Ralph Bisschops

Metaphor as the Internalization of a Ritual The inner Temple of Samuel Holdheim (1806-1860)

Series A: General & Theoretical Papers ISSN 1435-6473 Essen: LAUD 1996 (2nd ed. with divergent page numbering 2007) Paper No. 401

Universität Duisburg-Essen

Ralph Bisschops

The Free University of Brussels (Belgium)

Metaphor as the Internalization of a Ritual The inner Temple of Samuel Holdheim (1806-1860)

Copyright by the author Reproduced by LAUD 1996 (2nd ed. with divergent page numbering 2007) Linguistic Agency Series A University of Duisburg-Essen General and Theoretical FB Geisteswissenschaften Paper No. 401 Universitätsstr. 12 D- 45117 Essen

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Metaphor as the Internalization of a Ritual The inner Temple of Samuel Holdheim (1806-1860)

I. Metaphor and Evaluation

Value-Ascribing and Duty-Ascribing Metaphors Not all metaphors have a cognitive or descriptive function: there is a group of metaphors whose specific aim is to perform an evaluation. When we call someone a "pearl", it hardly entails that we are trying to find a more appropriate way to refer to him in a cognitive sense. In this example we merely seek to ascribe a value to the main subject. The motivation for this metaphorical predicate is to be found in the value represented by the image of the pearl, rather than in a supposed similarity. This becomes particularly clear when we think about metaphors that stand for a negative value. Maintaining, for instance, that there is the slightest resemblance between Jews and "insects" is already a declared form of anti- Semitism. I would call this type of metaphors value-ascribing metaphors. They assign a positive value or negative value (or even a set of positive or negative values) to an entity (thing, person, action, group, etc.). Metaphors of this kind are: «my girl-friend is a jewel», «Saddam Hussein is Hitler». We can also observe a class of metaphors that come very close to the abovementioned type, but which nevertheless is to be distinguished from it. This class contains metaphors that perform the conveyance of a duty. There is a difference between duty and value. Writing good poems is certainly a value, but not everyone's duty. I would provisionally define duty as a value that ought to be realized by a given person within a given context. To illustrate this, let us consider the following verses of Isaiah: «Is such a fast that I have chosen? a day for a man to afflict his soul? (...) Is not this rather the fast that I have chosen? to loose the chains of wickedness, to undo the bands of the yoke, and to let the oppressed go free, and to break every yoke? Is it not to share thy bread with the hungry, and that thou bring the poor that are cast out to thy house? when thou seest the naked, that thou cover him; and that thou hide not thyself from thy own flesh?1» (Isaiah, 57, 5-7). What Isaiah says here is that the ethical obligations of helping the poor and liberating the oppressed are as important as the ritual duty of fasting on the Day of Atonement. Other features common to fasting and the other duties are hardly to be observed, apart from the fact that they all require a certain degree of unselfishness. However, the most obvious effect

1 Translation by Harold Fisch, The Jerusalem Bible, Koren Publishers, Jerusalem 1986.

1 of these verses is that they aim to present our duties towards our fellows and the compelling ritual obligation of fasting as equally important. In fact, in every religion there is a tendency to overestimate the ritual aspect as opposed to the the ethical one. Hence, in the present text «fast» figures as a metaphor with a conspicuous duty-ascribing character. There is a very puzzling type of duty-ascribing metaphors, namely those performing the internalization of a duty. In these cases the main subject belongs to the inner world. Here two totally different realms of reality are related to one another. A striking example of this type of transfer is the «circumcision of the heart», such as claimed by many prophets («Circumcise yourselves to the Lord and take away the foreskin of your heart» [Jer. 4,4]2). The question which arises here is: How can a clearly defined ritual, such as circumcision, be redefined in terms of thoughts, feelings and attitudes? A possible answer is that «circumcision of the heart» denotes an attitude of sensitivity to the needs and the suffering of our fellow human beings. But it hardly needs explaining that a definite clarification of this metaphor is unlikely to succeed. The reason of this difficulty lies not in the often alleged fact that vagueness and polysemy are inherent to metaphorical meaning (an opinion which is subject to criticism), but rather in that they are intended as riddles, inspiring the addressee to an endless reflection and stimulating new experiences3. Since the subsidiary subject stands for a duty (in the form of a biblical command), interpreting those metaphors entails an attempt to realize that duty on a psychological level. The circumcision of the body is an act that has to be performed, and similarly the circumcision of the heart points to an act that the addressee has to realize within the realm of his feelings, attitudes and thoughts. The "meaning" of these metaphors therefore is to be regarded as programmatic (and not as a reference to some preexisting thing). In the present case the addressee is expected to find an «inner translation» for a given ritual. Another, perhaps more familiar example of internalizing metaphors is the internalization of alimentary purity in Matthew 15,11. This means that concrete behavior such as obeying the Jewish dietary laws is to be transferred to the inner self. Here the same question arises as above: How is the inner performance of eating kosher expected to be? Apparently there are no standards according to which this "inner purity" can be measured. There is nothing the addressee can do but try, until he senses that he has found the right way.

2 See also Deut. 10,16: "Circumcise therefore the foreskin of your heart, and be stiff necked no more". 3 I rely here on the remarkable study of Dr. Martin Pöttner (Metaphors of Universal Love), published in the same volume, that some metaphors initiate a new type of experience, which cannot be described as long as this experience has not been made.

2 Value-Extension and Value-Shift, Duty-Extension and Duty-Shift With respect to the effect of metaphorical evaluations a second distinction is to be made. A precept such as: "Circumcise your hearts" can mean two things: a) Circumcision of the body is certainly a good thing, but the duty it incorporates is to be extended to the domain of your feelings, thoughts and attitudes. Or b) As long as your heart is "circumcised" you are all right. The circumcision of your body is of secondary importance and loses its compulsory nature. In the first example, we encounter a duty-extension: The subsidiary subject, i.e. the ritual that functions as the starting-point of the metaphorical process, remains in effect. There is no abrogation but only an extension of the duty initially represented by the subsidiary subject. In the second case, the subsidiary subject ceases to be the embodiment of the duty assigned to the main subject. Metaphorizations of this sort are often introduced by the adjective "true" ("true purity is ...", "true offerings are ...", "true fasting is ..., etc.). A well-known example is the allegation made in the sixties that "true faithfulness is not physical". Here, we are presented with a real shift of the concerned duty. In the History of Religion such metaphors performed a break with a tradition that was experienced as restrictive. Mostly they functioned as powerful tools of religious renewal or change. They exerted - and still exert - a strong emotional effect of relief, which holds particularly when the abrogated duty pertains to a ritual, the omission of which can cause feelings of guilt and anxiety. That such metaphors can also generate a strong poetic effect can be illustrated by the following verses of Leonard Cohen: «Forget your perfect offering / there's a crack in everything / That's how the light gets in4.» Though the term "duty - transfer" would sound more familiar, especially to semanticists, I prefer the term duty-shift for these metaphorical processes in order to emphasize the fact that the subsidiary subject loses its compelling character (which is not indicated by the term transfer). In the abovementioned examples we have dealt with duty-shift and duty-extension. Of course, the same distinction is to be made between value-extension and value-shift. In general a duty-shift presupposes a value-shift. However, in the present study we will be presented with an issue (pertaining to the metaphorization of the Temple service) where the distinction between duty-shift and value-shift will prove indispensable.

4 Anthem in The Future, 1992, Stranger Music.

3 The Function of Dogmatics Value-shifts and duty-shifts do not occur frequently. There are at least two factors that hinder such a process. First, worshippers mostly cling to their rituals, experiencing them as a part of their religious identity. Second, since value-shifts jeopardize the consensus that holds a religious community together and can easily lead to a schism, religious authorities have always attempted to put a stop to such metaphorical processes. This, however, is the point at which dogmatics intervenes. The Talmud, for instance (since the present article deals with Jewish theology I confine myself to talmudic dogmatics), stipulates that «a verse cannot depart from its plain meaning5». To be sure, according to the Talmud it is not only allowed but even an obligation to search for other layers of meaning in reading the biblical text. The metaphorical understanding of a biblical verse is permissible as long as the literal sense is not compromised. But in no way can the original, plain sense be abrogated. Thus only value- and duty-extensions are permitted, not shifts. Consequently, the hostile attitude of the prophets, in particular Isaiah, to fasting and offerings cannot, according to Jewish orthodoxy, be interpreted as a proposal to jettison these rituals but only as a warning against overestimating them at the expense of ethics. Hence, orthodoxy views them only as value- and duty-extensions. Interpreting Isaiah otherwise and saying that he really advocated the suppression of offering and fasting in the hope that the Israelites would then be more sensitive to the injustice around them would perhaps be closer to the biblical text. But making such a rendering theologically acceptable requires a new dogmatic framework. A perfect example of the development of a new dogmatology with the purpose of internalization are the epistles of Paul of Tarsus. In his abrogation, for instance, of circumcision, Paul resorted to a refined argumentation based on the assumption that in Judaism every law is a sign of distinction. Abraham received the commandment of circumcision as a reward for his unconditional faith. Thus, according to Paul, it was Abraham's faith, and this while he was yet wncircumcised, that made him a great patriarch; not the circumcision itself. Therefore circumcision, since it is a mere reward (and not a merit in itself) can be abrogated (Rom. 4,9-13) and thus internalized (see Col. 2,11). As we shall see, the Jewish reformer Samuel Holdheim, to whose thinking this article is devoted, resorts to similar reflections in his many abrogations (which, however, did not affect circumcision6). This is no coincidence: both Paul and Holdheim were Jews trained in rabbinic argumentation.

5 «R. Kahana said: By the time I was eighteen years old I had studied the whole Shas, yet I did not know that a verse cannot depart from its plain meaning until to-day. What does he inform us? — That a man should study and subsequently understand.» Sabbath, 63 a (Talmud Babli, Soncino-edition, under the editorship of Rabbi Dr. Isidore Epstein). 6 This item will be discussed below.

4 Samuel Holdheim (1806-1860) We shall now discuss the writings of the Jewish reformer Samuel Holdheim (1806-1869). One of the great interests of his undertaking is that his entire religious thinking tends towards internalization. The Jew, as Holdheim envisaged him, is the one who freed himself from all external marks of Jewishness by viewing his tradition as a powerful tool for shaping his interior life. Holdheim's key-metaphors are "inner sacrifice", "inner purity", "inner fast". Contrary to Paul, with whom he has been compared by his Jewish opponents and supporters alike, Holdheim never left the realm of Judaism. The internalization he achieved is in every respect the purest and even the most difficult one, since Judaism is shaped as a legal system. In Christianity, by contrast, there is an mtertwining between the internalization of some Jewish customs and the adherence to new elements of faith. To be sure, Paul of Tarsus strives, as Holdheim does, for the achievement of an interior religiosity, which he even considered as inner Judaism (Romans 2,28-29). However, the main idea in his undertaking is the imitation of Christ, which appears as the guideline of his thinking. With Holdheim things are different. His internalized Judaism is not supported by any exemplary gestalt but is simply the product of value (or duty)-extensions and value (or duty)-shifts.

The Purpose of this Investigation By introducing the terms duty-shift and duty-extension, my first aim was to give a more precise description of what happens in some metaphorical processes. The question arises, however, whether value-extension and duty-extension, value-shift and duty-shift are interdependent. In the following I will focus on value- and duty-shifts, since only these operations are relevant in the present study. We can safely say that a value-shift entails a duty-shift or at least the abolition of the original duty. Saying that being circumcised should be an inner and not an outer state is to declare that the rite of circumcision should be transferred into the realm of feelings. What is no longer a value cannot constitute the foundation of a duty. But the reverse does not seem to be true. There can be a duty-shift without a corresponding value-shift. A minister can have been delegated the duties of his king without being equal in rank (i.e. without having the same "value"). Of great interest is the question of whether a mere value-shift or a mere duty-shift represents a sufficient condition for a metaphor. Can we say that this or that minister is the "true king" of the kingdom, only because royal duties have been delegated to him? Obviously not. A word such as "king" comprises connotations such as rank, majesty and power7 which are not

7 The relationship between metaphor and rank has more profoundly been treated in my articles Metapher, Wert und Rang, in: Revue Beige de Philologie et d'Histoire, LXVIII, 1990, 3, pp. 636-645; Metaphor, Value and Status (translation of the aforementioned article), LAUD (Linguistic Agency University of Duisburg), Theoretical Papers, Paper N° 319, Duisburg 1992; and in my book Die Metapher als Wertsetzung, Novalis, Ezechiel, Beckett, DUISBURGER ARBEITEN ZUR SPRACH- UND KULTURWISSENSCHAFT, Peter Lang, Frankfurt 1994.

5 associated with the sole notion of duty. Therefore, a duty-shift without a corresponding value-shift is unlikely to generate a metaphor. With regard to value-shifts, things are even more intricate. To be sure, every value-shift can permit the generation of a metaphor, but one can also refrain from performing such metaphorizations precisely because there has been a shift of values and the initial value is no longer in effect. To put it otherwise: in the case of a value-shift the metaphorization of the initial term is possible but may prove superfluous. Such a sophisticated argumentation can be encountered in some works of Samuel Holdheim. At first sight all this seems to be mere semantic algebra. But, as we shall see, it can be very useful for the clarification of some links between metaphor and dogmatology in Judaism.

II. Samuel Holdheim: A Survey of his Doctrine Since little is known about Samuel Holdheim, despite his tremendous influence (especially in the U.S.A.), his writings having been neither republished nor translated, the following account of his thinking will be more extensive than is customary in a case study. Rabbi Samuel Holdheim was born in the town of Kempen (eastern Prussian province of Posen) where he received an orthodox Jewish education. Soon respected as a brillant talmudist he was ordained rabbi by the famous Hatam Sofer (Rabbi Moses Schreiber), one of the greatest orthodox authorities of that time8. He started his career as a private tutor9. After having collected a sufficient fund to attend university in his late twenties, he studied at the universities of Prague and Berlin, where he obtained his doctorate. From 1836 to 1840 he served as rabbi in the synagogue of Frankfurt an der Oder. From 1840 until 1847 he held office as chief rabbi («Landesrabbiner») of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. In 1847 he became rabbi of the new Reform community of Berlin (already founded by the "Reformfreunde" in 1845 but without holding services until Holdheim's assumption of office).

The Political Starting-Point of Holdheim's Thinking It has already been noticed that if German Jewry had ben forced to live under Napoleonic rule, the Jewish Reform Movement would never have emerged10. This holds particularly true for the thinking of Samuel Holdheim. Noteworthy, however, is that the starting point of Holdheim's undertaking was in no way the fact that the emancipation brought on by Napoleon had been partially abrogated by the German states. What Holdheim was reacting against were those aspects of the legislation of some German states that we would nowadays label as positive discrimination.

8 See: Jakob J. Petuchowski, Abraham Geiger and Samuel Holdheim, in LEO BAECK YEARBOOKS, 1977, p. 143. 9 Emmanuel Ritter, Samuel Holdheim, sein Leben und seine Werke, Berlin 1865 (Verlag von W.J. Peiser), p. 14. 10 See: Michael Meyer, Response to Modernity, Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford 1988.

6 In fact, some German Länder, such as Würtemberg11 and Mecklenburg-Schwerin12 made substantial concessions to the Jewish courts in matters pertaining to marriage and inheritance13), arguing that in those cases the religious convictions of Jews were to be taken into account. Holdheim was a fierce opponent of such special rulings. First, they perpetuated the isolated status of German Jewry and «impeded its civil and spiritual emancipation14». The submission to the laws of the host country would, particularly in the Germany after the Enlightenment, be a step towards equal citizenship of Jews and their cultural development by the standards of German Bildung. Second, the presence of two separate rulings in private law for Jews and non-Jews within the same state would have an «unfavorable effect on Jewish morality15» and reinforce the biased belief that Jews constituted a «State within the State16». Third, once this equality of both Jews and non-Jews before the laws of the state had been achieved, Jews would never again have to fear the looming threat of a new Haman17, who would denounce them as a people «that does not live according to the laws of the king18». Up to this point, Holdheim's position does not differ substantially from the declarations made by the French Sanhedrin in 1806, proclaiming the unconditional loyalty of French Jewry to the French constitution. But the claim of the orthodox communities that their "religion" should be respected in cases relating to private law leads Holdheim to the question what Jewish "religion" ought to be in a state that is no longer hostile towards Jews. By radically calling into question the traditionalists' view on Jewish religion, Holdheim was to arrive at conclusions that went far beyond the principles of loyalty and tolerance as defined by the French Sanhedrin. In my account of the thinking of Samuel Holdheim I will center on the following items: 1° The position Holdheim adopted towards Talmud and rabbinic Judaism in the matter of the autonomy of rabbinic courts; 2° The "true Jewish religion" as viewed by Holdheim; 3° Finally, I shall devote my attention to the metaphors of internalization, which, in my view, are constitutive items in Holdheim's elaboration of a theology of Jewish Reform.

11 Edict of April 25, 1828, Art. 40, 12 Statut für die allgemeinen kirchlichen Verhältnisse der israelitischen Untertanen, 1839, § 31 13 In Mecklenburg-Schwerin an Edict of February 22,1812, stipulated that Jews should maintain the custom of granting the first-born a double portion of the inheritance (Deut, 21:17), «since they regard it as founded in their religion». This edict remained in effect until September 11, 1817. 14 Über die Autonomie der Rabbinen und das Princip der jüdischen Ehe, Schwerin 18472, Verlag der Kürschner'schen Buchhandlung, p. 5. 15 Über die Autonomie der Rabbinen, p. 6 16 Über die Autonomie der Rabbinen, p. 5 17 i.e. the prototype of the anti-Semite as described in the Book of Esther. 18 op. cit.,p. 5.

7 The "Rabbinic" Holdheim At the outset of his controversy with the traditionalists, Holdheim refers back to the Talmud. He had grown up within a traditional Polish community where he acquired a profound knowledge of Talmud and rabbinic Judaism which in his adolescence already earned him a fair reputation19. For this reason, his first German writings are particularly interesting for anyone who wishes to see Jewish Reform based on halachic argumentation. To be sure, these very writings earned him the reproach of using Talmud against Talmud. His major endeavor was to single out the properly «religious» aspects of Judaism and to set them apart from its legalistic aspects. Against the traditionalists' claim to legal autonomy he put forward the following assumptions: Suppose the state were to grant the Jewish communities legal autonomy, this could not been confined to matters pertaining to marriage, but should be extended to all biblical and rabbinic laws. The actual state of affairs was the result of a striking inconsequence. With regard to marital laws in particular, Holdheim argued, that, since they have the form of a mere sales contract, they have no bearing on religion and are mere remnants of the civil constitution of the Jewish commonwealth, which ceased to exist in the year 70 CE. Thus, the more basic issue arose as to what extent Mosaic and Talmudic laws should remain in effect after the Jews lost their Palestinian homeland. To solve this issue Holdheim invoked the Talmudic precept that, in diaspora, the law of the kingdom is the law of the Jewish people. «With the fall of the Jewish State the Jew ceased to be a citizen of it, and all his obligations to it ceased to be in force. To be sure, with his entrance into another state the Jew cannot regard the state laws as religious statutes, as he once did in Palestine; but by virtue of his religion, he must nevertheless feel obliged to fulfill his duties as a citizen.20» If follows that in a non-Jewish state there is «no other legislation to be recognized except that of the state according to the sentence of a qualified judge21». As to the rabbinic interdiction set down in the Hoshen Mishpat22, according to which an Israelite is forbidden to turn to a non-Jewish court23, Holdheim replied that this ruling is due to a misunderstanding of a baraita24 to Gittin 88a, on the authority of which Israelites

19 Emmanuel Ritter, Samuel Holdheim, Sein Leben und seine Werke, Verlag von W. J. Pfeifer, Berlin 1865, p. 13. 20 Die Autonomie der Rabbinen, p. 15 (translation by the author). 21 op. cit., p. 19. 22 The part of the Arba'ah Turim («The Four Rows»), compiled by Jacob ben Asher (1270-1340), who codified all laws in effect after the destruction of the Temple. 23 The ruling that all litigations between Jews must be referred to Jewish courts is post-Talmudic and stems from Rabbi Jacob Tarn, 12th cent. 24 Tannaitic (Tannaim = scholars who wrote down the Mishnah, i.e. the most authoritative part of the Talmud) statement not found in the Mishnah and with less legal authority than Mishnaic statements.

8 may not assemble together with heathen judges in a court». This saying does not apply, Holdheim argues, to the (Jewish) parties turning to a non-Jewish judge. Besides, this baraita stems from the assumption held in ancient times that judges belonging to another religion would sentence in the name of their gods. This, to be sure, holds true for the oracles at Dodona and Delphi, but the same cannot be said of the laws of Solon, Lykurgos and the Twelve Tables25 and a fortiori of the laws of civilized countries. The rabbinical authorities adopted an immature attitude towards the gentile constitutions in that they showed themselves unable to imagine a law inspired by common sense rather than grounded in a religious conviction26. However, Holdheim adds, even in Talmudic disputations appeals to common sense can be encountered27 when scriptural bases are lacking. Holdheim summarizes these assumptions in stating that «the so-called Jewish law is Jewish only in a national respect, but not in a religious respect, just as Roman and Germanic law are terms that refer to their respective national origins28». Accordingly, the Prussian common law cannot be regarded as a Christian law29, even in those parts that serve as guiding principles for the relationship between Jews. The major argument that Holdheim adduces against Talmud and its claim that all laws that can still be observed after the destruction of the Second Temple ought to be observed, seems obviously inspired by the philosophy of Georg Wilhem Friedrich Hegel, with whose thinking he was demonstra-bly30 acquainted: After the first exile, Jews lost the notion of a commonwealth so explicitly present in Mosaism. During the Second Temple Period the state lacked the most secure foundation it could have, namely the self-awareness (das Bewußtsein seiner selbst). The idea of a commonwealth as such, of its essence and its conditions, was no longer present in the minds of the Jews of that time. They only perceived single features, such as a land, a temple, a high priest, a king and a Sanhedrin but the idea of a state as a «spiritual organism», transcending all these single phenomena, was beyond their grasp. In contrast to the Jews of the Babylonian exile who knew too well that they had lost a commonwealth, those after the destruction of the Second Temple «did not even realize that they had lost a state, because they had never had one31».

25 Die Autonomie der Rabbinen, p. 72. 26 Die Autonomie der Rabbinen, p. 72 - 73. 27 Die Autonomie der Rabbinen, p. 81. 28 Über die Autonomie der Rabbinen, p. 14. 29 op. cit. p. 15. 30 In Geschichte der Entstehung und Entwicklung der jüdischen Reformgemeinde in Berlin (Berlin, Julius Springer, 1857) Holdheim quotes the «Philosophy of Religion» (Religionsphilosophie) of G.W. F. Hegel, to strengthen his own view on the sacrifices in Ancient Judaism (p. 91). 31 Die Autonomie der Rabbinen, p. 42-43.

9 Religious and Civic Obligations Holdheim's endeavor was to transform the inherited legalism of the Jewish Religion into one that could harmonize with the requests of modern Western states. In comparison to the adherents of other religions, the ancient Mosaic notion of the holiness of the laws of the commonwealth results in a much greater ability of Jews to show themselves committed to the laws of the state. According to Holdheim, Judaism does not distinguish between man's duties towards God and his duties towards his fellow-men, but only between his obligations towards God and the state, or rather the human community embedded within a state. Therefore, Holdheim argues, it is precisely the law-oriented character of their religion that makes Jews loyal citizens of the country in which they live. This makes clear that Holdheim's standpoint was not anti-legalistic. He rather extended the genuine Jewish valorization of legalism to the realm of the modern state.32

What about Ritual Observance? Does this mean that, in the diaspora, Jews should jettison the laws and customs they inherited from their ancestors? What about Sabbath-observance? What about the dietary laws? It must be noted that Holdheim never provided a systematic and detailed account on the issue of which laws should be preserved and which not. In Holdheim's work, questions of that kind have always been dealt with on an occasional basis, and, to be more precise, in his polemics against orthodox opponents (such as Samson Raphael Hirsch) and conservative ones (such as Zachariah Frankel). In his first books (such as "The Autonomy of the Rabbis and the Principle of Jewish Marriage") Holdheim's majors concern was the status of Jewish woman, who, according to rabbinic law, could be divorced by her husband without any reason that could be sufficient for a secular court and who, on the other hand, could not obtain a divorce where the coexistence between the partners was obviously unbearable33. A widow who wished to remarry was also in an awkward position when her brother-in-law refused to perform the chalitsah34. Arguing that these laws do not reflect the high esteem in which marriage was held in Mosaic Judaism, and, besides this, seem to be borrowed from the Romans, Holdheim regarded secular courts as more likely to pronounce sentences that accord with the ethical feeling of the time35.

32 Vorträge über die Mosaische Religion für denkende Israeliten, Schwerin, 1844 (C. Kürschner'sche Buchhandlung), pp. X-XI. 33 Only men are entitled to divorce, except in those cases where physical afflictions on the side of the husband, mostly due to the kind of work he performs, make sexual intercourse repugnant to his wife. 34 i.e. a ceremony exempting from levirate marriage. 35 In Die Autonomie der Rabbinen Holdheim puts it more crudely: «Jewish (marital) law is not biblical, but late rabbinic, (...), a self-made law or a borrowed one. In the states, by the laws of which we are governed, we find a better one.» p. 154, Footnote N° 113 (translation by the author).

10 Apart from that, Holdheim dealt with the status of the kohanim36. Everyone who descended from a Cohen was regarded as having the same duties of the high-priests of the Temple with respect to ritual purity. Hence, among other restrictions, he was not allowed to marry a widow or a divorced woman. To this Holdheim responded that since the Temple had been destroyed - and thus there was no longer any theological reason for staying absolutely pure - those prohibitions ought to be abrogated37. As to Sabbath-observance, Holdheim attempted to demonstrate on rabbinic grounds that Jewish civil servants are exempt from observing the Sabbath since a positive command (i.e. the obligation to obey to the laws of the nation) takes precedence over a negative command (i.e. forbidden works)38. Later on, Holdheim was to extend this abrogation to all who would suffer severe financial losses by staying at home on Sabbath, invoking the Talmudic saying that «man has not been created for the Sabbath, but the Sabbath has been created for man» and that the Sabbath, which is a day of joy, must not lead to impoverishment39. But it is also to be noted that, in his responsa, Holdheim did not always decide in a systematic and predictable way. In contrast to the allegation in Geoffrey Wigoder's Encyclopedia of ]udaism40, Holdheim did not transfer the Sabbath to Sunday morning. This was decided by the board of the Reformfreunde who founded the Berlin Reform Synagogue. Holdheim himself could not approve the decision of the board of management to move the celebration of the Sabbath to Sunday. He did approve of holding Sabbath services on Sunday so that those who were unable to participate on Saturdays would not be deprived of communal worship. However, for Holdheim, the Sabbath remained the seventh day of the week, i.e. Saturday41. In no way did Holdheim approve the abandonment of circumcision, which had also been decided by his board42. In his book Über die Beschneidung («On Circumcision») he opposed only the custom then current in some communities of forcing unwilling fathers manu militari to have their sons circumcised (by getting the local police to apply a decision of a Jewish court43).

36 Kohanim (plural of Kohen): priests. In Judaism priesthood is hereditary (through the father). Despite their limited liturgical function since the destruction of the Temple, the kohanim are still bound to some purity-laws pertaining to their status in Ancient Judaism, one of which is the prohibition of marrying a divorced woman, coming in contact with the dead and walking among the graves in cemeteries. 37 Die Autonomie der Rabbinen, pp. 162-164. 38 op. cit. p. 108, Footnote N° 76. 39 Das Zeremonialgesetz im Messiasreich, Schwerin, Verlag der Kürschner'schen Buchhandlung, 1845, p. 136. 40 Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 1989, p. 343-344. 41 At first there were two Sabbath services in Berlin, a regular one on Saturday and an extra one on Sunday. Due to lack of worshippers, the Saturday ones were abandoned after some time. Holdheim was obliged to accept this fact of lack of support for Saturday services although he personally regretted this development (see: Geschichte der Entstehung und Entwicklung der jüdischen Reformgemeinde in Berlin, Berlin 1857, p. 154). 42 A disctmction between Holdheim's own decisions and those of his board has never been made by his commentators.. 43 Über die Beschneidung, Schwerin, 1844, p. 74.

11 One could wonder why Holdheim did not try to be more systematic and precise on the issue of which laws should remain in effect, and which not. Holdheim himself assigned this task to the "Wissenschaft des Judentums" (science of Judaism), which originated a few decades previously. To him, it was a matter of the Wissenschaft to single out all those laws that had been adopted out of merely political considerations, and to separate them from the complex of the Jewish law. He adds: «In such a process of purification, what would be lost in matter would be gained twofold in intensity44». It is to be noted that to this day, Holdheim's undertaking remains unfamiliar to Judaism. Modern Reform theologians such as Leo Baeck have tried to justify the Reform movement by insisting on the fact that Judaism has always been a religion in change, adapting its laws and customs according to the necessities of the time. Even the Talmud, they argue, would have been a reform of the Mosaic law, making it more centered on man and his needs. One frequently adduced example is the more joyful and lenient attitude adopted toward Sabbath observance by the Pharisees, who made of the Sabbath a day of joy and not a day of sadness, as it was for the Sadducees (i.e., the priests). Furthermore, they insisted on the existence of post-Talmudic rulings, such as the suppression of polygamy by Gershom of Mainz. It was a sign of great moral strength and intellectual rigor that Holdheim always refused such self-delusion. He was perfectly and even painfully aware of the fact that he operated a real break with traditional Judaism. After all the Talmud never abrogated a single law, except the prosbul of Hillel, which still figures as the flagship in the argumentation of modern Reform-theologians. Post-Talmudic innovations were relatively rare, and consisted mostly in modifying a single law. Never did they give rise to a new movement45. Thus, Holdheim's doctrine was a world-shattering upheaval compared to the modest halachic changes undertaken in Jewish history until then. For this reason Holdheim developed the dogmatic principles necessary to give Reform Judaism a philosophical and theological background. Of course, many of his proposals had already been put forward by Jewish Reformers in earlier decades. The originality of Holdheim does not lie in the concrete changes he advocated, but in the dogmatic and philosophical framework he constructed. His major principles can be summarized as follows: 1° There is a moral progress in history (a notion that stems from Hegel). Thus, the dead have no precedence over the living46. The Talmud is to be respected as the expression of Judaism in its time. But it cannot claim the perenniality of its standards.

44 Die Autonomie der Rabbinen, pp. 50-51. 45 Against those who romanticized Jewish Reform as being a return to the sources of Judaism, Holdheim retorted that, without any doubt, the rabbis of the Talmud would disagree with his proposals. 46 Jakob und Israel, Schwerin 1841, p. 13.

12 2° The destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE is to be regarded as the manifestation of God's will in history47. According to Holdheim, God himself would have declared through this event that sacrificing animals can no longer be held as true worship. 3° Since the loss of their national sovereignty, Jews can no longer be regarded as a people set apart from the gentile nations, but as a «family48» which has to merge with the other nations. The peculiar task of the Jews consists in being a light for the nations, i.e., in spreading ethical monotheism until all nations worship the same God. Holdheim expounds his discarding of any form of ethnic conception of Judaism on the basis of a sophisticated reasoning: The holiness of the Jewish people can only be in effect when it is linked to the holiness of the land and the holiness of the Temple49. But even when we believe that holiness is a substantial entity, producing effects of holiness (i.e., a heightened form of life), this holiness can only manifest itself through the union of the Jewish people, the Holy Land and the Temple. To be more precise: Jews can only be regarded as a holy people as long as they are in possession of the Holy Land and as long as there is a Temple where the offerings are brought. But through the destruction of the Temple and the loss of the land Jews have sunk to a state of diminished holiness50, if there is any holiness left at all. Consequently, Holdheim extends the notion of election to the whole of humanity51. The practical consequence of widening the sense of the word "chosen people" (am segula) was Holdheim's willingness to celebrate marriages between Jews and Christians (without demanding a conversion). 4° The observation of the moral laws laid down in Mosaic Revelation is an unconditional obligation for every Jew. Holdheim defines the moral laws as those laws which are eternally true and not bound to the particular mentality of the Jews at the time of Moses. As to the ritual laws, their purpose is to stimulate devotion. As long as they foster religious fervor, they can be maintained. But as soon as they prove to hinder religious and moral elevation, they must be rejected. According to Holdheim, the ritual laws are to be regarded as mere «crutches», helping man to develop deep inner devotion. They are the form52 of Jewish religion, whereas ethics are its substance. They make up the outer appearance, whereas ethics constitutes the core.

47 See: Der Gedächtniszug der Zerstörung Jerusalems in jüdische Predigten, p. 98 ff. 48 Vorträge über die Mosaische Religion, p. X, footnote 1. 49 Das Zeremonialgesetz im Messiasreich, p. 33 ff. 50 Das Zeremonialgesetz im Messiasreich, pp. 35-36. 51 Einsegnung einer gemischten Ehe, Berlin 1849, p. 7. 52 In his book Das Zeremonialgesetz im Messiasreich Holdheim follows another line of thinking. Ritual laws intend to ensure purity. Since with the destruction of the Temple the world fell into a state of absolute ("mortal") impurity, they can no longer produce their purifying effect. In this argumentation Holdheim leans on a mystic belief held by very pious Jews. But, in contrast to them, Holdheim draws from this belief, which he treats only as one of the many theological hypotheses he had to deal with, the conclusion, that purity laws in an impure world are as efficient as medicine for a corpse.

13 5° The notion of faith holds a central place in Holdheim's writings. «Faith» Holdheim states, «is the innermost center in which all Jewish commutities will find their highest unity and their highest consensus53». Note that traditional Judaism does not hold mere faith in high esteem, but gives preference to the observance of the law. Along with his emphasis on faith Holdheim named the Jewish community a "Church" (Kirche).

III. From Sacrifice to Prayer the move towards Inwardness Holdheim's Judaism aims at the inner man. Faith and religion are the Temple deep inside us54. This seems quite logical. When Jewish religion is no longer regarded as a system of laws it becomes a religion centered on faith and on inner perfection. Holdheim even goes so far as to say that, more than any other confession, Israelite faith is an inward experience55. To be sure, interior purity is not foreign to Judaism; in many psalms and prayers the worshipper expresses the wish that his heart be purified. Yet, Holdheim's radical turn toward inwardness seems to be very foreign to traditional Judaism. In the following paragraphs I shall try to show that the ultimate (i.e. dogmatologic) reason for the disagreement between Reform Judaism and Jewish Orthodoxy lies in the question whether some biblical terms central to faith are to be understood metaphorically or metonymically. Without doubt, the claim of an inner religion is the result of an internalization or a set of internalizing processes. This leads us to the following questions: What has been internalized and by which mode of internalization (value - extension or value-shift; duty-extension or duty-shift)? What is the ontological status of these internalized entities? (What do they mean, and what do they stand for?)

The Starting-Point of the Move to Interiority In fact, Holdheim does not depart from the whole complex of ritual laws. Holdheim's inner religiosity is not a substitute for all the laws he abrogated or for those he did not consider as essential (such as the dietary laws). The starting-point of the internalizing process can, in contrast, clearly be located. It is the rabbinic claim that the Temple service is to be replaced by prayer. Let us look closer at this Talmudic saying: «The question was raised: If a man erred and did not say the afternoon Tefillah, should he say it twice in the evening? Should you argue from the fact that if he erred in the evening he prays twice in the morning, [I may reply that] this is because it is all one day, as it is written, And there was evening and there was morning, one day; but in this case, prayer being in the place of sacrifice, since the

53 Geschichte der Entstehung und Entwicklung der jüdischen Reformgemeinde in Berlin, p. 102. 54 See Jüdische Predigten, p. 104. 55 Das Zeremonialgesetz im Messiasreich, p. 136, footnote.

14 day has passed the sacrifice lapses. Or should we rather say that since prayer is supplication for mercy, a man may go on praying as long as he likes ? - Come and hear: For Rabbi Huna ben Judah said in the name of Rabbi Isaac reporting Rabbi Johanan: If a man erred and did not say the afternoon Tefillah, he says it twice in the evening, and we do not apply here the principle that if the day has passed the offering lapses. An objection was raised: That which is crooked cannot be made straight, and that which is wanting cannot be numbered. 'That which is crooked cannot be made straight7; this applies to one who omitted the Shema' of the evening or the Shema' of the morning or the Tefillah of the evening or the Tefillah of the morning. 'And that which is wanting cannot be numbered7: this applies to one whose comrades formed a group to perform a religious act and he was not included with them.56» This passage comprises the principles fundamental to Jewish worship: Since sacrifices are rendered impossible by the destruction of the Temple, prayer has replaced these sacrifices. Within the context of the above quotation this entails chiefly that the prayers must be recited at the very moments where the corresponding sacrifices took place. This claim laid the foundation of the synagogue service, which, in turn, responds to the duty of collective worship. "Praying with comrades" is regarded as having a greater effect than praying alone (many prayers and above all the Torah portion cannot be recited without the presence of ten adult men). Through the influence of Ezekiel a similar strategy had been adopted in order to ensure the survival of the Jewish community in Babylon after the destruction of the first Temple. Saying that prayer replaces the sacrifices is apparently a clear form of duty-shift. However, since the rabbis of the Talmud had great difficulties affording the loss of the Temple, this shift has expressly been conceived as a provisional one. Therefore, the liturgy expresses the hope that once the Temple would be rebuilt. From the day the Temple service is re-inaugurated, prayer will lose its effectiveness. This position becomes thoroughly understandable if we consider the following saying of Rabbi Eleazar57: «From the day on which the Temple was destroyed the gates of prayer have been closed (...). But though the gates of prayer are closed, the gates of weeping are not closed, as it says, Hear my prayer, O Lord, and give ear to my cry; keep not silence at my tears.» Here we encounter the very starting point of Holdheim's theological development. In an unambiguous allusion to the saying of Rabbi Eleazar, Holdheim declared that the destruction of the Temple «pulled down the wall between the heart of the divine Father and the hearts of men58». He goes even so far as to say:

56 Berachot, 26c. 57 Berachot, 32b; Baba Metzia, 59a.. 58 Der Gedächtnistag der Zerstörung Jersualems in Jüdische Predigten, p. 98.

15 «With the downfall of sacrificial worship and the Jewish state, the way to a higher historical development of Judaism had been opened, so that our religiosity is a purer one, our religious freedom a more solid one59».

The Gates of Prayer To Holdheim, the fire which destroyed the altar did not close the gate of prayer, but opened it. He vehemently rebutted the Talmudic saying that prayers are a mere surrogate for the offerings. Prayer has a value in its own. It needs no other legitimation or valorization. The hope expressed in the Talmud and in the liturgy that once the Temple would be restored, does not accord with the «higher level» of morality and humanity which Jews have achieved during the past 17 centuries in the diaspora. If there is ever to be a Messianic era, it will not be marked by the restoration of archaic rituals, but by the adherence of the entire humanity to the Abrahamic monotheism. To put it in the terms of my introduction: according to Holdheim the duty-shift from sacrifice to prayer should not be regarded as provisional but as definite. Hence, the duty-shift (from sacrifice to prayer) should also be a value-shift. Thereby, sacrifice becomes a metaphor for prayer. In his sermons on this matter, Holdheim deals with the "inner sacrifice" which entails the sacrifice of selfishness. From a Talmudic standpoint, in contrast, the duty-shift (from sacrifice to prayer) does not go together with a value-shift, since sacrifices remain a central value in Mosaic cult, the fulfillment of which can be postponed for compelling reasons, but never abrogated. Thus, in traditional Judaism, the relation between offerings and prayers seems to be metonymical, a part of the Temple worship being taken as the accomplishment of the entire ritual (an in-depth discussion of this relation follows in the next paragraph). By claiming that prayer must replace sacrifices, Holdheim argues, the rabbis of the Talmud made a significant step toward internalization, the importance of which they ignored. Holdheim remarks bitterly that the rabbis were taught to pray by need (die Not lehrte die Rabbinen beten60).

Some Precedents for Holdheim's View But is all this so world-shaking? Certainly not. Holdheim's conception of the offerings as a stage in the development of mankind pointing to a superior form of worship had already been formulated in Maimonides' philosophical work, to which Holdheim refers incidentally. As to the prophets, apart from Ezekiel, they battled unanimously against holding the offerings in too high esteem. The rejection of Jewish particularism and Holdheim's view on the mission of Judaism

59 «Mit dem Untergang des Opferdienstes und des jüdischen Staates ist die Bahn der höheren geschichtlichen Entwicklung und Fortbildung des Judentums gebrochen worden, so dass unsere Religiösität eine viel reinere, unsere religiöse Freiheit eine festere geworden.» (op. cit. p. 98.) 60 Das Zeremonialgesetz im Messiasreich, p. 15.

16 among the gentiles goes back to Isaiah (56,7). As to the blessing which expresses the hope of restoration of the Temple, it has already been removed from the prayerbooks by Abraham Geiger, Reform-rabbi at the synagogue of Hamburg-Altona. Regarding the presumed underestimation of prayer, the Talmud which comprises at least five centuries of reflection and discussion is not as unanimous as Holdheim tried to make us believe. Besides, there has never ever been a serious desire for the reconstruction of the Temple and the re- establishment of animal sacrifices among Jewry in the Diaspora. One wonders whether Holdheim was not battling against an element of Jewish collective imagination, constitutive of collective identity but unrelated to concrete behavior. In the very fact, however, Holdheim attacked the core of rabbinic Judaism. This will become more clear as soon as we consider the dogmatic and pragmatic consequences of the issue whether prayer replaces sacrifice provisionally or definitely. We have already dealt with the emotional reluctance of the rabbis to give the synagogue-worship the status of the Temple service. The loss of the latter was a source of too great a distress to make possible an unreserved evaluation of its surrogate. But, from a pragmatic point of view there is more than meets the eye. To clarify this I will first discuss the traditionalist view on the Temple. Subsequently I shall examine Holdheim's position.

The Traditionalist View on Temple and Synagogue If we want to measure up to the orthodox position regarding the relation between synagogue and Temple, between prayer and sacrifice, we must draw a distinction between "replacement" and "substitution". Prayers replace sacrifices the way a surrogate does, they do not substitute for them. The synagogue has never been considered as a new Temple, not even as a kind of temple. This urges the question: Why not? The following arguments could be adduced against treating the Temple as a metaphor. First, there is the ontological status of the Temple (and of religious matters in general). What has been established by God cannot be abrogated by man. This state of affairs deals intimately with the notion of replacement. The following example could clarify the meaning of this term. An ambassador cannot be regarded as a "king", or "president", even in cases where he enjoys the same powers. This case can easily be grasped in terms of value-shift and duty-shift. An Ambassador or minister can be granted some power of attorney by virtue of a duty-shift or duty-extension, but not by virtue of a value-extension or value-shift, since there will never be equality in rank. The same holds true of the relation between synagogue and Temple. Synagogue worship, even when it exerts the same effect (such as operating atonement), can only replace the Temple. The synagogue cannot be regarded as being a temple. Second, the Israelites were enjoined to erect only one temple, that of Jerusalem, whereas there is not the slightest restriction on building synagogues. This uniqueness of the Temple, once more, indicates its preciousness. By using the word Temple as a metaphor one would confer the same degree of preciousness to the many synagogues, a situation which can even be regarded as a logical impossibility.

17 To give a provisional definition of the concept of replacement in the terms of my introduction: There has been a duty shift from Temple to synagogue, but there has never been a value-shift, the Temple being an irreplaceable value and an entity of a totally different order. Third, the saying that prayer «replaces» sacrifices does not entirely accord with the real state of affairs. Taken out of its context it could mean that there is a clear duty-shift from sacrifice to prayer. Though the synagogue has not the same rank as the Temple, at least the duty of praying could be regarded as a substitute for the duty of offering. However, one could even go further and declare that even that is not true. As we have previously observed, the saying that prayers replace sacrifices figures within a passage which stipulates the moments of the day at which prayers should be said. Hence, the duty under concern is that of reciting prayers at the very moments at which the corresponding sacrifices had to be performed. There has been no question about any other analogy between prayers and offerings. Apart from that, prayers cannot replace sacrifices in the sense that they stand for another ritual (e.g. offerings), since, during the existence of the Temple, they were already a part of that rite, the offerings having always been accompanied by prayers. Long before the destruction of the Temple there already was a long and extremely rich tradition of prayers, as is attested by the books of Psalms. So, what really happened after the destruction of the Temple, was that one (admittedly subordinate) part of the Temple service, the only one that could still be performed, came to be considered as representing the entire service. To that end, the liturgy of the synagogue (which had already come into being during the first exile), had been worked out. In order to ensure the closest similarity with the Temple service the services of the synagogue were held at the same time as the offerings and were given the same names (Shaharit [morning], Musaf [additional], Minha [afternoon], Ne'ilat She'arim [closing of the Temple gates] or Ma'ariv [in the evening]). Thus, the relation between prayer and sacrifice can be seen as analogical, since each synagogal service recalls the corresponding Temple service. But it has also a conspicuously metonymic (synecdochic) character, since a part of the Temple service (e.g. prayers) comes to stand for the entire service (e.g. offerings and prayers). Hence, a major difference between metaphor and metonymy lies in the fact that within metonymic relationships there is neither value- extension (or value-shift) nor duty-extension (or duty-shift)61. Hence, the term «replacement» first and foremost expresses the hope that God will content Himself with the prayer of man. To be sure, from a strictly semantic point of view, there is still no fundamental objection against the metaphorization of the Temple, otherwise Holdheim's position would

61 Metaphors can have a value-assigning function. Metonymy and synecdoche can have a similar effect, but here things are somewhat different. At first glance, "gold" instead of "money" seems to be a perfect example for a value-assigning metonymy. In my view, this is not the case. The word "gold" has only a value-reminding function, not a value-assigning one. It reminds us that in former times coins were made of gold; or to put it more abstractly, that a given sum of money represents a certain amount of gold. Hence, this relationship is determined in advance and not established by the figure of speech.

18 lack the prerequisite of its linguistic possibility. Moreover, the rabbinic term for prayer is "avodah shel-ha-lev" [service of the heart], which, in turn, can serve as a convincing argument in favor of treating the Temple and the offerings as metaphors. But, in the main, the issue under concern presents us with a dogmatologic and pragmatic issue.

The Possible Pragmatic Consequences of Treating Sacrifice as a Metaphor Supposing that the loss of the Temple would cease to be felt as irreparable, the pragmatic consequences would be tremendous and could even be terrifying. Because in this case sacrifice, until then limited to animal sacrifices, could be extended to other regions, affecting the health, the wealth and the happiness of the disoriented worshippers. This would urge the question to what extent the duty of "sacrifice" could be extended. To the realm of the human life? As everybody knows, the story of the binding of Isaac (Hebrew: akeda) denotes the prohibition of human sacrifices. Like no other religion Judaism had to fight against this practice, widespread among the Canaanite and Phoenician population. Christianity, in stating that with the God-sacrifice sacrifices would be abolished once and for all, has found a strategy against the seduction of human sacrifice62. But in Judaism this kind of response to the question of how to worship after the destruction of the Temple does not exist. Thus, the sole prevention of an uncontrollable and dangerous extension of sacrificial attitudes such as self-mutilation and even human sacrifice was the dogmatic statement that prayer «replaces» sacrifice. In the same line of thought, animal sacrifice, though archaic from a modern viewpoint, is to be considered as an inestimable progress in human history, the sacrifice of animals being a substitute for that of humans as suggested by the foundational myth of the binding of Isaac (Gen. 22,13).

Holdheim's Hegelian Response Holdheim concerned himself much with the Christian attitude toward sacrifice. In Christianity, he said, sacrifice has been abolished by the crucifixion. This was, on the one hand, a relief, but on the other hand it strengthened the ontological status of sacrifice, reinforcing the idea that sin can only be forgiven by shedding blood. According to Holdheim, sacrifice should be deprived of this privileged status and prayer should be valued as having the same -if not greater- force to achieve atonement. Thus, Holdheim, contrary to traditionalism, regarded the Temple service as reflecting a conception of atonement characteristic of its time. His Hegelian background did the rest. Since, according to Hegel, there is an evolution in the perception of truth throughout time, prayer could be regarded as a worship of the same order as the Temple service, having the same force, but with an even stronger metaphysical foundation (within the Hegelian system, all that comes later in the course of History is closer to truth).

62 The fact that such a seduction exists has been brilliantly expressed in literature by the play of Tenessee Williams, Suddenly last Summer.

19 Holdheim's Emphasis on Atonement Until now we have dealt only with the evaluation of prayer and sacrifices respectively. The question arises: are there no cognitive elements (i.e. pertaining to the nature of both sacrifice and prayer) involved in that metaphorical process of internalization? Not to Holdheim, who departed from the ontological premiss that the nature of a thing can only be defined by its effects and that for this reason the Temple service cannot have precedence over prayer, since both have the power of atonement. His major argument is precisely that traditional Judaism did not draw the conclusions from its own ontology63. Although only replacing sacrifices and not substituting for them, prayer has been ascribed the same powers as the shedding of the blood of bulls, cows, sheep, goats and turtles. Even the rabbis of the Talmud agreed that one can be redeemed through prayer. So, why then cling to the replacement-dogma, why not come to terms with the ideal of the Temple and say that, once and for all, prayers make up a worship of the same or even a higher order? Why look out for these «old crutches» (sic!), which in reality were discarded eighteen centuries ago? With these very crutches on which Judaism limpingly showed the way to the other nations, Holdheim complains, it is now lagging behind humanity64. This makes clear that, to Holdheim, the whole issue depends only on evolving standards of value and not on

63 »Die Rabbinen sprechen also im Namen Gottes die Ansicht aus, daß die Idee der Sühne nicht absolut an die Opfer geknüpft sei, daß Gott die Notwendigkeit der Sühne durch Opfer nur an das Bestehen des Tempels mit dem Opferritus beschranke, daß zu allen Zeiten, wo dieser nicht existiert, Gott die Sünden durch etwas anderes - sei es das Lesen der Opferkapitel in der Schrift oder was sonst, immer ist es ein Anderes - vergeben wolle. Was das Andere für ein Ding sei, kann uns gleichgültig sein; genug es ist ein Ding, welches sühnende Kraft hat, ohne ein Opfer zu sein. Für uns ist die Ansicht wichtig, daß nach den Rabbinen, Gottes eigenen Ausspruche zufolge, ein unkörperliches Ding, das weder Blut, noch Fleisch, noch Fett, sondern eine geistige Tat des menschlichen Willens und Gemüths ist, welches ohne geheiligten Altar, ohne geweihten Priester aus dem Stamme Aharon, kurz ohne alle die Bedingungen, welche bei dem in der Bibel vorgeschriebenen Opfer notwendig sind, so gut wie ein wirkliches Opfer von Fleisch und Blut, oder ein unblutiges Speiseopfer mit Weihrauch und Öl, so gut wie das heilige Raucherwerk sühnende Kraft habe und des Menschen Sünde vor Gott tilgen könne. Uns ist es lediglich um die eine wichtige Idee zu tun, daß auch in dem religiösen Bewußtsein der Rabbinen das Wesen der Sühne aus dem dem Kreise der äußerlichen Werke herausgetreten und eine innerliche Tat des Gemüts geworden ist.» (Das Zeremonialgesetz im Messiasreich, p. 13.) 64 «Wenn wir also der rabbinischen Grundansicht die unsrige entgegensetzen und ihnen gegenüber mit aller Entschiedenheit eines zur Klarheit gekommenen religiösen Bewußtseins behaupten: die Kulturgeschichte des menschlichen Geschlechts drehe sich nicht in einem ewigen Zirkel und es könne unmöglich in den Planen der Vorsehung liegen, die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Judentums, nachdem es die Welt besiegt und erobert haben wird, wieder auf jene Stufe der nationalen Beschranktheit und der Isolierung zurückzuführen; daß nur der menschliche Leib nicht aber der Menschengeist altert und dieser nie, nachdem er an Weisheit und Erkenntnis zum Marine erstarkt ist, wieder zum Kinde werde, daß das Judentum also nimmer mehr ein langst überschrittenes Stadium der Entwicklung als die Summe vieltausendjähriger Erfahrung und Reife sein ewiges Anteil und seinen bleibenden Gewinn nennen werde; daß wir an einen absoluten Fortschritt des menschlichen Geschlechts glauben und nach den messianischen Verheißungen gottbegeisterter Seher das Judentum als den Vorkampfer und Herold desselben betrachten, daß es, einmal mit dem ganzen menschlichen Geschlecht zum Marine erkräftigt, nimmer mehr die vor Jahrtausenden weit hinweg geworfenen Krücken hervorsuchen, und, start wie es ehedem mittelst dieser Krücken gehen lernend, der Menschheit voranging, jetzt derselben nachhinken werde.» (Das Zeremonialgesetz im Messiasreich, p. 8)

20 the nature (i.e. effect) of prayer and Temple worship. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, in his discussions about prayer and sacrifice, Holdheim always focusses on their power of atonement. This could be sensed as a narrowing view, for the function of offerings was not confined to atonement (there were also peace-offerings, and those brought as thanks). Furthermore, Holdheim overlooks that sin-offerings could only be brought for a sin committed inadvertently, whereas prayer can atone for all sins (especially during the ten days of penitence between Rosh-ha-Shana and Yom Kippur). Most significantly the theme of Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement) predominates in Holdheim's thinking65. Without this focus on atonement, Holdheim's position cannot be grasped66 in its full scope.

Provisional Summary To summarize Holdheim's reasoning: − Even from a Talmudic viewpoint, both sacrifices and prayers exert the same effect (e.g. atonement). − The Temple service was the paramount form of worship in its time. − The Talmudic saying that prayers «replace» sacrifices represents a move towards internalization, the historical consequences of which were blocked by the rabbinic authorities. − In modern times, prayer is to be valued as a more elevated form of worship than sacrifices. There are two possible conceptions of prayer that can be derived from this set of affirmations. 1° Since the Temple service has been the paramount value in its time it can still be used as a metaphor conveying the past glory of Temple service to prayer. Prayer could be regarded as the new embodiment of an antiquated rite. The peculiarity of this kind of value-shift lies in its dependence on a view of history as a progress. 2° But there is also a second possible view on prayer and liturgy, which can be derived from the affirmation that there is a real value-shift from sacrifice to prayer, depriving the Temple service of its original status. Since the Temple service is no longer a value, prayer could be regarded as a value in its own right, which does not require any legitimation from

65 Insofar as Holdheim's sermons are concerned, this is quite natural, since an important part of the Torah portions read on this day deal with sacrifices (e.g. the portions of Shaharit and Mussaf). Hence, most of the sermons that Holdheim devoted to the sense of the offerings brought in the Temple were held at Yom Kippur. The fact that Holdheim's orientation towards the Kippur experience is not merely occasional (even the most modest rabbi delivers a sermon on that day) is illustrated in his seminal essay Das Zeremonialgesetz im Messiasreich, where the idea of atonement figures as the starting point of his reasoning. 66 «Allein es kann doch nicht geleugnet werden, daß die Idee der Sühne durch Opfer der Mittelpunkt des ganzen mosaischen Kultus und wie das ganze Leben unter der Sünde steht, so auch der ganze Kultus eine fortlaufende Expiation durch Opfer sei.», Das Zeremonialgesetz im Messiasreich, p. 11.

21 outside. Thus, considering the Temple service as a metaphor for prayer would be senseless, since a value-assigning metaphor makes sense only when the subsidiary subject (e.g. the Temple service) is still regarded as the embodiment of a value.

The Issue of Communal Worship It is no accident that both lines of thought are represented in Holdheim's writings. On the one hand, Holdheim endeavors to disconnect prayer from sacrifice. One of his arguments against the "replacement"-dogma is: "Why replace something that God does not want?67". Other consequences of this replacement-dogma are that prayers should be held at the very times the sacrifices were brought and that they should be recited in Hebrew instead of the vernacular language. "We live in the present and we pray in the past", Holdheim complains68. Prayer should be freed from nostalgia and come to be considered as an independent form of worship. It ought to be joyful, and pervaded by a spirit of forgiveness freeing our heart from any grief against our fellow-men. Finally, remembering Isaiah's verse "My house shall be called a house of prayer for all nations" (Isaiah, 56,7), Holdheim expects from liturgy that it should invite non-Jews to join Jews in prayer69. On the other hand this absolute view on prayer without reference to the Temple service would lack the basis of its obligation. Of course, it would be more close to the spirit of some ancient psalms (though not all), but there is no constraint to recite them apart from those which entered the liturgy. Hence, there must be a relation between prayer and the ancient sacrifice; otherwise there would be no compelling reasons for erecting synagogues and attending services. It is no accident that, especially in his works written during his ministry in the Berlin Reform synagogue, Holdheim characterized prayer as a kind of offering. But a sacrifice of what? Holdheim answers: «God expects only love, not sacrifices, not the blood and the fat of the animals or of the animal body but the sacrifice of the animal spirit, the offering of selfishness and passion!70»

67 Vorträge über die mosaische Religion für denkende Israeliten, p. IX Footnote Nr.l. 68 Die wesentlichen Erfordernisse eines ächt jüdischen Gottesdienstes, Berlin 1850 (Verlag L. Lassar), p. 11. 69 Die wesentlichen Erfordernisse eines ächt jüdischen Gottesdienstes, Berlin 1850 (Verlag L. Lassar), p. 14. 70 «Gott verlangt nur Liebe, nicht Opfer, nicht das Blut und Fett der Tiere oder des tierischen Leibes, sondern das Opfer des tierischen Sinnes, das Opfer der Selbstsucht und Leidenschaft!», Die rechte Buße, Predigt gehalten am Versöhnungsfeste 5611 (16. September 1850), Berlin 1850 (Verlag von Leopold Lassar).

22 The Inner Sacrifice In this passage value-shift and duty-shift coincide, generating for the first time a clear (value- and duty-ascribing) metaphor, defining the inner duty that supplants the outer duty of sacrificing animals. What is to be sacrificed in Holdheim's internalized worship is selfishness and passion (Leidenschaft). Three years later, in a sermon on humility, Holdheim underpins his view on prayer as inner sacrifice with a reference to the very same Talmud (although in his earlier writings he charged it with religious formalism, going even so far as to suggest that the Gospels are in no way inferior to it71). In a homiletical salto mortale he goes back to the following passages of the Talmudic tractate Sanhedrin. «R. Joshua b. Levi said; He who sacrifices his [evil] inclination and confesses [his sin] over it, Scripture imputes it to him as though he had honored the Holy One, blessed be He, in both worlds, this world and the next; for it is written, Whoso offereth the sacrifice of confession honoureth me.» (Sanhedrin 43b). «R. Joshua ben Levi also said: When the Temple was in existence, if a man brought a burnt offering, he received credit for a burnt offering; if a meal offering, he received credit for a meal offering; but he who was humble in spirit, Scripture regarded him as though he had brought all the offerings, for it is said, The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit72. And furthermore, his prayers are not despised, for it is written, A broken and contrite heart, O God, Thou wilt not despise73» (Sanhedrin 44a) These quotations are very significant, since they appear in a volume of sermons in which Holdheim endeavors to demonstrate that his vision of an inner Judaism is not borrowed from Christianity but rooted in Ancient Judaism and that the legalistic aspect is the mere embodiment of a religion of love, humility and loving-kindness. Even more significant is the way Holdheim paraphrases these sayings, compressing them in the following way: «Who slaughters his sinful urge, who sacrifices his passion and, in doing this, confesses his sins will be rewarded as if he had brought all the offerings»74. Note that the link between the sacrifice of the evil inclination and the offerings of the Temple has been established by Holdheim and not by Rabbi Joshua ben Levi. In the present quotation from the Talmud even humility, though held in high esteem, is not presented as a state of mind making the sacrifices superfluous. The equivalence between the sacrifice of the evil inclination, humility and the Temple service is only suggested by Holdheim's free rendering. Holdheim's reading of this Talmudic passage illustrates in an unparalleled way

71 Geschichte der Entstehung und Entwicklung der jüdischen Reformgemeinde zu Berlin, Berlin 1857, p. 137. 72 Ps. 51,19 73 Ps. 51,19 74 «Wer seinen sündigen Trieb schlachtet, seine Leidenschaft opfert und darüber seine Sünden bekennt, dem wird's angerechnet als hatte er sämtliche Opfer dargebracht.», Predigten über die jüdische Religion, p. 87.

23 that he must have sensed the metaphorization of the sacrifices as an indispensable moment in his move towards interiority. Regarding the question of what is to be understood by «the sacrifice of the evil inclination» great difficulties arise. In the first place the Talmudic text itself presents us with a problem, since the Talmud adopts an altogether more subtle view on the dark side of the human soul. The evil inclination (yetzerhara) is mainly regarded as an aspect of his being which man should neither ignore nor suppress, but which he ought to transform into the motor of his good deeds. The Yoma tractate (the tractate which deals with the Day of Atonement and, consequently, with issues of sin and innocence) tells the story that in the time of Ezra the rabbis imprisoned the evil desire for three days, then looked in the whole land of Israel for a fresh egg and could not find one (Yoma 69 b). Thus, the evil inclination is something we must overcome but not destroy. The Talmudic adage «The greater the man the greater his evil inclination» [Sukka, 52 a] illustrates, once again, that our dark side must be used in order to achieve progress. The saying of Rabbi Joshua ben Levi is the only one that deals with a so-called suppression (e.g. sacrifice) of the evil inclination. This could be clarified by the context in which his saying figures as aggadic material: it deals with capital punishment and the confession of sins before death. The Mishna which follows immediately after the sayings of Rabbi Joshua states that he who confesses before being put to death «has a portion in the world to come» (Sanhedrin 43b). Therefore, it is plausible that the aforementioned saying refers to the exceptional situation of a person who at the end of his life regrets all his evil doings75 Thus Holdheim, in trying to find a Talmudic basis for his internalization of the sacrifices, refers to a passage which can in no way be regarded as representative for the rabbinic thought. Now the question arises what this "sacrifice of the evil inclination" means within Holdheim's own thought. We shall try to shed light on this claim by examining its dogmatic and pragmatic consequences.

IV. Docmatic and Pragmatic Consequences of Holdheim's Internalization In his radical internalization of the Temple service which leads him to internalize even the notion of sacrifice, Holdheim's doctrine definitely conflicts with a long Jewish tradition regarding the way in which man should cope with his pulsions. In short: Holdheim makes an attempt on the core of the libidinal balance which is peculiar to the Jewish way of living and which has meanwhile been generalized through psychoanalysis. To be sure, Holdheim showed himself unable to keep to his idea. In other sermons the classical notion of transformation of the evil inclination reappears.

75 I am indebted to Rabbi A. Dahan for this clarification.

24 Religion as the «Right Cast of Mind» The idea of suppressing the evil inclination entails the valorization of positive emotions, intentions and inclinations. This is exactly what Holdheim aimed at. In the same volume in which Holdheim provides a Talmudic basis for his radical internalization of the Temple service, he characterizes Judaism as a religion of the spirit, of the heart and of love76. To those who object that this love must nevertheless manifest itself through the observation of the divine commandments, Holdheim answers: «Nevertheless love itself, apart from its expression, is enjoined as a feeling in the same way as the feeling of hatred against our brother, apart from evil doings, is forbidden as a non-divine feeling. Love without action is a soul without a body, which in the realm of mankind is without practical significance, but the action without love is a body without a soul, which in the Kingdom of God is without any value77.» This is to say that true religion aims at the production of «good» feelings and at the suppression of the «bad» ones. In the same line of thinking Holdheim demands from religion that it generate the right cast of mind (Gesinnung). The importance of inner devotion has never been ignored by traditional Judaism, certainly not in East European circles. Therefore we could even safely say that Holdheim's inner Judaism is deeply rooted in the notion of kavanah, which means fervor in prayer. Nevertheless, the Mosaic ethics, by virtue of their legalistic articulation, do not aim at the inner aspect of man, but confine themselves to his deeds. As a result, the freedom of feeling and thinking has even come to be regarded as a peculiarity of Jewish religion. To be sure, even Holdheim repeatedly insisted on this freedom; but this claim seems to be as problematic as the one adopted by Moses Mendelssohn, who asserted that the freedom of thinking can perfectly go together with the strict obedience to the Mosaic law - a position which Holdheim incidentally severely criticized.

Holdheim's Universalistic Outreach On the other hand the move towards internalization frees Judaism from particularism and enables it to become a religion that appeals to every human being. Emotions can be shared under all circumstances. Holdheim claimed that Jewish services should be celebrated in a way that could attract non-Jews. Holdheim's ambitions regarding this universalistic outreach

76 «Auf das Gebot der Gottesliebe lasset heute unser Augenmerk gerichtet sein, auf diese kostbare Perle in der mit unauslöschlichem Glanz strahlenden Krone des Judentums, auf dieses älteste Zeugnis, daß die mosaische Religion eine Religion des Geistes und des Herzens, eine Religion der Liebe sei.» Predigten über die jüdische Religion, p. 37. 77 «Nichtsdestoweniger ist die Liebe selbst, von ihrer Betätigung abgesehen, als Gefühl geboten, wie das Gefühl des Bruderhasses, von feindseligen Werken abgesehen, als ungöttliches Gefühl verboten ist. Die Liebe ohne Tat ist Seele ohne Körper, die in einem Menschenreich ohne praktische Bedeutung ist, aber auch die Tat ohne Liebe ist Körper ohne Seele, der in einem Gottesreich wertlos ist.», Predigten über die jüdische Religion, pp. 41-42.

25 are not to be underestimated. If Jews had been able to detach themselves from the Temple service, Holdheim said, Christendom would never have had the opportunity to become a world religion78. Holdheim was convinced that, in an enlightened world, Judaism is more suited (and more likely) to become the universal religion on the account of its more rational character. This is the very reason why Holdheim never worried about the offspring of mixed couples. He was convinced that if a child were given a choice between Christianity and Judaism, he would opt for the latter79. In his sermon held at the celebration of a marriage between a Jewish man and a Christian woman, Holdheim concludes with the following passionate words, leaving no doubt about the ambitious width of his universalistic outreach and his willingness to make substantial dogmatic concessions: «There is only one God and Father, and there is only one chosen people, which God loves in a preferential way, a people which is God's property, the human race.80» Holdheim knew only too well what he destroyed by saying this. According to his own words he tried to pull away the stone which covered the source of true and living Judaism81, so that Jews and non-Jews alike could drink from it82. And he was convinced that this source would never dry up83.

78 «Hätte man die Idee des Judentums geistig erfaßt, geistig fortgebildet, den Opferdienst hundert Jahre fruher abgeschafft und die "Anbetung Gottes im Geiste und Herzen," wie die Propheten sie lehrten, als das Höchste in der Vordergrund gestellt, das Judentum hätte sicherlich nicht eine neue Religion aus seinem Schoße geboren werden sehen, die eine so feindliche Stellung zu demselben einnahm, sondern hätte sich selbst wie ein Geistesstrom über die Völker ergossen, hätte den Ruhm, die heidnischen Altare zu stürzen, nicht fremden Händen und fremden Namen überlassen müssen.», Die Wesentlichen Erfordernisse eines ächt jüdischen Gottesdienstes, p.8. 79 «Wir trauen auf der anderen Seite gleichfalls im Ernst der überzeugenden Kraft unseres Glaubens, daß wir gar nicht zweifeln, daß Kinder aus einer gemischten Ehe zwischen Juden und Nichtjuden sich unbedingt dem jüdischen Glauben zuwenden müssen (...)», Das Religiöse und das Politische im Judenthum. Mit besonderer Beziehung auf gemischte Ehen, Schwerin (Kûrschner'sche Buchhandlung) 1845, p. 87. 80 «Es gibt. nur Einen Gott und Vater, und es gibt nur Ein auserwähltes, vorzüglich geliebtes Volk Gottes, Volk des göttlichen Eigentums, das Geschlecht der Menschenkinder», Einsegnung einer gemischten Ehe, Berlin 1849. 81 Predigten über die jüdische Religion, p. 161. 82 See his sermon Das Judentum unter dem Bilde eines Brunnens, in: Predigten über die jüdische Religion, pp. 160-172. 83 «Noch kann es [das Judentum] nicht daran denken; mit anderen Bekenntnissen zu verschmelzen, irgend eine seiner eigentümlichen Anschauungen zum Opfer zu bringen, damit die anderen sich ihm nahren (nähern?). Es gilt vielmehr, die Kraft, die Gotteskraft des Judentums in ihrer Reinheit und Wahrheit den Volkern als Leuchte vorzuhalten, damit sie nicht glauben und sprechen, das Judentum sei eine seit beinahe zwei Jahrtausenden überwundene Bildungsstufe, an welche die erleuchtete Menschheit der Gegenwart nicht anknüpfen könne. Es gilt, meine Freunde, den Volkern zu zeigen, daß so Vieles auch schon aus dem Brunnen des Judentums geschöpft worden, dieser noch lange nicht erschöpft sei und noch reiche Quellen in sich trage und berge, um den Geistes- und Wissensdurst einer ganzen Welt zu stillen und zu befriedigen.», op. cit. p. 164.

26 Another consequence of Holdheim's internalization is that, according to his view, the Jewish religion should no longer be sensed as a yoke84. The Divine Will should not be honored as being alien to the human will; on the contrary it must rise from the depth of the worshipper's soul85. Or to put it in philosophical terms: the divine law should not be experienced as heterogeneous to our being, but as homogeneous to it. This indicates the inclusion of the Greek ideal of autonomy which culminated in Hegel's philosophy. According to Holdheim the ceremonial law was not yet considered as a yoke in the time of Moses, but rather as a «soft rope of love», not an external constraint but an inner conviction. However, in the meantime, man has changed. «We did not die for the Law,» Holdheim argues, «but the Law died fo us»86. At the present time, ritual observance according to traditionalist standards must be discarded as superstition.

Ethic as the «True Offering» In his ethics Holdheim's emphasis on autonomy leads to an emphasis on the moral duties of each individual. Ethical behavior is individual and not collective behavior. Once again the Temple as a metaphor reappears: At the outset of his sermon on the ethical duties of the individual Holdheim characterizes him as "a Temple and altar of God" where the desires and passions are burnt87 . The question arises what Holdheim regards as the principles of ethical behavior. Holdheim mostly deals with the right feelings and the right cast of mind. Regarding their expression through behavior, Holdheim is less explicit, at least in his doctrinal statements. This is no accident, since in Holdheim's view, the ethical act (die sittliche Tat) can be defined through the feelings and attitudes that bring it forth, such as philanthropy, loving-kindness and charity. It seems as if Holdheim's thought achieved the internalization of sacrifice in its full meaning only towards the end of his life. At this time he developed a sacrificial attitude. He regarded the sacrifice of our life, our health and our wealth for the sake of humanity as the «true offering» (das wahre Opfer). In his own terms: «If we regard prayer as a higher form of worship than sacrifice, we mean only the sacrifice brought on the altar, the sacrifice of animals, the sacrifice of an earthly good, [which is] the symbol of the real offering, the symbol of the actual dedication of the whole life and of everything that conveys a value to it to God. By this real sacrifice, I do not only mean that of all our desires and passions, but also that of all the other things which the sheer human spirit loves and honors, the sacrifice of health and life, of splendor and glory, which the most noble man is able to bring for the well-being of humanity, this sacrifice is

84 Predigten über die jüdische Religion, p. 46. 85 Predigten über die jüdische Religion, p. 39. 86 «Nicht wir sind für das Gesetz, sondern das Gesetz ist für uns erstorben», Predigten über die jüdische Religion, p. 47. 87 Predigten über die jüdische Religion, p. 50.

27 infinitely higher than the sacrifice of the altar and even than prayer which took its place.88» In this context we encounter the pragmatic consequences of Holdheim's internalization of the Temple service. It generates a specific kind of ethics, not unfamiliar to Christianity. What is so strikingly paradoxical in Holdheim is the fact that while he strove to free Judaism from any metaphysical premiss that could justify the sacrifices of the ancient Temple (such as the belief that atonement is linked to the shedding of blood), he came to proclaim self-denial as a supreme value. This illustrates how powerful the internalization of a rite such as the Temple service can be. From a Jewish point of view, however, Holdheim's greatest deviation lies precisely in his exaltation of a sacrificial behavior (and not in the suppression of covering one's head, which has repeatedly been adduced as an indication of Holdheim's radicalism89). It is due to Holdheim's conception of Mosaic and Talmudic law as mere civil laws which have no bearing with religion and ethics. It may surprise some well-meaning readers, but Jewish ethics do not regard goodness as a virtue in its own right. Goodness must be counterbalanced by intelligence and psychological insight, otherwise it could be harmful to the benefactor and to those who should profit from his beneficence as well. Emmanuel Levinas90, who cannot be suspected of right-wing orthodoxy, even goes so far as to say that the function of Jewish law consists precisely in protecting man against his own altruism91. To avoid any misunderstanding about the Jewish notion of sacrifice I want to draw a clear distinction between sacrifices and sacrificial behavior. By sacrificing one devotes a part of one's wealth, strength and talents to worship. Sacrificial behavior, by contrast, is the giving up of one's entire wish for personal wealth, happiness and fulfilment for the presumed sake of humanity or worship.

88 «Wenn wir aber das Gebet höher stellen als das Opfer, so meinen wir nur das Altaropfer, das Tieropfer, das Opfer eines irdischen Guts, das Symbol des wirklichen Opfers, das Sinnbild der tatsächlichen Hingebung des ganzen Lebens und alles dessen, was ihm Wert gibt, an Gott. Dieses wirkliche Opfer, aber ich meine nicht nur der sämtlichen Begierden und Leidenschaften, sondern auch dessen, was der rein menschliche Sinn sonst liebt und ehrt, das Opfer an Gesundheit und Leben, an Ruhm und Glanz, welches der edelste Mensch für das Wohl der Menschen zu bringen im Stande ist, dieses Opfer steht unendlich höher als das Altaropfer und auch als das an dessen Stelle getretene Gebet.», Seeks Predigten, Berlin 1863 (im Selbstverlage der Witwe des sel. Verfassers), pp. 64-65. 89 Covering one's head is a custom (minhag), not a law. 90 Du Sacré au Saint, Editions de Minuit, Paris 1977, p. 21. 91 This aspect of Jewish law becomes particularly manifest in matrimonial law (the first mishnah of the Talmudic treatise on this subject sounds very matter-of- fact since it deals with the modalities of divorce). Marriage, indeed, is the situation par excellence where the temptation of giving up one's entire happiness for the benefit of the partner is actually present. Significantly Holdheim's heaviest criticism of rabbinic Judaism concerns its lenient attitude towards divorce.

28 Conclusion We can conclude that Holdheim's metaphorization (through internalization) of the sacrifices of the Temple has come to generate a sacrificial behavior which conflicts sharply with rabbinic ethics whose main concern is survival and the preservation of human life, starting with the preservation of one's own life as an instrument of God's will that may neither be weakened nor destroyed. In this regard the fact that traditional Judaism regarded the link between sacrifices and prayer as synecdochical (and not metaphorical) proves to be very circumspect from a pragmatic point of view. Certainly, by admitting only a duty-shift from sacrifice to prayer (and not a value-shift) rabbinic Judaism upholds a value with which today's worshippers can no longer truly identify themselves (e.g. animal sacrifices). But on the other hand it precludes that the Temple service comes to be internalized in its full weight and gravity. This is precisely what happened with Holdheim: Since he declared that there is a real value-shift from sacrifice to prayer, he was also bound to confer to the ensuing duty- shift a determination which went far beyond the original rabbinic conception. With the internalization of the Temple service, the act of sacrificing came also to be transferred to the realm of inner feelings. Subsequently, since Holdheim presupposed a direct relationship between feelings and deeds, the notion of sacrifice even became the basic principle of his ethics, generating an attitude of self-denial. As I previously said, Holdheim has often been compared to Paul of Tarsus. Since Paul there has never been a similar attempt to internalize and universalize the Jewish heritage until Holdheim's work. Conspicuously, in both cases the notion of sacrifice is central, as if it were impossible to universalize Judaism without being presented with the question of how to deal with sacrifice. Of course, after Samuel Holdheim Reform Judaism continued to develop, mainly in Protestant countries, without being permanently confronted with that issue. It must, however, also be noticed that, after Holdheim, Jewish Reform theology never reached such a degree of philosophical profoundness and intellectual honesty. The fact that, nowadays, Reform communities are returning to more traditional forms of worship is significant for today's doctrinal insecurity.

29