,” Ha-Tsofeh (August 21, 1975), 2. 60 “Secretary’s Visit – Demonstrations,” 1975JERUSA01326 (Aug. 20, 1975).

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As it turned out, the peaceful rally near the consulate was a diversion.61 Small groups of

demonstrators slipped away during the songs and speeches, heading for the Prime Minister’s

Residence. Police tried to disperse the crowds as protesters blocked traffic and chained

themselves to police barricades. Hundreds of angry demonstrators roamed the streets, waving

signs at journalists and chanting, “Traitor! Traitor!”, “Rabin Resign!”, and “Kissinger Go

Home!”62 Trucks and buses inched through the streets, emerging from the crowds bedecked with

posters denouncing the government. The crowds in downtown Jerusalem peaked at about 6:00

pm, as police officers on horseback ordered the protesters to disperse while others coaxed the

demonstrators off the streets. As the evening progressed, approximately 200 young activists

entered Jerusalem’s Old City in small groups, converging outside Foreign Minister Yigal Allon’s

second-floor apartment. Several demonstrators managed to climb up a balcony and break into

Allon’s home, only to be arrested when police arrived and dispersed the crowd.63

2.A.1 “Operation Kissinger”: Israeli and American Security Services Address Concerns over Kissinger’s Personal Safety

As the security situation deteriorated, Israeli authorities advised the American Embassy that they could not guarantee Secretary Kissinger’s personal safety on the highway from the airport to Jerusalem, despite his armored limousine. The United States Secret Service concurred,

61 “7 held in anti-pact rallies,” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 21, 1975), 1. 62 “'Gush Emunim' Protested in Jerusalem Against Signing the Interim Accord With Egypt,” Ha-Tsofeh (August 21, 1975), 2; “Israelis Break into Allon's Home to Protest Pact: Angry Israelis Break into Allon's Home,” Los Angeles Times (Aug. 21,1975), B1, 22; “7 held in anti-pact rallies,” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 21, 1975), 1. 63“7 held,” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 21, 1975), 1; “Anti-K demonstrators spent Sabbath in jail,” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 24, 1975), 2; “'Gush Emunim' Protested in Jerusalem Against Signing the Interim Accord With Egypt,” Ha-Tsofeh (August 21, 1975), 2; “Israel protesters invaded foreign minister's home,” Chicago Tribune (Aug. 21, 1975), 2; “Israelis Break into Allon's Home to Protest Pact: Angry Israelis Break into Allon's Home,” Los Angeles Times (Aug. 21,1975), B1, 22.

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and it was decided that Kissinger and other top officials would be helicoptered to Jerusalem. The

rest of Kissinger’s party would travel by motorcade to Jerusalem for a festive reception.64

With American personnel already in-country, an Airforce C-5A Galaxy cargo plane flew

in additional staff, security personnel, and two armored cars.65 Israeli authorities mobilized one

thousand police, border guards, and soldiers for “Operation Kissinger,” while the State

Department called in reinforcements from American diplomatic missions in Greece, Turkey, and

Iran. Advance teams were already hard at work converting the sixth floor of Jerusalem’s King

David Hotel into a “temporary State Department”, while police established a perimeter around

the building and guests were forced to check out of their rooms early to accomodate the influx of

Americans.66

In Washington, President Gerald Ford telephoned Kissinger before his departure for

Israel at Andrews Airforce Base.67 “There are riots all over Israel,” Kissinger told the President,

“So much so that they will not let me go by automobile.” Ford asked who was behind the unrest, but Kissinger replied that it was “hard to know.” He supposed that the demonstrations were

“probably” the work of the “opposition,” but in any event, it was “not the happiest atmosphere in which to try to save a country.”68

64 Los Angeles Times (Aug. 21,1975), B1, 22; Emb. To State, “Administrative/Logistical Arrangements - Car Assignments” 1975TELAV05462 (August 20, 1975); “Administrative / Logistical Arrangements -- Transportation from Airport” 1975TELAV05492 (Aug 20, 1975); “SECVISIT- Administrative/ Logistical Arrangements” 1975TELAV05437 (Aug. 19, 1975); “SECVISIT- Administrative/Logistical Arrangements” 1975STATE195299 (Aug. 17, 1975). 65 Los Angeles Times (Aug. 21,1975), B1, 22; “More US security men arrive,” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 20, 1975), 1; “K's Armoured Cars Arrive,” Jerusalem Post (Aug 21, 1975), 2; 66 “King David Ready,” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 21, 1975), 2; John Maclean, “Kissinger in Israel; street fights flare” Chicago Tribune, (Aug.22 , 1975), 1, 12; “Unprecedented Night of Protests with Kissinger's arrival in the City last night,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 22, 1975), 1-2. 67 “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation [hereinafter, “Telecon”] – The President – Secretary Kissinger, August 20, 1975 8:00 p.m. [Henry Kissinger’s Visit to Middle East; Document Includes Previously Withheld Text; Differently Excised Version Appended],” The Kissinger Conversations, Supplement II: A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969-1977, Digital National Security Archive, ProQuest, [Accessed Aug. 27, 2019] 68 Ford-Kissinger Telecon (August 20, 1975), 1.

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“Well,” said the President, “I think they have to realize, Henry, that the alternative is a hell of a lot worse for them.”

“I feel absolutely comfortable with what we have done,” Kissinger replied.

“I do too,” Ford said, reassuring Kissinger that his conscience should be “completely clean, free and clear.”

Wrestling with his own conflicted feelings over the pressure campaign he had orchestrated against the Israeli government, Kissinger remarked that if the shuttled failed, the alternative would be “going for the all-out agreement.” Thinking aloud and venting his frustration, Kissinger declared that “this situation cannot continue.”

“I hate like hell; to send you over there in that atmosphere,” Ford told Kissinger. “I worry about you.”

“Oh, physically?” Kissinger replied. “They will not dare make an attack.” A few “rioters” might try something, but the groups behind the demonstrations “would not do an organized thing.” Surely, the opposition knew that “if they did, it would ruin them in this country.”

Kissinger preferred not to think about it, and turned the President's attention to other business.69

Before ending the call, Ford brought the conversation back to the worrisome situation on the ground in Israel.

“I do wish you the very, very best,” Ford said. “I am concerned for your safety.”

“I think there is no problem, Mr. President,” Kissinger replied, trying to put Ford at ease.

Ford told Kissinger to “take care,” lightening the mood by suggesting that Kissinger

“throw [one of his staffers] to the wolves.” Kissinger assured the president that such extreme measures would not be necessary, since one thousand Israeli police officers had been mobilized

69 Ford-Kissinger Telecon (August 20, 1975),1- 2.

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for his protection. Alas, the additional security would give Kissinger’s unlucky aide “trouble

bringing girls into the hotel.”

Before ending the call, the president offered some encouragement to his secretary of

state. Ford said that he had the “highest faith that you will do what is in the best interest of the

country…good luck, and God bless you. Give Nancy our best.”70

2.A.2 NRP Party Politics and Kissinger’s Visit

Ha-Tsofeh’s editorial on August 21 noted that Kissinger’s arrival heralded the final stage of negotiations over the interim accord. While significant issues still remained unresolved,

Kissinger believed the talks would succeed; otherwise, he would not have returned. Still,

Kissinger needed to appreciate Israel’s well-founded concerns about the accord. The editorial

argued that the demonstrations ahead of Kissinger’s arrival were “the fruits of anxiety and fear

over what is to come.” Nevertheless, it was essential that the protesters behave lawfully and

peacefully. The decision over the interim accord would not be made on the streets, but “by the

institutions of the State of Israel lawfully empowered to do so.” Of course, this decision would

be made after the Knesset factions convened their “party committees” to debate the accords. 71

In addition to expressing empathy for the protesters and renouncing violence, the

editorial is notable for mentioning, almost as an afterthought, that the decision-making bodies in

Israel’s political parties would meet prior to the Knesset vote. This illustrates the outsized

influence of Israeli party politics on decision-making and foreign policy during this period. To be

sure, the negotiations were led by Rabin, Allon, and Peres. The cabinet would meet as necessary

in order to debate and vote on the negotiating team’s mandate as the talks progressed. Once an

70 Ford-Kissinger Telecon (August 20, 1975), 5. 71 “With Kissinger’s Arrival (editorial),” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 21, 1975), 2.

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agreement was reached, it would be brought before the cabinet. Following cabinet approval, the

government would request a Knesset debate before the final signing ceremony.

To varying degrees, the cabinet ministers and MKs could not act independently of their

parties. Thus, the Knesset debate would be scheduled in order to allow the political parties to

convene their decision-making bodies beforehand. In the case of the NRP, this meant that Burg

and Raphael would be forced to convene either the NRP Executive or the Central Committee to

formally instruct the NRP Knesset Faction to vote in favor of the accord.

Burg and Raphael were particularly vulnerable to pressure from the grassroots of the

party, due to the Zeirim’s organizing and Gush Emunim’s activism. The Zeirim pushed for

convening the NRP Central Committee, a larger decision-making body with closer ties to the

party base, giving the Zeirim a better chance at constraining the NRP’s Knesset members.72

While Burg and Raphael could block that particular gambit, they would still need to garner

support from leading NRP activists while outfoxing the Zeirim and Gush Emunim. This political

maneuvering would exacerbate the rifts within the party as Gush Emunim escalated its struggle

against the accords and turned up the pressure on Burg and Raphael.

2.A.3 Late to the Party: Mass Demonstrations Upon Kissinger’s Arrival on August 21, 1975

When Kissinger and his wife Nancy arrived in Israel on August 21, they were greeted by

Foreign Minister Yigal Allon at the airport. In a brief statement, the secretary signaled that an agreement was likely, expressed support for the Israeli government in the face of domestic

criticism and offered the United States’ continuing friendship. Harkening back to his departure

72 “Dayan to return to the country to participate in the vote on the interim accord,” Ma’ariv (Aug. 21, 1975), 4.

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the previous March, Kissinger was “very pleased to be back in Israel” and optimistic that “a

strong desire for peace will prevail.”73

Answering hawkish critics of the government, Kissinger noted the “conviction and

firmness” with which Rabin, Allon, and Peres conducted negotiations. He admitted that Israel

would inevitably be forced to make concessions. Such concessions, though, “reflect[ed] not a

weakened resolve, but the conviction that Israel's strength...gives it the possibility to dedicate

itself to peace without fear.” The secretary acknowledged that these had not been “easy times”

for Israelis, who were understandably concerned about the risks of peacemaking, which were “no

less awesome than sacrifices for war.” Kissinger concluded by acknowledging that “relations

between Israel and the United States have gone through a difficult period.” However, he

reassured Israelis that “this has ended, and we have emerged from our dialogue strengthened in

our friendship and determined to pursue common policies.”74

Kissinger and top-level members of the American delegation boarded a helicopter,

accompanied by Allon.75 The rest of his entourage, with the press corps in tow, set off on the

main road to Jerusalem. When the motorcade approached the city entrance, 150–200 activists

poured onto the street, blocking traffic into the capital. Teenagers and young adults chanted

73“Department of State Bulletin” LXXIII:1892 (Sept. 29, 1975), 458. 74 “Department of State Bulletin” LXXIII:1892 (Sept. 29, 1975), 458-459. 75 This reconstruction of event surrounding Kissinger’s arrival relies upon both American and Israeli press accounts, as well as U.S. diplomatic cables. See: “Administrative/Logistical Arrangements – Transportation from Airport” 1975TELAV05462 (Aug. 20, 1975); “Anti Kissinger Demonstrations 1975JERUSA01337 (Aug 22, 1975); John MacLean, “Kissinger in Israel; Street fights flare,” Chicago Tribune (Aug. 22, 1975) 1, 12; Marilyn Berger, “Kissinger Met in Israel by Protests,” Washington Post (Aug. 22, 1975), 1, 4; Unprecedented Night of Protests with Kissinger’s Arrival in the City Last Night,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug 22, 1975), 2; Abraham Rabinovitch and Judy Seigel, “Violent protests mark Kissinger’s arrival,” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 22, 1975) 1-2; “Police Officer: Jerusalem has never seen such a thing; intersections blocked; people accosted; cars stoned,” Ma’ariv (Aug. 22, 1975), 2, 11; “Timeline of Events,” Ma’ariv (Aug. 22, 1975), 2; “The Drinks Were Finished, The Food was Gone – And the guests remained…” Ma’ariv (Aug. 22, 1975), 1; “Water Cannons and Tear Gas - Against The Protestors,” Ma’ariv (Aug. 22, 1975), 1; “Exit blocked at reception,” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 22, 1975), 1.

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“Rabin, Resign!” and “Henry, Go Home!” as police tried to clear the street. Several dozen laid

down across the road, refusing orders to disperse.

After about 30 minutes, the order was given to disperse the protesters by force. Clashes

broke out as police began to bodily move the protesters, with officers using truncheons and tear

gas to clear the demonstrators from the road.76 The American motorcade was able to avoid the

violence (and the gridlock) by taking a side road into the city, though the baggage car was lost.

Kissinger’s helicopter set down near the King David Hotel, and the travel-weary

Americans settled in on the sixth floor.77 Meanwhile, demonstrations continued across the city.

Near the Wolfson Towers, children danced in circles and chanted slogans. Downtown, hundreds

blocked traffic at Zion Square. Outside the Prime Minister’s Office, police arrested several

members of the Herut youth movement, where some of the ringleaders had stockpiled eggs to

hurl at American and Israeli officials.

As the evening went on, the protesters converged on the Knesset, where a reception was

to be held in Kissinger’s honor. Gush Emunim activists blocked traffic along roads leading to the

Knesset, forcing the American motorcade to take a roundabout route along dirt roads before

arriving at a side entrance to the Knesset 20–30 minutes late. Unable to reach the parliament

building by car, officials and other guests, along with the police, were accosted by protesters as

they walked toward the Knesset on foot.

Reports vary on whether Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek was slapped, spit-upon, or

egged in the face. Yosef Burg, the NRP minister who was known to staunchly support the

government and the accord, was greeted with jeers, insults, and curses. The crowd in the vicinity

76 Jerusalem Post (Aug. 22, 1975) 1-2; Ma’ariv (Aug. 22, 1975), 1-2, 11; Ha-Tsofeh (Aug 22, 1975), 2. 77 “MemCom Israeli Political Situation – Secretary’s Hotel Suite (Rm. 620), King David Hotel, Jerusalem - Aug 21, 1975, 7:25pm – 7:50 pm,” The Kissinger transcripts: a verbatim record of U.S. diplomacy, 1969-1977, Digital National Security Archive, ProQuest, [Accessed Aug. 19, 2019].

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of the Knesset swelled to approximately two thousand, as throngs of demonstrators continued to

arrive. As the situation escalated, police were ordered to disperse the crowd, using force if

necessary. The commander in chief of the national police force, himself a guest at the reception,

kept a close eye on the situation.

The police used tear gas and water cannons to clear the streets while demonstrators

overturned cars, let the air out of tires, and threw rocks at police officers and soldiers sent to

restore order. Arrests were made, wounded on both sides were taken to hospital, while a group of

several hundred youths sat singing in the streets. The youths even seemed to enjoy being

drenched by police water-cannons and hoses in the hot, summer weather.

Long after the drinks ran out and the food was gone, officials and dignitaries were trapped in the Knesset building. As midnight approached, Kissinger’s party left through a back door after police managed to clear a route back to the King David Hotel.78 While demonstrators

managed to locate and surround Kissinger’s motorcade, they were dispersed by police after

trying to tip over the cars in the secretary’s motorcade. The American delegation arrived safely at

their hotel, but the night was far from over.

Cadres Gush Emunim activists led by Rabbi Moshe Levinger drove into Jerusalem,

entering the city through various entrances before converging near the King David Hotel. At

approximately 4 a.m., the activists assembled a “motorcade” of their own around the block from

the hotel. Lights came on in the windows of the King David hotel and area residents angrily took

to their balconies as Levinger’s group chanted anti-Kissinger slogans into loudspeakers mounted

on their cars. Quiet was restored after an hour or two, and Rabbi Levinger was taken into custody

after a decidedly unorthodox car chase.79

78 Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, 271. 79 “Anti-K demonstrators spend Sabbath in jail” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 24, 1975) 2; Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 24, 1975), 2.

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Demonstrations continued throughout Kissinger’s shuttle and the signing of the Sinai II

Accords, but the evening of Kissinger’s arrival became a particular source of shame and anger for Israeli officials.80 Rabin was “shocked and ashamed” at Kissinger’s’ treatment, directing his

anger toward Gush Emunim, whose conduct he considered “despicable and misguided.” Hoping

to mend fences after a tense period in US–Israel relations, Rabin had planned a festive reception

in Kissinger’s honor. Instead, Gush Emunim “stormed through the streets of the capital like

common rabble and laid siege to the Knesset to disrupt the reception.” The prime minister was

particularly disgusted by the “self-styled ‘Guardians of the Faith,’…who claimed divine

justification for embellishing their religious chauvinism with anti-Semitic slurs.” Rabin took a

dim view, moreover, of “[Gush Emunim’s] ‘spiritual mentor’ – the eminent Rabbi Zvi Yehudah

Kook – [who] referred to [Kissinger] as ‘the husband of a gentile woman.’” In Rabin’s view,

“there could be no excuse for Jews anywhere to stoop to such obscene behavior.”81

2.A.4 “They’re Practicing for the High Holidays”: Protest, Prayer, and the Police

The next morning, the press was called into the first negotiating sessions between Rabin

and Kissinger, where the prime minister apologized to Kissinger before the assembled cameras

and microphones.82 After Rabin expressed his regrets, the press was shown out of the room, and

the delegations began to haggle over American political commitments to Israel. Shimon Peres

tried to make the case for a U.S. presence in electronic monitoring stations, but was drowned out

by the sound of a shofar.

“Are those protesters?” Kissinger asked.

80 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 452; Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, 271-272. 81 Rabin, 271. 82 “Memorandum of Conversation at Prime Minister's Residence, Jerusalem, Friday, August 22, 1975, 9:50 a.m. - 2:30 p.m..,” Box 4 - August 21 - September 1, 1975 - Sinai Disengagement Agreement - Vol. I (1), Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, 1.

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“They're practicing for the High Holidays,” Allon replied in jest.

“Outside the prime minister's house?” Kissinger joked, “That's carrying the coalition with the [National-]Religious Party too far.”83

The shofar-blower outside Rabin’s residence that morning, though, was likely not an enthusiastic supporter of the NRP’s representatives in the Rabin government. While many of the protesters were NRP voters, party members, or part of its Bnei Akiva youth movement, their anger was not only directed at Burg and Raphael no less than Kissinger and Rabin. As cabinet ministers, the two represented the national-religious public in the government while simultaneously representing the government within the religious-Zionist camp. Consequently,

Burg and Raphael faced an onslaught of anger over the arrest of NRP constituents, many of whom were also injured in clashes with police.

* * *

Over the weekend, smaller demonstrations took place across the country were mostly peaceful, particularly over the Sabbath. On Friday evening, several hundred religious youths, identified as supporters of Gush Emunim, held a prayer service welcoming the Sabbath outside the Prime Minister’s Residence in Jerusalem.84 They returned the next morning dressed in

Sabbath finery, conducting morning prayers. Police looked on from a distance, having apparently decided that the young men in prayer shawls posed no threat to public order. Later, they walked to the police headquarters, bringing a Torah scroll so that Rabbi Levinger and the other detainees could read the weekly Torah portion. The praying protesters, meanwhile, held a kiddush outside

83 Ibid, 6. 84 Waxman et. al., “Protest at Country Club Junction Turned into Mass Brawl between Police and Protestors,” Ma’ariv (Aug. 24, 1975), 3.

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the compound in solidarity with the prisoners.85 The same morning, several dozen religious

youths conducted a festive service outside Rabin’s private home in Ramat Aviv. After much

singing and dancing, they listened to sermons denouncing the proposed interim agreement.86

2.A.5 R. Zvi Yehudah’s Effort to Mobilize Turnout for Anti-Accord Demonstrations

Protests and rallies across the country were also planned for Saturday evening after the

conclusion of the Sabbath. Rav Zvi Yehudah penned an open letter of encouragement to the

“dear, sweet protesters [who will be demonstrating] this motzei shabbat.”87 To R. Zvi Yehudah,

the demonstrations were part of a Manichean struggle between the “wondrous devotion” of the

heroic youth and the “weak government and the [weak] of faith.”88

Rav Zvi Yehudah promised that the demonstrators’ “names, legacies, and actions” would

“endure in the chronicles of our nation,” for their part in “the resurrection of the word of the

Lord in [the national] patrimony.” The Rabin government, though, would be remembered in

infamy for being led astray by “The Apostate” (i.e., Kissinger). Rav Zvi Yehudah likened the

Rabin government to the British mandatory regime. He held that the rapid and spectacular

dissolution of the British Empire had been Diving retribution for Great Britain’s “betrayal” of its

“historic mission” to facilitate the Jewish return to Zion. So too, the Rabin government would

eventually fall as punishment for “being carried away in servitude to the foreign minister of

another country, to our great sorrow and humiliation.”

85 “Prayer Services held to protest interim accord,” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 24, 1975), 2; “Protest at Country Club Junction,” Ma’ariv (Aug. 24, 1975), 3; “Detention Order Issued for 22 protestors against Kissinger in Jerusalem,” Ha-Tsofeh, (Aug. 24, 1975), 2. 86 “Prayer,” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 24, 1975), 2; “Protest at Country Club,” Ma’ariv (Aug. 24, 1975), 3; “Detention Order,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 24, 1975), 2. 87 Saturday night, after the conclusion of the Sabbath. 88 “RZY Kook: Yasher koah to our dear, sweet protestors,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 24, 1975), 2.

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2.A.6 Clashes at the “Country Club”: The Use of Force by Police

With the encouragement of R. Zvi Yehudah and others, small demonstrations were held across the country.89 In the northern city of Netanya, Gush Emunim held a rally in Independence

Square, where Rabbi Moshe Zvi Neriah, a former NRP MK and the rosh yeshiva of the Bnei

Akiva network of religious high schools, spoke against the interim accord. In Haifa, several

hundred Bnei Akiva teenagers danced and sang near the central synagogue, disrupting traffic for

a half-hour before proceeding to a nearby movie theater where they gathered on the sidewalk and

listened to speakers denouncing the accords. Some chanted anti-Kissinger slogans while others

distributed advertisements for the mock trial of Henry Kissinger, which was being organized by

the NRP Zeirim, Gush Emunim, and various student groups.

While most of the demonstrations on the night of August 23 were peaceful, allegations of

severe police brutality emerged after a small rally near the “Country Club” junction north of Tel

Aviv. It was rumored that Kissinger and the Israeli negotiating team would meet nearby to hold

talks after the Sabbath (In fact, Kissinger remained in Jerusalem’s King David Hotel).90 Several

hundred youths, many from Bnei Akiva, walked along the road and gathered near the junction,

where some of the demonstrators taunted police, screaming “Nazis! Nazis!”91 Other

demonstrators chanted the verse, “Take counsel together, and it will come to naught; speak a

word and it will not come to pass, for God is with us!”92 Still others waved placards and signs

89 “Protests in Haifa and Netanya Against Withdrawal,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 24, 1975), 1. 90 Protest at Country Club Junction in North TA – Where Kissinger and the Israeli Team Held Talks,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 24, 1975), 91 Ma’ariv (Aug. 24, 1975), 3. 92 This verse from Isaiah (8:10) is part of a prophecy in which God promised to protect Israel from the Assyrian Empire; “Protest at Country Club Junction,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 24, 1975); Ma’ariv (Aug. 24, 1975), 3.

298 proclaiming, “Kissinger, we don’t want you here” and “We regret to inform you of the untimely passing of the Independence of the Israeli Government.”93

Although traffic flowed freely, police reportedly used indiscriminate force to disperse the crowd. Officers swung nightsticks and truncheons freely, hitting protesters as well as passers-by.

One officer was seen smashing the rear window of a parked car, while another took a swing at journalist Yitzhak Oded. Police also roughed up a Likud lawmaker who complained about damage to his car. The injured included women and children, student leaders, and a rabbi. 94

2.B The Controversy over the Conduct of Protesters and Police Enters the NRP Debate over the Interim Accord

The chaotic, lawless protests surrounding Kissinger’s arrival presented a new challenge for law enforcement as well as an unprecedented challenge to state authority. While it was beyond Rabin’s authority to “teach Gush Emunim the rudiments of good manners,” he would settle for an end to “rioting in the streets.” Rabin, then, personally ordered the police to “put a stop to it – by force, if necessary.”95 However, this heavy-handed response played into the hands of Gush Emunim’s militant elements, who set out to provoke violent confrontations with law enforcement.

Many police officers struggled to confront this unexpectedly militant activism against a visiting allied statesman under their protection. Assault on the persons and property of high- ranking Israeli officials, such as the mayor of Jerusalem, the foreign minister, and the interior minister, lent further urgency to the situation. Hostile behavior and vitriolic rhetoric by some protesters, along with a police crackdown ordered from the top, created a situation in which

93 Ma’ariv (Aug. 24, 1975), 3. 94 Yitzhak Oked, “Police swing at protesters,” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 24, 1975), 1; “Against Violence at Demonstrations,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 25, 1975), 2 95 Rabin, 272.

299 many police officers employed excessive and, at times, indiscriminate force. Within the NRP, the conduct of the police, as well as that of Gush Emunim, became intertwined with the debate over the interim accord.

Zevulun Hammer and Ben-Meir, the self-styled “political representatives” of many Gush

Emunim activists, emerged as the most strident critics of the police. Within the NRP establishment, many felt a natural sympathy for the young, kippa-clad demonstrators from the movement’s youth group and schools. The “Country Club” incident, in particular, elicited fierce criticism of the police, leading many to see the protesters as innocent idealists and overlook the militant tendencies among them.

When the cabinet took up the issue of the protests and police response, Burg and Raphael joined their ministerial colleagues in condemning the violence and expressing support for the police.96 Burg, who was himself a target of intimidation, took a forceful stand against the demonstrators, further straining his relationship with the Zeirim. Moreover, the debate over the interim accords within the NRP became inexorably linked to debates over the behavior of the protesters, the police response, and the legitimacy of state authority.

2.B.1 Burg and Raphael Participate in Cabinet Deliberations over the Violence among Protesters and Police

When the government met on August 24, Raphael took a hard line on both the negotiations as well as allegations of police misconduct. The cabinet refused Rabin’s request for a mandate to “bring the negotiations to a positive conclusion.” After a lengthy debate, it was decided to simply release a statement that negotiations would continue “on the basis of prior

96 “The Government Condemns The Protests,” Davar (Aug. 25, 1975), 2; “The Cabinet: The Police Conducted themselves with restrain; Expresses its Appreciation” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 25, 1975), 1

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[Cabinet] decisions.”97 Raphael interjected, proposing that the government adopt a resolution

declaring that Israel would make “no additional offers of concessions.” Some argued that

Raphael’s proposal would be misread as an Israeli attempt to scuttle the talks, while others feared

that it would make the cabinet seem divided between tough and timid ministers. Burg reminded

his colleagues that “there was no need” for a new government decision, and the cabinet simply

issued a statement that previous government resolutions remained in-force and negotiations

would continue.98

Later, when the cabinet took up the issue of ongoing violent demonstrations against the accord, Raphael submitted a formal inquiry over allegations of police brutality. During the 90- minute debate, Police Minister Shlomo Hillel, himself a critic of the proposed agreement, resolutely defended law enforcement. The police, he argued, had shown restraint in the face of demonstrators who resorted to violence. In addition, demonstrators who blocked traffic posed a danger to public safety and created conditions bordering on civil unrest. For his part, Burg

leveled criticism at the media for broadcasting reports that were likely to increase public support

for the protesters. Ultimately, the cabinet issued a statement “express[ing] its appreciation and

gratitude to the Israel police.” Violence on the part of protesters, it declared, endangered Israel’s

“democratic way of life,” and the police were to be commended for “conducting themselves with

proper and laudable restraint.” That said, the minister of police would investigate every

allegation of police brutality.99

97 “The Government Did Not Authorize the Team to Make Additional Concessions,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 25, 1975), 1- 2. 98 Ibid. 99 “The Government Condemns,” Davar (Aug. 25, 1975), 2; “The Cabinet,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 25, 1975), 1. “Minister Hillel and the Police Commander in Chief to Appear Tomorrow in the Knesset On the Issue of the Protests,” Ma’ariv (Aug. 26, 1975), 12.

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2.B.2 Ben-Meir and Hammer Criticize Police Conduct along with the Interim Accord:

In a television interview, Ben-Meir accused police of using excessive force, beating men,

women, and children “in the cruelest fashion” in both Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. The incident at

the “Country Club Junction” stood out as particularly egregious. The sheer multitude of reports,

Ben-Meir argued, both in the media and from private citizens, proved that police used excessive

and unnecessary force against peaceful protesters. Moreover, Ben-Meir rejected the notion that

blocking traffic, in and of itself, warranted the use of violence by police.100

That evening, Hammer took the government and police to task at a rally in Bnei Brak,

and drew a direct connection between the proposed interim accord and the conduct of the police.

Hammer declared that the Rabin government had no the moral authority to withdraw from

territory in Sinai. Therefore, it was resorting to violence in order to force the agreement on the

people. The crowd cheered as Hammer denounced the “out of control” police who beat

demonstrators “on orders received from above.” Hammer recounted his encounters with rabbis,

women, and children beaten by police. Territorial withdrawal, Hammer insisted, was “a matter

to be decided by the people, not by police coercion.” 101

As the crowd cheered, Hammer warned against being “seduced by American billions,”

calling on Israelis to make do with less. Taking a stand against American pressure would

“invigorate” the “national spirit” and inspire renewed commitment to the “great values” of the

Jewish people. However, accepting the accord would leave the country “flooded with

[American] money” and “weaken the people’s spirit,” thereby inviting an “Arab attack against a

weak nation.” Hammer believed that by “stand[ing] up against the dictates,” Israel would earn the “support of American Jewry and important members of the American Congress.”

100 Ibid. 101 “Z Hammer: The Agreement Won't Be Concluded with Police Violence,” Ha-Tsofeh (August 25, 1975),

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2.B.3 Public Comments by Burg and Raphael on the Protests and the Peace Process

Burg and Raphael also spoke out publicly. In a television interview, Raphael predicted

that an agreement would be reached, but he foresaw difficulties ahead. Israel and Egypt had yet

to agree on the exact lines of deployment around the mountain passes or the presence of

American technicians at electronic listening posts in the buffer zone. Raphael also presented

himself as a staunch defender of the Golan settlements. “I do not see a possibility for an accord

with Syria,” said Raphael. Israel could only accept “cosmetic” changes to the existing lines in an

interim accord, although a final peace agreement was another matter. Still, Raphael saw “no

chance at all” that Syria would agree to peace terms that Israel could accept.102

Raphael also stressed that “the Zeirim” were not the only ones “in my party” with doubts

about the interim accord. Raphael and many of his associates were gravely concerned, and the

NRP’s decision-making bodies would take up the matter when the final terms of the accord were

known.103

As for the demonstrations, Raphael claimed that the cabinet heard and understood the

protesters’ message. Peaceful protest was perfectly acceptable, but there had been “a few

provocations” by protesters “in the last demonstrations.” Raphael addressed the protesters

directly, saying that he “had the opportunity to explain the protesters’ reservations to Dr.

Kissinger, and to his deputy in more detail.” Raphael had told the Americans that the demonstrators had legitimate and sincere objections to the accord, but that even they were “ready for peace with Egypt on the basis of far-reaching territorial compromise.” The protesters simply had “greater doubts than others that the present negotiations would bring about peace.”104

102 “Minister Y Raphael: Difficulties in the Talks Still Expected,” Ha-Tsofeh (August 25, 1975), 1-2. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid.

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Burg was more circumspect in his public pronouncements. He expected that “the coming

days” would be “decisive” and urged the public to withhold judgment on the accord. “The

agreement is complicated,” Burg explained, “because it is being conducted as an Egyptian-

American-Israeli triangle” instead of a bilateral process. Ministerial responsibility limited what

Burg and other cabinet members could tell the public, but he hoped that “the government would

be able to explain its position” after concluding the negotiations. Once the facts were known, the

public would understand “the extent to which [Burg and his cabinet colleagues] took a stand” for

Israeli security. As for the protests, Burg commented that debate and protest were, indeed,

essential in any democracy. However, demonstrators should take care to ensure that their

behavior remained within the confines of the law.

2.B.4 Gush Emunim’s Demonstrations Exacerbate Tensions within the NRP

Tensions in the NRP caused by Gush Emunim’s conduct and the police response

compounded pre-existing friction over the interim accord, itself. Hammer and Ben-Meir

demanded that Avraham Melamed convene the NRP Faction Chairman to discuss Burg’s alleged

violations of the NRP policy platform by taking dovish positions in cabinet meetings. The Zeirim also accused Burg of siding with Gush Emunim’s critics during the cabinet debate over the protests.105

Within the NRP, some speculated that Ben-Meir and Hammer’s attacks on Burg were likely to scuttle Hammer’s candidacy for a ministerial post. One NRP official told Davar that

“the protests’ only accomplishment [was that they] prevent[ed] Hammer’s entry into the

105 “Hammer and Ben-Meir Demand that the NRP Knesset Factions Convene for Debate over “the ‘Dovish Votes’ of Minister Burg,” Ha-Tsofeh (August 26, 1975) 1; “Addition of Ministers from NRP Postponed Until After Interim Accord,” Ma’ariv (Aug. 27, 1975), 4; “Tensions in the NRP Between the Zeirim and the Majority Factions,” Davar (August 26, 1975), 2.

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government, which [was] nothing to be sorry about.”106 Burg, though, insisted that he continued

to support Hammer’s appointment to the cabinet, and denied rumors that alternatives to Hammer

were being considered. Hammer, for his part, stressed that he was completely focused on

opposing the interim accord.107

Others observed that the Zeirim were being dragged to the right by Gush Emunim. The movement’s mass demonstrations put severe pressure on NRP ministers and Knesset members while creating rifts within and between various elements in the party. The Religious Kibbutz movement, for instance, withdrew from a conference that included Labor-affiliated kibbutz movements whose younger members were organizing counterdemonstrations against Gush

Emunim. The anti-Kissinger demonstrations were sure to come under fire at the meeting, and while Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Dati officially disapproved of Gush Emunim’s conduct, many of its members were active in Gush Emunim. The movement therefore pullout out of the conference, lest criticism of Gush Emunim cause internal strife among the kibbutzniks. Thus, Gush

Emunim’s inroads into the traditionally dovish Religious Kibbutz Movement stymied grassroots

cooperation between elements in the labor and the national-religious camps.108 Gush Emunim’s

demonstrations, then, exacerbated tensions within the NRP and drove a wedge between religious

Zionism and labor.

2.C The Limits of Militancy and the Shift toward Non-violent Protest.

106 “Tensions in the NRP,” Davar (August 26, 1975), 2. 107 “Addition of Ministers,” Ma’ariv (Aug. 27, 1975), 4. 108 “Tensions in the NRP,” Davar (August 26, 1975), 2.

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2.C.1 Militant “Mussar”: Rabbi Moshe Levinger and his Followers Garner Support by Remaining in Prison

Rabbi Moshe Levinger and other demonstrators arrested during the anti-Kissinger

protests remained in prison, with Levinger leading many of them in a hunger strike.109 While

they had been offered bail, it would only be granted on the condition that they sign a declaration

that they would not participate in further demonstrations. Levinger’s group refused, for prison

was precisely where they wanted to be.110 Elyakim Ha’Etzni, a Gush Emunim activist and

lawyer for the detained demonstrators, explained his clients’ strategy. The detainees aimed to

“force the police to arrest 5,000 protesters and bring them to the court,” overwhelming the justice

system and throwing the government off-balance. Ha’Etzni also declared that, upon their release,

his clients would continue demonstrating, even after Kissinger’s departure.111

In the detention facility at the police headquarters in the Russian Compound, the

detainees came under the care of R. Raphael Levin, whose late father R. Aryeh Levin was known

as the “Rabbi of the Prisoners” for ministering to political prisoners, among others, during the

British Mandate. R. Shlomo Goren also stopped in from time to time, and the prisoners were

permitted to hold Torah classes and “mussar schmoozim.” The group also welcomed visitors,

including prominent rabbinic figures such as Rabbi Avraham Shapira, rosh yeshiva of Merkaz

HaRav, and Rabbi Haim Druckman, head of the Orot Etzion yeshiva.112 In addition to offering

words of encouragement and hizzuk, the rabbis persuaded Levinger’s group to break their hunger

109 “MK Dr. Z Warhaftig Visits Gush Emunim Prisoners in Jail in Jerusalem,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 28, 1975), 1; “‘We Call on the Public to Declare Civil Disobedience,’ Said Prisoners to MK’s Who Visited them in Jail,” Ma’ariv (Aug. 28, 1975), 4. 110 Ma’ariv (Aug. 28, 1975), 4. 111 Ma’ariv (Aug. 28, 1975), 4. 112 “MK Dr. Z Warhaftig,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 28, 1975), 1; “We Call on the Public,” Ma’ariv (Aug. 28, 1975), 4.

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strike for the Sabbath.113 Others in the group allowed themselves an additional leniency,

accepting ice cream from Likud MK Yigal Horowitz.114

Horowitz came with a delegation of Likud MKs, accompanied by Hammer and Ben-

Meir. Warhaftig, though, visited the prisoners on his own, separate from the anti-accord MKs.

Rabbi Levinger had “mussar” of his own for the Knesset members over their alleged “silence” on the interim accords. In his view, the government had ignored the will of the people, undermined Israeli democracy, and secreted Kissinger into Jerusalem in a manner that was “an affront to the State and its honor.” Levinger believed that the MKs should have protested from within the Knesset, and urged them to prevent the parliament from functioning by disrupting

Knesset proceedings to prevent the parliament from functioning. He also warned that the group would refuse water and call for mass civil disobedience if the government offered further concessions.115

One of the detainees, a high school senior, asked the MKs to call on Israeli students to

boycott the first day of school on August 31, and take to the streets. Others called for work

stoppages at factories and civil unrest. Levinger vowed that, even if the group were released on

bail, it would continue to organize demonstrations, which would be non-violent, but

“tumultuous.”

Ultimately, the MKs promised to march in Gush Emunim’s demonstration on August 28.

Horowitz told the protesters that theirs was a struggle not only over Judea and Samaria but also

over Tel Aviv. Eitan Livni promised to work against police violence, though Yoram Aridor

cautioned that the issue must not distract from the political struggle against the accord. Geula

113 “Protest Detainees in Jail in Jerusalem Intensify their Hunger Strike,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug 31, 1975), 1. 114 Ma’ariv (Aug. 28, 1975), 4. 115 Ibid

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Cohen accused the government of “brainwashing” the public by distracting the people over a few

kilometers in Sinai while it negotiated away Israel’s sovereignty. Ben-Zion Keshet, also backed

the demonstrators, and felt a bit jealous of the their youthful vigor, which allowed them to fight

the good fight.

Hammer made a particularly noteworthy comment, which illuminates the symbolic

significance of the protesters’ continued detention. Hearing government officials call for

“fighting against dissidents among the public,” and then seeing the detainees in jail, Hammer

could not help but worry that Israel was returning to the “dark period of the Saison,” a time when

the Jewish Agency ordered the Haganah to crack down on the Irgun, to keep the right-wing militia from attacking British targets in Palestine during World War Two. Surrounded, as he was, by former fighters and commanders of the Irgun, Hammer’s comment was particularly poignant.116 Ultimately, the group refused to disrupt the Knesset proceedings as Levinger asked,

but promised to participate in a mass rally scheduled for August 28.

Hammer and Ben-Meir certainly identified with the protesters, and were willing to

champion their cause. However, this did not mean that they were willing to employ the militant

tactics R. Levinger had suggested. It was one thing to use parliamentary maneuvers to rankle the

governing coalition, but preventing the Knesset from operating was beyond the pale. Similarly,

Hammer and Ben-Meir did not shy away from rallies and demonstrations where firebrand

speakers riled up the crowds. However, they only took part in rallies and demonstrations that

were held lawfully. While they were vocal in their criticism of police violence against

demonstrators, Hammer and Ben-Meir did not advocate or encourage violence on the part of the

demonstrators.

116 Ma’ariv (Aug. 28, 1975), 4.

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2.C.2 “It Is a Time of Peril for Jacob”: Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren Works to Preserve Societal Cohesion, Remaining (Mostly) Neutral on the Interim Accord

The differences between Gush Emunim and the Zeirim over the appropriate means to oppose the accords found a parallel in the statement by R. Zvi Yehuda Kook and Chief Rabbi

Shlomo Goren. The former expressed his heartfelt support for the protesters, both on the streets and in prison.117 Indeed, R. Zvi Yehudah’s public declarations were also aimed at mobilizing the

faithful to take to the street. R. Goren, however, was not the spiritual leader of a protest

movement but a public official in service of the state. Moreover, he did not share R. Zvi

Yehudah’s conviction that the areas up for negotiation were part of the Land of Israel.118

Consequently, R. Goren’s focus was on maintaining social cohesion and support for the

government as it worked to secure the interests of the country.

Two days before Kissinger’s arrival, Chief Rabbi Goren issued a plea for civility during a

Torah scroll dedication ceremony. He observed that Israel would soon face “grave” decisions

over which “there are opinions going both ways.” However, all Israelis, R. Goren declared, were

“equal in their desire for true peace.” The acceptance of the Torah, Goren noted, was “a symbol

of the solidarity and unity of the people of Israel, the State of Israel, and the Torah of Israel.”

Indeed, Jewish tradition taught that during the revelation at Mount Sinai, the entirety of the

Jewish People were united “as one people with one heart.”119 R. Goren went on to make a subtle

political statement after ceremoniously writing the final letters in the new Torah scroll, remaking

that the completed scroll symbolized the “wholeness of our Torah and the inheritance of our

117 See, e.g. “R.Z.Y Kook: Ya’asher kokhakhem to our dear, sweet protestors [Blessed is God, Eve of the Holy Sabbath ‘When you shall enter the Land that the Lord, 5735 {Aug. 22, 1975}],’” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 24, 1975), 2; “Blessing of Encouragement from R. Z. Y. Kook to the Prisoners of the Jerusalem Protests,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 29, 1975), 2; “Might and Fortitude for the People!” Ha-Tsofeh (Sep. 2, 1975), 1. 118 Shifra Mescheloff, “The Public Image and Creative Torah Work of Rabbi Shlomo Goren (1948-1994),” PhD Thesis (Ramat-Gan, Israel: Bar Ilan University, July 2010), 111. 119A reference to Rashi on Exodus 19:2, “Israel encamped there.”

309 forefathers.” The “inheritance of our forefathers” could be interpreted as a reference not only to the Torah but also to the Land of Israel.120

Rav Goren’s call for unity and civility prior to Kissinger’s visit received scant attention.

However, following the violent clashes between demonstrators and police, the chief rabbi’s “Call for the Unity of the Nation and Ahavat Yisrael” was widely disseminated.121 His proclamation was emphatically non-partisan, drawing heavily from the Bible and the piyyutim of the High

Holiday literature to transcend the debate over the interim agreement. Rav Goren proclaimed to his “dear friends and neighbors from the Right and from the Left” that “it is a time of peril for

Jacob, but from it he shall be saved” (Jeremiah 30:7). He proclaimed that the “Enemies of Israel” sought its isolation and destruction, so that “the Name Israel [would] no longer be remembered.”

(Psalms 83:5) In the face of this hostility, the government was in the midst of making “the most fateful decisions which will determine the future and well-being of the Land and the State.”

Therefore, “how terrible it [was] to see instances of fraternal hatred.”

“Violence and hate,” R. Goren declared, would undermine the country’s “moral and social resolve,” thereby imperiling “The People which Dwells in Zion.” It was vital, then, for

Israelis to realize that the nation’s strength and survival depended on unity, both at home and in the Diaspora. With Rosh Hashanah approaching, the Jewish people found themselves in the traditional “month of mercy and forgivingness.” In that spirit, he urged the public to “strengthen the love of Israel in your hearts, the love of one's friend, the love of all who call themselves

120 “Rabbi Goren at Torah Scroll Dedication Ceremony in Kiryat Motzkin,” Ha-Tsofeh (August 20, 1975) ISA, P/5079/7 121 “Call by the Chief Rabbi of Israel Shlomo Goren for Unity of the Nation and Ahavat Yisrael,” [Statement dated 16 Elul 5735/ August 26, 1975], Rabbi Shlomo Goren – Reactions, Declarations, Manifestos, and Calls to the Public, Personal Archive of Rabbi Shlomo Goren, Israel State Archive, ISA, P/5084/27; “Rabbi Goren ‘Against the Waves of Hate in our Midst,’” Yedioth Aharonot (Aug. 27, 1975), ISA, P/5079/7; “Rabbi Goren: Reject and Despise Every Manifestation of Hate and Violence,” Davar, (Aug. 27, 1975), ISA, P/5079/7; “R. S. Goren calls on Citizens of Israel to Strengthen Unity and to Stop all Fraternal Hatred,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 27, 1975), 1.

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Jews,” while “rejecting and deploring all expressions of hate and violence.” Goren prayed that

the government would be guided by the “Divine Presence” and “goodly counsel” in its

“determinations and decisions,” “in the merit of Ahavat Yisrael and unity” in Israeli society.122

After issuing his public appeal for an end to hate and violence, R. Goren traveled to Sinai

for a pre- High Holiday “awakening” tour of the front lines.123 As the founding Chief Rabbi of

the IDF, R. Goren did not shy away from military matters. Whereas former IDF generals

regularly “graduated” into the Knesset and the Cabinet, R. Goren “graduated” from the IDF

Rabbinate to the Rabbinate of the state. R. Goren’s rabbinic persona combined traditional piety

and erudition with the abrupt brashness of Israeli generals and statesmen. Goren continued to

hold the rank of a general in the reserves and prided himself on earning paratroopers’ wings. As

Chief Rabbi, R. Goren regularly corresponded with foreign leaders and Israeli politicians, using

the access afforded by his position to involve himself in matters of state policy.124

This duality was evident during R. Goren’s tour of the front. Visiting with the troops,

their officers, and area commanders, R. Goren called on the soldiers to maintain their “spiritual

and moral superiority,” which was their true source of strength. Israel, he declared, was indeed

going through difficult times. However, it was but another “stage of the realization of the vision

of the third redemption, as promised by God.” Goren blessed the troops that they might “go from

strength to strength and be successful in all [they] do.”

In addition to ministering to the troops, R. Goren made a point of touring various

“strategic locations” and conferring with theater commanders. In particular, R. Goren visited the

122 “Call by the Chief Rabbi of Israel Shlomo Goren for Unity of the Nation and Ahavat Yisrael [lit. Love of Israel],” ISA, P/5084/27. 123“R.S. Goren visited IDF Camps in Sinai Yesterday,” Ha-Tsofeh, (August 29, 1975). ISA, P/5079/7; “Rabbi Goren in Milta and Gidi,” Yedioth Ahronoth (Aug. 29, 1975), ISA, P/5079/7.. 124 See, e.g. ISA, P/5054/11; and Mescheloff, 197.

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Gidi and Milta Passes, as well as Um Ha-Shiba, the strategic locations where Israel maintained surveillance and reconnaissance stations at the heart of the interim accord negotiations. In the passes, R. Goren climbed to the top of an observation tower, where he reportedly enjoyed a clear view of the Egyptian positions along the Suez Canal.125

Rav Goren’s tour of Israeli lines in Sinai, as reported by the press, signaled ambivalence over the price Israel would pay for the interim accord. The sites Goren visited were those at the heart of the Sinai II negotiations. In sharing the fact that he could view the Egyptian fortification along the canal, R. Goren highlighted their strategic importance. Moreover, his remarks that the troops’ true source of strength was their “spiritual” superiority echoed comments made by the

Zeirim and others who argued that spiritual resolve trumped U.S. military technology.

After the signing of the accord, on September 13, R. Goren weighed in on the foreign policy situation during his annual “Shabbat Shuva Drasha” – an elaborate sermon traditionally delivered on the Sabbath before Yom Kippur.126 Preaching to the Yeshurun Synagogue in

Jerusalem, R. Goren’s sermon focused on redemption, both personal and national. The coming year, he said, would be a “turning point in the life of the state.” R. Goren reiterated his call for national unity, calling on the people to “rise above all arguments and quarrels.” Addressing the leadership of the State, Goren urged them “to be careful, lest they rush to concede portions of the inheritance of our forefathers.” Therefore, Israel needed to “rely less on statements from other countries.” Instead, the government should put its faith “in itself, in our nation, and in the help of the God of Israel,” R. Goren asserted.127

125 “Rabbi Goren in Milta and Gidi,” Yedioth Ahronoth (Aug. 29, 1975) ISA, P/5079/7. 126 “R.S. Goren calls on the Government not to Rush into Concessions over Parts of the Patrimony of Our Forefathers,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept 14, 1975), 8. 127 Ibid.

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This sampling of R. Goren’s statements and activities both during and after the Sinai II negotiations indicates his ambivalence toward the Sinai II Accords, as well as his deference to the government in conducting affairs of state. Rav Goren, unlike R. Zvi Yehudah, was a state official whose position afforded him access to decisionmakers and military brass. In this instance, it also acted as a constraint on R. Goren’s public comments. He certainly signaled his ambivalence over the interim agreement, especially the price Israel would pay in strategic positions on the ground. Moreover, his continued references to the “wholeness of the Land” and his caution against “rushing” to concede parts of Israel’s “patrimony,” no less than his efforts to put Hammer in the cabinet, strongly suggest that he shared the concern that the accord would serve as a basis for future concessions in the West Bank.

In contrast to his statements on policy, his calls for unity and civil discourse were clear, emphatic and unequivocal. Moreover, R. Goren expressly legitimized opinions on both sides of the debate. His priority, then, was to maintain social cohesion and prevent civil unrest. Like the

Zeirim, Gush Emunim, R. Zvi Yehudah, and many others, R. Goren believed in the primacy of spiritual over material strength. However, he did not view the prospect of “capitulation” by the government as the primary threat to the nation’s spiritual well-being.

For R. Goren, the immediate spiritual threat was the divisiveness caused by extremist elements during and in response to the mass demonstrations. Acting, as he did, from within the state establishment, R. Goren did not view the “revolt against coercion” as the path toward spiritual salvation in the way that Gush Emunim and R. Zvi Yehudah did. In R. Goren’s view, spiritual strength was a product of social cohesion, which he framed in terms of religious principles such as “unity” and “Ahavat Yisrael.” These principles, moreover, created a religious

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imperative to adhere to the boundaries set by law as well as traditional norms regarding expressive speech.

2.C.3 Protest through Performative Civil Obedience De-escalation, and Rival Demonstrations by Gush Emunim and the Zionist Left

R. Goren’s appeal for calm contributed to a process of de-escalation that was already

underway. With the most militant demonstrators either in custody or released on bail, the police

adapted their tactics to gain control over the streets and curb the use of excessive force. There

was also a limit to the public’s willingness to tolerate violence, vitriol, and civil unrest. Thus, as

Kissinger’s shuttle continued, it became increasingly common for demonstrators to use civil

obedience as an expression of protest.

Protests against the accords continued, and were generally orderly, if not sedate. Before

dawn on Monday, August 25, a group of religious youth gathered outside the Prime Minister’s

Office along with three calves, representing Rabin, Peres, and Allon, respectively. The Israeli

negotiating team, the youths charged, was “being led to the slaughter.” Their bovine

demonstration was “noisy” but “peaceful.”128 Approximately one thousand people gathered in

Petah Tikvah for a 90-minute rally in the city square.129 Organizers received a permit from the

police, who kept a close eye on the demonstrators, who dispersed in an orderly fashion at the end

of the rally. The “Women’s Circle for a Secure Israel” held two parades in Ramleh and Rishon

Le-Zion. Fifty to sixty women marched calmly through the streets, escorted by police cars, with

placards and banners condemning the interim accord.130 Meanwhile, the Israeli and American

teams concluded negotiations over the map of Israel’s withdrawal and redeployment in Sinai.131

128 “Anti-Kissinger Demonstrators,” 1975JERUSA01362 (Aug. 26, 1975). 129 “Mass Gathering of 'Gush Emunim' in Petah Tikvah,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 26, 1975), 2. 130 “Parades of the Women's Circle for a Secure Israel,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 26, 1975), 2. 131 “Deliberations over Sinai Withdrawal Map in Sinai Concluded,” Ma’ariv (Aug, 26, 1975), 1.

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The next day, Gush Emunim and the Zeirim were forced to cancel the public “trial” of

Henry Kissinger they had planned for August 27. After Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek blocked

their efforts to rent a municipal space, the organizers had rented a 3,000-seat hall in the Jewish

Agency’s Binyanei Ha’umah convention center.132 One of the “judges” set to preside over the

“trial,” a member of the faculty at Bar-Ilan, explained that their aim was not to attack Kissinger

personally, but rather to create a forum for substantive arguments about Kissinger’s Mideast

policy.133

Activists, though, had previously told the media that the trial might well include the

“charge” that Kissinger was “a traitor to the Jewish people, as a Jew.”134 Moreover, the trial was

seen in the context of Kissinger’s arrival, where he was met with demonstrators banging on his

limousine, chanting “Traitor!” and “ Kissinger, Go Home!” until police forced the crowd away

from the motorcade with their batons.135 U.S. Ambassador Malcolm Toon, then, brought the

trial to the attention of Rabin and Allon the attention of Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign

Minister Allon. Toon “express[ed] his surprise that [the] semi-governmental Jewish Agency would agree to rent [the] hall for [an] event of this nature at such [a] critical period in negotiations for [an] interim agreement.” In response, Rabin and Allon “indicated that they would take care of the problem.”136

The management of Binyanei Ha'umah informed the Zeirim and Gush Emunim that it

was voiding the contract to rent the hall. The mock trial, they claimed, would constitute a safety

132 “Management of ‘Binyanei HaUma’ Refuse to Provide the Hall for Kissinger Trial,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 27, 1975), 1; “Jerusalem Mock Trial of Secretary and US Middle East Policy Cancelled,” 1975TELAV05520 (Aug. 27, 1975); “Kissinger ‘Mock Trial’ Cancelled,” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 27, 1975), 2. 133 “Kissinger Mock Trial,” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 27, 1975), 2. 134 “Preparing a Public Trial Against K,” Ma’ariv (Aug. 17, 1975), 1. 135 MacLean, “Kissinger in Israel; Street fights flare,” Chicago Tribune (Aug. 22, 1975), 1. 136 “Jerusalem Mock Trial of Secretary and US Middle East Policy Cancelled,” 1975TELAV05520 (Aug. 27, 1975)

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hazard without a police presence, and the police lacked the manpower due to the massive

operation underway to guarantee Secretary Kissinger’s personal safety.137 Ben-Meir traveled to

Jerusalem that evening, in order to personally intercede with the Jewish Agency and the police

commander for the Jerusalem district.138 The Jewish Agency denied any involvement in the matter, while the police insisted that nothing could be done. There was little interest, apparently, in facilitating what the secretary of the Labor Party denounced as “the most racist performance ever put on in Israel.”139

2.C.4 “Decisions in the Knesset, Not the Beit Knesset!” The Competing Demonstrations on August 28, 1975.

The cancelation of Kissinger’s “trial” came as Gush Emunim and their allies worked to

secure permits for their “Rally of the Tens of Thousands,” set for August 28 in Jerusalem. Much

of the public found the vitriolic protests against Kissinger’s arrival distasteful, and Gush Emunim

went to great lengths to avoid a repeat performance.

The “Rally of the Tens of Thousands” was the largest protest during Kissinger’s 1975

shuttle.140 The crowd that assembled in the Western Wall Plaza included a “high percentage of

young people, [including] many yeshiva (religious school) students.”141 A litany of speakers

railed against the proposed accords, after which the demonstrators prepared to set off on a protest

137 “’Kissinger Trial’ Will not take place This Evening Because the Management of Binyanei Ha’umah” Cancelled the Hall Rental,” Davar (Aug. 27, 1975), 3; “Jerusalem Mock Trial,” 1975TELAV05520 (Aug. 27, 1975); “Kissinger ‘Mock,” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 27, 1975), 2. 138 “Management of ‘Binyanei Ha’umah’ Refuse to Provide the Hall for Kissinger Trial,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 27, 1975), 1 139 “’Kissinger Trial’ Will not take place” Davar (Aug. 27, 1975), 3. 140 “Big anti-pact rally held in Jerusalem,” Jerusalem Post (Aug 29, 1975), 1. 141 “Thousands Rally in Jerusalem Against Interim Agreement” 1975JERUSA01423 (Aug. 29, 1975).

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march through the city. The organizers, who obtained a permit for the event, cautioned the

demonstrators to march peacefully and lawfully, without departing from the planned route.142

From a pickup truck mounted with loudspeakers, organizers directed the demonstrators

through the Armenian quarter of the Old City, emerging from the Jaffa Gate.143 Police closed

Jaffa Road, redirecting motorists as the procession headed toward the city center. Plain-clothed officers mulled about downtown Jerusalem as the demonstrators marched along the three- kilometer route from the Jaffa Gate to the Binyanei Ha'umah convention center. Uniformed police kept watch from the side as smiling faces beneath knitted kippot licked ice cream cones; yeshiva students formed small dance circles, singing festive, traditional melodies, and Hassidic songs.144 Nearby, the large contingents of police assembled for crowd control were able to stand

down, water cannons and tear gas launchers, untouched.

At the end of the march, the demonstrators gathered outside Binyanei Ha’umah for

another rally.145 Again, a litany of speakers denounced the accord-in-the-making, urging the young people to remain active in the cause. The demonstrators dispersed peacefully after concluding the rally with the singing of “Hatikvah,” the national anthem.146 Aside from isolated

incidents of youthful rowdiness, the event remained non-violent and orderly with few arrests.147

The confrontation and civil disobedience of the previous week had been cast aside in favor of civil obedience – the expression of dissent by means of punctilious and performative adherence

to social and legal norms governing political expression.

142 “Thousands Rally” 1975JERUSA01423 (Aug. 29, 1975); Jerusalem Post (Aug 29, 1975), 1; “Thirty Thousand Participated in Gush Emunim Protest Against Accord,” Ha-Tsofeh (August 29, 1975), 1-2. 143 Davar (Aug. 29, 1975), 1-2; “Thirty Thousand,” Ha-Tsofeh (August 29, 1975), 1-2. 144 “Thousands Rally” 1975JERUSA01423 (Aug. 29, 1975); Jerusalem Post (Aug 29, 1975), 1; “Thirty Thousand,” Ha-Tsofeh (August 29, 1975), 1-2; Davar (Aug. 29, 1975), 1-2 145 “Big, Anti-pact rally,” Jerusalem Post (Aug 29, 1975), 1; “Thirty Thousand,” Ha-Tsofeh (August 29, 1975), 1-2 146 Jerusalem Post (Aug 29, 1975), 1; “Thirty Thousand,” Ha-Tsofeh (August 29, 1975), 1-2. 147 Ha-Tsofeh (August 29, 1975), 1-2.

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Reports of the rally noted the ubiquitous presence of religious teenagers and yeshiva

students in the crowd.148 This was not mere happenstance. Rabbi Moshe Zvi Neriah, head of the

Bnei Akiva network of yeshivot, issued a public appeal for all yeshiva students to attend the rally

(Gush Emunim organized the buses). This proved to be a controversial move, as many other

heads of Bnei Akiva yeshivot objected. The organization’s Central Committee convened by

Rabbi Zukerman, head of the Kfar HaRoeh yeshiva, and Rabbi Aryeh Bina, from the Bnei Akiva

yeshiva in Jerusalem. Rabbi Neriah was asked to retract his statement calling on the youth to join

the demonstration, but he refused. Eventually, it was decided that only twelfth-graders would be

permitted to attend.149

In Tel Aviv, the Kibbutz Artzi movement, MaPaM, and Ha’Shomer Ha’Tzair organized a

rally in Malkhei Yisrael Square in support of the accords and against “religious zealotry” and

“extremist nationalism on the streets.”150 Reports on the size of the crowd varied from 5,000 to

just over 10,000.151 With Gush Emunim simultaneously holding its own rally in Jerusalem, this

demonstration, organized by the socialist, “pioneering” branch of the Zionist Left, was as much

about countering Gush Emunim (and Herut) as it was about the interim accord.

The event began with a rally in Malkhei Yisrael square, the site of the anti-accord, “Am

Yisrael Hai” rally six-weeks prior. MK Meir Talmy, the secretary-general of MaPaM,

denounced Gush Emunim and the proponents of “not one inch,” vowing not to “let nationalist

demagoguery sway the decisions of the government.” Another speaker condemned “nationalist

148 “Thousands Rally” 1975JERUSA01423 (Aug. 29, 1975); Jerusalem Post (Aug 29, 1975), 1; “Thirty Thousand,” Ha-Tsofeh (August 29, 1975), 1-2; Davar (Aug. 29, 1975), 1-2 149 “Gush Emunim Expects Tens-of-Thousands of Participants in March – Tonight,” Ha’aretz (Aug. 28, 1975), ISA, P/5079/7. 150 “Mass Protests Held In Favor of the Accord and Against It,” Davar (Aug. 29, 1975), 1-2.. 151 “5,000 at pro-accord rally in Tel Aviv,” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 29, 1975), 2.

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incitement and religious hysteria,” declaring that “the Homeland is not a [sacrificial] alter, but a

place to build and to be re-built. Victor Shemtov, the minister of health, proclaimed that Begin

had always “been in the minority, and would remain in the minority.” He further warned that the

“combination of religious zealotry, extreme nationalism, and military adventurism” imperiled

Israeli democracy.152

“Do you want a Government of Begin, Geula Cohen [and] Zevulun Hammer, who are

bound to bring war?” Shemtov asked rhetorically.

The crowd replied with a loud “No!”153

After the rally, demonstrators paraded through the streets around Malkhei Yisrael Square,

following in the footsteps of the “Am Yisrael Hai” marchers the previous month, albeit without

the detour toward the US Embassy.154 Many sang “Heveinu Shalom Alecheim,” while others chanted “Gush Emunim, go away!” and “Yes to peace, no to war!” Some protesters waved placards with slogans such as “Blood is worth more than oil!”, “Peace, yes! War, no!”, and

“Fascists, Go home!” Others, however, carried signs addressing their political opponents: “Gush

Emunim, Go to the Negev!”, “Bloc of the Faithful – Bloc of the Rioters,” and “Decisions in the

Knesset, not the beit knesset [synagogue].”

The march ended with dancing and singing. Revelry replaced angry slogans, but the battle lines had been drawn between Labor activists and the religious-Zionist youths flocking to

Gush Emunim.

Despite Gush Emunim’s shift to civil obedience, its initial militance left a lasting impression on the Zionist Left, and beyond. While R. Goren called for calm, other rabbinic

152 Davar (Aug. 29, 1975), 2 153 “5,000 at Rally,” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 29, 1975), 2. 154 Davar (Aug. 29, 1975), 1-2.

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figures such as R. Zvi Yehudah energized the protesters. While Warhaftig and, to a lesser extent,

Raphael, tried to engage with Gush Emunim, the group persisted in directing its protests against

the government and the NRP ministers.

The next section examines the NRP debate over the Sinai II Accords, during which Gush

Emunim ratcheted up the pressure on Raphael and Burg, particularly the latter. By intimidating

Burg, Gush Emunim’s conduct was not only up for debate, it also made that debate personal.

There was a clear logic behind Gush Emunim’s behavior; as votes in the cabinet and Knesset grew imminent, Burg, Raphael, and the NRP lawmakers would have to appear before the NRP’s decision-making bodies to receive a mandate to vote for, or against, the accord. Thus, Burg and

Raphael would have to face their constituents within the party, giving Gush Emunim an opening to confront the party leadership.

Confrontation in the NRP over Ratifying the Sinai II Accords 3.A NRP–Gush Emunim Activists Pressure Burg and Raphael

On August 31, 1975, Gush Emunim activists with NRP membership escalated their

confrontation with Burg and Raphael. The NRP Knesset Faction had announced that it would

begin deliberations over the interim accord, anticipating imminent votes in the Cabinet and the

Knesset as negotiators worked out the final details. That same morning, R. Moshe Zvi Neriah,

Hanan Porat, and other Gush Emunim activists met with Yosef Burg to request a postponement of the faction meeting in order to hold a party referendum over the interim accords.155

R. Neriah argued that the vast majority of the anti-Kissinger demonstrators were NRP voters. They voted for the NRP at the urging of prominent rabbis – like R. Neriah – who now

opposed the interim accord. Neriah told Burg that “just as we had an obligation to call for voting

155 “NRP Members Picket Next to Burg's Home- Want Party Referendum on Accord,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 1, 1975), 4.

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for the NRP, now we are obligated to say to those who were elected that they must ask the

voters, and all members of the NRP, for their opinions on this issue.” Burg was unpersuaded and

refused to delay the Knesset faction’s decision. Nor would Burg commit to holding a party

referendum.

Leading members of Gush Emunim also visited Raphael, warning him that the accord was “unacceptable to the majority of religious Jewry.” Raphael was warned that voting for the accord would “burn bridges” with the “young generation of ‘knitted kipot.’” The activists demanded that the party’s stance on the accord be decided by secret ballot in the NRP Central

Committee.156

Like Burg, Raphael rebuffed Gush Emunim’s demand to bring the decision over the

interim accord before a party forum where Burg and Raphael would have less influence. While

Raphael could empathize with Gush Emunim’s objections, and even commend the group for

“contribut[ing] their share during the negotiations,” he still backed the Interim Accords.157

Raphael gave three reasons for his support: First, the accord would take the largest Arab

military out of the conflict, paving the way for a separate peace between Israel and Egypt.”

Second, an agreement over Sinai would provide “room to maneuver” in the “struggle for Israeli

rule over…parts of the historic Land of Israel.” Sinai was not the West Bank, and the decision

over the interim accord involved “practical foreign policy and security concerns” and not a

“dispute over principles.” Therefore, it was Raphael’s duty to weigh the costs and benefits of an

agreement, consult with reliable military experts, and decide “according to his conscience.” 158

Third, the accord would provide a lengthy period of calm, which Israel needed to address socio-

156 “NRP Members Picket,” Ma’ariv (sept. 1, 1975), 4; “Minister Raphael Explains to 'Gush Emunim' Delegation the Reasons for his Decision in favor of the Agreement with Egypt,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept 1, 1975), 2. 157 “NRP Members Picket,” Ma’ariv (sept. 1, 1975), 4; “Minister Raphael Explains,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept 1, 1975), 2. 158 “Minister Raphael Explains,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept 1, 1975), 2.

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economic problems and build its military. Thus, Raphael believed that an agreement was

“preferable from a military and a national perspective” and more important than “holding the

mountain passes and oil in Sinai.”159

At the request of some Gush Emunim activists, Raphael contacted Shlomo Hillel, the minister of police, asking him to expedite the release of demonstrators still in custody. Hillel promised to look into the legal issues involved, but he warned that any release would be conditioned on a promise not to participate in further demonstrations.160

Some of the detainees welcomed Raphael’s assistance and were willing to make that promise.161 Others, such as Levinger and his band of detained demonstrators, were not. Indeed,

the Levinger group announced that they would escalate their hunger strike and refuse water over

Burg and Raphael’s support for the accord.162 When Levinger heard that Raphael was

interceding with police, he disavowed the Gush Emunim activists who had met with Raphael.

Levinger’s group was “not at all interested in Dr. Raphael taking care of [their] release on bail

because their sitting in jail [constituted] a war against Dr. Raphael himself, among others.”163

Burg, meanwhile, worked to shore up support for the accord in his LaMifneh faction. In a meeting of the LaMifneh secretariat on August 31, Burg explained his reasons for supporting the accord.164 Overall, the deal on the table was better than what was offered in March. The duration

of the accord was longer, the lines of deployment were more favorable to Israel, and the

159 “NRP Members Picket,” Ma’ariv (sept. 1, 1975), 4; “Minister Raphael Explains,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept 1, 1975), 2. 160 “The Gush Emunim Prisoners are Not at all Interested in Dr. Raphael Taking Care of Their Release on Bail,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 2, 1975), 4. 161 Handwritten protocol NRP Faction meeting (24 Elul 5735 - Aug. 31, 1975),” NRP Knesset Faction Protocols from 5735, File 26, Box 4, Series A, NRP Knesset Faction (R.G.003), Archive for the Study of Religious Zionism, Bar Ilan University. 162 “Protest Detainees in Jail in Jerusalem Intensify their Hunger Strike,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug 31, 1975), 1; “NRP Members Strike Next to Burg’s House; Want Referendum in NRP on the Accord,” Ma’ariv (Sept 1, 1975), 4. 163“The Gush Emunim Prisoners,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 2, 1975), 4. 164 “Dr. Burg to 'LaMifneh' Faction: The Agreement Today - More Reasonable Than the One Proposed Last March,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 1, 1975), 2.

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arrangements for demilitarized buffer zones included new elements that would render a surprise

Egyptian attack impossible. Moreover, the Americans had upped their offer of military and

economic aid.

Besides, what, exactly, was the alternative? Burg held that proponents of a

comprehensive peace could argue for rejecting the interim agreement in favor of a

comprehensive deal based on “their doctrine” and “the degree of concessions they are prepared

to make.” However, Burg was perplexed by self-styled “hawks” who favored a separate peace

with Egypt, but now objected to the proposed interim accord because it meant sacrificing too

many bargaining chips for negotiations over a comprehensive peace. Burg found this argument

paradoxical, for these same “hawks” held that a comprehensive agreement was “incompatible

with the geopolitical reality." In addition, the US administration clearly viewed preventing a

“flare up in the region” as vital to its national interest. In Burg’s view, preventing a “flare-up” was also “desirable for the security of Israel.” More to the point, so was accommodating the Ford administration.

Finally, Burg argued that “ministers and MKs must decide” the issue based on “the best information available to them and the dictates of their conscience.” In his view, the accord was

“not merely an issue of territory in the Sinai.” It was also about the “diplomatic environment,” as well as the “supply [of] state-of-the-art arms for the IDF.” The accord might not have been the

“ideal outcome” of the negotiations, but the deal on the table “clearly indicate[d] a change for the better.” Therefore, Burg would support the agreement based on the best information available to him, and the dictates of his conscience.165

165 “Dr. Burg to 'LaMifneh' Faction,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sep. 1, 1975), 2.

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After Burg spoke, the LaMifneh secretariat took up the issue. Some members argued in favor of accepting the accord, while others were opposed. Ultimately, the faction resolved “to support the interim agreement as accepted by our members of the government and recommend that our members vote in favor of it in the NRP Executive, in the Knesset Faction, and in the cabinet.” Burg now had a clear and specific mandate to approve the agreement in the cabinet, as

well as to convince others in the party leadership to do the same.166

3.A.1 The NRP Knesset Faction Debates the Interim Agreement Ahead of Votes in the Cabinet and the Knesset (August 31, 1975)

As the negotiations entered the final stage, the NRP Knesset Faction convened on

Sunday, August 31, 1975. As the debate unfolded, the conversation came to include issues

outside the scope of the agreement, including Gush Emunim’s conduct and the police response.

Additionally, the Knesset Faction grappled with the dilemma of legitimizing its decision in the

face of opposition from within the party.167

Raphael opened the meeting with a report on the latest developments in the negotiations.

An agreement was near. The main sticking point was the “language” of American “political

commitments” in a side deal with Israel. Kissinger would return from Egypt that evening to work

out the final details in time for a cabinet vote the next morning. The Knesset vote would be held

two days later, on September 3, allowing political parties to convene their decision-making

166 “Dr. Burg to 'LaMifneh' Faction,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sep. 1, 1975), 2. 167 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975),” NRP Knesset Faction Protocols from 5735, File 26, Box 4, Series A, NRP Knesset Faction (R.G.003), Archive for the Study of Religious Zionism, Central Library, Bar Ilan University; “The NRP Knesset Faction Will Debate the Issue of the Agreement Today,” Ha-Tsofeh (Aug. 31, 1975), 1; “Minister Raphael Explains to 'Gush Emunim' Delegation the Reasons for his Decision in favor of the Agreement with Egypt,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 1, 1975), 2; “NRP: The Zeirim -Against; The Undecided - In Favor,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 1, 1975), 15; “The NRP Knesset Faction Decided to Grant Freedom to Vote To Its Members on the Issue of the Interim Accord,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 1, 1975), 1; “'Gush Emunim' Group Headed by R. [Moshe Zvi] Neriah Strike next to Dr. Burg's Home,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 1, 1975), 1.

324 bodies.168 Raphael announced his intention to “vote for [the agreement] in the cabinet,” and asked the faction for “a mandate” to do so.169

Warhaftig spoke next, urging the faction to immediately intervene on behalf of the Gush

Emunim prisoners. There was “no basis” for holding the activists on the grounds that they might

“commit another offense.” Warhaftig urged the faction to “meet with the justice minister and the attorney general to eliminate this abuse of the courts!”170

Though Warhaftig was ardent in defending the prisoners’ civil rights, he expressed mixed feelings about Gush Emunim. The Levinger group had told Warhaftig that their hunger strike was meant to pressure the NRP faction into voting against the accords. In response, Warhaftig had admonished the activists for their “unjustified” behavior. Elected officials were obligated “to act according to their conscience and understanding” of the public good. Warhaftig asked his colleagues to “come out [publicly]” in response to Levinger’s group and call on them to “stop the hunger strike.”171

Raphael interjected that he had already interceded on behalf of the prisoners. That very morning, Raphael “sat for two hours with a rather large delegation from Gush Emunim,” and contacted Police Minister Hillel at their request. Hillel was receptive to Raphael’s entreaties, but he “required a promise that they won’t participate in prohibited activities.” While some of the detainees agreed, “the Levinger group [was] not prepared to so.”172

Turning back to the interim accord, Wahrhaftig acknowledged that “the accord which has been agreed upon does not solve any [fundamental] problem [in the Arab–Israeli conflict].

168 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975),” File 26/4/A/RG003, Bar Ilan Archive. 169 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 2; “NRP Members Picket Next to Burg's Home- Want Party Referendum on Accord,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 1, 1975), 4. 170 Emphasis in the original. Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975). 171 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 3. 172 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 4.

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However, [he] view[ed] the agreement as an inescapable necessity.”173 Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, had bequeathed “a medini last will and testament,” Warhaftig said.

Its central imperative was, “do not allow yourselves to be put in a position where there won’t be at least one great-power by your side.” For better or worse, Israel faced “a situation in which it is impossible not to accept the agreement.” However, Warhaftig was willing to give MKs “the option to vote differently.”174

Melamed “view[ed] territory as a bargaining chip in negotiations over a comprehensive peace agreement.” Therefore, he was fundamentally opposed to interim agreements because they would “take such chips out of our hands.” However, once the government decided to pursue an interim accord, there was no turning back. Melamed would vote in favor of the accord because, like Warhaftig, he believed that the most important consideration was to mend fences with the

United States. Under different circumstances, though, “[Melamed] would abstain.”175

Next to take the floor was Simcha Freedman, a lecturer in Talmud from Kibbutz Tirat

Zvi. “They asked Churchill at the age of 80 how he felt,” Freedman mused. “‘Considering the alternative,’ [Churchill] said, ‘my condition is good.’” Freedman believed that the interim accord was also good, but only in light of the alternatives. Though it would not bring peace, the accord would buy Israel “valuable” time. The “global situation” would improve, and “the Arabs’ power” would diminish as the effects of the oil crisis dissipated. Most importantly, Freedman believed that Israel needed this time to address internal problems. “With great regret,” Freedman was willing to allow MKs to request freedom from party discipline, but not if it changed the outcome of the vote.176

173 “NRP Members Picket,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 1, 1975), 1; Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 4. 174 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 4. 175 “NRP: The Zeirim -Against; The Undecided - In Favor,” Ma’ariv (Sep. 1, 1975) 15. 176 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 4-5.

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Tempers flared when Ben-Meir brought up the subject of police violence against

protesters. Ben-Meir appreciated that the police were put in a difficult situation, but he insisted there were “exceptional” cases of police brutality that demanded attention. Ben-Meir also claimed that when the cabinet debated the issue, Burg defended the police and complimented their performance.177 “Why,” he asked, “did Dr. Burg have to be against the protestors in the

cabinet?”178

“You are smearing me,” Burg responded. The notion that he condoned police brutality

was nothing short of a “blood libel.” 179

After urging the faction to “continue [its] efforts on behalf of the prisoners,” Ben-Meir

moved on to the “horrible” interim accord.180 He argued that the NRP had been “united, in

principle, in favor of an [interim] agreement” with Egypt, but only as “a significant step toward

peace.” Instead of a step toward peace, Israel was ceding territory in exchange for “time.” The

proposed accord, he declared, was ‘a political defeat of the highest order.”181 If the agreement

had been similar to what Israel had proposed in March, “which was a large withdrawal in

exchange for ending the state of war,” then Ben-Meir and the Zeirim “would have supported” it.

Similarly, the Zeirim would have supported “a small withdrawal – without the passes and Abu

Rodeis” in exchange for what the Egyptians were now offering.182 Thus, Ben-Meir proposed that

the NRP ministers “not vote at this stage,” and that “the party give all of its representatives a free

vote” in the Knesset.183

177 “NRP Members Picket,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 1, 1975), 4. 178 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 4-5. 179 “NRP Members Picket,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 1, 1975), 4. 180 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 5. 181 “NRP Members Picket,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 1, 1975), 4; Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975, 6. 182 “NRP: The Zeirim -Against; The Undecided - In Favor,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 1, 1975), 15. 183 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 6; “NRP Members Picket,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 1, 1975), 4.

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In response to Ben-Meir, Aharon Abuhatzira proposed that the faction adopt a resolution calling on the NRP ministers to vote for the accord in the cabinet. As for the Knesset vote,

Abuhatzira proposed that the issue be brought before the party executive for a decision.184

Hammer rejected Abuhatzira’s scheme. Either the faction should decide on how the MKs and ministers should vote, or it should be brought before the executive. Splitting the decision served no purpose.185 Instead, Hammer proposed that all the MKs be given the freedom to vote as they saw fit. Echoing Ben-Meir’s view, Hammer declared that he was “in favor of an interim accord with Egypt.” However, the present accord “include[d] [American] pressure and harmed

[Israel’s] independence.” For that reason, Hammer was “against it.” As to the issue of police violence against demonstrators, Hammer emphasized that “the police [had] conducted themselves in an unusual and brutal manner” during the August 23 demonstration at the Country

Club Junction.186

The NRP’s position during the cabinet and Knesset votes remained a bone of contention.

Pinchas Scheinman argued that if the ministers were to vote for the agreement in the cabinet, then that would “obligate the entire faction” to support the government’s position in the Knesset.

However, if the ministers were to oppose the accord in the cabinet, then there might be room to allow MKs a free vote.187

Warhaftig rejected all of these schemes. The faction’s decision regarding the ministers’ vote in the Cabinet would, for all intents and purposes, convey the NRP’s stance on the accord.

With the cabinet set to meet the next day, the NRP ministers would have no choice but to vote one way or the other. In Wahrhaftig’s view, the ministers could not avoid taking positions of

184 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 6. 185 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 7. 186 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 7. 187 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 7.

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their own, and “if you have a position, then go with your position,” Warhaftig urged. “A faction

that cannot reach a decision on a matter like this,” he proclaimed, “is not a faction.”188 There was

no room for abstentions.

Raphael Ben-Natan, the “strongman” of Burg’s LaMifneh faction, agreed with

Warhaftig. It was the prerogative of the NRP Knesset Faction to decide how it would vote. The

Zeirim could always appeal to the Executive, but Ben-Natan believed that the faction should

endorse whatever position Burg and Raphael would take in the cabinet.189

Burg was the last to speak before the faction put the question to a vote. “Tomorrow,”

Burg announced, “I will vote in favor of the accord.” He would do so “because, within the NRP,

there was “a consensus that in Sinai, it is possible to be more flexible.190 The agreement on the

table, Burg argued, was “better than the [rejected] agreement in March.”191 Moreover, it was

certainly better than no agreement at all.192 The duration of the accord was longer, the amount of

U.S. aid was greater, “and the armaments [were] better.” Anyone who called for the ministers to oppose the accords, he argued, was “committing a great sin.” “The worst thing,” Burg believed, would be “to say no, today.” Rejecting the accord “would harm the state and put us in

[diplomatic] isolation.”193

As to the controversy over the anti-Kissinger demonstrations, Burg quipped that he had seen “someone from the police who was too ‘active.’” On the other hand, though, he had also seen the conduct of the “‘activists’ on the other side.” As for giving Ben-Meir and Hammer the

freedom to vote against the accord, Burg was adamantly opposed. “I do not want to be a Shabbos

188 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 7-8. 189 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 8. 190 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 9. 191 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 9. 192 “NRP Members Picket,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 1, 1975), 4. 193 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 9.

329 goy,” he proclaimed. Burg was unwilling to shoulder the blame for an unpopular vote in the cabinet, while the others sat idly by with a wink and a nod. Therefore, he argued that “freedom to vote should not be given.”194

Raphael asked for the floor to comment on Warhaftig’s remarks. First, he wished to clarify that it was not his practice to abstain from cabinet votes on the interim accord. The only exceptions were one instance in which the vote exceeded the mandate given to the ministers by the faction, and the other was when he submitted an alternative proposal himself. “No serious person,” Raphael declared, could abstain on such an issue.195 Raphael went on to reiterate his support for the accord on the one hand, as well as his support for the protesters (who conducted themselves lawfully), on the other. Raphael claimed that the demonstrations had actually

“strengthened the hand of the government.” Moreover, he sympathized with the protesters’ sincere motivations Therefore, he moved for a vote on Warhaftig’s proposal to support the accord and grant a free vote to “our haverim who will vote differently for reasons of conscience.”196

The faction voted, 7–2, in favor of the accord, with Hammer and Ben-Meir opposing the motion. 197 Abuhatzira proposed that the question of whether to allow MKs to vote differently than the rest of the faction should be brought before the party executive.198 Warhaftig, on the other hand, moved that MKs who wished to vote against the accord should be allowed to do so under two conditions. First, they must have taken a clear and consistent stance against the agreement, effectively limiting the option to Hammer and Ben-Meir. Second, MKs who planned

194 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 9. 195 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 10. 196 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 10. 197 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 10-11; “NRP: The Zeirim -Against; The Undecided - In Favor,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 1, 1975), 15; “The NRP Knesset Faction Decided to Grant Freedom to Vote To Its Members on the Issue of the Interim Accord,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 1, 1975), 1. 198 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975) 11; “The NRP Knesset Faction,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 1, 1975), 1.

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to vote against the accord would have to inform the faction chairman the day before, so that he

could bring it to the attention of the coalition whip. By a margin of 5–2, with Raphael in favor

and Burg opposed, Warhaftig’s motion passed, allowing Ben-Meir and Hammer to vote against

the accord in the Knesset.199

The Knesset Faction meeting ahead of the votes on the Sinai II Accords illustrates both

the cleavages within the NRP and how different figures within the NRP navigated these

differences. The impact of Gush Emunim on the debate is evidenced, first and foremost, by the

fact that the debate over the accord went hand-in-hand with the debate over Gush Emunim’s demonstrations. Burg had little use for Gush Emunim, and felt that decisions regarding affairs of state should be made by deliberative bodies where rational debate could take place. Unlike

Raphael, Burg made no attempts to curry favor with Gush Emunim, rejecting their entreaties when they visited his office earlier in the day and limiting himself to backhanded criticism of both the demonstrators and the police during the Knesset Faction meeting.

Raphael, by contrast, told the faction of his meetings with the Gush Emunim delegation earlier in the day. Indeed, he had tried to persuade them to respect his vote, even if they disagreed. Moreover, Raphael had personally and publicly intervened on behalf of the demonstrators still in detention, and even called the police minister to lobby on their behalf.

Indeed, Raphael had been able to expedite the release of those detainees who pledged not to engage in further demonstrations that violated the law. Moreover, Raphael expressed understanding for Gush Emunim’s opposition to the accords, going so far as to claim that the demonstrations had strengthened the government’s hand during the talks.

199 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting (Aug. 31, 1975), 4, 10-11

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Raphael’s comments on the detained demonstrators during the cabinet meeting, though,

came in response to Warhaftig coming out forcefully on the matter. Warhaftig viewed the

ongoing detentions as unlawful, with the demonstrators being held not for crimes allegedly

committed during the demonstrations but for potential crimes they might commit in the future.

This rationale, Warhaftig believed, was an insufficient legal basis for their detention and an abuse of judicial power. At the same time, Warhaftig was not uncritical of the more militant elements of Gush Emunim. Dismayed by the Levinger group’s hunger strike, Warhaftig argued that it was improper to protest against elected representatives for using their best judgment to

advance the common good. Moreover, he went so far as to call on the NRP Knesset Faction to

publicly call for Levinger’s group to end their hunger strike.

Ben-Meir and Hammer remained the most forceful critics of the police, attacking Burg

for supposedly commending improper police behavior. Ben-Meir and Hammer did not shy away

from forcefully criticizing their political opponent. However, they differed from Gush Emunim

by opposing the accords within the confines of the law, and through activism within the

framework of the NRP. Furthermore, Warhaftig made it possible for Ben-Meir and Hammer to vote against the accords in the Knesset, while the NRP faction fulfilled its coalition obligations to Labor and remained within the bounds of coalition discipline.

3.B “An Interesting Answer in our Language”: Rav Moshe Zvi Neriah and Hanan Picket Burg’s Home

While the Zeirim criticized Burg from within, Gush Emunim employed other methods to

pressure the interior minister and NRP chairman. On the evening of August 31, about 20

activists, including NRP Central Committee members, rabbis, professors, settlers from the

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Golan, and others gathered outside Burg's home.200 Led by R. Moshe Zvi Neriah and Hanan

Porat, the group announced that they would picket Burg’s home unless he agreed to hold a party

referendum over the accords. The group would remain until the negotiations came to an end, one

way or another.201

Porat recounted that Burg refused to commit to honoring the results of a party referendum

if it rejected the accord, saying “that’s an interesting question.” Therefore, Porat, Neriah, and the

others had come to give Burg “an interesting answer, in our language.”202 Porat’s “language”

relied upon performative religious ritual in order to express dissent. The protesters set out chairs,

while someone fetched a table. As the police looked on, kerosene lamps were passed out. Rav

Neriah sat down to deliver a shiur – a lesson – on the Mishna, continuing where he had stopped

the day before in his classroom at Yeshivat Kfar Ha’Roeh.203 The police looked on as R. Neriah

taught, allowing the group to remain so long as they did not block traffic or disrupt public

order.204

3.B.1 The Bnei Akiva Yeshivot Renounce R. Neriah

Rav Neriah’s campaign against the accords had already caused disquiet within the

leadership of the Bnei Akiva yeshivot. The NRP was their lifeline to government funding.

Moreover, Burg, himself a trained educator and rabbi, was ideologically committed to supporting religious schools. For the administration of the Bnei Akiva network of yeshivot, R. Neriah’s

visible and personal attack on Burg crossed the line.

200 “NRP Members Picket Next To Burg's Home- Want Party Referendum on Accord,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 1, 1975), 4; “'Gush Emunim' Group Headed by R. [Moshe Zvi] Neriah Strike next to Dr. Burg's Home,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 1, 1975), 1. 201 “NRP Members Picket,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 1, 1975), 4; “'Gush Emunim' Group,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 1, 1975), 1. 202 “NRP Members Picket,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 1, 1975), 4. 203 “'Gush Emunim' Group,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 1, 1975), 1. 204 “NRP Members Picket,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 1, 1975), 4.

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The organization’s director-general issued a statement disavowing R. Neriah’s protest.

The statement declared that, since the organization’s inception, the heads of Bnei Akiva yeshivot

had refrained from taking political positions. “Educational work,” they declared, was their

“prime concern, to which [they] dedicate[ed] all of their attention.” While the Bnei Akiva schools could not prevent roshei yeshiva from “expressing their private beliefs,” Rav Neriah’s protest did not reflect the views of the Bnei Akiva Yeshivot. Therefore, they were “not to be viewed as identifying with the strike next to the home of a dear friend to our Torah-educational enterprise,

Minister Yosef Burg.”205

The peculiar spectacle of Bnei Akiva renouncing the actions of its spiritual leader illustrates the degree to which Kissinger’s diplomacy, and the opposition to it (and him), redrew the lines on religious Zionism’s ideological map. The force of American pressure invited an opposing force, rallying the NRP’s Zeirim and many of its constituents against the accords.

Kissinger’s arrival led Gush Emunim to mobilize the grassroots of religious Zionism. The rallying cries of R. Zvi Yehudah and R. Neriah brought thousands onto the streets, begging the question as to how, if at all, they impacted the NRP’s behavior in the Cabinet and the Knesset.

3.C Burg and Raphael Support the Sinai II Accord in the Cabinet (September 1, 1975)

The next day, the cabinet held a seven-hour debate before voting to initial the accord and refer it to the Knesset for ratification. After months of deliberations over maps, drafts, and annexes, many ministers believed that there was nothing new to be said (though there was,

205 “Merkaz Bnei Akiva Yeshivot Does Not Identify with the Picket Next to the Home of the Minister Dr. Yosef Burg,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975), 1.

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apparently, seven hours’ worth of things to be said).206 The cabinet was not particularly keen on

the interim accord, but there was no choice – eyn breira.207

Burg told the cabinet that he would vote for the interim accord with Egypt “out of loyalty

to the NRP’s position on the matter of concentrating its efforts on Judea and Samaria.”208 The

agreement, Burg predicted, would “delay the debate” over the West Bank while providing a

much-needed opportunity for the country to address domestic issues. In supporting the accord,

Burg distanced himself from both “the tone and the reasoning of the MaPaM ministers.”209 Burg went on to condemn the inflammatory rhetoric directed toward the religious youths who had demonstrated against the accords, censuring circles on the Left for taking terms such as

“fascism” from the “outdated dictionary” and introducing them into the public discourse.

Burg’s defense of opponents of the accords was not unconditional. To be sure, Burg sympathized with opponents of the accord who had “sincere motivations.” However, Burg drew a “clear distinction” between adolescent stubbornness (of which there was no shortage on the

Left), and “believers in Eretz Yisrael.” Bearing that distinction in mind, Burg declared that “I add my heart to those of the believers.”210 Burg also chastised those government ministers who had

appeared at pro-accord rallies. Members of the government, Burg believed, should make appearances in the Knesset, and not on the streets. The ugliness of the previous weeks should serve as a wake-up call for the government to remove the rhetoric of “insult and humiliation”

from the public discourse in light of “the trials and challenges” that lay ahead.

206 Having nothing to new to say did not, though, prevent the cabinet from arguing for seven hours. 207 “Cabinet finds accord best 'under the circumstances',” Jerusalem Post (Sept 2, 1975), 2, 208 “Dr. Burg: I Voted Yes out of Loyalty to the Position of the NRP,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sep. 2, 1975), 1; “Allon, Peres and Rabinovitch...,” Ma’ariv (Sept 2, 1975), 11. 209 “Dr. Burg: I Voted Yes,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sep. 2, 1975), 1. 210 “Dr. Burg: I Voted Yes,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sep. 2, 1975), 1.

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On his way out of the cabinet room Burg spoke to the press as “one of those who had

been attacked, specifically, by those beloved groups which sprung up in the beit midrash of

religious Zionism.” Burg unequivocally condemned intimidation and fearmongering. “There is a

place for debate, but there is no place for humiliation and spewing hate.” Burg had voted based

on his “conscience,” as well as his “personal, ideological, and mamlakhti responsibilities.” To be sure, Burg was “happy that we have come to the end of this particular affair.” The affair itself, though, was cause not for happiness, but only for “mamlakhti responsibility.”211

Outside Burg’s home, members of the NRP Central Committee, academics, public

figures and settlers joined R. Neriah’s band of protesters. As they picketed Burg’s home, they

continued to demand that a party referendum before the NRP ministers and MKs voted on the

accord. Eventually, the group received word that the cabinet had approved the accord, which

would be referred to the Knesset for ratification. A “somber mood fell upon” the protesters, and

leading Gush Emunim activists held an urgent meeting to discuss the way forward.212

3.D The NRP Executive Debates the Sinai II Accords (September 2, 1975)

The Knesset vote to ratify the accord was set for September 3, allowing Labor, the NRP,

and other Knesset factions to convene their parties’ decision-making bodies on September 2.

Labor’s Central Committee voted to support the accords by a margin of 370 to 4, with 4

abstentions. (Dayan and others in Rafi protested by absenting themselves from the vote.) In

addition, the Alignment planned a rally outside the Knesset to demonstrate grassroots support for

the accord.213

211 “Dr. Burg: I Voted Yes,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sep. 2, 1975), 1; “Rabin: Without Steps Which are Likely to be Seen as Unpopular, We Will Not Reach Peace,” Ma’ariv (Sep. 2, 1975), 4. 212 “The Gush Emunim Prisoners,” Ma’ariv (Sep. 2, 1975), 4. 213 Davar, (Sept 3, 1975), 1.

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The picture in the NRP, however, was more chaotic. Outside Burg’s home, the

demonstrators went on a hunger strike. In custody at the Russian Compound, the Levinger group

refused to end its hunger strike, despite entreaties from rabbis and other prominent figures.

Levinger, for his part, reiterated that Gush Emunim wanted nothing to do with Raphael. They

preferred to remain in prison. Within the mainstream NRP, Burg’s LaMifneh faction, Raphael’s

Likud U’Temurah, and the Religious Kibbutz Movement announced their support for the accord,

while the Zeirim led the opposition.214

Burg and Raphael’s refusal to convene the NRP Central Committee ensured that the

decision to vote for the accord in the Knesset would remain in the hands of the party’s senior

leadership. While the Zeirim were gaining support among the party rank-and-file, most of the

NRP Executive was part of the “Old Guard” establishment. Thus, the Zeirim and other opponents

of the accord found themselves at a tactical disadvantage in the NRP Executive. However, the

scene outside Burg’s home demonstrated that the party was deeply divided, irrespective of the

Old Guard’s hold on the party machine.

On the afternoon of September 2, the NRP Executive met at the party’s headquarters in

Tel Aviv.215 The five-hour meeting was chaired by Daniel Vermus, a Zeirim activist and the

party’s deputy secretary-general. Vermus opened the meeting by wishing Secretary-General Zvi

Bernstein a swift recovery from his illness. Prior to beginning the debate over Sinai, Vermus also

extended greetings to a new group of settlers in the Golan Heights and a group of activists

encamped at the Tekoa outpost in the Judean hills.216

214 “NRP Executive to Meet Today,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 2, 1975),1. 215 “The NRP Executive Approves the Agreement: Opposes any Accord with the Syrians over the Golan that will Involve Evacuating Settlements from the Heights,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975),1-2; “Tumult in the NRP Executive - Decides in favor of the Agreement with a Majority of 30 In Favor and 19 Against,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 3, 1975), 4; “NRP Executive Concerned by Conduct of Gush Emunim Members,” Davar (Sept. 4, 1975), 9. 216 “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sep. 3, 1975),1.

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Burg opened the debate, calling on the executive to approve the ministers’ decision to

support the accord. The interim agreement would ease tensions along the Egyptian frontier, and the benefits outweighed the cost. To be sure, Israel was paying a heavy price for an accord that fell short of a peace deal. However, Israel was “not exempt from making a serious effort to achieve some calm…along the Egyptian border,” even if a final peace accord was out of reach.217 Burg offered a lengthy account of the diplomacy and negotiations that led to the accord,

emphasizing that if Israel still held 90% of the Sinai Peninsula.218 Israel had no shortage of

bargaining chips, and accusations that the negotiations had been conducted with a “weak knee”

were unfounded. Moreover, “it would become clear that we have several strong cards in our

hand” when additional portions of the agreement were made public.219

The important thing, Burg insisted, was that Israel make good use of the “time out”

provided by the accord. The country had been on heightened military alert since the 1973 war,

and the interim agreement would afford a degree of respite on the southern front. “The trials are

still ahead of us,” Burg cautioned, “especially with internal issues.” Now that the country could

breathe a little easier, it was time to restore Israel’s readiness to meet future challenges. In a nod

to the Zeirim, Burg concluded that “now there is room to re-examine the call for establishing a national unity government!”220

Raphael spoke next, echoing Burg’s comments that once the entirety of the agreement

became public, it would be seen in an entirely different light. He urged everyone to wait until

“the American administration put all of the documents relating to the agreement…before

Congress.” Then, Raphael declared, it would become clear that “in terms of the political backing

217 “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sep. 3, 1975), 2. 218 “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sep. 3, 1975),1-2; “Tumult in the NRP,” Ma’ariv (Sep. 3, 1975), 4. 219 “Tumult in the NRP,” Ma’ariv (Sep. 3, 1975), 4. 220 “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975), 2.

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[Israel would receive from the United States], this is an agreement that Israel has been striving

for since it was established.” Moreover, Raphael held that strengthening American influence in

the region, while pushing out the Soviets, was a “foreign policy accomplishment of the utmost

importance” for Israel.221

Raphael emphasized that, “like many others” in the cabinet, his final decision to support

the accords was based on the classified military annexes to the agreement.222 Raphael had

consulted with senior IDF officers, who demonstrated that Israel was militarily prepared for any

contingency, and that “the change in the line does not endanger Israel’s position.” Raphael had

reached the “unequivocal conclusion” that the agreement posed no danger from a military point

of view, even if he doubted “the trustworthiness of the enemy.223” Moreover, even retired IDF

officers who opposed the agreement had told Raphael that their opposition was not due to

military considerations. “The new line in the Sinai,” he asserted, “would not require a significant addition of forces to hold it.”224 Moreover, the loss of the oil fields—a key strategic asset— would be offset by “binding commitments to supply oil” should Israel be unable to acquire it from other sources.

Warhaftig disagreed with Raphael that the accord was an accomplishment of the “utmost importance.” He cautioned against rhetorical excesses in one direction or the other. “We must relate to the agreement,” he argued, “with neither cries of victory nor with tears of lamentations.”225 That said, the U.S. president considered the accord to be “of the utmost

221 “Tumult in the NRP,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 3, 1975), 4. 222 “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975), 2. 223 “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975), 2. 224 “Tumult in the NRP,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 3, 1975), 4. 225 “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975), 2.

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importance” to American interest. For Israel, Warhaftig argued, it was “of vital interest to earn

the trust of the United States, which is our one true friend.” Therefore, the NRP “did not have a

choice” other than to vote for the accord.226

Shlomo Levi, a representative of Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Dati, had an unhappy task. He saw the accord as “just another debacle in the chain of debacles that started with the Yom Kippur War.”

Moreover, the government had failed to properly inform the public as to the contents of the agreement.227 However, the secretariat of Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Dati movement had decided that the

accord was “a necessity not to be condemned,” and instructed its representatives in the NRP

Executive to vote in favor of it.228 Levi would follow the secretariat’s directive and vote to

support the accord, though he, personally, believed that the interim agreement was

“condemnable.”229

The Igud HaMoshavim – the umbrella body of religious, agricultural settlements – also

expressed serious reservations about the interim accord. In their view, the accord might have

been the “lesser evil,” and, therefore, a necessary evil. Still, the agreement set a dangerous

precedent for future negotiations over the Sinai and other fronts. With a fair number of

communities in and around the Golan Heights, the Moshav bloc proposed that the NRP

Executive adopt a “clear and binding decision” opposing any negotiations with Syria that

involved territorial withdrawal.230

226 “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975), 2. 227 “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975), 2. 228 “Religious Kibbutz: In Current Circumstances --- Accord is Necessity,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 2, 1975), 1. 229 “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975), 2. 230 “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975), 2.

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Zevulun Hammer and R. Moshe Zvi Neriah spoke against the accords, while Hanan Porat

was permitted to address the executive on behalf of Gush Emunim. In addition, several Gush

Emunim activists with ties to the NRP were allowed to attend the meeting as observers.231

Hammer reiterated the Zeirim’s opposition to the interim agreement, laying out the

Zeirim’s case against the accord. He urged the NRP to vote against the accord both as an

“expression of protest” and to raise the alarm over the “danger” it posed. Hammer also found it

“odd” that senior IDF officers who had previously warned against the dangers of relinquishing

the mountain passes were suddenly arguing that “the agreement is good.”232

In Hammer's view, the accord was fundamentally flawed. Israel was conceding tangible

assets to Egypt without receiving a “piece of peace” from the Egyptians. Israel would conduct a

“unilateral withdrawal,” under “American pressure, that [would] make a mockery of us among

the Arabs.”233 Nothing in the secret portions of the agreement, Hammer argued, could make up

for this fatal flaw.234 Rabin originally promised a “piece of peace” in exchange for a “piece of land,” but all he could deliver was a “piece of time.” In Hammer’s view, the U.S. administration

had decided “to take from [Israel] all the spoils of the Six-Day War,” and Israel was doing

nothing to stop it.235

Rav Neriah echoed the sentiment. The government, he declared bitterly, had “rushed to

capitulate” to Kissinger and Ford. The Americans had declared “economic war” on Israel by

embargoing weapons, and “we rushed to surrender.” Why, R. Neriah asked, did the government

not “mobilize public opinion in the [Jewish] community in the United States?” How hard, he

231 “NRP Executive Concerned by Conduct of Gush Emunim Members,” Davar (Sept. 4, 1975), 9; “Tumult in the NRP,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 3, 1975), 4; “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975), 2. 232 “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975), 2. 233 “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975), 2. 234 “Tumult in the NRP,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 3, 1975), 4. 235 “Tumult in the NRP,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 3, 1975), 4.

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asked, would it have been to take the stand that “there are no withdrawals without peace?” Was

this principle not “understood and accepted” in international affairs?236

In R. Neriah’s view, Israel “needed to have acted now as [it] would act if they wanted to

take the Golan or Jerusalem from us.”237 This “capitulation” to the Americans, he argued, was a

product of “a crisis of the soul” and a “crisis of ideology” in Israeli society as well as the

leadership of the state. In light of this weakness of leadership and spirit, R. Neriah proclaimed,

the time had come for “pioneers who will ascend to the Land out of faith and build it out of deep

spiritual conviction.” Pioneering, R. Neriah believed, was of “natural interest to our youth,” and

it was the youth who would “guide us along the correct path.”

Though not a member of the NRP Executive, Hanan Porat was given the floor on behalf

of Gush Emunim.238 While some expressed anger over Porat’s appearance, Burg and Raphael

gave their approval.239 After three days on hunger strike outside Burg’s home, Porat announced that Gush Emunim “was not so bothered” by “returning territory in the Sinai.” However, the

movement was “infuriated.” because Israel’s “national honor [was] being trampled on.” Porat demanded a party referendum, arguing that a majority of NRP members would agree with him.

“Is our anger worth nothing?” he proclaimed. How could the government allow Israel “to suffer humiliation like this from the American administration?” The government had demonstrated that

Israel was “no longer able to withstand pressure.” Consequently, Porat expected that “Ford and

Kissinger will continue to pressure [Israel].” “We will withdraw,” he exclaimed, “but where will

it stop!”240

236 “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975), 2. 237 “Tumult in the NRP,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 3, 1975), 4; “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975), 2. 238 “NRP Executive Concerned,” Davar (Sept. 4, 1975), 9; “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975), 2. 239 “NRP Executive Concerned,” Davar (Sept. 4, 1975), 9; “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975), 2. 240 “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975), 2.

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After all of the speakers had been heard, the 50 or so members of the Executive prepared

to vote by secret ballot. As Raphael read aloud the text of the proposed resolution, he was

interrupted by shouting from the floor.

“I come from the prisoners in the Russian Compound,” shouted a young man, and they spit on you!”241

The youth, it turned out, was R. Neriah’s teenage son, who refused to leave the meeting.

Pandemonium broke out when members of the NRP Executive tried to bodily remove the

younger Neriah from the room. The other Gush Emunim youths crowded around Neriah as

members of the Executive tried to shove him toward the exit. One of the Gush Emunim activists

blocked the door to the hall, which was plunged into darkness when another activist killed the

lights. A brawl broke out in the scrum around Neriah, and blows were exchanged between the

Gush Emunim youth and the NRP members pushing toward the exit.242

Rav Neriah was forced to intervene, putting an end to the violence.243 Tensions in the hall abated, just a bit, as the young activists left meeting. The executive returned to the business at hand, and someone from the floor moved for the Executive to vote on holding a party

referendum.244 The debate quickly escalated into an argument, as objections and points of order

gave way to insults and invective.245 Hammer and Ben-Meir accused Burg and Raphael of

refusing their request to convene the Central Committee, leading to a bitter dispute between the

241 “NRP Executive Concerned,” Davar (Sept. 4, 1975), 9; “Tumult in the NRP,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 3, 1975), 4. 242 “NRP Executive Concerned,” Davar (Sept. 4, 1975), 9; “Tumult in the NRP,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 3, 1975), 4. 243 Davar (Sept. 4, 1975), 9; Ma’ariv (Sept. 3, 1975), 4. 244 Davar (Sept. 4, 1975), 9; Ma’ariv (Sept. 3, 1975), 4. 245 “Tumult in the NRP,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 3, 1975), 4.

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Zeirim, Abuhatzira, and Raphael over who had supported bringing the issue before a wider party

body.

“Lie!” Ben-Meir exclaimed while Raphael was talking.

“Liar!” Raphael replied. “I’ll show [everyone] who you [really] are!”246

After calm was restored, the motion for a party referendum was rejected by a quick voice vote.247

By secret ballot, the Executive adopted a resolution in favor of the accord by a majority of 30–

19.248 Ben-Meir and Hammer announced their intent to vote against the accord in the Knesset,

“as an expression on behalf of the 40% of the executive and 80% of the party” who opposed the

interim accord. The party hawks scored a victory, however, when Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Dati and the

Moshavim introduced a resolution committing the NRP to oppose any withdrawal from

settlements in the Golan in an interim accord.249

3.E “You Shall Not Live by the Sword”: Warhaftig’s Address to the Knesset during the Debate over the Interim Agreement

During the Knesset debate over Sinai II, Warhaftig reiterated the positions he took during

internal NRP debates while simultaneously articulating the religious significance of international

relations in an era of globalization.250 Warhaftig confessed his reservations over interim

agreements; he was prepared to make “very painful territorial concessions,” but only “to reach a

state of peace with our neighbors.” Warhaftig rejected extreme positions on both sides, declaring

that the accord merited neither “cries of victory” nor the "dirges of Lamentations.” The accord

246 “Tumult in the NRP,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 3, 1975), 4; “NRP Executive Concerned,” Davar (Sept. 4, 1975), 9. 247 “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975), 1; “Tumult in the NRP,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 3, 1975), 4. 248 “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975), 1; “Tumult in the NRP,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 3, 1975), 4. 249 “The NRP Executive,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 3, 1975), 2. 250 Divrei Knesset v. 74 (September 3, 1975), 4079-4136.

344 was hardly the deal of the century, but it was certainly not “another debacle of the Yom Kippur

War.251

Warhaftig focused on two fundamental breakthroughs in the accord. For the first time,

Israel and an Arab state renounced the use of force, and committed to a “just and lasting peace.”

This shared commitment to peace created an opportunity for Israel to change Arab hearts and minds by “accept[ing] [the accord] in good spirits.” Warhaftig noted that military experts saw no danger in redeploying the IDF, and that ceding Abu Rodeis would not impact Israel's oil supply.

“You shall not live by the sword,” Warhaftig proclaimed. “Nor shall the sword devour forever.”252

The “main reason” for accepting the accord, though, was “the influence of the United

States.” Warhaftig disagreed with the Zeirim and others who “completely reject[ed], a priori,” that Israel “take into account the interests” of its greatest friend. “Little Israel,” Warhaftig observed, “[did] not have many friends among the nations of the world.”253 Moreover, as the

“political, economic, and military inter-dependence between states continue[d] to grow,” Israel needed “the friendship of the United States, its administration, and its people” more than ever.

While it was imperative that the Jewish People remain true to its unique heritage and tradition, the Jewish state needed political allies, partners in trade, and cultural exchange in order to survive and thrive. “[Israel might be] ‘a People that dwells alone,’ but not a state that dwells alone,” Warhaftig declared.254

251 Divrei Knesset v. 74 (Sept. 3, 1975), 4091. 252 Divrei Knesset v. 74 (Sept. 3, 1975), 4091-2. Warhaftig invoked Genesis 27:40 “And you shall live by the Sword,” as well as II Samuel 2:26, “And shall the sword devour forever?” 253 Divrei Knesset v. 74 (Sept. 3, 1975), 4092; Numbers 23:9. 254 Divrei Knesset v. 74 (Sept. 3, 1975), 4092.

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Warhaftig anticipated a period of calm, and the question was how to use it. Would Israel

“strengthen the will and the unity of the People which dwells in Zion?” Would the country

“adapt [its] way of life to reality, without illusions, for the great roles expected of [the Jewish

people] in this era and for the ages?” Would the country abandon “the race to increase the

standard of living beyond its means?”255

It was “possible to hope” that by confronting its domestic challenges, Israel might inspire its neighbors to do the same. Perhaps, Warhaftig hoped, the Arab states would realize that “there

is another way to resolve the issues between us, and that is the way of peace.” With Rosh

Hashana only two days away, Warhaftig asked his colleagues to pray “that the words of the

Prophet Isaiah be fulfilled. That ‘on that day shall Israel be the third with Egypt and with Assyria

(Assyria in this context is Syria), a blessing in the midst of the earth, for the Lord of the Hosts

has blessed him, saying: Blessed be Egypt, My people; Assyria, the work of My hands; and

Israel, My inheritance.”256

3.F From Sinai to Syria?

The Knesset ratified the Sinai II Accords by a vote of 70 to 43, with 7 abstentions.257

Except for the Zeirim, the NRP Knesset Faction supported the agreement, which was signed in

Geneva the next day. The formal agreement was part of a larger bargain that included Israeli and

Egyptian commitments to the United States, along with separate side-deals with the Americans.

While the accord fell short of the prophecy of Isaiah invoked by Warhaftig, it was still an

unprecedented breakthrough in Arab–Israeli diplomacy. Israel ceded large swaths of the Sinai

255 Divrei Knesset v. 74 (Sept. 3, 1975), 4092. 256 Divrei Knesset v. 74 (Sept. 3, 1975), 4092; Isaiah 19:2. 257 Divrei Knesset v. 74 (Sept. 3, 1975), 4135-4136.

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Peninsula, including the contested mountain passes and oil fields.258 The accord also included a

renunciation of the “threat or use of force,” which approximated de-facto non-belligerency. In addition, American technicians would operate electronic warning stations in a new buffer zone to be established in the mountain passes.259 Egypt agreed to permit non-military Israeli cargo

through the Suez Canal and gave a number of “assurances” to the United States: Egypt would

renew the UN mandate for Sinai peacekeepers on an annual basis; “reduce hostile propaganda in

its government-controlled media”; and “ease the boycott” of American firms doing business with

Israel.260

In the accompanying bilateral US–Israeli agreements, Israel received significant diplomatic commitments from the United States. The US promised not to recognize or negotiate

with the PLO unless it recognized Israel’s right to exist and accepted UN Security Council

Resolution 242. The United States also pledged to “consult fully” with the Israeli government in

order to “concert its position and strategy” on the peace process. The United States would also

“make every effort to ensure” that future negotiations would “be conducted on a bilateral basis” between Israel and each Arab state in order to negate Israel’s numerical disadvantage vis a vis the Arabs.261

In addition, to political commitments, the US guaranteed Israel’s oil supply for a

minimum of five years and offset the loss of Sinai oil fields. The US also pledged “ongoing and

long-term” military support and “periodic consultations” to institutionalize military-to-military

258 “Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, ed. Adam M. Howard (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011) [hereinafter, FRUS XXVI], Document 226; Fischer, “Turning Point on the Road to Peace: The Government of Yitzhak Rabin and the Interim Agreement with Egypt, Israel Studies, 19:3, (Fall 2014), 55-80. 259 Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement, (September 1, 1975) FRUS XXVI, Doc. 226; “Memoranda of Agreement,” FRUS XXVI, Document 227. 260 “Letter from Secretary of State Kissinger to Israeli Foreign Minister Allon- Jerusalem, September 1, 1975,” FRUS XXVI, Document 228. 261 Memoranda of Agreement (Jerusalem, Sept.1 1975), FRUS XXVI Document 227.

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relations. The United States also committed to providing Israel with “advanced and sophisticated

weapons.”262

The agreement also included assurances between the United States and the parties

regarding a “next step” with Syria. Israel committed not to “initiate military action against

Syria,” 263 while Egypt agreed not to “participate in hostilities” or use force if Syria attacked

Israel or initiated a war of attrition.264 Ford promised Sadat that he would “make a serious effort”

to resume Syrian-Israeli negotiations and reaffirmed the US’s commitment to “a just and lasting

peace in the Middle East” that included “the legitimate interests of…the Palestinian people.” The

United States would “remain active” in the peace process, aiming for a final peace “in a

deliberate and systematic way.265

In a letter to Rabin, President Ford “recognize[ed]” Israeli territorial concessions as “an

act of great significance…in the pursuit of final peace.” He pledged to “make every effort to be

fully responsive” to Israel’s military and economic needs, thereby easing the “heavy military and

economic burdens” of withdrawal. President Ford also expressed his “resolve” to maintain

Israel’s qualitative military edge, pledging to ask Congress for “military and economic

assistance” to Israel on an annual basis.266

Along with ongoing military and economic aid, Ford promised diplomatic backing “in

the spirit of the [American–Israeli] special relationship.” The United States rejected an imposed

settlement and would “make every effort to coordinate with Israel” to avoid introducing

proposals “that Israel would consider unsatisfactory.267 Regarding Syria, the US would “support

262 Ibid. 263 “Minute of Record,” FRUS XXVI, Document 230. 264 “Letter from Secretary of State Kissinger to Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Fahmy,” FRUS XXVI, Document 229. 265 “Letter from President Ford to Egyptian President Sadat,” FRUS XXVI, Document 233. 266 “Letter from President Ford to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin,” FRUS XXVI, Document 234. 267 Ibid.

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the position” that any accord “must assure Israel’s security from attack from the Golan Heights.”

In addition, the US would “give great weight to Israel’s position that any peace agreement with

Syria must be predicated on Israel remaining on the Golan Heights.”268

* * *

The decision-making process over the interim accord demonstrated the outsized role of

political parties in Israeli foreign affairs. Before they could vote in the cabinet, Burg and Raphael

needed a mandate from the NRP Knesset Faction – which included representatives of the major

factions within the NRP. The Knesset Faction, in turn, sought a mandate from the NRP

Executive before voting to ratify the accords. The need for a mandate allowed Gush Emunim to

pressure the party leaders with the aim of blocking the accord. Gush Emunim also seized control

of the agenda by stealing the spotlight, forcing the Zeirim to defend the group while it

orchestrated a campaign of intimidation against NRP leaders. Although Gush Emunim ultimately

failed to thwart the accord, its efforts ratcheted up inter-factional tensions within the NRP. The

next section investigates the efforts to calm these tensions and prevent an inter-factional schism

by filling the NRP’s vacant cabinet seat.

“Shalom Bayit” or Schism? Fallout from the Struggle over Sinai II and Zevulun Hammer’s Cabinet Appointment (September – November 1975) While Sinai II offered a respite on the southern front, the home front was another matter.

Israeli society in general, and the religious-Zionist community, in particular, was deeply shaken by the confrontation with the U.S. administration, as well as by the demonstrations and debate surrounding the accord. Gush Emunim had emerged as a force to be reckoned with, bringing tens of thousands to the streets. Its more militant elements, however, cast a shadow on the movement,

268 Ibid.

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projecting an image of radical, even violent, zealotry. Within the NRP, this campaign against the

Sinai II Accords deepened preexisting factional, ideological, and generational rifts.

Prior to Kissinger’s visit, it had seemed that Zevulun Hammer would join Burg and

Raphael in the cabinet, with the Zeirim tempering their campaign against the Rabin government

and the party leadership. The controversy and chaos created by Gush Emunim during Kissinger’s

shuttle, though, stymied efforts to bring stability and unity to a deeply divided NRP. The

Zeirim’s connections to Gush Emunim, whose campaign against the interim accords targeted

Burg and, to a lesser degree, Raphael, cast new doubts on the Zeirim’s loyalty to the party. To be

sure, the NRP still had a cabinet seat to fill and was pushing Labor for yet another. However,

many in the Old Guard doubted that the Zeirim could be trusted to sit in the cabinet. The Zeirim,

meanwhile, had renewed reservations about joining the Rabin government.

4.A Toward “Unity in the National-Religious Camp”: Efforts to Heal the Rifts in the NRP

Gush Emunim’s radicalism during the debate over Sinai II, along with anxieties over the

next “step” in the peace process, ratcheted up tensions between the Old Guard and Gush

Emunim’s supporters, especially the Zeirim. It was one thing to play cat-and-mouse with the IDF across barren hilltops in the West Bank. However, it was quite another to picket Burg’s home and attempt an assault on his person, thereby forcing him to accept police protection.

At the same time, filling the vacant cabinet seat demanded a decision. Sooner or later, the

NRP would have to decide whether to nominate Hammer for the post. During the Ten Days of

Repentance between Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur, anxieties deepened over the prospect of a

Syrian accord.269 Burg paid a rare visit to R. Zvi Yehudah on September 14, after a lengthy

269 “Golan Heights Settlements Debate Their Future,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 14, 1975), 8. These anxieties were exacerbated when the Ministerial Committee on Settlements declined to approve four new Golan settlements,

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period of estrangement. The two spoke for over an hour, but Burg had little to tell the press. Burg

announced that he and R. Zvi Yehuda had a “good conversation” about “unity in the national-

religious camp,” while avoiding any “discussion of politics.” Burg declined to comment further,

telling the press that the substance of his encounter with R. Zvi Yehudah would remain

private.270

Though Burg remained silent, the timing of his visit spoke volumes. Burg visited R. Zvi

Yehudah on Erev Yom Kippur, the day for seeking forgiveness from those one may have

wronged or offended, before seeking forgiveness from God on the Day of Atonement itself.

Thus, Burg’s meeting with R. Zvi Yehudah was demonstrably aimed at reconciliation and

repentance.271 Within the party, there was talk of efforts to restore shalom bayit – “peace at

home” – and put an end to Gush Emunim's attacks on party leaders.272 Burg, in particular, was

shaken by the vitriol and threats of violence directed at his person, which forced him to accept

twenty-four-hour police protection.273 In a personal letter, Burg confessed that the final weeks of negotiations over the Sinai II Accord "were difficult for [him] in the party and in politics."

Burg’s spirits were lifted, though, by “the blessings of a friend from [his] youth along with an

interesting book.”274

4.B The Zeirim Reconsider Joining the Government…Again

referring the issue to the Cabinet for a decision. Settler leaders met on September 12, publicly appealing to the Prime Minister to immediately approve the new construction. The delay, they argued, “deepens the anxiety over our continued presence in the Golan.” 270 “Information Center Refuses to Organize Gush Emunim Tour in Sinai,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 14, 1975), 4; “Burg and Rabbi Kook Met for Clarifying Conversations,” Davar (Sept. 16, 1975), 3. 271 “Information Center,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 14, 1975), 4. 272 “Burg and Rabbi Kook Met,” Davar (Sept. 16, 1975), 3; Information Center,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 14, 1975), 4. 273 “Bodyguards for Burg,” Ma’ariv (Aug. 29, 1975), 4. 274 Burg to Klein, Letter marked “private” dated September 9, 1975, Copies of out-going Correspondence - The Minister's Activities in the NRP and the Mizrahi Movement (v. 2), Bureau of Interior Minister Yosef Burg, Israel State Archive, A/4132/7.

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Burg's visit to R. Zvi Yehudah came as the Zeirim were once again consulting with R.

Zvi Yehudah and others over Hammer's cabinet appointment. Hammer claimed that the Zeirim decided to join the government in early August to block the interim accord but decided to fight the agreement through public protest when it became apparent that negotiations were progressing too quickly for Hammer to join the government. With the interim accord behind them, the Zeirim

would need to re-visit the issue.275

As the Zeirim conducted a reassessment of their previous decision to join the

government, there was talk of possible negotiations over the Golan Heights. As a gesture of

solidarity, the Zeirim's 150-member Central Committee convened a special session in the

Golan.276 After meeting with retired military officers and representatives from the Golan

settlements, the Zeirim issued a statement warning against any changes to the lines of

deployment as set out in the Syrian-Israeli separation-of-forces agreement subsequent to the

1973 war. Hammer and Ben-Meir also joined in the Golan settlers’ call to immediately approve four new settlements in the Heights, as recommended by the Jewish Agency’s Settlement

Division. The Zeirim further declared that the Golan Heights was “an integral part of the State of

Israel,” and vowed to undertake “immediate political activity” to prevent another withdrawal.277

Many in the NRP derided the Zeirim's consultations as a “show,” so that the group could

join the government under the pretense of “saving” the Golan Heights.278 To be sure, the

275 “NRP Zeirim Asked to Provide a Written Commitment,” Ma’ariv (October 3, 1975), 21; “Hammer hesitates over Cabinet seat as parties protest,” Jerusalem Post (Oct. 8, 1975), 2. 276 “Young Guard warns against Golan Changes,” Jerusalem Post (Sept 25, 1975), 2; “NRP Young Guard on Golan Withdrawal” 1975TELAV06163 (Sept. 26, 1975). The amicable welcome which the Zeirim received during its tour of the Golan Settlements was in stark contrast to the angry reception Raphael received during his tour of NRP- affiliated settlements in the Golan earlier in the month. “Raphael Met with Sharp Criticism During His Tour of NRP Settlements in the Golan,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 5, 1975), 4. 277 “Young Guard warns,” Jerusalem Post (Sept 25, 1975), 2; “NRP Young Guard,” 1975TELAV06163 (Sept. 26, 1975). 278 ”NRP Zeirim,” Ma’ariv (October 3, 1975), 21; “NRP Seen Sure to OK Hammer for Cabinet Post,” Ha-Tsofeh (Oct. 22, 1975), 2.

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Zeirim’s consultations were, in many ways, performative. Nevertheless, the Zeirim, R. Goren,

and R. Zvi Yehudah had previously decided that in would be preferable to have Hammer in the government when negotiations over the Sinai accord were gaining traction, and territorial withdrawal had become an immediate possibility. The imminent prospect of territorial withdrawal made the Zeirim’s case for joining the government more persuasive with Gush

Emunim hardliners. After the Sinai II Accord, though, concerns over the Golan Heights may have been genuine, but they were neither imminent nor urgent. Moreover, the interim accord only added to Gush Emunim’s antipathy toward the Rabin government. Many in Gush Emunim were now staunchly opposed to Hammer accepting a cabinet post, as were some of the Zeirim.279

Some in the NRP establishment were unsure whether the Zeirim could be trusted to

abide by party discipline and collective, ministerial responsibility. NRP Secretary-General

Bernstein went so far as to demand a written commitment from the Zeirim. Others sought to

include a declaration that the Zeirim would adhere to coalition discipline in the NRP Executive's

resolution to nominate Hammer for the position.280 The Zeirim, though, unequivocally rejected

attaching any special conditions or stipulations to Hammer’s appointment.281 Nor would they

expressly commit to abiding by party and coalition discipline.

Hammer and Ben-Meir intensified their intra-factional maneuvering, negotiating a

possible merger with Warhaftig. Should they succeed, the new faction would be the largest in the

NRP. In addition, the Zeirim sought alliances with the religious Kibbutz and Moshav

movements to provide Hammer with broader support for taking a more aggressive stance against

279 “Hammer hesitates over Cabinet seat as parties protest,” Jerusalem Post (Oct. 8, 1975), 2. 280 “NRP Zeirim Asked,” Ma’ariv (October 3, 1975), 21; “NRP seen sure to OK Hammer,” Ha-Tsofeh (Oct. 22, 1975), 2; “Hammer hesitates,” Jerusalem Post (Oct. 8, 1975), 2. 281 “NRP Zeirim asked,” Ma’ariv (October 3, 1975), 21; “NRP Young Guard balks at party Discipline,” Jerusalem Post (Oct. 20, 1975), 2; “NRP seen sure to OK Hammer,” Ha-Tsofeh (Oct. 22, 1975), 2.

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withdrawal in the cabinet. While the leadership of the Kibbutz and Moshav movements did not

necessarily share the Zeirim’s hawkish approach to foreign policy (let alone the Zeirim’s neo- liberal economic worldview), they shared an interest with the Zeirim in keeping their

communities beyond the range of Syrian artillery.282

4.B.1 Opposition to Hammer’s Appointment within the Alignment

Opposition to Hammer's appointment arose within Labor, as well. Labor's own “Young

Guard,” MaPaM, and others argued that Hammer would try to stymie implementation of the

interim agreement and make it difficult for the government to conduct peace talks moving

forward.283 Moreover, the Zeirim, “politically represent[ed] Gush Emunim,” and their entry into

the cabinet would “legitimize people who openly support illegal and violent demonstrations.”

More to the point, Hammer’s appointment would give the government “an extreme religious-

nationalist character” as well as “constitute a threat to the government's collective

responsibility.”284

4.B.2 The Zeirim Refuse Demands that They Commit to Abide by Party Discipline

The Zeirim's ties to Gush Emunim worried both the left-flank of the Labor Alignment as well as the NRP establishment. However, those same ties inspired fear of another kind among the NRP’s veteran leadership. The anger and mutual suspicion generated by the tumult surrounding Kissinger’s visit created an untenable atmosphere of tension, with many speculating that the Zeirim, along with elements of Gush Emunim, might split from the NRP.285 Though

282 “NRP Zeirim Asked,” Ma’ariv (October 3, 1975), 21. 283 “Hammer hesitates,” Jerusalem Post (Oct. 8, 1975), 2; “Labor Youth Confer with Rabinovitch on Issue of Hammer Joining,” Ha-Tsofeh (Oct. 17, 1975), 1; 284 “Hammer hesitates,” Jerusalem Post (Oct. 8, 1975), 2; “Labor Youth,” Ha-Tsofeh (Oct. 17, 1975), 1. 285 “NRP Zeirim asked,” Ma’ariv (October 3, 1975), 21; “NRP seen sure to OK Hammer,” Ha-Tsofeh (Oct. 22, 1975), 2

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Hammer insisted this was not the case, the party establishment feared that the Zeirim and Gush

Emunim could form a powerful electoral force.

The fear of a schism, along with Burg and Raphael's belief that the Zeirim could be

“domesticated,” led the establishment to drop its demands that the Zeirim publicly accept party discipline.286 For its part, Gush Emunim had little interest in electioneering. After demonstrating

its ability to mobilize thousands of young, energetic supporters, the movement set its sights on

direct action to establish a foothold in the heart of the West Bank. In addition, Leftist opposition

to Hammer's appointment only hardened the Zeirim's resolve.287 While the Zeirim were unable to gain Gush Emunim’s support for Hammer entering the cabinet, Gush Emunim tempered its criticism of Hammer’s decision.

In an interview with Israel Radio, Hammer declared that he was “enter[ing] the government in order to contribute...to changing part of the government's line on those issues where [he] disagree[ed]” with the government’s position. During the previous year, Hammer had

“made a great effort to exert influence on the issues that [he] believe[d] in.”288 He had attempted

this along “with many actors outside the government” and was committed to continuing this

struggle from within. Hammer also declared that he was “a friend to Gush Emunim and that they

[were] friends of [his].” While he shared much of their political philosophy, Hammer and Gush

Emunim disagreed “over the correct way to achieve [their common] objectives.” That said,

Hammer insisted that "the objectives ha[d] not changed, the tactics ha[d].”289

286 “NRP seen sure to OK Hammer for Cabinet Post,” Ha-Tsofeh (Oct. 22, 1975), 2; “NRP Young Guard balks at party Discipline,” Jerusalem Post (Oct. 20, 1975), 2; “The Government Will Not Deliberate Today Over Addition of Hammer,” Davar (Oct. 26, 1975), 2. 287“NRP Informs Rabin of Hammer Appointment - Will demand additional minister,” Ma’ariv (Oct. 26, 1975), 4; “Hammer hesitates,” Jerusalem Post (Oct. 8, 1975), 2. 288 “Z Hammer: The Objectives Haven't Changed- The Tactics Have,” Ha-Tsofeh (Oct. 24, 1975), 2. 289 “Z Hammer,” Ha-Tsofeh (Oct. 24, 1975), 2; “Hammer unanimously Elected by NRP: Will be Party’s third Cabinet Minister,” Jerusalem Post (Oct. 24, 1975), 2.

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4.B.3 The NRP Executive Selects Hammer as their Nominee for Welfare Minister (October 23, 1975)

On October 23, the NRP Executive voted unanimously to select Zevulun Hammer as its

candidate for welfare minister.290 Secretary-General Bernstein presided over the meeting and

wished Hammer much success. Bernstein acknowledged that Hammer and the Zeirim “had

misgivings” about joining the government. However, that was all in the past. Bernstein was

“certain that Member of Knesset Hammer will serve as a faithful preventative of the entire

party.” Hammer's appointment, Bernstein hoped, would signal “the beginning of a new era of

unification and unity” for the NRP.291

Burg also hoped that Hammer's appointment would serve as “a bridge to uniting all parts of the movement.” Burg declared that the NRP’s ability “to achieve unity after a period of crisis” was a demonstration of the party’s strength. Thus, he hoped that the “period of schism” was over; feigning incredulity, Burg proclaimed that he “could not imagine a minister not accepting

[collective responsibility and coalition discipline] so long as he is a member of the government.”

Burg could only “hope that we do not reach the point [where we fulfill the verse] ‘rejoice,

Zevulun, in your going out.’”292

Burg’s doubts were well-founded. Hammer thanked the Executive for unanimously

endorsing his candidacy, declaring it a “positive beginning” to his service in the cabinet. Still,

Hammer was non-committal on coalition discipline and put the onus for party unity on the

NRP’s veteran leadership.293 Hammer depicted his nomination as part of the Zeirim’s vision of

290 “The NRP Executive Unanimously Selects Zevulun Hammer for the Position of Welfare Minister,” Ha-Tsofeh (Oct. 24, 1975), 1-2; “Burg Blesses Hammer: 'May we not come to [fulfill] the verse, “and Zevulun will rejoice in your going out',” Ma’ariv (Oct 24, 1975), 4; “Hammer unanimously Elected by NRP: Will be party’s third Cabinet Minister,” Jerusalem Post (Oct. 24, 1975), 2. 291 Deut. 33:18; “Burg Blesses Hammer,” Ma’ariv (Oct 24, 1975), 2. 292 “Burg Blesses Hammer,” Ma’ariv (Oct 24, 1975), 2. 293 “Burg Blesses Hammer,” Ma’ariv (Oct 24, 1975), 2.

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the NRP infusing the state with nationalist-religious values by taking its rightful place in national

leadership. “The religious public,” Hammer asserted, was “uniquely suited” to look after social welfare, because caring for the needy was fundamental to Jewish peoplehood and tradition.294

While Hammer declared his commitment to re-shaping the state’s “social topography,” he later

stressed that he was entering the cabinet to “struggle over the Land of Israel.”295

4.B.4 Minister Victor Shemtov Condemns Hammer

Minister Victor Shemtov of MaPaM took the unusual step of excoriating Hammer’s appointment through the Government Press Office.296 While Shemtov professed his respect for

every party’s right to choose its cabinet representatives, he was astounded by Hammer’s

nomination. The NRP writ-large had its own “tactical, internal-partisan reasons” for appointing

Hammer to the cabinet, but it galled Shemtov that Hammer would “join a government to which

he had been so adamantly opposed.”297 Only two months prior, Hammer’s “political and

religious allies” (i.e. R. Zvi Yehudah and Gush Emunim) were denouncing the “Cabinet of Evil”

for its “shameful surrender to the ‘Husband of the Gentile Woman.’” In the interim, the cabinet

had declared its readiness “ to open negotiations with Syria without preconditions” and

announced its determination to “block [the] anarchic settlement efforts” that Hammer

supported.298 Shemtov accused the Zeirim of “establish[ing] a new record for unprincipled

294 “The NRP Executive Unanimously Selects,” Ha-Tsofeh (Oct. 24, 1975), 1-2. 295 “The NRP Executive Unanimously Selects,” Ha-Tsofeh (Oct. 24, 1975), 1-2; “NRP Youth Group Leader Zvulum [sic] Hammer to be Minister of Social Welfare” 1975TELAV06756 (Oct 24, 1975). 296 “Shemtov calls Hammer 'unprincipled pragmatist',” Jerusalem Post (Oct. 26, 1975), 2. 297 “The Government Will Not Deliberate Today Over Addition of Hammer: There is no doubt that approval will be given by the Government and in the Knesset,” Davar (Oct. 26, 1975), 2; “Shemtov calls Hammer,” Jerusalem Post (Oct. 26, 1975), 2. 298 “Shemtov calls Hammer,” Jerusalem Post (Oct. 26, 1975), 2.

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pragmatism” by sending Hammer to the cabinet, proving that their claim to be “fighters for their

principles” was a “fraud.”299

4.C “Trojan Horse” or Coopted Politician? Zevulun Hammer Becomes Minister of Social Welfare (November 1975)

In the cabinet, Shemtov pressed Rabin on whether Hammer remained committed to the

hard line he took during the protests against the interim accord. Rabin replied that “it goes

without saying that a cabinet minister must be bound by cabinet discipline and accept the yoke of

collective responsibility.”300 However, if Hammer’s acceptance of cabinet discipline truly “went

without saying,” then Rabin’s statement would have been unnecessary.

4.C.1 Avraham Melamed and Ben-Meir Address the Knesset During the Debate over Hammer’s Appointment (November 4, 1975)

When Hammer’s appointment went to the Knesset for ratification, NRP Faction

Chairman Avraham Melamed had warm wishes for his “young friend.”301 As the “son of the

founding generation of Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi,” Hammer represented the next generation of

religious Zionism – “the generation of the knitted kippot.” This new generation was a “worthy

and proper successor” to Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi’s founders because it “blossomed…from the national-religious education system” and the “beit midrash [study hall] of religious Zionism.”302

Melamed observed that the Israeli political map had been transformed by the wars of

1967 and 1973, sowing ideological confusion and undermining the cohesion of existing political

parties. Every camp experienced a rise in extremism after the “victory” of 1967, including the

299 “Shemtov calls Hammer,” Jerusalem Post (Oct. 26, 1975), 2; “The Government will not Deliberate,” Davar (Oct. 26, 1975), 2. 300 “Hammer co-opted to cabinet pending Knesset approval,” Jerusalem Post (Nov. 3, 1975), 2. 301 “Announcement of the Government on the Addition of Knesset Member Zevulun Hammer to the Cabinet,” Divrei Knesset v.75 (Nov. 4, 1975), 218-244. 302 Divrei Knesset v.75 (Nov. 4, 1975), 223.

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religious camp. Moreover, the “events surrounding the Yom Kippur War…gave rise to [new]

debates” within political parties as well as “within the hearts” of Israelis. Therefore, Melamed

called for restoring civility to politics while putting an end to “shaming one’s fellow.” Hammer’s

cabinet appointment, then, was an encouraging development, for it broadened the government’s

base of support. Unity, Melamed insisted, was the order of the day, and he called on Rabin to

swiftly establish a broad, national unity government based on “the national consensus because

this [was] the need of the hour.”303

Just before Hammer’s nomination was put to a vote, Ben-Meir delivered the closing

statement in the debate. Ben-Meir had warm words for his “friend and colleague,” who would

"serve in the government as the representative of the National-Religious Party.” In addition to his

“formal representation” of the NRP, Hammer would also represent the “young generation…of

National-Religious Jewry, the Generation of the Knitted Kippot.”304Ben-Meir lauded this

generation for “shin[ing] its light onto the entire country.” Young, religious Zionists took up

arms in defense of their country as “students and soldiers of the yeshivot hesder” and were also

found among the “intelligentsia of the universities, in research and in teaching.” The Generation

of the Knitted Kippot also boasted its own cadre of “pioneers” – the young “mitnakhlim and

mityashvim” in the Religious Kibbutz Movement, the “moshavim of Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi,” and

the “rural and urban settlements” in the territories.305

After extolling the generation of the knitted kippot for its virtue, Ben-Meir stressed that, as the representatives of the knitted kippot, the Zeirim would make “no change whatsoever

303 Divrei Knesset v.75 (Nov. 4, 1975), 223-4. 304 Divrei Knesset v.75 (Nov. 4, 1975), 241. 305 Divrei Knesset v.75 (Nov. 4, 1975), 241.

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concerning those principles to which [they had] dedicated [them]selves.” The Zeirim’s refusal to

join Rabin’s cabinet the previous year had been “the correct decision and the courageous one” at

the time. Now, after “many misgivings and much consideration,” the Zeirim had decided to join

the cabinet. This, too, was the “correct” and “courageous” decision. Furthermore, Ben-Meir

warned that “if tomorrow we need to make another decision, we will also know how to take

it.”306

Addressing criticism from Gush Emunim circles, Ben-Meir promised that the Zeirim

would “struggle with all [their] power” to amend the Law of Return, as well as to “increase the pace of urban and rural settlement in all areas of the homeland….” Hammer would “struggle in the cabinet” against anyone who opposed “the realization of Zionism and the realization of the

Jewish People's right to dwell…in the Land of Israel.”307 The Zeirim had “conducted a resolute

and fine struggle” and would continue their struggle from wherever they could “best exert

influence, in the strongest way, for [their] ideals and principles.”308

Ben-Meir legitimized Hammer’s appointment to the cabinet by invoking rabbinic

authority. He claimed that the same figures who previously counseled the Zeirim to remain

outside the government were now insisting that Hammer join the cabinet. These figures, included

“the founding father of the high-school yeshivot, Rabbi Moshe Zvi Neriah,” as well as “our rosh

yeshiva, Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook.” It was “impossible,” Ben-Meir declared, “to reject all of this

[rabbinic support] in one fell swoop.”309

Ben-Meir’s trump card, though, was the decision of the Chief Rabbinate instructing the

Zeirim to join the government. The Zeirim’s sine qua non was that they receive the approval of

306 Divrei Knesset v.75 (Nov. 4, 1975), 241. 307 Divrei Knesset v.75 (Nov. 4, 1975), 242. 308 Divrei Knesset v.75 (Nov. 4, 1975), 242. 309 Divrei Knesset v.75 (Nov. 4, 1975), 242.

360 the Chief Rabbinate. After having “educated an entire generation to accept the authority of the

Chief Rabbinate, [the] Zeirim had not strayed from that” commitment. Consequently, the Zeirim had approached the Rabbinate before convening their Central Committee to decide whether to join the government.

As a sign of their fealty to the Rabbinate, Ben-Meir read the CRC’s decision into the

Knesset record, reiterating that the Zeirim were joining the government “on the basis of [the

CRC’s] decision.310 Ben-Meir concluded by wishing “Zevulun Hammer success in strengthening our societal bond and our societal strength…in order to guarantee the vision of Jewish sovereignty over the entire Land of Israel.”311

4.C.2 The Open Question of Ben-Meir and Hammer’s Acceptance of Coalition Discipline

The Knesset approved Hammer’s appointment in a swift voice vote before moving on to other business. Despite their close association with the Zeirim, Gush Emunim announced that

Hammer’s appointment would not impact their struggle against the government’s diplomatic and settlement policy.312 In the event of a confrontation between Gush Emunim and the government,

310 Divrei Knesset v.75 (Nov. 4, 1975), 242.; “The Chief Rabbinical Council Approves Addition of NRP Youth to the Government,” Ha-Tsofeh (August 15, 1975), 1; The full text of the CRC’s ruling, rendered into English, is as follows.: The Chief Rabbinical Council, in its meeting of 6 Elul 5735 deliberated over the inquiry of MK's Zevulun Hammer and Dr. Yehudah Ben-Meir to the Chief Rabbi of Israel and the Council on the matter of representatives of their faction joining the government. The Council resolves that out of consideration for the grave, national, medini, and religious decisions which are at stake, in which the future of our state and the Land of our Forefathers depends upon these decisions, we are obligated to trues in the Holy One Blessed Be He - The Hope of Israel and its salvation in times of distress. Therefore, we must strengthen the structure of the Government of Israel. Thereby, we will strengthen the internal unity of the nation and invigorate our spirit, our strength, and our hope. These agents of the public may be relied upon to know to act as one with their colleagues in the government for the sake of the wholeness of the Torah, the people and the land, and do anything possible in order to safeguard the patrimony of our forefathers and the sanctity of our people, expediting the amendment of the Law of Return, so that it will say that one is a Jew only in accordance with the sacred Halakha of Israel through the generations, which to our regret has not been amended to this day. May we merit peace in the land and the fulfilment of the Word of the Lord in his Torah, “and I will separate you from the nations to be for me.” May Judah be saved in our time, and may Israel dwell securely in its land.” 311 Divrei Knesset v.75 (Nov. 4, 1975), 244. 312 Gush Emunim Secretariat, “True and Steadfast Spirit (Advertisement),” Ha-Tsofeh (Oct. 24, 1975), 2.

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it was unclear where Hammer and Ben-Meir’s loyalties would lie. While the Zeirim were

emphatic in their acceptance of rabbinic authority, it was unclear whether Hammer and Ben-Meir

would maintain coalition discipline.

The Zeirim’s complicated alliances and allegiances caught the attention of officials in the

U.S. embassy. The embassy’s report on Hammer’s appointment noted that Burg and Bernstein claimed that Hammer would represent the entire party. However, the “NRP leaders fail[ed] to

make clear whether Hammer and Youth Group have agreed to accept party discipline.” Hammer,

himself, remained circumspect, saying that “I'm not entering the government in order to leave it,

but I won’t stay there under all circumstances.”313

It was clear, however, that Hammer would “represent [the] most hardline position in [the]

cabinet on foreign policy and security issues.” The Zeirim, were “closely linked” with Gush

Emunim, while Hammer, himself, “believe[d] that Israel ha[d] both [the] religious/historical

right and [the] security obligation to retain all of West Bank.”314 Thus, Hammer was expected to

“strengthen [the] position of hardliners in the cabinet, such as Galili and Hillel.” Moreover, he

might also “create problems” for the “more moderate” Burg and Raphael by acting as a “Trojan

Horse.” Hammer’s very presence would constitute an “obvious, unstated threat of revealing to

[the] NRP public what [Burg and Raphael would] say in cabinet meetings,” should they “depart

from ‘Land of Israel’ principles.”315

The CIA concurred that Hammer could be expected to strengthen hardliners in Rabin’s

cabinet and “constrain his two fellow Religious Party [sic] ministers.” It added, though, that

Hammer’s inclusion in the 20-person cabinet would not “appreciably alter the government’s

313 “NRP Youth Group Leader Zvulum [sic] Hammer to be Minister of Social Welfare” 1975TELAV06756 (Oct 24, 1975). 314 Ibid. 315 Ibid.

362 negotiation strategy.” With Hammer in the cabinet, Rabin hoped to earn the parliamentary support of the entire NRP Knesset Faction and temper the Zeirim’s criticism of the government.

The NRP leadership, for its part, hoped that Hammer’s appointment would “patch over the growing rift between the increasingly powerful Zeirim and the party’s Old Guard.”316

Summation: 5.A The Incremental Maturation of the Zeirim’s Practice of Politics

Hammer’s ambivalent acceptance of a cabinet portfolio was a turning point in the evolution of the Zeirim’s practice of politics. After reaching the limits of their influence “from the outside,” the Zeirim re-evaluated their priorities in light of Hazani’s death and Kissinger’s renewed diplomacy. Together with Chief Rabbi Goren, they concluded that Hammer could best stymie an unacceptable accord from within the cabinet. The imperative to prevent a precedent for withdrawal in the West Bank, then, trumped amending the Law of Return to recognize only halakhic conversions.

Rav Goren, himself, reached this conclusion the previous year. The Zeirim successfully influenced the peace process from the “outside” by pressuring the NRP leadership to take a hard line in coalition talks. The Old Guard and Labor, in turn, formulated the Judea and Samaria proviso, diverting the peace process from the West Bank to Sinai. However, the proviso also demonstrated the limits of the Zeirim’s influence. The Zeirim persisted in their struggle against the NRP joining a Labor government, refusing to join the cabinet or accept coalition discipline when the NRP eventually entered the coalition. Their effort to force a Labor-Likud unity government failed, negotiations over Sinai II began, and the Zeirim found themselves on the outside, looking in.

316 Central Intelligence Agency, “’Israel: New Cabinet Minister’ - Staff Notes: Middle East - Africa - South Asia,” (Oct. 31, 1975), 1-4, General CIA Records, CREST [Accessed May 14, 2019].

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The Zeirim were in their element during the American “reassessment,” when diplomacy

broke down, and Israelis rallied around the flag. Taking a stand against a larger, stronger

political force came naturally to a group that first organized as an insurgent youth faction

struggling against their marginalization by the establishment. Moreover, the Zeirim based their practice of politics on standing up for their principles. Thus, the Zeirim had a role to play as long

as negotiations remained at a standstill, urging the public to maintain its resolve and endure the

standoff with the U.S. administration. However, the resumption of negotiations in the summer of

1975 left the Zeirim little influence from the “outside.” The public had little appetite for

prolonging the standoff with the US, which was the only alternative the Zeirim could offer.

5.B The Zeirim Change Tactics

The NRP’s cabinet vacancy allowed the Zeirim to adjust their tactics. They remained

convinced that accepting the interim accord absent an Egyptian commitment to non-belligerency

meant surrendering to American pressure, thereby weakening the national spirit and inviting

future “dictates.” However, the Zeirim came to recognize the limitations of their “outsider”

approach. As the NRP’s third-largest faction, the Zeirim could have claimed the NRP’s third

cabinet seat in 1974. Indeed, serving in the cabinet was a logical next step for the Zeirim, who

would join the highest echelons of national and party leadership.

However, serving in the cabinet would also coopt the Zeirim into the establishment,

forcing them to temper their struggle against the Rabin government. When faced with this choice

in 1974, the Zeirim refused a cabinet seat as a matter of principle. A year later, however, the

Zeirim found themselves with an opportunity to participate directly in the decision-making

process. Moreover, the prospect of renewed peace talks added an ideological incentive for the

Zeirim to adjust their practice of politics. Consequently, the Zeirim set aside their misgivings

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over being coopted into the cabinet, lest the government capitulate to Kissinger, weaken the

national spirit, and invite further “dictates” to cede territory.

The Zeirim’s commitment to the authority and prestige of the Chief Rabbinate brought R.

Goren back into the picture. By pushing the CRC to grant the Zeirim dispensation to join the

cabinet, Rav Goren removed the main religious-political impediment to Hammer’s appointment

– the CRC’s 1974 ruling. The CRC’s blessing was not only a sine qua non for Hammer joining

the cabinet, it also gave the Zeirim religious legitimacy for changing their practice of politics.

Thus, fealty to the Rabbinate, and a commitment to prevent territorial withdrawal, brought the

Zeirim’s principles into alignment with their political ambitions.

Hammer’s decision to join the Rabin government, then, marked an incremental and

ambivalent change in the Zeirim’s practice of politics. Hammer joined the cabinet in order to

uphold the principles of rabbinic authority and the “Whole Land of Israel.” At the same time,

Hammer had also joined a government that the Zeirim fundamentally opposed. The Zeirim could

still claim to be guided by their principles, but they also made a pragmatic decision to prioritize

some principles over others.

5.C Gush Emunim’s Impact on the NRP

The Zeirim’s tactical reversal, though, came too late. Kissinger announced his return to

the region days after R. Goren and the CRC instructed the Zeirim to join the government.

Hammer’s appointment fell by the wayside amidst the initial maneuvering in anticipation of

Kissinger’s imminent “shuttle.” The Zeirim reverted to influencing decisions from the outside,

but they were quickly eclipsed by Gush Emunim. The group’s demonstrations against Kissinger,

the Rabin government, and the interim accord were an unprecedented show of strength. Gush

Emunim brought tens of thousands to the streets, demonstrating its capacity for grassroots

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organizing and mobilization. In the process, Gush Emunim temporarily cornered the market on

right-wing protest against the Rabin government’s diplomatic and settlement policy.

Hammer and Ben-Meir were constrained by the basic norms of partisan, parliamentary

politics, despite their selective adherence to the “rules of the game.” Nevertheless, as the Zeirim moved toward the establishment, Gush Emunim was unfettered by such constraints and escalated its transgressive protest.

Thus, Gush Emunim used dramatic, coordinated acts of civil disobedience – focused on

Kissinger’s person, whether on the roads, outside his hotel, or at the Knesset – in order to attract attention to their cause. These organized disruptions of public order were accompanied by violence, vandalism, and vitriol. Hammer and Ben-Meir, meanwhile, found themselves dragged along by Gush Emunim’s agenda, speaking at Gush Emunim rallies, offering support for Gush

Emunim’s demonstrators, and voicing Gush Emunim’s grievances against the police. It is not surprising, then, that many among the Zeirim had misgivings over Gush Emunim’s violent foray into the arena of mass demonstrations.

In Ben-Meir’s view, the anti-Kissinger demonstrations were “the first clear, serious difference of…approach” between the Zeirim and Gush Emunim. While the Zeirim “knew

about” Gush Emunim’s plans, Ben-Meir and Hammer “were definitely not in favor of it.” Gush

Emunim was established outside the framework of the NRP as a non-partisan entity. However, it

“left the issue of settlements” during the anti-Kissinger protests, and the group began to

transform into “a type of political organization” opposed to any concessions, anywhere. Later,

Ben-Meir came to believe that “the downfall of Gush Emunim began” with the anti-Kissinger

demonstrations of August 1975.317

317 Excertpt from “Yehudah Ben-Meir, Private Interview, Tel Aviv, July 10, 1980” in Drezon-Tepler, Interest Groups and Political Change in Israel (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1990), 182.

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Gush Emunim’s ties to the NRP and the Zeirim had significant, near-term implications

for the party. The group exacerbated tensions over the interim accord by injecting the conduct of

the police and the protesters into the discourse within the NRP. The protesters’ targeting of

Yosef Burg only added fuel to the fire. Additionally, Gush Emunim successfully seized the

agenda among opponents of the accord, eclipsing the Zeirim.

The contrast between R. Neriah’s actions and the tactics of Ben-Meir and Hammer is instructive. Although he was a former MK and a member of the NRP Central Committee, Rav

Neriah did not share Ben-Meir and Hammer’s commitment to working within the system.

Instead, he took direct action by picketing Burg’s home. Not surprisingly, Rav Neriah’s actions

were controversial. The NRP was a political party serving in both national and local

governments, not a protest movement; picketing the home of the party chairman was decidedly

out of order. Consequently, the response to R. Neriah’s departure from accepted political

behavior came from R. Neriah’s own network of Bnei Akiva yeshivot, which had close ties to the

NRP. The yeshiva network’s Central Committee took the unprecedented step of publicly and

unequivocally renouncing the actions of R. Neriah, their founding father and spiritual leader. The

network of yeshivot staunchly supported Burg – one of its leading political patrons.

Unlike R. Neriah, Hammer and Ben-Meir did not stray too far from the NRP’s normative

boundaries during the debates in the Knesset Faction and Executive, however tense and

acrimonious those debates might have been. The conduct of the demonstrators and the police

emerged as a particularly sensitive subject, with Ben-Meir and Burg trading recriminations.

Warhaftig made an impassioned plea to secure the release of Gush Emunim detainees. Raphael,

in turn, stressed that he had personally interceded with the minister of police, but the “Levinger

group” refused to desist from further civil disobedience as a condition of their release. Indeed, a

367 young heckler from the “Levinger group” precipitated a brawl in the NRP Executive after denouncing Raphael.

5.D The Range of Views within the NRP on the Sinai II Accords:

Despite the friction in the party, the NRP Knesset Faction and Executive held substantive, albeit contentious, debates over the merits of the Interim Agreement. Each body eventually decided to support the accord in the cabinet and the Knesset, while Hammer and Ben-

Meir received permission to vote against the accord as a matter of conscience. As I discuss in the previous chapter, the fault lines between the Zeirim and the Old Guard were already evident during the American “reassessment in the spring of 1975. However, the debate over the cabinet and Knesset votes on the accord operationalized these differences, forcing both the Old Guard and the Zeirim to defend their positions relative to the NRP’s platform and confront each other’s arguments.

Burg and Raphael both supported the accords, arguing that the NRP platform treated

Sinai differently than the West Bank. Raphael, though, dove for political cover, asking the party for a mandate, interceding on behalf of the Gush Emunim prisoners, and supporting Hammer and

Ben-Meir’s bid for freedom from coalition discipline. Burg, in contrast, simply announced his intention to vote for the accord to the Knesset faction, and declared that anyone who did otherwise was committing a “great sin.” The US was offering unprecedented military, economic, and diplomatic support that Israel could not refuse; prudence as well as “mamlakhti responsibility” dictated that the NRP’s representatives vote for the accord.

Avraham Melamed, Burg’s political ally and the NRP’s leading “dove,” accepted this mamlakhti responsibility. Melamed expressed a desire to protest the government’s “step-by-step” approach, which disincentivized compromise by encouraging each side to hoard its bargaining

368 chips for the next round. He believed that Israel needed a comprehensive, final peace with its neighbors, which step-by-step diplomacy only pushed farther out of reach. However, the government was committed to this strategy and Melamed believed that it would be reckless to rebuff the Americans (again). Therefore, Melamed would vote to ratify the accord despite his misgivings.

Warhaftig, to a lesser degree, also had misgivings about “step-by-step” interim accords, but he rejected the notion of abstaining from a vote of such importance. Warhaftig’s primary consideration was Ben-Gurion’s doctrine that cultivating great power was necessary for Israel’s survival. By accepting the accord, Israel would take a step toward peace as well as improve relations with the United States.

Despite his increasingly close ties with the Zeirim, Warhaftig rejected their confrontational, unilateralist approach to foreign policy, along with Hammer’s reading of the biblical prophecy that Israel was destined to “dwell alone.” In Talmudic style, Warhaftig read beyond- and even against- the plain meaning of the biblical text, applying it to the new reality of

Jewish statehood: Israel, as a “people” might dwell alone, but not as a “state.” For Warhaftig, statehood was a paradigmatic shift in the Jewish condition; Israel was no longer just a people, but a state actor with the agency and ability to shape its relations with other nations.

The interim accord, moreover, was a tangible manifestation of that agency. Warhaftig attached particular importance to the provisions of the accord that declared the agreement a

“significant step” toward peace and renounced the use of force, thereby committing the parties to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.318 To Warhaftig, this “significant step” toward peace demonstrated that, like any other state, Israel was capable of changing its relationships with its

318 Warhaftig took special note of articles 1 and 8 of the accord. See, “Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement,” FRUS XXVI, document 226; Divrei Knesset v.74 (Sep. 3, 1975), 4091-4092.

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Arab adversaries. Indeed, the interim accord marked the beginning of that change in Israel’s

relationship with Egypt.

Warhaftig also believed that the Arabs, as state actors themselves, were capable of making peace with Israel. They, too, derived agency from national liberation and statehood.

Although Israel could not force the Arabs to choose peace, it was obligated to make its best effort to change Arab attitudes. Therefore, Warhaftig believed that Israel should proactively communicate its peaceful intentions in order to affect a gradual shift in Arab attitudes. Still,

Warhaftig’s prayerful optimism did not negate his ambivalence over the accord.

The Knesset faction and the NRP Executive gave Burg, Raphael, and Warhaftig a mandate to support the accords, while Hammer and Ben-Meir were allowed to vote according to their conscience. It was better that Hammer and Ben-Meir vote “no” with dispensation from the party than invite a challenge to the leadership’s authority.

The debate over the interim accord also exacerbated generational and ideological divisions within the party. Gush Emunim escalated the confrontation between the Old Guard and the Zeirim, who were pulled farther to the right. Gush Emunim’s attacks on Burg were particularly impactful, leaving the party bruised and bloodied once the Sinai II Agreement was concluded. This tense situation within the NRP threatened to undermine the working relationships that were necessary for the party to function effectively. Concern grew over a possible schism in the party, because the prevailing atmosphere of mutual-suspicion and anger was unsustainable.

The NRP’s vacant cabinet seat offered an alternative way forward. Some of the Old

Guard hoped that joining the cabinet would tame the Zeirim and distance them from Gush

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Emunim. Others feared that a ministerial portfolio would only strengthen the Zeirim as they persisted in their struggles against the party leadership and the government. The Zeirim, though,

were intent on taking over, not leaving, the party. Their concern was that collective ministerial

responsibility would force Hammer and his faction to soften their opposition to the government’s

policies.

Ultimately, skeptics in the Old Guard dropped their demand for a loyalty pledge from the

Zeirim, while Ben-Meir and Hammer tempered their opposition to the government, albeit

temporarily. Rav Goren was glad to finally see Hammer in the cabinet, while the threat of a

schism in the party receded. However, the NRP’s underlying ideological and generational

divisions remained unresolved, with profound consequences for the party’s inter-factional

balance of power and its coalition partnership with Labor.

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Chapter 5: A Game of Factions: Inter-factional Competition in the NRP and the Rabin Government’s Agenda (Nov. 1975—Sept. 1976)

This chapter begins in November 1975, with Israeli reactions to the UN General

Assembly’s condemnation of Zionism as racism and other diplomatic gains by the PLO. As protest gave way to calls for “Zionist action,” attempts to define Zionist action stretched the limits of consensus in the NRP. Gush Emunim shattered that consensus with its wildcat settlement bit at Sebastia, which coincided with the Jerusalem Conference for Jewish Solidarity, the centerpiece of the Rabin government’s “Zionist response” to the General Assembly and PLO.

I argue that the Sebastia standoff challenged the Rabin government’s diplomatic policy, its authority, and the consensus-based, transnational Zionist praxis of the Solidarity Conference.

After an inconclusive cabinet debate, Rabin chose to strike a bargain rather than evacuate the Sebastia settlers. Under the “Kaddum Compromise,” Gush Emunim evacuated Sebastia, while the Elon Moreh settlement group relocated to the nearby Kaddum military camp. Within the Alignment, the compromise was met with anger over Rabin’s capitulation to Gush Emunim.

The NRP welcomed the non-violent outcome, and idealized the settlers as paragons of national- religious virtue.

The second part of this chapter investigates the escalation of inter-factional competition within the NRP, as the Zeirim established the “Movement for National-Religious Renewal”

(MNRR), a tripartite alliance with Warhaftig and an ad-hoc group of intellectuals, educators, rabbis, and others – including members of the Elon Moreh group at Kaddum. While the MNRR purported to be a “movement,” it also became the NRP’s largest faction, displacing Burg’s

LaMifneh. The MNRR posed a credible threat of secession, which the Zeirim used to coopt Burg.

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The Zeirim also used their growing political power to aggressively confront Labor and the Rabin

government while avoiding coalition sanctions. The MNRR also provided cover to the settlers at

Kaddum. The day it was established, Yosef Burg warned Rabin that forcibly evacuating Kaddum

would force Burg and Raphael to follow Hammer in resigning from the cabinet. Rabin, who

appreciated Burg’s predicament, delayed the cabinet debate over Kaddum.

The third part of this chapter examines the efforts to resolve the Kaddum impasse and

preserve the coalition. Days before the cabinet’s debate on settlement policy and Kaddum, Rabin

met with the NRP Executive. During the tense encounter, Rabin presented his diplomatic agenda

for 1976–1977, which centered on negotiating long-term “end-of-war” agreements in 1977. The

Executive adopted a moderate resolution, supporting Kaddum while also re-affirming the government’s authority over settlement. However, the meeting exposed a glaring dissonance between Rabin and the NRP over Gush Emunim. Moreover, the MNRR built upon the NRP consensus to avoid violence to compel Burg and Raphael to quit the government over the slightest threat of coercion. Thus, when the cabinet resolved to relocate the Elon Moreh group to an alternative location, the settlers enjoyed a de-facto veto over implementing the cabinet’s decision. The cabinet’s inability to enforce its decision further contributed to the decline of

Rabin’s image and authority. The chapter thus concludes with an examination of several elements that contributed to the disconnect between Rabin and the NRP over Kaddum, in particular, and Gush Emunim more broadly.

Solidarity or Settlement? Competing “Zionist Responses” to Israeli Diplomatic Isolation and International Support for the PLO (November–December 1975) 1.A No Claim After the Storm: Israeli Diplomatic Setbacks Following the Sinai II Accords: (November 1975)

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When Zevulun Hammer joined the cabinet on November 4, 1975, the NRP’s veteran leadership hoped for a period of calm. Coopting Hammer would temper the Zeirim’s campaign against the Rabin government and NRP leadership, restoring order to the party. Gush Emunim seemed chastened by public distaste over the anarchic, anti-Kissinger protests. Sinai II removed the threat of renewed conflict on Israel’s southern front, while the American presidential elections offered a respite on the diplomatic front. The cabinet could focus, then, on the home

1 front, and address Israel’s social and economic woes. 0F

1.A.1 The Legitimation of the PLO and the De-Legitimation of Zionism at the United Nations

This hoped-for calm failed to materialize, as the PLO and Syria launched a Soviet-backed

“diplomatic offensive” in response to the Sinai II accords. On November 10, 1975, the United

Nations General Assembly handed the PLO a critical victory, condemning Zionism as “a form of

2 racism and racial discrimination.”1F In addition to delegitimizing Zionism, the UN invited the

PLO to “all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East” while institutionalizing

3 the PLO’s use of UN bodies to confront Israel.F Two days later, congressional testimony by State

1On expectations that Hammer’s appointment would ease tensions in the NRP, see “Editorial- The election of Zevulun Hammer,” Ha-Tsofeh (Oct. 24, 1975), 2; “Burg Blesses Hammer: 'May we not come to [fulfil] the verse, “and Zevulun will rejoice in your going out',” Ma’ariv (Oct 24, 1975), 4; Raphael, 453. Regarding objections to Gush Emunim’s modus operandi among sympathizers in the religious Kibbutz movement, see excerpts from Amudim in “The Kibbutz Da'ati and Gush Emunim,” Davar (Dec. 15, 1975), 7. For the diplomatic hiatus due to the U.S. Presidential election of 1976 see, Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 181. For calls by NRP leaders to address economic issues after Sinai II see, e.g. “A Conversation with Yosef Burg: Utilizing the 'Interim Accord' for Security and Economic Organizing - The Main Challenge,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sep. 26, 1975), 3; Remarks by Zerach Warhaftig in Divrei Knesset v.75 (Sept 3, 1975), 4091-4092. 2 General Assembly Resolution 3379 (XXX), Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, A/RES/3379 (10 November 1975), UNISPAL, https://www.un.org/unispal/ga-res-on-qop/ [Accessed 27 Aug. 2019]. Resolution 3379 was later repealed. See, General Assembly Resolution 46/86, Elimination of racism and racial discrimination, A/RES/46/86 (16 Dec. 1991), available from undocs.org/en/A/RES/67/97. 3 General Assembly Resolution 3376 (XXX), Question of Palestine, A/RES/3376 (10 November 1975), available from undocs.org/en/A/RES/3376(XXX); General Assembly Resolution 3375 (XXX), Invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the efforts for peace in the Middle East, A/RES/3375 (10 November 1975), available from undocs.org/en/A/RES/3375(XXX).

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Department official Howard Saunders elicited Israeli concerns that the US might soften its stance on the PLO.

Saunders argued that the “Palestinian dimension” was the “heart” of the Mideast conflict; any peace accord would have to address their legitimate national interests. Saunders hinted that the PLO might be able to represent those interests if its aspirations were limited to the

4 West Bank and Gaza. 3F To many in Israel, Saunders’ testimony suggested that the US might recognize the PLO if it made cosmetic changes to its rhetoric. Amidst civil unrest in the West

Bank and a deadly Jerusalem bombing by the PLO’s dominant Fatah faction, the notion of PLO control in the territories exacerbated existential fears triggered by the UN’s delegitimization of

Zionism.5 Consequently, the cabinet responded forcefully to the “Saunders Document,”

6 expressing “grave criticism” over its “many mistakes and distortions.”5F Ambassador Simcha

Dinitz was instructed to personally deliver the cabinet’s reply, underscoring the gravity of the

7 matter.6F

4Harold H. Saunders, “The Palestinian Issue,” Current Policy 8 (Washington, D.C.: State Dept, Bureau of Pub. Affairs, Office of Media Services, Nov. 1975), 1-3. Haith Trust Digital Library, [http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951d03587624j [Accessed Aug. 26, 2019] 5 “Terrorist Bomb Rips Downtown Jerusalem,” JTA Daily News Bulletin, XLIII:216 (Nov. 14, 1975), 1; Consulate General Jerusalem to State, “Terrorist Bomb Kills Six, Injures 38 In Jerusalem,” (Nov. 14, 1975), 1975JERUSA01766; Department of State to Embassy Tel Aviv and Con. Gen. Jerusalem, “Riots in Ramallah,” (Nov. 11, 1975), 1975SSTATE266678; Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Riots in Ramallah,” (Nov. 12, 1975), 1975TELAV07179; Con.Gen. Jerusalem to State, “Student demonstrations in Ramallah Area,” (Nov. 12, 1975), 1975JERUSA01758; Con.Gen. Jerusalem to State, “Student Demonstrations in Nablus Area,” (Nov. 14, 1975), 1975JERUSA01768, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, National Archives (accessed October 24, 2019). 6 “Saunders Testimony Critically Received” 1975TELAV07291 (Nov. 17, 1975); “Israeli Cabinet Meeting” 1975TELAV07283 (Nov. 17, 1975). 7 “Israel Again Faces its Palestinian Dilemma,” 1975TELAV07507 (Nov. 26, 1975); “Saunders Testimony Critically Received” 1975TELAV07291 (Nov. 17, 1975); “Israeli Cabinet Meeting” 1975TELAV07283 (Nov. 17, 1975); Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Amb. Dinitz, Israeli Embassy in Washington, Outgoing Cable signed by Eli Mizrahi, in Medini-Meyuhad (Secret) Saunders Document / Opened: November 25, 1975, Bureau of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister's Office, ISA, A/7027/7.

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1.A.2 “I am a Zionist”: Israelis Protest the General Assembly

Israelis initially responded to the General Assembly resolutions with hastily organized

demonstrations and protests across the country. Thousands of high school students rallied in

Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, some wearing a yellow Star of David reminiscent of the Holocaust, and

others wearing buttons that proclaimed, "I am a Zionist.” In municipalities across the country,

squares, plazas, and streets named in honor of the UN were retitled “Zion” or “Zionism.”

Students at Tel Aviv University (temporarily) renamed their school “The University of

Zionism,” while Tel Aviv’s municipal rabbinate and Religious Council instructed synagogue

rabbis and lay leaders to preach against the General Assembly resolutions in their weekly

sermons. Afterward, the congregations were to recite Psalm 83, entreating God to protect Israel

8 from the collusion of hostile, foreign powers.7F

During a special session of the Knesset, Prime Minister Rabin angrily denounced the

General Assembly majority for “advancing the agenda of enemies of the Jewish people and the

State of Israel.” By defining Zionism as a form of racism, the UN thereby rejected Zionism’s character as the national liberation movement of the Jewish people and, by extension, the nation- state birthed by that movement.9 The PLO, in turn, could justify its “struggle against the state of

Israel’s very existence” as a struggle against racism, thereby legitimizing the “establishment of

an ‘Arafat’ state on the ruins of the Jewish state.”10

Like Rabin and many others, NRP Faction Chairman Avraham Melamed heard echoes of

the Holocaust in the General Assembly resolutions. He observed that the General Assembly

8 Ha-Tsofeh, (Nov. 12, 1975), 2; “Wave of protest sweeps country in wake of anti-Zionist resolution,” Jerusalem Post (Nov. 12, 1975), 2; Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Israel and Anti-Zionism,” 1975TELAV07257, “(Nov. 14, 1975). Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “The Protests Continue,” 1975TELAV07224, (Nov. 13,1975). 9 Divrei Knesset v.75 (Nov. 11, 1975), 313-331. 10 Divrei Knesset v.75 (Nov. 11, 1975), 313.

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chose to condemn Zionism on the anniversary of “Kristallnacht” – the Nazi pogrom that was a

prelude to the Holocaust.11 Equating Zionism with racism “turned the UN Charter into

Nuremberg laws,” Melamed charged. The Nuremberg laws had excluded Jews from German society, thereby denying their nature as human beings and legitimizing their extermination.

Similarly, the condemnation of Zionism as racism excluded the Jewish state from the family of nations, thereby legitimizing Israel’s destruction.

Melamed also lamented the failed promise of the international institutions established in the wake of World War II. The United Nations had been founded on the basis of peace and tolerance as a rebuttal to the Nazi vision of a world ordered by racial totalitarianism and Jew-

hatred. Sadly, Melamed observed, member-states with “racist-national ideologies” were now able to muster a majority in the UN.12

1.A.3 The Limits of Consensus over “Zionist Action” within the NRP:

In the spirit of “practical” Zionism, the General Assembly’s condemnation of Zionism

demanded tangible “Zionist action” as a matter of pride, if not ideology. Rabin focused on areas

of consensus, calling on Diaspora Jewry to join Israel in defense of Judaism, the Jewish people,

and the Jewish state. To the youth in the Diaspora, Rabin extended an invitation to join the

Zionist project by immigrating to Israel. As for Israelis, Rabin called for greater resolve,

sacrifice, and effort in “guaranteeing the welfare and future” of their country. He asked all Jews

to deepen their Jewish identity as well as their connections to the State of Israel and the Land of

11 Ibid, 314. For a discussion of UNGA Resolution 3379 and memory of the Holocaust see Gil Troy, Moynihan's Moment: America's Fight Against Zionism as Racism, (Oxford University Press, 2012), 142-147. Loeffler chronicles the “divergence” between international institutions and Jewish human rights activists, scholars and practitioners following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, which culminated in Resolution 3379. James Loeffler, “Prisoners of Zion,” Rooted Cosmopolitans (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2018), 261-294. 12 Divrei Knesset v.75 (Nov. 11, 1975), 317-318.

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13 Israel. 12F To that end, Israel and the World Zionist Organization would convene an emergency

meeting of international Jewish communal leaders in Jerusalem.14

Raphael backed Rabin’s call for Aliyah as “the most appropriate and genuine” Zionist

action, for it was the “soul of Zionism and its life’s breath.” To that end, he urged a “renewed

initiative” to encourage and integrate new immigrants.15 Avraham Melamed also endorsed

Rabin’s call to action, including Aliyah. However, he also cautioned that Israel’s response to the

General Assembly resolutions must not come at the expense of the peace process. Although the

Arab states were the central backers of the anti-Israel effort at the UN, it remained in Israel’s

core interest to reach an accommodation with its neighbors. Invoking Ben-Gurion, Melamed

urged Israel to “struggle against this resolution as though [Israel’s Arab interlocutors] were not

involved” and to “struggle for peace despite the UN Resolutions.”16

While Raphael kept to the prime minister’s line and Melamed articulated the anxieties of

the doves, the Zeirim took a drastically different position. They resolved that “the most

appropriate response to the UN Resolutions [was] the realization of Zionism in [all of] Eretz

Yisrael.” To that end, the Zeirim called on the government to expand settlements and apply

Israeli law in the entire Land of Israel. Zevulun Hammer urged his colleagues to take “realizable

Zionist action” by annexing areas of the West Bank “step-by-step,” beginning with the Latrun

Salient, the Etzion bloc, Kiryat Arbah, and Kalkilya.17

13 Divrei Knesset v.75 (Nov. 11, 1975), 314. 14 “Rabin, Dulzin Announce Emergency Meeting of World Jewish Leaders in Jerusalem Nov. 27-29 to Plan a Major Zionist Information campaign,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLIII:215 (Nov. 13, 1975), 1; “World Jews to Meet in Israel on UN Resolutions,” New York Times (Nov. 13, 1975), 10. 15 “Minister of Religion: Our Response to the Schemers is a Renewed Push for Aliyah and Absorption,” Ha-Tsofeh (Nov. 13, 1975), 2. 16 Divrei Knesset v.75 (Nov. 11, 1975), 318. 17 “Hammer Calls for Annexing Gush Etzion, Kiryat Arba, and the Latrun and Kalkilya areas,” Ma’ariv (Nov 14, 1975), 4; “Hammer: Take Realizable Zionist Action in Eretz Yisrael, Ha-Tsofeh (Nov. 17, 1975), 2.”

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1.B Competing “Zionist Responses” and the Authority of the State: Gush Emunim Challenges the Rabin Government with a Settlement Bid at Sebastia

1.B.1 Standoff at Sebastia: Gush Emunim Takes Direct Action (November 30–December 8, 1975)

The General Assembly resolutions led Gush Emunim to challenge the Rabin government and offer an alternative ideological and operational program. Like the Zeirim, Gush Emunim

demanded that the government “take action.” They held that “the true path” to the “realization of

Zionism” required both Aliyah and settlement. In that spirit, the group demanded unrestricted

settlement and the application of Israeli law to “the entire Land of Israel.”18 Unlike the Zeirim,

Gush Emunim challenged the government’s policy and authority through direct action.

The movement had long sought a beachhead in Samaria, a densely populated, mountainous region in the West Bank. Successive Labor governments avoided settling in the area, which was earmarked for compromise – either territorial or functional. Gush Emunim often protested this policy by squatting in an abandoned train station at Sebastia, near Nablus, forcing

the IDF to bodily remove the activists.F This time, Gush Emunim planned to do more than protest the government’s settlement policy: it planned to force the government to change that policy and permit a settler presence in Samaria.

To that end, the Sebastia settlement bid would be a loud and visible affair, in stark contrast to Gush Emunim’s covert efforts to establish a presence at Ofra, near Ramallah. Gush

Emunim would threaten active resistance and mount a propaganda campaign to win public sympathy. Fearful of internecine violence, the cabinet would balk at forcibly evacuating Sebastia and permit a settler presence in Sebastia. Swaying public opinion would be the key to victory,

18 Gush Emunim advertisement, Ha-Tsofeh (Nov. 14, 1975), 2.

379 and Gush Emunim decided to wait for the right moment, having already tested the limits of the public’s tolerance for civil disobedience with its anti-Kissinger demonstrations. 19

The UN denunciation of Zionism as racism gave Gush Emunim the opening it was looking for. The ideological assault on Israel’s legitimacy and institutionalization of political support for the PLO evoked existential anxieties, and Gush Emunim seized upon these anxieties.

Castigating the government’s “helplessness and weakness” in the face of the UN’s “Palestinian state plot,” the group offered settlement as a panacea for the ideological, diplomatic, and security challenges facing the State. Settlement offered protection from the peril of an imagined “Arafat

State” while demonstrating the reality of the Jewish attachment to the Land. If the government would not act, then it was up to the people to “ascend and settle the heart of Samaria” and forestall a PLO takeover by declaring “to the nation and the world that this land is ours!”20

Beginning on Sunday, November 30, hundreds, then thousands, answered the call.21 The

Elon Moreh Settlement Group2 made camp at the Sebastia train station, while supporters and an auxiliary corps of students on Hanukkah recess boosted their numbers.22 Gush Emunim’s

Netanya office organized supplies, reinforcements, and a campaign to sway Israeli public opinion, while Palestinians in the area demonstrated against the nascent settlement-in-the- making.23 When the IDF ordered them to disperse, activists announced that they would “defend

[Sebastia] the way any man would defend his home.” Hanan Porat pledged to “struggle hard” against any eviction; R. Moshe Zvi Neriah proclaimed that the Sebastia settlers were “the

19 Drezon-Tepler, 186-187; Gorenberg, 324-325. 20 Gush Emunim advertisement, Ma’ariv (Nov. 28, 1975), 5. 21 Yisrael Galili, “Handwritten timetable- Unfolding of Events in the Sebastia Affair (Kaddum),” in Kaddum 11.1976-2.1977, Bureau of Minister Without Portfolio Yisrael Galili, Bureau of the Prime Minister, ISA, G/7449/7; Davar, (December 1, 1975), 1-2; Gorenberg, 326. 22 “Elon Moreh Settlers Put up a Tent with a Synagogue and Post Office Inside,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 3, 1975), 2. 23 Ibid; Gorenberg, 331.

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descendants of the Maccabees” and “ready to sacrifice their lives for the sanctification of God’s

Name.”24 Unlike the Maccabees, some of the activists carried submachine guns and assault

rifles.25

The UN Security Council Invitation to the PLO Gush Emunim received an unexpected boost from the UN Security Council when it

invited the PLO to participate in a debate on the Middle East. The US declined to veto the

invitation because it was attached to the renewed mandate for peacekeepers in the Golan

Heights. Still, many in Israel were perturbed by this apparent softening of US opposition to the

PLO. The government decided to boycott the Security Council debate, an act of protest which

26 also dramatized Israel’s isolation in its opposition to the PLO.27F Thus, it became easier for many

Israelis to sympathize with the Sebastia settlers’ desire to take action, however misguided,

against the perceived existential threat of the PLO. While this sentiment did not necessarily

translate into support for Gush Emunim’s agenda, the group benefited from public sympathy that

led to misgivings over using force against the Sebastia settlers. With the country’s legitimacy

under assault abroad, the Israeli public’s instinct was to rally around the flag. Solidarity, not

internecine conflict, was the order of the day.27

In the spirit of “practical” Zionism, the General Assembly’s condemnation of Zionism demanded tangible “Zionist action” as a matter of pride, if not ideology. Rabin focused on areas of consensus, calling on Diaspora Jewry to join Israel in defense of Judaism, the Jewish people,

24 Ha-Tsofeh reported that this rhetoric was “unusually harsh” for R. Neriah. “Please, Do not Cause a Terrible conflict between brothers,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 8, 1975), 1. 25 See, Photograph in Ma’ariv (Dec. 1, 1975), 1; Gorenberg, 331. 26 Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Denies Shift on Palestinians: Says P.L.O. Role in U.N. Debate Next Month Does Not Mean Recognition,” New York Times (Dec. 2, 1975), 1, 6; “Resentment over US Vote among most of the Knesset factions,” Davar (Dec. 2, 1976), 1; “Israel Will Shun Mideast Debate in UN's Council,” New York Times (Dec. 2, 1975), 1. 27 Drezon-Tepler, 186-187; Gorenberg, 327.

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and the Jewish state. To the youth in the Diaspora, Rabin extended an invitation to join the

Zionist project by immigrating to Israel. As for Israelis, Rabin called for greater resolve,

sacrifice, and effort in “guaranteeing the welfare and future” of their country. He asked all Jews

to deepen their Jewish identity and their connection to the State of Israel and the Land of

28 Israel. 12F To that end, Israel and the World Zionist Organization would convene an emergency

meeting of international Jewish communal leaders in Jerusalem.29

Raphael backed Rabin’s call for Aliyah as “the most appropriate and genuine” Zionist

action, for it was the “soul of Zionism and its life’s breath.” To that end, he urged a “renewed

initiative” to encourage and integrate new immigrants.30 Avraham Melamed also endorsed

Rabin’s call to action, including Aliyah. However, he also cautioned that Israel’s response to the

General Assembly resolutions must not come at the expense of the peace process. Indeed, the

Arab states were the central backers of the anti-Israel effort at the UN. However, it remained in

Israel’s core interest to reach an accommodation with its neighbors. Invoking Ben-Gurion,

Melamed urged Israel to “struggle against this resolution as though [Israel’s Arab interlocutors]

were not involved” and to “struggle for peace despite the UN Resolutions.”31

While Raphael kept to the prime minister’s line and Melamed articulated the anxieties of

the doves, the Zeirim took a drastically different position. They resolved that “the most

appropriate response to the UN Resolutions [was] the realization of Zionism in [all of] Eretz

Yisrael.” To that end, the Zeirim called on the government to expand settlements and apply

Israeli law in the entire Land of Israel. Zevulun Hammer urged his colleagues to take “realizable

28 Divrei Knesset v.75 (Nov. 11, 1975), 314. 29 “Rabin, Dulzin announce Emergency Meeting of World Jewish Leaders in Jerusalem Nov. 27-29 to Plan a Major Zionist Information campaign,” JTA Daily News BulletinXLIII:215 (Nov. 13, 1975), 1; “World Jews to Meet in Israel on UN Resolutions,” New York Times (Nov. 13, 1975), 10. 30 “Minister of Religion: Our Response to the Schemers is a Renewed Push for Aliyah and Absorption,” Ha-Tsofeh (Nov. 13, 1975), 2. 31 Divrei Knesset v.75 (Nov. 11, 1975), 318.

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Zionist action” by annexing areas of the West Bank “step-by-step,” beginning with the Latrun

Salient, the Etzion bloc, Kiryat Arbah, and Kalkilya.32

1.B.2 The Jerusalem Conference of Jewish Solidarity (December 3–5, 1976)

The Sebastia settlement bid coincided with the Jerusalem Conference of Jewish

Solidarity. More than 170 Jewish communal leaders from five continents converged on the

Knesset, along with Israeli lawmakers, academics, union leaders, and cabinet officials. The

three-day summit – convened by the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the World

Zionist Organization – symbolized the Zionist conception of Jewish peoplehood in response to

the condemnation of the General Assembly. Just as importantly, the conference was a forum for

Israeli and Diaspora leaders to plan joint “Zionist action” in Jewish education, consciousness-

raising, and political activism, along with philanthropy, state-building, settlement, and Aliyah.33

Symbolically and practically, the Solidarity Conference was Rabin’s “Zionist response”

to the UN General Assembly on behalf of the state. Cabinet ministers participated in the working

34 groups, and Rabin made sure to attend the lengthy plenary sessions.30F Critically, Rabin declined

to forcibly evacuate Sebastia during the conference; the televised spectacle of Jewish settlers

35 clashing with Jewish soldiers would elicit anything but “solidarity” among the delegates.31F

32 “Hammer Calls for Annexing Gush Etzion, Kiryat Arba, and the Latrun and Kalkilya Areas,” Ma’ariv (Nov 14, 1975), 4; “Hammer: Take Realizable Zionist Action in Eretz Yisrael,” Ha-Tsofeh (Nov. 17, 1975), 2. 33 “World Jews to Meet in Israel on UN Resolution,” New York Times (Nov. 13, 1975), 10; Outgoing Foreign Ministry cable, “The Jewish Leaders' Conference,” (Nov. 25, 1975), ISA, A/110/15; “170 Jewish Leaders to Arrive at Conference to begin Tomorrow in Jerusalem,” Davar (Dec. 2, 1975), 1; “Lack of Planning at ‘Jewish Summit’,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 5, 1975), 3; ”The Jerusalem Declaration,” in Address by the Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at the Jerusalem Conference of Jewish Solidarity- December 5, 1975, (Jerusalem: Information Department of Keren Hayesod- United Israel Appeal, c. Dec. 1975), in Speeches of Y Rabin; 3.6.1974 – 24.2.1977, Bureau of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister’s Office, ISA, A/114/6. 34 “Lack of Planning,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 5, 1975), 3. 35 Gorenberg, 327; Drezon-Tepler 186-187; Burg Oral History 40 (July 30, 1990), 19, ISA, A/7781/2.

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The Sebastia settlement bid, though, was spectacle enough. Gush Emunim had hoped

Rabin would hesitate during the conference, and used the time Rabin gave them to settle in and

strengthen their numbers with an auxiliary of supporters, especially Bnei Akiva high schoolers on

36 Hanukah recess. Some delegates, particularly Orthodox rabbis, trekked out to Sebastia to visit

with the settlers.37 Other delegates encountered Gush Emunim at the conference when a group of

activists – most notably the songwriter/singer Naomi Shemer – arrived without invitation,

requesting a meeting with the working group on Aliyah, settlement, and volunteerism. The

activists’ request triggered a bitter dispute: some delegates threatened to boycott the working

group if Gush Emunim participated; others vowed that if Gush Emunim did not attend, neither

38 would they.34F

Rabin responds to the Sebastia Settlement Bid (December 5, 1975) By framing the Sebastia settlement bid as a “Zionist response” to the General Assembly,

Gush Emunim put the cause of settling Samaria (and scuttling territorial compromise) on the

conference’s agenda. At the same time, the group openly defied the government, challenging its

policies on settlements and the peace process. When Menachem Begin, Leader of the

Opposition, declared his support for settling Sebastia during the closing plenary session, Rabin

39 had no choice but to respond during his closing remarks.35F

Rabin’s speech offered an ideological rejoinder to the UN condemnation of Zionism, and

a diplomatic program to counter legitimation of the PLO. The General Assembly resolutions

36 Indeed, the Sebastia settlers issued a public appeal to Rabbi Israel Miller, Chairman of the influential Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations. “Thousands of Settlers and their Supporters Get Settled Yesterday at Elon Moreh,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 1, 1975), 1. 37 “First Building Dedicated in Elon Moreh,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 4, 1975), 1; “Rabbi Shraga Shoenfeld, USA: 'First and foremost- Must Unite the Nation,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 4, 1975), 17. 38 “'Gush Emunim' Delegation Meets with Working Group of Jerusalem Conference,” Davar (Dec. 5, 1976), 3; “Settlers affix Mezuzot to Sheds,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 4, 1975), 2. 39 “Rabin: Must undermine UN Assembly,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 7, 1975), 1.

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aimed to “outlaw the Jewish national-liberation movement” and the Jewish state. In Rabin’s

view, this demanded a united response based on shared beliefs and objectives. Despite their

differences, Rabin asserted that the delegates could agree on basic principles: Zionism was the

national-liberation movement of the Jewish people; the “undeniable” Jewish right to Eretz

40 Yisrael; and the imperative for peace, taking into account security and changing circumstances.36F

Rabin offered the past as a guide to the future. In 1947, David Ben Gurion met the needs

of the hour by deciding “realize the Zionist dream…in a part of Eretz Yisrael.” Now, too, in the

wake of the Yom Kippur War, the Rabin government’s policy addressed the needs of the times:

Israel refused to divide Jerusalem, withdraw to the 1967 borders, “go down” from the Golan

Heights, permit an “Arafat State,” or have dealings with “the so-called PLO.” Like Ben-Gurion,

Rabin’s government was prepared to compromise over territory, though the West Bank required

the people’s approval “at the polls, though the democratic process.” In a rejoinder to the

“Saunders Document,” Rabin insisted on putting the Palestinian issue “in its proper perspective.”

While the matter could not be ignored, it was not “the heart of the conflict,” and would be

41 resolved by an accord with Jordan.37F

Before concluding with a call for action and unity, Rabin offered a rejoinder to Gush

Emunim. “We are for settlements,” Rabin declared, “the more, the better.” However, settlement

had to “serve our strategic political goals.” The government prioritized the Golan Heights, where

it had decided to establish four new settlements. In the West Bank, the Jordan River was “the

line of defense of the heart of Israel in case of war.” There was an “outcry for settlers” to

“fortify” the line in the Jordan Valley. “Go and settle this line,” Rabin declared.42

40 “Address by the Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, at the Jerusalem Conference of Jewish Solidarity- December 5, 1975,” (Jerusalem: Information Department of Keren Hayesod - United Jewish Appeal, c. 1976), ISA, A/114/16. 41 Ibid 2-3. 42 Ibid. 3.

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1.B.3 The Divergent Positions of the NRP Ministers during the Sebastia Standoff:

The Sebastia affair posed a dilemma for Burg, Raphael, and Hammer. As members of the

cabinet, they were bound by collective responsibility to support the policy of the government.

However, the three NRP ministers also led a “camp party,” representing the national-religious

“camp” in Israel’s consociationalism democracy.43 This dual role obligated Burg, Raphael, and

Hammer to support the government’s policy and authority while also advocating for constituents

in open defiance of the cabinet. Moreover, the NRP was also an organ of the Mizrahi – a social

and spiritual movement within Orthodox Judaism with an active role in Jewish communal life

across the Diaspora. Therefore, Burg, Hammer and Raphael also had to consider the sensibilities

44 of religious-Zionist and modern-Orthodox Jewry across the globe.40F Indeed, World Mizrahi sent

a public “blessing of strength” to the Sebastia settlers, calling on “the government and the Zionist

movement to increase the settlements and strengthen them.”45

These competing responsibilities put the NRP ministers in the crossfire between Gush

Emunim and the government, as well as two competing forms of Zionist praxis. On one side, the

Zionism of the Jerusalem Conference of Jewish Solidarity brought together a cadre of communal

elites in support of government-approved efforts at state-building, consciousness-raising, as well as pro-Israel diplomatic and political initiatives. On the other side, the Zionism of Gush Emunim brought together a young, ideologically cohesive settlement group, supported by an auxiliary of

43 Liebman and Don-Yehiya “Anatomy of a Religious Party,” in Religion and Politics in Israel (Bloomington: Indiana U. Press, 1984). See, also Eliezer Don-Yehiya, “Stability and Transformation in a Camp Party: the NRP and the Revolution of the Zeirim,” Medinah, Mimshal Vi-yehasim Benle'umiyim 14 (1980), 25-52. [Hebrew] 44 While the Jerusalem Conference was underway, Rabbi Fabien Schoenfeld, President of the Rabbinical Conference of America, along with the Chief Rabbi of South Africa and the Rabbi of the Jewish community in Paris, visited Sebastia, and announced that they “completely identified” with Gush Emunim and planned to ask Rabin not to evict them “Rabbi Shraga Shoenfeld, USA: 'First and foremost- Must Unite the Nation,’” Ma’ariv (Dec. 4, 1975), 17; “The Government Must Approve the Settlement in Samaria and Emphasize our Historic Right to the Land of Israel,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 5, 1975), 1. 45 “The Merkaz Olami: Settlement [Hitnahlut] - Appropriate response to the Malicious attacks on Zionism,” Ha- Tsofeh (Dec. 10, 1975), 1.

386 high school, yeshiva, and seminary students on Hanukkah vacation. Through chaotic, direct action at Sebastia, the young activists engaged in a performative and transgressive iteration of

“Tower-and-Stockade pioneering” for the sake of Heaven (on earth).

* * *

Of the three NRP ministers, Zevulun Hammer was closest to Gush Emunim. On the first day of the Sebastia affair, Hammer urged the cabinet to set aside its agenda and debate establishing a settlement in Samaria. Thousands of idealistic, young Israelis were building at

Sebastia out of their own initiative, demonstrating their passion for settling the region.

Dismissing their effort would discourage potential settlers, leaving the West Bank vulnerable to the PLO.46 Rabin, though, refused to depart from the agenda. The government’s settlement policy was guided by strategic priorities, not young zealots on some windswept hilltop.

47 Unauthorized settlement attempts would be dealt with accordingly.43F

Ben-Meir staked out a hard line, traveling to Sebastia with Likud MK Ehud Olmert.

“The only response to pressure from the United Nations,” Ben-Meir told the press, was “to establish a Jewish settlement at this location.” Moreover, the NRP would quit the coalition if the government agreed to withdraw from the West Bank or the Golan Heights.48 In the Knesset,

Ben-Meir insisted that no Israeli law could “forbid Jewish settlement in any part of the Land of

Israel.” Moreover, Ben-Meir warned that the “anti-Zionist, anti-Jewish act” of evicting the settlers would doom the government’s effort to rally the world around the Zionist cause at the

49 Jewish Solidarity Conference.45F

46 “Minister Hammer: The Government Must Decide on Establishing a Point of Jewish Settlement in Samaria,” Ha- Tsofeh (Dec. 1, 1975), 1. 47 “Minister Hammer,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 1, 1975), 1; “Rabin to Hammer: Deviation from the Settlement Policy will Not be Permitted,” Davar (Dec. 1, 1975), 1. 48 “Thousands of Settlers Cut off in the Mountains,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 1, 1975), 15; “Approx. 2,000 reached Sebastia,” Davar (Dec. 1, 1975), 2. 49 Divrei Knesset v. 75 (Dec. 2, 1975), 550; Divrei Knesset v. 75 (Dec. 3, 1975), 591-592.

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While Hammer shared Ben-Meir’s sympathies, the newly minted welfare minister chose

to exert influence from within, urging Rabin, Peres, and the rest of the cabinet to engage with

50 Gush Emunim and find an alternative location for settlement.46F Foreshadowing Hammer and

Ben-Meir’s later role as intermediaries between the government and the Elon Moreh settlers after

their relocation to Kaddum, Hammer undertook a two-sided effort at mediation. Hammer worked

to persuade his cabinet colleagues not to use force while he simultaneously tried to convince the

51 settlers at Sebastia not to resist a possible evacuation.4 “The day that the settlers are expelled by

force would be a sad day for Israel, and a day of rejoicing for the PLO,” he told the press.52

Burg joined Hammer in visiting the site, but with much ambivalence. He disapproved of

Gush Emunim’s anarchic tendencies and had little use for its core activists who cynically

performed for the cameras. Burg remembered the heckles and shouts of “Lowlife!” and

“Traitor!” directed at him during Kissinger’s visit in August. That “hatred” evoked memories of

the mood during the gut-wrenching “shilumim” debate, and the tense hysteria during the “waiting

53 period” before the 1967 war.\ However, Burg was sympathetic to the many young students, the

“fantastic kids,” who flocked to Sebastia out of idealism and faith in an ideology with

implications he did not yet fully appreciate.54 Burg’s ambivalence translated into silence. When

journalists at Sebastia asked Burg for comment, he tersely replied that he “came only to look and

not to speak.”55

50 “Hammer Asked Rabin & Peres to Avoid Using Force against Settlers at Sebastia,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 5, 1975), 1. 51 “NRP Sec. General Welcomes the Agreement,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 9, 1975), 1; Drezon-Tepler, 187. 52 “1000 supporters of ‘Gush Emunim’ went out to Sebastia at Night to reinforce the Settlers in Preparation for an Evacuation,” Ma’ariv (Dec 7, 1975), 12. 53 Burg Oral History 1, (Dec. 29, 1975), 3, in Yosef Burg- Interviews 1-6 (29.12.1975- 30.9.1976), ISA, A/7780/9. 54 Burg Oral History 40 (July 30, 1990), 19, in Yosef Burg Meetings 33-45, Original, 21/2/1990 - 14/11/1990, The Institute for International Relations- Division for Oral Testimony, ISA A/7781/1. 55 “Hammer Asked Rabin,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 5, 1975), 1; “Minister Hammer Visits Sebastia Today,” Davar (Dec. 5, 1975), 3.

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While Burg remained tight-lipped and Hammer expressed measured support for Gush

Emunim, Raphael staunchly defended the government’s record and authority. He extolled the

cabinet’s announcement of new Golan settlements as the “classic Jewish response in the spirit of

the Maccabees” to the Security Council’s invitation to the PLO. Raphael sympathized with the

Sebastia protesters’ commitment to the “national and historic right” of settling Eretz Yisrael.

However, the government had exclusive authority over establishing settlements, and the present

56 crisis demanded “complete obedience” to the “elected state and national institutions.”5

1.B.4 Ghosts of the Altalena: The Cabinet Debates Evacuating Sebastia (December 7, 1975)

Rabin’s inaction during the Solidarity Conference enabled the Sebastia activists to bolster their numbers, bring supplies, and build rudimentary structures. This delay complicated the task of evacuating the site, thereby increasing the risk of a clash in full view of the television cameras. Burg, Raphael, and Hammer were determined to avoid a confrontation between the IDF and the settlers, with over a thousand students and young people caught in the middle. Burg had little sympathy for the militant activists who would resist for the benefit of the nightly news. He worried, though, about “our children,” the “fantastic children,” who were also at Sebastia.57

When the cabinet met on December 7, MaPaM’s Victor Shemtov raised the question of

the Sebastia settlement bid before the cabinet.58 The cabinet, haunted by ghosts real and

imagined, failed to decide on a course of action. Some argued for an immediate evacuation, by

56 “Dr. Raphael: Our Response to the Security Council Decision - a Line of New Settlements on the Golan Heights,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 2, 1975), 1. 57 Burg Oral History Interview 40 (July 30, 1989), 19. ISA, A/7781/2. 58 Excerpt from Protocol of Cabinet Meeting (7.12.75), in Kaddum 11.1975-2.1977, Bureau of Minister Without Portfolio Yisrael Galili, Office of the Prime Minister, ISA, G/7449/9; “Harsh Language in Government Debate over The Settlements,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 8, 1975), 15; “The Cabinet is Resolute in Its Position Not to Allow Settlements which are Not in Accordance with its Positions,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 8, 1975), 1; “Hard Conversation,” Davar (Dec. 8, 1975), 2.

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force if necessary. Justice Minister Zadok recalled the Altalena incident of 1948, in which a ship

laden with arms and munitions reached Israeli shores. Although the Irgun organized the clandestine arms shipment, David Ben-Gurion insisted that the nascent IDF receive the weapons.

When a clash broke out between Irgun fighters and an IDF-Palmach force, Ben Gurion enforced the state’s monopoly on the use of force, ordering an artillery bombardment that killed a score of

59 Irgun activists.55F

Zadok argued that Sebastia was the “Altalena of 1975.” Once again, separatists

challenged an exclusive prerogative of the state – control over its present and future borders.

Then, Ben-Gurion had taken the painful, yet necessary, decision to assert the government’s

authority using deadly force. Now, too, it was imperative that the government assert its authority,

even if that meant using violence against fellow Jews. MaPaM’s Victor Shemtov concurred,

rhetorically proposing that the government muster a thousand men from his movement to

confront the Sebastia settlers. Unfortunately, Shemtov retorted, the government “lack[ed] a Ben-

Gurion who would do that.”60

Shemtov’s comment was particularly audacious, since Rabin had been the IDF-Palmach

commander who carried out Ben-Gurion’s painful order to open fire on the Altalena.61 Prime

Minister Rabin retorted that the government did “not lack a Ben-Gurion,” what it lacked was the

Palmach.62 Though Rabin would not say it, he doubted whether the military would faithfully

execute his order to remove the settlers. Rabin suspected Peres of colluding with Gush Emunim, allowing them to evade the IDF and reach Sebastia. Furthermore, IDF Chief of Staff Mordecai

59 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime, (New York: The Free Press, 2002), 164-166. 60 “Harsh Language,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 8, 1975), 15. 61 Cohen, Supreme Command, 164-166; Gorenberg, 336. 62 “Harsh Language,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 8, 1975), 15.

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“Motta” Gur staunchly opposed evacuating Sebastia by force, leaving Rabin infuriated and

63 unsure whether he had a viable military option.58F

The alternative was a compromise suggested by author Haim Goury during Peres’ visit in

Sebastia earlier that day. Gush Emunim would evacuate Sebastia, and a small group of settlers

would remain in a nearby military camp until the cabinet held a debate on settlement policy. The

NRP ministers were united in support of the compromise despite their differences over Gush

64 Emunim.59F Burg, Raphael, and Hammer urged their colleagues to consider the settlers’

intentions. Raphael stressed that their “idealistic” motives, however misguided, should be

encouraged given the “demoralization” in Israeli society.65 Burg argued that the settlers’ actions,

though problematic, were a reaction to the UN’s delegitimization of Zionism; the government

had exercised restraint during the Jewish Solidarity Conference and should continue to do so.

Hammer took issue with Zadok’s comparison to the Altalena. The Sebastia settlers were not

“extremists” out to “overthrow the government,” but young idealists “whose [only] intent is to

dwell in the Land of Israel.” That “idealism,” moreover, was to be encouraged “against the

vision of the PLO.”66

When the matter was put to a vote, the three NRP ministers proposed that the cabinet task

Rabin and Peres with negotiating a non-violent solution. However, the majority resolved that

“settlement is only permitted in accordance with decisions of the government,” and empowered

Rabin and Peres to enforce this policy.67 The next day, though, Peres and Rabin agreed to

Goury’s compromise: Gush Emunim would vacate Sebastia, while 30 families from the Elon

63 Gorenberg, 336, Yitzhak Rabin and Dov Goldstein, Pinkas Sherut, (Tel Aviv: Ma’ariv Publications, 1979), 550. 64 “The Cabinet is Resolute,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 8, 1975), 1; “Hard Conversation,” Davar (Dec. 8, 1975), 2; “Harsh Language,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 8, 1975), 15; Excerpt from Protocol of Cabinet Meeting (7.12.75), ISA G/7449/9. 65 “Harsh Language,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 8, 1975), 15; “The Cabinet is Resolute,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 8, 1975), 1. 66 “Hard Conversation,” Davar (Dec. 8, 1975), 2; “Harsh Language,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 8, 1975), 15. 67 Excerpt from Protocol of Cabinet Meeting (7.12.75), ISA, G/7449/9.

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Moreh group would move to the nearby Kaddum military camp for two or three months until the

68 cabinet held a debate on settlement policy. F

1.B.5 The Kaddum Compromise and Rabin’s Standing in Labor

The “Kaddum compromise” was met with anger and consternation in the Alignment, but

with relief in the NRP. The dominant perspective in Labor viewed the Sebastia incident as an act

of defiance against the government’s authority and its settlement policy. Rabin’s decision to

compromise instead of evicting the settlers led many in Labor to question Rabin’s leadership and

the cabinet’s effectiveness as a deliberative body. After passing up the opportunity to assert his

authority, Rabin was accused of capitulating to Gush Emunim and failing to uphold the

credibility of the government, to say nothing of the credibility of the governing party.69

On December 9, the Rabin and Peres faced the Alignment Knesset Faction, where Peres’

overview of events was met with heckles and shouts. Yigal Allon was particularly enraged by the

agreement, which he viewed as the government’s “first surrender” to Gush Emunim.70 He believed that Gush Emunim’s goal was to force the government to establish a settlement in

Samaria, thereby departing from Alon’s settlement “parameters.” The Kaddum compromise allowed Gush Emunim to declare “victory,” even if the settlement at Kaddum was merely

“temporary” or “de-facto.” When Peres tried to quash the debate, Allon lost his temper, shouting

that he would “not be silent anymore.”71

68 Prime Minister Rabin to the Members of the Cabinet, “End of the Sebastia Affair, December 8, 1975, in PM Rabin – the Sebastia Affair – November to December 1975, Bureau of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Office of the Prime Minister, ISA A/7247/4. 69 “The 'Doves' in the Alignment Pounced on the 'Hawks' in Debate over the Compromise with the Settlers,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 10, 1975), 4, 15; “Allon Shouts: 'I Won't Be Quiet Anymore' - Rabin threatens to Resign,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 10, 1975), 1, 15; “Rabin threatens to Resign,” Davar (Dec. 10, 1975), 1-2; “Discontent with Rabin in Alignment Faction and Labor Circles,” Davar (Dec. 11, 1975), 1. 70 Allon Oral History 9 (July 31, 1979), 14, ISA, A/5001/19. 71 Ibid; Allon Oral History 22 (Aug. 31, 1979) 1-3, ISA, A/5001/21; Allon Oral History 8 (July 24, 1979), 19, A/5001/19. See, also, “Allon shouts,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 10, 1975), 1, 15.

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Criticism of the Kaddum compromise reached a crescendo when MaPaM lawmakers

accused Rabin of violating the cabinet’s December 7 and moved to evict the settlers

immediately, despite the compromise. Rabin drew a line in the sand, assuming full responsibility

for the agreement with Gush Emunim. Rabin declared he would resign if the Alignment rejected

the compromise, thereby toppling the government. Labor Secretary-General Zarmy quickly

moved to adjourn, and Faction Chair Moshe Wertman declared an end to the proceedings.72

According to Davar, “not even one of the ministers rose to defend the compromise reached in

Sebastia.”73 MaPaM responded to the adjournment by convening its political committee, which

demanded the removal of the settlers. The Kaddum compromise, MaPaM warned, created a

“precedent for capitulation” that would undermine “confidence in the government and its

authority.”74

The editorial page of Davar also excoriated Rabin and Peres for their “capitulation” to

Gush Emunim. Comparisons with the Altalena affair were “not unfounded,” because the “illegal

settlers…planned to use force against the IDF and the government.” The editorial charged that

there had been no “serious effort” by the IDF to prevent the Sebastia affair and that the

government’s “indecisiveness” gave the squatters “a full week to hunker down and get settled.”

The editorial did not explicitly demand the eviction of the Elon Moreh settlers from Kaddum.

However, it called on the government to use “every means and all force” at its disposal to

combat unauthorized settlement. At the same time, Davar called for strengthening legal

75 settlements that conformed to “the national consensus.”70F

72 “The Doves,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 10, 1975), 4, 15; “Allon Shouts,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 10, 1975), 1, 15; “Rabin Threatens,” Davar (Dec. 10, 1975), 1-2; “Discontent with Rabin,” Davar (Dec. 11, 1975), 1. 73 “Discontent with Rabin,” Davar (Dec. 11, 1975), 1. 74 “MaPaM Demands Removal of the Settlers from Samaria,” Davar (Dec. 11, 1975), 2; See, also “Rabin Rejects Shemtov's Demand for Urgently Convening the Cabinet and Giving 'Explanations for the Compromise with the Settlers,” Ha-Tsofeh, (Dec. 10, 1975), 1. 75 Editorial, “The Agreement with the Settlers - A Dangerous Precedent,” Davar (Dec. 9, 1975), 7.

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Rabin, for his part, denied that the Kaddum agreement violated the cabinet’s decision of

December 7. The cabinet tasked him and Peres with enforcing the ban on unauthorized

settlement, and the Kaddum compromise did precisely—it ended the unauthorized settler presence at Sebastia. The Elon Moreh group would wait at the Kaddum military camp until the cabinet resolved the matter during a comprehensive debate on settlement policy. Kaddum, Rabin stressed, was not a settlement, and his government had made no commitment to establish a settlement at the site.76

Labor opposition to Rabin’s leadership abated after a week or two, if only for want of an

77 alternative. 72F However, Rabin was in the awkward position of standing virtually alone with his

arch-rival Peres in defending the compromise. Not surprisingly, MaPaM and the Labor “doves”

opposed the agreement. However, Justice Minister Zadok, one of the four ministers managing

the Sebastia incident, also disavowed the agreement because it was reached without his

knowledge and on terms not approved by the ministerial group.78 Yigal Allon saw himself as the

“guard dog” tasked with preventing settlement would foreclose compromise over the West Bank.

Though he generally operated quietly, Allon also knew how to bark.79 When the two–three

month grace period eventually came to an end, Allon would push for the swift evacuation of

Kaddum.

1.C A Pious-Pioneering Vanguard: The NRP Idealizes the Sebastia Settlers

76 Government Press office, “Press Bulletin - Jerusalem, 9 December 1975: Points from Replies by the Prime Minister, Mr. Yitzhak Rabin, During the 'Meet the Press' Programme Broadcast over Galei ZaHaL (I.D.F. Radio) on 9 December 1975,” in Elon Moreh group, Bureau of PM Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister’s Office, ISA, G/6723/71. 77 “Rabin rejects Shemtov's Demand,” Ha-Tsofeh, (Dec. 10, 1975), 1; “Rabin Visit- Domestic Political Situation,” (Jan. 14, 1976) 1976TELAV00340. 78 Haim Zadok to Shimon Peres, “Personal” (Dec. 10, 1975) A/7247/4 ISA. 79 “Allon Shouts,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 10, 1975), 1, 15; Allon Oral History 9 (July 31, 1979) 14, ISA, A/5001/19; Allon Oral History Interview 22 (Aug. 15, 1979) 1-2, ISA, A/5001/22.

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1.C.1 The NRP Welcomes the Kaddum Compromise

While the Kaddum compromise was met with opposition in Labor, the NRP breathed a sigh of relief.80 Moreover, many viewed the agreement as validation, if not a victory, for the

Sebastia settlers. Ha-Tsofeh published triumphant photographs of the Elon Moreh settlers setting up their new camp at Kaddum, with a feature-length article extolling the artists, academics,

81 rabbis, and professionals who counted themselves among Gush Emunim’s supporters.76F Yitzhak

Raphael lauded the prime minister’s decision to compromise, proclaiming that “Yitzhak Rabin elevated the dignity of the government and strengthened its position among the general public.”

Raphael also expressed hope that Gush Emunim’s acceptance of a sensible compromise indicated that the group would behave responsibly in the future, and leave settlement policy in the capable hands of the government and the Ministerial Committee on Settlements. NRP

Secretary-General Zvi Bernstein also commended the government for resolving the situation peacefully, stressing the vital role of the NRP ministers. Bernstein also extended his congratulations to the Elon Moreh group for successfully gaining a foothold in Samaria.82

80 The relief felt by many in the religious public is illustrated by a selection from correspondence received by Rabin after the Sebastia incident ended. Rabbi Haim David Halevy, the Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv expressed his appreciation for Rabin’s “wise and sensible position on the Sebastia affair (and other affairs as well).” Rabbi Fabian Schoenfeld, the President of the Rabbinical Council of American who had close ties to the religious-Zionist community in Israel, commended Rabin for his “wise and statesmanlike decision” which “avoided a potential bloodbath.” He assured the Prime Minister that the compromise enjoyed the “full support” of Modern Orthodox “spiritual leaders.” Eliav Shochetman, a law professor at the Hebrew University who would later author a halakhic polemic against territorial withdrawal, gave Rabin a “Yasher Koach” for his “decision to permit the continuation of the Jewish Settlement in Samaria’s hold on the Land.” See, Haim David Halevy to Yitzhak Rabin (6 Teveth 5736 [Dec. 10, 1976], R. Fabian Schoenfeld to Yitzchok [sic] Rabin [undated telegram]; Yehudah Avner to R. Fabian Schoenfeld (Dec. 25, 1975); and Eliav Shochetman to Yitzhak Rabin, (Dec. 9, 1975); in PM Yitzhak Rabin – Elon Moreh group, Bureau of Elon Moreh Group (1), Bureau of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister’s Office, ISA, G/6723/71. 81 Naomi Gutkind, “Settlers of the Faithful and their Adherents,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 12, 1975), 7. 82 “NRP Sec. General Welcomes the Agreement,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 9, 1975), 1; “Dr. Burg Cautions Against Internal Erosion on Foreign Policy,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 12, 1975), 1.

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1.C.2 Ha-Tsofeh Idealizes and Appropriates the Sebastia Settlers

The editorial board of Ha-Tsofeh idealized the Sebastia settlers and their Bnei Akiva auxiliary as the vanguard of a new “Eretz Yisraeli” generation within religious Zionism. The

National-Religious movement, moreover, could proudly claim this pious-pioneering generation as its own. These youthful idealists “blossomed” in the NRP-supported schools, yeshivot, women’s seminaries, and youth movements. There, religious Zionism’s “Eretz-Yisraeli” generation developed a new “consciousness” in which “Torah and mitzvot, K’lal Yisrael and

Eretz Yisrael, [were] bound together as one.” Moreover, it was nothing short of a “miracle” that

“a generation shining with the joy of pioneering creativity [had] arrived on the scene” during a time of “despair and frustration” for Israeli society.

The government was to be commended for avoiding a violent clash, particularly after the

PLO’s diplomatic gains, which were “a prelude to infiltrating Judea and Samaria.” Settling the

Land was clearly the order of the day, “even without permission.” Moreover, the pious pioneers at Sebastia were particularly suited to stand guard over the nation by virtue of their “purity and attachment to Eretz-Yisraeli life, with Torah study and with settlement, with the observance of mitzvot and volunteering for elite combat units, with the dignity of their personal conduct and the valor of their conquests in battle.”

It was not surprising, then, that the Sebastia settlers enjoyed “great public support” among those Israelis who “appreciate[d] a pioneering act out of love and selflessness.” Gush

Emunim’s critics could rest assured that these pious pioneers “knew the value of discipline” and posed no danger to the government. It was only natural that “messengers [on] a vital mission” would sometimes get ahead of the government, especially since they “had a hunch” that the government would eventually approve of their efforts. After all, “in the history of the Yishuv and

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of the state, there were, from time to time, activities that came before their formal approval.” So,

too, “the first Jewish settlement in the heart of Samaria [would] certainly be established, please

God, just as Kiryat Arba was established by Hebron…”83

1.C.3 Supporters of the Faithful: Normalizing and Mainstreaming Gush-Emunim

If the Sebastia settlers were the new "pioneering vanguard," then it followed that a larger

force was marching not far behind. In a feature-length article, Ha-Tsofeh profiled some of Gush

Emunim’s supporters.84 The group’s “success” at Sebastia demonstrated its ability to deploy

activists in the field, generate publicity, and conduct a propaganda campaign on-par with any

“veteran political party.” Gush Emunim’s “secret weapon” was the social and political diversity

of its supporters. Naturally, only a faith-based movement could bring together those from the

Right and the Left, both religious and secular, who shared a “closeness of the soul” to Gush

Emunim’s values.

For the composer and poet Naomi Shemer, Gush Emunim provided a “spontaneous expression of [her] feeling that the Land of Israel is ours, and we need to settle it.” One poet from Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair was “convinced that the torch of Zionism and its values [had been] passed…from the Leftist movements of the past to Gush Emunim.” From the other side of the secular-religious divide, Yehudah Elitzur, a professor of biblical studies, was an “enthusiastic supporter of Gush Emunim.” Reading the Bible as history, Elitzur asserted that Samaria was “the flesh of our flesh since the dawn of the Nation in the Land.” Biblical accounts indicated that

Samaria was heavily forested and uninhabited until inherited by the tribe of Efraim, which cleared the forests at the instruction of the prophet Joshua.

83 Editorial - “A Nation that Shall Live by Its Faith,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 12, 1975), 2. 84 Naomi Gutkind, “Settlers of the Faithful and their Supporters,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 12, 1975), 7.

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Professor Mordecai Han took a sabbatical from his anesthesiology practice to serve as a

physician to the settlers, commuting daily to Kaddum from his home in a Tel Aviv suburb.

Though Han was already a religious man, his experience living and praying with the Elon Moreh

settlers was life-changing, and he prescribed it for all “mature people whose faith ha[d] become routine…to rejuvenate themselves.” While Han’s family had a “sentimental” connection to

Sebastia, where his daughter Michal was married, they would be satisfied with “any other place

in Samaria.”

Rabbi Haim Druckman also prioritized “settling Jews in Samaria.” The prominent rosh

yeshiva held that the government’s attempt to preserve Samaria for territorial compromise

created a religious imperative to settle the region, rather than elsewhere in Eretz Yisrael. R.

Druckman also found the notion foolish, since the Arabs’ “hatred and enmity” made peace impossible, while the international community had “shown, not for the first time, its loathing for

[Israel]. We have to trust in the Holy One Blessed Be He,” R. Druckman believed, "not the world.”85

While Ha-Tsofeh's editorial page idealized the Elon Moreh settlers, its feature-length

article normalized them. Religious Zionism’s “pioneering vanguard” was neither cloistered nor

parochial; its young, idealized idealists were recognized as the heirs to the legacy of Zionist

pioneering by admirers from all sectors of (Jewish) Israeli society. Moreover, there were

85 Gutkind, “Settlers of the Faithful,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 12, 1975), 7. Rabbi Druckman later entered politics in 1977 as Gush Emunim and Rav Zvi Yehudah’s unofficial representative in the NRP Knesset Faction. Tellingly, Rav Druckman’s prioritized settlement in areas of the Land of Israel likely to be ceded in a peace accord. This illustrates the instrumental, functional relationship between Kissinger’s diplomacy and theological change among Messianic religious-Zionists. Inbari identifies a “post-statist” turn in Rabbi Zvi Yehudah’s theology as a counter-reaction to the Israeli government’s willingness to cede territory as part of Kissinger’s diplomacy. In fact, Hellinger, Hershkowitz and Susser note that Kissinger was “the target of [R. Zvi Yehudah’s] greatest vehemence.” While both of these studies focus on theo-political ideology, it must be noted that theological change was part and parcel of concrete, political struggle. Inbari, Messianic Religious Zionism Confronts Israeli Territorial Compromise, (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 2012), 30-36; Hellinger, Hershkowitz, and Susser, Zionism and the Settlement Project: Ideology, Politics, and Civil Disobedience, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2018), 64.

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supporting roles available for artists, academics, and rabbis, along with older professionals still

young at heart.

1.C.4 “Let There Be No Illusion”: Burg Challenges the Party Line on the Sebastia Affair

While Ha-Tsofeh (and Yigal Alon) proclaimed the Elon Moreh settlers’ victory, and

Bernstein offered his congratulations, Yosef Burg soberly told the NRP Executive that the

Kaddum compromise was nothing of the sort. The dispute over Jewish settlement in Samaria was

merely “frozen” until after the UN Security Council’s January session with the PLO.86

Therefore, Burg stressed that the NRP ministers were united in support of Rabin as he worked to

thwart “an additional state in the West Bank.”87 Statecraft, not wildcat settlement, was necessary

to counter the “erosion” of international opposition to a Palestinian state. Burg was more

worried, though, by the “erosion” of Israeli opposition to a PLO-controlled state, which would create a “border of bloodshed” on Israel’s eastern frontier. Moreover, the Sebastia affair

exacerbated this erosion by galvanizing elements in MaPaM that challenged Israel’s rejection of

the PLO. “Let there be no illusion,” Burg warned, “the internal erosion is more dangerous that

the erosion on the outside.”

Burg called for the NRP to take a “cooling-off period” on settlements, giving the party

time to reassess its behavior.88 In a backhanded rebuke to Gush Emunim, Burg suggested that the

Executive consider the conduct of the NRP’s cabinet ministers with those who “tear [their

garments] and stage hakafot.”89 Burg was more forthright in his criticism of Gush Emunim in

86 “Dr. Burg Cautions Against Internal Deterioration in Foreign Policy,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 12, 1975), 1. 87 Ibid; “BURG: NRP Ministers back Rabin on Palestine issue,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 12, 1975), 3. 88 “Dr. Burg Cautions Against Erosion,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 12, 1975), 1. 89 Burg, here, was criticizing R. Moshe Levinger in particular, and the Gush Emunim leadership in general, without referring to either of them by name. On December 7, R. Levinger tore his shirt and sat on the ground as though in mourning, in response to Peres’ admonishment that the settlers would not be allowed to remain at Sebastia. Hakafot refer to the traditional practice of dancing in circles with Torah scrolls on Simhat Torah, the Jewish festival in which

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more private forums, lambasting the group's leadership for having “no understanding of the

scope of the political problem.” The group’s “isolated act of settlement” did nothing to counter

the PLO’s growing international clout, nor did it contribute to the settlement enterprise, which

required “joint effort” with other movements according to a “comprehensive mamlakhti plan.”90

Indeed, Burg’s LaMifneh faction had been established on a “progressive” platform of close

cooperation with the “Worker’s Camp” to establish agricultural settlements and build the state. It

was “tragic,” Burg felt, that much of religious Jewry had a “hatred for the Worker’s Camp”; his

main “grievance” against the ringleaders at Sebastia was “that they are giving my youths over to

Begin.”91 Still, Burg rejected comparisons to the Altalena. “Any canon that is aimed at Jews,”

92 Burg declared, “cannot be a holy cannon.” F

“Neuralgic Sensitivity’ and the Seeds of Confrontation between Labor and the NRP The Kaddum compromise laid the foundation for a confrontation between Labor and the

NRP. Dual perceptions of Gush Emunim and the Elon Moreh settlers translated into dueling

opinions of what should be done with them. The dominant view among Labor elites saw the

Sebastia settlers as anarchic lawbreakers whose defiance undermined the credibility of the

government (to say nothing of the governing party). Thus, opposition to the settlers’ ongoing

presence at Kaddum came not only from MaPaM and Labor’s dovish wing, but also from

93 Rabin’s inner circle, including Allon, Zadok, and Galili.87F Moving forward, Rabin would face

the annual cycle of reading a portion of the Torah ends and begins again. Gush Emunim put a new spin on the practice of holding musical “second Hakafot” the night after the festival by hiking through the mountains of the West Bank with activists (and, perhaps, IDF soldiers giving chase) circling the hill. “Dr. Burg Cautions Against Internal Deterioration in Foreign Policy,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 12, 1975), 1; Drezon-Tepler, 268 n 12. 90 “Dr. Burg: Mass Settlement Will Succeed Only Through a Joint Effort of all of the Settlement Movements,” Ha- Tsofeh (Dec. 14, 1975), 2. 91 Burg Oral History 1 (Dec. 29, 1975) 13, ISA, A/7780/9; Burg Oral History 73, (Nov. 3, 1992), 10-13, File n. 17, Burg Papers [Uncatalogued], Archive for the Study of Religious Zionism, Central Library, Bar Ilan University. 92 “Dr. Burg: Mass Settlement Will Succeed,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 14, 1975), 2. 93 Zadok to Peres, “Personal” (10 December 1975), ISA, G/7449/9; “Allon: Peace is up to the Arabs,” Jerusalem Post (March 21, 1976), 2.

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mounting pressure from within Labor to prove his mettle and swiftly evacuate the Elon Moreh

settlers from Kaddum.

Within the NRP, however, the Elon Moreh settlers were idealized as the embodiment of

pious-pioneering virtue. Even those less enamored with Gush Emunim’s ideology could take

pride at the sight of young, religious women and men in knitted skullcaps leading a “pioneering”

enterprise.94 Pride went hand-in-hand with fear: the specter of an “Arafat State,” real or

imagined, resonated beyond the national-religious camp, facilitating the glorification of the settlers in NRP circles. As one Israeli youngster wrote to Rabin, he believed that the Elon Moreh group should remain in Samaria, even though he was a “normal boy” and “not a Gush Emunim person.” “If they don’t settle [the West Bank],” he feared, “then the Arabs will come and conquer the country.”95

These anxieties were deeply felt. The nascent Oz-VeShalom movement observed that the

public mood “border[ed] on hysteria, as though [Israel was] standing on the edge of

annihilation.”96 To American diplomats, Israelis seemed to suffer from a “neuralgic sensitivity”

97 to the “PLO challenge.”91F The recent trauma of the Yom Kippur War, the stresses of diplomatic

isolation, terrorism, and nationalist unrest among West Bank Palestinians, fueled the Sebastia

standoff and constrained the Rabin government. These anxieties also led the NRP to claim the

Elon Moreh settlers as its own, lauding them as selfless defenders of the nation. Within the

Alignment, though, many considered Gush Emunim a nuisance at best, and subversive at worst.

94 “Settlers of the Faithful and their Adherents,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 12, 1975), 7. 95 Guy Morad to Yitzhak Rabin, (Dec. 9, 1975), ISA, G/6723/71. 96 “The Intellectual Circle for Religious Zionism Calls for formulating a comprehensive medini plan,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 10, 1975), 3. 97 “Israel Again Faces its Palestinian Dilemma” 1975TELAV07507 (Nov. 26, 1975).

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These dissonant perceptions of the Elon Moreh settlers sparked tension between Labor

and the NRP, while the uncertainty surrounding the settlers’ presence at Kaddum kept these

tensions palpable. The Kaddum compromise, moreover, served as a mechanism for conflict. The

government pledged to decide the settlers’ status during a debate on settlement policy in two or

three months, after a critical session of the UN Security Council set for January. Thus, calls from

within Labor to evacuate Kaddum would grow louder in February and March 1976, with Gush

Emunim loath to give up its beachhead in Samaria. Concomitantly, the Zeirim would grow

increasingly confrontational on issues touching on the West Bank as they achieved a

breakthrough in their struggle for leadership of the NRP.

In the second part of this chapter, I examine the establishment of the Movement for

National Religious Renewal, a Zeirim-led bloc, which upended the NRP’s inter-factional balance of power. I then describe Ben-Meir and Hammer’s forceful reactions as Rabin tried to set the government’s diplomatic agenda for 1976 and 1977. Finally, I demonstrate the initial impact of the MNRR on Burg and Raphael’s behavior in the cabinet, Rabin’s response, and pushback from

Labor as the question of the Elon Moreh settlers at Kaddum resurfaced.

Internal NRP Strife, Israeli Settlement Policy, and Rabin’s Agenda for 1976-1977 2.A The Zeirim Form Unlikely Alliances to Shift the NRP Balance of Power

On November 13, 1976, the Zeirim voted to merge with Warhaftig’s “Center Faction.”

The merger was overshadowed by the UN’s condemnation of Zionism, but the Zeirim continued

98 to court potential allies.92F These efforts bore fruit in February 1976, when the Circle for

Change—a group of intellectuals, rabbis, and professionals—agreed to form a tripartite union

98 “Youth Circles: It Is Upon the Government to Take Concrete Actions in Response to the Assembly Resolution,” Ha-Tsofeh (Nov. 14, 1975), 2; “Hammer Calls for Annexing Gush Etzion, Kiryat Arba, and the Latrun and Kalkilya areas,” Ma’ariv (Nov 14, 1975), 4.

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99 with the Zeirim and Warhaftig. The Circle, which included members of the Elon Moreh group

at Kaddum, staunchly supported Gush Emunim.100 Some, like Rabbi Haim Druckman, were new

to party politics. Others, like R. Moshe-Zvi Neriah, were activists who felt that the party’s

factionalism undermined its “standing as the representative of religious Zionism.” R. Neriah

hoped the new bloc would “reach a wide base,” attracting candidates “whose honesty, public

101 responsibility, and faithful-pioneering outlook [R. Neriah could] admire.”95F

Warhaftig’s participation raised eyebrows, given his dovish views on territory,

102 settlement, and the peace process. 96F However, Warhaftig believed that the divide between

himself and the Zeirim was more generational than ideological. The young were naturally “more

activist and extreme,” while “the mature” were “more sensible.” However, Warhaftig was

hopeful that he and the Zeirim would overcome their differences through their shared religious

commitment. The NRP was Warhaftig’s spiritual home, and he felt obligated to “guide” the

103 Zeirim toward “moderation” as they inherited the leadership of the movement.9

2.A.1 The Inauguration of the Movement for National-Religious Renewal (March 10, 1976)

The MNRR was inaugurated on March 10, 1976, displacing Burg’s LaMifneh as the

NRP’s largest faction. Despite Warhaftig’s moderation, the overwhelming majority in the

MNRR “supported massive settlement across the Land, without any hesitation.” Daniel Vermus,

99 “Body for Renewing the Face of Religious Zionism Established,” Ha-Tsofeh (Feb. 24, 1976), 2; Vermus, 105. 100 “The Large Factions in the NRP Court the Small Ones,” Ma’ariv (Feb. 26, 1976), 4; “Fathers and Sons Unite to Conquer the Leadership of the NRP,” Ma’ariv (March 4, 1976), 18; “Race Between Ideology and Seats in the NRP,” Davar (March 1, 1976), 7; “Heads of Gush Emunim Support New Movement Established in the NRP,” Ha’aretz (March 11, 1975), 1; “NRP Merger controls 37% of party votes,” Jerusalem Post (March 10, 1976), 2. 101 “Fathers and Sons,” Ma’ariv (March 4, 1976), 18. 102 “Cabinet Showdown over Kadum Soon,” Jerusalem Post (March 12, 1976), 2. 103 Ma’ariv (March 4, 1976), 18; See, also Warhaftig, Fifty Years, From Year to Year (Jerusalem, Yad Shapira: 1988), 244.

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who presided over the Inaugural Assembly, even tried to convince R. Zvi Yehudah to make a

104 rare public appearance as “the spiritual father of national-religious settlement.”98F

Vermus settled for an enthusiastic letter of support, which he read to the 1,000 people

105 who packed into the Zionist Organization of America House in Tel Aviv.99F As he looked out at

the packed hall from the dais, Vermus felt “full of hope and very much excited.” Academics,

rabbinic figures, NRP activists, and some Kaddum settlers crowded the stage, beneath a large

banner proclaiming that “the old will be made new, and the new will be made holy.”106 Vermus and his colleagues sensed “that finally, things were moving in the NRP.”107 This was a pivotal

moment for the Zeirim, who were finally able to cast off “the label of ‘Forever Young’” define

themselves based on their purpose, not biology.108

2.A.2 The Inaugural Charter of the Movement for National Religious Renewal

That purpose, however, was unclear. The MNRR was established as a faction within the

NRP. Yet, it was presented as a “movement” with its own charter, a cadre of ideologues, and a

solid grassroots base able to stand independently. Indeed, the ceremonial signing of the MNRR’s

Inaugural Charter was a bit much for a simple merger of partisan factions. Written on parchment

in script evocative of a Torah scroll, the charter styled the new bloc as the “Movement for

National-Religious Renewal,” with no mention of the NRP.109 The body of the document also

104 Vermus, 105-106. 105 Vermus,105-106; “Union of Hammer and Warhaftig Factions Established,” Davar (March 11, 1976), 3; “Founding Convention of Movement for 'National-Religious Revival,” Ha-Tsofeh (March 11, 1976), 1; “Movement for National-Religious Renewal Established in the NRP,” Ma’ariv (March 11, 1976), 4 106 Photographs in Vermus, 247-248; Ma’ariv (March 11, 1976), 4. 107 Vermus, 110. 108 Vermus, 107. 109 “Inaugural Charter of the Movement for National Religious Renewal - Established by the NRP Zeirim, the Center List, and the Circle for Change,” File 1(14).jpg, CD-ROM disk accompanying Vermus, Knitted Revolution. [Copy in possession of the author.] The omission was conspicuous when contrasted with the banner above as the stage, which read “The Movement for National-Religious Reneval The NRP [sic].” See, Photographs in Vermus, 247-248.

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omitted any explicit reference to the NRP, identifying the MNRR with the historic religious-

110 Zionist and Torah ve-Avodah movements.105F

Moreover, the charter read as an indictment of the NRP, alleging that the party had

become incapable of fulfilling its “historic mission” to preserve the Jewish character of the State

and guide it through the “stages in the Godly process of the redemption.” Additionally, the party

was failing to carry out its “national and historic responsibility” to share the “great message of

religious Zionism” in the face of a societal spiritual crisis. The charter promised to meet these

challenges with “spiritual and trustworthy leadership,” loyalty to principle, and “ideological

consistency.” To that end, the MNRR would “broaden [the movement’s] ranks and leadership”

with the “finest constructive, creative and intellectual forces” in religious Zionism.

Although the charter professed lofty ideals in florid “whereas” clauses, it was short on

specifics. The document lacked an operative program and provisions institutionalizing the new

bloc, while its ideological pronouncements were limited to generic, religious-Zionist shibboleths.

During the Inaugural Assembly, author Nachum Arieli lauded the MNRR’s ideological neutrality for enabling the MNNR’s members to unite “without any side compromising on its world view.”111

The charter’s s lacunae and ambiguity made it possible for the Zeirim to articulate a

credible, yet deniable, threat to secede from the NRP. The charter could be interpreted as a vision

for the future of the NRP or as a vision for the establishment of a new party. Indeed, Zevulun

Hammer hinted at secession, declaring that the MNRR was the “last effort to save the NRP from

110 The term “Mafdal” (NRP) is only used to identify the “Zeirei Ha-Mafdal” as co-founders of the bloc, along with the “Center List” faction and the “Circle for Change.” See, “Inaugural Charter.” 111 The MNRR would not formalize these arrangements until February 1978. See, “Agreement between the Central Actors Composing the Movement for Religious-Zionist Renewal- 28 Shevat 5738 – 2.2.78,” File 1 (2)-07, Disk accompanying Vermus, the Knitted Revolution. [digital facsimile in possession of the author]

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112 disintegration and schism by means of revolution in its leadership.”107F Tellingly, all of the

speakers at the Inaugural Assembly referred to the MNRR as a “movement,” with the exception

of Warhaftig.113

Warhaftig spoke of the MNRR as a “faction,” albeit the faction to end all factions. The

prevailing “regime of the factions” was odious to Warhaftig, and he shared the Zeirim’s

ambition to topple it from within. Vermus and his comrades, though, reveled in the challenge of

beating the Old Guard at its own game. Vermus marveled that the Zeirim boasted “the largest

faction with the broadest base” after decades of being “stepped on” by the “great LaMifneh.”

Finally, they would compete as “equally matched players on the factional-political field of the

NRP.”114

In the coming months, the Zeirim would use the threat of secession as leverage over other

factions. In order for the threat to succeed, it had to be credible as well as deniable. Splitting the

party would degrade, if not destroy, the NRP as a decisive force in Israeli politics; party loyalists,

particularly Warhaftig, were unlikely to entrust the party to a faction prepared to destroy it.115

Thus, the Zeirim publicly emphasized their program to take control of the NRP, and only hinted

at splitting the party during the Inaugural Assembly. At the same time, the Zeirim conveyed their threat to secede using anonymous press reports.

Speaking “on background,” Vermus and others told journalists that the MNRR’s next objective would be to create an “alliance of the downtrodden” with groups such as Ha-Kibbutz

Ha-Dati, the National-Religious Women’s Movement, and the religious Moshavim. This alliance

112 “Heads of Gush Emunim,” Ha’aretz (March 11, 1975), 1; “Movement for National-Religious Renewal Established in the NRP,” Ma’ariv (March 11, 1976), 4; “Union of Hammer and Warhaftig Factions Established,” Davar (March 11, 1976), 3. 113 Ha’aretz (March 11, 1975), 1; Davar (March 11, 1976), 3. 114 Vermus, 105. 115 Warhaftig, Fifty Years, 244.

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would push LaMifneh to end its entente cordiale with Likud U’Temurah, in favor of a modus

vivendi with the MNRR. Should this fail, the MNRR would have consolidated enough power to

break from the NRP.116

2.A.3 Burg’s LaMifneh and Raphael’s Likud U’Temurah React to the Establishment of the MNRR

The LaMifneh leadership got the message. In late February, Burg’s faction recognized the threat posed by the nascent MNRR. While publicly downplaying the emerging alliance,

LaMifneh turned its traditional allies in the religious Kibbutz and Moshav movements for support.117 Following the MNRR’s inaugural assembly, NRP Secretary-General Bernstein (of

LaMifneh) swiftly denounced the MNRR’s “slandering” of the party, warning that “turning the

118 faction into…a movement” endangered the NRP’s very existence.1

Leading activists in LaMifneh echoed the sentiment, denouncing the “signs of schism”

coming from the MNRR and the Zeirim’s threat to “either seize control [of the party] or break

away.” The Zeirim and Warhaftig held contradictory “medini” views, proving that the MNRR

lacked an ideological basis and was a “tactical gambit” that jeopardized the party’s future.

Indeed, some feared that if the peace process resumed, the Zeirim would bolt the party at Gush

Emunim’s urging (without Warhaftig). However, the LaMifneh activists urged reconciliation and

116 Vermus writes that he and others “leaked” the story. He quotes extensively from the reporting by Ha’aretz correspondent Ron Kislev, who “knew [what] to say” because the Zeirim told him of their plans. Vermus, 106-107; Ha’aretz (March 10, 1976), 1. 117 “The Large Factions in the NRP Court the Small Ones,” Ma’ariv (Feb. 26, 1976), 4; “Race Between Ideology and Seats in the NRP,” Davar (March 1, 1976), 7. 118 “Z. Bernstein: Unification of Factions is a Positive Thing, but [only] Within the NRP and with Respect for It,” Ha-Tsofeh (March 12, 1976), 2; “Z Bernstein: A Broad Coalition Operates in the NRP that Is Responsible for Both Successes and Failures Together,” Ha-Tsofeh (March 14, 1976), 2.

407 were willing to reach an accommodation with the MNRR. They stressed their faction’s

119 independence, downplaying its connection to Raphael’s Likud U’Temurah.114F

Deepening the wedge between LaMifneh and Raphael’s Likud U’Temurah was central to

120 the Zeirim’s strategy. 115F As minister of religion, Raphael set out to enact ambitious reforms, which created a formidable network of patronage and prestige, along with and political

121 adversaries. 116F The reorganization of local religious councils, which provided religious services as a public utility, enabled Likud U’Temurah to distribute patronage among supporters.

However, the exclusion of other factions “soured relations with LaMifneh.” Raphael also made it a “top priority” to support yeshivot early in his term, providing direct grants to specific institutions and cultivating relationships with educators and roshei yeshiva.122

Raphael’s past association with a public corruption scandal also made him political enemies.123 Golda Meir would not suffer Raphael in her cabinet, but was forced to relent after

Labor’s weak showing in the 1973 election. After joining the Meir government during the

“halakhic conversion” crisis, Raphael earned the opprobrium of both ultra-Orthodox and religious-Zionist rabbis. When he subsequently traveled to the United States in search of a

119 “LaMifneh Faction in the NRP: Union of Hammer and Warhaftig Factions - Separatism,” Davar (March 18, 1976), 2; “LaMifneh Against Indications of Schism at the 'Movement for Renewal' Convention,” Ma’ariv (March 18, 1976), 4; “'Old guard' of NRP warns against split,” Jerusalem Post (March 18, 1976), 2; “LaMifneh Faction Calls for Preserving the Unity of the NRP,” Ha-Tsofeh (March 18, 1976), 1-2. 120 Vermus, 106-107. 121 Raphael, 395, 399. 122 In his memoir, Raphael denies that hiring practices during his tenure in the Ministry of Religion were either unlawful or improper. However, he acknowledges that “relations with LaMifneh soured” due to his revamping of municipal religious councils. Raphael, 414-415; “The Majority in LaMifneh Demands Disconnecting from Raphael's Faction,” Ma’ariv (April 8, 1976), 4; “This Is How They Tried To 'Buy' An Activist In The 'Zeirim' In The NRP,” Ma’ariv (April 8, 1976), 17; “Dr. Raphael at 'Gush LeLikud U-Temurah Mesiba: There's no concern that the government will decide to forcibly remove the Kaddum Settlers,” Ha-Tsofeh (April 26, 1976), 2; “LaMifneh Members of NRP urge Split From Raphael Faction,” Jerusalem Post (May 4, 1976), 3. 123 Advertisement: “Yitzhak Raphael – Resign!! We are on Hunger Strike!!” Ma’ariv (Nov. 3. 1974); Gad Peled and Yossi Yosefov to Yitzhak Rabin, Telegram (29 Oct. 1974); Peled and Yosefov to Rabin (Nov. 21, 1974); Eli Mizrahi to Meir Shamgar (Dec. 4, 1974); Meir Shamgar to Eli Mizrahi [Urgent- Hand-Delivery] (Dec. 5, 1974); Mizrahi to Yosefov and Peled (Dec. 11, 1974) in Raphael Yitzhak Minister of Religion- Eighth Knesset, Bureau of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, PMO, ISA, G/6717/8.

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compromise, alleged remarks critical of ultra-Orthodox rabbinic figures triggered a fresh campaign for his resignation.124 To the Zeirim, Raphael personified the political cronyism which they believed tainted the party, and many blamed him for the NRP’s loss of two mandates in the

1973 election.125 Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Dati, which objected to Raphael’s inclusion in the NRP

Knesset slate, encouraged LaMifneh to break ties with Raphael and reach an accommodation

with the MNRR.126

While the Zeirim’s efforts to coopt LaMifneh would play out over time, the establishment of the MNRR immediately redrew the NRP’s political map. The next section explores the impact of heightened inter-factional competition within the NRP on the cabinet and the coalition.

Hammer and Ben-Meir aggressively confronted Labor over the appointment of a dovish director-

general in the Foreign Ministry and an exploratory diplomatic initiative by the U.S.

administration. At the same time, the two championed the cause of the Kaddum settlers, some of

whom were members of the MNRR. Yet, when calls for taking up the Kaddum issue coincided

with the MNRR’s inaugural assembly, it was Yosef Burg who unexpectedly gave Rabin a

warning which many Laborites saw as an ultimatum.

2.B The “Government of Withdrawal”: Hammer and Ben-Meir Challenge the Rabin Government’s Agenda

124 Rabbi Dobov to Premier Rabin, Telegam: “Extreme distress [at] public bizoyon Gedeloai [sic] Yisroel. Doctor Raphael Must Resign,” (Manchester: Jan. 17, 1975); Yitzhak Raphael to Yitzhak Rabin (Dec. 15, 1974); Raphael to R. Moshe Feinstein, ISA, G/6717/8. 125“Move Within NRP to Downgrade Yitzhak Raphael,” 1977TELAV00486 (Jan. 21, 1977); “Current Status of National Religious Party,” 1976TELAV08339 (Dec. 13, 1976); Aryeh Rubinstein, “Inside the NRP: How Raphael was ousted,” Jerusalem Post (March 25, 1977), 14. 126 “Race Between Ideology and Seats in the NRP,” Davar (March 1, 1976), 7.

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2.B.1 Rabin Goes to Washington

As the Zeirim built their new bloc and the Elon Moreh group settled in at Kaddum, Rabin

focused on setting the political agenda for 1976 and 1977. In late January 1976, Rabin arrived in

127 Washington after the US vetoed a Security Council resolution calling for a Palestinian state.122F

Kissinger proposed an American initiative to gauge Arab willingness to negotiate agreements to

end the state of war with Israel. Although formal talks were on hiatus for the 1976 presidential

campaign, Kissinger believed it was necessary to avoid the appearance of a complete

standstill.128 First, the secretary needed to know what Israel could offer, and Ford pressed Rabin

to be forthcoming on all fronts. The prime minister indicated that he could give ground in Sinai

and even dismantle some settlements in the Golan Heights. However, Rabin asked Kissinger to

“delay the Jordanians until 1977.”129

Kissinger tried, unsuccessfully, to loosen the Gordian knot between that Israeli coalition

politics and the peace process. While he did not expect Rabin to present a map with lines of

withdrawal, Kissinger hoped that Rabin would give him something tangible to take to the

Jordanians in order to sell them on the initiative. However, Rabin would only agree to discuss the

West Bank “in general terms.” “Go[ing] into specifics,” Rabin told the secretary, “would bring a

parliamentary crisis and elections.”130 While Rabin was constrained by the “Judea and Samaria proviso” in the coalition agreement, the prospect of elections was beginning to lose its deterrent

value. Rabin confided in Kissinger that he was considering snap elections in late 1976, but would

127 “US Casts Veto on Mideast Plan in UN’s Security Council,” New York Times (Jan. 27, 1975), 65, 4; “Memorandum of Conversation - Washington, undated, 10:30 a.m.-noon,” FRUS XXVI, Document 256, “Memcon – Washington, January 28, 1976, 11 a.m. noon,” FRUS XXVI, Document 257. 128 “Memcon – Washington, January 28, 1976, 11 a.m. noon,” FRUS XXVI, Document 257. 129 “Memcon – Washington, January 28, 1976, 11 a.m. noon,” FRUS XXVI, Document 257. 130 Ibid. See, also: “Memcon – Washington, January 29, 1976, 9:45 a. m.” FRUS XXVI, Document 258.

410 only decide after passing economic reforms.131 Thus, during his final meeting with Ford, Rabin emphasized that he “[could] make no commitments now with regard to territorial concession in

132 the West Bank.” The implication was that this would change once elections were called. 1

Rabin returned to Israel with a diplomatic agenda aimed at keeping Israel on good terms with the US in 1976, while preparing for difficult negotiations in 1977.133 He successfully withstood the pressure to discuss territorial concession in the West Bank, forcing Kissinger to settle for “the concept of a diplomatic approach” to end the state of war with all three of the

134 “confrontation states,” including Jordan.129F Those talks would likely drag out until the U.S. presidential elections, and Kissinger would only proceed after the cabinet formally accepted the

American initiative.135

2.B.2 “Nisht Klappen Mit’n Hammer”: The Zeirim Oppose the Avineri Appointment

Before the cabinet took up the end-of-war initiative, Yigal Allon unexpectedly tapped

Shlomo Avineri, a leading political scientist, to serve as director-general in the Foreign Ministry.

Though Avineri’s credentials were above reproach, his stated willingness to engage with the

131 Memcon - January 28, 1975, p15-16, 22, The Kissinger transcripts: a verbatim record of U.S. diplomacy, 1969- 1977, Digital National Security Archive, ProQuest, Document ID 167908336. 132 During a briefing with President Ford, Kissinger expressed his frustration with Rabin’s refusal to recognize the PLO, while also stalling with Jordan. That said, Rabin was “thinking of calling an election,” though this would not be mentioned during the meeting because Rabin did not want the information shared with other officials who would be present. Kissinger opined that calling early elections were “not a bad idea,” since Rabin had “promised an election on the West bank anyway.” Memcon – Washington, January 29, 1976, 9:45 a.m., FRUS XXVI, Document 258. During the meeting, Rabin conveyed to Ford his inability to make specific concessions on the West Bank “now” and “today.” The implication being that what was not possible then might well be possible after calling elections. “Memcon – Washington, January 29, 1976, 9:45-10:30 a.m.” FRUS XXVI, Document 259. 133 Stenographic Protocol: Yeshivat Ha-Lishka, Siyat HaMaarakh BaKnesset ve Rikuz MaPaM, (March 2, 1976) 22- 25, ISA, A/7034/1. 134 Indeed, when Chief Rabbi Goren visited the Whitehouse a few weeks later, Ford remarked that Rabin had done a “superb job in dealing with the United States” and that Goren “should be proud of him.” “Memcom February 19, 1976,” Box 18, Memoranda of Conversations - Ford Administration. https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/guides/findingaid/Memoranda_of_Conversations.asp#Ford 135 FRUS XXVI, Document 259; Transcript: Prime Minister's Meeting about the Diplomatic Report on Television - Deep Background - Not for Use (Wed. March 3, 1976), 13-15, A/7034/1.

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PLO and, perhaps, accept a Palestinian state was controversial.136 Thus, the appointment elicited sharp criticism from Likud and highlighted divisions within the Alignment.137 Within the NRP,

Hammer and Ben-Meir were always ready to “man the barricades,” while Burg and Raphael remained “more cautious.” Moshe Meizels, a veteran reporter at Ma’ariv, observed that “who is a Palestinian?” seemed to be replacing “who is a Jew?” as the third rail of Israeli politics.138

True to form, the Zeirim manned the barricades during a February 12 meeting of their

Central Committee. Hammer asserted that Avineri’s appointment would signal a softening of

Israel’s opposition to a Palestinian state. Ben-Meir, in turn, denounced Allon personally for his

139 “internal political maneuver…at the expense of the State of Israel.”1 As the Zeirim condemned

Allon, the political committee of Burg’s LaMifneh hosted the foreign miniser. Coincidentally,

136 “Prof. Avineri Proposed as Director-General of the Foreign Ministry,” Ha-Tsofeh (Feb. 12, 1976), 1; “Nomination of New MFA Director General Again Highlights the Palestinian Issue,” 1976TELAV01084 (Feb. 12, 1976); “Sharp reactions for and against the appointment of Prof. Avineri,” Davar (Feb. 13, 1976), 1. 137 Within Labor, disagreements over the Palestinian issue spilled out into the open. Allon urged a proactive approach aimed at a Jordanian Solution, while Rabin preferred to stall until 1977, thereby forestalling a coalition crisis. Dovish elements in MaPaM and Labor became increasingly critical of the government’s categorical refusal to engage with the PLO, if only as a tactical measure. Moreover, criticism of the government’s evasion of the Palestinian issue extended beyond the doves to include more centrist figures such as Yitzhak Navon, the influential chair of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. as well as more hawkish figures such as Ezer Weitzman and Yehoshafat Harkabi, Israel’s leading expert on the PLO. See, Toon to Atherton, “Report on the Israeli Scene,” 1975TELAV08023 (Dec. 19, 1975); Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Israel Again Faces its Palestinian Dilemma,” 1975TELV07507 (Nov. 26, 1975); “Eban Urges Overall Israeli Peace Initiative,” 1976TELAV07461 (Nov 25, 1975); “Alon's Domestic Position,” 1976TELAV00021 (Jan. 2, 1976); “Allon Visit: The Palestinian Question,” 1975TELAV08237 (Dec 25, 1975); “Time to Change Tactics on the PLO, says Harkabi,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 21, 1975), 2; “leading 'Hawk' in Israel Asks for Negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization,” The Jewish Exponent (Jan. 9, 1976), 39. Harkabi had yet to undergo his avian metamorphosis from hardline “hawk” to “Machiavellian Dove.” Harkabi saw elements of moderation in the Palestinian National Council’s debate over the PLO’s participation in the Geneva Peace conference. However, “vague moderacy and explicit extremism [were] kaleidoscopically intertwined” in the PNC resolutions. In 1978, Harkabi bemoaned the “oft-repeated story of false hopes of change [in the PLO].” The PLO had not yet undergone a metamorphosis of its own, which would come only “when the PLO recognizes that the Palestinian national right to self-determination applies to only part of Palestine.” See, Harkabi, “Twelfth Palestinian Council,” Palestinians and Israelis (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1974), 283; The Palestinian Covenant and its Meaning (London: Vallentine, Mitchel, 1979), 19, 22. 138 “Israeli Definition of 'the Palestinian Question' Intensifies Polarization in the Parties,” Ma’ariv (Feb. 16, 2016), 19. 139 “Z Hammer: The Appointment is Likely to be Interpreted as a Withdrawal from Opposition to a Palestinian State,” Ha-Tsofeh, (Feb. 13, 1976), 1; “Sharp Reactions For And Against The Appointment Of Prof. Avineri,” Davar (Feb. 13, 1976), 1; “Nomination of New MFA Director General Again Highlights the Palestinian Issue,” 1976TELAV01084 (Feb. 12, 1976)

412 the meeting was Allon’s first chance to comment on the opposition to Avineri, which he condemned as “McCarthyism.” Burg, though, refused to comment beyond lamenting the

“deterioration of interpersonal relations” in Israeli politics.140

The purpose of Allon’s meeting with LaMifneh was to discuss the American “end of war” proposal. Tellingly, discussion of the peace process had become intertwined with the issue of

Israeli settlement Samaria and the settler presence at Kaddum. Allon insisted there was “no place for a settlement in Sebastia [sic], nor would there be in the future.” The American end-of-war initiative would include an overture Jordan, as well as Egypt and Syria, thereby putting Samaria up for negotiation. Moreover, Allon believed in the possibility of serious negotiations with

Jordan, even though it would require “go[ing] to elections and receiv[ing] a mandate from the people.” Burg, for his part, observed that the direction of the peace process depended upon the

American presidential election, while Melamed reiterated his concern that time was not on

Israel’s side.141

The contrast between the meetings of the Zeirim’s Central Committee and LaMifneh’s

Political Committee on February 12 reflected the differences between the two factions and their relations with Labor. Among the Zeirim, Hammer and Ben-Meir voiced harsh, public criticism not only against Avineri but against Allon, personally. In LaMifneh, Burg respected the cabinet’s role as a deliberative body and refused to comment publicly. Moreover, while the Zeirim were united in their ideological commitment to Judea and Samaria, LaMifneh included both doves and hawks. The “decisive majority,” including Burg, could accept the Allon Plan, albeit “with an

142 accent that’s a bit more Rightist than Leftist.” F This diversity of views, and a willingness to

140 “Sharp reactions for and against the appointment of Prof. Avineri,” Davar (Feb. 13, 1976), 1; “Dr. Burg: On The Issue Of The Appointment Of Avineri I Will Express My View In The Cabinet,” Ha-Tsofeh (Feb. 13, 1975), 1-2. 141 “Dr. Burg,” Ha-Tsofeh (Feb. 13, 1976), 1-2. 142 Burg Oral History 4, (Feb. 9, 1976), 9-10.

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reconsider those views in accordance with the circumstances, made dialogue between LaMifneh

and Allon both possible and productive.

***

When the cabinet met to discuss the Avineri appointment, the difference between the

three NRP ministers quickly became apparent.143 Burg suggested delaying for a month or two

until the controversy abated. Raphael, though, staunchly supported Rabin and Alon’s position

that the cabinet made policy, not the bureaucracy. Therefore, it was inappropriate for the cabinet

to scrutinize a civil service appointment. Allon had the right to select his own staff, and Raphael

wished he could recruit someone of Avineri’s caliber into the Ministry of Religion.144

Hammer, who initiated the debate, argued that Avineri would be unable to carry out his

duties as director-general of the Foreign Ministry. The position required Avineri to promote the government’s position in meetings with foreign officials, including its categorial opposition to recognizing the PLO and the establishment of a separate, Palestinian entity. Insofar as Avineri had publicly objected to these positions, he could not effectively make the government’s case.145

Hammer proposed delaying the appointment until after the settlement debate that had been promised in the Kaddum compromise. Should the cabinet approve settling all of Eretz Yisrael, including Samaria, then Avineri would withdraw on principle. If the government prohibited settlement in Samaria and evacuated Kaddum, then Hammer’s resignation would render his objections moot.146

143 “Rabin Promises: Avineri Appointment Is Not a 'Change' in the Government Line,” Ma’ariv (Feb. 16, 1975), 3 & 15; “The Government Approved the Appointment of Prof. Avineri as Director General of the Foreign Ministry,” Ha-Tsofeh (Feb. 16, 1976), 1; “Government approved Appointment of Avineri,” Davar (Feb 16, 1976), 1-2; Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Israeli Cabinet Approves New Director General” 1976TELAV01167 (Feb. 17, 1976). 144Ha-Tsofeh (Feb. 16, 1976), 1; Davar (Feb 16, 1976), 1-2; “ Ma’ariv (Feb. 16, 1976), 3 & 15. 145 Davar (Feb 16, 1976), 1-2; Ma’ariv (Feb. 16, 1975), 3 & 15; “Israeli Cabinet Approves,” 1976TELAV01167 (Feb. 17, 1976). 146 Davar (Feb 16, 1976), 1-2; “ Ma’ariv (Feb. 16, 1975), 3 & 15; “Israeli Cabinet Approves” 1976TELAV01167 (Feb. 17, 1976).

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Ultimately, only Hammer voted against the appointment. Still, Hammer was able to spark

a two-hour debate, which he then used to deliver an ultimatum on Kaddum. In addition, Hammer

angered some of his colleagues by speaking out publicly before the cabinet took up the issue. In

case Hammer had forgotten, Moshe Kol (Independent Liberals) reminded him that a minister’s

job was to defend the government from the opposition, not attack it from within. “Nisht klappen

mit’n Hammer” – “Don’t bang with the Hammer,” Kol quipped.147

2.B.3 The Cabinet Accepts the American “End-of-War” Initiative

When the cabinet took up the “end-of-war” proposal which Rabin had brought back from

Washington, Hammer again initiated a confrontation.148 Attorney General Aharon Barak held

that responding to the American initiative did not require a formal vote; it would be sufficient to

149 adopt a “summation” by consensus, without a formal vote.1 Raphael voiced concerns that

accepting the initiative might undercut Israel’s future negotiating position, but he Barak’s legal

opinion, thereby avoiding either a difficult vote or a confrontation in the cabinet.150 Hammer,

though, chose confrontation. Accepting the American initiative, he argued, meant applying the

land-for-peace formula to the West Bank no differently than in Sinai or the Golan Heights.

Discussing the West Bank in the same breath as other territories constituted a “distinct change”

in the government’s policy, Hammer argued. Therefore, the cabinet was obligated to vote on the

147 Ma’ariv (Feb. 16, 1975), 3 & 15. 148 ,” Ha-Tsofeh (Feb. 23, 1976), 1; “Cabinet Asks U.S. to Examine Possibility of End of Belligerency Agreements with Arab States” 1976TELAV01317; Davar (Feb. 23, 1976), 1; “The Government Give Power of Attorney to US To Investigate the Possibility of a Interim-Agreement with Jordan for Ending the State of War,” Ma’ariv (Feb. 23, 1976), 3. 149 See, Guidelines for the Government Program, Part 5, Paragraph 4, (June 3, 1974), 11, in Coalition Negotiations over Forming the Government, Prime Minister's Office, ISA, A/7025/18; “Rabin authorized,” Ha-Tsofeh (Feb. 23, 1976), 1; “Cabinet Asks” 1976TELAV01317, (Feb. 23, 1976); Davar (Feb. 23, 1976), 1; “The Government Gives,” Ma’ariv (Feb. 23, 1976), 3. 150 “ Davar (Feb. 23, 1976), 1; Ha-Tsofeh (Feb 23, 1976), “Cabinet Asks,”1975TELAV01317 (Feb. 23, 1976); Ma’ariv (Feb. 23, 1976), 3.

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“end-of-war” initiative, which, Hammer charged, violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the

coalition agreement.151

As expected, the cabinet accepted Barak’s legal opinion and adopted a “summation” by consensus. The summation conveyed Israel’s willingness to reconvene the Geneva Peace

Conference (without the PLO), while also requesting that the United States inverstigate Arab

readiness to end to the state of war. To that end, Israel and the US needed to clarify the definition

of an “end to the state of war.” The decision to begin negotiations or propose terms would be

addressed later, if necessary.152

The “summation” drew criticism from across the political spectrum. An editorial in

Davar warned against a repeat of the “misunderstanding” between Israel and the US over “non-

belligerency” during the Sinai II talks. It was vital, therefore, that Israel and America agree upon

the precise legal and political elements of an “end to the state of war.”153 Within the NRP,

Avraham Melamed voiced similar concerns, while Ben-Meir denounced the summation as “the

worst decision this government has taken.” Burg argued that the initiative was exploratory and

included no “operative decisions.” Ben-Meir countered that if Jordan agreed in principle, Israel

would be forced to offer concessions in the West Bank. Therefore, accepting the agreement

amounted to agreeing, in principle, to concessions in the West Bank.154

During an appearance at Bar-Ilan University, Burg defended the cabinet’s “summation.”

Kissinger would simply investigate the Arabs’ readiness for what amounted to (almost) peace,

under the guide of ending the state of war. Once Kissinger ascertained the Arabs’ positions, the

151 “Cabinet Asks,” 1975TELAV01317 (Feb. 23, 1976); “Rabin authorized,” Ha-Tsofeh (Feb 23, 1976), 1; Davar (Feb. 23, 1976), 1. 152 “Hostile Reaction Here,” Jerusalem Post (Feb. 24, 1976), 1-2. 153 Editorial, “In Favor - but in favor of What?” Davar (Feb. 24, 1976), 7. 154 “Hostile Reaction Here,” Jerusalem Post (Feb. 24, 1976), 1-2.

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cabinet would consider whether to enter negotiations, and under what terms. Moreover, Burg

also claimed that all the NRP ministers supported the cabinet’s “positive response” to the U.S.

initiative, since the government’s response was adopted by consensus.155 Burg was also asked

about the NRP’s internal situation, amidst reports that the Zeirim were forming a new bloc. He

replied that the Zeirim had “toned down” their campaign against the party leadership since

156 Hammer joined the government. And, in any event, things were far worse in Labor and Likud.151F

Burg spoke too soon. Hammer fiercely denied that he supported the American end-of-war

initiative and demanded that the cabinet reexamine the issue.157 Rabin, in turn, agreed to publish

the cabinet’s summation in its entirety, along with clarifications to prevent any

misunderstanding. After piercing the veil of collective ministerial responsibility, Hammer

withdrew demand for a vote on the American initiative.158

“A Government of Withdrawal”: Ben-Meir Challenges the Rabin Government, Burg, and Raphael While Hammer backed down, Ben-Meir was just getting started. During a budget debate on March 2, Ben-Meir took the podium and immediately launched into a blistering tirade against

the Rabin government. “This budget is a budget of withdrawal, by a government of withdrawal,

that conducts a foreign policy of withdrawal,” Ben-Meir charged. Again, and again, Ben-Meir

returned to the theme of “withdrawal.”159 The budget, he declared, “represent[ed] a withdrawal

from economic growth” and a “withdrawal from economic independence.” In the same vein, the

155 “Dr. Burg at Bar-Ilan University: We asked the United States to inquire,” Ha-Tsofeh (Feb. 26, 1976), 1. 156 Ibid. 157 “Hammer: I oppose the Government's Summation,” Ma’ariv (Feb. 27, 1976), 1; “Minister Hammer Did not Support the Proposal to Discuss an End to the State of War with Jordan,” Ha-Tsofeh (Feb. 27, 1976), 1; “Hammer Against Gov’t plan on ‘end-of-war’,” Jerusalem Post (Feb. 27, 1976) 2. 158 The Government will Deliberate Today over What to answer the United States on the Issue of the Possibility of Negotiations with Jordan? “ Ha-Tsofeh (Feb. 29, 1976), 1; “There is no decision on Negotiations with Jordan of any other Arab State: Israel is Ready to Examine the Possibility of Negotiations on the Matter of Abolishing the State of War,” Ha-Tsofeh (March 1, 1975), 1; “Cabinet Discusses End of War Formula” 1976TELAV01514 (March 1, 1976). 159 Divrei Knesset v.76 (March 1, 1976), 1953.

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government’s acceptance of the US end-of-war initiative and its reliance on American aid

“represent[ed] a withdrawal from peace, a withdrawal from independence, and a withdrawal from the Land of Israel.”160

Ben-Meir charged that the government’s spiritual failings left it wanting for “courage.” It

lacked the courage to withstand a “confrontation in the arena of foreign [affairs]” as well as the

161 courage to face “the grave crisis in the economy.”1 This spiritual failing had tangible, material

implications: Israel’s balance-of-payments deficit was an existential threat to the state, because it

created a “diplomatic dependency” that was snowballing into “diplomatic servitude.” Hence, the

cabinet’s “shameful and shocking decision” to accept the American initiative came as “no

surprise” to Ben-Meir.162 Worst of all, the public had “no confidence” in “either the government,

in the Knesset, or in anything…” Returning to the issue at hand, Ben-Meir declared that he

would not support the government’s proposed budget, which would bring about an “economic

Holocaust.”163

2.B.4 Makeh Be’patish: The Coalition Chairman Calls for Sanctioning Ben-Meir

For Coalition Chairman Moshe Wertman, Ben-Meir’s “Government of Withdrawal”

speech demanded a response. The threat to abstain from a budget vote was on par with

threatening to abstain from voting confidence in the government, and Wertman perceived it as

such. The coalition whip charged that Ben-Meir “constantly attack[ed] the government,” and that

his attacks were “worse than those by the Likud members.”164 Wertman sent Rabin a transcript

of Ben-Meir’s “Government of Withdrawal” speech, requesting urgent consultations to

160 Divrei Knesset v.76 (March 1, 1976), 1953. 161 Divrei Knesset v.76 (March 1, 1976), 1953. 162 Divrei Knesset v.76 (March 1, 1976), 1953. 163Ibid, 1955. 164 Coalition Chair Likely to Demand Ejection of MK Ben-Meir from Finance Committee,” Davar (March 4, 1976), 2.

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reconsider Ben-Meir’s “status in the coalition.”165 Wertman also announced a crackdown on

Alignment MKs who “incited” against the government; Labor could hardly demand that the NRP

keep its people in line when MKs from the governing party shirked coalition discipline.166

Ben-Meir remained defiant, insisting that it was his duty as a Knesset member to speak the truth. Moreover, the coalition agreement did not abrogate his right to free speech.167 As if to

prove his point, Ben-Meir again denounced the government from the Knesset rostrum the next

week. He argued that the cabinet’s “unfortunate, grave, and mistaken” decision to accept the

“end of war” initiative meant a “withdrawal from peace” as Israel’s central foreign policy

objective. Ben-Meir went on to deliver a rejoinder to Rabin’s recent comments denouncing Gush

Emunim as “secessionist” and a “danger to democracy.” The true “secessionists,” Ben-Meir implied, were Burg and Raphael – “those sitting in the government” – because the overwhelming

majority of the NRP backed Gush Emunim’s “pioneering effort.”168

2.C Rabin Avoids a “Battle Royale” over Kaddum

Hammer’s aggressive challenges to the Avineri appointment and the U.S. “end-of-war” initiative demonstrated his willingness to disrupt, and even undermine, NRP-Labor relations in the cabinet. Hammer’s ultimatum over Kaddum, though, signaled his willingness to topple the government. At the same time, Ben-Meir questioned the very legitimacy of Rabin’s “government of withdrawal” from the Knesset rostrum. The Zeirim’s bold defiance of the Rabin government coincided with the final steps in establishing the MNRR. Indeed, Ben-Meir branded those

165 Moshe Wartman to Yitzhak Rabin, Subject: Speech by Mk Ben-Meir during the Debate on the State Budget,” March 3, 1976), in Eighth Knesset – MK Yehudah Ben-Meir (National-Religious Front), Bureau of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Menachem Begin, ISA, G/6752/15 . 166 “Request for Rabin: Eject MK Ben-Meir from the coalition,” Ma’ariv (March 4, 1976), 4; See, also “Coalition Chairman Likely to Demand Ejection of MK Ben-Meir from the Finance Committee,” Davar (March 4, 1976), 2; “Knesset Briefs,” Jerusalem Post (March 4, 1976), 3. 167 Ibid. 168 Proposals for the Agenda - United States- Egypt Arms Deal, Divrei Knesset v.76 (March 10, 1976), 2056-2058.

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“sitting in the government” as the true “secessionists” hours before the MNRR’s Inaugural

Assembly, as the newspapers reported the Zeirim’s threats to secede. Ben-Meir’s defense of

Gush Emunim, then, was also a pointed message to Burg and Raphael: If the Zeirim’s bid for party leadership failed, and the MNRR left the NRP, then the majority of its voters would follow.

Ben-Meir’s increased power in the NRP provided a shield when Wertman attempt to sanction him. The coalition whip demanded Ben-Meir’s seat on the Finance Committee as the price for his “government of withdrawal” speech. The NRP technically complied with

Wertman’s demand by moving Ben-Meir to the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, at the expense of the dovish Avraham Melamed, who relinquished his seat to make room for Ben-

Meir.169 Ben-Meir’s prestigious new assignment, though, was more promotion than punishment.

2.C.1 “The Government Must Prove Its Authority”: MaPaM Demands the Eviction of Kaddum

Like Ben-Meir, the Elon Moreh settlers at Kaddum also received political cover from the

MNRR. Hours after Ben-Meir’s “Government of Withdrawal” speech on March 2, MK Meir

Talmy, MaPaM’s Secretary-General, pushed Rabin to swiftly evict the Elon Moreh settlers.

Talmy insisted that “the government must prove its authority.” Kaddum could not be permitted

“to remain as a fact [on the ground]” in defiance of the cabinet, following in the footsteps of

Kiryat Arbah and, more recently, Ofra. Talmy insisted that the practice of retroactively

approving unauthorized settlements “must come to an end.”170

Like Wertman before him, Talmy failed to persuade Rabin to assert his authority.

Talmy’s demand to evict the Elon Moreh settlers came as the NRP’s most ardent proponents of

169 Divrei Knesset v.76th (March 30, 1976), 2,325. 170 “Stenographic Protocol- Meeting of the Lishka, Alignment Knesset Faction, and the Rikuz MaPaM of 4 Adar I, 5736- March 2, 1976,” page numbered 24-45 ISA, A/7034/1 .

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settlement – including members of the Elon Moreh group – established the largest faction in the

NRP. Previously, the settlers enjoyed a degree of political cover due to their clout as pious

pioneers and guardians against an imagined PLO takeover of the West Bank. However, of the

NRP’s three cabinet ministers, only Hammer pledged to resign if Kaddum were evacuated. This

changed, however, with the establishment of the MNRR.

2.C.2 Burg Warns Rabin Against Evicting the Kaddum Settlers

On March 10, the day of the MNRR’s Inaugural Assembly, Yosef Burg requested a

meeting with Rabin. He expressed “astonishment” at reports that Allon would demand the

evacuation of Kaddum at the next cabinet meeting. Burg warned Rabin that evicting the settlers

would trigger a cabinet crisis that would topple the government and force new elections.171

Hammer’s threat to resign over Kaddum was well known, but the cabinet could withstand the resignation of one NRP minister. By establishing the MNRR, Hammer changed the equation. As the leader of the NRP’s largest faction, Hammer’s resignation would force Burg and Raphael to follow, lest Hammer and the MNRR leave the NRP as well as the government. The cabinet would lose three ministers, the coalition would lose all ten NRP members, and the government would lose its parliamentary majority.172

171 “Burg to Rabin: There will be a Cabinet Crisis if Kaddum is evacuated,” Ha’aretz (March 11, 1976), 1. The Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office, Amos Eiran confirmed Ha’aretz’s account of the Burg-Rabin meeting were accurate during a conversation with Thomas Dunnigan, the Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy. “National Religious Party (NRP) Position on Qadoum,” 1976TELAV01806 (March 12, 1976). See, also “Burg: Government Crisis Expected if Kaddum Settlers Evacuated,” Ma’ariv (March 11, 1976), 16; Evacuation of Camp Kaddum Will Cause a Cabinet Crisis,” Ha-Tsofeh (March 12, 1976), 1; “Burg Sees Rabin on Kaddum Issue,” Jerusalem Post (March 11, 1976), 1; “Kaddum Problem to be Raised in the Government in a General Debate on Settlement Policy,” Davar (March 11, 1976), 1. 172 “Kaddum Problem,” Davar (March 11, 1976), 1.

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2.C.3 Rabin Delays the Kaddum Debate

Within the Prime Minister’s Office, Burg’s warning to Rabin was correctly seen as a

response to the NRP’s inter-factional strife+ and not a hostile act against the government.173

Burg was the NRP minister most vocal in his criticism of Gush Emunim and a staunch supporter

174 of the NRP’s Historic Alliance with Labor.1 Yet, it was Burg who warned Rabin against evacuating Kaddum. Moreover, Burg saw to it that news of his meeting with the prime minister

spread just as the Zeirim inaugurated their new bloc. Thus, Burg’s warning to Rabin put Burg on the “right” side of the Kaddum issue within the NRP. In addition, the timing of the meeting and

Burg’s decision to inform the press demonstrated that Burg’s warning to Rabin was a gambit in response to the establishment of the MNRR.

Rabin, for his part, “heard” what Burg had to say; Kaddum would not be on the cabinet’s agenda for its next meeting, scheduled for March 14.175 The next morning, Davar reported that

the government would not hold a debate over Kaddum. Instead, there would be a “general

debate” on settlement policy at a later date. At that time, the cabinet would adopt a detailed

settlement plan, which would also include an alternative site for the Elon Moreh group, thereby

avoiding a confrontation over Kaddum.176

173 “Burg to Rabin,” Ha’aretz (March 11, 1976), 1; “National Religious Party (NRP) Position on Qadoum,” 1976TELAV01806 (March 12, 1976); “Cabinet Showdown over Kadum Soon,” Jerusalem Post (March 12, 1976), 2. 174 Indeed, Burg, Raphael Ben-Natan, and others founded LaMifneh in the 1940’s as a “progressive,” socialist- oriented faction in HaPoel HaMizrahi, which sought closer ties between the religious worker’s movement and mainstream Labor Zionism. Burg Oral History 73 (Nov. 3, 1992) 7-13, File n17, Burg Papers, Bar Ilan Archive; “Interview with the Minister Dr. Yosef Burg on his Reaching 70,” Ha-Tsofeh (Feb. 9, 1979), 7. 175 “Burg to Rabin,” Ha’aretz (March 11, 1976), 1; “NRP Position on Qadoum,” 1976TELAV01806 (March 12, 1976; “Cabinet Showdown,” Jerusalem Post (March 12, 1976), 2. 176 “Kaddum Problem,” Davar (March 11, 1976), 1.

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2.C.4 Labor Responds to Burg’s Warning

Rabin’s accommodation of the NRP, though, complicated relations within the Labor

Alignment. Rabin understood that Burg’s warning was a ploy to defend his position in the NRP.

MaPaM, in contrast, saw it as an ultimatum meant to pressure Rabin into turning Kaddum into the next Kiryat Arbah. Responding in kind, MaPaM announced that permitting the settlers to remain at Kaddum would give them cause to dissolve the Alignment and run separately from the

Labor Party in the next election.177 The “medini” issue – particularly the West Bank and Israel’s relationship with the Palestinians – was the most “sensitive” point of contention between (and

178 within) MaPaM and Labor.173F Kaddum encapsulated the “medini issue,” and MaPaM feared that

Rabin’s failure to act would allow Gush Emunim and other “right-wing circles” to “undermine the decisive influence of the labor movement in leading this country.”179

Calls to evacuate Kaddum came not only from MaPaM, but from Rabin’s political allies within the Labor party. Justice Minister Zadok, who had been part of the ministerial team dealing with the Sebastia crisis, alleged that Peres had exceeded his mandate in negotiating the Kaddum compromise. Therefore, Zadok favored a swift evacuation of the settlers.180 Foreign Minister

Allon pressed Rabin to put evacuating the Kaddum settlers on the cabinet’s agenda as quickly as possible, even if it entailed the use of force. As an author of Labor’s quasi-official settlement program, Allon saw himself as the vigilant, yet unappreciated, “guard dog” for settlement in the

177“MaPaM position on Qadoum Settlers” 1976TELAV01841 (March 12, 1976); “Anshei Hityashvut Demand Settlement in Samaria from Rabin, Davar (March 11, 1976), 1-2; “MaPaM Discusses place in Alignment: 'Areas an split nation,'“ Jerusalem Post (March 11, 1976), 3; “Government due to Confront Qadoum,” 1976TELAV01802 (March 11, 1976); “Go-it-alone threat by MaPaM,” Jerusalem Post (March 18, 1976), 1; “Labor Party and MaPaM Disagree on Negotiations and Settlement Policy, 1976TELAV03120 (May 4, 1976). 178 “Stenographic Protocal From the Meeting of the Alignment Executive; 7 Iyar 5736 - May 7, 1976,” 63, ISA, A/7029/4. 179 “Go-it-alone threat by MaPaM,” Jerusalem Post (March 18, 1976), 1. 180 Haim Zadok to Shimon Peres (Dec. 10, 1975) ISA, A/7247/4.

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territories, and the Kaddum compromise flagrantly violated the “Allon Plan” by putting settlers

in an area meant for an eventual accord with Jordan.181

Diplomats at the U.S. Embassy saw Burg’s meeting with Rabin as evidence of the

“interplay between domestic politics and GOI [Government of Israel] policy on the West Bank.”

With MaPaM threatening to break with Labor, and the NRP promising a coalition crisis, the

182 embassy predicted a “battle royal” over Kaddum. 177F When Yigal Allon pressed Rabin during the

cabinet meeting of March 21, the prime minister declared that the debate on settlements –

including Kaddum – would be held after the West Bank municipal elections scheduled for April

12. Responding to questions, Rabin insisted that he “had not accepted, and will not accept, an

ultimatum on the Kaddum issue.”183

Rabin scheduled the settlement debate for May 9, 1976, while Allon kept a close eye on

the cabinet’s agenda, canceling a trip to Washington to guard against further delay. In the

interim, the government searched for a compromise to keep the coalition intact. Though Rabin

was able to buy time, it came at a political price. The delay contributed to the perception that

184 Rabin was indecisive and unable to govern.1 Moreover, the uncertainty over Kaddum’s fate

kept the issue in the spotlight, allowing it to become an irritant within the Alignment and a point

of contention between the NRP and Labor.185

181 Allon Oral History 9 (July 31, 1979), 13; Allon Oral History 8 (July 24, 1979), 19; Allon Oral History 3 (May 21, 1979), 1-2, ISA, A/5001/19. . 182 “Government due to Confront Qadoum,” (March 11, 1976), 1976TELAV01802; “NRP Position on Kaddum,” 1976TELAV01806 (March 12, 1976). 183 “The Debate in the Government over Kaddum- At the End of April,” Ha-Tsofeh (March 23, 1976), 1; “Kaddum debate put off,” Jerusalem Post (March 22, 1976), 1. 184 “Transcript: Prime Minister's Meeting about the Diplomatic Reporting on Television - Deep Background - Not for Use (Wed. March 3, 1976),” 20, ISA, A/7034/1; “Transcript: Prime Minister Rabin with Terry Smith of the New York Times (April 27, 1976),” 10-12. ISA, A/7034/7; “Transcript; The PM in a Background Conversation with Yoel Marcus (Ha’aretz) - Tel Aviv (May 7, 1976),” 2. ISA, A/7034/8; Yigal Allon Oral History 22 (Aug. 31, 1979), 1-2, ISA, A/5001/22. 185 Drezon Tepler, 188-189.

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Part three of this chapter examines the efforts to reach yet another compromise over

Kaddum. It begins with Rabin’s appearance before the NRP Executive, as it prepared to adopt a

formal position on the cabinet’s imminent debate over settlement policy and Kaddum. While

Rabin presented his diplomatic vision with clarity and precision, he failed to appreciate the

Executive’s anxiety over the fate of the Kaddum settlers. With input from Rabin, the Executive

adopted a resolution supporting a permanent settlement at Kaddum while reaffirming the

government’s authority over settlement policy. Despite the divisions within the party, the NRP

was united against forcefully evicting the Kaddum settlers. Demonstrating the impact of the

MNRR on the party’s stance, Avraham Melamed reiterated Burg’s warning against evacuating

Kaddum while also extending an olive branch to the MNRR. After a 10-hour debate, the cabinet

adopted a compromise resolution that the NRP could live with. However, the failure to

implement the cabinet’s decision ultimately undermine Rabin’s image and authority.

“The Government Will Not Fall”: Rabin and the NRP Avoid a Cabinet Crisis over Kaddum 3.A The Stormy Spring of ‘76

Even with Kaddum on the back burner, the Spring of ’76 was a stormy political season.

MaPaM and Labor Party leaders held urgent talks to preserve the Alignment, making early

elections impossible for Rabin.186 Civil unrest in the West Bank continued, fueled by the “Land

Day” events of March 30, 1976, in which six Arab citizens of Israel were killed during protests

against land appropriation in the Galilee. At the UN Security Council, the new U.S. representative announced that the United States viewed Israeli settlements as illegal under

186 “A background speech by Yitzhak Rabin with Jeoffrey Paul (Editor of the Jewish Chronicle) (May 25, 1976), 20- 21 ISA, A/7034/7; “Stenographic Record: Meeting of the Ma'arakh Leadership 22.4.76,” ISA, A/7029/4; “Stenographic Protocol From the Meeting of the Alignment Executive; 7 Iyar 5736 - May 7, 1976,” ISA, A/7029/4.

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international law.”187 Closer to home, Israel and Jordan were caught off guard when West Bank

municipal elections brought nationalist mayors to power. Both in Israel and abroad, many saw

the election “as an expression of victory for the PLO.”188 When Gush Emunim held a provocative Passover hike through the West Bank, Rabin responded by touring the Jordan Valley

"to focus the attention of the people on…the real meaning of settling, completely in contradiction to what Gush Emunim has done.”189

Within the NRP, inter-factional competition escalated over holding elections for

delegates to the party convention. The MNRR stressed its intention to “conquer the NRP from

within,” beginning a petition drive to liberalize NRP membership requirements.190 Raphael, for

his part, placed loyalists on religious councils in LaMifneh strongholds, antagonizing LaMifneh

activists who controlled the local NRP branches. Pressure mounted on Burg and Ben-Natan to

sever ties with Likud U’Temurah, partner with the MNRR, and oust Raphael. Ben-Natan cautioned against doing anything hasty; he and Burg would speak with Raphael.191

In the meantime, LaMifneh established a division for the faction’s own “Zeirim,” led by

Rabbi Moshe Salomon, head of the Torah Ve-Avodah network of vocational yeshivot.

LaMifneh’s “Zeirim” stood for political moderation and a return to the NRP’s traditional focus

on religious issues. Shaul Mayzlish, the group’s secretary and a Ha-Tsofeh reporter, quipped that

“judging by the Young Guard of Zevulun Hammer and Yehuda Ben-Meir, one would think that

the NRP's only interest was Judea and Samaria.” In addition to political moderation, LaMifneh’s

187 Remarks by Amb. Scranton (United States of America), Security Council official records, 31st year, 1896th meeting, 23 March 1976, New York. S/PV.1896 (New York: United Nations, 1984), 68. 188Transcript: “Prime Minister Rabin with Terry Smith of the New York Times,” (April 27, 1976) 6, ISA, A/7034/7. 189 Rabin with Terry Smith (April 27, 1976),” 6-7 &17, ISA, A/7034/7. 190 “Dr. Raphael at Gush LeLikud U-Temurah Mesiba: There's no concern that the government will decide to forcibly remove the Kaddum Settlers,” Ha-Tsofeh (April 26, 1976), 2; “Qaddum Controversy Intensifies,” 1976TELAV02910 (April 26, 1976). 191 Ibid; Burg Oral History 41 (Aug. 14, 1990), 16-17, ISA, A/7781/2; Burg Oral History 42 (Sep. 4, 1990), 11, ISA, A/7781/2.

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Zeirim adopted the faction’s traditional anti-clerical bent, favoring a greater role for Judaism in

Israeli public life and a halt to the Chief Rabbinate’s forays into partisan politics.192

Raphael continued to staunchly support Rabin, insisting that the prime minister would not evict the Elon Moreh settlers from Kaddum. MK Pinhas Scheinman, head of the Religious

Council in Tel Aviv, urged Likud U’Temurah to refocus the NRP’s attention on “fundamental problems in the area of religion,” taking “balanced” positions in other areas.193 Likud U’Temurah

and LaMifneh sounded a common note on policy, but clashed over personality and patronage.

Raphael grew angry when Burg and Ben-Meir presented LaMifneh’s grievances, reacting with

“hash words” and “treated [Burg] in a truly degrading way.” On their way out, Ben-Natan turned

to Burg, vowing that Raphael would “pay” for his “attitude.” Though Burg would later admit

that Raphael “didn’t deserve” the fate in store for him, Burg raised no objection as he and Ben-

194 Natan left the meeting.1

3.B Rabin Meets the NRP Executive (May 6, 1976)

As the cabinet’s settlement debate loomed, Rabin downplayed Kaddum as “a simple,

nothing issue.” He emphasized that the cabinet would debate the totality of its settlement policy;

Kaddum was simply too insignificant to merit a debate of its own. “Everyone tries to make an

issue of it,” Rabin told Terrance Smith of the New York Times. “I promise you, on this the

195 government will not collapse. Take my word.”18 In order to make good on his word, Rabin

appeared before the NRP Executive when it convened to take a position on settlement policy and

Kaddum ahead of the impending cabinet debate.196

192 “At Inaugural Assembly of the LaMifneh Faction Youth: The main problem is not 'Kaddum but 'Kaddumi’,” Ha- Tsofeh (April 30, 1976), 2; “'Lamifne' Members of NRP urge Split from Raphael Faction,” Jerusalem Post (May 4, 1976), 3; “Young, religious and moderate,” Jerusalem Post (May 16, 1976), 8. 193 “Dr. Raphael at Gush LeLikud U-Temurah Mesiba,” Ha-Tsofeh (April 26, 1976), 2. 194 Burg Oral History 34, 12-13; Burg Oral History 41, 18; Burg Oral History 42, 11. 195 Rabin with Terry Smith (April 27, 1976), 15. A/7034/7. 196 “Rabin to Appear at NRP Executive during Debate on Future of the Settlements,” Ma’ariv (May 6, 1976), 16.

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3.B.1 Secretary-General Zvi Bernstein Welcomes Rabin…and Asserts the Party Line

When Rabin appeared before the NRP Executive, Secretary-General Bernstein gave the

prime minister a warm welcome. Bernstein praised the close relationship Rabin had forged with

the NRP leadership, which enabled them to overcome the occasional “difference of opinion” and

“continue the historic alliance between the Worker's Camp and the National-Religious Camp.” It

was regrettable, then, that Kaddum had become an outsized point of contention. The NRP

believed that “the borders of the country – particularly [with] Jordan – should be determined by

the nation, if and when a proposed peace [accord] is brought before it.” The democratic process

was binding on all Israelis, and there could be “no escape from accepting the majority’s

view.”197

At the same time, the NRP backed “settlement in all parts of Eretz Yisrael, albeit in

accordance with the guidelines of the government and the settlement institutions.” Regarding the

Elon Moreh settlers, Bernstein asserted that their presence at Kaddum was authorized by the

government. Therefore, allowing Kaddum to develop into a permanent settlement was consistent

with the principle that the cabinet must approve all settlement. Bernstein urged Rabin to

disregard the polemics surrounding Kaddum and balance the equities; forced eviction would

198 inflict greater harm on the settlers than their opponents would suffer if there was no eviction..

3.B.2 “The Existence of The Nation and The State are The Most Important Things”: Rabin Pitches His Diplomatic Agenda to The NRP

Although Kaddum was the central item on the agenda, Rabin began his remarks by dismissing the Kaddum issue entirely. As the NRP ministers looked on from their seats at the

197 “Rabin: ‘If The Likud Is Prepared to Join the Government According to the Current Policy Guidelines I Do Not See a Reason to Oppose That,” Ha-Tsofeh (May 7, 1976), 1-2. 198 Ibid.

428 daias, Rabin said that he had “looked forward” to meeting with the NRP Executive “on the assumption that this meeting would be an opportunity to solve [Israel’s] fundamental problems, and not secondary problems.” And, in Rabin’s view, “the issue of Kaddum [was] a secondary problem.” The state of Israel faced critical economic, diplomatic, and socio-economic challenges, and had to “prepare for the real issues and not the imaginary ones.”199

Rabin focused his remarks on the agenda he had been pushing since his January trip to

Washington: the next step in the peace process. Rabin asserted that Israelis wanted “peace more than anything else” and that Israel had proven this by accepting the 1947 Partition plan. “The greatness of Israeli statecraft,” Rabin declared, was that “since the historic decision to accept the partition plan…the State of Israel [always] says: we are ready for peace.”200 Rabin held that Arab rejectionism was the “main obstacle to peace.” Nevertheless, “every responsible person in Israel” was morally obligated to ask themselves: “What are we proposing to ourselves, to the Arab world, and to the world as a whole as the Israeli path to achieving peace?”201

Rabin championed his government’s “complete and comprehensive approach” for achieving peace “under the current circumstances.” There were two theoretical paths to peace: reaching a comprehensive agreement all at once and a “staged advance toward real peace, over time.” While Rabin’s government was ready to embark upon either path, the Israeli and Arab positions were irreconcilable on three critical issues: the “definition of peace,” the “borders of peace,” and the Palestinians.202

199 Transcript: The Prime Minister during his appearance at the NRP Executive- Tel Aviv - May 6, 1976), 1, ISA, A/7245/18, 1. 200 Transcript: Prime Minister at NRP Executive, 2. 201 Transcript: Prime Minister at NRP Executive, 3-4. 202 Transcript: Prime Minister at NRP Executive, 4-5.

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According to Rabin, Israel defined peace as the “building of peaceful relations” in all

areas and levels of society, while the Arabs envisioned little more than ending the state of war.

Regarding the “borders of peace,” Israel rejected the 1967 borders but was “ready, in order to achieve peace, to go for far-reaching territorial compromises on all fronts.” Unfortunately, Arab leaders rejected “any sort of territorial compromise.” Finally, Israel believed that “the Palestinian issue need[ed] to be solved in the context of an agreement with Jordan.” The Arabs, however, insisted upon an “Arafat State” in the territories.203

Rabin believed that these differences precluded a final, comprehensive agreement.

However, Israel still had a strategic and moral obligation to seek out “every opportunity to move

toward peace, distance war, and elicit maximum understanding and aid from abroad.”

Consequently, the government had accepted the American request to “consider the possibility of

negotiations with the neighboring Arab states over ending the state of war.” Pushing back against

critics such as Hammer and Ben-Meir, Rabin asserted that negotiating an end-of-war agreement

was, in fact, an Israeli idea, which had first been broached during his tenure as ambassador to

Washington. Thus, it was “incorrect” and a “distortion of the truth” to present the end-of-war initiative as an “American dictate.”204

That said, the U.S. administration was satisfied that Israel had done its part to advance the

peace process, even though the Arab states had yet to reply. Rabin ascribed great importance to

the U.S. administration’s opinion and made no apologies on that score. He predicted that a

“serious medini process” would emerge in 1977, and Israel needed to “begin preparing for a

difficult diplomatic confrontation.”205 Israel’s main vulnerability was economic. It consumed

203 Transcript: Prime Minister at NRP Executive, 4-5. 204 Transcript: Prime Minister at NRP Executive, 6-7. 205 Transcript: Prime Minister at NRP Executive, 8-9.

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more than it produced, making it dependent on assistance. In order to prepare for the diplomatic

challenges expected in 1977, it was vital to “infuse into the national consciousness the extent to

206 which Israel’s economic condition will determine its ability to take a stand diplomatically.” F

Before concluding his remarks, Rabin returned to the subject of territorial compromise.

Rabin emphasized his readiness for far-reaching concessions in Judea and Samaria, along with

the importance of holding the line in the Jordan Valley. Rabin reminded the Executive that he

had served as IDF Chief of Staff while the West Bank was still in Jordanian hands, and then after

it came under Israeli control. Rabin acknowledged the widespread concern over ceding the high

ground in Samaria. Based on his knowledge and expertise, though, Rabin did not share this

concern. That said, Rabin stressed his ongoing commitment to the coalition agreement, which

allowed the government to negotiate territorial concession in the West Bank, with the added

“safeguard” of calling early elections to receive the “verdict of the people” on any peace

accord.207

In the discussion that followed, Rabin argued that the Jewish right to Eretz Yisrael need

not automatically translate into territorial maximalism. He, too, believed in the Jewish right to

the Land, but he did not believe that Israel was “obligated to achieve all of [its] aspirations.”

Rabin framed Jewish tradition as politically pragmatic and state-centric, asserting that Jewish polities in Eretz Yisrael had always “known different borders.” The nation’s “leaders, devotees, and prophets” always prioritized “the existence of the nation and the state, in the broadest sense of the term.” This heritage of state-centric pragmatism, then, obligated the government to decide

206 Transcript: Prime Minister at NRP Executive, 10, 12. 207 Transcript: Prime Minister at NRP Executive, 12.

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what it was “willing to risk, and for what purpose.” While the fate of the Jews must not “be in

the hands of the gentiles,” sound strategy had to reflect “actual strength.”208

3.B.3 “Settlement is Not Protest”: Rabin Fields Questions about Kaddum and Gush Emunim

Though Rabin unapologetically advocated for painful territorial compromise, he avoided the Kaddum issue entirely in his opening remarks. Rabin’s glib dismissal of Kaddum as an

“imaginary problem” amounted to a backhanded rebuke to the NRP Executive for paying so much attention to the matter. Rabin sensed, but refused to validate, the anxiety and angst expressed by members of the Executive.209 Indeed, Bernstein later remarked – speaking to Rabin as much as to the NRP Executive – that “the prime minister understood the anxiety in this meeting on the subject of Kaddum, which is likely to be a thorn and a festering wound in the body of the coalition.”210 Of course, had Rabin actually expressed such understanding, then

Bernstein’s comment would have been unnecessary.

Rabin, though, was determined to set the record straight, not reassure anxious NRP

leaders. The prime minister read aloud his December 8 memorandum to the cabinet, which

outlined the terms of the agreement reached at Sebastia. The document proved, Rabin insisted,

that the government made “no commitment” to establish a settlement at Kaddum; the Elon

Moreh group moved to the site knowing that their presence would be temporary and subject to

the cabinet’s decision. Therefore, there was no basis for the demand that the Elon Moreh settlers

208 Transcript: Prime Minister at NRP Executive, 14. 209 Transcript: Prime Minister at NRP Executive, 13. 210 “The NRP to Rabin: We Will Not Accept The Evacuation of The Kaddum People Against Their Will,” Davar (May 7, 1976), 1.

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remain at Kaddum. While Rabin tried to show “patience and tolerance” for those in the NRP

Executive with “different views,” he insisted that the facts were undeniable.211

Rabin’s “patience and tolerance” did not extend to Gush Emunim. Rabin made no effort to conceal his disdain for the group, which was anathema to his Zionist beliefs and democratic sensibilities. The prime minister believed in the right to freedom of political expression, along with an obligation to obey the government’s decisions. If citizens were dissatisfied with those decisions, then the place to challenge the government was in the voting booth. It galled Rabin that Gush Emunim not only flouted the government’s authority but also tried to “prevent the adoption of democratic decision[s]” by “going into the street [and] disturbing the peace.” Rabin recalled Kissinger’s August 1975 shuttle, when the group physically obstructed state business.212

Rabin tried to find common ground with the audience by distinguishing between Gush

Emunim, on the one hand, and the religious Zionism’s “real” settlement movements: Ha-Kibbutz

Ha-Dati and the moshavim of Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi. Rabin, too, believed in the value of settling

the Land of Israel, and professed his “utmost respect” for religious Zionism’s pioneering settlers.

Indeed, Rabin lauded the religious moshavim and kibbutzim he visited during tours of the Golan

Heights, the Jordan Valley, and elsewhere. Gush Emunim, he claimed, was conspicuously absent

213 on the frontiers. sus

“Settlement is not protest,” Rabin insisted. “Real settlement” entailed hardship and

sacrifice in order to build productive agriculture and industry, and “real settlers” suborned their

individual or sectoral desires to the state-building enterprise. Gush Emunim’s protest marches and wildcat settlement bids were the antithesis of “real settlement,” while Kaddum was nothing

211 Transcript: Prime Minister at NRP Executive, 15. 212 Transcript: Prime Minister at NRP Executive, 16. 213 Transcript: Prime Minister at NRP Executive, 16-17.

433 more than “lodging for a professor who lives in Tel Aviv.” Rabin was certain that the NRP leadership appreciated the difference between real, pioneering settlements and the bourgeois farce at Kaddum. After all, quite a few members of the NRP Executive knew firsthand “what it is to put roots in the soil.”214

3.B.4 The NRP Executive Refuses “to Accept the Removal of the Kaddum Settlers”

When the discussion ended, the NRP ministers on the dais handed Rabin a copy of the resolution they drafted among themselves. Rabin grew visibly angry as he read, exclaiming that

215 the draft was “worded like an ultimatum.”2 The NRP ministers assured Rabin that this was not their intention and consulted privately with the prime minister. After they returned, Rabin looked on from the dais as Raphael read the proposed resolution off a page conspicuously laden with cross-outs, indicating that the language had been softened for Rabin’s benefit.216

The Executive voted unanimously to adopt the resolution drafted by Burg, Raphael, and

Hammer, with last-minute input from Rabin. The NRP would “not accept the removal of the

Kaddum settlers…against their will and wishes,” as this would establish “an area closed to

214 Transcript: Prime Minister at NRP Executive, 16-17; Rabin’s frustration with Gush Emunim and the settlements it spawned continued to complicate his relationship with religious (and other) constituencies during his second terms as Prime Minister. In August 1995, Remarks during a meeting with U.J.A. leaders created the impression that Rabin saw the settlers as “parasites.” In response to an inquiry from Burg, Rabin explained that his comments had been misconstrued as referring to “people.” Rather, he meant to say that “political settlements” in the West Bank were established “without any security justification.” When Rabin exclaimed “who needs them,” he meant to convey that these settlements were unnecessary and “burdensome” to the State, both politically and from a security perspective. Tragically, Rabin’s shorthand reply was typed and prepared for his signature on the eve of his assassination. The unsigned reply was later sent to Burg by Eitan Haber, then an advisor to Rabin. See, Eitan Haber to Yosef Burg, Nov. 20, 1995; Yitzhak Rabin to Yosef Burg [unsigned], Nov. 2, 1995; Fax from Josef Burg to Yitzhak Rabin, Aug. 22, 1995, in Inquiries and Correspondences- Dr. Yosef Burg, Bureau of Prime Minister Rabin, Prime Minister's Office, ISA, GL/23211/10. 215 “With Rabin Present, NRP Leadership Decided ‘Not To Accept Removing The Inhabitants of Kaddum From Their Location Against Their Will And Wishes And With Establishing An Area Closed To Jewish Settlement In The Land Of Israel,’” Ma’ariv (May 7, 1976), 4; “Decision of the National Religious Party Executive During its Meeting Yesterday - The NRP Will Not Accept the Removal of the Kaddum Settlers Against their Will,” Ha-Tsofeh (May 7, 1976), 1. 216 “The NRP to Rabin: We will not Accept the Evacuation of the Kaddum People Against Their Will,” Davar (May 7, 1976), 1; See, also Ma’ariv (May 7, 1976), 4; Ha-Tsofeh, (May 7, 1976), 1.

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Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel.” The Executive also asserted that the Elon Moreh

group’s presence at Kaddum was sanctioned by the government, and, therefore, it was proper to

recognize the site as a “permanent settlement.” While asking the government to recognize

Kaddum, the Executive also signaled its respect for the government’s authority. It urged the

Ministerial Settlement Committee to implement a comprehensive settlement plan based on the

government’s “national, medini, and strategic considerations.” Moreover, the Executive

enumerated settlement priorities that dovetailed with Rabin’s views. Finally, the NRP lauded the

“great awakening for settlement” among its young generation and called on religious youths to

217 accept settling the Land as an “obligation for every young man and young woman.”11F

3.C The Cabinet Avoids a Crisis while Melamed Issues an Ultimatum

Although the NRP Executive unanimously adopted the resolution drafted by Burg,

Raphael, and Hammer (with input from Rabin), inter-factional differences remained. Hammer

reiterated his threat to quit the government, while Ben-Meir warned that Burg and Raphael

218 would be forced to resign, “even against their will.”F Raphael remained a vocal supporter of the

prime minister, downplaying the NRP Executive’s decision as an “Ani Ma’amin,” a declaration

of faith and principle, rather than an operative “ultimatum.” After a meeting with Rabin, Raphael

announced that there was nothing to fear regarding Kaddum.219 Hammer and Ben-Meir also met with Rabin, and then with Peres and Galili. In each meeting, Hammer warned of a cabinet crisis if Kaddum were to be evacuated by force.

217 “Decision,” Ha-Tsofeh (May 7, 1976), 1. 218 “The NRP to Rabin,” Davar (May 7, 1976), 1. 219 “Minister Raphael after his Meeting with the Prime Minister: I Have Reason to Believe That the Government Will Not Decide on Removing the Settlers by Force,” Ha-Tsofeh (May 9, 1976), 1.

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3.C.1 Melamed Offers an Ultimatum and Olive Branch as the Cabinet Debates Kaddum

On May 9, the cabinet finally held its long-anticipated debate on settlement policy. While

Burg, Hammer, and Raphael participated in the ten-hour session, Faction Chairman Avraham

Melamed dealt with the press. The impact of the MNRR on the party was unmistakable during

Melamed’s news conference outside NRP headquarters. Melamed warned that the NRP would quit the government if the cabinet’s decision proved “unacceptable” to the Kaddum settlers. He insisted that the party was “united behind the resolution adopted [by the Executive] regarding

Kaddum.” Therefore, “not even one NRP minister” would remain in the government.

Melamed – a founding member of Oz Ve-Shalom – admitted that the NRP’s stance on

Kaddum conflicted with his personal views. Indeed, he lamented that the NRP chose to neglect the “character of the state” in favor of the “territory of the state.” He blamed the Kaddum crisis on the Rabin government’s failure to assert its authority from the beginning. Moreover, certain officials continued to quietly support the Kaddum settlers, and this aid was tantamount to “an explicit endorsement” of “their actions.” Once the government made the mistake of allowing the settlers to reside at Kaddum, it could not force them to leave.220

As chair of the NRP Knesset Faction, Melamed was responsible for enforcing party

discipline. He accepted the party’s decisions despite his personal views. The Zeirim, though,

were both willing and able to flout party discipline, and even threaten to split the party. This

gave the Zeirim an advantage over LaMifneh in the NRP’s game of factions. It is telling, then,

that the NRP’s most prominent dove extended an olive branch to the MNRR while defending the

Kaddum settlers. Downplaying LaMifneh’s ties with Likud U’Temurah, Melamed insisted that

the faction would rather partner with the MNRR despite their “medini” differences. However,

220 “MK Melamed: If The Government Takes a Decision That Is Not Accepted by the Kaddum Settlers - The NRP Will be Unable to Remain in The Government for Even One Day,” Ha-Tsofeh (May 10, 1976), 2.

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LaMifneh would only support the MNRR if the Zeirim stopped “sitting on the fence” and committed to remain in the NRP.

Melamed’s comments demonstrate the influence of the MNRR. He echoed Burg’s warning to Rabin in March that evacuating Kaddum would trigger Hammer’s resignation, forcing Burg and Raphael to follow, lest Hammer leave the NRP as well. Following the NRP

Executive’s resolution on Kaddum, the ever-present threat of secession forced LaMifneh to follow Hammer and the MNRR’s line on Kaddum. Hence, Melamed presented the NRP

Executive’s decision as an ultimatum, in contrast to Raphael’s “Ani Ma’amin.” For an elected

NRP official in the spring of 1976, the Elon Moreh Group was untouchable.221

3.C.2 The Cabinet Decision of May 9, 1976

The MNRR’s leverage over Burg’s LaMifneh effectively constrained the cabinet’s freedom of action on Kaddum. While 20,000 demonstrated against Kaddum in Tel Aviv’s

Malkhei Yisrael square, the outcome of the cabinet debate was a foregone conclusion. On the morning of May 9, Davar reported that “government circles” anticipated a compromise.222 The terms of a “proposed agreement” published by the paper were strikingly similar to the cabinet decision adopted later that day. The cabinet resolved to strengthen settlements “on both sides of the green line,” with the Ministerial Settlement Committee overseeing the effort. The government also resolved to proactively thwart unauthorized settlement attempts and declared that there would be no permanent settlement at Kaddum. Thus, the Elon Moreh group would be

221 Indeed, when Moshe Unna, Uriel Simon, and other Oz Ve-Shalom members signed a petition demanding Kaddum’s evacuation, Melamed’s name was noticeably absent. See, Arye Slotzky to Yitzhak Rabin (March 3, 1976); Petition addressed to Yitzhak Rabin (March 5, 1976); Eli Mizrahi to Yisrael Galili (March 14, 1976); Eli Mizrahi to Yisrael Galili (March 16, 1976) in ISA, G/7449/9; “4 NRP Members Signed Proclamation for Evacuating the Settlers from Kaddum,” Ma’ariv (March 23, 1976), 19. 222 “Assessment in Government Circles: Government will not Decide to Take Down Kaddum By Force,” Davar (May 9, 1976), 1-2.

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offered an alternative site to settle. “In the near future,” the cabinet would decide when and,

more importantly, where to relocate the group.223

While the NRP ministers abstained from the vote, the party accepted the cabinet’s

decision. Secretary-General Bernstein was “disappointed” that a settlement would not be allowed

at Kaddum; he hoped the government would reconsider its position. Hammer noted that the

injunction against settling Kaddum did not preclude settling elsewhere in Samaria. This created a

basis for dialogue. Raphael, true to form, came out in support of the government. He noted that

the decision implicitly recognized Gush Emunim as a settlement movement. Therefore, Raphael

hoped the group would “turn over a new page” and reconcile with the government in the search

for Elon Moreh’s new home. Raphael also took his share of credit for the decision, stating that he

and Labor ministers had agreed on a non-violent solution three weeks before the cabinet

debate.224

3.C.3 Failure to Implement the Cabinet’s Kaddum Decision

Upon closer examination, it emerges that Labor agreed to offer the Elon Moreh group an

alternative settlement location as early as March 10, 1976, when Burg warned Rabin against

evacuating Kaddum. In Davar’s original story on Burg’s warning to Rabin, Daniel Bloch

reported that the government would offer alternative settlement locations to the Elon Moreh

223 Government Decision 677 of May 9, 1976 on “Settlement Policy including the Future of the Settlement Group Located at Camp Kaddum,” in Kaddum, Bureau of Prime Minister Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin, Office of the Prime Minister ISA, A/7037/11; “The Government Decides by Majority: ‘There Will Not Be a Settlement at Kaddum,’” Davar (May 10, 1976), 1-2. For an English translation of the cabinet decision see, “Israel Government Decision Concerning Settlement in the Israel-Administered Areas,” The Middle East Behind the News (Philadelphia: Consulate General of Israel, May 14, 1976), ISA, G/6754/21. 224 “Reactions of Ministers to the Government Decision,” Ha-Tsofeh, May 10, 1976), 1; “Dr. Y. Raphael: ‘Opportunity for opening a new page with Gush Emunim,” Ha-Tsofeh (May 11, 1976), 1; “Hammer: The decision makes additional discussion possible,” Ha-Tsofeh (May 10, 1976), 1; Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “May 9 Cabinet 'Decision' on Qadoum,” 1976TELAV03217 (May 10, 1976); “Dr Raphael before Students at Bar-Ilan: Over three Weeks Ago he Got an Agreement from Labor Ministers that There Won't Be a Forced Evacuation of the Kaddum Settlers,” Ha-Tsofeh (May 13, 1976), 1.

438

group in order to avoid a confrontation.”225 Like the original Kaddum compromise, however, the

cabinet’s decision elided the underlying issue of whether to settle Samaria or to preserve it for

territorial compromise. Instead, it provided a means for both the government and Gush Emunim

to save face: there would be no settlement at Kaddum, but the geographic definition of

“Samaria” could be stretched to allow the Elon Moreh settlers to settle within Alon’s

“parameters,” but on the edge of Samaria. Most importantly, the coalition would remain intact.

Alon’s “parameters,” though, were designed to allow territorial compromise. The Elon

Moreh group – as the “vanguard” of Jewish settlement in Samaria – was determined to remain in

the “heart” of Samaria, in order to “prevent the partition of the Land of Israel.”226 Unlike the

NRP, the settlers had no interest in preserving the coalition, and no incentive to compromise.

Indeed, the NRP’s threat to leave the government took coercion off the table, along with any

leverage the cabinet might have had. Thus, the Elon Moreh group rejected every proposed

227 alternative, despite attempts by Ben-Meir and Hammer to mediate behind the scenes. 221F In late

June, Gush Emunim and the Elon Moreh group broke off talks with representatives of the

government and the Jewish Agency Settlement Division. The government’s refusal to offer a

location in the “heart” of Samaria, they alleged, indicated that it intended to prohibit Jewish

settlement in the region.228

By the summer of 1976, Kaddum had become the “thorn and festering wound” that NRP

Secretary-General Bernstein had predicted during Rabin’s meeting with the NRP Executive.

Shemtov, Kol, and Hausner pressed Rabin on Kaddum, while Gush Emunim activists staged a

225 “Kaddum Problem to be Raised in the Government in a General Debate on Settlement Policy,” Davar (March 11, 1976), 1. 226 Yehiel Admoni, meeting notes entitled “Kadum - 28 June 1976,” 4-5, ISA, G/7449/9. 227 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “NRP Young Guard Leader on Quadoum,” 1976TELAV03466 (May 14, 1976). 228 Gush Emunim Secretariat and Elon Moreh Secretariat to the Government of Israel, Open Letter dated 25 Sivan 5736 - 23.6.1976, ISA, G/7449/9 ; Admoni to Galili [untitled] 1 July 1976, ISA, A/7037/11; Galili to Rabin, “The Negative Response of the 'Elon Moreh' Settlement Group,” ISA, A/7037/11.

439 small demonstration at one of the proposed permanent locations for Elon Moreh.229 In the NRP,

Raphael kept a close eye on Kaddum from his seat on the Ministerial Committee on Settlement,

230 asking Galili to let him know when something was being “cooked up” over Kaddum.2 By

August, the standstill on Kaddum led the Independent Liberal Party to formally demand the implementation of the cabinet’s May 9 decision on Kaddum.231

3.C.4 The Impact of Kaddum on Rabin’s Image, Authority, and Agenda

As time passed, the feud between Rabin and Peres soured cabinet meetings, leaving Burg

232 feeling “ashamed” by such conduct at the highest level of government. F Eventually, fear of a coalition crisis over Kaddum gave way to concerns over public opinion leading up to the 1977

Knesset elections. Allon urged Rabin to present the Elon Moreh settlers with an ultimatum: move to one of the alternative locations or be forcibly evacuated from Kaddum. However, it seemed to Allon that the prime minister had little desire for “yet another crisis with the NRP over

Gush Emunim,” let alone an “unnecessary confrontation” with Peres. In the meantime, Rabin’s willingness to avoid the Kaddum issue and preserve the coalition turned into “the most glaring evidence of [his government’s] internal frailty.” That frailty, in turn, would become “one of the main causes of [Labor’s] downfall.”233

Rabin saw Kaddum differently; he was determined not to allow his government to fall over Kaddum for two reasons. First, and foremost, Kaddum was simply not worth a cabinet crisis. Rabin believed that far too much importance was being attached to a group of squatters on

229 Handwritten note by Yisrael Galili of responses to ministers’ questions on June 20, 1976, and June 27, 1976 in ISA, G/7449/9; Victor Shemtov to the Government Secretary, “Inquiry” (handwritten) dated July 28, 1976, ISA, A/7037/11. 230 Raphael to Galili Handwritten note c. June—July 1976, ISA, G/7449/9. 231 Moshe Kol to Yitzhak Rabin, (9 August 1976), ISA, A/7037/11. 232 Burg Oral History 40, (July 30, 1990), 18, ISA, A/7781/2. 233 Allon Oral History 22, (Aug. 31, 1979), 1-3.

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a strategically insignificant hilltop. It infuriated Rabin that his allies, no less than his opponents,

fixated on the issue, using it as a barometer of his leadership. Second, Rabin believed that Gush

Emunim was in league with his political opponents, and that Kaddum was a ploy to undermine him politically. Thus, toppling the government over Kaddum would give Gush Emunim precisely what Rabin thought it wanted.234

Rabin’s Assessment of his Image as a Weak Prime Minister Though he was loath to admit it, Rabin understood that political allies and opponents

alike questioned his authority and ability as prime minister. Rabin attributed this, first and

foremost, to Peres’ unprecedented “war” against him from within the cabinet. Their feud was

fueled not only by their own rivalry and ambition, but by deep disagreements between other

cabinet ministers over settlements, foreign policy, and security. While denying that the feud with

Peres impaired his job performance, Rabin was forced to admit that he was unable to obtain

assessments from IDF intelligence due to Peres’ interference.235

Rabin also believed that “harsh challenges by the opposition, the Kaddum debate, and

Peres’ “sitting on the fence” further contributed to his image as weak and indecisive.236

Moreover, Rabin inherited a weakened parliamentary position. The Alignment held 13 fewer

seats than in 1969, creating a greater dependence on the NRP.237 However, the NRP was

becoming less reliable as a coalition partner. Rabin understood that the NRP was undergoing “a

process of change in [its] balance of power,” and that the NRP’s increasingly erratic behavior

and the conflicting positions of its ministers were a product of this power struggle. Therefore,

234 Drezon-Tepler, 183-186; See, also, “Prime Minister Rabin with Terry Smith of the New York Times,” (April 27, 1976), 15 & 24, ISA, A/7034/7. 235 Transcript: PM with Yoel Marcus, ISA, A/7034/8, 1-2. 236 Transcript: PM with Yoel Marcus, ISA, A/7034/8, 4. 237 Transcript: PM with Yoel Marcus, ISA, A/7034/8, 4.

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Rabin was forced to carefully pick his battles when dealing with Labor’s traditional coalition partner.238

Rabin, then, chose not to pick a battle over Kaddum. Although the cabinet’s May 9

resolution was never implemented, it achieved its primary objective: preserving the coalition.

Rabin and the NRP were able to avoid a confrontation, despite his tense meeting with the NRP

Executive. The MNRR, which included settlers from Kaddum, transformed the NRP consensus

against violence at Kaddum into opposition to coercion of any kind against the Elon Moreh

group at Kaddum. Moreover, Hammer’s threat to quit the government (forcing Burg and Raphael

to follow) shielded the settlers from the possibility of eviction, leaving the government without

leverage over the Kaddum settlers. Thus, efforts to implement the cabinet’s decision were

doomed from the start. Absent the credible threat of eviction, the Elon Moreh group rejected

each and every proposed alternative outside the “heart of Samaria.” Rabin was willing to appear

weak and indecisive rather than topple the government on Gush Emunim’s terms.

As 1976 progressed, Labor and the NRP began to prepare for the 1977 Knesset elections.

In the final part of this chapter, I examine the growing disconnect between Rabin and the NRP

over Kaddum in particular, and Gush Emunim more broadly: Rabin’s lack of familiarity with,

and empathy for, religious Jewry; his belief that Gush Emunim was a manifestation of Israel’s

crisis of values; his assessment of the utility of settlement and its demographic implications; the

significance Rabin attached to US–Israel relations; and the imperative to take an incremental

approach to the peace process in order to preserve that relationship and advance toward an

eventual peace.

238 Transcript: PM with Yoel Marcus, ISA, A/7034/8, 17.

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“I am Not so Politically Crazy as to Say It”: Rabin’s Agenda for 1976–1977 and Conflicting Perspectives on Gush Emunim 4.A Rabin’s Unfamiliarity with Religion and his Disconnect with the NRP over Gush Emunim

During Rabin’s meeting with the NRP Executive, he struggled to relate to the audience.

He stressed the core value of settling the Land of Israel and expressed commonality with religious Zionism’s “pioneering” settlements. Rabin also advocated territorial compromise in terms that the NRP Executive, in his estimation, would find persuasive. To that end, Rabin invoked the fluid boundaries of biblical Israel as precedent, arguing that Jewish tradition had always been pragmatic in order to ensure its survival. However, Rabin seemed unaware of the fundamental dissonance between his perceptions of Gush Emunim and those of the NRP

Executive. What many in the NRP saw as youthful idealism and Zionist pioneering, Rabin saw a subversive farce of “real settlement.” While the NRP lauded the settlement “awakening” among religious youth, Rabin disparaged Gush Emunim and the Elon Moreh settlers. Though the prime minister recognized the agitation of NRP members who asked about Kaddum, he failed to grasp the extent to which many in the NRP genuinely feared for the Kaddum settlers’ welfare.239

Rabin’s failure to grasp NRP concerns about the Kaddum settlers is a striking contrast to his attentiveness to the party’s internal power struggles. Rabin seemed unaware that he and the

NRP perceived the rank-and-file of Gush Emunim differently. This lack of empathy for the anxious members of the NRP Executive is attributable, in part, to Rabin’s unfamiliarity with the religious community. Burg noticed that Rabin “was always correct” in his relations with the national-religious camp. However, there was something “dry” in his interactions with religion and religious constituencies. Burg observed that, unlike Ben-Gurion or Golda Meir, religion did

239 “The NRP to Rabin,” Davar (May 7, 1976), 1.

443 not “bother” Rabin. Rather, Burg sensed that Rabin simply “did not understand” or “did not feel the depth” of religious matters. Thus, the prime minister lacked “an appreciation of the strength of religion and the power of religion for a religious Jew.”240

Raphael, who softened the NRP’s Kaddum resolution to assuage Rabin, considered himself close to the prime minister. He respected Rabin’s talents and abilities, though he observed that inter-personal relations were not Rabin’s forte. Quite often, Rabin simply did not know “how to act” around the religious public and politicians. The problem, Raphael believed, was that Rabin was “very distant from religious Jewry.” Therefore, Raphael was vocal in publicly praising Rabin, hoping to endear the prime minister to the religious community. He also arranged for Rabin to meet with rabbinic figures and religious intellectuals, tour religious institutions, and visit yeshivot. By familiarizing Rabin with the religious community, Raphael hoped the prime minister would build relationships, gain a better understanding of religious

241 sensibilities, and become more at ease in religious settings.2

4.B Rabin’s View of Gush Emunim as Part of the Crisis of Values in Israeli Society

Rabin’s lack of empathy for NRP sensibilities also reflected his deeply entrenched views on the state of Israeli society. Rabin linked the “political chaos” in Israel to the crisis of values which followed the “devastating blow” of the Yom Kippur War.242 The war accelerated a process of “detachment,” as Israelis “divide[d] themselves” from the collective, focusing only on

“their reality and what they [wanted] in their daily life.” Despite the critical strategic challenges

240 Burg Oral History 40, 15. 241 Raphael, 389-390. 242 Transcript: Rabin with Jeoffrey Paul (May 25, 1976), 19, ISA, A/7034/7.

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facing the state, even “the most educated” Israelis did not understand the necessity of

subordinating their personal desires for the sake of the collective.243

To Rabin, Gush Emunim was part of the problem, not the solution. The group put its

desire to settle Samaria above the interests and authority of the state. Its penchant for self-

indulgent protest marches though the West Bank were yet another manifestation of the

“detachment” in Israeli society. Moreover, Rabin anticipated renewed U.S. pressure in 1977 over

the next step in the peace process. To resist that pressure, Israel needed to produce more and

consume less, strengthening the state’s economic resilience. Gush Emunim’s messianic

escapism, though, distracted the public from the state’s real challenges by “dragging” it “into a

stupid debate…over Kaddum,” as if that “crappy place with no importance” was “Israel’s

244 existential problem.”2 “It is easier to speak about Kaddum,” Rabin lamented, “than lowering

245 the standard of living and working harder.” F

4.C The Obsolescence of Settlement as an Instrument of Statecraft

Rabin’s aversion to Gush Emunim also reflected his assessment that settlement was an obsolete instrument of statecraft. Rabin held that “the borders of [the state of] Israel will not be determined by settlement.” Instead, Israel’s “overall power – military, political, and economic –”

would decide the fate of the territories.”246 Off the record, Rabin told Yoel Marcus of Ha’aretz

that he was prepared to break the taboo against dismantling settlements. While he was “not so

politically crazy as to say it,” Rabin was careful in his public comments not to rule out

243 Ibid 21-22. 244 Transcript: The PM in a Background Conversation with Yoel Marcus (Ha’aretz) - Tel Aviv May 7, 1976, 12, ISA, A/7034/8. 245 Transcript: The Prime Minister at an Assembly of Twelfth-Grade Students in Tel Aviv: Heikhal Ha-Tarbut, May 6, 1976, 2-5, ISA, A/7036/14. 246 Transcript: PM with Yoel Marcus, 11-12.

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“evacuating a settlement or two or three.” Indeed, some Golan settlements were “too far forward,” to remain within Israel’s borders in the event of a Syrian accord.247

Rabin held that the Jordan Valley would serve as Israel’s eastern border, and “if you are settling on the Jordan line, the mountain ridgeline isn’t important anymore.” Therefore, the security argument for settling the high ground in Samaria was “bullshit.” Furthermore, demography trumped geography. To Rabin, “the issue of the state and its Jewish character [was] far more important” than holding the Samaritan mountains. Israel could not retain the densely populated northern West Bank “for the long term, if we don’t want to get to apartheid.”248

4.D The Importance of American Support while Pursuing an “End to the State of War”

Rabin’s assessment of the demographic and geographic realities informed his broader diplomatic strategy, which also informed his attitude toward Gush Emunim. First, and foremost,

Rabin held that “that there is no such thing as [Israel] without the Americans.” If Israel did not

“maneuver sensibly,” then it "could really lose America." Gush Emunim would “lose America,” and Rabin was fighting for “a more sensible policy that does not antagonize the American people.”249 Rabin’s objective in 1976 was to preserve the “American-Israeli strategic understanding” to avoid comprehensive negotiations in favor of “interim solutions.”250

Rabin predicted that, in 1977, the U.S. Administration would reassess its stance on the PLO and reconsider the comprehensive approach to peacemaking.251 Revisiting the comprehensive approach would bring renewed American pressure, since a comprehensive peace was only possible based on terms that were intolerable for Israel. Israel would have to resist pressure for a

247 Transcript: PM with Yoel Marcus, 12. 248 Transcript: PM with Yoel Marcus, 13. 249 Transcript: PM with Yoel Marcus, 11. 250 Transcript: PM with Yoel Marcus, 15. 251 Transcript: PM with Yoel Marcus, 7.

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comprehensive accord while steering the peace process toward painful, yet possible, agreements

to end the state of war with Jordan, Syria, and Egypt.252 When asked whether domestic political

constraints would allow for such agreements, Rabin replied that “over this, I am willing to go to elections.” Rabin believed that “the Jewish nation [was] a wise nation” despite its “its natural inclination to be extreme.” He was “convinced” that, when presented with a “concrete

agreement,” Israelis would be “far more inclined to compromise” for the “real possibility” of

peace.

Summation The year of 1976 brought little relief from the stresses on Israeli politics and society

which followed the Yom Kippur War. The PLO’s success in isolating Israel while bolstering its

status in international forums – despite its use of terrorism and avowed aim of eliminating Israel

– posed new diplomatic, strategic, and security challenges. These challenges demanded a

“Zionist response” that offered more than ideological release, but actionable strategies to roll

back the PLO’s diplomatic gains, rehabilitate Israel’s international standing, and increase

national resilience by fortifying the economy.

Rabin began to formulate the beginnings of a response to these challenges during the

Jewish Solidarity Conference in December 1975. Following his meetings with Kissinger and

Ford in January 1976, Rabin presented a well-reasoned strategy for negotiating end-of-war agreements with Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. As the year progressed, however, Rabin’s pitch for his diplomatic program failed to resonate in press interviews, Labor Party forums, and speeches to a variety of audiences – including the NRP Executive.

252 Transcript: PM with Yoel Marcus 13, 15-16.

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Rabin’s “end-of-war” diplomatic program was well-reasoned but poorly timed. He

believed that the public would be receptive to a “real possibility” for peace. Indeed, he was

willing to test that proposition by calling elections. However, Rabin also decided to foreclose any

“real possibility” of results during 1976 by deferring meaningful action on his end-of-war strategy until 1977. Stagnation in the peace process, along with Arab rejectionism, undercut

Rabin’s claim that his strategy offered a viable, actionable approach for addressing Israel’s international standing, the borders of the state, its security, and relations with its Arab neighbors and the Palestinians.

Nationalist unrest in the West Bank, the specter of a PLO takeover (real, or imagined), and Israel’s international isolation became more acute. The absence of proactive diplomacy, moreover, invited other actors to propose alternatives. At Sebastia, Gush Emunim exploited this opening to propose a competing, actional response to these challenges. The group held out settlement—which would demonstrate the Jewish connection to the Land—as the panacea for preventing a PLO takeover of the West Bank and countering the delegitimating of Israel in international forums.

The open question of Kaddum kept Gush Emunim’s message in the public eye, frustrating Rabin’s efforts to focus the national agenda on bolstering the economy and, by extension, Israel’s diplomatic resilience. Not only did Kaddum undermine Rabin’s authority and agenda, it was also an ongoing, demonstrable challenge to the substance of Rabin’s political strategy. Rabin planned to manage US–Israel relations and negotiations with Israel’s neighbors by pursuing end-of-war agreements in 1977. This strategy was premised on territorial compromise, which Rabin lauded as the doctrine by which Ben-Gurion was able to establish the state. Gush Emunim challenged this premise, first at Sebastia, and then at Kaddum. It proposed a

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strategy premised on territorial consolidation rather than territorial concessions. In response to

Rabin’s hypothetical strategy to pursue end-of-war agreements, Gush Emunim offered a demonstrably actionable plan.

Though Rabin rejected the linkage between settlements and diplomatic policy, that

linkage became apparent following the cabinet’s May 9 decision on Kaddum. The cabinet

decided to relocate the Elon Moreh settlers to an alternative site that conformed to Alon’s

settlement parameters. Those parameters offered guidelines for settling strategically significant

areas, while implicitly limiting settlement in areas designated for territorial compromise. The

Elon Moreh group, however, sought both a presence and a precedent for further settlement in

Samaria. Their objective, first at Sebastia, and then at Kaddum, was to further a policy of holding

territory instead of conceding territory. Entrenched in the “heart” of Samaria, the Elon Moreh

group had every reason to reject proposed alternatives that would facilitate territorial

compromise consistent with the Allon Plan.

Paradoxically, the settlers’ ability to reject these proposed alternatives depended upon

NRP leaders who opposed their agenda. Gush Emunim’s propaganda campaign during the

Sebastia affair contributed to the NRP establishment’s glorification of the settlers. In the climate

of anxiety over the PLO, the NRP establishment – willfully blind to Gush Emunim’s foibles –

claimed these young activists as its own, lauding them as paragons of national-religious virtue

and the vanguard of the NRP’s next generation. The party claimed the young activists of Gush

Emunim by virtue of their ties to NRP institutions, leaders, and constituents.253 From a narrower,

partisan perspective, it would not do for the leading graduates of NRP-supported schools and

254 youth movements to find a more inviting political home in Likud. F

253 Burg Oral History 40 (July 30, 1990), 19, ISA, A/7781/2. 254 Burg Oral History 1 (Dec. 29, 1975), 13, in Yosef Burg- Interviews 1-6 (29.12.1975- 30.9.1976), ISA, A/7780.

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Beyond popularity and prestige, the Elon Moreh settlers benefited from institutionalized, factional support within the NRP that translated into political cover in the cabinet. The establishment of the MNRR in March 1976 had a decisive influence on Burg and Raphael, despite their own views on territory and settlement. Burg, and most of LaMifneh, begrudgingly accepted the need for territorial compromise.255 Indeed, Burg viewed the demographic

256 consequences of retaining the densely-populated region as “pikuah nefesh of a sort.”F Raphael was mostly in agreement with Burg, becoming more inclined to compromise after joining the cabinet.257 Though neither of them was particularly fond of Gush Emunim, the MNRR forced

Burg and Raphael to support Hammer’s threat to resign over Kaddum.

Burg and Raphael’s stance reflects the centrality of inter-factional competition in the

NRP and its influence on the Rabin government. Faced with the prospect of losing his coalition majority, Rabin swallowed another Kaddum compromise in May 1976. Although the cabinet asserted its authority on paper, it gave the Elon Moreh group a veto in practice. By shielding the settlers from eviction, the NRP’s ultimatum allowed them to reject every offer of an alternative settlement location. Eventually, the settlers cut off negotiations entirely, keeping Kaddum on the agenda as a point of contention between Labor and MaPaM and another front in the escalating conflict between Rabin and Peres.

Already frustrated by Hammer’s disruption in the cabinet and Ben-Meir’s unchecked defiance in the Knesset, Labor politicians grew concerned by the NRP’s escalating inter- factional strife during the second half of 1976. By summer’s end, there was a notable rift between Raphael and Burg, who seemed to be growing closer to the Zeirim. Warhaftig had

255 Burg Oral History 4 (Feb. 9, 1976), 9; Burg Oral History 5 (Aug. 19, 1976), 16, ISA, A/7780/9. 256 Burg Oral History 6 (Sep. 30, 1976), 5, ISA, A/7780/9. 257 Burg Oral History 4 (Feb. 9, 1976), 10; Burg Oral History 6 (Sep. 30, 1976), 7 & 11, ISA, A/7780/9.

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grown silent (in public) about foreign policy matters, and it was feared that Burg might follow,

allowing hardliners to seize the agenda. As the 1977 elections grew closer, many recalled the

Zeirim’s obstructionism during the 1974 coalition negotiations. While the Burg-Raphael entente ultimately prevailed in that contest, the emerging constellation of forces in the NRP raised

258 doubts about the future. F

258 Daniel Bloch, “Strange Matchmaking in the NRP,” Davar (Sep. 17, 1976), 11.

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Chapter 6: Semakh Zevulun Be-Tzeitekha: U.S. Military Aid, the Sanctity of the Sabbath, and the End of the Labor-NRP Historic Alliance (1976–1977)

This chapter focuses on the dispute, confrontation, and cabinet crisis triggered by the

delivery of American-manufactured F-15 warplanes shortly before the Sabbath. The first part of

the chapter briefly surveys the NRP’s internal strife during the second half of 1976. Burg and the

Zeirim bargained over deferring party elections and marginalizing Raphael. By December 1976,

Raphael, who was counting on the elections to bolster his faction’s strength, found himself

backed into a corner and fighting for political survival. Thus, Raphael became increasingly

dependent on the power and prestige he enjoyed as minister of religion.

Bearing this context in mind, the second part of this chapter investigates the events

surrounding the delivery of three F-15s on Friday, December 10, 1976. Raphael, Ben-Meir, and

Kalman Kahana of Poalei Agudat Yisrael warned Rabin that the planned arrival ceremony risked desecrating the Sabbath. Unable to reschedule, Rabin downgraded and shortened the ceremony.

Later, news reports of a grand, spectacular event led Hammer and Raphael to speak out in protest, while Kahana promised a no-confidence motion in the Knesset. As the NRP ministers protested in the cabinet, Raphael made an overture to Allon, suggesting an apology from Rabin to resolve the dispute. After agreeing on the language of an apology, Burg and Raphael agreed that the matter was resolved.

Part Three begins with Raphael unexpectedly reversing his position, rejecting the apology he helped draft. Over Burg’s objection, Raphael persuaded the NRP Knesset Faction to abstain from the no-confidence vote, catching Labor unprepared. As the coalition scrambled for votes,

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Rabin personally appealed to Hammer and Raphael. The NRP Knesset Faction rebuffed Rabin’s

appeal, having already announced its abstention in the Knesset plenum. Nevertheless, in the end,

the government narrowly prevailed in the no-confidence vote.

Part Four examines the aftermath of the no-confidence vote within the NRP,

demonstrating the interplay between the Sabbath, settlements, and inter-factional strife. During a

meeting of the NRP Executive, Raphael and Likud U’Temurah excoriated Burg for splitting with

the faction to vote confidence in the government, and pressured the other factions to schedule

party elections. The NRP Executive also marked the first anniversary of Kaddum’s establishment

by demanding government recognition for “Elon Moreh” as a permanent settlement.

Part Five investigates Rabin’s decision to fire the NRP ministers and concomitant rupture

between Labor and the NRP. In the cabinet, Rabin formally proposed dismissing the NRP

ministers, with Allon making the case for the “prosecution.” Burg was caught off-guard, blaming

Labor for a “historic” mistake, while Raphael sounded a contrite tone and Hammer took pride in standing up for his principles. While the Alignment ministers were generally critical of the

NRP’s abstention, they urged Labor and the NRP to continue the Historic Alliance. Later, the

Alignment Knesset Faction debated the impact of the Zeirim on the Historic Alliance, the NRP’s conduct during the term of the Eighth Knesset, and the NRP’s influence on Labor foreign policy.

Part Five concludes with the NRP ministers’ public response to their dismissal and Rabin’s surprise resignation, ironically dubbed the “Brilliant Maneuver.”

Part Six describes the fallout from Rabin’s gambit, as the NRP disavowed its alliance with Labor. The party took an ambivalent step to the right, as Raphael was ousted, and R. Haim

Druckman – a close disciple of R. Zvi Yehudah – joined the ticket. Burg, however, kept the

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NRP’s options open. The chapter concludes with the debate in the NRP Knesset Faction over the

party’s role in a Likud government, following the “upheaval” of Labor’s defeat at the polls.

Yitzhak Raphael Fights for his Political Survival (May– November 1976) During the second half of 1976, NRP factions set aside ideological considerations in

favor of competitive advantage. The NRP constitution required that elections to the party

convention be held in late 1976. Raphael was expected to benefit from those elections, with his

network of patronage garnering a large share of the NRP base. In addition, his support for

Agudist yeshivas was expected to bring many dual Agudah-NRP members to the polls. Under

the new party “key” fashioned from the election results, Likud U’Temurah was expected to earn

a greater share of seats in the NRP’s governing bodies.1 Fearful that Raphael would win a

plurality of the vote, LaMifneh members increasingly supported deferring party elections to sideline Raphael, even if that meant joining forces with the Zeirim. Likud U’Temurah, in turn, struggled aggressively to set a date for elections.2

While each NRP faction claimed to support holding party elections, it was apparent by

August 1976 that elections could be held no sooner than the beginning of 1977. The factions blamed each other for the delay, while the Moshavim and Bnei Akiva worried that a costly and contentious vote would weaken the NRP’s general-election campaign.3 In the meantime,

Raphael continued appointing Likud U’Temurah members to religious councils in cities and

1 “'LaMifneh' Members of NRP urge Split From Raphael Faction,” Jerusalem Post (May 4, 1976), 3; “People in NRP Working to Delay Internal Elections,” Ma’ariv (June 21, 1976), 4; Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Current Status of the National Religious Party,” 1976TELAV08339 (Dec. 13, 1976); Asher Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Generation (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1985), 105-109; Yael Yishai, “Factionalism in the National Religious Party: The Quiet Revolution,” in The Elections in Israel- 1977, ed. Asher Arian (Jerusalem Academic Press, 1980), 57-74. 2 “Raphael Faction Demands not Postponing the Elections in the NRP,” Davar (July 7, 1976), 2. 3 “The Factions in the NRP Play the Election Lottery,” Ma’ariv (Aug. 18, 1976), 18.

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towns where LaMifneh controlled the local party branches. Thus, more LaMifneh activists

supported pushing Raphael down on the NRP Knesset slate and out of the cabinet.4 Others in

LaMifneh feared alienating traditional supporters in Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Dati and the Moshavim,

who found Raphael’s past objectionable.5

Raphael’s iron grip on the religious bureaucracy played into the Zeirim’s hands. By

alienating LaMifneh members, Raphael allowed the Zeirim to coopt Burg while threatening to secede if LaMifneh did not join forces to sideline Raphael. If that meant deferring party elections, which the Zeirim previously condemned as undemocratic, then so be it. They could live with Burg for a little while longer, but Raphael was “anathema” to Hammer and many others. NRP Knesset Faction Secretary Aryeh Han, who supported the Zeirim, secretly told U.S. diplomats that he and others in the NRP still blamed Raphael for the loss of two Knesset seats in the 1973 elections.6

The Zeirim also pushed for changing NRP membership rules to enable their supporters to

join and to disqualify dual Agudah-NRP members likely to support Raphael.7 While they failed

on both accounts, the debate allowed LaMifneh and the MNRR to filibuster in the Central

Committee, frustrating Raphael’s efforts to schedule elections.8 Opposition to Raphael also

began to emerge within Likud U’Temurah; some observed that the resistance from the other

factions was mainly directed at Raphael. If he could be pushed out, then perhaps Likud

4 “Strange Matchmaking in the NRP,” Davar (Sept. 17, 1976), 11. 5 “In the NRP Everyone Accuses Everyone of Avoiding Internal Elections,” Ma’ariv (Sep. 13, 1976), 18. 6 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Current Status of the National Religious Party,” 1976TELAV08339 (Dec. 13, 1976). 7 “Proposal to Deny Vote in NRP to Those Who Voted in Agudah Elections,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 9, 1976), 4; “Heads of the Movement for National Religious Revival Propose Separate Elections for the NRP and HaPoel HaMizrahi,” Ha- Tsofeh (sept. 28, 1976), 1-2; “Hammer and Ben-Meir Demand Census Before Elections to the NRP: In Order to Allow Voters Who aren't Members of the Sick Fund to Join,” Davar (Sept. 28, 1973), 3; “NRP Sec. Gen: Unusual to Introduce new Proposals after the Rule is Unanimously Adopted,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 28, 1976), 1. 8 Ma’ariv (Sept. 9, 1976), 4; Ma’ariv (Sep. 10, 1976), 4; Ma’ariv (Sep. 13, 1976), 18; Davar (Sept. 17, 1976), 11; “Lawsuit to Require NRP to Set Date for Elections Rejected,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 24, 1976), 79; “Proposal to Deny Vote,” Ma’ariv (Sept. 9, 1976), 4; “Heads of the Movement,” Ha-Tsofeh (sept. 28, 1976), 1-2.

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U’Temurah could reconcile with the other factions and participate in composing the NRP slate for the 1977 Knesset election.9

On September 28, 1976, the Central Committee finally took up the question of scheduling elections. The meeting broke up, though, after a brawl broke out during the vote. 10

Secretary-General Bernstein summoned the factions to a mediation “round-table,” but while they parlayed in public, bickering and scheming intensified behind the scenes. Schemes to abolish the regime of factions, muster a supermajority to postpone elections, and push out the entire Old

Guard were hatched and rejected.11 Raphael offered to support deferring the elections if

LaMifneh resumed cooperation with Likud U’Temurah. Burg, however, was already negotiating with Hammer and Warhaftig to form a bloc without Raphael. By late October, Hammer saw “a very good chance” for change in the party leadership. Raphael, in turn, warned of an existential leadership crisis in the NRP. He called for a united “religious front” in the upcoming Knesset elections, signaling that Likud U’Temurah had options outside the NRP, perhaps in concert with

Agudist elements.12

9Ma’ariv (Sept.13, 1976), 18. 10 The crisis in the NRP caught the attention of the US Embassy, which reported to Washington that the “relative strength” of the NRP’s factions had the potential to shape the next Israeli government. “The Youth Faction,” with their “strong ties to Gush Emunim” and “uncompromising stand on retention of the Occupied Territories,” could be expected to push the NRP to back a Likud government if the possibility were to arise. Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “NRP Meeting Ends in Brawl,” 1976TELAV06730 (Sept. 30, 1976). For accounts of the Central Committee meeting see, also: “Meeting of the NRP Central Committee 'Exploded' Into Scuffles and Brawls,” Davar (Sept. 29, 1976), 1; “Due to Technical Difficulties in the Course of the Secret Balloting- NRP Central Committee Disperses Without Deciding Whether to Hold or Postpone Elections,” Ha-Tsofeh, Sep. 29, 1976), 1; “Dr. Burg: The Proposal for a Secret Vote was Baseless,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 29, 1976), 1; “NRP Sec. Gen: 'Unusual to Introduce New Proposals after the Rule is Unanimously Adopted,” Ha-Tsofeh (Sept. 28, 1976), 1. 11 “Elections Affair in the NRP to be Debated in Meeting of the Central Committee at the End of the Month,” Ma’ariv (Oct. 1, 1976), 12. 12 “Dr. Burg Wants to Establish in the NRP a Joint Bloc with Minister Hammer's Faction,” Ma’ariv (Oct. 6, 1976), 4; “Progress in Negotiations to Establish new Bloc in the NRP,” Ma’ariv (Oct. 12, 1976), 4; “Hammer: There is a Chance for Far-Reaching Changes in the Leadership of the NRP,” Ma’ariv, (Oct. 22, 1976), 5; “Threat to Split LaMifneh Faction in NRP,” Ma’ariv (Oct. 27, 1976), 16; “Labor Leadership Considers Postponing the Internal Elections,” Davar (Oct. 31, 1976), 2; “Hammer: There is a Chance for Far-Reaching Changes in the Leadership of the NRP,” Ma’ariv, (Oct. 22, 1976), 5.

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The Zeirim aspired to create a “more beautiful NRP” by ousting Raphael, whose political dealings they found distasteful. In the process, they made some unsavory political moves of their own. Burg observed that the Zeirim had become part of the NRP establishment, though they

“still wouldn’t admit it.” The “good ones among the Zeirim” seemed to be motivated by sincere faith in R. Zvi Yehudah Kook’s messianic theology. The “politicians” Burg had dealings with were another matter. “All the failings it took me forty years to acquire,” Burg lamented, “[the leaders of the Zeirim] acquired in four years.”13

Raphael appealed to the NRP Supreme Court and took a page out of the Zeirim’s

playbook, calling a national convention of Likud U’Temurah. Representatives of 68 NRP

branches would attend the convention, whose mandate was to “examine the faction’s path in the

NRP” as well as “relations with other parts of religious-Jewry.” The message to the other NRP

factions was clear: Raphael, no less than the Zeirim, helmed a movement able to stand for

elections on its own.14

By December 1976, the walls were closing in on Raphael. The MNRR and LaMifneh

were running out the clock, making it virtually impossible to hold party election before the 1977

Knesset campaign.15 Though backed into a corner, Raphael still wielded considerable power as

minister of religion. Should Likud U’Temurah split from the NRP, Raphael’s support for

Agudah-affiliated yeshivot and his network of patronage would pay dividends in a general

election. Raphael knew the value of religious prestige, having cultivated relationships with

13 Burg Oral History 6 (Sept. 30, 1976), 8. 14 “Raphael's Faction to Hold Convention,” Ma’ariv (Nov. 11, 1976), 4; “Raphael Faction Boycotts Vote in NRP Presidium,” Davar (Nov. 12, 1976), 3. 15 “NRP may postpone elections,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 14, 1976), 2; “NRP Bodies Obligated to Set Date for Elections - But the Party Central Committee is Empowered to Delay by a Two-Thirds Majority,” Ma’ariv, (Dec. 1, 1976), 4.

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roshei yeshivah and an alliance with MK Aharon Abu-Hatsira, scion of a distinguished North

African rabbinic family.16 The NRP Supreme Court also gave Raphael reason to keep fighting

for Likud U’Temurah’s future in the NRP by ordering the relevant party bodies to schedule

elections. Behind the scenes, though, the Zeirim continued to muster a supermajority to defer elections and move Raphael to a lower spot on the NRP slate for the Ninth Knesset.17

Within Labor, too, a leadership contest had been simmering since Rabin narrowly bested

Peres in the contest to succeed Golda Meir. In November 1976, Rabin got an early start to his campaign for re-election as Labor leader and prime minister. Rabin intended to focus on foreign policy, pointing to his success with the Egyptian interim agreement and the rebuilding of Israel’s military with advanced American weapons. Those weapons would give Israel diplomatic maneuvering room, and Rabin intended to ask the voters for a mandate to use that maneuvering room. As 1977 drew near, Rabin intended to champion – and maybe pursue – agreements with

Egypt, Jordan, and Syria to end the state of war.18 As it happened, the delivery of advanced

American weapons set in motion the end of Rabin’s tenure, the dissolution of Labor’s

partnership with religious Zionism, and an end to Labor’s political hegemony.

The F-15s Arrive: An “Occasion to Rejoice” or a “Very Grave Matter”? On Monday, December 6, 1975, three F-15 fighter planes took off from McDonnell

Douglas headquarters in St. Louis, Missouri, flying West-to-East across the continental United

States. On Tuesday, the flight departed for the Azores islands in the North Atlantic, where the

16 Burg Oral History 41 (Aug. 14, 1990), 17, ISA, A/7781/2; Arian, 105-109; Yishai, “Factionalism in the National Religious Party,” 57-74. 17 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Current Status of the National Religious Party,” 1976TELAV08339 (Dec. 13, 1976). 18 Transcript entitled “Rabin Interview with Time - 24.11.76,” ISA, A/7036/15; Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Rabin Begins His Campaign,” 1976TELAV08286 (Dec. 9, 1976); Joseph Kraft, “Israel's Political Timetable,” Washington Post (Nov. 28, 1976), 31.

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planes were refueled and underwent a day of maintenance and inspection. Due to changing time

zones, and because the planes were only flown during daylight hours, it took until Friday,

December 10 for the F-15s to depart for the final leg of their journey. The flight was scheduled

to arrive in Israel no earlier than three o’clock in the afternoon for a festive welcome ceremony.19

2.A The NRP Warn against Sabbath Desecration during the F-15 Arrival Ceremony:

While the planes’ intercontinental journey went smoothly, political storm-clouds were gathering at their destination. On Monday, December 6, Rabin’s office learned that the F-15s were in the air and expected to arrive Friday afternoon, shortly before the Sabbath. Rabin was contacted by Raphael, who urged the prime minister to either reschedule or cancel the event, lest it desecrate the Sabbath.20 With Peres in Washington, Rabin asked IDF Chief of Staff Mordecai

“Motta” Gur about rescheduling the delivery.21 Meanwhile, Ben-Meir raised the matter in the

Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (FADC), which decided that the ceremony did not

involve pikuah nefesh [safeguarding human life] that would justify violating the Sabbath. After

contacting Rabin’s bureau, the FADC was informed that the prime minister was personally

attending to the matter.22 MK Kalman Kahana of Poalei Agudat Yisrael, who sat with Ben-Meir on the FADC, also lobbied Rabin and Gur to cancel the ceremony.23

19 Timetable of the F-15 shipment (Undated), in The F-15 Episode- No Confidence in the Government- December 1976, Bureau of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Office of the Prime Minister, ISA, A/7245/5; “First three F-15 jets fly to Israel,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 12, 1976), 1. 20 Raphael, 392. 21 Handwritten account of 12/6/76-12/8/76 numbered 1-4, ISA, A/7245/5; List of attempts to reschedule numbered 1-3, ISA, A/7245/5; Divrei Knesset v.78 (Dec. 14, 1976), 657-677, 658; “NRP Faction Submits Urgent Item for the Agenda,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 12, 1976), 1; “Raphael and Hammer Protest over Holding a Mass Ceremony that Caused Hillul Shabbat,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 12, 1976), 1. 22 “NRP Faction,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 12, 1976), 1; “Raphael and Hammer Protest,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec.12, 1976), 1; Raphael 392. 23 Divrei Knesset, v.78 (Dec. 14, 1976), 657; Raphael, 392; Handwritten Notes numbered 1-4, A/7245/5.

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On December 7, Gur notified Rabin that the arrival could not be-rescheduled once the

aircraft were in transit. In response, Rabin downgraded the event to an internal IDF ceremony

with 290 participants, rescinding invitations to the president, the cabinet, and the FADC. Aside

from Rabin, the Israeli participants were either military officers, security officials or journalists;

a modest American contingent included embassy officials and representatives of McDonnell

Douglas, the aircraft manufacturer. The revised guest list, however, failed to account for military

personnel and their families living on-base, and press reports later estimated that approximately

3,000 people were present.24

Raphael and others apparently came to believe that the ceremony had been canceled

when their invitations were rescinded. Later, they discovered that the event had been

downgraded to a smaller, IDF event scheduled to conclude shortly before the Sabbath.25 The new

schedule left little room for error. The F-15s would arrive at three o'clock, with the participants

taking their seats by 3:20 p.m. IAF chief Benny Peled, Gur, and Rabin would deliver remarks,

followed by the customary military rites and refreshments. The event would conclude by 3:45–

3:50, a half-hour before the Sabbath, though guests would be free to move about the aircraft.26

2.B “Heart-Stopping Aerobatics”: The F-15s Arrive…Late (December 10, 1976)

When the F-15s arrived 20–30 minutes late on Friday, December 10, Rabin dispensed with the military rites and rituals. The proceedings ended by 4:00 p.m., 17 minutes before the

Sabbath.27 Ha-Tsofeh’s military-affairs correspondent described the F-15s arrival with wonder and excitement, reporting that over 3,000 people welcomed the F-15s in a grand, festive

24 “First 3 F-15 Planes Arrived,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 12, 1976), 1-2; Jerusalem Post (Dec. 12, 1976), 1; Raphael, 392. 25 “NRP Faction,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 12, 1976), 1; “Raphael and Hammer Protest,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec.12, 1976), 1; Raphael, 392. 26 Captain Rachael Rabinovitch to PMO Military Secretary, “Secret/Urgent RE: Timetable for 'Falcon' Arrival Ceremony,” (Dec. 7, 1976) A/7245/5. 27 “Schedule as Implemented,” Undated, ISA, A/7245/5; Divrei Knesset v.78, 658.

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ceremony. The crowd waited with anticipation until the planes’ silhouettes appeared the edge of

the horizon, flying through the clear blue sky at record speed, leaving trails of white smoke in

their wake. As the F-15s blazed through the sky, a squadron of F-4 Phantoms escorted the IAF’s

newest aircraft on their final approach.28

As the F-15s touched down, one of the planes gently grazed the runway before breaking formation and taking to the sky, delighting the crowd with “heart-stopping aerobatics” that astonished even the most seasoned IAF pilots. With a top speed 2.3 times the speed of sound, a maximum altitude of 72,000 feet, and a flight time of 5 ½ hours, the F-15 was the definitive answer to the Soviet-made MIG-25. Chief of Staff Motta Gur and IAF commander Benny Peled lauded the IAF’s pilots and technicians for their prowess in learning to operate and maintain the world’s most sophisticated aircraft. The arrival of the F-15s created “another Israel,” Gur

boasted, revolutionizing the IAF’s operational capabilities. Prime Minister Rabin declared the F-

15 delivery a “three-fold occasion to rejoice” for the IDF, the State of Israel, and the “friendship between Israel and the United States.” “These planes give us certainty and faith,” Rabin proclaimed, “certainty in our strength and faith in a better future.” 29

2.C “A Very Grave Matter”: The NRP Reacts to News of the F-15 Arrival Ceremony:

On Sunday, December 12, the lead story in Ha-Tsofeh was a triumphant, patriotic

account of the F-15 arrival.30 Separate news items reported on the efforts to reschedule or cancel

the event, and the angry reactions from Raphael, Hammer, and Ben-Meir upon learning of the

ceremony on Saturday night.31 Raphael was “distressed” to discover that the “mamlakhti

28 “The First 3 ‘F-15’ Planes Arrived,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 12, 1976), 1-2. 29 “The First 3 ‘F-15’ Planes Arrived,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 12, 1976), 1-2. 30 “The First 3 ‘F-15’ Planes Arrived,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 12, 1976), 1-2. 31 “Raphael and Hammer Protest,” Ha-Tsofeh, (December 12, 1976), 2.

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ceremony” took place, claiming that it violated an understanding between him and Rabin.

Raphael would consider it a “very grave matter” if the Sabbath had, in fact, been violated, and he

would consult his NRP colleagues about an appropriate response.32 Hammer asserted that

operational necessities might justify delivering the planes close to the Sabbath, but not an official

ceremony.33 Ben-Meir condemned Rabin for desecrating the Sabbath, not to mention wasting

taxpayer shekels on a photo-op.34

Ha-Tsofeh’s editorial page hailed the shipment of new warplanes as a vital contribution to Israel’s long-term security. Hopefully, the IDF’s growing qualitative edge would encourage the Arab states to negotiate an end to the state of war with Israel. Moreover, by delivering the F-

15s, “the United States demonstrated once more its friendship with our country and its faith in

our ability to use them for security and stability.” That said, the editorial “note[d] with sorrow

that the delivery ceremony involved public Sabbath desecration on a mass scale, which the IDF

has always been careful to avoid.” Rabin had been asked to cancel and prevent Sabbath

desecration, but the “promised response” never materialized. Therefore, the editorial demanded

“an apology for what occurred” and “a promise to meticulously comply with Sabbath observance

[in the IDF].”35

The December 12 issue of Ha-Tsofeh gave no indication that the F-15 arrival ceremony

was cause for a coalition crisis. Hammer and Raphael’s statements of protest made no such

threat, while Ben-Meir’s plan to submit a proposal for the agenda in the Knesset was a routine

32 “Raphael and Hammer Protest,” Ha-Tsofeh, (December 12, 1976), 2; In his memoirs, Raphael writes that, after warning Rabin of the likely political fallout, the prime minister promised to downgrade the ceremony to an internal IDF event, with no outside attendees. This appears to contradict Raphael’s statement in Ha-Tsofeh that Rabin broke a promise to completely cancel the ceremony, and supports Rabin’s assertion that he only promised to downgrade the ceremony, not cancel it entirely. Raphael, 392. 33 “Raphael and Hammer Protest,” Ha-Tsofeh (December 12, 1976), 2. 34 “NRP Faction Submits,” Ha-Tsofeh (December 12, 1976) 2. 35 Lead Editorial, Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 12, 1976), 2.

462 parliamentary step. The editorial, moreover, proposed an apology as the appropriate remedy for this unfortunate episode, along with a promise not to repeat the mistake. The paper focused, however, on the impact of the IAF’s new, cutting-edge planes on Israel’s strategic and diplomatic prospects. Anyone reading Ha-Tsofeh in the Prime Minister’s Bureau would likely have concluded that any grievances over the ceremony could be resolved with an apology.36

2.D The NRP Ministers Protest the F-15 Arrival Ceremony in the Cabinet (December 12, 1976)

The cabinet had a full agenda when it convened the next day.37 Recent events at the UN demonstrated broad European support for peace talks with the PLO, and the ILP’s Moshe Kol pushed for the cabinet to reconsider its stance toward the Palestinians. A heated debate ensued between Kol and Allon over the significance and sincerity of recent moderation in PLO rhetoric, in contrast to the organization’s charter. Rabin stepped in to halt the discussion, denying Kol’s request for a cabinet debate on Israeli policy toward the PLO.38 For good measure, Rabin reiterated that “the government’s decisions on this issue [were] quite clear.”39 Israel categorically rejected a “third” [i.e., Palestinian] state and refused to negotiate with “terrorist organizations.”

The Palestinian issue would be resolved in an agreement with Jordan, with territorial concessions in the West Bank subject to elections.40

36 Rabin’s file of materials from the incident includes the first-two pages of Ha-Tsofeh’s December 12 issue. The front-page story about the arrival of the F-15’s is marked with red ink, as is the portion of the editorial which addressed the Sabbath desecration and called for an apology. This indicates that the newspaper was read by either Rabin or his staff. ISA, A/7245/5. 37 Government Secretariat, Communique regarding Cabinet Meeting of Dec. 12, 1976, ISA, A/7245/5. 38 Ma’ariv, (Dec. 13, 1974), 4; “Criticism in Government,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 13, 1976). 39 “Rabin: There Has Not Been a Change in Israel’s Policy on the Palestinian Issue,” Davar (Dec. 13, 1976), 1. The incoming Carter Administration seemed inclined to seek a comprehensive peace based on the 1967 borders and a Palestinian entity in the West Bank. Holding a cabinet debate over the PLO would undermine efforts by Israeli diplomats in Washington to persuade the new administration to aim for an end the state of war with Jordan, Egypt, and Syria, instead. 40 Government Secretariat, Communique of Dec. 12, 1976, ISA, A/7245/5; “Israel Calls for Return to Geneva,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 7, 1976), 1-2; “Allon to the Cabinet: Putting Forward the Proposal in the General Assembly Achieved its Aim,” Davar (Dec. 13, 1976), 1-2; “Criticism in Government,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 13, 1976), 1; “Rabin: There Has Been No Change in the Government’s Position Regarding the PLO,” Ma’ariv, (Dec. 13, 1976), 4.

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After quashing discussion of Israel’s perennial Palestinian dilemma, Rabin briefed the cabinet on the F-15 delivery.41 With Defense Minister Peres out of the country, Rabin explained the new planes’ capabilities, noting that the F-15 sale was part of a broader framework of Israeli-

American agreements included in Sinai II.42 Rabin also addressed the timing of the delivery. He explained why efforts to reschedule proved unsuccessful and described the steps taken to shorten the ceremony. Rabin was adamant that the event concluded before the Sabbath.43

Raphael led the charge as the NRP ministers protested vigorously.44 He alleged that

Rabin broke his word and made it clear that he took the matter personally.45 “I doubt that your boss has so many loyal friends like me that he can insult me with such ease,” Raphael wrote in a

41 Government Secretariat, Communique regarding Cabinet Meeting of Dec. 12, 1976, ISA, A/7245/5; Ma’ariv, (Dec. 13, 1974), 4; “NRP Ministers Harshly Attacked Plane Arrival Ceremony Involving Sabbath Desecration,” Ha- Tsofeh (Dec. 13, 1976), 1; “Rabin’s regrets: No Confidence Motion on F-15’s and Sabbath,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 13, 1976); “Rabin Explains the Timing of the F-15 Reception Ceremony,” Davar (Dec. 13, 1976) 2. 42 “Peres To Hold Meetings Today at the Pentagon,” Davar (Dec. 13, 1976), 2. 43 Government Secretariat, Communique regarding Cabinet Meeting of Dec. 12, 1976. 44 “NRP Ministers Harshly Attacked Plane Arrival Ceremony Involving Sabbath Desecration,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 13, 1976), 1. 45 Accounts differ over what, exactly, Rabin promised Raphael. Both Ma’ariv and Ha-Tsofeh reported that Raphael accused Rabin of breaking his word. [Ma’ariv, (Dec. 13, 1974), 4; Ha-Tsofeh, (Dec. 13, 1976), 1] Ha-Tsofeh reported Raphael’s allegation that Rabin promised to cancel the ceremony, only to learn on Saturday night that the ceremony took place. [“NRP Ministers Harshly Attacked,” Ha-Tsofeh, (Dec. 13, 1976), 1.] According to Ma’ariv, Raphael accused Rabin of promising that “there would not be hillul shabbat in the reception ceremony for the planes.” This implies that Raphael knew the ceremony would take place, but believed that no public Sabbath desecration would occur. [Ma’ariv, (Dec. 13, 1974), 4.] In his memoirs, Raphael writes that Rabin “promised me that he would conduct the ceremony solely within the framework of the military, without no outside invites.” [Raphael, 292-3.] Kalman Kahana, after tabling his no-confidence motion in the Knesset, claimed he was told on Wednesday December 7 that the ceremony was cancelled, only to be informed on Thursday that an internal, IDF event would be held. [Divrei Knesset, v.78 (December 14, 1976), 657.] Ma’ariv’s reporting and Raphael’s memoirs support Rabin’s claim that he promised to downgrade the ceremony to avoid Sabbath desecration, rather than cancel it entirely. After the situation escalated into a full-blown crisis, the Jerusalem headquarters of the Mizrahi-HaPoel HaMizrahi World Organization, put out a bulletin detailing its version of recent events. The bulletin claimed that the NRP was promised that the ceremony would be postponed until after the Sabbath. It charged Rabin with “deceit” for claiming the ceremony had been cancelled, and that the NRRP subsequently learned that a downgraded ceremony would still be held on the afternoon of December 10. Only after the Sabbath ended on the night of December 11, though, did it become apparent that the ceremony had involved “mass, organized sabbath desecration.” This suggests that the NRP was aware—and tacitly accepted—that there would be a downgraded ceremony ending before the Sabbath. [Zambrovsky to Burg, Raphael, and Hammer, Letter dated 2 Teveth 5737 [Dec. 23, 1976], enc. draft of bulletin; Zembrovsky to Centers and Leaders of the Movement in the Diaspora, Bulletin dated 6 Teveth 5737 [Dec. 27, 1976]; MK Zevulun Hammer- Correspondence, file 295, Box 29, Section A, Archive of the NRP Knesset Faction, RG 003, Warhaftig Institute for the Study of Religious Zionism, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel.]

464 note to Allon.46 Burg decried the F-15 reception as “a most egregious spectacle,” which disregarded the sanctity of the Sabbath. The shipment was planned well in advance, and care should have been taken to ensure that the planes would not arrive on a Friday afternoon. The IDF was meant to be “a shared framework for all soldiers” – including those who observed the

Sabbath.47

Hammer stressed the distinction between permissible violations of Sabbath restrictions for “matters of security and logistics,” and desecrating the Sabbath to hold a ceremony.

Moreover, Hammer took issue with Chief of Staff Gur’s remark that the new F-15s created

“another Israel.” Israel’s true strength emanated from its “unique spiritual values,” not “a few airplanes.” Hammer sounded a prophetic note, declaring that “neither by valor nor by strength, but rather by My Spirit says The Lord of Hosts” (Zachariah 4:6). Sabbath desecration harmed the nation spiritually, and Hammer simply would not “return to business as usual.”48

2.E Deal, or No Deal? Raphael and Allon Negotiate an Apology to Resolve the Dispute

While Raphael spearheaded the NRP’s protest, he also took the initiative to resolve the dispute.49 Raphael passed another note to Allon, warning that the NRP would not be able to

“vote against the proposal of no-confidence” unless Rabin apologized.50 Allon recognized the

46 Handwritten note dated 12.12.76, ISA, A/7245/5. During the Cabinet meeting of Dec. 19, 1976, Allon recounted his exchange of notes with Raphael, stressing that he saved the notes after showing them to Rabin. This is consistent with the account in Raphael’s memoir, in which Allon goes to extraordinary lengths to “appease” him and the NRP ministers. “Transcript of Government Meeting of Dec. 19, 1976,” 9, in Resignation of Prime Minister Yizhak Rabin, Bureau of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Office of the Prime Minister, Israel State Archives, A/8218/33; Yitzhak Raphael, Not Easily Came The Light (Jerusalem: Edanim and Yediot Publishers:1981), 392. 47 “NRP Ministers Harshly Attacked,” Ha-Tsofeh, (Dec. 13, 1976), 1. 48 Ma’ariv, (Dec. 13, 1974), 4; “NRP Ministers Harshly Attacked,” Ha-Tsofeh, (Dec. 13, 1976), 1. See also, “Rabin Explains,” Davar (Dec. 13, 1976) 2; “Rabin’s regrets,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 13, 1976) 1. 49 Ma’ariv, (Dec, 13, 1974), 4; “NRP Ministers Harshly Attacked,” Ha-Tsofeh, (Dec. 13, 1976), 1; “Rabin Explains,” Davar (Dec. 13, 1976) 2. 50 The note reads: “If there does not come out of here an announcement that includes an expression of regret, an explanation, and a justification- we will not be able to vote against the proposal of no = confidence of Agudat=Yisrael.” Handwritten note marked “Raphael 12.12.76”, The F-15 Episode- No Confidence in the

465 note as an overture to resolve the dispute and urged the prime minister to grant Raphael’s

“justified request” for an apology. Rabin agreed, and Allon enlisted Zadok and Galili to draft an apology with Raphael, who “haggle[d] over every word” until he was satisfied that the apology

“promise[d] that nothing like this would happen ever again.” 51 Though Hammer would have no part of the agreement, Allon and Rabin believed that “an understanding was reached with at least two of the NRP ministers that they would not support or abstain from the no-confidence

[vote].”52 Burg, as well, believed that Raphael had accepted Rabin’s apology and would vote confidence in the government.53 The cabinet communique released after the meeting included

Rabin’s “expression of regret,” and reported that the cabinet accepted Rabin’s apology.54

“And You Shall Surely Rebuke Your Fellow”: The NRP Abstains from Voting Confidence in the Government (Except for Burg) 3.A Raphael’s Reversal

Later that afternoon, Raphael unexpectedly reversed his position.55 He told the Jerusalem

Post that he remained “distressed” by the Sabbath desecration and “[could] not defend the

Government- December 1976, Bureau of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Office of the Prime Minister, Israel State Archives, A/7245/5. Allon later told the cabinet that he made a point of saving Raphael’s note. Transcript, Government Meeting of Dec. 19, 1976, 8. ISA, A/8218/33. 51 Transcript, Government Meeting of Dec. 19, 1976, 10. ISA, A/8218/33; Raphael, 392. 52 Transcript, Government Meeting of Dec. 19, 1976, 10; Timeline of Events Dec. 12, 1976- Dec. 20, 1976 numbered 383, ISA, A/8218/33. 53 “The Trap Broke and We Escaped,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 16, 1976) 2; Transcript, Government Meeting of Dec. 19, 1976, 10; In his memoirs, Raphael writes that “Foreign Minister Yigal Allon worked hard on the language of the government announcement in order to appease us.” Rabin, moreover, “tried to explain, to give a justification, and was even ready to express regret publicly.” Raphael, 392. 54 The statement in the communique is substantively and stylistically similar to a hand-written draft in Rabin’s files, which reads: Out of consideration for the sanctity of the Sabbath, the status of the ceremony was downgraded to the minimum and moved up as much as possible. If, despite the downgrade and moving up [the ceremony] there resulted any sabbath desecration whatsoever- I am sorry for that.” Handwritten note marked 12.12.76, ISA, A/7245/5. Compare with “Communique of Dec. 12, 1976, item 4, ISA, A/7245/5. 55 The account in Raphael’s memoir is similar in both substance and style to a December 27 bulletin from the Mizrahi-HaPoel HaMizrahi World Organization. The bulletin states that, in response to the NRP ministers’ protest, Rabin “explained that it had been impossible to delay and if there had been any Sabbath desecration, he was sorry for it.” Consequently, the NRP ministers, “despite all of the pain, saw in his proclamation a sort of promise to look

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government’s action.” Even Rabin had admitted that holding the ceremony had been “a

mistake,” Raphael claimed. The next morning, The Post reported that it was “not clear” whether

the NRP would vote confidence in the government and “to what extent [the NRP] accepted

Rabin’s expressions of regret.”56 Davar reported that the NRP Knesset Faction would decide

how to vote during its weekly meeting.57 Yonah Cohen, Ha-Tsofeh’s Knesset correspondent, had

the inside scoop, reporting that the NRP ministers had rejected Rabin’s apology, and that the faction might abstain “in accordance with precedents from similar episodes.”58 Cohen speculated

that Rabin timed the event to prevent Peres from attending. Davar, for its part, attributed the

imminent parliamentary dispute to inter-factional competition within the NRP and rivalries

between the NRP and Agudah.59 Neither was far off the mark.

3.B The NRP Knesset Faction Decides to Abstain (December 13, 1976)

The NRP Knesset Faction convened the next morning to discuss the F-15 delivery. Ben-

Meir had already introduced a proposal for the agenda, a routine parliamentary move that would

allow the NRP to protest form the Knesset rostrum. In the interim, Kalman Kahana of Poalei

Agudat Yisrael introduced a motion of no-confidence.60 The opposition parties united behind the

motion in a bid to topple the government, raising the stakes as the NRP Knesset Faction

considered how to vote.61 In Raphael’s telling, he brought the matter to Rabin’s attention and

was assured that the ceremony was canceled. On Saturday night, however, it emerged that “the

after things from now on, and we were satisfied with that.” This corroborates Allon’s account, along with the the documentary evidence that Labor met Raphael’s conditions for the NRP to vote confidence in the government. Zabrovsky to Centers and Leaders of the Movement in the Diaspora, Bulletin Dated 6 Teveth 5737 [Dec. 27, 1976], 1. 295/6/A/003, Inst. Study of Rel. Zionism, Bar Ilan U. 56 “Rabin’s Regrets,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 13, 1976), 1. 57 “Rabin Explains,” Davar (Dec. 13, 1976) 2. 58 “Agudah’s Proposal to Express No Confidence in the Government Will Be Raised Tomorrow in the Knesset,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 13, 1976), 1. 59 “NRP Ministers Harshly Attacked,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 13, 1976), 1; “Rabin Explains,” Davar (Dec. 13, 1976) 2. 60 “Motion of No Confidence in the Government Proposed by Agudat Yisrael- Today in the Knesset,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 14, 1976), 1. 61 “NRP Faction Decides to Abstain from the Vote Against the Motion,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 14, 1976), 1.

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ceremony [was] held despite everything.”62 Thus, Raphael proposed that the NRP abstain from

the no-confidence vote, “thereby expressing the objection of the national-religious public.”63

A consensus formed around abstaining from the vote. Ben-Meir recounted that the

Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee had objected to holding the ceremony and was told by

Rabin’s bureau that it had been canceled. However, the ceremony still took place, just without

the FADC in attendance.64 Aharon Abu-Hatsira declared that the NRP must not “accept such a

flagrant breach” of the Sabbath, while Simcha Friedman observed that many in the Alignment

also “object[ed] to what took place.” Pinchas Scheinman urged the NRP not only to abstain but

to demand an apology and a promise not to repeat the mistake. Zerach Warhaftig opposed

leaving the government. Therefore, abstaining from the vote was both “the maximum that the

NRP is able to do,” as well as “the minimum that the NRP is obligated to do.”65

Burg was the sole voice of dissent in the Knesset Faction, though Secretary-General

Bernstein backed his position. Burg echoed Ha-Tsofeh’s editorial of the previous morning. The

timing of the F-15 ceremony did not reflect a government policy to hold state ceremonies on

Friday afternoons. The F-15 delivery was a complex operation, and the IDF personnel who

planned the shipment had made a careless error. That error demanded an apology, which the

prime minister had given. Burg accepted that apology and urged the faction to do likewise,

“because a coalition party is obligated to vote with the government.” Burg also warned that

abstaining from a vote of no-confidence was legally tantamount to resigning from the

government.66

62 “3 NRP Ministers Summoned,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 14, 1976), 1&15; “NRP Faction Decides to Abstain,” Ha-Tsofeh, (Dec. 14, 1976), 1. 63 “NRP Faction Decides to Abstain,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 14, 1976), 1. 64 “3 NRP Ministers Summoned,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 14, 1976), 1&15. 65 “NRP Faction Decides,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 14, 1976), 1. 66 “3 NRP Ministers Summoned,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 14, 1976), 1&15.

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Aryeh Han, secretary of the NRP Knesset Faction and a supporter of the Zeirim, responded by pulling out a volume of Knesset records. He declared that there was precedent for the NRP to abstain from a vote of confidence over Sabbath desecration. In May of 1969, the

NRP Knesset Faction, led by Haim Moshe Shapira, abstained from a no-confidence vote over television broadcasts on the Sabbath. Golda Meir, the prime minister at the time, declined to sanction or dismiss the NRP ministers over a matter of conscience. In this instance of Sabbath desecration, as well, both law and custom allowed the NRP to abstain while Rabin turned the other cheek.67

For his part, Zevulun Hammer argued that the NRP “must not accept” a pattern of

Sabbath desecration by the government, since the F-15 arrival ceremony came on the heels of a meeting with Histadrut representatives held on a Saturday. The NRP must not acquiesce to routine Sabbath desecration by the government, Hammer argued, and “the time for talking with our coalition partners is over.”68 The NRP had no choice but to abstain, in order “to make it clear that the NRP cannot be part of a government which conducts itself in violation of the laws of the

Torah.”69

After the matter was put to a vote, Melamed concluded the meeting by announcing the faction’s decision.70 In light of Rabin’s apology, which he would reiterate from the Knesset rostrum, the NRP would abstain from the vote of no-confidence. The faction tasked MK Simcha

Friedman with announcing to the Knesset that the NRP abstention was an act of protest against public Sabbath desecration. Burg, meanwhile, received the faction’s permission to vote with the

67 “3 NRP Ministers Summoned,” Ma’ariv (December 14, 1976), 15. 68 “The F-15s and the Sabbath,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 14, 1976), 1. 69 Ma’ariv, (Dec. 14, 1976) 1, 15; “NRP Faction Decides,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 14, 1976), 1. 70 “The F-15s and the Sabbath,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 14, 1976), 1; Ma’ariv (Dec. 14, 1976), 1&15; “NRP Faction Decides,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 14, 1976), 1.

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government. 71 During an emergency meeting of the coalition leadership that evening, Justice

Minister Zadok warned the NRP that abstaining from the vote could be viewed as tantamount to

resigning from the government.72 In response, an unnamed NRP member exclaimed that “if you

don’t like our attitude, you can ask our three ministers at next Sunday’s cabinet meeting to pack

up their bags and leave the government!”73

3.C Labor Frantically Whips Votes for the Government (December 14, 1976)

3.C.1 Coalition Whip Wertman Leads by Example

The NRP’s unexpected decision to abstain created a significant risk that the government

might fall. Rabin’s papers from December 13–14 include numerous handwritten whip-counts

(along with a number of sketches and doodles) from the coalition’s frenzied efforts to account

for the votes and whereabouts of all 120 Knesset members.74 Coalition Chairman Moshe

Wertman sent an urgent notice to every coalition lawmaker, announcing that all were expected to

be present and accounted for in the Knesset plenary at 4 p.m.75 Wertman led by example,

directing the parliamentary war effort in the Knesset, despite his father’s death that morning.76

Feverish efforts were made to locate and summon MKs traveling abroad. Defense Minister

Shimon Peres and Housing Minister Avraham Ofer were hurriedly helicoptered to the Knesset

after arriving from abroad at Ben-Gurion airport. In the Knesset, the debate was extended (with

the NRP’s support) to allow the incoming Alignment MKs to arrive for the vote.77

71 “Frantic Vote-Whipping Ahead of Confidence Vote Today,” Davar (Dec. 14, 1976), 1-2. 72 “NRP Faction Decides,” Ha-Tsofeh, (Dec. 14, 1976), 1. 73 “The F-15s and the Sabbath,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 14, 1976), 1; See also Ma’ariv, (December 14, 1976), 1&15; Timeline of Events Dec. 12, 1976—Dec. 20, 1976 numbered 383, ISA, A/7245/5. 74 See, List of Alignment MK’s (handwritten); Napkin from Knesset Cafeteria with Vote Count and Doodles, in ISA, A/7245/5. 75 Moshe Wertman to Members of the Coalition, (Dec. 13, 1976), ISA, A/7245/5. 76 “No Confidence Move Rejected by Seven Votes,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 15, 1976), 1; “Rabin Denies F-15 ceremony Desecrated the Sabbath,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 15, 1976), 2. 77 List of Alignment MK’s (handwritten); Napkin from Knesset Cafeteria with Vote Count and doodles, A/7245/5;

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3.C.2 Rabin Makes a Last-Minute Appeal and Zadok Delivers a Warning

Hours before the Knesset was set to convene on December 14, Rabin and Zadok tried one last time to sway Raphael and Hammer. Echoing Burg’s remarks to the Knesset Faction, Rabin argued the no-confidence motion was a transparent attempt to topple the government, not an expression of protest against Sabbath desecration. The far-left, communist, and secularist parties supporting the motion cared little for the sanctity of the Sabbath.78 In addition, abstaining from

the vote could be grounds for dismissal from the cabinet. The two NRP ministers understood the

warning but could not ignore public Sabbath desecration. They agreed to convene the faction to

reconsider, but would recommend against it.79

3.D The Knesset Debates a Motion of No-Confidence in the Government (December 14, 1976)

3.D.1 Kalman Kahana Proposes No-Confidence in the Rabin Government

Just after 4:00 p.m., Kalman Kahana introduced a motion of no-confidence on behalf of

the Religious-Torah Front. Kahana and Yosef Burg had studied together at the Hildesheimer

Rabbinical Seminary in Berlin, where both were ordained by Rabbi Yehiel Yaakov Weinberg.

The pair took different, yet parallel paths. Burg entered the Knesset with Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi,

while Kahana represented Poalei Agudat Yisrael.80

Kahana alleged that the government violated the Sabbath to put on a spectacle and boost

its image.81 Kahana had tried to prevent the event and thought the state ceremony was canceled.

He later learned that it was merely downgraded to an IDF event, but was somewhat mollified by

“By a Majority of only 7 Votes,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 15, 1976), 3; “No Confidence Move,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 15, 1976), 1. 78 “By a Majority of only 7 Votes,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 15, 1976), 3. 79 “By a Majority of only 7 Votes,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 15, 1976), 3. 80 Burg Oral History 26 (Oct. 26, 1989), 5-6, File N. 12, Burg Papers [Uncatalogued], Bar Ilan Archive. 81 Divrei Knesset v.78 (Dec. 14, 1976), 657.

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Rabin’s promise to minimize the number of participants and conclude before the Sabbath. On

Saturday night, Kahana was dismayed by news reports of a grand, public ceremony with 3,000

participants. Adding insult to injury, the planes arrived behind schedule and further delayed the

ceremony with an impromptu airshow.82

Kahana dismissed Rabin’s claim that the event was not a state (“mamlakhti”) ceremony;

Was “the IDF not part of mamlakhtiyut?” he asked.83 Though Kahana was unsure how Rabin

managed to return home before sundown, Kahana nevertheless commended the prime minister

for not publicly desecrating the Sabbath, himself. However, Kahana alleged that the ceremony

caused thousands of other participants to violate the Sabbath, including hundreds of IDF soldiers

who cleaned up afterwards. Even if no members of the government violated the Sabbath, the

prime minister still held a state ceremony that caused many others to do so.84

3.D.2 Rabin’s Rejoinder

In his rejoinder to Kahana, Rabin delivered the apology and explanation he had promised.

The prime minister detailed his unsuccessful efforts to reschedule the F-15s’ arrival and the steps taken to shorten the ceremony. Rabin insisted that even with the 20–30-minute delay, the abridged ceremony ended by 4 p.m. and involved “absolutely no desecration of the Sabbath.”

Rabin further maintained that he departed promptly and arrived home in Tel Aviv before the

Sabbath, as did Ha-Tsofeh’s military correspondent. Rabin repeatedly and emphatically insisted

82 Divrei Knesset v.78 (Dec. 14, 1976), 657. 83 Here, Mamlakhtiyut refers to the principle of “state consciousness” that guided Ben-Gurion’s efforts to create a society of citizens out of disparate immigrants and cultural groups. See Nir Kedar “Ben-Gurion's Mamlakhtiyut: Etymological and Theoretical Roots,” Israel Studies 7:3, (Fall 2002), 117-133. Kahana’s point here is well taken. The IDF was a central part of Ben Gurion’s mamlakhti program. He viewed the military not only as a “defense force,” but as the “potter's workshop for the nation's pioneers, a civilizing apparatus for the integration of the exiles, their unity and cultural uplifting.” David Ben-Gurion, “Uniqueness and Mission: Speech on Military Education and the Nation to the High Command of the Israel Defense Forces on 6 April 1950, Uniqueness and Mission (Tel Aviv: Israel Ministry of Defense, 1971), 133. 84 Divrei Knesset v.78 (Dec. 14, 1976), 657.

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that the ceremony did not involve Sabbath desecration. However, he expressed regret if the

ceremony caused anyone to violate the Sabbath, even indirectly.85

3.D.3 Menachem Hacohen Rebukes the NRP

When the motion was put up for debate, Alignment MK Menachem Hacohen, an

Orthodox rabbi, spoke prior to the NRP’s Simcha Friedman. In Hacohen’s view, the real affront

to the Sabbath was Kahana’s no-confidence motion, which turned the day of rest into “a game

ball on the playing field of Israeli politics.”86 It was peculiar that secularist and leftist factions

which opposed public Sabbath restrictions, were now voting no-confidence over alleged

violations of the very restrictions they hoped to abolish. Hacohen offered his “blessings and best

wishes” to Shulamit Aloni on the occasion of her “civil marriage" to Agudat Yisrael.87

Turning to the NRP, Hacohen agreed that the NRP ministers had a halakhic imperative to

protest apparent Sabbath desecration involving the F-15 ceremony in the cabinet. However,

Hacohen argued that the NRP’s abstention failed “the moral and religious test of ‘For you shall

surely rebuke your fellow and bear no sin on his account.’”88 Rabin’s lengthy explanation and

apology proved that he internalized the NRP’s message, rendering further rebuke inappropriate

and unnecessary. Indeed, the NRP would now “bear the sin” of publicly shaming Rabin by

abstaining from the vote of no-confidence.89

85 Divrei Knesset v.78 (Dec. 14, 1976), 658. 86 Divrei Knesset v.78 (Dec. 14, 1976), 662. 87 Divrei Knesset v.78 (Dec. 14, 1976), 662. 88 “…You shall surely rebuke your fellow, and not bear a sin on his account.” (Leviticus 19:17) That “sin” is traditionally understood as publicly shaming whoever is to be rebuked. See Rashi, ad loc; B.T. Arakhin 16b; Sifra, Kedoshim 4:8. 89Divrei Knesset v.78 (Dec. 14, 1976), 663.

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3.D.4 A Matter of (Mamlakhti and Religious) Conscience: The NRP Explains Its Abstention

Simcha Friedman rejected Hacohen’s criticism when he took the floor to explain the

NRP’s abstention. The NRP Knesset Faction operated in a parliamentary environment where voting was the means for binding and lasting actions and expressions. Personal utterances during cabinet meetings, press releases, and Knesset debates had no parliamentary force and effect. The

NRP Knesset Faction, then, could only fulfill its obligation to rebuke and protest Sabbath desecration with a vote.90

Friedman stressed that the NRP objected to the ceremony, not the delivery of the aircraft.

According to the party’s “religious-mamlakhti” worldview, meeting the “actual defense needs”

of the state was “not a desecration of the Sabbath, but a sanctification of [the Sabbath.]”91

Furthermore, the NRP did not support the “chorus” of opposition parties backing the no-

confidence motion for purely political purposes. The NRP’s Knesset members were following

the dictates of their conscience. Their “religious conscience” obligated them to protest, while

their “mamlakhti conscience” would not permit them to vote no-confidence and topple the

government. “We simply cannot vote confidence in this act of the government,” Friedman

declared. “Therefore, we abstain.”92

3.D.5 The NRP Knesset Faction Rejects Rabin’s Personal Appeal

As Rabin had asked, the NRP Knesset Faction met again to reconsider its position.

However, the debate in the plenary was already underway, and Friedman had already announced

that the NRP would abstain. Raphael and Hammer urged the faction to stand by its decision,

90 Divrei Knesset v.78 (Dec. 14, 1976), 663-664. 91 Divrei Knesset v.78 (Dec. 14, 1976), 664. 92 Divrei Knesset v.78 (Dec. 14, 1976), 664.

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while Burg opposed the move. If the faction voted to leave the government over the F-15

ceremony, Burg would accept party discipline. However, Burg’s “mamlakhti conscience” would

not allow him to abstain from voting confidence in the government while serving as a minister.

Moreover, the issue had become “political,” not “religious.” The no-confidence proposal was no

longer a protest against Sabbath desecration, but a contest between the coalition and the

opposition. In any event, Burg was “not ready to aid the united-front of Tewfik Touby, Shulamit

Aloni, and Rabbi Kalman Kahana, because this front wasn’t established for the sake of the honor

of the Holy Sabbath” (Kavod Shabbat Kodesh).”93

Ultimately, the NRP Knesset Faction stood by its original decision to abstain, while

granting Burg the freedom to vote his conscience. The government prevailed by a narrow margin

of 55–48, with Shlomit Aloni exclaiming that “Minister Burg is in favor of Sabbath desecration,”

foreshadowing the criticism Burg would face in the NRP.94

“Minister Burg is in Favor of Sabbath Desecration”: Fallout from the No-Confidence Vote in the NRP (December 15–17, 1976) 4.A Raphael and Likud U’Temurah Demand Party Elections and Shame Burg for Voting Confidence in the Government (December 15, 1976)

When the NRP Executive convened the next day, Likud U’Temurah members demanded

a thorough discussion of the NRP’s response to the F-15 arrival ceremony, “so that members of

the party will understand the background for members of the faction splitting apart [i.e., Burg],

and the significance of this stance.” Secretary-General Bernstein tried to block the transparent

attempt to embarrass Burg for voting with the government. He argued that the matter had been

93 “By a Majority of only 7 Votes,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 15, 1976), 3; “NRP Leaders clash over Burg vote,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 16, 1976), 1-2. 94 Divrei Knesset v.78 (Dec. 14, 1976), 677; Jerusalem Post (Dec. 16, 1976),1; Ma’ariv (Dec. 15, 1976), 3.

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thoroughly debated by the Knesset faction, which permitted Burg to vote confidence in the

government.95

Nevertheless, Raphael’s supporters continued to demand a debate, angrily condemning

Burg for his press statement that the dispute was “political and not religious.” The NRP’s

political opponents regularly accused the party of using religion as a political tool to rile up

voters, and now Burg was making their argument for them. Moreover, what was Sabbath

desecration if not a religious issue par excellence? An uproar ensued as supporters of Burg and

Raphael shouted and hurled insults, and the debate over the NRP’s response to the F-15 delivery gave way to a row over scheduling party elections. Bernstein called for order, as Likud

U’Temurah members “blew up” the meeting. Raphael’s loyalists angrily demanded that the party set a date for elections and that Burg answer for his behavior. Eventually, Shlomo Levi of the

Religious Kibbutz movement appealed directly to Raphael to bring his faction to heel.96

Raphael claimed to be “astonished” that Bernstein would not allow the Executive to

discuss the urgent need to schedule elections. Furthermore, Raphael was “personally insulted” by

Burg’s press statement that the no-confidence vote was a political – not religious – matter. He

was “astonished” by Burg’s absence from the meeting after breaking with the Knesset faction the

previous day. However, Raphael agreed to postpone the matter of scheduling elections until the

Executive’s next meeting. Tempers eased, the meeting returned to regular business, and most of

Likud U’Temurah left the hall, including Raphael.97

95 “Stormy Meeting of the NRP Executive on the Issue of the Split in the Religious Ministers’ Vote in the Knesset,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 16, 1976) 1-2. 96 “‘Betrayal, Disgrace’ - This is What They Called Minister Bug's Knesset Vote in NRP,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 16, 1976), 4, 15; “Stormy Meeting,” Ha-Tsofeh (December 16, 1976), 1; “The Trap Broke and We Escaped,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 16, 1976), 2. 97 “Stormy Meeting,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 16, 1976), 1; “NRP Leaders Clash over Burg vote,” Jerusalem Post (Dec 16, 1976), 2; “The Trap,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 16, 1976), 2; “Betrayal, Disgrace,” Ma’ariv (Dec. 16, 1976), 4, 15.

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4.A.1 Burg’s Rejoinder: “Where is the Integrity, the Common Sense?”

Though Raphael had already left by the time Burg arrived, his supporters forced Burg to defend his break with the Knesset Faction.98 Burg reiterated that abstaining from a vote of

confidence in the government was a violation of ministerial responsibility with potential legal

complications. More to the point, the spectacle in the Knesset was a “political circus” having

nothing to do with the sanctity of the sabbath.99

Burg argued that he and Raphael had agreed to vote with the government in exchange for

Rabin’s apology. Not only did Raphael break the agreement, but he also proposed that the entire

faction abstain. Burg reminded the NRP Executive that, just the other week, the Alignment

upheld its end of the coalition agreement by blocking Shulamit Aloni’s bill to institute civil

marriage. Yet, the NRP failed to uphold its side of the bargain and vote confidence in the

government. “Where,” Burg asked, “[was] the integrity, the common sense, and the [dictates of]

conscious, in that?”100

Aside from Bernstein, Burg was alone in defending the coalition agreement with Labor.

The majority agreed with Hammer, who rejected Burg’s argument that the motion of no-

confidence was “political” and not “religious.” It was for Tewfik Touby and Shulamit Aloni “to

explain to their public” why they voted no-confidence over Sabbath desecration. “As a member

of the NRP,” though, Hammer “was put in an embarrassing position by Rabbi Kahana’s proposal

[of no confidence].” Moreover, the vote demonstrated Labor’s dependence on the NRP; had the

party voted with the opposition, it would have toppled the government. During its next meeting,

the cabinet would return to business as usual.101

98 “Stormy Meeting,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 16, 1976), 1. 99 “NRP Leaders Clash,” Jerusalem Post (Dec 16, 1976), 2. 100 “Stormy Meeting,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 16, 1976), 1. 101 “Stormy Meeting,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 16, 1976), 1.

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4.A.2 The NRP Executive Celebrates Kaddum’s First Anniversary

The NRP Executive also took up the issue of Kaddum on the occasion of its first

anniversary. Although efforts to locate an alternative site had reached an impasse, daily life

continued at Camp Kaddum. By unanimous vote, the NRP Executive demanded that the

government recognize Kaddum as a permanent settlement. Bernstein proclaimed that the one-

year anniversary of Kaddum’s establishment would be remembered as “a momentous date in the

history of religious settlement [hityashvut datit].” The NRP had supported Kaddum from the

beginning and would insist that the government provide the settlers with the same utilities and

services as other Israelis. During the next cabinet meeting, the NRP’s ministers would demand

that the government recognize Kaddum and provide urgently needed schools and

kindergartens.102

In its Friday editorial, Ha-Tsofeh declared that the struggle for Kaddum and the NRP’s abstention from the no-confidence vote were continuations of the Maccabees’ struggle against the Assyrian Greeks and “Hellenizing” Jews. Centuries after the Maccabees stood up to

Antiochus’s decree against Sabbath observance, the NRP was standing up to the “Hellenizing” hard-left’s effort to abolish the sabbath in the public sphere. The struggle over Kaddum –

established a year prior during Hanukkah – was of a kind with the Maccabean struggle for the

Sabbath. Although the settlers lived at Kaddum with government permission, Rabin and others

“defamed” the settlers and denied their children a public education. The Elon Moreh settlers—

the “spiritual descendants of the Maccabees”—did not seek the conquest of a “foreign land” but

a return to “the patrimony of our forefathers.” The NRP could be sure that not only would

102 Ibid.

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Kaddum eventually be recognized by the state, its critics would also recognize it as the “paragon of Jewish pioneering.”103

4.A.3 Settlement, The Sabbath, And Inter-factional Competition In The NRP

Though Labor and the NRP had their share of disagreements during the tenure of the

Rabin government (Kaddum being a prime example), it was usually Hammer or Ben-Meir who escalated disputes, while Raphael generally played a pacifying role. Raphael, who held Rabin in high esteem, was outspoken in support of the prime minister and generally tried to back Rabin during cabinet debates. The great value Raphael ascribed to his relationship with Rabin paralleled his support for the NRP’s historic alliance with Labor.104 Therefore, it was characteristic of Raphael to make an overture to Allon during the cabinet meeting of December

12. Moreover, it was true to form for Raphael to negotiate an apology to resolve the dispute.

Therefore, Burg and the Labor ministers had good reason to believe the matter was settled once

Raphael and Allon drafted the statement of apology for Rabin.

It was particularly surprising, then, when Raphael rejected Rabin’s apology and pushed for abstaining from the no-confidence vote.105 Raphael’s uncharacteristic behavior is mainly attributable to his precarious position in the NRP, and the critical importance of Raphael’s role as minister of religion for his political survival. Indeed, Raphael writes in his memoirs that Rabin’s apology would have sufficed “had there not arisen a great uproar within religious Jewry, including members of the NRP.” As the minister of religion, Raphael “saw [him]self as free from coalition discipline” on religious issues.106

103 “From Modi’in to Kaddum [Editorial],” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 17, 1976), 2. 104 Raphael, 394. 105 Raphael, 393. 106 Raphael, 393.

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Raphael’s account makes no mention of his political struggle at the time. However, Likud

U’Temurah’s conduct the day after the no-confidence vote demonstrates that Raphael’s response to the F-15 arrival ceremony was closely connected to inter-factional competition in the NRP.

Raphael used the NRP Executive as a forum to castigate Burg – a rival in league with the Zeirim

– for voting confidence in the government instead of protesting Sabbath desecration along with the rest of the party. While condemning Burg in front of the party faithful, Raphael and Likud

U’Temurah also pressed the other NRP factions to schedule elections to the party convention.

Not surprisingly, Burg saw Raphael’s conduct as a product of Raphael’s ambitions to

succeed (i.e., unseat) him as head of the party, as well as the result of unanticipated competition

between Raphael, Ben-Meir, and Kalman Kahana.107 Burg was well acquainted with Kahana, his

study partner from rabbinical school, and a longtime Knesset colleague. In Burg’s view, Kahana

was too quick and too vocal when reacting to religious transgressions by the government.108

Kahana remained true to form after the F-15 reception, and once Kahana raised the issue,

Raphael and Ben-Meir could hardly let themselves to be seen as “less religious, less fighters.”109

(This was particularly true of Raphael, whose outreach to Agudah circles encroached on

Kahana’s base.)

The parliamentary revolt of two cabinet ministers and nine members of the coalition –

whether motivated by party politics, personality, or principle – was an inherently provocative

act.110 While insubordination on the part of Hammer and Ben-Meir had become somewhat

107 Burg Oral History 26 ( Oct. 26, 1989), 6, in Institute for International Relations- Oral History Division (Interviews 26-17) Transcripts- 1989, File number 12, Burg Papers [uncatalogued], Archive for the Study of Religious Zionism, Bar Ilan University. 108 Burg Oral History 26, (Oct. 26, 1989), 1-5. 109 Burg Oral History 41, (Aug. 14, 1990), 15, ISA, A/7781/2. 110 “The NRP asserts itself- Editorial,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 19, 1976), 1.

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routine, Raphael’s behavior shocked his Labor colleagues. The NRP Executive only added insult

to injury when it demanded that the government recognize Kaddum as a permanent settlement.

NRP and Labor ministers had an unspoken agreement not to press the Kaddum issue. The

“temporary” settler camp remained a sore point within Labor, reminding many in the ruling party

of Rabin’s failure to assert his – and his government’s – authority. By abstaining from the no-

confidence vote, the NRP once again forced Rabin to choose whether to assert his authority.

Prime Minister Rabin’s “Brilliant Maneuver” 5.A “And on Top of This They Added Kaddum”: Rabin Considers His Options

After years of provocations and disputes between NRP hardliners and elements within

Labor, the common wisdom in “political circles” was that the Alignment would paper over the

affair. Neither party, after all, had an interest in sparking a government crisis.111 There was a

sense within the Alignment Knesset Faction, though, that something was afoot. Rumor had it that

Rabin was planning a dramatic announcement in the Knesset, though the Alignment leadership

expected “some sort of surprise on the Palestinian issue.” When Rabin declined requests to brief

the Knesset faction, it was assumed that the prime minister was keeping his cards close to the

chest for dramatic effect.112

At the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, Ambassador Malcolm Toon received a call from the office of Foreign Minister Yigal Allon. Toon would soon depart for his next assignment as the

American ambassador to Moscow, and Allon had invited him to a farewell luncheon on

December 20. However, Allon had urgent business in Brussels, and his office wished to know if the Ambassador would reschedule. Luckily, Toon had also received a lunch invitation from

111 “The NRP Will Demand that the Government Recognize the Settlement of Elon Moreh as a Community Entitled to Receive all State Services,” Ha-Tsofeh (Dec. 16, 1976), 1. 112 “The Faction Tries to Reveal the Secret,” Ma’ariv (Dec 16, 1976), 2.

481

Knesset Speaker Yisrael Yeshayahu and was glad to reschedule his lunch with Allon for the

following week.113

In fact, Allon had no business in Brussels, urgent or otherwise. Rather, Rabin was

considering a surprise announcement to the Knesset. Following the no-confidence vote, Rabin

huddled with a closed circle of advisors and colleagues as he considered the political and legal

implications of exercising his prerogative to dismiss the NRP ministers.114 Under normal

circumstances, Rabin did not have the authority to demand a cabinet member’s resignation.

Indeed, he attributed the disorder in his cabinet to this constitutional lacuna.115 However, Section

11(G) of Israel’s Transition Law considered abstaining from a no-confidence vote tantamount to

resigning from the cabinet, giving Rabin the option of dismissing the NRP ministers.116

Justice Minister Zadok and Finance Minister Rabinovitch urged Rabin to dismiss the

NRP ministers. Zadok stressed that the NRP violated the most fundamental principles of

coalition governance in a parliamentary democracy. Rabinovitch, for his part, emphasized electoral considerations. The Rabin government was already seen as weak; accepting this egregious breach of coalition discipline would compound the problem. Labor Minister Moshe

Baram – a former coalition whip – presciently warned that dismissing the NRP ministers would push the party into the right-wing camp. Allon believed that Rabin erred in holding the F-15 arrival ceremony in his rush to “steal the show” from Peres. Nevertheless, the NRP’s subsequent behavior presented Rabin with a serious dilemma and an “appeal to prove his leadership.”117

113 Toon to Atherton, “Foreign Minister’s Luncheon,” 1975TELAV08336 (Dec. 14, 1976); Toon to Atherton, “Appointment with Foreign Minister,”1976TELAV08453 (Dec. 16, 1976). 114 Timeline of Rabin’s activities between Dec. 12, 1976- Dec. 20, 1976, ISA, A/8218/33. 115 Transcript; The PM in a Background Conversation with Yoel Marcus (Ha'aretz) - Tel Aviv May 7, 1976, 20, ISA, A/4034/8. 116 Attorney General Aharon Barak to P.M. Yitzhak Rabin, Memorandum of 19 Dec. 1976, ISA, A/8218/33. 117 Allon Oral History 22, 16, ISA, A/5001/22.

482

Rabin chose to assert his authority and dismiss the NRP ministers as the first step in a

parliamentary gambit. Rabin would ask the cabinet for a mandate to inform the Knesset that the

NRP ministers were deemed to have resigned from the government. Their resignation would take effect immediately upon Rabin’s announcement. Hours later, Rabin would submit his own resignation, immediately turning the cabinet into a caretaker government. Under Israeli law at the time, no minister was permitted to enter or exit such a government, which was also immune to votes of no-confidence.

Publicly, Rabin would insist that he decided to eject the NRP to uphold the principles of coalition discipline and collective ministerial responsibility. In private consultations, though,

Rabin stressed that the dismissal of the NRP ministers was but one stage in a process to call early elections while the government continued to function without the NRP. Each step, Rabin stressed, was part of “a single package.” Rabin justified his decision by noting that “[The NRP’s] vote was not planned by us. They wanted to prove that they dared to speak out, and on top of this, they added Kaddum in a resolution that [the NRP Executive] adopted unanimously."118 In

the face of these provocations by the NRP, Rabin decided to dismiss the NRP ministers, thereby

asserting his authority.119

5.B Denouement: The Cabinet Meeting of December 19, 1976

5.B.1 Rabin Asks the Cabinet to Approve the Dismissal of the NRP Ministers:

On the morning of December 19, Rabin called the cabinet’s weekly meeting to order, asking that all non-ministers clear the room. The prime minister announced that he was

118“Prime Minister's Meeting with ILP Ministers Kol and Hausner with the participation of Ministers Allon and Zadok in the PM's office in Jerusalem, Sunday, 19.12.1976 at 08:45 - notetaker Eli Mizrahi,” page 6, in The Government Crisis- December 1976 (conversations with ILP Ministers and more) 12.1976-2.1977, Bureau of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister's Office, ISA, A/7246/11 119 Allon Oral History 22, 16, A/5001/22.

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departing from the agenda to discuss the NRP’s abstention from the no-confidence vote the

previous week.120 The NRP ministers knew what was coming, having been warned by Rabin a

half-hour earlier that he would demand their resignations. The prime minister expressed pride in

the government’s achievements and conveyed his appreciation for the “relationship of mutual

respect and cooperation” between him and the NRP ministers. However, the fact remained that

the NRP had failed to support the government in a vote of confidence. The cabinet would be

unable to function, Rabin asserted, if it ignored this breach of collective responsibility, the

“central principle for maintaining a coalition government.”121

Rabin recalled that Labor and NRP ministers had agreed to an apology, which would

enable the NRP to vote confidence in the government. After learning that the NRP intended to

abstain, Rabin and the coalition leadership warned the NRP, multiple times, that abstaining was

tantamount to resigning from the government. Rabin’s personal appeals went unheeded, and the

NRP abstained – except for Burg. Rabin thanked Burg for his vote and hoped it “wouldn’t damage” Burg politically. The prime minister noted for the record that Burg had chosen to be considered “part of the [NRP] faction and bear responsibility for its decisions.” Therefore, Rabin

asked the cabinet to task him with delivering a formal announcement to the Knesset, at which

time “Yosef Burg, Yitzhak Raphael, and Zevulun Hammer will cease to serve as ministers.”

Rabin anticipated that the NRP would respond by withdrawing from the coalition and wished to

stress that there was “no quarrel” between Labor and the NRP.”122

120 Meeting 16/ 736 of the Government; 16 Kislev 5737 - 19.12.76 (11:40 a.m.), in Stenographic Protocols of Cabinet Meetings from the Year 1976, Scanned Stenographic Protocols of Cabinet Meetings, Government Secretariat, Prime Minister’s Office, ISA, ISA-PMO-GovernmentMeeting-00119ar, 1-2. 121 Ibid, 2-3. 122 Ibid, 3-4.

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5.B.2 The NRP Ministers Respond to Rabin

Burg Blames Labor for Creating a “Rift” with Religious Jewry The Historic Alliance between Labor and Religious Zionism occupied a central place in

the cabinet debate. Burg spoke first, reiterating that he voted with the government with

permission from the NRP Knesset Faction and accepted party discipline. Burg claimed that

Rabin’s decision came as no surprise: the NRP abstained with full knowledge of the law, and

that morning’s issue of Davar reported on the possible dismissal of the NRP. The cabinet debate

was a charade, as the decision had been made before the print deadline the previous evening.123

Burg expressed “regret that the prime minister saw the need to invoke the law.” Rabin was embarking upon an irresponsible “political adventure” at a time when the country needed

“maximum stability,” or, at the very least, a “minimum of instability.” Either way, Rabin’s gambit was certainly no cure “for what ail[ed] the state and what ail[ed] the government.” On a

“personal note,” Burg “would never have imagined” that he and his colleagues would part ways in such an inglorious manner. 124

Burg “plac[ed] upon [the cabinet] the historic responsibility” for leaving “religious

Jewry without any representation in the government.” Adding insult to injury, religious Jewry

was being ejected for protesting Sabbath desecration. While the issue may have “developed” into

a political affair, its “roots” were clearly “religious.” Burg accused his colleagues of creating a

“rift between religious-Zionist, nationalist Jewry and this government.” That rift, moreover,

might well become a rupture between the NRP and Labor. Lest they had forgotten, Burg

reminded his Labor colleagues that Mizrahi/Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi was a “pioneering, Zionist”

movement. Despite occasional “differences of opinion,” the NRP had always been Labor’s loyal

123 Ibid, 5. 124 Ibid, 5.

485

partner. Only time would tell “how long, how deep, and how far” the rift between Labor and the

NRP would grow.125

Raphael Professes “Mutual-Respect and Feelings of Friendship” Raphael, spoke next, striking a more conciliatory tone while adamantly defending his

conduct. Raphael had been aware of the possible consequences when he proposed that the NRP

faction abstain from the vote of no-confidence. Moreover, Raphael “would not have acted

differently” even if he had “known back then, with one hundred percent [certainty]” that Rabin

would dismiss the NRP ministers. That said, Raphael insisted that he held “no grudge at all

toward the prime minister for exercising his prerogative” under the law.126

Raphael went on to thank Rabin for his “collaboration” and expressed appreciation for the “collegiality” of his colleagues. He had no “quarrel” with the government, which had “done a great many good things.” However, Raphael was truly “worried” that, “perhaps, because of this parting, the long chapter of partnership between National-Religious Jewry and the Labor

Movement would come to an end.” While some in the NRP might find that desirable, Raphael was not one of them. “In any event," he concluded, “I part from you with mutual respect and feelings of friendship.”127

Hammer is Honored to be Sacked While Burg had stopped just short of declaring the end of the historic alliance, and

Raphael expressed concern about its future, Hammer spoke of the end of the Labor-NRP alliance as a fait accompli. He “accept[ed] with love, albeit not with joy, the decision of the Labor Party

to sever the partnership.” He was able to accept this “with love,” because the NRP’s Knesset

125 Ibid, 6. 126 Ibid, 6. 127 Ibid, 7.

486

vote had been “a matter of conscience and values.” What’s more, it was “an honor... to leave the

government under such circumstance.” It was far better to leave the government “over a matter

that you believe [in]” than over some personal or political squabble.

Hammer emphasized that the NRP would have been within its rights to vote against the

government, since the no-confidence motion was over “a religious issue on which the National-

Religious Party was united and which [the NRP] was obligated to handle to the best of its

ability.” However, because “there were explanations and there was regret over what was done,”

the party chose to show leniency and abstain.128 In Hammer’s view, the NRP could not have

remained in the government without a significant act of protest. Voting with the government was

never an option, and Hammer had expected Labor to “absorb” the NRP’s act of defiance as it had

in the past. Had Hammer known that Labor would cut ties with the NRP for political gain, then

he might well have voted to topple the government based on political considerations of his

own.129

Hamer voiced concern that, without the NRP, the new government would lack “balance”

in its “approach to foreign policy and security,” along with “religion, and perhaps other issues.”

Without the NRP, the cabinet would be too dovish to “represent [the State] with strength.”

Thererefore, Hammer declared, the NRP would have no choice to protest this imbalance and demand “elections as early as possible.”130

5.B.3 Yigal Allon Makes the Case for Dismissing the NRP Ministers

After Burg, Raphael, and Hammer delivered their statements, the cabinet debated Rabin’s motion to dismiss the NRP ministers. None of the Labor or ILP ministers would contemplate

128 Ibid, 7. 129 Ibid, 8. 130 Ibid, 8.

487 objecting to the prime minister asserting the authority expressly granted to him by law.

Therefore, the outcome of the vote was a foregone conclusion. Though mainly declarative, the ensuing debate delved into the implications of Rabin’s decision for the relationship between the

NRP and Labor.

Yigal Allon was the first Labor minister to speak, making the case for the prime minister.

Israeli parliamentary democracy (not to mention the coalition agreement) attached special significance to votes of confidence in the government and votes over the budget. Each member of the coalition was obligated to support the government when either matter came before the

Knesset. Hinting at Ben-Meir and Hammer, Allon admitted that the government might, from time to time, make peace with “a rebel or two.” However, the abstention of an entire faction was another matter.

The government might have been able to make its peace with dissent from within the

NRP had there been an “intentional affront to the sanctity of the Sabbath, out of a lack of consideration for religious sensibilities.” In that case, Allon’s NRP colleagues should have come to him and Rabin and asked that they “show understanding” for the NRP’s intent to abstain as a matter of conscience. Then, perhaps, the cabinet could have discussed the planned vote and found a way for NRP members to abstain without causing a coalition crisis.131

Instead, the NRP ministers listened to Rabin’s explanation of the events surrounding the

F-15 arrival ceremony, which demonstrated that the prime minister never intended to desecrate the Sabbath and that the ceremony did not desecrate the Sabbath. After listening to Rabin’s account, Raphael “turned [to Allon] with a note and explained that only an expression of regret would allow the members of the National-Religious Party to vote in favor of the government.”

131 Ibid, 9.

488

Rabin agreed, and a statement was drafted for the prime minister to deliver from the Knesset

rostrum and distribute to the press. Hammer refused to be a party to the deal but indicated that he

would not make a “ruckus.” Consequently, there had been a “firm basis” to Allon and Rabin’s

belief that the NRP (perhaps, without the Zeirim) would vote with the government.132

The issue moving forward, Allon declared, was the “historic alliance between the Labor

Movement and the religious, Zionist camp.” This partnership was of “critical value” in building and governing the State. Allon was “certain that [he could] speak for all of [his] colleagues, that

[they had] not looked for grounds to eject the National-Religious Party from the government just as [they had] not looked for grounds to advance the Knesset elections.” However, the NRP’s abstention left the government with no choice but to take a stand for coalition discipline.

Allon held the NRP responsible for the present crisis. Burg, himself, had told the press that “the Sabbath had been turned into a pretense” for trying to bring down the government.

Thus, the NRP’s claim to have abstained as a matter of conscience was patently false. The NRP’s abstention was, from the beginning, a willful violation of collective responsibility aimed at hurting the government. The blame, then, lay not with the “majority of the government, but with the members of the National-Religious Party who chose this path, with only one of them having the courage to object.” Nevertheless, Allon hoped that the two movements would continue to cooperate politically in the Knesset so that their partnership could be “renewed on the basis of mutual respect.”133

132 Ibid, 9-10. 133 Ibid, 11.

489

5.B.4 The Labor Ministers Back Rabin and Criticize the NRP’s Abstention

Most of the cabinet supported Rabin’s dismissal of the NRP ministers as a regrettable but necessary step to maintain coalition discipline. The NRP’s abstention, and their behavior throughout the entire affair, was roundly criticized. Minister of Police Shlomo Hillel begrudgingly supported the NRP ministers’ dismissal, whom he blamed for the unnecessary crisis. Gad Ya’acobi, another hawkish Alignment minister, regretted the loss of Hammer and

Raphael, his political “neighbors.” However, the NRP had to face the consequences of violating

“the most fundamental principles of constitutional and parliamentary democracy.”134

Finance Minister Rabinowitz expressed eagerness to have the NRP back in the government but was sharply critical of the NRP for treating the vote as a matter of conscience.

Rabinowitz had been the mayor of a large city, in a coalition with both Agudat Yisrael and the

NRP. “I know what an insult to the Sabbath is, believe me,” said Rabinovitch. The F-15 arrival ceremony was an unfortunate accident, and Rabin explained the steps taken to prevent Sabbath desecration. It was “preposterous,” he argued, to speak of the “sanctity of the Sabbath” in the context of the no-confidence vote.135

Education Minister Aharon Yadlin declared that Labor also “valued the sanctity of the

Sabbath.” While most of Labor was “non-observant,” their movement respected “the place of the

Jewish tradition’s values” in the State of Israel. That respect led the entire government, not just

Rabin, to express regret. Whether or not there had been Sabbath desecration, Labor sympathized with the “real and sincere affront to religious sensibilities.” For Yadlin, though, the real “affront to the Sabbath” was the cynical alliance of the radical left with Likud and Agudat Yisrael.136

134 Ibid, 14. 135 Ibid, 20. 136 Ibid, 12.

490

MaPaM’s Victor Shemtov objected to Burg’s claim that the no-confidence vote was “an

incident on the basis of religion.” Indeed, “some of those who abstained” did so in order to paint

the government as “lacking self-respect and not worthy of confidence.” Given the election

campaign on the horizon, the vote was a “political incident par-excellence” and warranted a

political response.137

5.B.5 The Labor Ministers Urge Continued Partnership with the NRP

Ultimately, though, the central issue in the debate was not the NRP minsters’ dismissal,

but the historic alliance between Labor and the NRP that had enabled Labor to build and govern

the state. While most of the Labor ministers expressed unequivocal support for continuing the

partnership with the NRP, some also noted unwelcome changes in the NRP. The Independent

Liberals, though, believed that the NRP-Labor alliance had come to an end.

Shimon Peres asked for the floor after Allon’s detailed account of the events leading up

to the no-confidence vote. Troubled by the NRP ministers’ suggestion that Rabin’s decision might end the historic alliance, Peres insisted that Rabin’s move was neither a “breaking of the relationship” nor a “writ of divorce” between Labor and the NRP.138 Finance Minister Yehoshua

Rabinovitch expressed the belief that the partnership with the NRP could be mended swiftly,

urging his NRP “friends” not to “erase” their hard work in building the state and the Historic

Alliance because of Rabin’s “necessary step.”139 Aharon Yadlin pledged that Labor would do everything possible to preserve the Historic Alliance by making no changes to the “status quo”

137 Ibid, 18-19. 138 Ibid, 11. 139 Ibid, 20.

491

on religion and state. Labor and the NRP were both true “movements,” with a shared past that

would inevitably result in a “shared future.” 140

Justice Minister Zadok insisted that enforcing coalition discipline was “in no way,

whatsoever, a rift” between the two parties; it was his “belief and hope” that their separation

would be “for a limited period” until Labor formed its next government. Zadok urged the two

parties to remain in contact and work together as they had when the NRP was in the opposition at

the beginning of Rabin’s term.141 Yisrael Galili also urged the NRP ministers not to conflate

their dismissal from the cabinet with the historic alliance. The two camps continued to share

common ground in many vital areas, including settlement, the Histadrut, and foreign policy.142

MaPaM’s Victor Shemtov, one of the NRP’s most vocal antagonists, also came out for maintaining the Historic Alliance. Shemtov was “not a religious person” and had “never been pleased” with the NRP’s outsized influence in the cabinet and Knesset.143 Still, he considered the

“partnership of the worker’s movement and pioneering, religious Zionism” one of the “greatest achievements” of the Jewish state. Just as MaPaM had worked to create “honorable terms” for

the NRP to return to the coalition at the beginning of Rabin’s term, it would again work to

“create the conditions to enable renewing this historic alliance,” which was “a blessing for the

nation and a blessing for the state.”144

Immigration Minister Rosen of the Kibbutz Artzi recalled his movement’s partnership

with the religious moshavim and kibbutzim in purchasing land and developing agriculture during

the British Mandate. Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi, as well, was their “partner in building the Histadrut.”

140 Ibid, 13-14. 141 Ibid, 23. 142 Ibid, 27. 143 Ibid, 19. 144 Ibid, 19-20.

492

Rosen recalled his many years of service in the cabinet together with the NRP “under the leadership of the late minister Shapira,” who represented “the realist and constructive wing” of religious Zionism. Rosen was sad to part with his NRP colleagues, particularly Burg, with whom he had “a good friendship.” While he still hoped to strengthen Labor’s ties with the NRP’s

“realistic and constructive wing,” Rosen urged his NRP colleagues to engage in deep soul- searching.145

5.B.6 The Independent Liberals Accuse Religious Zionism of “Straying from its Historic Path”

The harshest criticism and most-dire prognosis for the Historic Alliance came from the

Independent Liberals. Tourism Minister Moshe Kol was astonished that the NRP would

undermine Rabin the vote of no-confidence. The prime minister had always gone to great lengths

to accommodate the NRP at the ILP’s expense. Indeed, Rabin had blocked debate on issues

important to the ILP to placate the NRP, especially on matters relating to religious pluralism or

the Palestinians. Kol recalled the Talmudic saying that “one is not brazen toward the person they

are indebted to.” The NRP owed Rabin a great debt, yet it had been so brazen as to abstain from

the no-confidence vote and then demand Kaddum as their “prize.”146

Kol charged that “Religious Zionism ha[d] strayed from its historic path, which [had

been] a constructive path of education and hityashvut.” However, the NRP had grown

preoccupied with “medini” issues in recent years.147 While Kol took no joy in the parting of the

ways between Labor and the NRP, their “Historic Alliance” had been based on “values” and

“mutual respect.” Now, however, their relationship had become one of “mutual provocation.” In

145 Ibid, 26. 146 Ibid, 15-16. 147 Ibid, 15.

493

the meantime, he ruefully observed that Labor still “[did] not have consideration for [the

ILP].”148

Gideon Hausner echoed the sentiment. The NRP was “no longer the NRP that it once

was,” but had been “taken over by other elements” with a completely different “political

orientation.” Hausner believed that the NRP’s abstention from the no-confidence vote had been

“influenced by medini positions,” which was the “real reason” for the “parting of the ways” with

Labor.149

5.C “Now It’s the Son-in-Law of Rav Maimon!” The Alignment Knesset Faction Debates Rabin’s Decision and The Historic Alliance (December 19, 1976)

The cabinet voted unanimously to approve the NRP ministers’ dismissal.150 As the news

spread, talk of the end of Labor’s Historic Alliance with the NRP spread with it. Most Alignment lawmakers learned of the NRP ministers’ dismissal on television or radio, and were only briefed by Rabin later that evening. Rabin explained his efforts to persuade the NRP not to abstain, the constitutional and legal justifications for dismissing the NRP ministers, and the process by which he would dismiss the NRP during a Knesset announcement the next day. He refused, however, to discuss the future of the government and the timing of elections, giving no indication of what he planned to do next.

While the NRP’s dismissal was a fait accompli, the Alignment Knesset Faction held a candid, contentious debate. Again, the debate was mainly declaratory, since dismissing the NRP ministers required no action by the Knesset Faction. Consequently, the discussion quickly moved

148 Ibid, 18. 149 Ibid, 20. 150 “Timeline of Events Dec. 12, 1976 – Dec. 20, 1976 numbered 383,” ISA, A/8218/33; Government Secretariat, “Agenda Item 245 ‘Abstention of the NRP Ministers from the Knesset Vote on the Motion of No-Confidence in the Government and the Implementation of Section 11(VII) of the Transition Law, 5709 – 1949’, Protocol of Cabinet Meeting 16/537, 27 Kislev 5737 – 19.12.76 (11:40),” 3, ISA, A/8218/33.

494

beyond the NRP’s abstention from the no-confidence vote, and Alignment MKs vented their

frustrations with their NRP colleagues during the term of the Eighth Knesset. The conversation

also came to include the nature of Labor’s partnership with the NRP – past, present, and future.

5.C.1 Labor’s “Guard Dog”? The NRP as a Constraint on Labor’s Conduct of Diplomacy

The hawkish David Coren criticized Rabin’s “gambit” as a “political mistake.”151 The cabinet would be “unbalanced” without the NRP to counter Victor Shemtov, just as Rabin prepared to meet the American president-elect, Jimmy Carter. Therefore, Coren urged Rabin to cancel the Knesset announcement that would terminate the NRP’s membership in the cabinet.152

Menachem Hacohen objected to Coren’s suggestion that Alignment ministers needed the

NRP as a “guard dog” to protect against excessive diplomatic concessions. If, indeed, the NRP

ministers had acted as a constraint on their Alignment colleagues, then their dismissal was all the

more vital. Hacohen fully supported Rabin’s move, lest it appear that the NRP “held the

government by the throat.” That said, Hacohen urged his colleagues to consider the fundamental

question of whether to use the “worn out” expression “Historic Alliance.” Labor’s partnership

was with the “NRP of Burg,” a “moderate” political force that “stood with [labor]” in making

difficult choices. Now that the NRP was being “dragged along by extremists,” it was time to stop

“speak[ing] in terms that don’t exist anymore.” “Are we talking about the time of Rav

Maimon?!" he exclaimed. “Are we talking about the pragmatic, deal-making NRP?”

“Now it’s the son-in-law of Rav Maimon!” someone shouted.

“The son-in-law,” Hacohen replied, “fell very far from the tree!”153

151 “Stenographic Record of Alignment Knesset Faction Meeting – December 19, 1976,” 13-14, ISA, A/8218/33. 152 Ibid, 15-16. 153 Ibid, 16-17.

495

5.C.2 “More Right-Wing than Herut”: The Alignment Debates The Zeirim’s Impact on The NRP

Many Alignment lawmakers shared the sentiment that the NRP had undergone a

fundamental change. In an apparent reference to the Zeirim, Finance Committee Chairman

Yisrael Kargman asserted that the NRP had been “taken over by a group of nationalists, more

right-wing than Herut.” These hardliners, moreover, had pushed the NRP leadership “into things

like what happened the previous week.”154

Police Minister Moshe Hillel interjected. “The instigator [of the NRP’s abstention] was

davka Raphael,” he exclaimed. “What do you want from the others? By his own account, this

was Raphael himself!”

Kargman surmised that Raphael instigated the abstention because of his “rivalry with the

group of nationalists.” Moreover, he held these nationalists responsible for the NRP’s

“mamlakhti irresponsibility.” Everyone saw “what they were doing with Kaddum yesterday.”

The basis of the NRP-Labor alliance was “responsibility,” and the NRP’s “incitement against the

government’s [settlement] decisions” was the cause of its deterioration.155

Others joined the chorus of criticism against the NRP’s behavior at Kaddum and in the

Knesset, where Ben-Meir’s impact was unmistakable. Eliezer Ronen alleged that the NRP’s

“continuous humiliation of the government” had undermined its “existence and ability to govern.”156 While some NRP members “conspired against government decisions” in Knesset

committees, others undermined its authority “in the field.” The previous evening’s “mass rally of

154 Ibid, 7. 155 Ibid, 8. 156 Ibid, 4.

496

twenty-five thousand or ten-thousand participants [at Kaddum]” was the “clearest evidence” that

the “NRP of the past [was] not the NRP of the present.”157

5.C.3 Yehudah Ben-Meir as a Destabilizing Element in the Coalition:

Aharon Efrat argued that “the path of the NRP” in recent years was “dictated by

Yehudah Ben-Meir, not Burg and not Raphael.” This was obvious to “anyone who followed things in the Knesset committee… in the Finance Committee… in all of parliamentary life.”

Within the NRP, “Nationalistic and chauvinistic elements” overshadowed the party’s

“pioneering” wing and “embittered the lives of those NRP members who wanted to preserve [its] tradition” and partnership with Labor.158 Nuzhat Katzsab, also on the Finance Committee, did a

“cost-benefit analysis of the Finance Committee sessions in which Yehudah Ben-Meir

[participated],” finding only costs and no benefits.159

“So, you sent him to me!” shouted an MK on the Foreign Affairs and Defense

Committee.

“So, I sent him to you,” Katzsab replied, “and since then, we [have been working] in an

orderly fashion.” Whether Labor liked it or not, Ben-Meir had become the “driving force” of the

NRP, “at least here in the Knesset.”160

5.C.4 “Do Not Belittle the Historic Partnership”: Alignment MKs Urge Continued Partnership with “Pioneering” Religious Jewry

Others, though, supported Rabin’s decision while also cautioning against a rift with the

NRP. Shalom Levin, who studied at the famed Mir Yeshiva, argued that holding the F-15

157 Ibid, 5-6. 158 Ibid, 12. 159 Ibid, 32. 160 Ibid, 32-33.

497 ceremony on Friday afternoon had been “a mistake.” While he supported Rabin’s stance against the NRP’s “blackmail,” Levin believed that Labor could not “realize [its] medini and pioneering vision” for the Jewish state without the NRP. Therefore, Labor had a duty to fight “the war for the soul of the pioneering, religious youth.” Levin believed that the “extremist-nationalist tendencies” among religious youths were not only “foreign” to Labor, but also to “the spiritual leadership of Zionist, religious-Jewry.” The challenge facing Labor was to “find a way to have conversations with the [religious] intellectuals to restore the partnership.”161

Yitzhak Navon also voiced criticism of the NRP but insisted that most of the NRP were

“not at all like” the hardline nationalists many were describing. While some parts of the NRP’s

“official program” seemed “more extreme,” the NRP’s presence in the cabinet did not impede the Sinai II negotiations. Moreover, even the Alignment had a few “weak links” of its own.”162

Moshe Carmel also supported Rabin’s decision to eject the NRP ministers, emphasizing that

Labor and the NRP were parting ways over the NRP’s “behavior” during a specific vote, and not

“over its policies.” Moshe Shahal contended that the NRP did not abstain out of extremism, but because it saw the government as weak, and, therefore, dismissed Rabin’s warnings ahead of the no-confidence vote. The Alignment, then, shared in the blame by tolerating abstentions and attacks on the government from within its ranks. If Labor deputies did not respect the government, why should the NRP?163

161 Ibid, 43. 162 Ibid, 19-20. 163 Ibid, 39-32.

498

5.C.5 “Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi and Mizrahi Lent Us a Hand”: Golda Meir Offers the Perspective of a Party Elder

Golda Meir gave Rabin her full support and offered the perspective of a party elder. She

objected to Hacohen’s claim that the Historic Alliance was outdated. Whether or not the NRP

was in the government, it would not do to “belittle the Historic Alliance.”164 Meir felt “obligated

to point out” that both religious Jewry and the Bund took an “extreme, anti-Zionist position” until “right before the Holocaust.” Despite their many differences, the fact remained that “Ha-

Poel Ha-Mizrahi and Mizrahi lent [the Labor movement] a hand.” This, Meir believed,

“strengthened Zionism over and beyond anything that [could] be imagined.” Meir could only imagine “how far [Zionism] could have gone” had the Bundists also “lent a hand.”165

“Do not belittle this,” Meir reiterated. Labor must not say “end of story, barukh

shepatarnu [good riddance],” no matter the difficulties with the NRP. Meir took a moment “to

say that [she] very much appreciate[d]…what Yosef Burg did” when he voted confidence in the

government. Recalling the Zeirim’s campaign to keep the NRP out of Labor-led governments in

1974, Meir noted that “but for [Burg’s] leadership…the NRP would have been outside the

government” for a year or more. Therefore, Meir urged her colleagues not to forget that that

Labor still had important allies and friends in the NRP. Again, Meir reiterated, “do not belittle

the Historic Alliance between religious Jewry and the [Zionist] Worker’s Movement.”166

Meir acknowledged that the NRP’s recent conduct was unacceptable, and the party

“need[ed] to understand” that open defiance of the government and the coalition would no longer

be tolerated. However, Labor also needed to look inward, especially if members believed that the

164 Ibid, 27. 165 Ibid, 28. 166 Ibid, 28.

499

Alignment needed a “guard dog” on foreign policy. The party platform had a “foreign policy

program” that was binding upon all Labor members of the government and Knesset.167

5.D “Right of Reply”: The NRP Ministers Respond to their Dismissal in the Knesset

On the afternoon of December 20, 1976, Rabin announced to the Knesset that, due to the

NRP’s failure to vote confidence in the government, Burg, Raphael, and Hammer were deemed

to have resigned as cabinet ministers. Rabin’s announcement was not subject to debate, and

Menachem Begin’s motion of no-confidence was ruled out of order. However, each of the now-

former ministers was granted the “right of reply” in the Knesset plenum.168

5.D.1 Burg Declares “War”

Burg was the first to respond to Rabin’s announcement, declaring that the matter at hand

was neither “personal” nor a “medini issue,” but a “religious” issue. Burg insisted he and the

NRP Knesset Faction were united over the “national and religious obligation to safeguard the

Sabbath.” He voted with the government out of coalition responsibility, not because he approved

of the F-15 reception ceremony. On the contrary, Burg condemned the government’s “lack of

consideration for the sanctity of the Sabbath” and denounced the ejection of the NRP ministers as a “pseudo-dramatic” diversion from Labor’s internal strife and scandal. Rabin would be hard- pressed to convince the public that he acted out of a “mamlakhti calling” to uphold coalition discipline, since Rabin no longer had a coalition. The country needed “stability,” yet Rabin had brought “upheaval.” The nation yearned for unity, yet Rabin created a “schism” between the government and religious Jewry.169

167 Ibid, 27-28. 168 “Announcement by the Government about the Resignation of Ministers Pursuant to Clause 11(G)(2) and (3) of the Transition Law, 5709 – 1949,” Divrei Knesset v.78 (December 20, 1976), 727-731. 169 Ibid, 728-9.

500

With elections on the horizon, Burg drew the battle lines for the NRP’s campaign.

“Religious Jews” were “in isolation,”—dismissed from the government while secularist factions held an “anti-religious festival.” Burg pledged work for the NRP’s “religious-public goals” from the opposition benches, continuing the “war against those who destroy and uproot religion.” The

NRP would prevail with “roots deep in the soil of Eretz Yisrael and the…nation of Israel.”

In a nod to the Zeirim and Gush Emunim, Burg lauded the “idealism” of the religious-

Zionist youth, the “roses growing and blossoming” in the NRP’s “garden” of educational institutions. Despite the occasional disagreement and a few “thorns,” the movement’s youth would imbue the NRP with the “moral and communal strength” to fight “[Rabin’s] fractured government.” Burg lamented Labor’s decision to end its “long and blessed journey” with the

NRP, particularly since there was “great doubt” whether Labor would remain in power. For its part, the “national-religious public” would “struggle for the right of [its] existence in the parliamentary arena.170

5.D.2 Raphael’s Regrets?

Raphael, who helped escalate the dispute, took a more measured tone in order to

“explain” his “motivations.” He reiterated that the NRP “did not leave the government in a squabble or disagreement.” Coalition governance naturally involved "differences of opinion over great issues," which required both Labor and the NRP to find compromises when necessary and consensus whenever possible. Despite being outvoted and disagreeing with some of the cabinet’s decisions, Raphael was proud of the Rabin government’s “great works and accomplishments.”

170 Ibid, 729.

501

The cabinet took “practical steps” to close gaps in society, “made progress” toward a future

peace accord, and “restored Israel’s self-confidence.”171

However, Raphael also took note of the government’s shortcomings. The cabinet was

hamstrung by internal divisions, unable to foster social cohesion, and the NRP had been forced

to “struggle” over “spiritual and religious issues.” Still, the party had remained in the

government in order to preserve the NRP-Labor “coalition partnership” and “strengthen the

government.”172 Raphael insisted that the NRP did “not want a crisis,” and that he was

“astonished by Yitzhak Rabin,” whom he knew personally as someone who “considers things

deeply.” Yet, it appeared to Raphael that Rabin had received poor advice and made a decision that would prove “very terrible and very damaging in the long run.” Rabin had failed to anticipate that by dismissing the NRP ministers, he would strengthen those in the partywho opposed the Historic Alliance. Thus, Rabin would come to “regret this gambit.” 173

5.D.3 From Hammer with Love

In contrast to Burg’s anger and Raphael’s regret, Hammer was self-assured and

unapologetic. Hammer accepted his dismissal “with love,” since there was “no greater honor

than leaving [the government] out of principle.” Hammer was proud to stand for “the principle of

[his] freedom of conscience on religious-ethical issues,” and for “the principle that the

government of Israel will not abet…Sabbath desecration.” Furthermore, “if what they’re saying

is true, that the NRP’s decision to recognize Kaddum” contributed to Rabin’s decision, that

would be “an additional honor for me.”174

171 Ibid, 729-730. 172 Ibid, 729-730. 173 Ibid. 729-730. 174 Ibid, 730-731.

502

While Hammer had “no grievances” with Labor for ending the alliance, he denounced

Rabin’s “slap in the face” to the “Old NRP,”—the party veterans who “kept faith with [the]

Historic Partnership.” As a citizen, though, Hammer had a “medini grievance” over Rabin’s

pandering to radical factions ready to “concede” both sacred ground as well as the “Jewish

character of the state.” Without the NRP, the government lacked a parliamentary majority, public trust, and moral legitimacy.175 Hammer regarded the government as too “one-sided” to lead the

country, declaring that the “People of Israel” were entitled to a “more representative, more

reliable, more unified” leadership. If Rabin intended to resign, then “the quicker, the better.” If

he tried to stay on and “entangle the state” in dangerous diplomacy, then Hammer would “do

everything to topple [the government].”176

5.E Rabin “Slams the Door” on the NRP

As Hammer left the rostrum for his new seat in the opposition benches, Eban, Zadok, and

Rabinovitch complemented Hammer on his remarks. After the session adjourned, lawmakers

gathered in the Knesset cafeteria to celebrate the fifth night of Hanukkah. The NRP’s Pinhas

Scheinman lit the candles, while Labor’s Yisrael Yeshayahu, the Speaker of the Knesset,

supplied the traditional jelly doughnuts and potato pancakes.177

Later that evening, Rabin summoned the cabinet for a surprise meeting, informing the

Labor and ILP ministers that he would resign the premiership that evening. Kol and Hausner

quickly handed Rabin their own letters of resignation, but the cabinet became a transition

government when President Katzir accepted Rabin’s resignation at approximately 11:00 p.m.

The law prohibited ministers from leaving or entering a caretaker government, and the ILP’s

175 Ibid, 727-731. 176 Divrei Knesset v.78 (Dec. 20, 1976) 727-731. 177 “NRP Ministers: Proud to be Out,” Jerusalem Post (Dec. 21, 1976), 1.

503

subsequent appeal to the High Court only dramatized that while the ILP was in, the NRP was

out.178 As an NRP election pamphlet put it, Rabin not only showed the NRP the door, he

“slammed the door in our faces.”179

The Fallout from Rabin’s Gambit and the 1977 Knesset Elections As Raphael predicted, Rabin’s dismissal of the NRP minister bolstered the camp in the

NRP opposed to the Historic Alliance. As far away as New York, Rabin’s gambit elicited anger

in religious circles. Even those who agreed with Burg’s decision to vote with the government

were reluctant to speak out. Rabin’s dismissal of the NRP ministers put Burg in an even more

difficult position, prompting Rabbi Joseph H. Lookstein to pen a letter to his “dear Reb

Yosef.”180 R. Lookstein “agree[ed] wholeheartedly” with Burg’s conduct, and was “proud that

there was one person like [Burg] who raised his hand against the ‘no-confidence’ vote.”

Lookstein offered Burg “encouragement” and “a pat on the back from a friend.” He

insisted that the “intelligent and intellectual religious Jews in America” agreed with “the position

[Burg] took.” However, most were “afraid to say anything…because the Sabbath [was]

involved.” “The temper and the mood of the times,” wrote Lookstein, were “such that all of us

are terrorized by the ultra-religious and by the extremistic [sic] elements in the world Jewish

community and in Israel itself.”181

178 Government Secretariat, “Agenda Item 264, ‘Resignation of the Prime Minister,’ Protocol of Cabinet Meeting 17/357, 28 Kislev 5757 – 20.12.76 (at 21:30 in the Knesset), ISA, A/8218/33; Rabin to Katzir, Letter of Resignation, Dec. 20, 1976, ISA, A/8218/33; Katzir to Rabin, “Assignment of the task of Forming a Government” 4 January 1977, ISA,G/6746/31. 179 “Campaign Pamphlet entitled 'Letter to Bnei-Akiva Member- B”H, Iyar 5737,” in The NRP Party, Elections to the Ninth Knesset- 1977, Series 9, Collection of Publicity Materials for Knesset Elections, National Library of Israel, File V 3007/04 (System Number 990034557890205171). 180 Joseph H. Lookstein to Dr. Joseph Burg (Dec. 31, 1976), ISA, G/2763/1. 181 Joseph H. Lookstein to Dr. Joseph Burg (Dec. 31, 1976), ISA, G/2763/1.

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“A friend knows the soul of his fellow,” Burg replied. The atmosphere in the NRP had

become “stifling,” causing the party to “slip on a rotten banana-peel, [doing] the work for

Agudah and Mapai all at once.”182

The atmosphere within the NRP, along with rising discontent with Labor in the broader

public, led the NRP to declare an end – or at least a hiatus – to the “Historic Alliance.” The party

platform for the 1977 Knesset elections declared that “The NRP no longer ha[d] any obligation

or commitment to any party or bloc whatsoever.” Furthermore, the NRP considered itself “free to

work toward assembling a government that will meet the needs and the challenges of the nation

and the state in the spirit of the national-religious worldview.”183

The NRP’s election campaign, moreover, signaled growing, albeit ambivalent, support for a realignment from Labor to Likud. Campaign literature and advertisements put out by the

NRP promised a “change of government” while reiterating the NRP’s call for a national unity government, thereby signaling that despite the falling out with Labor, the NRP had not yet landed in the open arms of Likud.184 The Zeirim, however, adopted a clearer line. Their

campaign materials expressly promised that the NRP would “work to establish a Likud-NRP

government.” Only if that proved unfeasible would the Zeirim seek a national unity

government.185

6.A Raphael’s Ouster: “Religious Idealism” or “Sordid Politics?”

Rabin’s dismissal of the NRP ministers also hastened Raphael’s ouster, removing a key

proponent of the NRP-Labor alliance from the political scene. The coalition crisis led the

182 Yosef Burg to Joseph H. Lookstein, (Jan. 12, 1977), ISA, G/2763/1. 183 National-Religious Party/Mizrahi- HaPoel HaMizrahi, Platform of the National-Religious Party for the Elections to the Ninth Knesset- Microfilm (Israel: 1977), 8, OCLC Accession Number 239636401. 184 Red pamphlet entitled ‘I Will Vote For The NRP,’1977; Pamphlet entitled ‘Letter to Bnei Akiva Member; National Library of Israel, File V 3007/04. 185 Pamphlet entitled ‘Letter to the Youth,’ 1977, National Library of Israel, File V 3007/04.

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Knesset to call early elections for May 1977, giving LaMifneh and the Zeirim ample justification

for postponing elections to the NRP convention. On January 9, 1977, the NRP Central

Committee deferred internal elections by an overwhelming majority of 400–2.186 Raphael’s

reservoir of electoral support, painstakingly cultivated during his term as minister of religion,

particularly among dual NRP-Agudah members, was placed out of reach. The NRP’s list of

candidates to the Ninth Knesset would be determined by party bosses, according to the 1972

party “key,” without regard for the factions’ support among party members.

Despite last-minute pleas from the venerable R. Shlomo Yosef Zevin and Shlomo

Zalman Shragai, one of Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi’s founding ideologues, LaMifneh agreed to a four-

way alignment with the MNRR, the Moshavim, and Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Dati. With Raphael

traveling overseas, his allies broached the possibility of Likud U’Temurah running with Poalei

Agudat Yisrael.187 However, the Zeirim’s threat to split the party continued to provide leverage

over LaMifneh. If forced to choose, Burg would rather Raphael secede than the Zeirim.188

Burg claimed that the new alignment was merely an effort to prevent “organizational

fragmentation,” and not a hostile act directed against Raphael. Burg professed to be “in the last

years of [his] public service,” and that he had with no reason to create a rift with Likud

U’Temurah as he contemplated retirement.189 In fact, Burg had neither plans to retire nor reason

to fear a rift with Likud U’Temurah. Burg had learned that MK Aharon Abu-Hatsira and David

Glass, Director-General at the Ministry of Religion, were planning a putsch in Likud U’Temurah.

186 “NRP Central Committee Decided to Defer Internal Elections,” Ha-Tsofeh (Jan. 10, 1977), 1-2. 187 “LaMifneh Faction Secretariat Decided In Favor of The Agreement with The Zeirim, The Union of Moshavim, and Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Dati,” Ha-Tsofeh (Jan. 20, 1977), 1; “'The house is Burning' -Said One of Raphael's Close Associates in the NRP,” Ma’ariv (January 21, 1977), 4; “Secretariat of the 'Gush Le-Likud U'Temurah': A United Party must be Preserved through Representation of the Factions According to the Existing Balance of Power,” Ha- Tsofeh (Jan. 21, 1977), 1; “Dr. Burg: 'The Four-Way' Agreement in the NRP is not Intended to Push Out Dr. Raphael,” Ha-Tsofeh (Jan. 23, 1976), 1. 188 “Raphael's Secession preferable to the Zeirim's Secession,” Ma’ariv (Jan. 12, 1977), 6. 189 “Dr. Burg: 'The Four-Way' Agreement,” Ha-Tsofeh (Jan. 23, 1976), 1.

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With outside help from the Zeirim and the acquiescence-if not assistance- of LaMifneh, Abu-

Hatsira, the scion of a storied, North-African rabbinic family, replaced Raphael as minister of religion. Raphael’s protegee, David Glass, took Likud U’Temurah’s second Knesset seat.190

Without the support of Likud U’Temurah activists loyal to Glass and Abu-Hatsira, seceding from the NRP was no longer a viable option for Raphael.191

The Jerusalem Post’s Aryeh Rubenstein, who reported extensively on the affair, described Raphael’s ouster as an “almost paradoxical combination of religious idealism and sordid politics.”192 Burg, though disgusted by the “great betrayal” of Raphael, did nothing to stop it when Glass and Abu-Hatsira came to Ben-Natan for support. Burg’s failure to intervene is all the more striking insofar as Burg knew that the Zeirim meant to push out the entire ancien regime, and stepped in to prevent Wahrhaftig’s ouster while Raphael was being put out to pasture.193 Even Glass admitted that Raphael’s ouster was “improper,” though he denied having been promised a safe position on the NRP list in exchange for deposing Raphael.194

While many saw Raphael’s removal as the epitome of the chicanery and backroom politics that the Zeirim purported to abhor, the Zeirim touted Raphael’s ouster as the centerpiece of a “process of renewal” in the NRP.195 Ben-Meir fervently rejected Rubenstein’s criticism,

190 “Raphael Faction Boycotts NRP Executive Meeting,” Jerusalem Post (Feb. 9, 1977), 2; Indicting The NRP,” Jerusalem Post (Feb. 25, 1977), A7; “United Executive Committee Chooses The 12 Top Candidates on The NRP Knesset List,” Ha-Tsofeh (March 21, 1977), 1-2; Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “NRP Excludes Raphael from Knesset List,” March 22, 1977), 1977TELAV02014; Aryeh Rubinstein, “Inside the NRP: How Raphael was ousted,” Jerusalem Post (March 25, 1977), 14; Burg Oral History 35, (April 4, 1990) 13, ISA, A/7781/2; Burg Oral History 41, (Aug. 14, 1990) 16-17, ISA, A/7811/2; Burg Oral History 42 (Sep. 4, 1990), 11, ISA, A/7781/2. 191 “Raphael Faction in NRP Executive votes for split,” Jerusalem Post (Feb. 14, 1977), 2; “Two New Religious Factions Formed,” Jerusalem Post (Feb. 15, 1977) 2; “Raphael cancels bid to quit NRP,” Jerusalem Post (Feb. 23, 1977) 3. 192 Aryeh Rubinstein, “Indicting the NRP,” Jerusalem Post (Feb. 25, 1977), A7. 193 Burg Oral History 41 (Aug. 14, 1990), 12, ISA, A/7811/2; Raphael, 450-458; Aryeh Rubinstein “Warhaftig loses sure place on NRP faction list,” Jerusalem Post (Mar. 11, 1977), 2. 194 Aryeh Rubinstein, “Indicting the NRP,” Jerusalem Post (Feb. 25, 1977), A7. 195 Zeiri HaMaFDaL, “Pamphlet entitled 'Letter to the Youths,'“ NRP Headquarters for the Young Generation, 1977; Pamphlet entitled “Letter to Bnei Akiva Member” Iyar 5737/ April-May 1977, National Library of Israel, File V 3007/04.

507 insisting that the election of Glass and Abu-Hatsira was transparent and fair. He and other opponents of Raphael had merely “exercised [their] inherent right as members…of a democratic party to vote [their] conscience.”196

6.B Toward a “More Beautiful NRP”: Enter R. Haim Druckman

Raphael’s ouster left Hammer in second place on the NRP Knesset list along with an unpleasant aftertaste. While Ben-Meir announced that the NRP had entered a “new chapter,” becoming a “more beautiful NRP,” Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Dati declined to put a representative on the

NRP slate.197 Moreover, the party remained on the outs with R. Zvi Yehudah Kook since entering the Meir and Rabin governments in 1974. Burg, no less than the Zeirim, understood the electoral significance of R. Zvi Yehudah’s endorsement. When the NRP postponed party elections In January 1977, Burg made an “emotional plea” to Rav Zvi Yehudah, asking him to reconsider his stance on the NRP. Burg was “certain” that R. Zvi Yehudah, as the son and successor of “our Master Rav Kook, of righteous memory,” would rejoin the NRP, and bring with him the “holy sparks of light and Torah” of his father.198

According to Vermus, hardliners in Gush Emunim and Merkaz HaRav considered the

NRP “too flexible” and sought a representative on the NRP list. “In practice,” though, “this was the demand of R. Zvi Yehudah Kook.” The Zeirim came to understand that “only the addition to the list of [R. Zvi Yehudah’s] disciple Rabbi Haim Druckman would guarantee the broad support of the settlement-sympathizers and the settlers themselves for the NRP List.”199 Himself a prominent educator and rosh yeshiva, R. Druckman was formerly a prominent member of Bnei

196 Aryeh Rubinstein [and Yehudah Ben-Meir] “Democracy and the NRP,” Jerusalem Post (Mar. 31, 1977), 10. 197 “United Executive Committee Chooses The 12 Top Candidates on the NRP Knesset List,” Ha-Tsofeh (March 21, 1977), 1-2. 198 “NRP Central Committee Decided to Defer Internal Elections,” Ha-Tsofeh (Jan. 10, 1977), 1-2. 199 Vermus, 116.

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Akiva’s national leadership and was widely acclaimed in the NRP’s youth-movement.200 Thus,

R. Druckman was placed second on the NRP list after Burg, while Hammer and all the rest were

moved down a spot.201 Within hours, R. Zvi Yehudah proclaimed that “all of us are obligated to

vote for [the NRP] and work with all our ability for its successful performance in the Knesset

elections.”202 R. Zvi Yehudah’s endorsement, which would feature prominently in NRP

campaign advertisements, brought elements within Yeshivat Merkaz HaRav into the NRP

fold.203 Though Gush Emunim remained non-partisan, the group expressed approval of

Druckman’s candidacy.

6.C “A Man Mustn’t Turn Himself into Poultry”: Burg Keeps the NRP’s Options Open as it Tilts to the Right

As the NRP leaned to the right, it also sent mixed signals. The U.S. Embassy saw

Raphael’s ouster and replacement by Druckman as a product of “the ascendancy of the youth faction.” In the embassy’s assessment, the party was “now decidedly hardline on the West

Bank,” and would likely “attract significance Gush Emunim votes.” However, Ben-Meir stressed

to embassy officials that R. Druckman’s character and prestige were the primary reasons for

including him on the list. Ben-Meir stressed that R. Druckman was “a spiritual man who leads an

exemplary life and is active in education and good works.” Moreover, the rabbi would attract the

200 “Rav Kook In Proclamation After The Placement Of Rav Druckman: Obligation To Vote For The NRP,” Ma’ariv (April 13, 1977), 4; Pamphlet entitled “Letter to Bnei Akiva Member.” 201 Vermus 118-119; “Demand for Putting Rav Haim Druckman on the NRP List,” Ma’ariv (March 27, 1977), 4; “Rav Kook is Asked to Influence Rav Druckman to Appear on NRP List,” Ma’ariv (March 28, 1977), 4; “Delegation asks R. Zvi Yehudah Kook to influence Rav Druckman to Join the NRP Knesset List,” Ha-Tsofeh (March 29, 1977), 1; “Struggle in the NRP over Placing Rav Druckman in the Second Spot,” Ma’ariv (April 6, 1977), 4; “Elections 1977,” Ma’ariv (April 12, 1976), 4; “Rabbi Haim Druckman Placed in the Second Spot on the NRP List for the Elections to the Knesset,” Ha-Tsofeh (April 13, 1977), 1; “Rav Kook in Proclamation,” Ma’ariv (April 13, 1977), 4; “Rabbi Druckman second on NRP list,” Jerusalem Post (April 14, 1977), 2. 202 “Rav Kook in Proclamation,” Ma’ariv (April 13, 1977), 4. 203 “Advertisement- Rav Zvi Yehudah Hacohen Kook Calls for voting 'Bet'“ Ha-Tsofeh (May 9, 1977), 4; Vermus 118-119.

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support of “religious intellectuals” and others who were “turned off” by “people like Raphael”

and disillusioned with “the subordination of spiritual considerations to politics.”204

Yosef Burg, the NRP campaign chairman at the top of the ticket, kept his (and the party’s) options open. When asked if the NRP would back Likud in forming a coalition, Burg would only say that he had “prayed for many years” that the parliamentary math would “put the choice between right and left in the hands of the NRP.”205 In a lengthy interview with Ha-Tsofeh

just before election day, Burg reiterated that the party’s “options are open.” When pressed as to

what, exactly, that meant, Burg remained coy, explaining that the NRP was not “committed to

establishing a coalition with the makeup of the previous governments.” His declared objective,

though, remained “a national unity government with the broadest base.”206

Burg also kept his options open with regard to possible territorial concessions. At the outset of the campaign, Burg told the press he had made it clear to the Zeirim “that LaMifneh's line is very progressive, and not necessarily extreme right-wing." Therefore, Burg had worked to bring Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Dati and religious Moshavim into the four-way alignment to provide

“balance on the medini position.” LaMifneh rejected the uncompromising “not-one-inch” philosophy that categorically rejected territorial concessions. Instead, LaMifneh believed in a

“struggle for every inch,” which entailed driving a hard bargain at the negotiating table.

Therefore, Burg suggested that proponents of territorial compromise “slow down the pace and not talk about far-reaching concessions.”207

204 Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Gush Emunim Advocate Number Two on NRP List, 1977TELAV02676, April 15, 1977 205 “Dr. Burg: The Elections in the Movement were Democratic and Proper,” Ha-Tsofeh (March 29, 1977), 1. 206 “Conversation with Dr. Yosef Burg, Head of the NRP List for the Ninth Knesset,” Ha-Tsofeh (May 13, 1977), 3 207 “Dr. Burg: The 'Square Agreement' in the NRP isn’t meant to Push out Dr. Raphael,” Ha-Tsofeh (Jan. 23, 1977), 1.

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While the NRP platform rejected “any plan” that included “concessions over any parts of the historic Land of Israel, the inheritance of our forefathers,” Burg refused to rule out such concessions.208 Burg knew his “Zionist, national obligations” to “struggle for our rights.”

Moreover, he criticized the Alignment’s “eagerness for concessions” as liable to invite American pressure. When pressed on territorial concessions in the West Bank, Burg replied that the NRP’s efforts “need[ed] to be directed toward a strong stance in all negotiations.” Similarly, Burg would not commit to demanding that the guidelines of the new government include a specific plan for far-reaching settlements. Instead, he expressed satisfaction that the NRP had been “the force that pushed” for settlement during the Rabin government. In summing up the interview,

Ha-Tsofeh’s correspondent ruefully observed that Burg chose his words carefully, refusing to make any “promises” beyond vague declarations of principle. When asked if he identified with the “hawks” or the “doves,” Burg quipped that “a man mustn’t turn himself into poultry.” 209

The NRP’s 1977 election campaign distanced the party from Labor while courting the hardline elements that galvanized following the Yom Kippur War. Although the balance of power in the party shifted decidedly in favor of the Zeirim, the NRP’s tilt to the Right was neither linear, uncontested, nor absolute. The 1977 campaign reflected broader sentiments of discontent in Israeli society and a desire for change. NRP advertisements promising a “change of government” appealed to that sense of discontent. The voters were looking for alternatives to

Labor hegemony, and the NRP branded itself as an “Alternative of Values.” 210

6.D The NRP Knesset Faction Debates the Party’s Role in a Likud Government

208 Ha-Tsofeh (January 23, 1977), 1. 209 “Conversation with Dr. Yosef Burg,” Ha-Tsofeh (May 13, 1977), 3. 210 “Advertisement- If you really want a change of Government,” Ha-Tsofeh (May 5, 1977), 2.

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The Israeli electorate delivered its verdict on May 17, 1977, in what became known as

the “Mahapakh, or “Upheaval” – Israel’s first transfer of power to a non-Labor government.

Likud garnered 43 mandates (and would add two more after merging with Ariel Sharon’s Shlom-

Zion party). The Alignment received a mere 32 seats, while the NRP grew from 10 to 12 seats.

The new “Democratic Movement for Change” (DaSH) earned 15 seats.211 The parliamentary

math made it possible for the NRP to return the Alignment to power or to push for a unity

government between Likud and Labor. However, when the NRP Knesset Faction met to discuss

the upcoming coalition negotiations, Melamed and Glass – the NRP’s most dovish MKs – flatly

rejected a unity government. The will of the electorate was clear and inescapable: Likud would

head the next government, and Labor would head for the opposition benches.212

* * *

As the NRP Knesset Faction looked ahead to coalition talks, the party faced new

questions about its role in a Likud government. The Zeirim envisioned a new partnership with

Likud as well as a new type of partnership. The NRP and Likud would act in concert, with the

NRP involved in all areas of governance – from welfare and the economy to foreign policy and

security. To that end, the Zeirim advocated a gentler approach to coalition negotiations with

Likud and a softening of the NRP’s religious demands. They saw the Upheaval as an opportunity

to transform the NRP into a national party.213 Warhaftig, Glass, and Melamed, though, cautioned

211 Central Elections Committee for the Ninth Knesset, Appendix to Memorandum on the Results of the Elections to the Ninth Knesset (May 31, 1977), 22, in Knesset Election- General, Bureau of Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister's Office, Israel State Archives, G/6752/62. 212 “Handwritten Protocol NRP Faction Meeting (May 19, 1976),” in Ninth Knesset Protocols; 1977-1978, File 24D, Box 8, Series B, NRP Knesset Faction(R.G.003), Archive for the Study of Religious Zionism, Bar Ilan University. 213 Ben-Meir and Hammer’s position reflected the Zeirim’s broader program of transforming the NRP, and the inter- generational impetus behind their rejection of the “Historic Partnership” with Labor. Writing in Ha-Tsofeh, Eliezer Sheper- a leading Zeirim activist- asserted the “Historic Partnership” allowed Labor to dominate the major areas of policy and governance, from foreign policy and defense to education, the economy, and trade, while the NRP

512 that the NRP was, first and foremost, a religious party – responsible for protecting the vital interests of the religious public.214

The Zeirim had good reason to expect a new type of relationship with Likud. Menachem

Begin the Likud leader and prime minister -designate was a key ally and ideological fellow- traveler in support of the “Whole Land of Israel.” Begin and the Zeirim had both joined in Gush

Emunim’s settlement bids and collaborated in opposing the Sinai II Accords. During the 1977 campaign, Hammer and Ben-Meir made a pact with Begin that neither party would form or join a coalition without the other.215

Begin’s affinity for traditional Judaism also made him a natural political partner for the

NRP writ-large. Begin frequently invoked Jewish tradition, was deferential to rabbinic figures and postulated a deep connection between Jewish religion and Jewish nationalism.216 Indeed, after receiving the mandate to form a government, Begin prayed at the Western Wall, where he was greeted by dancing yeshiva students, and called on R. Zvi Yehudah later that same day.217

Yonah Cohen, Ha-Tsofeh’s parliamentary correspondent and NRP publicist, captured the general feeling among religious Zionists that Begin’s rise to power brought a “new style of governance” characterized by “sanctifying the Name of Heaven.”218 This “new style,” though,

Leadership remained fixated on sectoral interests. In the interim, a laudable and capable generation of young, religious professionals, agriculturalists, intellectuals, and soldiers had arisen from NRP-supported schools and Yeshivot, the Bnei Akiva youth movement, and Bar Ilan University. This generation, though, found itself “confined” to the religious sector, excluded from the central arenas of national life that were dominated by Labor: whether the upper echelons of the IDF Officer Corps or the Foreign Service. The “multitudes” of religious, young adults who supported the NRP on election day expected the party to demand “comprehensive responsibility and a true partnership” that would enable religious youth to integrate into all areas of national life. Eliezer Sheper, “Comprehensive Responsibility and True Partnership,” Ha-Tsofeh (June 20, 1977), 3. 214 Protocol of NRP Faction Meeting, (May 24, 1976). 215 Arye Naor, Begin Ba’Shilton: Edut Ishit [Begin in Power: A Personal Testimony], (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1993), 32, 42. [Hebrew] 216 Eliezer Don-Yehiya, “Menachem Begin’s attitude to religion and the 1977 ‘political upheaval’,” Israel Affairs 24:6 (2018), 976-1007. 217 Naor, Begin Ba’Shilton, 52-54. 218 Yonah Cohen, Mehut Zehut U-Zekhut [Essence, Identity, and Right], (Jersualem: Heichal Shlomo Publications, 1978), 379. [Hebrew]

513 also posed a political threat to the NRP. Begin’s traditionalism made Likud appealing to religious and traditional Israelis. As Avraham Melamed reportedly quipped, “every time Begin puts on a yarmulke and says, ‘With God’s Help,’ we lose one voter.”219

First, and foremost, though, the NRP had to contend with the tensions and contradictions of the party’s internal dynamic. The NRP faction in the Ninth Knesset reflected the new balance of power following Raphael’s ouster. Ben-Meir, the parliamentary provocateur during the Eighth

Knesset, assumed responsibility for enforcing party and coalition discipline as the new Chairman of the NRP Knesset Faction.220 Druckman, a newcomer to politics, enjoyed the second place on the NRP list thanks to the support of the Zeirim, though he was not a member of their faction.

Indeed, Druckman was prepared to go to extremes that the Zeirim would not consider.

Druckman supported the Zeirim’s vision for the NRP’s relationship with Likud. Indeed, he raised eyebrows by suggesting the NRP agree to abolish the Ministry of Religion, should it become necessary as part of Likud’s program to consolidate ministries. The NRP’s efforts were better spent on education and settlement. Druckman emphatically refused to concede, though, when it came to Judea and Samaria.221 Warhaftig, who served as minister of religion for over 12 years, pushed back, explaining the Ministry’s significance and urging Druckman to show “a little flexibility” on foreign policy. The election campaign was over, and it was incumbent upon the winners to be “more moderate and cautious.” Burg agreed.222

Summation The NRP’s decision to support a Likud government was largely pre-determined by the results of the 1977 general election. Those elections, however, were preceded by a rupture

219 Burg Oral History 40 (July 30, 1990), 13, ISA, A/7781/2. 220 Protocol: NRP Faction Meeting (July 11, 1977). 221 Protocol: NRP Faction Meeting (May 24, 1976). 222 Ibid.

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between Labor and the NRP with far-reaching ramifications. While the untimely arrival of three

F-15s shortly before the Sabbath was the proximate cause of the dispute, the disagreement over the military ceremony was insufficient, in and of itself, to create a coalition crisis. Indeed, Ha-

Tsofeh’s editorial page initially indicated that an apology would resolve the matter, and Raphael, himself, drafted the apology with Allon. The dispute only escalated into a parliamentary confrontation after Raphael reversed his position, rejected the apology, and urged the NRP faction to abstain from the no-confidence vote. The NRP Executive’s demand that the government recognize Kaddum only added insult to injury. Rabin, in turn, chose to dramatically escalate the confrontation by dismissing the NRP ministers and excluding the NRP from the caretaker government formed after his resignation.

These decisions by Raphael and Rabin resulted from larger processes underway long before the F-15 delivery. Raphael’s decision to reject the apology and abstain from the no- confidence vote stemmed from the escalation of inter-factional competition within the NRP. That competition, in turn, tainted Labor-NRP coalition relations. Throughout Rabin’s term, the

Zeirim’s provocations (and Gush Emunim’s wildcat settlement bids) undermined Rabin’s credibility within Labor. When the NRP abstained, brazenly violating coalition discipline, Rabin

unexpectedly asserted his authority in response to the most recent – and most egregious –

provocative move by the NRP.

Although all three NRP ministers protested the F-15 reception, they were driven by

different agendas. Burg saw the incident as the product of carelessness on the part of military

planners, who should have paid closer attention to the planes’ arrival time.223 However, “there

was no more Sabbath desecration than you would have in the army if [the reception ceremony]

223 Burg Oral History 26, (Oct. 26, 1989), 5- 6, File N.12, Burg Papers [Uncatalogued], Bar Ilan Archive.

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did not occur.”224 “As a religious Jew and a representative of religious Jewry” it was Burg’s

obligation to protest Sabbath desecration while exercising discretion.225 Thus, Burg protested

negligent disregard for religious sensitivities at the proper time and in the proper forum: the

weekly cabinet meeting. And, when an apology was offered as an appropriate remedy, Burg

accepted it.

Sabbath desecration was a matter of principle for Burg no less than Hammer. However,

they differed in two key respects that were central to the NRP’s inter-generational strife. For

Burg, a long-time cabinet minister and Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi activist, the participation of religious-Zionist Jewry in the government, in partnership with Labor, was also a matter of principle. For Hammer, opposition to the NRP’s partnership with Labor was a matter of principle. That partnership relied upon a division of labor: the NRP exercised outsized influence on “religious” issues and looked after sectoral interests, while the Labor movement enjoyed political hegemony and directed policy on affairs of state.

This division of labor was anathema to Hammer and the Zeirim. They believed that the

NRP’s mission was to exercise national leadership in all areas of governance according to religious-nationalist principles instead of pure raison d ‘état. The “Wholeness of the Land of

Israel” was the Zeirim’s central guiding principle, and the Alignment’s readiness to cede territory linked the preservation of that “Wholeness,” with the Zeirim’s aspiration to expand the NRP’s role in affairs of state. The existence of a credible peace process, and Gush Emunim’s mobilization of NRP constituents against territorial withdrawal, made it all the more untenable for the Zeirim to acquiesce to Labor’s continued dominance over foreign policy while the NRP

224 Burg Oral History 41, (Aug. 14, 1990) 15, ISA, A/7781/2. 225 Burg Oral History 26, (Oct. 26, 1989), 5-6.

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busied itself with parochial interests. Thus, Hammer was disinclined to give Rabin the benefit of

the doubt to preserve a partnership that he ardently opposed.

Hammer’s protest against the F-15 arrival ceremony also contained an additional ideological element. Hammer considered it a sacred, national obligation to defend the state. It was both religiously permissible and nationalistically laudable for the IDF to perform vital, necessary operations on the Sabbath, while refraining from all other activity. It was one thing to take delivery of aircraft that guaranteed Israel’s qualitative edge over rival, Soviet-equipped

Arab militaries. Holding an official celebration likely to cause Sabbath desecration was an entirely different proposition.

Hammer viewed the festive reception as elevating material considerations above the nation’s spiritual values. When the IDF Chief of Staff proclaiming that the delivery of the F-15s had created “another Israel,” it galled Hammer that the nation was being defined in strictly material terms. Hammer’s objection to the F-15 reception on spiritual grounds echoed the

Zeirim’s stance during the U.S. reassessment, which included a hold on the F-15 sale. Hammer and Ben-Meir had argued for rejecting American military aid rather than injure the national spirit by “capitulating” to American pressure over the Sinai II accords. Indeed, Ben-Meir tried to amend the defense budget to underwrite the development of Israeli warplanes as an alternative to the American-supplied F-15. Rabin’s “Government of Withdrawal,” though, ultimately inked the

Sinai II Accord, receiving the F-15 (among other weapons systems) in return. There was a hint of schadenfreude among the Zeirim when the untimely delivery of Rabin’s political prize for Sinai

II escalated into a crisis that brought down his government.

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Raphael, in stark contrast to the Zeirim, embraced the partnership with Labor (and U.S.

aid), prioritizing “religious” issues as a matter of both principle and politics. As minister of

religion, Raphael claimed a unique prerogative and imperative to protest Sabbath desecration.

Furthermore, the religious prestige Raphael enjoyed by virtue of his position was vital to his

political survival. Thus, Raphael reacted as though Rabin had injured him personally by holding

the F-15 arrival ceremony, leading the protest against Sabbath desecration in the cabinet. At the

same time, Raphael made an overture to resolve the matter with a public apology by Rabin. Burg

was keen to resolve the matter and accepted the apology. Hammer refused, reflecting his attitude

toward the NRP-Labor alliance.

With two of the three NRP cabinet ministers onboard, Allon and Rabin had reason to

count on the NRP’s support (with the possible exception of Hammer and Ben-Meir) in the vote

of no-confidence. When Raphael reversed his position and pushed the NRP Knesset Faction to abstain, Allon and Rabin were caught off guard, along with Burg. In addition to imperiling the government, however briefly, by pulling the NRP’s parliamentary support, Raphael’s rejection of an apology that he, himself, had co-authored, made the NRP’s rejection of coalition discipline all the more audacious. Thus, Raphael’s reversal emerges as the critical moment in which the dispute escalated into a confrontation and, subsequently, a rift between Labor and the NRP.

As Labor frantically whipped votes and helicoptered MKs to the Knesset, Rabin’s personal appeals failed to move Raphael, who was generally an enthusiastic ally. Tellingly,

Raphael’s conduct featured prominently when Allon made the case for dismissing the NRP ministers to the cabinet. In the Alignment Knesset Faction, many were dismayed that it was the moderate, pragmatic Raphael who pushed the NRP to abstain. Alignment MKs were accustomed to the Zeirim flaunting coalition discipline and discrediting the government. Indeed, Ben-Meir

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was something of an enfant terrible in the Alignment eyes. Raphael’s conduct, though, raised

fresh doubts about the NRP’s reliability as a coalition partner.

These doubts were not unfounded. Raphael’s rejection of Rabin’s apology was closely

connected to the NRP’s inter-factional strife. By December 1976, Raphael’s back was against the

wall, as the MNRR and LaMifneh filibustered elections to the NRP convention. Whether

Raphael stayed or split with the party, his prestige as minister of religion was vital to his political

survival. It is not surprising, then, that Raphael – by his own admission – rejected Rabin’s

apology on account of an “uproar” in the religious community. The “stifling atmosphere” 226 in

the party, and the religious public’s deep sensitivity to public Sabbath desecration by the state

and the IDF, also help explain why Raphael decided to press the issue. At minimum, Raphael

avoided the sort of withering criticism that he and Likud U’Temurah directed at Burg.

It bears mentioning that the Zeirim also played a critical role in swaying the Knesset faction to abstain. Raphael could count on Hammer to favor abstaining from the vote, and with two of the NRP’s three ministers planning to abstain, the rest of the faction was likely to follow.

When Burg warned that abstaining could lead to the NRP ministers’ dismissal, Faction Secretary

Aryeh Han – a supporter of the Zeirim – provided the evidence to back up Ben-Meir and

Hammer’s claim that there was precedent for the NRP to abstain from a vote of no-confidence.

With Burg’s mamlakhti argument neutralized, the Knesset Faction resolved to abstain.

By abstaining from the vote and putting the outcome in doubt, the NRP imperiled the

Rabin government, albeit briefly. More importantly, the NRP (except for Burg) flouted coalition discipline, brazenly defying Rabin’s authority in the Knesset plenum. As discussed in the

226 Yosef Burg to Joseph H. Lookstein, (Jan. 12, 1977), ISA, G/2763/1.

519 previous chapter, Rabin had come to believe that his inability to control an unruly cabinet stemmed from his lack of authority to dismiss insubordinate ministers. The NRP’s abstention, however, triggered a law giving Rabin that very authority, should he choose to exercise it.

Several factors led Rabin to do just that. By failing to vote confidence in the government, the NRP ministers undermined the cabinet as a deliberative body in which all members shared responsibility. As prime minister, it was Rabin’s duty to enforce this fundamental constitutional principle. From an electoral perspective, allowing the NRP’s defiance to go unanswered would only serve to further undermine the government’s image.

Furthermore, Rabin spent most of his tenure as prime minister under pressure from

Labor to assert his authority over Gush Emunim and the Zeirim. For the coalition’s sake, Rabin turned the other cheek to Ben-Meir’s provocations and tolerated the NRP’s support for Gush

Emunim at Kaddum. Each time Rabin reiterated the Judea and Samaria proviso, many in the

Alignment viewed the NRP as an obstacle to an accord with Jordan. Others were simply irked that the NRP was able to constrain Labor’s foreign policy. The NRP’s call to recognize Kaddum the day after the no-confidence vote only added insult to injury.

Although Rabin’s decision to dismiss the NRP came as a surprise, many in the Alignment thought it was a long time coming. Thus, Rabin enjoyed broad support when he brought the matter before the Alignment Knesset Faction. While many insisted that talk of the NRP’s tilt to the right was greatly exaggerated, and others argued for preserving the Historic Alliance, even pro-NRP elements in the Alignment supported Rabin’s decision and criticized the NRP’s behavior.

The Alignment’s support for Rabin’s dismissal of the NRP Ministers also illustrates the direct and indirect impact of the Zeirim on Labor-NRP relations. By destabilizing the coalition,

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undermining the government’s authority, and escalating inter-factional competition within the

NRP, the Zeirim created an environment conducive to a confrontation between the two parties.

Raphael, fighting for political survival, failed to appreciate that he was pushing the limit of what

Rabin and his colleagues could tolerate. By reneging on his pledge to accept Rabin’s apology,

Raphael lit a match in a tinderbox, unwittingly catalyzing the end of the Labor-NRP alliance that

Raphael championed.

Raphael was not alone in failing to appreciate the sensibilities of the other party. As

Raphael observed during his remarks to the cabinet and Knesset, Rabin uncharacteristically failed to anticipate the political damage his gambit would cause to pro-Labor elements in the

NRP. Indeed, the NRP all but disavowed the Historic Alliance in its 1977 platform. Rabin’s oversight is explained by Burg’s observation that Rabin “did not understand the intensity of the grievance against the [arrival of] the airplanes on that Friday.” In Burg’s view, Rabin lacked “an appreciation of the strength of religion, the power of religion for a religious Jew.”227 Many in the

religious community saw Rabin’s dismissal of the NRP ministers as retribution for defending the

sanctity of the Sabbath. This perception was reinforced by Rabin’s “brilliant maneuver,” which

conspicuously excluded the NRP from the caretaker government at the precise moment when the

1977 campaign began in earnest.

In any event, internal NRP power struggles were not Rabin’s central concern as he and

his advisors planned the “Brilliant Maneuver.” Rabin planned to focus the Alignment’s election

campaign on foreign policy, asking the electorate for a mandate to pursue end-of-war agreements

involving territorial compromise on all fronts.228 Additionally, Rabin was also mulling an end-

227 Burg Oral History 40 (July 30, 1990) 16-17, ISA, A/7781/2. 228 Transcript entitled “Rabin Interview with Time - 24.11.76,” ISA, A/7036/15; Emb. Tel Aviv to State, “Rabin Begins His Campaign,” 1976TELAV08286 (Dec. 9, 1976); Joseph Kraft, “Israel's Political Timetable,” Washington

521 of-war agreement with Jordan prior to elections, in order to put a concrete peace accord before the electorate. Indeed, while the coalition crisis escalated in Jerusalem, Israeli diplomats in

Washington were lobbying the incoming Carter administration to broker such an agreement.229

Rabin’s dismissal of the NRP ministers offered an opportunity for diplomatic freedom of action.

At the time, Rabin and his advisors explicitly stated that the “brilliant maneuver” was engineered to exclude the NRP from the transition government, enabling Rabin to pursue initiatives that had been blocked by the NRP, such as the restructuring of government ministries.230 Hammer, as well, observed that the interim cabinet would be “unbalanced” on “medini” matters.

Even without the NRP “guard dog” in the cabinet, Rabin would not get the opportunity to pursue an end to the state of war with Israel’s neighbors. In Washington, the Carter administration-in-waiting rebuffed overtures by Israeli diplomats over ending the state of war.

The incoming administration rejected the incremental approach favored by Kissinger and Rabin, as well as the “Jordanian option” for resolving the Palestinian issue. As Rabin would discover

Post (Nov. 28, 1976), 31. Yigal Allon later recalled that Rabin was ready, in principle, for a “next step” involving territorial compromise in exchange for something “less than peace and full normalization” that would lead to a “real peace” in the future. Yigal Allon Oral History 22 (Aug. 31, 1979), ISA, A/5001/22. 229 Carter and his foreign policy team, though, rejected the “step-by-step” approach as well as the “Jordanian option” for resolving the political status of the Palestinians. This effectively foreclosed the possibility of an “end-of-war” agreement with Jordan before the elections. Dinitz, “One-on-One Conversation with Yoav [AKA Vice President- elect Walter Mondale] on Dec. 14, 1976”; Dinitz to Allon (c.c. Rabin), “Conversation with Shimon [a.k.a Cyrus Vance] on 76.12.20,” (December 22, 1976); Dinitz to Allon, c.c. PM, “Conversation with Reuven [a.k.a. Walter Mondale] on Dec. 18, 1976” (Dec. 22, 1976); Read Out [?] from Washington “Main Points from Lunch with Habib Dec. 20, 76,” (Dec. 21, 1976); in Reports of Amb. Simcha Dinitz to PM Rabin and FM Alon- 2.12.76 - 25.4.77, ISA, A/7063/15. 230 According to notes of Rabin’s conversations with ILP ministers Kol and Hausner, Allon and Rabin explicitly stated that their objective was to ensure that the NRP would not remain in the transition government. It was implicit in the conversations that removing the NRP would also provide diplomatic freedom of action. However, there is no record of Rabin sharing the details of a specific diplomatic initiative with the ILP ministers. See, “Prime Minister's Meeting with ILP Ministers Kol and Hausner with the participation of Ministers Allon and Zadok in the PM's office in Jerusalem, Sunday, 19.12.1976 at 08:45 - notetaker Eli Mizrahi,” 3; “Record of PM's Conversation with Ministers Kol and Hausner in the PM's Office in Knesset- Sunday, Dec. 19, 1976 at 19:30 note taker Eli Mizrahi,” 1; “Prime Minister's Meeting with ILP Ministers, Kol and Hausner with the Participation of Ministers Allon and Hausner, in the Prime Minister's Bureau in Jerusalem -Dec. 20, 1976 13:20,” 1; in The Government Crisis- December 1976 (conversations with ILP Ministers and More) 12.1976-2.1977, Bureau of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister's Office, ISA, A/7246/11.

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firsthand when he met Carter, the new president envisioned a separate Palestinian polity and an

almost-full withdrawal to the 1967 lines, which Rabin would not, and could not, accept.231 Upon

returning to Israel, a scandal erupted over an American bank account from Rabin’s tenure as

ambassador to Washington. Rabin took a leave of absence from the government and resigned his

candidacy for the premiership in favor of Shimon Peres.232 Weeks later, Menachem Begin’s

Likud trounced Peres and the Alignment at the polls.

231 Rabin, 292-300. 232 David Landau, “Rabin Resigns following Probe into Illegal Bank Account,” JTA Daily News Bulletin XLIV:68 (New York: Jewish Telegraphic Agency, April 8, 1977), 1-2; Rabin, 309-314.

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Conclusion

Summary of Main Findings Between 1974–1977, a nexus formed between the US-mediated Arab–Israeli peace

process, inter-factional competition within the NRP, and its historical alliance with Labor.

Kissinger’s diplomacy created the prospect of territorial concessions and presented the

government with decisions germane to the disposition of the West Bank. Labor and the NRP’s

Old Guard tried to accommodate their parties’ differences over the West Bank, thereby

constraining the Rabin government’s diplomatic policy.

The Zeirim, though, stood for a practice of politics guided by principle, not

accommodation. The peace process operationalized the Zeirim’s flagship religious principle – the

“Wholeness of the Land of Israel”; the Labor Alignment’s willingness to cede territory added an

ideological impetus to the Zeirim’s struggle against the Historic Alliance and, by extension, the

NRP leaders who cultivated that alliance. Over the course of the Rabin government’s term, the

Zeirim gained power at the expense of the Old Guard and confronted Labor when decisions

relating to the West Bank arose. These confrontations destabilized the Labor-NRP coalition

partnership, leading to a rupture between the two parties.

1.A The Impact of the Labor-NRP Alliance on the Peace Process

The “Judea and Samaria” proviso drafted in March 1974 was an attempt by Labor and the

NRP “Old Guard” to accommodate differences between their two camps over territorial

compromise in the West Bank. Under the proviso, the government retained the freedom of action

to make decisions as part of the American-mediated peace process, except for the final decision

to ratify an accord (presumably, with Jordan). Ratification would depend on the outcome of

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elections, should any coalition party request them. Thus, the NRP leadership could guarantee the

territorial status quo for the duration of the government’s term. Moreover, the proviso

incentivized the NRP’s participation in the government, since only a coalition party could

demand elections. At the same time, the proviso disincentivized negotiations with Jordan, lest

success topple the government early in its term.

The proviso’s outsized impact on Israeli and American decision-making was also a

product of contingency. Golda Meir’s unexpected resignation in the aftermath of the Agranat

report brought to power an unelected prime minister with a hand-me-down coalition agreement

that included the Judea and Samaria proviso. As a newcomer to politics, Rabin’s first task was to

earn the public’s confidence in him, his government, and Labor, while building his own base of

support in the party. Early elections were precisely what Rabin and his political benefactors were

determined to avoid. Thus, the Judea and Samaria proviso became an unexpectedly powerful

deterrent against pursuing negotiations with Jordan early in Rabin’s tenure.

1.A.1 The Unexpected Impact of the Judea and Samaria Proviso

While the Judea and Samaria proviso ultimately served the Zeirim’s agenda by

constraining the Rabin government’s diplomatic policy, the proviso ran counter to the Zeirim’s

immediate objective in 1974: preventing the formation of a Labor-NRP coalition. Rather than

accept the accommodation, the Zeirim chose to confront the Old Guard over “who is a Jew,”

rallying a broad coalition – including prominent rabbinic figures – against the NRP joining the

government. Although the Old Guard overcame this opposition to join Golda Meir’s cabinet,

defying the Chief Rabbinate led to a bruising inter-factional contest and a rift between the NRP leadership and rabbinic circles. Meir’s resignation gave the Zeirim a second chance to block the

NRP’s entry into the coalition. Unwilling to defy the Rabbinate twice, the NRP leadership took

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the party into the opposition; Rabin formed a government with Shulamit Aloni and a one-vote majority. Meanwhile, contacts between Labor, the NRP, and Rav Goren continued.

Rabin and his political patrons in Labor were intent on maintaining the Historic Alliance.

Therefore, Rabin treated the Judea and Samaria proviso as in-force during consultations with

Kissinger in the summer and autumn of 1974. To be sure, accommodating the NRP was not the

only factor in steering the peace process toward Egypt: Rabin saw an opportunity to take the

most powerful Arab military out of the fight; Kissinger wanted to bring Egypt into the pro-

Western camp; and Sadat was eager to rebuild the Egyptian economy and reclaim lost territory.

The Jordanians, for their part, were constrained by inter-Arab rivalries and the rise of the PLO and, ultimately displayed little flexibility in closed-door consultations.

While international factors contributed to the Egypt-first approach, the Judea and Samaria proviso allowed Rabin to persuade Kissinger that Israeli domestic politics precluded a Jordanian disengagement accord in 1974. Thus, the American secretary of state came to believe that “the problem [with pursuing a Jordanian accord] is the religious party,” briefing the president and other NSC principles accordingly.1 As R. Goren told the CRC in the summer of 1974, they succeeded in “deferring the evil decree” for the duration of Rabin’s term – so long as the NRP eventually joined the coalition.2 The Zeirim, too, eventually realized that the NRP could not

prevent territorial concessions from the opposition benches.

Thus, the Judea and Samaria proviso illustrates the central importance of the Labor-NRP partnership in shaping Israeli policy toward the peace process in 1974. The Zeirim’s hard line,

and the possibility of the West Bank being put on the negotiating table, led the NRP and Labor to

1 See, Chapter 1. 2 See, chapter 2.

526 adopt the proviso in order to facilitate the continuation of their coalition partnership. When

Meir’s resignation decapitated the Labor leadership, the proviso became an even more powerful deterrent against negotiations with Jordan. Consequently, Rabin refused to pursue an accord on the Jordanian track, lest it scuttle attempts to bring the NRP into the coalition. Eventually, R.

Goren, and even the Zeirim, came to realize the utility of the NRP’s membership in the coalition.

1.B From Accommodation to Confrontation in the Cabinet and the Knesset

Hammer’s entry into the cabinet in November 1975 marked a turning point for Labor-

NRP relations that illuminates how – and why – the two parties eventually found themselves unable to accommodate their differences. Hammer joined the cabinet with a clear mandate from the Zeirim’s Central Committee, and, most importantly, from the Chief Rabbinate: protect the

“wholeness” of the Land of Israel. This mandate legitimized Hammer’s presence in the cabinet so long as he waged a proactive, visible struggle against territorial concessions. Hammer’s struggle, in turn, was both a response to the prospect of territorial withdrawal created by

Kissinger’s diplomacy, as well as a destabilizing element within the Labor-NRP coalition partnership.

While the Judea and Samaria proviso justified the NRP’s presence in the cabinet, it did not resolve the fundamental differences between Labor and (part of) the NRP over the West

Bank. The proviso was a useful instrument for accommodating disagreements, but only insofar as Labor and NRP leaders desired accommodation. Burg and Raphael’s commitment to maintaining the partnership with Labor (and goodwill in Washington) motivated them to avoid confrontations over decisions related to the peace process – especially the West Bank. Hammer, though, fundamentally opposed the Historic Alliance and had no interest in avoiding

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confrontation. On the contrary, Hammer’s mission was to confront Labor over any movement,

however preliminary, toward concessions in the West Bank.

Kissinger’s exploratory (and long-forgotten) end-of-war initiative in 1976 exposed the

durability of the Judea and Samaria proviso, as well as its limitations as a mechanism of

accommodation following Hammer’s entry into the cabinet. When Rabin consulted with

Kissinger and Ford in January 1976, the proviso constrained Rabin from discussing territorial

concessions in the West Bank. Negotiations with Jordan had the potential to topple the

government, and Rabin confided in Kissinger that he was mulling early elections to remove this

constraint. Ultimately, Rabin agreed to a general, exploratory initiative to end the state of war

with Syria, Jordan, and Egypt.

When Rabin brought the initiative before the cabinet, he attempted to prevent a

confrontation by avoiding an operative decision over Kissinger’s “end of war” initiative in favor

of a non-binding cabinet communique. Burg and Raphael supported Rabin’s proposal, which

would cultivate goodwill in Washington and avoid drawing attention to the differences between the NRP and Labor regarding the West Bank. Hammer, though, chose to highlight those differences by insisting on a formal vote, lest acceptance of the initiative be construed as willingness to concede territory in the West Bank. While Hammer eventually backed down, Ben-

Meir kept up the fight with withering attacks on Rabin’s “Government of Withdrawal” from the

Knesset rostrum.

1.C The Fragmentation of Religious-Zionist Politics: The Old Guard, the Zeirim, and the Impact of Gush Emunim

These episodes illustrate the incompatibility of the Zeirim’s practice of politics with the

Labor-NRP tradition of political accommodation. Though the peace process inevitably posed

politically difficult decisions, Burg and Raphael tried to avoid or minimize such decisions. While

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Burg preferred to keep disagreements within the cabinet, Raphael was more outspoken. His

criticisms, however, often went hand-in-hand with expressions of staunch support for Prime

Minister Rabin and his government. In conducting and formulating foreign policy, Burg and

Raphael, as well as Warhaftig, were guided by the Ben-Gurionist imperative to seek great-power support. Consequently, they considered it legitimate to make concessions in order to cultivate goodwill in Washington.

The Zeirim, though, amplified, rather than minimized, the peace process’s impact on

Labor-NRP relations, adopting a confrontational posture toward the U.S. administration. Their modus operandi was to take a stand for principle, not accommodate disagreements. This confrontational ethos led Hammer and Ben-Meir to re-write the defense budget to fund the development and production of weapons systems–particularly warplanes–in Israel. While their parliamentary gambit was eventually undone, the two renegade lawmakers drove home the

Zeirim’s message of self-reliance and spiritual resilience in the face of the 1975 American

“reassessment.” After accepting a ministerial portfolio, Hammer pushed for debates and formal decisions on relatively-minor questions, lest there be any hint that the government was willing to make concessions in the West Bank. Ben-Meir, for his part, provoked confrontations in the

Knesset through speeches and parliamentary gambits that soured relations with the Labor

Alignment. Indeed, when Rabin dismissed the NRP ministers, booting its Knesset Faction from the coalition, many Alignment MKs were relieved (if not glad) to see Ben-Meir go.

1.C.1 Gush Emunim as an Extra-Parliamentary Actor

While the Zeirim hampered efforts to minimize or avoid decisions in response to

Kissinger’s diplomacy, Gush Emunim directly forced the government into divisive decisions that undermined Labor-NRP relations. In addition, the movement exacerbated internal NRP strife.

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Gush Emunim pioneered the use of settlement to challenge the government’s foreign policy and security strategy. With Allon as foreign minister and Kissinger mediating a viable diplomatic process on the basis of land-for-peace, Gush Emunim launched wildcat settlement bids beyond the confines of the Allon Plan at a time when its implementation seemed possible. Thus, the

Rabin government faced an extra-parliamentary opposition unhindered by the rules of the partisan, parliamentary game.

During the anti-Kissinger demonstrations in August 1975, Gush Emunim displayed its ability to mobilize tens-of-thousands of religious-Zionist young people (and others) against the government’s foreign policy. At the same time, however, the movement also exhibited a capacity for militancy that shocked Kissinger and his delegation, enraged President Ford, horrified many

Israelis, and upended the NRP. By targeting Burg, and, to a lesser extent, Raphael, Gush

Emunim nearly caused party tensions to boil over. The Zeirim’s close association with Gush

Emunim, and their advocacy on behalf of the protesters, created a linkage between the substantive policy debate over Sinai II and the controversy surrounding Gush Emunim’s tactics.

1.C.2 “Reassessment” And The Fundamental Differences Between The “Old Guard,” The Zeirim, And Gush Emunim

Even before Kissinger’s arrival, the range of reactions to “reassessment” exposed fundamental differences between the Zeirim and the “Old Guard” over US–Israel relations and the interim accords. The Zeirim stressed the spiritual imperative to stand up for national honor and took a confrontational stance against the U.S. Administration. To that end, the Zeirim stretched the limits of parliamentary norms by derailing the defense budget and participating in a heated, anti-American rally in July 1975. Burg, Raphael, and Warhaftig, in contrast, took an approach guided by realpolitik and acted within the bounds of normative partisan and

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parliamentary behavior. Thus, the means and objectives of the Old Guard were characterized by

accommodation, while the Zeirim adopted the means and objective of confrontation.

The anti-Kissinger demonstrations of August 1975, as well as the Sebastia standoff in

December 1975, also highlighted the differences between Gush Emunim and the Zeirim. Gush

Emunim’s willingness to completely disregard the bounds of normative political behavior reflected their single-minded focus on retaining and settling the territories. To be sure, the Zeirim publicly downplayed Gush Emunim’s excesses during the anti-Kissinger protests and supported the establishment of a settlement at Sebastia (and, later, at Kaddum). However, the Zeirim neither condoned nor participated in the use or threat of violence. Moreover, they were

“definitely not in favor” of Gush Emunim expanding its activities beyond the “struggle for Eretz

Yisrael” to include Israeli diplomacy on other fronts.3

Thus, religious Zionism in this period was caught between three competing, operative

approaches to foreign policy and the practice of politics: the traditional, insider approach of the

“Old Guard;” the Zeirim’s “insider-outsider” hardline; and Gush Emunim’s categorical rejection

of any concessions through direct action. As I discuss below, these competing approaches to

politics went hand-in-hand with ideological and generational change in the NRP, as well as

religious Zionism more broadly.

1.D The Deterioration in Labor-NRP Relations

Gush Emunim’s direct action at Sebastia, on the heels of the PLO’s diplomatic

counteroffensive to the Sinai II Accords, successfully forced Rabin to depart from the Allon

Plan. Once again, an outside force created an impetus for a decision over the West Bank that

3 Drezon-Tepler, Interest Groups and Political Change in Israel (Albany: State U. of N.Y. Press), 1990, 182.

531

threatened the Labor-NRP alliance. Moreover, the Kaddum compromise perpetuated that

impetus for decision. Most Labor ministers viewed a permanent settlement at Kaddum as a

challenge to the government’s credibility (to say nothing of the governing party). In the NRP, meanwhile, the Zeirim established a new bloc – the Movement for National-Religious Renewal – that would force Burg and Raphael to quit the government if it evacuated Kaddum.

The cabinet’s May 1976 compromise decision to relocate settlers kept the coalition alive.

Tellingly, Hammer was a (reluctant) party to the accommodation, because it prevented a forced evacuation and because no area of the Land of Israel was declared “off-limits.” However, Gush

Emunim kept the confrontation alive by refusing the proposed alternatives. The best Labor and the NRP could do, then, was tacitly agree not to raise the issue. Indeed, the NRP did not formally demand that the government recognize Kaddum until December 1976.

1.D.1 Contingency and the Human Element in Labor-NRP Relations

The human, inter-personal element was also vital to managing disagreements between

Labor and the NRP. On the one hand, Rabin was attuned to power relations and the complications of coalition governance. Thus, Rabin accommodated the NRP by refusing to discuss West Bank concessions with Kissinger. Similarly, Rabin was responsive when Burg warned against bringing Kaddum before the cabinet in March 1976. However, when Rabin met the NRP Executive two months later, he failed to empathize with members of the Executive who genuinely feared for the legions of Bnei Akiva teenagers – their children and grandchildren – who would flock to Kaddum if the cabinet ordered its evacuation. A confrontation was avoided thanks to Raphael, who re-wrote the Executive’s draft resolution on Kaddum together with

Rabin, Burg, and Hammer.

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1.E The End of The Historic Alliance, The Burg-Raphael Entente, and “Step-by- Step” Diplomacy

At the same time, the human element ultimately played a central role in the Rabin

government’s downfall. In his capacity as minister of religion, Raphael took the alleged Sabbath

desecration involved in the F-15 arrival ceremony as a personal affront. Though Raphael

considered himself a “loyal friend” to Rabin,” his political survival depended on the prestige

(and patronage) of the Ministry of Religion. Inside the cabinet room, Raphael negotiated an

apology to allow the NRP (except the Zeirim) to vote confidence in the government. Later,

though, Raphael reneged on the agreement due to anger in religious circles over the incident.

With his prestige as minister of religion on the line, Raphael called for the NRP Knesset Faction

to abstain from the no-confidence vote.

With two of the NRP’s three minsters supporting abstention, the rest of the faction

(except Burg), followed suit. The Knesset faction’s abstention also reflected the interconnectedness between the Labor-NRP partnership, inter-factional competition in the NRP, and the peace process (insofar as the F-15 delivery was the fruit of an American-Israeli side agreement to the Sinai II Accords). Hammer, true to form, framed the delivery as a material gain

which caused spiritual harm. Burg, however, contextualized the incident in light of Labor-NRP accommodation over religion and state. The military’s logistical failure did not amount to a violation of the status quo by Labor and did not justify a gross violation of coalition discipline and ministerial responsibility. Raphael, whose political survival was threatened by the emerging power-sharing arrangement between Burg and the Zeirim, was quick to take up the mantle of

Defender of the Faith.

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Raphael, though, failed to anticipate that Labor might perceive the abstention as the latest in a series of parliamentary provocations by the NRP. Moreover, the NRP Executive added insult to injury the next day by demanding government recognition of Kaddum on its one-year anniversary. With Labor-NRP relations already strained by the Zeirim, and the government’s credibility undermined by Kaddum, Rabin faced pressure to assert his authority. Thus, Rabin decided to dismiss the NRP ministers and then resign, automatically creating a caretaker government from which the NRP was conspicuously excluded.

Rabin, for his part, failed to understand the emotional resonance of Sabbath desecration for religious Jews. Consequently, he did not anticipate the consequences of his “brilliant maneuver” within the NRP. Burg was made to look the fool for splitting with the NRP faction to vote confidence in the government. Raphael’s dismissal from the Ministry of Religion further weakened his position, leading members of his own faction to collude with the Zeirim to oust

Raphael rather than move him to a lower spot on the NRP Knesset list. Raphael retired from public life, and Likud U’Temurah was significantly weakened. With pro-Labor elements undermined by Rabin’s gambit, the NRP’s 1977 platform stressed that the party was independent of any party or bloc – effectively disavowing the Historic Alliance.

Rabin, meanwhile, led a caretaker government unconstrained by the Judea and Samaria proviso. Moreover, Rabin left his mark on Labor’s 1977 platform, which expressed “Israel’s readiness for territorial compromise with [Egypt, Jordan, and Syria].”4 The platform also stressed the government’s acceptance of Kissinger’s end-of-war initiative and its readiness to

4 “Peace and Security- Section A. Main Objectives,” Election Platform of the Alignment (1977); Political Resolutions of the Labour Party National Convention- 24.2.1977 (Translation), 2, ISA, A/114/6.

534

press forward with negotiations to end the state-of-war on all fronts.5 Upon arriving in

Washington, however, Rabin discovered that President Carter flatly rejected Kissingerian

incrementalism in favor of a comprehensive peace. Furthermore, Carter did not share Labor’s

preference for the Jordanian option, and favored an independent Palestinian entity. While Rabin

and the Alignment were prepared for territorial compromise in the West Bank, a separate

Palestinian polity and a withdrawal to the 1967 lines were non-starters. Ultimately, though,

Rabin resigned after a minor financial scandal, elevating Peres to the top of Labor’s ticket in time to suffer a historic electoral defeat at the hands of Likud.

2. Analysis In the summary above, I elucidate the manner in which the Labor-NRP alliance served as

a conduit for inter-factional competition in the NRP to impact the peace process. The Labor-NRP

alliance led Rabin to divert the peace process away from the Jordanian track in 1974 and

constrained the government’s response to the 1976 end-of-war initiative until “step-by-step” diplomacy went out of fashion in Washington. I also discuss the differences between the Zeirim and the Old Guard and the Zeirim’s growing influence over NRP policy as a destabilizing element in NRP-Labor relations. After elucidating these inter-causal relationships, I now turn to a brief analysis of this study’s contribution to our understanding of the development of religious

Zionism. First, I discuss the differences between Gush Emunim and the Zeirim. I then examine the Old Guard’s inability to maintain the control enjoyed by Haim Moshe Shapira over religious

Zionism’s operational foreign policy. Finally, I scrutinize the views of Burg and Warhaftig on

territorial concessions and the legitimacy of religious considerations in policymaking.

5 “Peace and Security- Section C: Political Accomplishments- A Basis for Progress,” Election Platform of the Alignment (1977); Political Resolutions of the Labour Party National Convention- 24.2.1977 (Translation), 5, ISA, A/114/6.

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2.A Processes of Change in Religious Zionism and the NRP

Although inter-factional competition in the NRP did not always reflect ideological and

policy disagreements, the Zeirim and the “Old Guard” adopted fundamentally different practices

of politics. Moreover, competition between these approaches was connected to larger processes

of change within the NRP and religious Zionism in general. In assessing the connections

between the peace process and these changes between 1974–1977, it is necessary to distinguish

between the direct and indirect impact of ideas on behavior.

The Zeirim and Gush Emunim: Differences and Similarities

Inbari, as well as Hellinger, Hershkowitz, and Susser convincingly demonstrate that

1974–1977 was a theo-politically transformative period for R. Zvi Yehudah Kook and his

disciples.1 However, that transformation did not extend to most of religious Zionism’s elected leadership. To be sure, R. Zvi Yehudah’s influence on the NRP grew along with that of Gush

Emunim and the Zeirim. R. Zvi Yehudah helped move thousands of young people to rally against Kissinger, and his influence could also move the faithful to the polls. Thus, R. Zvi

Yehudah enjoyed a large degree of influence, prestige, and respect among NRP activists and leaders. However, this did not mean that NRP officials saw R. Zvi Yehudah’s public pronouncements and theological arguments as persuasive. While this was particularly true of

Warhaftig and Burg, as I discuss below, the Zeirim, themselves, did not always heed R. Zvi

Yehudah’s instructions.

While Gush Emunim arose, in part, from the NRP Zeirim, the two groups were

fundamentally different entities with distinct purposes and agendas. Unlike Gush Emunim, the

1 Motti Inbari, Messianic Religious Zionism Confronts Israeli Territorial Compromises (Cambridge University Press, 2012); Moshe Hellinger, Isaac Hershkowitz, and Bernard Susser, Religious Zionism and the Settlement Project: Ideology, Politics, and Civil Disobedience (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2018).

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Zeirim were not a one-issue movement. Their goals included a return to traditional values, the

expansion of the NRP’s involvement in all areas of governance, and the establishment of a

prominent role for religious Zionists in Israeli society, commerce, and civic life.

The Zeirim’s broad agenda shaped their practice of politics. They (mostly) accepted the

norms of political conduct and operated within the framework of partisan, parliamentary, and

governmental institutions. The Zeirim often perceived (or created) linkage between different

issues of concern to their faction and expressed ambitions in terms of religious principles. In

1974, those ambitions and principles led the Zeirim to champion rabbinic authority in coalition

politics, with staunch backing from R. Zvi Yehudah and the emergent Gush Emunim. In 1975,

the Zeirim responded to the American “reassessment” by conducting “national-religious public

diplomacy” that emphasized the principle of Israel’s religious and historic right to the land.

Similarly, the Zeirim treated the American pressure campaign as a spiritual test, in which

geopolitical outcomes would be determined by the moral integrity and resilience of the public

and its leaders.

To be sure, the Zeirim gained considerable political power from the growing influence of

Gush Emunim, Rav Zvi Yehudah, and circles connected to Merkaz HaRav (hereinafter,

“Merkazniks”). However, that same influence was also brought to bear on the Zeirim. Tellingly,

Gush Emunim and Rav Zvi Yehudah were not content with the Zeirim representing their

interests in the 1977 elections, even though the Zeirim’s “Movement for National-Religious

Renewal” included Gush Emunim activists and Merkazniks. The price for Rav Zvi Yehudah’s endorsement was the second position on the NRP slate, which went to R. Haim Druckman, bumping Hammer down to third.2 After the election, R. Zvi Yehudah demanded that Druckman

2 Vermus, 116-117.

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be appointed minister of education in place of Hammer. The Zeirim flatly refused, demonstrating the limits of R. Zvi Yehudah’s authority and the potential for conflicts between his agenda and the Zeirim’s interests. The Zeirim clarified that Rav Druckman was placed second on the NRP list out of respect, but he was not senior to Hammer – a faction leader who rose through the party

ranks.3

Challenges of Leadership and Challenges to Leadership: The “Old Guard” Versus The Zeirim and Gush Emunim

The Zeirim’s practice of politics competed with the modus operandi and objectives of the

Old Guard, which prioritized state-building and maintenance – especially the maintenance of religious institutions and arrangements over religion and state. The party’s veteran leadership was willing to cede territory, if necessary, for the sake of stability, American backing, and the prospect of peace. To this end, they sought accommodation with Labor, supported Sinai II, and accepted Kissinger’s 1976 end-of-war initiative. Moreover, the Old Guard took an oligarchical approach to affairs of state, in stark contrast to the Zeirim. Insofar as the Zeirim’s challenge to the Old Guard reflected processes of change within religious Zionism, it is necessary to assess how – and why – the Old Guard failed to prevent these changes.

In his study of religious-Zionist foreign policy until 1970, Don-Yehiya distinguishes between operational foreign policy carried out by religious-Zionist elites and popular attitudes.4

He finds that the leadership of Haim Moshe Shapira was decisive in preventing elements in favor

of “activist” means and “maximalist” territorial objectives from impacting the NRP’s operational

3 Vermus, 118-119; Ha-Tsofeh (June 19, 1977), 1; “Turmoil in the NRP over Rav Kook's Support of Druckman Against Hammer,” Ma’ariv (June 17, 1977), 1; “Agitation in the NRP Ahead of the Selection of its Ministers Today,” Davar (June 19, 1977), 1; “Rav Druckman Announces that He is not a Candidate for the Post of Minister of Education,” Ma’ariv (June 19, 1977), 1-2. 4 Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Religious Zionism Under The Leadership of Chaim Moshe Shapira and The Struggle for The Land of Israel. 1936-1970 (Sde Boker: Ben Gurion Research Inst. And Ben Gurion U. of the Negev: 2019). [Heb.]

538

foreign policy. The failure of Shapira’s successors (mainly Burg) to insulate operative policy

from religious-Zionist hardliners, then, is seen as a failure of leadership.

I find that Don-Yehiya’s analysis is correct, to a point. Burg and Raphael’s failure to

preserve the entente that gave them control over NRP institutions was, indeed, a failure of

leadership in the most literal sense. The Zeirim exploited Burg and Raphael’s inter-factional and

personal rivalries to increase their influence, and, by extension, the influence of their activist, maximalist line on foreign policy. In addition, the Zeirim convinced LaMifneh’s supporters in

Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Dati and the Moshavim to push the faction to dissolve the entente with Raphael,

who was tainted by association with a past financial scandal. These factors led Burg and

LaMifneh to break with Raphael in favor of the Zeirim, who had already coopted Warhaftig.

Consequently, the Zeirim and their allies in Gush Emunim gained power and influence, at the

Old Guard’s expense.

Don-Yehiya’s assessment of Shapira’s successors, however, does not give adequate weight to the particular circumstances of the post-Yom Kippur War environment. Gush

Emunim’s response to Kissinger’s diplomacy through direct action ended the NRP’s monopoly over operational, religious-Zionist foreign policy. Therefore, the NRP elite – especially its cabinet ministers – were unable to insulate operative policymaking from the influence of maximalists among the party faithful. Shapira was able to contain the Zeirim’s territorial maximalism because the Zeirim (mostly) played by the rules of the NRP’s factional/electoral game. Unlike Shapira, Burg (as well as Raphael and Warhaftig) confronted a mass movement

which operated outside the NRP framework and rejected the rules of the game. Gush Emunim

was willing to confront the American secretary of state, picket Burg’s home, and take direct

action against the cabinet’s authority over the disposition of the territories. Thus, Gush Emunim

539 upended the normative and institutional frameworks that enabled the NRP elite’s monopoly over operational foreign policy under Shapira.

2.B NRP Views on Land-for-Peace: An Issue of Religion and Statecraft?

The rivalry between the Zeirim and the Old Guard predated the capture of the territories in 1967. However, the post-1967 territorial debate quickly became central to the ideological and generational clash between the NRP’s insurgent youth faction and its veteran leadership. This clash reflected fundamental differences between the Zeirim and the Old Guard regarding the appropriateness of applying religious principles to the practice of politics. These differences, in turn, translated into conflicting positions on territorial concessions.

The Debate over the “Means” and “Ends” of Zionism

Having discussed the Zeirim’s position, I now turn to the Old Guard, particularly Burg and Warhaftig. In order to scrutinize Burg and Warhaftig’s views on territorial compromise, it is necessary to clarify the nature of the territorial issue between 1974–1977. In his study of religious-Zionist foreign policy under Shapira, Don-Yehiya finds that the Israeli discourse regarding the conflict included debates over both the purpose of Zionism and the means for achieving that purpose.5 In this study, I find that these debates continued between 1974–1977, both within the NRP and in Israeli society more broadly.

The debate over the purpose of Zionism, and the means to achieve it, was particularly prominent following the UN denunciation of Zionism as racism, which I discuss in chapter 5.

Rabin and Gush Emunim responded to this diplomatic setback by putting forward two competing visions of Zionism. Rabin employed internationalist means, convening a global summit of

5 Don-Yehiya, Religious Zionism under Shapira, 448-449, 452-453.

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Jewish-communal leaders and seeking consensus over Aliyah, Jewish education in the Diaspora, development of the state, and limited settlement under the cabinet’s control. These means, in turn, were aimed at fulfilling Zionist aspirations in a part of Eretz Yisrael, thereby making it possible to trade land for peace and improve relations with Israel’s Arab neighbors.

Gush Emunim, in contrast, took direct action that violated cabinet directives and military orders, while threatening active resistance. This variation of pre-state “tower-and-stockade” settlement was proffered as the means for the realization of Zionism in the entire homeland, as well as a panacea for Israel’s conflict with the Arabs: by settling in densely populated areas of the West Bank, Gush Emunim would prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state, which

Gush Emunim considered a mortal threat.

During his May 1976 encounter with the NRP Executive, Rabin again stressed the imperative to limit the realization of Zionism to part of the homeland. Moreover, he rejected

Gush Emunim’s methods as undemocratic and bourgeois, and, by extension, inherently un-

Zionist. In a private conversation the next day, Rabin went further, rejecting settlement as an instrument of national security and foreign policy. Ultimately, international accords, based on the relative power between states, would determine Israel’s boundaries, not settlement. Moreover, the security argument for settlements was, in Rabin’s professional opinion, “bullshit.”

The Dilemmas of the Post-1973 Reality

While the discourse surrounding the peace process included perennial debates over the means and ends of Zionism, these debates were also accompanied by new dilemmas that arose out of Kissinger’s diplomacy. Within the NRP, these debates also raised questions over the applicability of religious principles, imperatives, and ideas to modern statecraft.

541

“Reassessment” drove home Israel’s diplomatic, economic, and military dependence on

the United States, as well as the potential costs and benefits of that bilateral relationship.

International recognition of the PLO, and its prestige among West Bank Palestinians, forced

Israelis to confront growing Western recognition of Palestinian nationalism. At the same time,

Gush Emunim’s settlement bids in Samaria focused attention on the utility of settlement as an instrument of foreign policy.

The post-1973 peace process also raised new questions about what “peace” would entail, the strategy to best achieve that peace, and the territorial parameters of a possible settlement.

Some, such as Eban, favored a proactive, comprehensive approach to peace. They called for

Israel to take the initiative by proposing its vision of an agreement to resolve the entire Middle

East conflict, based on an Israeli withdrawal from the vast majority of the West Bank. Others, such as Rabin and Allon, envisioned interim, bilateral agreements between Israel and its neighbors. Those who supported this incremental approach were prepared for “far-reaching territorial compromise,” which, in the West Bank, meant ceding heavily populated areas to

Jordan. While some, like Allon, were proactive, others were more cautious. “Functional compromise” offered an alternative for those who rejected “territorial compromise.” They envisioned a sharing of authority and responsibility for the West Bank and its population, with

Israel retaining the territory. The pure, maximalist position – “not an inch”– rejected any compromise.

Peacemaking and Religious Principles

For religious Zionists, the discourse surrounding the peace process included an additional question: What role should religious principles, imperatives, and ideas play in Israeli policy toward the peace process? As discussed above, the Zeirim’s political praxis expressed ambition

542 through religious principles, and the Zeirim’s central principle during this period was the

“Wholeness of the Land of Israel.” Similarly, a small minority of the NRP, such as Melamed,

Unna, and the Circle for a Moderate Religious Zionism – Oz VeShalom, favored the

“comprehensive” approach, which would involve withdrawing from the vast majority of the

West Bank, except for Jerusalem and Gush Etzion. Like the Zeirim, their position was also based on religious principles: the value of peace, the sanctity of human life, and an imperative to avoid war.6

Members of the NRP Old Guard adopted more nuanced positions. Raphael went through a process of re-considering his views during his first (and last) term as a cabinet minister.7

During the negotiations over the Sinai II Accord, Raphael justified his support for the agreement by arguing that it was NRP policy to treat Sinai differently than the West Bank. In contrast to

Raphael, Burg and Warhaftig’s views developed over lengthy stints in the cabinet and therefore demand additional scrutiny.

Burg and Warhaftig had much in common. Both were prepared to accept territorial compromise in the West Bank in the mid-1970s, and both chose to cooperate with the Zeirim despite disagreements over policy and politics. Moreover, Burg and Warhaftig were both troubled by the radicalizing influence of R. Zvi Yehudah. However, the two “Old Guard” leaders had different attitudes toward the Zeirim, R. Zvi Yehudah, and the place of religious principles in conducting affairs of state.

During his tenure as minister of religion, Warhaftig partnered with R. Zvi Yehudah in developing the Merkaz HaRav yeshiva. He “admired” the rabbi as a “spiritual father” of

6 See, Chapter 3. 7 Burg Oral History 6, (August 19, 1976) 10-11, in Yosef Burg- Interviews 1-6 (29.12.1975- 30.9.1976), Leonard Davis Institute: Interviews with Individuals, Israel State Archive, A/7780/9.

543 religious Zionism, and cherished their “great friendship.”8 However, Warhaftig believed that R.

Zvi Yehudah saw only the “vision” of the Land of Israel, but not the “reality” of the Land.9 As an academic and traditional scholar of Jewish law and lore, Warhaftig tried, and failed, to persuade R. Zvi Yehudah to soften his opposition to territorial compromise.

Warhaftig argued that the religious and historical title to the Land “obligate[d] [Israel] to aspire for Judea and Samaria remaining in our hands.”10 Settling the Land of Israel was also one of the 613 biblical commandments.11 However, it was well-established in Halakha that safeguarding human life – or, pikuah nefesh – superseded nearly all of the commandments. In a novel way, Warhaftig applied this principle of pikuah nefesh to the state, holding that “with pikuah nefesh of the state and its security, there is a need to be flexible.”12 Therefore,

Warhaftig’s prioritized the “existence of the state and its security” over the location of its borders.13 Of course, he expected the government to drive a hard bargain for peace by

“struggle[ing] over every inch” at the negotiating table.14 Although Warhaftig refused to “draw maps” while in office,15 he later wrote that “he would have been in favor of far-reaching

8 Warhaftig, Fifty Years, From Year to Year (Jerusalem, Yad Shapira: 1988), 249. [Hebrew] 9 Warhaftig drew an analogy with the biblical account of Moses and Joshua. Moses received a vision of the entire Land of Israel from the summit of a mountain, but never set foot in the Land. While Joshua, who actually walked the Land, was constrained by reality and only conquered part of it. R. Zvi Yehudah saw the Land through the eyes of “Moses,” but lacked Joshua’s ability to understand the reality on the ground. Deut. 3:27; Deut. 24:1; Joshua 13:1; Sifrei Ba-Midbar 136:1; Warhaftig, 247; Ma’ariv (March 26, 1971), 21. 10Warhaftig, 247; Ma’ariv (March 26, 1971), 21. 11 Warhaftig, 293. 12 Ma’ariv (March 26, 1971), 21. Warhaftig derives the concept of “Pikuah Nefesh of the State” from an arcane point of law found in the Minhat Hinukh, authored by the 19th Century Galician scholar Rabbi Yosef Babad. The Minhat Hinukh holds that the Biblical commandment to raze an idolatrous Israelite city does not apply along the border of the Land of Israel. The destruction of a border city, he argues, would weaken the country’s defences against invasion. Therefore, the commandment is superseded by the imperative of “safeguarding the life of all of Israel.” Warhaftig understands “all of Israel” in terms of nationalism and the international, state system, and applies it to the general practice of statecraft. See, Minhat Hinukh to Sefer Ha-Hinukh 464:1; Warhaftig, 250; Benjamin Brown, “Babad, Yosef,” YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe, https://yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Babad_Yosef (accessed August 4, 2020); Warhaftig 250. 13 Ma’ariv (March 26, 1971), 21. 14 Warhaftig, 248. 15 Ma’ariv (March 26, 1971), 21.

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compromise agreements in the [West Bank] territories except for Jerusalem [and the Etzion

settlement bloc].”16

Warhaftig’s approach to “land for peace” was of a kind with his lifelong efforts to

operationalize and apply Jewish law to the governance of a modern state. Rather than posit a

fixed binary between politics and religion, Warhaftig understood traditional Judaism to

incorporate the pragmatic, political considerations inherent in statecraft. Burg, in contrast, was

more reluctant to base governance and statecraft on religious principles. This reluctance

stemmed from Burg’s realist, balance-of-power approach to international relations, as well as his understanding of Halakha and Jewish tradition.

Unlike Warhaftig, Burg intuitively posited what Shakman Hurd terms a “secular/religious binary.”17 He strove to be “pragmatic” and “independent”18 in his practice of realpolitik,

identifying as “neither a dove nor a hawk,” but as “a realist according to [his] worldview.19 That

worldview demanded both caution and decision. While statecraft necessitated swift decisions,

there was “no greater sin than being hasty.”20 The “statesman,” then, was “obligated” to

“constantly” assess the situation, identify any changes, and be prepared to make “instant”

decisions. Conceptually, then, statecraft was an ongoing exercise in balancing the “constant” and

the “instant.”21

16 In the 1990’s, Warhaftig also recognized “the rights of God’s creations [i.e. the Palestinians] acquired through hard work and great efforts over hundreds of years.” Warhaftig, 242. 17 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “A Suspension of (Dis)Belief: The Secular-Religious Binary and the Study of International Relations,” in. Calhoun et al, eds. Rethinking Secularism, (New York: Oxford U. Press, 2011) 166-184, 170. Burg believed that the NRP, “especially as a national-religious party, [could] be normal, because [it was] not fixed or prejudiced” on foreign affairs. However, he admitted in 1975 that a majority of the NRP did not identify with his centrist approach, and that the party was “very divided.” 17 Burg Oral History 1, (Dec. 29, 1975) 10, ISA, A/7780/9. 18 Burg Oral History 5 (Aug. 19, 1976) 8 ISA, A/7780/9. 19 Burg Oral History 1 (Dec. 29, 1975) 2, ISA, A/7780/9. 20 Burg Oral History 3 (Jan. 19, 1976) 8, ISA, A/7780/9. 21 Burg Oral History 123 (Jan. 19, 1997) 2, in N. 468 – Dr. Burg- Meeting 123, Burg Papers [Uncatalogued]; See, also, Burg Oral History 1 (Dec. 29, 1976) 3, ISA A/7780/9.

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This centrist, situational approach did not translate into “concessionism,” but a rigorous,

clear-headed assessment of reality (from Burg’s perspective).22 In the mid-1970s, Burg’s motto

for territorial compromise was “a little bit, slowly.” On the one hand, Burg tried to justify his

position on territory in purely strategic terms: retaining the Etzion bloc was necessary to “defend

Jerusalem,” and retaining Hebron was necessary to create lines of transport and communication

between the Etzion settlement bloc and Beersheba in the Negev. At the same time, Burg saw the

need for concessions in Samaria, due to its large Palestinian population. Indeed, Burg saw the

demographic implications of incorporating Samaria into the State of Israel as a “sort of pikuah

nefesh.” 23

Burg, too, felt bound by religious principles, as well as “humanistic” considerations, in

his practice of politics. 24 In 1937, Burg voted against accepting the Peel Commission’s partition

plan out of “tactical” considerations, and because he “[did not] have the right to concede on

Eretz Yisrael,” particularly as part of “an experiment of some kind.” By the mid-1970s, Burg had

come to rethink his position, favoring various formulations “of dominion and condominium” to

avoid the “problem of [a] principled concession.”25

In some instances, Burg was guided by personal sentiments, both religious and otherwise.

Tellingly, Burg described his attachment to Hebron and other biblical locales as “spiritual

baggage,” implying an irrational, emotional concern that deviated from the proper, realist

practice of statecraft. As a religious Jew, Burg did not experience the Bible as a collection of

mythology from the distant past, but as “another dimension” of his lived experience in the

22 Burg Oral History 1 (Dec. 29, 1975) 10, ISA, A/7780/9. 23 Burg Oral History 6 (Sep. 30, 1976) 5-6, ISA, A/7780/9. 24 Burg Oral History 123 (Jan. 19, 1997) 1, File 468, Burg Papers. 25 Burg Oral History 3 (Jan. 19, 1976) 1, ISA, A/7780/9. When Burg came out publicly for territorial compromise in 1997, he continued to insist that “this does not need to be called partitioning the Land,” in order to avoid violating religious principles. Burg Oral History 123 (Jan.19, 1997) 1; “Joseph Burg: 'In 1937 I Voted Against the Partition Plan. I've Changed My Mind,” Ha'aretz (Jan. 19, 1977), 1-2.

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present. Therefore, Hebron resonated with meaning, evoking Abraham’s grief as he purchased a

grave for his wife, Sarah. In the same breath, Burg recalled the 1948 “trauma” of Gush Etzion,

and his childhood memories of rushing to pick up the evening paper for news of the 1929

“disturbances” in Hebron, which created “a sort of special sympathy” for settlement in those

areas.26

In addition to a commitment to a realist political praxis, Burg’s theological views

contributed to his ambivalence about the relationship between religion and statecraft. Burg,

himself, was ordained as a rabbi after intensive study and examinations on the Shulkhan Arukh –

the Code of Jewish Law. At no time in his rabbinic exams was Burg asked about “Karl Marx,”

“the French revolution,” or “the difference between the American, British, and Continental

electoral systems.” While one could find laws pertaining to governance in Maimonides’s “Laws

of Kings and Their Wars,” Burg found those laws “most interesting” but “not at all applicable

today.” Hence, these laws were omitted from the Shulkhan Arukh. “Therefore, in [Burg’s]

opinion, the authority [of the rabbinate and Halakha] does not exist on political questions.”27

Like other religious Zionists, Burg ascribed (limited) messianic significance to the State

of Israel. Indeed, this was a “quintessential ideological-conceptual issue” for him. Burg distinguished between messianism as a “programmatic” idea as opposed to an “operative” imperative meant to guide “each and every [political] move.”28 Burg saw the State of Israel as

26 Burg Oral History 6 (Sep. 30, 1976) 6, ISA, A/7780/9; For Burg’s personal, family ties to Hebron see, Burg Oral History 123 (Jan.19, 1997) 1. 27 Burg Oral History 28 (Nov. 16, 1989) 14, File N.13, Burg Papers. 28 Burg Oral History 1 (Dec. 29, 1975) 7, ISA, A7780/9.

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only the “first flowering of [the] Redemption,” while R. Zvi Yehudah believed it was “the real

beginning” of the messianic process.29

Thus, Burg’s theological grievance against R. Zvi Yehudah Kook was that he brought the

“mystical” element “into operative, practical considerations.”30 Through Yeshivat Merkaz

HaRav, R. Zvi Yehudah effected a change in religious Zionism by spreading the teachings of his

father, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook. Burg was familiar with Rav Kook’s teachings and believed

that they were being dangerously misapplied.31 Rav Kook lived in “another era,” in which “there

[was] no State of Israel.” When R. Kook wrote about “Israel,” he did not have in mind a

terrestrial “state that has dozens of [hostile] Arab states surrounding it.”32

Rav Zvi Yehudah’s failure to make this distinction demonstrated that “the translation of

metaphysical concepts into political standing-orders distorts [their meaning] and is dangerous.”33

Burg experienced that danger firsthand during the anti-Kissinger protests of August 1975. In his

view, the politicization of the “holiness of the wholeness of the Land of Israel” led “bochurim

[yeshiva students] from Merkaz Harav to sit down in front of Kissinger’s car,” and Burg,

himself, was “intimidated” and threatened. It was disconcerting that religious Jews would “make

holes in [Burg’s] tires” in the name of “holiness.”34

Burg’s main political grievance, though, was directed toward the Zeirim and Gush

Emunim. At times, Burg expressed respect for the “good ones”35 among the Zeirim, that is, those who truly believed in Rav Zvi Yehudah’s message. Burg was also sympathetic toward the

29 Burg Oral History 6 (Sep. 30, 1976) 8, ISA, A/7780/9. 30 Burg Oral History 1 (Dec. 29, 1975) 7, ISA, A7780/9. 31 Burg Oral History 28, (Nov. 16, 1989) 10, File N.13, Burg Papers; Burg Oral History 35, (April 4, 1990) 14, ISA, A/7781/2. 32 Burg Oral History 28 (Nov. 16, 1989) 10, N.13, Burg Papers. 33 Burg Oral History 35 (April 4, 1990) 14, ISA, A/7781/2. 34 Burg Oral History 28 (Nov. 16, 1989) 10-11, N13.Burg Papers. 35 Burg Oral History 6 (Sep. 30, 1976) 8, ISA, A/7780/9.

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idealistic youngsters who were drawn to Gush Emunim.36 However, Burg saw the “politicians”

among the Zeirim as Gush Emunim’s partners in “tumult” and “fury,” who “worked to destroy

the traditional ideology and the character of Mizrahi and Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi.”37 Whether these

“politicians’” acted “for the sake of Heaven” in the mid-1970’s was something “only God” could know.38

While Warhaftig and Burg took similar approaches to foreign policy, settlements, and

security, the two were also very different. Warhaftig was a jurist and Talmudist who served as

minister of religion. He did not shy away from engaging in halakhic discourse with rabbinic

personalities as part of his practice of politics. Knowing that the rabbinic world was split over

land-for-peace, Warhaftig acted based on his own interpretation of tradition, which reflected his

lifelong project to apply religious precepts and principles to the governance of a modern,

democratic state. Warhaftig’s study of applied Talmud and Halakha was an inherently pragmatic

enterprise and translated into moderate, and at times contradictory, political positions.

Like Warhaftig, Burg was a learned, observant Jew. However, Burg based his practice of politics on a relatively stable secular/religious binary that generally separated Halakha from international relations. Burg’s separation of religion and statecraft reflected his realist (and cautious) approach to international relations. At the same time, this separation was also informed by Burg’s interpretation of Jewish law and lore. In Burg’s view, the excesses of the Zeirim, Gush

Emunim, and Rav Zvi Yehudah’s disciples were caused by the distortion inherent in the politicization of metaphysical, religious ideas.

36 Burg Oral History 40 (July 30, 1990) 19, ISA, A/7781/2. 37 Burg Oral History 28 (Nov. 16, 1989) 12, N13, Burg Papers. 38 Burg Oral History 6 (Sep. 30, 1976) 8, ISA, A/7780/9; Burg Oral History 40, (July 30, 1990) 18, ISA, A/7781/2.

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In addition to fundamentally different conceptions of religion and statecraft, Burg and

Warhaftig’s attitudes toward Rav Zvi Yehudah, Gush Emunim, the Zeirim, and the processes of

change they represented were also influenced by personal relationships, partisan interests, and

power struggles. Burg’s experience as the target of hostility, if not violence, certainly impacted

his views. In addition, while the Zeirim ultimately hoped to overthrow Burg, they were less

vigorous in challenging Warhaftig; he led the smallest of the NRP’s “major” factions and

eventually merged with the Zeirim to remain politically relevant. Moreover, Warhaftig had a

rapport with Rav Zvi Yehudah, as well as a son – Itamar – involved with Gush Emunim. These

associations likely influenced Warhaftig’s view that extremist tendencies among the Zeirim and

Gush Emunim were the product of inter-generational tensions and not an inherent theological flaw.39 Thus, Warhaftig believed that he could guide the Zeirim toward moderation and tried to

engage with R. Zvi Yehudah

3. Avenues for Further Research

The findings of this study suggest several promising avenues for additional research.

Don-Yehiya’s study of religious-Zionist foreign policy until 1970 begins to fill a lacuna in the

historiography of the NRP’s involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace process. By expanding the

temporal scope of my historical reconstruction, it is possible to continue filling this gap. First, it

is necessary to investigate the period between Shapira’s death in 1970 and the 1973 Yom Kippur

War. An examination of NRP factionalism and the Historic Alliance during this period, in the

absence of an active, viable peace process, would provide a baseline for assessing the impact of

Kissinger’s diplomacy on the NRP’s inter-factional dynamics and its partnership with Labor. In

addition, examining this period would shed light on key events such as the beginning of the

39 Warahftig, 249.

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Burg-Raphael entente and the 1972 NRP convention, when the Zeirim inserted hardline planks

into the party platform.

Similarly, it is necessary to broaden the temporal scope of my historical reconstruction to

include the post-1977 period. Kampinsky sheds additional light on the NRP in the Begin

government, arguing that the NRP’s prominence in the Likud-led cabinet led Zevulun Hammer

and the NRP to moderate their policy views.1 This claim begs a comparison between the NRP’s

status in the Begin government and its status in Labor-led coalitions. Such a comparison is

necessary in order to assess whether the NRP enjoyed greater influence under Begin, and, if so,

the manner in which the NRP’s new role led Hammer to moderate his views.

Broadening the temporal scope of this study beyond 1977 is also necessary to continue

the investigation of the inter-causal relationships between the NRP’s inter-factional competition,

its coalition partnerships, and Arab–Israeli diplomacy in the context of significant developments

in both the NRP and the peace process. Within the NRP, the Zeirim continued to gain ground,

with Daniel Vermus replaced LaMifneh’s Zvi Bernstein as NRP secretary-general in 1978. On the diplomatic front, it is necessary to examine the NRP’s participation in Sadat’s 1977 visit to

Jerusalem, the 1978 debate over the Camp David accords, and the 1979 Israeli–Egyptian peace

treaty. It is particularly important to scrutinize NRP attitudes toward the West Bank autonomy

negotiations subsequent to the 1979 treaty in light of Burg’s appointment as the lead Israeli

negotiator.

In addition to expanding the temporal scope of this historical reconstruction, it is also

necessary to more thoroughly investigate the rabbinic world and the development of the religious

1 Aharon Kampinsky, “The impact of political upheaval on a party's ideational position: the NRP and the 1977 upheaval,” Israel Affairs 24:6 (2018), 958-975, especially 962. See, also, Kampinsky, “Minister Zevulun Hammer's Ambivalent Attitude to the Peace Process with Egypt,” Iyunim 33 (Ben Gurion U. of the Negev, 2020) 40-63 [Heb.].

551

ideas that shaped day-to-day religious-political practice. In this study, I focus on praxis in order

to demonstrate the “kinetic energy” of religious principles and imperatives as they left the realm

of ideas and penetrate the political and diplomatic arenas. Moreover, reconstructing events in the

partisan, parliamentary, and governmental arenas illustrates how religious ideas helped shape –

and were shaped by – governmental institutions, personalities, and power relations.

However, this methodological approach is also limited in its ability to uncover the

organic, intellectual genesis and development of ideas. Thus, my historical study of religious-

political practice invites a complementary investigation of rabbinic circles and other religious-

Zionist intellectuals who involved themselves peace process. There is a particularly acute need

for additional scholarship focused on those who found themselves in the centrist, and even,

“dovish,” minority within religious Zionism. By examining responsa, halakhic rulings, rabbinic

periodicals, and other religious texts, we can better illuminate the evolution of the religious ideas

that helped shape – and were shaped by – the NRP’s practice of politics. Moreover, further scrutiny of rabbinic involvement in the peace process would also illuminate how ideas, people, and processes migrate from “religious” spaces to “political” spaces, and vice-versa.

552

Selected Bibliography

1. Primary Sources

Memoirs:

Ben-Natan, Raphael. In One Movement: Memories, Musings, and Divrei Torah [Words of Torah]. Tel Aviv: Moreshet. 1991. [Hebrew]

Burg, Yosef. Peraḳim Me-oṭobiyografyah. [Chapters from an Autobiography] Jerualem: Yad Shapira, 2000.[Hebrew]

Eban, Abba. Personal Witness: Israel Through My Eyes. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1992.

Ford, Gerald R. A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford. 1st ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1979.

Goren, Shlomo, and Rath, Avi. Be-ʻoz ṿe-taʻatsumot : Oṭobiyografyah. Tel-Aviv: Yediʻot Aḥaronot: Sifre ḥemed, 2013. [Hebrew]

Kissinger, Henry. Years of Renewal. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1999.

Meir, Golda. My Life [Ḥayai]. Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Maʻariv, 1975. [Hebrew]

Peres, Shimon, and Landau, David. Battling for Peace: A Memoir. 1st ed. New York: Random House, 1995.

Rabin, Yitzhak. The Rabin Memoirs. Yoram Peri ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.

Rabin, Yitzhak and Dov Goldstein. Pinkas SHerut (II). Tel Aviv: Ma’ariv, 1979. [Hebrew]

Raphael, Yitzhak. Lo Zakhiti Ba-or Min Ha-hefḳer. [Not Easily Came the Light]. Jerusalem, Israel: Sifre Yediot Aḥaronot and Edanim, 1981. [Hebrew]

Shafat, Gershon. Gush Emunim- the Story Behind the Scenes. Beit El: Beit El Library Press. 1996. [Hebrew]

Vermus, Daniel. The Knitted Revolution: How the Zeirei HaMaFDaL Captured the Party Leadership. Published Privately, 2016. [Hebrew]

Warhaftig, Zorach. Ḥamishim Shanah ṿe-shanah: Pirḳe Zikhronot [Fifty Years, From Year to Year (Memories)]. Jerusalem: Yad Shapira, 1998. [Hebrew]

553

Periodicals:

Davar [Hebrew] Ha’aretz [Hebrew] Ha-Pardes. New York: Union of Orthodox Rabbis. [Hebrew] Ha-Tsofeh [Hebrew] Ma’ariv [Hebrew] Yediot Aharonot [Hebrew] The Jerusalem Post JTA Daily News Bulletin. New York: Jewish Telegraphic Agency. Morasha. Jerusalem: NRP Young Guard. [Hebrew] The New York Times The Chicago Tribune The Lost Angeles Times Tehumim. Alon Shvut, Israel: Tzomet Institute. [Hebrew] Torah SheBa’al Peh. Jerusalem: Mossad HaRav Kook. [Hebrew] Eretz Nahala. Jerusalem: Merkaz Olami, The Young Guard of Mizrahi and Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi. [Hebrew] Shana B’Shana. Jerusalem: Heichal Shlomo. [Hebrew]

Collections of Primary Sources:

Central Foreign Policy Files. 1973-79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State. National Archives [accessed October 24, 2019].

Daniel Vermus Papers [Digitized] on C.D. ROM Disk (Copy in possession of the author).

Divrei Knesset [Knesset Records]. Knesset Archive. The Knesset. Jerusalem, Israel. https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/plenum/Pages/Sessions.aspx [Accessed Aug. 13, 2020]. [Hebrew]

Howard, Adam M. (ed.). Foreign Relations of the United States. 1969–1976. Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. 2011.

554

The Kissinger Conversations, Supplement: A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969-1977. Digital National Security Archive. ProQuest. [Accessed Aug. 13, 2020]

The Kissinger Conversations, Supplement II: A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969- 1977. Digital National Security Archive. ProQuest. [Accessed Aug. 13, 2020]

The Kissinger Telephone Conversations: A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969-1977. Digital National Security Archive. ProQuest. [Accessed Aug. 13, 2020]

The Kissinger Transcripts: A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969-1977. Digital National Security Archive. ProQuest. [Accessed Aug. 13, 2020]

Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974-76. National Security Advisor Files. Digital Collections. Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum. https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/guides/findingaid/Kissinger_Reports.asp [Accessed Aug 13, 2020]

Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection. Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. Arlington, VA. www.adst.org [Accessed Aug. 13, 2020]

The MaFDaL Party. File V 3007/04. Elections to the Ninth Knesset- 1977. Series 9. Collection of Publicity Materials for Knesset Elections. National Library of Israel. System Number 990034557890205171. [Hebrew]

Files from the Israel State Archive (ISA)

A/110/15; Bureau of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin – The Jewish Conference. Bureau of the Prime Minister. Prime Minister’s Office. ISA-PMO-PrimeMinisterBureau-000w3fm.

A/114/6; Speeches of Y Rabin; 3.6.1974 – 28.2.1977. Bureau of Prime Ministers Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir, and Yitzhak Rabin. Prime Minister’s Office. ISA-PMO- PrimeMinisterBureau-000w8tc.

A/4132/7; Copies of out-going Correspondence - The Minister's Activities in the MaFDaL and the Mizrahi Movement (v. 2). Bureau of Interior Minister Yosef Burg. Interior Ministry. ISA-MOIN-minister-0013t6j.

A/4132/8; Copies of out-going Correspondence - The Minister’s Activities in the MaFDaL and the Mizrahi Movement 1974-1983 (vol 3). Bureau of Minister Yosef Burg. Ministry of the Interior. ISA-MOIN-minister-0013t6k.

A/5001/19; Davis Institute – Personal Interviews Yigal Alon – Meetings 1-9. Davis Inst. Personal Interviews. Oral History Collections. ISA-Collections-Testimonies-000gvt8.

555

A/5001/22; Davis Institute- Interviews with Individuals – Yigal Alon- Interviews 20-23. Davis Inst. Personal Interviews. Oral History Collections ISA-Collections-Testimonies- 000gvtb.

A/7025/18; Coalition Negotiations over Forming the Government. Bureau of Prime Ministers Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin. Prime Minister's Office. ISA-PMO- PrimeMinisterBureau-000w9bc.

A/7027/7; Medini-Meyuhad (Secret) Saunders Document. Bureau of Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Gold Meir. Prime Minister's Office. Israel State Archive. ISA-PMO- PrimeMinisterBureau-000wd2r.

A/7029/4; Discussion with MaPaM (April-May 1976). Bureau of the Prime Minister. Prime Ministers’ Office. ISA-PMO-PrimeMinisterBureau-000wdf0.

A/7034/1; Prime Minister’s Speeches and Interviews – March 1976 (Continuation of 217A). Bureau of Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Golda Meir. Prime Minister’s Office. ISA- PMO-PrimeMinisterBureau-000w3cl.

A/7034/7; Prime Minister’s Speeches and Interviews – April-May 1976. Bureau of Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Golda Meir. Prime Minister’s Office. ISA-PMO- PrimeMinisterBureau-000w3cr.

A/7034/8; Prime Minister’s Speeches and Interviews (June-Aug.1976). Bureau of Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Golda Meir. Prime Minister’s Office. ISA-PMO- PrimeMinisterBureau-000w3cs.

A/7036/14; Speeches and Interviews of PM Yitzhak Rabin before Institutions, Organizations and Projects In Country and Before Media in the Country and Abroad. Bureau of Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Golda Meir. Prime Minister’s Office. ISA-PMO- PrimeMinisterBureau-000w3kp.

A/7036/15; Speeches and Interviews of P.M. Yitzhak Rabin- June-Nov. 1976 (Continuation of 246A). Bureau of Prime Ministers Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin. Prime Minister’s Office. ISA-PMO-PrimeMinisterBureau-000w3rs.

A/7037/11; Kaddum. Bureau of Prime Minister Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin. Prime Minister’s Office. ISA-PMO-PrimeMinisterBureau-000w3s7.

A/7063/15; Reports of Ambassador Simha Dinitz to P.M. Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Yigal Allon. Bureau of Prime Ministers Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin. Prime Minister’s Office. ISA-PMO-PrimeMinisterBureau-000w3sy.

A/7245/5; P.M. Yitzhak Rabin - The F-15 Episode- No Confidence in the Government- December 1976. Bureau of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Prime Minister’s Office. ISA- PMO-PrimeMinisterBureau-0007uv4.

556

A/7245/18; PM Yitzhak Rabin. Bureau of Prime Ministers Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin. Prime Minister’s Office. ISA-PMO-PrimeMinisterBureau-0007uqp.

A/7246/11; The Government Crisis- December 1976 (conversations with ILP Ministers and more) 12.1976-2.1977. Bureau of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Prime Minister's Office. ISA-PMO-PrimeMinisterBureau-0007jfa.

A/7247/4; PM Rabin – the Sebastia Affair – November to December 1975. Bureau of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Office of the Prime Minister. ISA-PMO-PrimeMinisterBureau- 0007wbm.

A/7780/9; Yosef Burg- Meetings 1-6 (29.12.1975- 30.9.1976) Original and Copy. Davis Institute Collections- Personal Interviews. Oral History Collections. ISA-Collections-Testimonies- 000he11.

A/7781/1; Yosef Burg Meetings 33-45, Original, 21/2/1990 - 14/11/1990. Institute for International Relations- Oral History Division. Oral History Collections. ISA- Collections-Testimonies-001448h.

A/7781/2; Inst. for International Relations – Oral History Division – Yosef Burg (meetings. 33- 45, copy). Davis Institute Collections – Personal Interviews. Oral History Collections. ISA-Collections-Testimonies-001448i.

A/8218/33; Resignation of Prime Minister Yizhak Rabin. Bureau of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Prime Minister’s Office. ISA-PMO-PrimeMinisterBureau-000zvz6

G/6717/8; Raphael Yitzhak Minister of Religion-Eighth Knesset. Bureau of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Prime Minister’s Office. ISA-PMO-PrimeMinisterBureau-000ucrp.

G/6723/71; PM Yitzhak Rabin – Elon Moreh Group. Bureau of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Prime Minister’s Office. ISA-PMO-PrimeMinisterBureau-000u7d4.

G/6746/31; Bureau of Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Menachem Begin- Coalition. Bureau of the Prime Minister. Prime Minister’s Office. ISA-PMO-PrimeMinisterBureau- 000v40d.

G/6752/15; Eighth Knesset – MK Yehudah Ben-Meir (National-Religious Front). Bureau of Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Menachem Begin. Prime Minister’s Office. ISA- PMO-PrimeMinisterBureau-000uliy.

G/6752/62; Knesset Election- General. Bureau of Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Menachem Begin. Prime Minister's Office. ISA-PMO-PrimeMinisterBureau-000uqeb.

G/6754/21; Settlements – General. Bureau of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Menachem Begin. Prime Minister’s Office. ISA-PMO-PrimeMinisterBureau-000uuwv.

G/7445/9; Work of the Government 70-76 – Part A. Files from the Bureau of Minister Yisrael Galili. Prime Minister’s Office. ISA-PMO-MinistersdeputyMinister-000kz9f.

557

G/7449/9; Kaddum 11.1975-2.1977. Bureau of Minister Without Portfolio Yisrael Galili. Prime Minister’s Office. ISA-PMO-MinistersdeputyMinister-000kx5o.

GL/2763/1; Bureau of Minister Yosef Burg – General Matters. Ministry of Religion- Minister’s Bureau. Ministry of Religious Affair. ISA-ReligiousAffairs-Minister-000y2v2.

GL/23211/10; Inquiries and Letters- Dr. Burg Joseph. Bureau of Prime Minister Rabin. Prime Minister's Office. ISA-PMO-PrimeMinisterBureau-0003s3m.

GL/43551/11; Protocol of the Chief Rabbinical Council (Kislev 5733 – Shevat 5736), Bureau of the Chief Rabbi. Israel State Archive. ISA-ChiefRabbinate-ChiefRabbinate-0005mc9.

GL/43551/14. Bureau of the Chief Rabbi – Protocol of Chief Rabbinical Council - protocols; Tamuz 5736- Av 5734. Bureau of the Chief Rabbi. Israel State Archive. ISA- ChiefRabbinate-ChiefRabbinate-0005ju8.

HZ/6858/3; Minister Yigal Alon- USA. Bureaus of Ministers Abba Eban, Yigal Allon, Moshe Dayan, and Yitzhak Shamir, Ministry of Foreign Affairs- The Foreign Minister. Minister of Foreign Affairs. ISA-mfa-Minister-000be4z.

N/571/6; Resignation of the 15th Government and the Formation of the 16th Government. Presidents Katzir and Navon- Files about the Formation of the Government. Bureaus of Presidents Zalman Shazar, Efraim Katzir, Yitzhak Navon, and Haim Herzog. Bureau of the President of the State. Residence of the President of the State of Israel. ISA-President- LetterCredence-000ew9q.

P/5054/11; Rabbi Shlomo Goren - Correspondence with Important People. Personal Archive of Rabbi Shlomo Goren. Israel State Archives. ISA-Privatecollections-NA-0013uva.

P/5072/6; The Chief Rabbi of Israel Shlomo Goren- Press Clippings (6) 1/1974-5/1974. Personal Archive of Rabbi Shlomo Goren. Israel State Archives. ISA-Privatecollections- NA-0013uzx.

P/5079/7; Press Clippings – 1975- Volume A. Personal Archive of Rabbi Shlomo Goren. Personal Archives and Collections. ISA-Privatecollections-NA-0013uui.

P/5084/17; Decisions of the Chief Rabbinical Council on the Matter of Who is a Jew. Personal Archive of Rabbi Shlomo Goren. ISA-Privatecollections-NA-0013xjd.

P/5084/27; The Chief Rabbi of Israel Rabbi Shlomo Goren – Reactions, Declarations, Manifestos, and Calls to the Public. Personal Archive of Rabbi Shlomo Goren. Israel State Archive. Personal Archives and Collections. ISA-Privatecollections-NA-0013xj.

Stenographic Protocols of Cabinet Meetings from the Year 1976. Scanned Stenographic Protocols of Cabinet Meetings. Government Secretariat. Prime Minister’s Office. ISA- PMO-GovernmentMeeting-00119ar.

558

Files from the Archive for the Study of Religious Zionism

Dr. Burg- [Oral History] Interview 123. File N. 468. Burg Papers [uncatalogued]. Archive for the Study of Religious Zionism. Warhaftig Institute for the Study of Religious Zionism. Central Library. Bar Ilan University.

Institute for International Relations- Oral History Division (Interviews 26-17) Transcripts- 1989. File n.12. Burg Papers [uncatalogued]. Archive for the Study of Religious Zionism. Warhaftig Institute for the Study of Religious Zionism. Central Library. Bar Ilan University.

M.K. Zevulun Hammer- Correspondence. file 295. Box 29. Section A. Archive of the NRP Knesset Faction (RG 003) Archive for the Study of Religious Zionism. Warhaftig Institute for the Study of Religious Zionism, Central Library, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel.

Ninth Knesset Protocols; 1977-1978. File 24D. Box 8. Series B. NRP Knesset Faction (R.G.003). Archive for the Study of Religious Zionism. Central Library. Bar Ilan University.

NRP Knesset Faction Correspondence with Newspapers, Radio, and Television- 5738. File 137. Box 13. Series A. NRP Knesset Faction (R.G. 003). Archive for the Study of Religious Zionism. Institute for the Study of Religious Zionism. Central Library. Bar-Ilan University. Ramat-Gan.

NRP Knesset Faction Protocols from 5735. File 26. Box 4. Series A. NRP Knesset Faction (R.G.003). Archive for the Study of Religious Zionism. Warhaftig Institute for the Study of Religious Zionism. Central Library. Bar Ilan University.

Yosef Burg- Institute for International Affairs Oral History Division- Interview (Meetings 73-74) Transcripts. File N. 17. Burg Papers [uncatalogued]. Archive for the Study of Religious Zionism. Warhaftig Institute for the Study of Religious Zionism. Central Library. Bar Ilan University.

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Ben Gurion, David. Uniqueness and Mission. Tel Aviv: Israel Ministry of Defense, 1971. [Hebrew]

Bloch, Daniel. “MK A. Melamed In Conversation with ‘Davar’: The Majority of the NRP- Doves.” Davar. May 25, 1975. 6.

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