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Theses and Dissertations
1990 Northern Ireland, the search for a solution Anthony Joseph Killian Lehigh University
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• ' • • NORTHERN IRELAND: THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION • •
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Anthony Joseph Killian
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A Thesis
Presented to the Graduate Committee of Lehigh University
in Candidacy for the Degree of Master of Arts
in•
• Government • ____ )
Lehigh University
1989 •
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This thesis is accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts• in• Government.
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' ' CON T·E NT S
Abstract ...... •.....•...... 1
Introduction .....•. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3
I I. The Fall of the Old Regime. ••••••••• ...... 7 • II. The Ethnic Divide: Protestants and Catholics ...... 18
III: Britain and Direct Rule ...... •...... •...... 32
0 IV: Looking at Alternatives ...... 58 Conclusion ...... 78 Notes ...... •...... •...... I 83 Bibliography ...... 97
Biographical Note. ••••••••••••• • • • • • • • • • • • . .••..•..•• 103
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ABSTRACT ...
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After almost eighteen years of Direct Rule (1972 t~.,, 1989) in Northern Ireland by the British government, the problem of a solution to the Ulster crisis remains elusive. This paper examines alternatives to the status quo within the framework of an investigation into past British efforts to reach an end to both terrorism and the absence of ~ stability in Northern Ireland. It is contended that the
/ /' . problem of terrorism cannot be resolved without a political settlement.
After discussing the events that resulted in• • •• Britain's intervention in Northern Ireland, this paper takes a look at the main issues which separate the two ethnic groups in Ulster - Protestants and Catholics. The two groups are characterized by a· distinct history, political view, and (obviously) religion. Each has its own affect on the politics of today.
This is followed by an examination of British policies since 1972. Faced with increasiri~ sectarian violence and the int·ransigence of Northern politicians, British policies have taken a two-pronged track: poli.tical initiatives t.owcrrd
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reconciliation and policies to combat terrorism. This paper's examination of these policies shows that they have ·failed.The locus of this failure resides in Britain's lack of a long-term strategy toward a political solution. Instead, most of its energies have been directed toward combatting terrorism. Even so, Britain's approach has been uneven such that it ebbs and flows in response to dramatic terrorist events that result in the loss of life.
Four potential options are explored as alternatives to
the status·, quo in Ulster. These are devolution, integration, \
4 unification, and independence. These alternatives are
analysed in light of the intended and unintended
consequences(1 each may have for those that have a stake in
'11 Northern Ireland which, 'besides Britain, Ulster Protestants, and Catholics, includes the Republic of Ireland as well. Of the four options, it is concluded that the creation of an independent Ulster offers the best foundation on which to build peace.
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INTRODUCTION
..Y, Twenty years ago this August the British-" government I' sent its trgops to Northern Ireland hoping that the British
army would bring stability to a deeply chaot·ic situation. Three yea·rs later, in. 1972, terrorist violence was at its • • • height, and the prospects looked bleaker. The refusal by the devolved Northern Ireland Gove~~ment to willingly , .... cede its ..., power of law and··, order to the British Government forced British Prime Minister Edward Heath to abolish Northern Ireland's government. The period of Direct Rule began and it continues to this very day. ' Indeed, in the present day, the continued campaigns of Irish terrorists, the enormous number of fatalities and • • • 1nJur1es, and the social and economic• dislocation of
' . thousands, make the need for a solution to the Ulster crisis·
-,' urgent. Thus, to at:.tack the problem of governing " Ulster is
• to analyze a very current issue of today's political scene. This problem is a fascin~ting,_ intriguing one for the ·,
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student of politics for it bespeaks basic questions which are fundamental to an understanding of government and the need for consensus. The questions that this paper answers include: what should the status of Northern Ireland be vis- _,
~- . '( a-vis Great Brit~~in? vis-a-vis the Republic of Ireland? Should government in the six counties be one of majority \ , rule? or of shared powers among the parties~
These questions have plagued the British government and four prime ministers· for almost two decades. Most of the writers on the subject are pessimists who despair at finding answers. "The problem with Northern Ireland is there is no solution," it is sai·a. 9r, "Once ·you've solved the Irish question, the Irish change the question!" These are common holdings among academics, journalj_sts, and politicians close
. I to the Ulster scene. Yet, it is the continued violence / that • should prompt an unceasing search for 'a solution to the political instability that~characterizes the province. This paper examines political alternatives as possible solutions to a political settlement for Northern Ireland. It does so after an examination of the events that immediately preceded_Direct Rule, of the sectarian differences that shape ~ ,. the two ethrf:ip groups of Ulster (Catholic and Protestant),
'f and of th~ past British policies aimed at achieving both a political settlement and the.defeat of terrorism. It is hoped that the reader will ~e persuad~d that the best chance "'? of
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\ . . bringing normality to that corner of the island is an Ulster ... that is separate from both Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland. ,, .
1, Perhaps the most significant finding of this paper is that the failure of British policy in Northern Ireland rests
I primarily in the view that the most important problem in the • province is one of security, i.e. the need to combat ~' , terrorism. This. ll\Yopia is a barrier to the real root of the problem: the need for a political solution which will settle the issue of the status of Ulster in the United Kingdom:
Britain is hampered in its efforts by a cultural bias toward Uls.termen who are view as inferior to Britons. This is compounded by a visceral dislike of the IRA who antagonize , L the British to such an extent that London, as will be shown, tends to view· Pr<>testant extremists ( such as the UDA) as somewhat legitimate.
This paper takes the perspective that it is Britain that must take the initiative in solving the Ulster problem for two reasons. First, as the sovereign, Britain alone bears ultimate responsibility for the affairs of Ulster.
Historically, however, the U. K. () has tried its b ..est to
,,, overlook, this responsibility. Secondly, the absence of
British initiatives at finding a political solution in• 'Northern Ireland· simply underwri,tes the /Stagnation th,at '---··)
' characterizes the present political state of affairs.' In -
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this,·Britain appears: weak and weary from its difficulties. .. This only encourages • the extremist violence that all hope to avoid.
.. Good pol icy, however, is not grounded· on hope .. -- and inactivity. Rather, it i's based on an_ understanding of interest and desired goals. If Britain's interest is 1n• bringing stability to the province, a fresh. look at an old . .I problem would be beneficial. I._, •
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( Chapter I: The Fall of the Old Regime
,• ' Northern Ireland began its existence in- 1920 when, after years of struggle, --the twenty-six counties of Ireland that ) I make up the Republic of Ireland were granted independence
through the Government of Ireland Act. 1 Six of the nine counties that formed the province of Ulster were exempted from the plan of independence and were constituted as Northern Ireland with a devolved government that would rule in the new statelet as to matters of local jurisdiction. Initially, the plan envisioned two parliaments in Ireland - one in Dublin and one in Belfast which would elect representatives to an all-Ireland parliament that would ..
govern in are~s, of common concern. Both new governments were given the option under the 1920 . ..,, Act of declaring against membership in the all-Ireland parliament, which is what the Northern parliament did. With that, a treaty was established
,til • between the South, which had become ~ the Irish• Free State, and , I the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
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'•, This tr.eaty, the Anglo-Irish Treaty, recognized a border that divided Ireland in two,parts; each has proceeded on its own distinct path.
Northern Ireland's government was styled after that.at Westminster and Whitehall. Elections were based on majority \ ...... , ...... ' rule, and a Government was formed by the majority party . ,. There was a cabinet of various ministers which was led by a prime minister. The monarch was represented by a royal governor. Since the creation of Northern Ireland was specifically designed to enable the Protestants, who are unionists, to have a dominant majority in the new province, Protestants formed the Government of Northern Ireland for fifty years without exception. ..
Uninterrupted unionist rule brought on abuses that .... impacted upon the Catholic minority. The latter felt the ill effects of being a politically unprotected minority as there
was discrimination with regard to housing and employment; a ,,'--" restriction on the local s.uffrage; and gerrymandering. These () conditions engendered hostilities between the two.,, ethnic
I I groups that continued, almost simmering, for over four \
decades. '
The contemporary period that is now eup11,emistically ' ·' ~ krtswn as "the Troubles" began with a civil rights ~ovement '\ ~hat sought to correct the societal imbalances in.Northern
• Ireland. ·In 1968, members of the catholic minority formed a r .. 8
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civil rights group called the Northern Ireland Civil Rights . Association (NICRA). The·Associati~n advocated change within the existing political system, -a novel approach at the time I, since Catholics historically denied the legitima~y of the I regime. ' NICRA called for an end to discrimination of Catholics in employment and housing, elimination of the Ulster Special Constabulary (called the "B Specials" - a Protestant civilian policing auxiliary whose only function was to beat up -Catholics), the abolishment of the Special 2 Powers Act , the redistribution of electoral boundaries, and the ending of restrictions on the suffrage. 3
Although predominantly Catholic, Enloe points out that Its founders intended it to be non communal, to join enlightened Catholics and Protestants in demanding that the Unionist party end its anti-democratic mode of government .... While it was true that the Catholics were the most legally deprived sector.of the population, • the civil rights spokesmen 'it. • • were arguing for the modernization of Ulster'sJ whole political system .... 4
Demonstrations by the members of NICRA occurred in 1968 and 1969. The Northern Ireland Prime Minister Terence O'Neill . was sympathetic to the pleas of NICRA and he martialed a fragile majority of his Unionist Party to institute 5 substantive reforms. But the marches were attended . with violence. Demonstrations in January_ and August, 1969; were met by Protestant extremists. Riots between the civil rights "-v activists and police erupted, anq during the latter occasion, when the Royal Ulster Constabulary was unable to control the
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situation, the "B Specials'' were mobilized and the result was
the burning to the ground • of 100 Catholic homes in Londonderry's Bogside district. 6 · During this-period, 1968 and 1969, the increasing level of violence was receiving international · media publicity.· International pressure was mounting on the United Kingdom government to take action. However, since 1920 Britain had
/> separqted itself from J the politics of Northern Ireland. A noted s-cholar of Northern Irish politics, Richard Rose, stated:
The creation of a Northern Ireland Parliament was .. welcomed as a means of getting Irish business of the House out of Commons. In 1923, the Spea~er of the House of Commons established a convention matters that should not be raised there that were within ' the responsibility of the· Stormont government. convention,, This was strictly adhered to for more four decades. 7 than The British civil service was unable to help because .... the Home Office staff dealing Ireland with Northern ... had been assimilated into the General Department, which covered such miscellaneous matters as London taxicabs, British Summer Time and state-owned pubs in Carlisle. 8 As a result of this political separation, the British were thus unp~epared to deal with events that _would occur as a - result of the civil ·rights movement. I The violence in Londonderry, and ' coincident riots in II Belfast, in August 1969 convinced Harold Wilson, " the prime minister of Britain, that British troops ¥I were required in Ulster to keep the 9 peace. Forces of tire British Arn1y arrived
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r· in Northern Ireland on August 14, 1969. O'Brien makes it • clear that the arrival of the army prevented a horrible human ; tragedy. He _states: ''· .. (T)here is no doubt that, had the British Government not intervened with its own forces, the Catholics of Belfast were in danger of decimation •.. 10 The arrival of British troops in Londonderry was a signal event in the history of Northern Ireland. First, deployment of the army represented a break with the past British practice of leaving Northern Ireland to itself. Although the Downing Street Declaration, a communique which set out Anglo-Ulster relation;S soon after military . ( intervention, declared that "resp6Q.¥bility for affairs in Northern Ireland is entirely a matter of domestic [i.e. Ulster] jurisdiction, 1111 the presence of the army ~eant that Westminster would be closely involved with policy matters, 'particularly those involving security and the powers of the police. Secondly, the arrival of the British Army ultimately (: presented a new raison d'etre for the Irish Republican Army. From 1962 to 1969, the IRA was inactive following a failed campaign that began in 1956 but was met with public indifference and governmental re_sistance by both Stormont and the Republic. 12 Thus, when the ri~ts of 1969 occurred, the " IRA was caught unprepared and could offer the Catholic population no defence from the Protestant extremism that
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13 greeted NICR.A and their demonstrations. . Initially, the .,· British Army's arrival was welc0med by the Catholic population who were, as was noted above, in severe peril. 14 l However, a political blunder occurred when operational
\ command of the troops >was given• over to the civilian authorities at Stormont. Soon this policy would prove detrimental to stability for as two observers noted: By leaving Stormont as the final authority in the province with its built-in Unionist majority, and by using the troops as the enforcers 1 of the final "'' authority, [the U.K. Government] ensured that ... people would associate the two things with 15 each other. ·
Catholics~ in their uncertainty about the disposition of the troops, turned to the IRA for help. I ' '
The Irish Republican Army
The Irish Republican Army is a group that follows in the long Irish tradition of political separatist violence. This tradition is an historic struggle for emancipation from British colonialism. Its origins began with Wolfe Tone and his Society of United Irishmen in the late eighteenth ce·ntury, continued through 1848 and the Irish Republican Brotherhood (whose members w~re called Fenians), reemerged in the acme Rule period as the Irish Volunteers, and then in .1916. when the Easter Rebellion occurred, the IRA was founged to lead the struggle for independence which resulted in th~
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I' I .... ' . ' .. birth of the Irish Free state. Thus political violence is very much.woven into the fabric of Iri~h nationalism, and thus lends cultural legitimacy to the IRA in its terrorist struggle against the British in Ulster. 16 the IRA was very much divided on In 1968-69, however, t, the issues of political efforts and whether to initiate a
I guerilla campaign. The internal debate forced a split, in December 1969, between two factions. The first of these was a minority who were sympathetic to Catholic calls for action, and to the idea that the British army and the Stormont regime were one and the same .. They decided to form the Provisional
,.. IRA (PIRA) with their sole purpose being to drive the British ' out of Northern Ireland and to bring Ulster into a united Ireland, by whatever means necessary. 17 The majority of the IRA was led by a more intellectual group which was steeped in Marxist ideology and the concept of a worker's revolution. It hoped to raise the political consciousness of the working class largely through its propaganda, although it also utilized force for various purposes. It's goal was to be the vanguard of a worker's revolution that would be prologue to a communist state. Because of the split and the formation of the Provisional IRA, the IRA became the Official IRA. 18 The rebirth of separatist violence in the campaign of the PIRA added a new dimension to the problem of government.
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,. in Northern Ireland. To what started as a political.movement . \ 'y-rl., /.~ -· l with expanding support 1 among the minority was added a terrorist campaign that proved difficult for the authorities to control. This campaign was- met by Protestant terrorist
groups such as the Ulster Volunteer Force and, later in 1972, the Ulster Defence Association. These militant Protestant groups had their own roots in the Home Rule period when Protestant militias sprang up to prevent Ulster from being included in a new separate Ireland. 19
Britain, meanwhile, continued to pressure the Stormont regime to implement reforms, most of which were along.... the lines advocated ' by NICRA. As a result, the "B Specials" were abolished, the Royal Ulster Constabulary was disarmed, restrictions on the suffrage were ended, and a Central • Housing Authority was created to eliminate the discrimination that had attended the distribution of new housing 20 developments. These efforts, one would think, should have
helped ameliorate the societal tensions tha-t existed 1n• Ulster. Yet, there was the other side of the ledger, the problem of increasing violence. Hillyard describes the dilemma:
(From 1969 to-1971] the·· strategy of the British government was 1 not to define the problem in terms of ·law and order but to deal with it at a number of different levels. On . the one hand, there was a J real attempt to correct the arbitrary· and inequitable administration.of criminal laws and to' establish institutions which would deal with the widespread problem of disqrimination. Liberal
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notions ..• were mobilised in support of reforms but no attempt was made to ensure that the notions were realised in practice .... on the other ~and~ the increasing violence on the streets, coupled with the demands of the Protestant community for tougher , measures, led to the development of a more coercive strategy to deal with the problem of violence. 21 ~ The lynchpin in this "coercive strategy" was the use of internment, that is the power to imprison suspected terrorists without warrant as provided by the Special Powers Act. The Northern Ireland Government used two i::easons to support its· use of internment. First, from January 1 to August 9, 1971, there had been a dramatic increase in the number of deaths and injuries. 22 Second, it was argued that ordinary processes . of law wer~ unable to overcome the "intimidatory pressures'' on JuriesI I from terroristic threats. 23 .. The effect of internment on the Catholic community's alienalion .from the state was overwhelming. On August 9, 342
people were arrested and placed in internment camps. Of th,ese, all but five were Catholic. 24 In the first five months, up to January 1972, 2,357 people were arrested. 25 The
"" interrogations that accompanied some of these arrests were, ) . . . , according to Amnesty Internati~nal, characterized by torture and bruta'Ii ty. 26 Four thous~nd people fled south to the . ' Republic. 27 For those that remained, there was widespread fear. Reverend Dennis Faul provided the following testimony • .. to the United states Congress":
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For every man arrested about ten members of his family have been affected and many of· his neighbors. One can say that the whole Catholic population of Northern Ireland has been affected and terrorized by the use of the Special Powers or the imminent threat that they can be used any day on any particular Catholic family. 28
With internment, c~tholic solidarity with the PIRA intensified. "The Catholics had been, in effect, driven into the hands of the IRA," one writer put it. 29 Internment proved to be a watershed in the history of Ulster violence. In 1971, 173 people were killed in sectarian ,. violence. In ...' ·, ..,J., 1972, the year after internment was announced 467 deaths 30 occurred. The policy had two fatal consequences for the Stormont regime. First, not only did.violence not abate, but initially those prisoners suspected of being IRA members were, in fact, "old men or ... inactive IRA members for many 31 years" and thus the active membership was unaffected. Secondly, the alienation of the Catholic minority was such
' . that the legitimacy of the Stormont re.gime was fully shaken in the eyes of Westminster, and all that was needed was a proverbial final nail in the coffin. That was provided on Bloody Sunday, January 13, 1972 when British paratroopers • " killed thirteen unarmed civilians in Londonderry. 32 When the British government decided to take over full policing and • security powers in the province, the Northern Irish cabinet
0 resigned. Thereupon, Prime Minister Edward Heath abolished • the Stormont parliament and began Direct Rule from London~ 33
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The chapter had ended, another was beginning.
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Chapter II: The Ethnic .. Divide: Protestants and catholics
The events outlined in chapter one do not explain an o£tious question: how has politics become so polarized as to provide the conditions which are the fertilizer for violence?' An answer is found in the dichotomy that is characteristic of the population of Northern Ireland. This dichotomy • coRcerns ethnicity. ... ''Ethnicity," Enloe states, "refers to a peculiar bond • among persons that causes them to consider themselves a group
I distinguishable from others. The content of the bond 1S a shared cul t·ure . [Ethnic identity] is a familiar and
I I reassuring anchor 1n a climate of turbulence,. and
uncertainty. 1134 <¥·
) This chapter examines these "peculiar bonds'' that have
I polarized th.e people of Ulster inI order to achieve an understanding which is .essential if a solution to the Irish
·o ·question is to have a sound basis. Two ethnic groups dominate the province of Ulster.
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·-f Within each is found a particular history, religion, and political view. For simplific.ation, they are usually referred to as Protestant and Catholic, their rel.\gious division. Appropriate ethnic or tribal labels are Scots-Irish and Irish-Irish. Politically, they are unionist and nationalist. To understand the political milieu in Northern Ireland one must know what separates the two ethnic groups.
• History
Protestants and Catholics in Ulster each have a distinct history. While a full treatment is not required here, it is instructive to summarize the essentials of that history. The Irish have known Catholicism since the Middle Ages. With the Reformation, however, England, particularly after the . seventeenth century Scottish succession,• was anxious to
r secure Ireland from the influence of the Catholic powers, most notably France. Toward that end, Irish lands confiscated by the Crown from I~ish rebels - who had no sentiment for the Reformation and were staunchly Catholic - were turned over to Scottish landlords who became known as Planters. These lands were located throughout historic Ulster. The Planters, now Scots-Irish, established a landed class which were resented by the Irish-Irish. 35 The Scots brought with them their Presbyterianism, a Protestant sect which differed from
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• the officially recognized Church of England, also Protestant, because the Scots considered 'it to be too "Rome-ish".
In their situation as settlers in the northeastern part of the island of Ireland,.. the Scots:..Irish Protestants quickly realized their position as a resented minority, and consequently adopted a "siege mentality" such that they distrusted the native Irish. 36
With the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, the "conscious separatism" dividing Catholic and Protestant, the North and the South, grew. Within Ulster, the wealthier Protestant landlords were able to invest their capital in emerging industries and take greater advantage of ifidustrialization. Catholic and Protestant labor~rs were in competition for jobs, and political realities were such that -·) Protestant workers were favored for employment. Urban riots- occurred which helped deepen the sectarian rift. 37 At the .. same time, the prosperity that was a consequence of industrialism was, Darby writes, "confined almost entirely to the northern part of the country. • . " so that "(t) he greater prosperity of the North, its economic structure, even its physical appearance, increased its alienation from the rest of Ireland. 1138 Alternatively, as the alienation from the South grew, economic links with Great Britain were enhanced. 39
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Politics
,. Irish separatism in its modern form, as distinguished from separatism in the late eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century when it was led by Protestant Ulster nationalists, developed because of the leadership of Parnell and the recognition of its momentum and force by the Liberal.leader Gladstone. 40 Gladstone and his Liberal Party, in 1885, could govern only in coalition with the Irish nationalist led by Parnell. This political reality combined / politicians the .. q.ctivities of the Fenian movement, Catholic radicals with ·-.; ... ,, who used terror to demonstrate their demands for a separate Ireland, led Gladstone to propose a Bill for Home Rule. Gladstone's proposal ultimately led, after thirty-four years and three versions of the Home Rule Bill, to the Government of Ireland Act 1920, and the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 which separated the South, the Irish Free State, from the Union and created the territory of Northern Ireland. Northern political divisions between Catholic and Protestant are·rooted in the events surrounding Home Rule. Today's unionists are, almost totally, Protestants who are committed to maintaining the link with Britain forever and refuse to become part of a· united Ireland. Today's . nationalists, also called republicans, see Northern Ireland
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... as an artificial creation, imposed by a foreign power, that disrupts the historical and geographical integrity of the · island of Ireland . • What followed the creation of Northern Ireland was the \ establishment of one party rule. For nearly fifty years, .the Ulster Unionist Party, as a consequence of the two-third Protestant population, held total power at Stormont. "A
c_·. . "---...., Protestant state for a Protestant people," was a famous (or infamous) statement made at the founding · of the Northern Ireland government. The emphasis on sectarian division at the outset meant that the Catholic majority would not be welcome in government. Discrimination in many areas of society (such as housing, employment, voting, etc.) against Catholics occurred. With regard to employment, the net effect was the creation of a situation whereby today the figure of the chronically unemployed fell disproportionately upon Catholics at a rate of two and one-half times that of Protestants. 41 Yet, the cause of the discrimination was two-fold. On the one-hand, the "siege mentality" obviously played a major role in creating the disposition of the Protestants to fear the Catholics. Altern·at.i-vely, the C~tholic nationalist's active
. . refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the government instigated a social chasm that was, and continues to be,
42 difficult to bridge. Despite the ills that prevailed in -~ . ._,.~ ) t 'Ulster society, there was little effort to correct the I
r • . , • ' ' • problems because of the fear of causing the spark that would ignite social unrest. Devlin noted:
The attitude of the average Ulsterman can be summed , up as 'You' 11 get enough to do you. ' Everyone knows that there are ills in our society, but if you have a job you content yourself with it and mind your own business. No criticism, no urge to go out and make progress can be afforded because these might disturb the delicate balance of the peace. 43
With the onset of "the Troubles", however, both the . Unionist· and Nationalist parties began to fragment. 44 Divisions within each camp caused new political parties to be developed. The Ulster Unionist Party was originally divided internally by the pressures exerted by NICRA and the question of conciliation with Catholics. When Stormont fell, the party could not withstand dissension wrought by the perceived interference of Britain in Ulster's internal affairs by the very fact of Direct Rule, and also by British insistence that Protestants share power with Catholics in any 45 . future government. Three new parties emerged in the 1972- 73 period.
The Official Unionist Party (OUP) is the heir of the Ulster Unionist Party. The group exists to advocate one thing: maintaining the union with Britain. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) , . founded by Ian Paisley who leads the Free Presbyterian Church, insists that the union not only be \ maintained but that a return to a Stormont-type devolved parliament should occur. In effect, the\DUP stands for the
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political independence of Ulster Presbyterians,· which. according to Stewart "was always more significant than either their nationalism or their unionism, and this is still true today. 1146 More than the OUP, the DUP takes ''populist" positions on important issues such as employment and housing. The Vanguard Unionist Party (VUP) is an evolutionary party in that it is the first to be willing to accept an independent Ulster as "the most realistic means of maintaining the Province's British heritage. 1147 Additionally, members of the VUP maintain open contacts with members of the Ulster Defense Association, a paramilitary organization.
While all republicans are nationalists, the politics vary. The Nationalist Party, paralleling the Official Unionist Party, exists for one purpose: a thirty-two county Ireland. Sinn Fein, a republican°' party and the political front for the IRA, had historically advocated Irish unity, and if necessary, the use of force to achieve that unity. When the IRA split into two groups in December 1969, Sinn
• Fein split into two parties. The political mouthpiece for the PIRA became Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF), while the other is Official Sinn Fein (OSF) who acts on behalf of the Official IRA. 48
The political objective of PSF, which would follow ~he I withdrawal of British troops after a victorious IRA campaign, },
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are to unite the four provinces (Ulster, Connacht, Leinster, . . .• and Munster) under a socialist federation. The Ulster 'provincial parliament would have a Scots-Irish (Protestant) majority.'"" Political power would be delegated from a national capital to regional and district councils. PSF would nationalize key industries, and withdraw Ireland from the
, European Economic Community. 49 The OSF in league with '\ ·.:..F-, the Official IRA, adopts a Marxist approach in that they seek to .raise the consciousness
of the working. class as a viable political block who must unite and lead a communist r~v6lution. This revolution would
• ideally occur simultaneously in the North and South effecting not only the departure of the British from Northern· Ireland,
but an abolishment of the Dublin government as well. OSF would, of course, be in the vanguard of thfs revolution - the founders of a new unified Marxist state. 50 As PSF and OSF were having their philosophical differences, the nationalists began to al'so splinter. In 1970, sev~pal politicians of the Nationalist Party, who had been civil rights activists, broke with the prevailing orthodoxy (of not working wit1:lin · the existing political .... «1,-•-· .... . institutions) and founded the Social _Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). Like NICRA, their goal was to work within political institutions for social reform, while also maintaining a long term goal for Irish unity, provided that
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such unity 51 was achieved peacefully, The SDLP replaced the Nationalist Party as "the political representatives of • the Catholic Community. 1152 The change reflected "the belief that greater material benefits could be obtained by con$tructive participation in the institutions of the state" as opposed to the ''traditional anti-partitionist principles'' characteristic of the Nationalist Party. 53
Religion •
The role that religion plays in the division betwe~rt the two ethnic groups is linked not so much to the effect it has on existing policies in Ulster, but rather to the fear that Protestants have concerning its effects in a united Ireland. In the Republic, the Irish constitution once recognized the special position of the Roman Catholic Church in the nation. 54 Although the constitution was amended so that the provision on the church's status was changed, catholic doctrine and the pronouncements of Church leaders influence political decisions on such issues as birth control, abortion, marriage and divorce. While. the impact of the Church on the Irish population has lessened in the wake of the Second Vatican Council, ,.compared to other European countries Irish Catholic fervor is still strong. Protestants, therefore, have a real fear that any compromise leading to ...
26 " .. •
a united Ireland would place.them in a Catholic influenced ' state whose policies would be antithetical to their way of life. This is not to minimize the effects that religion does have as a "reassuring anchor", to borrow Enloe's phrase, for the people of Northern Ireland. At the same time, on the Protestant side their religious beliefs are not monolithic. Heskin notes there are fifty-five fiercely independent denominations, forty-two of which have less than a thousand members. 55 Nevertheless, what unites these Protestants is a genuine fear of the Roman Catholic Church. Fear of the Church lies in three areas: (1) its strength
as a large international organization; (2) the ability of its priests to impose its views on its members; and (3) its appearance as a fortress-like institution with separate schools, convents/ and monasteries, led by the Vatican. 56 This fear colors the view that Protestants have of Catholics as a people that simply cannot be trusted. Because of the cultural division that exists between the
' ethnic groups, an abiding importance of kinship fosters an atmosphere which inhibits either group's engaging• in• a
\ dialogue with the other. Analysis of Ulster prejudice by.
" - Harris indicates that when people of both faiths gather, "the .. obvious aim was to prevent social relations being ruffled by disagreements over subjects on which it was accepted that cv
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there could be no consensus·. 1157 Given that on almost any topic, '' it was immediately assumed that. there was Catholic' • and Protestant viewpoints on these questions, •.. it is not surprising that it is only with members of the same side that individuals could relax enough to talk freely, to say what .they thought. 1158
* * * * * * * * * * As described above, it ~appears that the divisions that separate the two groups, Protestants and Catholics, leave very little room for compromise. But things are not always so black and white. First, both ethnic groups have shared a history, although related to both Britain and the Republic, which is unique to the six counties. Second, when once both groups were unified in their political position, "the Troubles" have been the catalyst for their fragmentation. This has been a positive occurrence. The evolution of the principles for which the SDLP and the Vanguard Party stand could lend themselves toward a dialogue, no matter how tentative.
An inescapable significant characteristic is that the Protestant/unionist position suffers from a real nationality prob(lem. Catholics in Northern Ireland readily admit to their being Irish. Ulster Protestants claim to be British. Northern Ireland is not, however, part of Britain. Great Britain is ·the territorial unit~ of Scotland, Wale~, and England. The
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very name of the realm, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and., Northern Ireland, demonstrates the distinction of Northern Ireland as different from Britain. Moreover, British people see Ulsterman, Protestant and Catholic, as non-British - or more precisely as Northern Irish. 59 Why, then, does the Protestant in Northern Ireland claim to be British? Finnegan provides an answer: The Ulster Protestant identifies with Britain in symbol and political loyalty because it is the alternative to the Irish Catholic identification . • • • The Ulster Protestant may not really have a nationality at all - i.e. an Ulster nationality - but adopts the British nationality for essentially negative reasons, not to be part of the Irish 60 • Ireland. Secondly, the nationalist claim that Ireland, because of its physical situation as an island, and because the ' majority of the island is Irish-Irish should be unified is not necessarily a valid argument. Such reasoning fails to
recognize the artificial, i.e.• negotiated, borders which exist between many sovereign states throughout the world. Additionally, the argument does not consider the distinct historical development of Ulster which, as was noted, separated Ulster from the rest of Ireland. The effects of this separation ~s especially significant for the politics of the present when it is considered that for the past six decades,~since the end of the Irish civil war when pro-Treaty forces prevailed over those who had rejected partition, the Republic has enjoyed , relatively
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stable parliamentary government. The border is not a ·dominant political issue in the South. 61 In fact, evidence suggests that most of the Irish in the Republic fear a united Ireland since it would add to itself a population that has become radicalized by civil strife for the past twenty years. In a major statistical study, MacGreil found that 78% in a sample of 2,259 residents of Dublin advocated a thirty two county I·rish Republic, i.e. a unitary state as the
solution to 62 the Northern Iris·h problem. Yet, probing deeper into the attitudinal surveys, 59% agreed with the statement
''Catholics • • in N.I. have more in common with Northern Protestants than they have with Catholics in the Republic". 63 Fifty-five percent agreed that "Northerners on all sides tend to be extreme 64 and unreasonable" . And, perhaps most significantly, only 55% disagreed with the statement "Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic are two separate nations. 1165 Ultimately, what the study concludes is that "(a) ttitudes towards the integration of :tiorthern Ireland internally and with the Republic of Ireland are quite dynamic1166 which is to say that they are not al together certain.
It is true that most Irish opinion polls demonstrate that majorities consistently advocate territorial unity between North and South, but these poll~ are highly suspect as~ to their true meaning. What is likely is that the opinions------~
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in these polls on the particular question of Irish unity reflect more of a romantic fancy than a considered reflection on the political consequences of the answer.
Irish politicians, too, have historically advocated a united Ireland because, like American politicians who advocate no increase in taxes, it is fashionable or, more
• importantly, politically wise. But this practice lS• apparently waning since hardly any mention at all was made of Ulster in the recent Irish parliamentary election. 67 It is contended, therefore, that Northern Ireland is truly distinct from both Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland by virtue of its unique historical and cultural ..
development. What emerges from this discussion 1S• the realization that while (roughly) one-third, who are Catholics, have an affinity with their counter-parts in the
CJ South, ·the two-third majority, . who are Protestant, do not '-.. have either an affinity with the South or a rightful claim to the British nationality. The differences are magnified further in light of British policies for Ireland under Direct Rule. And it is these policies which are the focus of the next chapter. \.
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I .J.-- ,-··~·~ - ~ ·- --·- Chapter III. Britain and Direct Rule
When Direct Rule~ began, over sixteen years ago, Northern Ireland ceased being an Irish, or at least an Ulster, problem and became a British problem. In 1969, as was t 6 noted, London's intervention was required to quell riotous civil unrest. The failure of Stormont to deal effectively with terrorism and its unwillingness to relinquish the powers
( . •. of law and security to Britain broke the camel's back and Westminster abolished the Northern Ireland government. Yet, what was assumed by Britain to be a temporary measure has continued, and has_ not been successful in ending violence.-~ What were Britain's efforts to return Ulster to ''normalcy" and why have they failed? This chapter investigates that question.
The United Kingdom's policies in Ulster have a two-fold
goal. First, on a political level a return to a· devolved parliament is desir~d. Second, on a security level terrorism is to be defeated. Often, it s6all be· shown, efforts have
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largely and lately dealt more with the problem of terrorism than with a political s~ttlement which would allow for the end of Direct Rule. '
Political Initiatives
The Heath G0vernment was short-lived, and its regime . over Northern Ireland even shorter (lasting from March, 1972 to December, 1973). 69 This period witnessed the sowing of the seeds of the political agenda for Ulster, which was, and continues to be,. the insistence that a future devolved Ulster parliament be based on a power-sharing agreement between the two communities. Two legislative Acts were adopted at Westminster. The first, the Northern Ireland Assembly Act 1973, provided for
a provincial assembly elected by proportional representation. This would break with the usual British method of a "first past the post"/winner take all electoral process. This was followed by the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973. This Act reaffirmed the Government's position that Northern Ireland was part of the United Kingdom and would remain so ·<1..,. • unless a majority of people voted otherwise in an official border poll. Further a councilar Executive, appointed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, which had as its ~ ' .. ,, . members politicians from the main parties was established.
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The electidn for the new Assembly took place in June, 1973; and a.coalition of Unionists who were sympathetic to the idea of power sharing, SDLP members, and members of the Alliance Partyro was appointed to the Executive. The price that the SDLP exacted for its participation in the Assembly and Executive was for Britain to accept a so called "Irish dimension" in Northern Irish politics. This referred to the part that the Republic might play in aiding
... political stability in the province. The Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 provided that institutions should be established that would allow for consultation and cooperation ; between the North and the Republic. A conference met in December, 1973, at Sunningdale to discuss ways to address the Irish dimension. The meeting included representatives of the British and Irish Governments and leaders of the Ulster political parties. What emerged from the conference was an agreement to set up a Council of Ireland with an executive council and an assembly that would be equally divided by elected members from the Dail (Ireland's parliament) and the Northern Ireland Assembly. The Irish Government recognized Northern Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom and agreed that no change in that status would occur without the consent of the majority of the province. With the sunningdale Agreement approved in the Assembly, the Executive took office on January 1, 1974 and Direct Rule had
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. .. , / :I seemingly ended. • •
'The Sunningdale Agr~ement split the Unionists so that two groups .emerged. Those favoring the Council of Ireland were led by Brian Faulkner (i.e. Faulkner Unionists). Those opposed were led by William Craig.• Opponents saw the agreement as a step toward an end to the union and a united Ireland. The PIRA was also against the agreement because it feared the consequences of diminished -·influence over the Catholic population.
Ultimately, events overtook the political process. The Ulster Unionist Council ' rejected the Sunningdale Agreement .. forcing Brian Faulkner to resign the leadership. Britain, saddled with a miner's· strike, underwent a change of Government as the Labour Party and Harold Wilson regained power. The unionist parties united forming a United Ulster ) Unionist Coalition to fight· .the idea of a Council of Ireland as well as power sharing. This was followed by a crippling strike led by the Ulster Worker's Council which was enforced by loyalist paramilitary organizations. These events were the catalyst for the resignation of the Unionist members of the Northern Ireland executive which brought down the devolved government and caused the resumption of Direct Rule. The failure of the power-sharing executive prompted a new approach by the B.ritish government. Whereas the., initiative for the new Assembly had come largely from the
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•· British Government and its bilateral negotiations with the political parties which led to a conference, ' the new regime of Harold' Wilson sought a constitutional convention, the
members of which 1 ( were limite.d to Ulster I politicians, which would debate and recommend a new Ulster government. The advantage of this plan, it was thought, would be that any proposal from the convention would be an Ulster-initiated ~ one, rather than one imposed by London. The Convention met on May a, 1975. As.a result of the election that preceded it, the Convention was dominated by the United Ulster Unionist Council parties (it won 47 of the 78 seats). The SDLP attained only 17 seats, with the
remaining 71 going to fringe parties. The result was inconclusive. Although the Convention issued a report, it contained only UUUC proposals and thus the Secretary of State for No,hern Ireland, Merlyn Rees, believed it did not command , sufficiently wide acceptance through the Ulster community. 72 The Convention ended in stalemate and w~-S, abolished by the Government on March 5, 1976.
From 1976 until the Conservative victory in 1979, there were no new political initiatives from the Labour Party - .. this despite a change in party leadership as James Callaghan replaced Wilson as prime minister.
. \ While the Conservative Party recently celebrated its tenth year in power, the administrations • of Margaret Thatcher
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have not concentrated on political initiatives in Northern
Ireland. In fact,.. after the initial failure .of her first
l, secretary of state, Humphrey Atkins, to achieve,, results through exploratory talks with ·1eaders of the Ulster parties, the idea of a political initiative in Ulster was abandoned.
•' ' )
The Problem of Terrorism
Upon the abolishment of Stormont, the Scots-Irish
I majority in Ulster were furious and were led to a kind of solidarity with Protestant extremism. In an effort to"" prevent civil war from breaking out (sectarian violence was at its height), the Official IRA declared a cease-fire. PIRA soon followed, but only after Secretary of State William Whitelaw agreed to enter into secret talks with PIRA on Ulster affairs.~ These talks provided de facto recognition of the IRA as a political entity with which the JJ.,.K. was obliged to bargain. 74
Internment was a contentious issue among the Catholic minority who had born • the brunt of its effects . The Government established a commission chaired by Lord Diplock (hence its name) the mandhte of which was to consiqer 'what arrangements for the administra tion of justice in Northern Ireland could be made in order to deal more effectively with terrorist organizations by bringing to book, otherwise than by internment ... individuals involved in terrorist activities ... ; and to make recommendations•. 75
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. ' The Diplock Comm1ss1on• • • found that "intimidation by terrorist organisations of those persons who could be able
. .... , to give evidence for the prosecution if they dared" was the "main obstacle to dealing / effectively with a terrorist crime" in the courts. 76 Until this fear of intimidation was alleviated through governmental measures, "the use by the Executive of some extra-judicial process for the detention of terrorists cannot be dispensed with. 1177 While not
• justifying internment per se, the commission did see its utility. Nevertheless, it held that "however effective [internment] may be in fact, [it] can never appear to be as complete as the safeguards which are provided by a public
I 1178 trial in a court of law. ) I The commission recommended, as a means of alleviating
<.." the problem of witness intimidation, the trials of terrorists be presided over by one judge with no jury. Bail could only be granted by a High Court judge and "only if stringent requirements are met. "79
One of the criticisms of the Diplock Report is that it ''was produced for the authorities responsible for law and order and not for the people of Northern Ireland as a
whole. 1180 · The focus of the report was myopic.I Hillyard argues:
The underlying problem of the political struggle •.. was .•. ignored and the sole focus was upon the , maintenance of public order. In this context, civil
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.. rights in general and the rights of suspects in particular appear as exceptional, anachronistic and even subversive. 81
The Diplock~eport was significant in the development of British anti-terrorist policies because much of its recommendations were incorporated into subsequent legislation.
The ,Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1913 established, among other things: non-jury trials for "scheduled", i.e. terrorist, offences ; 82 strict regulations ,. for the issuance of bail to those charged with a terrorist 83 offence; and, the continued provisions· for search and arrest without warrant of anyone suspected of being a 84 terrorist. Furthermore, the Act established punishments to persons, not only for being members of proscribed
organizations,~but also to any;11on-member who "dresses or behaves in such a way as to arouse reasonable apprehension .;II
that he is a member .of a proscribed organization. 1186 · Among
I the proscribed organizations were two major nationalist groups, the IRA and Sinn Fein, and two unionist groups, the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Red Hand Commandos. 87 The Act also proscribed the Ulster Freedom Fighters, but this is a fictitious cover name for the UDA. 88 The UDA itself was not proscribed.
The provision for search without warrant had a very large impact on the citizens of Northern Ireland. For
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example, the number of houses searched.by security forces climbed from 17,262 in 1971 to 75,000 in 1973, "one-fifth of ' "' all houses in Northern Ireland"! 89
The following year, the British Parliament applied some
J, of the measures enacted in the Northern Ireland Act to Great
Britain through the Prevention of Terrorism' (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974. The Act empowered the Home Secretary to proscribe an organization "that appears to him to be concerned with terrorism occurring in the United Kingdom ana connected with North Irish affairs. . . . "; 90 and to make it illegal for one to belong to such an organization. 91
Likewise, it made illegal the public display of support for a proscribed organization. 92 The Home Secretary is also given powers to bar entry to, or to evict from, Great Britain those persons he believes "[are] concerned in the commission,
preparation, or instigation 1193 of acts of- terrorism. Section 7 and its appended schedule allow for arrest, search, and seizure without warrant. Curiously, however, unlike the previous Act, it lists only one proscribed organization - the IRA. . Controversy surrounded the power of the Home Secretary . /' ·., ,, '_,,...... / '---'-...,,._/ -, to bar entry to, or to evict from, Great Britain suspected terrorists. Through regulations which ft set out the specifics of this power,. the police may detain and hold for questioning those who are considered sou~ces, of information on terrorist
......
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activities 94 at any port of entry. Moxon-Browne reports on a repult of these regulations. From 1974 to June 1979, 4146 persons were· thus • detained for questioning .... Under 'exclusion orders', in the same period, 140 people were removed from Britain to Northern Ireland, and 29 to the Republic. About 90 per cent of the people detained at ports have no charges brought against them. 95
The Prevention of Terrorism Act was criticized by British civil liberties groups. One such group said the Act "'nullifies the remedy of a writ of habeas corpus by making it lawful for the police to arrest on extremely wide grounds;' and [because of] claims that fingerprint records and photos of all those questioned are kept in police files. " 96
Certainly both laws are uncharacteristic of a liberal democratic state, and Britain's political institutions have had to suffer, in this respect, an apparent lack of legitimacy in the eyes 9f Ulster citizens. Finn, citing a 1985 survey by a "non-aligned" newspaper, the Belfast ( Telegraph, found that "57 percent of Catholics believe that 'in the main the legal system in Northern ·rreland dispenses justice' unfairly or very unfairly. Only 9 percent of the 97 Protestants agreed. Because of the widespread Catholic dissatisfa9.tion with Northern Irish justice, the Diplock Courts are another contributing factor to ''Catholic alienation from· the state. 1198
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In addition to legislative tactics, the U.K. Government used another controversial method to, in this case, placate terrorists. In 1972, one of th~ concessions that the IRA, and others, gained as a result of their dialogue with Whitelaw (see above) was the granting of Special category status to ·prisoners.In granting such status, the
British government agreed to five demands: ·1) IRA prisoners would have the right to wear their own clothes; 2) they would not be required to do 'penal labor'; 3) they would have the right to associate freely with the·ir colleagues within their own prison area; 4) they would receive certain educational facilities; and 5) prisoners who had lost remission of sentence because of their protesting behavior in prison would have it fully restored. In return, the IRA agreed to stop its campaign of violence. 99
The impetus for the Government's dectsion is explained by Holland: "In 1972 the Provisional IRA were at the peak of their strength; their hunger-striking members [in prison] were near death when the [G]overnment conceded, afraid that the security forces would be unable to contain the violence expected if [the IRA prisoners] died. 11100
In achieving Special Category Status, the IRA and other terrorists (for the s_tatus was given to both Catholic and Protestant terrorists) achieved a great symbolic victory. The .British "had acknowledged, in effect, that the IRA prisonets were not ordinary crimin~ls· but po).itical prisoners. " 101 This 1 • gave the terrorists legitimacy because a recognition 6f the~
IL IRA prisoners as political rather than criminal~ prisoners was
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• "tantamount to admitting that there is a justifiable cause ,. ' for struggle, for violence. 102 ~ "
Despite the use of internment, the establishment of the
Diplock Courts, and the distinction of Special Category
status as methods to thwart terrorism, terrorist violence cont'inued to take its toll. "By the spring of 1974 the total [dead]. • . reached and passed the thousand mark." Wounded
"numbered 14,000, and property damage and losses exceeded 11103 $200 million. In the autumn of ~974, 20,000 British troops were stationed in Ulster. 104
However, the British Army did have some success in rooting out IRA members and interning them. In 1972, for example, the army claimed that it had reduced the number of active IRA terrorists from one thousand to three or four hundred. 105 Later, British intelligence achieved- significant penetration of the IRA such that, in mid-1974., a master plan
for \the 106 take-over of Belfast was captured. In an effort to reestablish discipline among its ~ ranks, the IRA killed
informers of whom they were certain, and shot suspected informers in the knees. 107
While the eff arts of the a-rmy to root out the IRA were successful, the success was not absolute. The sensational bombing of the two pubs in the'English city of Birmingham by the IRA in November, 1974, demonstrated that Northern Iris·h .. terrorism was "exportable" to r, Great Britain. The nineteenth
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deaths that resulted caused a British outcry for the new Government of Harold Wilson to do something. This resulted in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974 (see above). The purpose of the Act was to establish an anti-terrorist law for Britain. \ The Labour Government offered a new strategy in dealing with Ulster terrorism. Its "central aim was to deny totally the political dimensions of the conflict and to reconstitute the problem in terms of law and order. 11108 It therefore initiated three related policies: (1) the restoration of full law and order responsibilities to the Royal Ulster Constabulary; (2) the end of internment in February 1975 and the use of the Diplock courts as the sole method of dealing
with suspected terrorists; and (3) the end of Special Category status on March 1, 1976. 109 The first was known as Ulsterization, the second and third were known as "criminalisation". According to Kenny, however,. the consequences of criminalisation "increased rather than diminished Catholic alienation. 11110 Due to strict controls placed on government interrogation methods, there became "an increased reliance on the evidence of accomplices (of political violence], now that direct confessions ·were harder to come ~y. 11111 The use of these. informers, called "supergrasses", caused consternation among both catholics and Protestants because many were "being
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. convicted and imprisoned as terrorists on the uncorroborated evidence· of in.formers. 11112 j The end of Special Category status caused further t confrontation as IRA prisoners• refused to wear prison• clothes. The jailers responded by "removing the mattresses
.and beds from the cell as well as any reading material. • • until 8: 3 o p. m. when mattresses were returned. " 113 As the standoff continued, "prisoners [were] locked in their cells twenty-four hours q day naked except for a blanket wrapped n around them. 11114 Conditions in the prisons were deplorable. Nationalist terrorist organizations responded by
' . r murd~ring twenty prison• wardens. By 1980, street demonstrations had become commonplace, and statements from diverse sources including members of both the American Congress and the British Parliament were made soliciting Government concessionl · for the prisoners. 115 Then came the hunger strike centered on prisoners in the Maze. In solidarity with the strikers, Ulster nationalists elected one of the prisoners, Bobby Sands, to Parliament in a bye-election. Riots, brought on by public outrage that the
Thatcher Government would not grant concessions, caused 50 deaths in 1981 ..Howev.er, the European Commission on Human J Rights, a prior critic of the British government, f9und "that the sufferings of the protesting prisoners• were self- inflicted. 11116 •
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I , While the Government won the battle of the hunger strikes at the Maze (Sands died in 1981 along with several of his compatriots), the cost to the government not only in terms of money but also in stability was considerable.· Hillyard reported:
In the north there were 1,205 demonstrations requiring two and a half million hours of police duty. The total cost of policing these parades and the ensuing order was over 12 million pounds. During the period a hundred thousand rounds of rubber bullets were fired, sixteen thousand in one month alone. The hunger strikes and the authorities' response did more to unite Catholic opinion than any other single event since internment in 1971 or Bloody, Sunday 1972. 117
Ulsterisation, for its part, placed the British Army in a precarious situation. Maxon-Browne explains:
From the army's point of view, the present policy is far from satisfactory as evidenced by the fact that the [IRA] is alive and well. First, ... [under the rules of engagement, a soldier] must wait for the terrorist to take the initiative [before he can open fire]. Second, the fact that the army is used as a police force in areas where the RUC is regarded· as unacceptable, suggests that the soldiers ought, in some cases, to have police powers .... Finally,· and most crucially, despite public statements to the contrary, the army feels it cannot succeed in the task it has been assigned. 118
Nevertheless, the army continues today in Ulster as the most visible symbol of ,Direct Rule ..
The current Govfrnment of Prime Minister Margaret ;• t ·, t L., Thatcher has accomplished three anti~terrorist measure~: the refusal to concede on the issue of Special Category status t. (which has already been discussed above), the Hillsborough
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.... , Agreement in 1985, and the recent moves to further curb individual freedoms in ' the name of combat\ng terrorism in 1988.
The Hillsborough Agreement is a landmark docum~nt in the history not only of anti-terrorist policies in Ulster, but of Anglo-Irish relations as well. For the first time, it formally gave the Republic ., of Ireland a consultative role to play in the affairs of Ulster during Direct Rule. Since the collapse of the S~nningdale Agreement, low-level contacts between the Republic and the U.K. were maintained. 119 These talks emphasized Britain's desire for closer policing of the border by the forces of the Republic to prevent the Irish side of the border from becoming a refuge for terrorists. The Irish government, for its part, sought to project an appearance of continuing a process toward Irish unity. The Republic was in no way soft on terrorism. Many, if not all, of its own anti-terrorist measures have been adopted by the .British government, especially under Thatcher. These methods include the use of a Special Criminal Court (established in 1972 under the Republic's Offenses against the State Act 1939)· which sits with no jury. An amendment to this Act "placed the onus on the individual to repudiate any published allegation that he was a member of the IRA [long p;oscribed in the Repu-blic) -~ A further amen~ment to the ~ct in 1976 prohibited spokesmen for proscribed organizations \. .. .. , .
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"to appear on radio or television, or be quoted in the press." 121
Thus, both countries realized that perhaps progress
could be made against terrorism in Ulster if the two entered
into a close arrangement with the understanding that Britain
and Ireland were "recognising the major interest of both
their countries and, above all, of the people of ~orthern
Ireland in diminishing the divisions there and achieving
lasting peace and stability;" 122 and were "reaffirming their total rejection of any attempt to promote political- objectives by violence. 11123
The agreement established an Intergovernmental
Conference·which would be the principal vehicle for Anglo
Irish consultation on matters of Northern Irish politics,
security, and the administration of justice as well as cross
border cooperation. 124 Provision was also made to allow for
the d·irect input of the views of the Irish Government
concerning "bodies appointed by the Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland. 11125 Consideration would be given to "mixed
courts in both jurisdictions for the trial of certain
[presumably terrorist] offences·. " 126 Furthermore, both
Governments committed themselves to enhanced security
cooperation (threat assessments, exchanges of information, technical c<;>9peration,) . 127 Finally, the agreement referred to the,) possibility of a future majority in Ulster givi.ng formal
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.. • "consent to the establishment of a united Ireland. 11128
The reaction to the Hillsborough Agreement in Uister was varied. Cox documented that " ( 1) ess than one-third" of Catholics ''believed it enhanced the prospect of a united 11129 Ireland. Protestants learned of the agreement with ''a profound psychological shock, not only because it was negotiated 'over their heads, but because it gave Dublin a role in Northern Ireland for the first time ever." 130 Indeed, London had not consulted with Unionist politicians in the period leading to the accord, while Dublin officials were in close coordination with leaders of the Social Democratic and Labour Party. 131
Terrorists, predictably, rejected the accord. Sinn Fein indicated that IRA activities would continue, while the UDA made death threats against members of the Intergovernmental Conference. 132 A new wave of violence followed. Twenty-three·
security officers were killed in 1985-86 by the IRA. From November 1985 to February 1986 more than one hundred policemen ·were injured in battles with unionists. 133 Moreover, a new loyalist terrorist group, the Ulster Resistance, was created to fight against the notion that Britain would abandon Ulster to a united Ireland, a goal recognized by the Hillsborough Accord. It was this group which ~as recently unsuccessful in exchanging a British-made ·antiaircraft missile with South- Africa for weapons and ammunition. 134
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Two new policies were announced in October, 19 8 8 • First,
' a ban on the broadcast via radio or television of interviews ~ ,with either members or supporters of terrorist organizations
. . in Northern Ireland was enacted. Second, by an · Order in Council the judiciary in Northern-Ireland were to be advised that a suspect's silence in criminal trials for terrorist offences may be interpreted to be an admission of guilt if there is evid~nce that points to such guilt.
These policy initiatives were a direct reaction to a
dramatic terrorist event - th~ August 2 O, 1988 bombing by the IRA of a bus carrying forty British soldiers (eight of whom
• . ' . were killed) in The Ulster town of Omagh. 135 The U.K. Government justified the policies for several reasons. In the case of the broadcast ban it was argued by Douglas Hurd, the
Home. Secretary, that "Terrorists. • .draw support and sustenance from having access to radio and television, and
from.addressing their views. • .directly to the population
136 at large. • • • " Further, the secretary noted that this policy had long existed in the Republic of Ireland. 137 The rationale for the curbs on the right to silence was that security officials "knew 90 percent of the front line IRA terrorists but did not have the ability to convict them in • court" based c;,n existing rules of evidence. 138 ... Despite protests from many sectors of the British public, including politicians and journalists, against these
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two policies, they continue in effect. Even the Irish Government was farced to acquiesce. 139
'An Assessment
Having described the political initiatives and the anti- J;c terrorist policies of the British Government, the question of their effectiveness must be addressed. It would be simplistic to measure the value of British policies by stating the obvious: a return to devolution and the ending of terrorist violence has not occurred. Thus, an acceptable criteria fl must view the tangible realities that have occurred in Northern Ireland as a result of, or despite, British policies.
Britain entered Northern Ireland because of violence. !~deed, ·it has been said that violence is "the single most consistent factor in Northern Ireland political life since 1969. 11140 f Statistics would unquestionably support such a view. From 1971 until 1984, terrorism was responsible for 2,372 deaths, 24,981 injuries, 29,242 shooting incidents, and 7,831 explosions. 141 The level of violence in Ulster requires the presence of 12,000 British soldiers, 7,000 policemen, 4,500 police reservists, and 8,000 members of the Ulster .. " Defence Regiment (the Ulster "national guard") . 142 To maintainI I these./, personnel, the British Treasury spends approximately 500
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million pounds (about $775 million) each-year. 143 In the 1987- 88 fiscal year, the cost of the British army's presence alone was expected to be 168 million pounds ($260 million), which is an increase from 144 million pounds ($223 million) in• 1986-87. 144
. ' Yet for ·a11· this capital expenditure, paramilitary organizations are very much alive and well. This has occurred for several reasons, one of which is a remarkable evolution of the terrorist organizations themselves. This evolution has appeared to have caught the authorities off-guard.
First, the paramilitary organizations have become sophisticated in acquiring technologically advanced weaponry. At the start of "the Troubles," terrorists relied upon "straight-forward blast and incendiary bombs made f.rom farm ,- fertilizer and gelignite boosters. 11145 Today, the PIRA, for example, utilizes powerful explosive devices made of Semtex which are detonated by radio control.-Such devices have an explosive velocity of 8,400 meters a second. 146 ·Police . attempts to prematurely detonate these radio-controlled bombs · through the use of high-powered radio wave sweeps have been largely ineffectual because the explosives are built to be activated by coded signals. 147
Additionally, Northern Ireland has witnessed the development of a remarkable underground economy developed by '- terrorist organizations on both sides to financially support
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their influence in certain regions,• particularly in the divided city of Belfast. While deaths from terrorist incidents, per year, have
for the most part declined since 1976, 148 comparison of ·armed
robberies and monies stolen in the years 1971 and 1983 are
telling. In the former year there were 437 armed robberies
and thefts of 273,300 pounds ($410,000). In 1983, by
contrast, there were 622 armed robberies and 830,258 pounds
($1.2 million) was stolen. 149 Ulster Is terrorist groups have become racketeers in organized crime operations which add a new dimension to the terrorism problem· that security officials face. Terrorist
I organizations are engaged in lucrative construction frauds
which generate annual profits of 10 million pounds ($15 million) for the various Protestant and Catholic groups (or
a combined business of 40 million pounds ($60 million). 150 The Ulster Defense Association established seeming legitimate security companies which extort customers for protection. Two
of these companies have annual incomes of 200,000 pounds
($300,000). 151 Both activities, the construction fraud (dominated by the Catholic groups) and the security racket (ddminated by the Protestants) are well coordinated between
the two sides as are armed robberies·which involve 50,000
pounds ( $75,000) · or more. 152 These huge sums are then laundered, in the case of the PIRA through its taxi cab
, 53
, -·. ' . business of which it holds a virtual transportation monopoly ... ' in the Catholic ghettos. 153
Of particular effect on the Catholic.population was the PIRA scheme that established a finance agency which channeled
.#. funds into the purchase of legitimate shops and stores (a . butcher shop, a pub, a supermarket, an inn), the profits of which were funneled back to the PIRA. With these monies the group started a construction firm and built more shops and a playground. Catholic people began to view the IRA as a big help inI improvingI I their neighborhoods and living conditions. 154
Although in 1984 "the British government (estimated]
that the total strength of the IRA comprises no more than around 300 men and women, ... this small number are [sic] backed up by several thousand sympathizers. Between them they cost the Bristish government 4 million pounds ($6 million) a day in their, attempt to control terrorism. 155
The result of all this, and the impact of British anti- terrorist policies is, as Adams states:
While the counter-terrorist forces of the RUC and the British-government have been concentrating on killing and capturing IRA leaders, the IRA have quietly and most effectively built a revolutionary infrastructure based on economic subversion. In the process the division between terrorism and pure crime has become blurred, and some terrorism is 156 ac t ua 11 y simp. l e cr1m1na. . 1 ac t 1. vi. t y and vice-versa.. An additional problem of British anti-terrorist policy is that it is not universally applied. The government, as well as the media, makes a distinction between Protestant and
'f
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•
Catholic terrorism, with the former being viewed as somewhat legitimate. Tom King, the former secretary of state for Northern Ireland, 157 was quoted as saying The Protestants are in the main a much more reactive force.... The security forces have had greater success against them in any case .... To be honest, they don't have the evil sort of dedication, skills, and cunning of the I.R.A. The reality is that they haven't. presented a threat, al though they are capable of some very nasty crimes and there are some very evil men amongst them. 158 There is much contradiction in such a statement. If the Protestants haven't presented a threat, how is it there was . " absolutely no consultation with unionist officials in the time just prior to the Hillsborough Accord? What group was it that called the general strike in 1974 that brought the •• power-sharing executive to ruin? Whose group was negotiating with South Africa concerning the exchange of British antiaircraft missiles for ammunition and weapons? King's statement,· certainly not g~arded and yet typical, demonstrates frustration and weakness vis-a-vis the IRA, and serves to be inflammatory. It demonstrates a British bias in favor of loyalist terrorists which can only· be self defeating. After all, how can-any anti-terrorist policy be effect__ ive when the application of the policy is either half hearted or contr.adictory? Either terrorism ia a totally '" unacceptable method of behavior, or it isn't. 159 The British ambivalence manifests its uncertainty over what direction Ulster policies should take. For the Prime ,, ••• 55 l • ·--,
, .
Minister to simply state continually:
We must carry on with our present pledge to the people of Northern Ireland, which is that there will be no change in their stat4s, except at their wish and through their express consent and the express consent of the House [ of Commons] 160 ' demonstrates a clear lack of leadership on an issue that the record indicates has cost the United Kingdom much in lives and resources. More than this, it is a recipe for stalemate since·such a statement theoretically absolves the British government of responsibility for Ulster and places it squarely on the shoulders of Ulster politicians. Yet,
I Catholic and Protestant _intransigence is being underwritten ~· \ ' by Direct Rule and the subvention that continually flows from the British treasury. No matter how much it would like to escape responsibility, the British Government must, if it has any hope of a future $.ettlement, see reality as it is and begin to think in terms of solving the political problem in Ulster, of which terrorism is but a symptom. If London is
._, really serious about defeating the IRA, it will devote its energies to finding a real solution to the status of Ulster in the United Kingdom.
In conclusion, the history of British policies during the troubles have proven to be fragmentary and essentially reactive. A lack of an understanding of the nature of terrorists themselves as they have evolved from political gunmen to part-terrorists, part-racketeers is evident. Since
56
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the direction that past political efforts and anti-terrorist measures have failed, it is reasonable to state that the , status quo is unacceptable. New alternatives must- be explored, and these will be the focus of the next chapter .
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Chapter IV: Looking at Alternatives
If the past policies have not worked, and clearly they have not, what are some potential solutions to the problems
of Ulster? There are several options. First, however, it
should be obvious that a return to devolution as ·existed
prior to Direct Rule is out of the question. It was the Stormont institutions which caused the present "Troubles"
inasmuch as they were unable to satisfy the legitimate demands of the minority.
Secondly, the Protestant majority has made it quite cle.ar that a power-sharing arrangeme;Jt would be unacceptable
in the context of an all Ireland framework as was proposed • in the early seventies.
There remain the following alternatives to consider: (1)
a devolved government and legislature that includes a power
sharing executive and a proportionately elected legislature within the United Kingdom; (2) the integration of Nor.thern . Ireland as a province of the United Kingdom without a
58 ., devolved government; (3) a declaration by the U.K. Government that Ulster is part of Ireland and that the United Kingdom shall bear no responsibility for, nor exercise sovereignty over, Northern Ireland and that such power and responsibility shall ·be assumed by the Republic of Ireland and its government in Dublin; or (4) an Ulster independent of both Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland. These will now be considered in turn.
Devolution
•
A return to a devolved administration and parliament in Northern Ireland has been a g9al. of British policy ever since Direct Rule began. This alternative, in order to be credible, would include the arrangements that came out of the Sunningdale Conference except for those involving the Republic of Ireland. A unicameral legislature elected by proportional representation would grant to the Catholic minority roughly one-third of seats in any assembly, and the executive's membership would be divided equally between Catholics and Protestants. , The link with Britain would be maintained.
An advantage of this option would be the .resumption of Ulstermen taking charge of their political and governmental affairs. Self-government should, of course, be a hallmark of
59.t
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.. \ any settlement. Additionally, power-sharing in the exe9utive would help insure against government policies that might
, discriminate against the minority, thus provi~ing some benefits to Catholics. Alternatively, Unionists generally would be especially pleased that governmental powers had returned to Ulster with the British union intact. They, therefore, would have a stake in insuring the success of the government because were devolution to fail, the alternatives may not be as sanguine. The present climate might favor devolution if, as expected, most people in Northern Ireland have become weary of the violence. An Ulster government that has the support of tpe SDLP would encourage a united front against terrorist groups of both faiths. With terrorists isolated, their legitimacy would be undermined so that a return to a level of stability as existed from 1956 to 1967 would recur. If most Ulst~rmen thought this to be likely, they just might welcome devolution. Another advantage of devolved government concerns its impact on Northern Ireland's economy. Twenty years of violent upheaval have made Northern Ireland an unattractive location for investment; ~ foreign investment virtually collapsed in the 1970s. 161 i/1' The United Kingdom, unfamiliq.r with Ulster matters from the beginning of "the Troubles, " took a piece-meal . approach to-the needs' of Northern Ireland's economy. r In her ,.,
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overview of the economic• constraints in Ulster affairs, Leslie McClements concluded: [In the early seventies] expensive infrastructure projects were adopted because they were expensive and could absorb funds quickly .... Economic appraisals of these ... public expenditure projects were not undertaken, and more effective uses of the same funds were not considered. When the public expenditure came under pressure in the late 1970s, the momentum of earlier years was difficult to halt. Again the basic facts and analyses were not available to allow the effective reallocation of financial resources. This resulted in dislocation and a period of painful readjustment which the more effective use of funds in earlier years would have largely avoided. 162 Ulster has the highest percentage of long-term unemployment in the United Kingdom, 163 with most of the burden falling on Catholic males at a rate of two and one-half times that of ' Protestants. 164 Any settlement that lends itself to public order would be welcome. However, devolution would also theoretically allow for Ulstermen to tak~ charge of their own economy. Surely some financial aid from London would have to be maintained despite the end of Direct Rule. The point is, however, that London's vision of Ulster's economic woes have been lacking, an·other defect in the status quo. Devolution offers hope for a better direction in the future. Even acknowledging the economic and security benefits ,that might accrue to Ulster if enough support of moderate \ Protestant and Catholics were obtained, the problem with f i devolution is that th·e plan may be seen as a step backward
··_\ 61 ,;•
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\ in Northern rr·eland' s development. Catholic protests and paramilitary activity had won the end of the Stormont regime. As events unfolded, the British government acknowledged that the issue of minority rights was important. London then recognized the need for a power-sharing government if devolution were to be realized. Within the last decade, Britain has recognized its "special relationship'' with the Republic regarding affairs between both countries, particularly Northern Irish affairs. The Anglo-Irish Agreement expresses the desire for a change in Ulster's status in the United Kingdom as long as such change is j brought about peacefully. Therefore, the road to Irish unity seems to have been painstakingly laid out since 1972. Seen in this perspective, Ulster's Catholics may maintain their demand that any plan for devolution require a role for the Republic. Of course, this is something that loyalists have steadfastly refused to concede. Protestants, desp.rte the obvious need for some consensus, may also reject power-sharing devolution. After the short-lived power-sharing government had fallen ·., in 1974, the Unionist-dominated constitutional convention of 1975 had the opportunity to propose a new government for Ulster. Well aware that. any proposal would require the inclusion of a power-sharing arrangement so as to be acceptable to London, the· Unionists made it quite clear that they would rather ''i~.
62 suffer Direct Rule than agree to power-sharing with Catholics.
Integration
The possibility of the political integration of Northern Ireland into mainstream United Kingdom politics has become a recent topic of debate both in Britain and in Ulster brought on by a growing number of Ulstermen desiring an affiliation with the main British parliamentary parties - something l_ong denied to Northern Ireland. In the past, British political parties had done their best to keep Northern Irish affairs out of Parliament, especially when • devolution was in existence. Today, despite Direct Rule, the British parties have not been anxious to inject themselves into Ulster electoral politics. Those favoring integration hope to gain entry into British political life. Direct Rule disenfranchises the people of Northern Ireland in two ways. First, the secretary of state, by virtue. of his office, is viewed-~s, in O'Malley's words, a dictator, ruling his fiefdom from his castle at Stormont .•.. (M)ost executive functions of the old regime, including responsibility for economic and security matters, passed into the Secretary of States handsfi. He can propose and dispose almost at will. But as a ruler he does not have to answer at the ballot box to his constituents, who come.from the shires of the mainland, not the counties of
-.. 63 Northern Ireland. 165 f Secondly, when Direct Rule was instituted, the people . of Northern Ireland were not effectively provided a means of participating in British politics even though Britain was directly involved in the governance of the province. This is true because the political system of the United Kingdom is dominated by two political parties: the Conservative Party and the Labour Party. At the present time, only one of these parties will form a Government. Herein lies the issue of integration, for presently both parliamentary parties have refused an affiliation of Ulster groups seeking to join their organizations. 166
The political isolation of Ulster from maipstream
politics.. is further understood when the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act 1949 are examined. This Act, Roberts notes,
allows for Southern Irish nationals resident in Great Britain to enjoy all the rights of British citizenship: nationals of the Republic resident in England, Scotland and Wales may [for example] vote for the British Labour ,. Party, join it, work for it, take part in formulating its policies (including its policy on Northern Ireland) and stand for election to Parliament or local government councils as official Labour candidates. . . . [Conversely, ] British citizens
resident in Northern \ Ireland are not permitted to I do any of these things. 167
While u1s·ter does elect representatives to Westminster, they are forced to choose among . ,. parties which reflect the .
I sectarian divide. The Ulster Unionist Party and Democratic
64 t
Unionist Party are Protestant, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, Sinn Fein, and Official Sinn Fein are Catholic. Yet, Members of Parliament from these Irish parties will never sit on either the Government's or Opposition's front benches, nor, obviously, serve in the Cabinet. Therefore, an Irish MP has a minimal or non-existent impact on government. Bernadette Devlin was not exaggerating when she wrote, "· . • [A] Member of Parliament representing an English
constituency can. • .use the system to the benefit of his
constituents; but the Northern Ireland MP is hardly more than
11 168 a public relations officer .. • • Those who advocate integration, such as Ivor Stanbrook who is a Tory MP, say this option "would allow for the elimination of sectarian differences" and "could bring peace, .. stability and reconciliation". 169 They have attempted to hold the Prime Minister to her rhetoric that "The Conservative
Party is not a Scottish party nor an English party nor a Welsh party nor an Irish party. We are a party of the whole 170 United Kingdom. " .. Thus it would be expected that with integration "(i)ndividual Unionists and Nationalists e (would) come together in normal political parties to -cooperate on the basis of shared views• on social, economic• and other i~sues. 11171 An intended consequence of integration would be a diminishment in the legitimacy of separatist terrorist
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groups, principally the IRA, because "the IRA can. hardly hav~ the Tory ... a result more favourable to their purposes than. I \ Party's exclusion of Ulster from its organisation and membership. 11172 Northern Ireland, in an integrated Parliament, would perhaps gain as many as three more seats in Parliament (from
17 to 20), and the Cabinet member for Northern Ireland would likely be an Ulsterman since the off ices for Wales and
Scotland are headed by a native of those regions. 1~ · While all this is probably true, the greatest advantage to integration would be the determination once and for· all, or at least for a lengthy period of time, the status of ' Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. As Rose put it,
~~•''' ,,.' ~ ' I Ulster "could no more fall under government from Dublin than might Birmingham, Manchester, or Leeds. 11174 With this decision, Great Britain would declare its commitment to see Ulste~'s problems as its own, and dedicate itself to doing its utmost at every level to solve many of them - not just the problem of terrorism. Political realities, however, make the possibility of Britain deciding on integration. highly unlikely. First, for Britain to adopt integration would 'be contrary to the understandings reached in the Anglo-Irish Agreement, particularly that Britain's efforts would be directed toward devolution. 175 Moreover, the Agreement specifically mak~s
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provision for the possibility of a united Ireland, along with a pledge from the British Government that it would introduce legislation to . that effect. 176 The Irish governihent surely would react negatively to a policy of integration such that the close cooperation between the two governments on border security (for anti-terrorist purposes), the very cause of bringing the accord into existence, may be impaired. 1n A second, and perhaps more significant problem is the nationality gap, already referred to in chapter two, which exists between the British and the Northern Irish. This is a very powerful barrier to integration, and it should be given careful recognition. After broaching the topic of
•.<:( integration to Merlyn Rees, the former Labour Home Secretary and an Ulster Secretary of State replied: "Neither the Labour Party nor the Conservative Party will venture into Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland is different and all we aim for
must be to let Ulster develop from both sides. The English are outsiders. " 178
Rees' position is very typical of British opinion toward Ulster. Despite Unionist declarations that they themselves are British, the media and the civil service continually
refer to the people of Ulster as Irishmen. 1~ The deg~ee of . bloodshed since 1969, an almost daily occurrence, emphasizes the distinction so that, in Rose's words, "Increased Westminster respons-ibilities in Ulster are formally opposed
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on the grounds that the problems are atypical and unsuitable for Westminster's governance. 18° For a British Government to succeed on achieving int~gration in the face of these problems would require vigorous leadership on the Irish question which, of course, has been severely lacking . • • Therefore, integration is not a viable alternative for the Irish question.
United Ireland
If the scenario of a united Ireland were to occur today, it would have to come about without the sanction of a plebesci te on the border - the long-sanctioned method of achieving Irish unity. 181 With Protestants holding an approximate two to one majority of the Ulster population, the
question of a 32 county Ireland in such a poll would surely fail. More probably, a British military withdrawal concurrent with a new Anglo-Irish treaty which would cede Northern Ireland to the Republic would be, required. Catholic nationalists and the Republic would achieve their so-called destiny of territorial unity, and the British would be rid of a territory that has been a constant thorn. Three parties would be satisfied; one would not.
• • There would be tremendous difficulties 1n a united
• Ireland. The most substantial obstacle 1S Protestant .,
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intransigence. The evidence is quite clear that above all things"· .. the most psychologically deep-seated reason why Protestants in Northern Ireland are resistant to a united Ireland is that they fear the Catholic Church. 11182 Protestants fear the influential position of the catholic Church in Irish state affairs. Protestant paramilitary organizations, particularly the UDA have made it clear that they would rather have independence than a united Ireland. A change would take place, such that whereas today the IRA gains the focus of attention, tomorrow the UDA would be
preeminent as the • greater threat to the state in a new Ireland. Yet, leaving aside Protestant objections, the simple fact is that the Republic also has its concerns about the costs involved. Rose observed:
... (W)hen Irishmen who live in the Republic read about bombings and murders in the North, become they aware of the disadvantages of making the whole Ireland one. To them it seems that violence might be the price of unity. 183 The experience of Merlyn Rees while secretary of state for Northern Ireland supports Rose. No Southern government in my period of office had ~ put its mind to what it would do if the North ever fell ·into its lap .... Deep-down, ... the Southern politicians understood the reality: the loyalists would fight incorporation with ·the South and without their cooperation, Dublin could not govern the North. All Irish . . t . t . governments have recognised, and con 1nue o recognise, th 1s. ..•. 184 Irish antipathy toward a united Ireland is rooted in its
69 ,/1..r, ' .. . . ' not-so-distant history. The Irish national experience has its origins in a civil war over the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in·the early 1920s. Today's two main parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, are the legacies of the two sides in that I I war. Thus, they \ want no repeat performance of recent painful history. They were, and are, firmly opposed to paramilitary organisations of whatever kind and -they continue to see the North as the tip of an iceberq which could wreck their own ship of state. ras Aside from the security and political implications, there is an economic consideration as well. While the economy of the North has borne the effects of the decline of industry, complicated by the climate of violence, the South has transformed its own economy from a dominantly rural society to a relatively stable urban one. 186 It was due to conditions of peace, among other reasons, that allowed the economy of the Republic to grow. The Irish certainly would be apprehensive of any measure that could h~ve a deleterious effect on its economy, particularly the fear of societal disruption that could attend unification. ' For these reasons, unification is not acceptable ·as a viable solution to a political settlement in Ulster. As Bowyer Bell summarizes:' I The prospect of a united Ireland with one million angry ·and violent Protestants and half that number of violent and radicalised Catholics holds little charm for the comfortable in Dublin. 187 ·• ., 70 ,... ' • J Independent Ulster The preceding discussion of various alternatives to the problem of government in Northern Ireland shed light on the fact that while the British view the Northern Irish as too different from themselves to allow integration, the Irish in the ' Republic consider Ulstermen too radical to be assimilated into a united Ireland. This observation makes the idea of an independent Ulster a challenging option worth scrutiny. An independent Ulster would initially • \ require: the withdrawal of British troops, the end of British sovereignty over Ulster, a renunciation of the goal of a united Ireland • on the part of the Republic of Ireland, and the disarming of both the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Ulster Defence Regiment pending the outcome of the formation of a government. With no military forces to speak ·of, a new Ulster's physical integrity could be guaranteed by both Britain and Ireland with the understanding that their armies would be '1 •__ -··;~ used solely forcfefense from an outside· force. This provision is actually superfluous since the greatest danger to the new state would be from within and no.t from without. , ·1 ) ,. This plan has a great deal of promise for several reasons. 71 " .. \ .· . . Both Britain and the Republic of Ireland want peace in 1 Ulster. The Anglo-Irish Agreement states as much. ~ It is presumed that in the interest of peace, the former would agree to give up its sovereignty should the latter renounce its historic territorial ambitions. The political dispositions of the two countries toward the issues of integration and an all Ireland settlement would suggest that the alternative of an independent state would be more ~ . acceptable to both countries. Indeed, the arguments against an independent state concern not so much the dispositions of either Britain or Ireland toward such a proposal, important though they are, but rather of Ulstermen themselves. ~~ • . -· •. ..,.> The first of these is that if British troops were ~ ., withdrawn, civil war in the province,• initiated by Protestants because of their "siege mentali~y~' would surely,; Foot calls this, ."a strong argument, which is often follow. ' won because it is not answered. " 189 An independent Ulste,would eliminate the incentive and the rationale for a civil war. Protestants, as Finnegan has 190 that shown , call themselves British as a label distinguishes them most of all as un-Irish. ~hey fear,the • changes in their lifestyle under a government wh-ich 1S heavily influenced by the Catholic Church. This is a very .,. real issu~ for Protestants and ·the idea of an independent '-· 72 " f< ' ' " . Ulster accommodates that fear, especially when it includes a renunciation by the Republic of any territorial ambition. If it fell solely to the Protestant terrorists alone to fight a war, it must be remembered that they are a minority of the Protestant population. Moreover one of these, the Ulster Defense Association, has already declared its acceptance of 191 the idea of independence. The UDA is the largest Protestant paramilitary group, estimated at 50,000 members, whose loyalty is to Northern Ireland more so than Protestantism. 192 With UDA acceptance, that would leave only the Ulster Volunteer Force as a potential dissenters' group, and their purpose is to agitate for the link with Britain, a purpose that would be non-existent under the proposal. With Protestants faced with a fait accompli, loyalist paramilitaries would ce~se to have a mission for political violence, and, should they persist in violent political behavior, they would be revealed as simply a criminal element that could accrue no legitimacy to themselves. It may also be assumed that Protestants and Catholics simply cannot live together, or that the fear of Catholics I would remain since demographically Catholics are expected to one day become a majority in Ulster, and with that the political situation would be drastically altered. As to Catholics and Protestants coexisting peacefully, o' Brien makes '\" a . salient point that in the Republic of 73 ti ' . . . .. ' ... ... • ( . Ireland, "Protestants - 5 percent of the population - enjoy the same political rights as everyone else and flourish economically, and their leaders have repeatedly. . . testified to the fair and generous treatment they have received from the State. 11193 I .,/, (/ Demographics became an important factor in Ulster politics because of British policies which consistently stated that there would be no change in the status of Northern Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom without the consent of the majority of the province. 194 Yet Walsh's analysis indicates that \_ ~teven on the assumptions most favourable to the growth of the [Roman Catholic] population, it would be well into the next century before the province would have [a Roman Catholic] majority. 11195 If Walsh's I conclusions are correct, Protestants would hav~ until, say, the year 2050, to help fashion a democratic government which would encourage Catholic loyalty to the st~te, and provide guarantees to the minority - a status that Protestants will one day share. Demographics becomes an incentive for both 1 groups to reach a modus vivendi with each other. % Of special importance to the proposal is that the withdrawal of Britain from Northern Ireland deprives the .. national separatist terrorist groups (the Official IRA, the ' Provisional IRA, .and the Irish Republican Army) of their stated purpose: to drive away the British Army.·· ,, 1i(, ,•,," 74 ,, .. • I • This consequence of the plan would be a delicate matter for the British government because it might appear, at first glance, as caving in to terrorism. Objectively, there is much truth to this. The separatist gunmen want Britain out; withdrawal for Britain would admit its defeat. Yet the PIRA • would achieve only a partial victory because there 1S virtua·lly no chance of Provisional Sinn Fein achieving a socialist state, nor of Official Sinn Fein achieving a communist state, within the framework of a united Ireland. 197 In fact, there is every hope that with new institutions of state coming into existence in Ulster the terrorists would ····· · be viewed, both by the authorities and the populace, as the criminals that Adams has shown they have become, 198 rather than the single-minded guerillas they once were. But on what basis can it be expected that "new institutions" might actually thrive in a new-found Ulster? The answer may concern "nation-building", i.e. the theories that describe the processes by which nation-states evolve. . In an article by Walker Connor 199 an important distinction is made between state and nation. A state is "a legal concept describing a social group that occupies a defined territory and is organized under common political ~ 11 ins titut ions and an effective government. " A nation is · a ,J t ( social group which shares a common ideology, common institutions and customs, and a sense of homogeneity. 11200 In 75 ·( l ' • ... ' ' the process of nation-building what isf sought is' an assimilation of two or more nations (in states that are non homogeneous) so that institutions can develop / that will accommodate the various ethnic identities. 201 In Northern Ireland, therefore, there are two unassimilated, or perhaps partially-assimilated, nations, ( Protestant and Catholic. Nationalism in Ulster is to the nation (either to the native Irish, or to the Scots-Irish). If the plan of an independent Ulster is to be successful, an evolution from a nationalism that is ethnocentered to one that 1S' territorially-centered #is required. 202 An understanding of the present pattern of loyalties in Ulster suggests that this evolution would be long in duration. A movement away from the extremes in Ulster society certainly is a painstaking affair. Yet, moderates do exist in Ulster. The SDLP and the Alliance Party are examples of those who do not live by, nor advocate, violence. While it is impossible to predict with certainty the actions of Protestants and Catholics in an independent Ulster, group identity with Ulster has been noted by various observers. Rees, for example, attributes Ulster's "fifty. years of de facto independence" as causing ''Ulster nationalism" which "is not something that can be ignored. 11203 He cites the literary and musical culture in Northern Ireland that manifests the development of both communities, and is 76 . ' expressive of a ''common Ulster outlook''. 204 o 'Malley, on the other hand, disagrees that such an identity for Ulster exists. "· .. (T)he forging of a common identity [is not] a simple matter as it has been made out to be," he states. Of the distinctiveness of the two sides, O'Malley·goes on to say: Both communities may feel abandoned by their putative reference groups, the Republic and Great Britain, but a common sense of apartness does not provide the impetus for developing a common sense of purpose, especially when both communities have an unequal sense of who they are in the first place. The Protestants ... may be in search of an identity, but Catholics are not .... 205 Perhaps O'Malley is correct, and Rees merely expresses wishful thinking brought on by years of frustration and fatigue in having dealt with Ulster politics and violence. Nevertheless, O'Malley concedes that: Northern Ireland's instability comes in part from the fact that she is perceived as being impermanent. Ending the uncertainty· that impermanence gives rise to is an argument for independence. But for independence to work it would have to be seen as a final solution, not an interim one. The future would have to look out for itself. 206 This is precisely the assumption that underpins thi~ thesis . .. • 77 (, . ' . .. ' • CONCLUSION No solution to the Ulster problem is without difficulty. This paper proposes a radical alternative as the best means of securing peace. It envisions a giant departure from the politics of today by advocating neither a continued union nor, the obvious alternative, an end to the border. Criticism should, therefore, be expected - particularly from many who may simply refuse to see Northern Ireland as anything but "Irish", or from others who tremble with thoughts of civil war at the severance of the union. Another point of concern is the reception of the plan among the British population. It is unquestionable that were Ulster to be independent, the status of the British Isles as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland would be fundamentally altered. Nevertheless, it can be confidently assumed from the evidence in this paper that the ', response of the British people would be one of relief rather .. . . .,.., than misgi~ing at having the costly Ulster problem removed L 78 ' .- • • • - from their responsibility. It may be asked why a redrawing of the border was not analyzed in chapter four as a possible alternative? The answer is that, on its face the idea would simply recreate the status quo in miniature. The fact is that the Catholic and Protestant populations are so mixed in Ulster that there is no easy way of redrawing the border to create a greater Protestant majority than al~eady exists. 207 Another possibility which is often mentioned includes forced resettlements, or paid resettlements, of either ethnic group to its patron country. Such an idea is even more radical politically than the concept of an independent state. The Republic certainly would object to an enticement by Britain of paying Ulster's 500,000 Catholics to resettle in the . Republic, as would the Catholics themselves. Alternatively, Britain would not look favorably upon the prospect of having to assimilate almost one million Protestants. 208 .. Additionally, Northern Irish Catholics, as we have seen, view the Scots-Irish as invaders. Thus the concept of ,the invaders farcing a resettlement of Cathol-ics from what the Catholics consider their land would·~e quite objectionable. No matter what alternative is adopted as a plan of action, one thing is absolutely certain. The status . quo cannot continue. The tragedies bbrn by Northern Ireland as 79 ' I . ' ,, ' . ... well as Great Britain demand a concerted plan to solve the political stalemate. One of the signal failures is the refusal by the three -J Thatcher Governments to adopt a policy on Northern Ireland when it maintains a large majority in the House of Commons. During the twenty years of the troubles, only the Conservative Party under Thatcher has had the numbers (majorities of one hundred pr more) in Parliament with which to easily pass legislation to effect its agenda. Sadly, no use of them has been made to effectively rule Ulster. Instead, British policies for the province have come only after dramatic terrorist events, leaving all the initiative to terrorists while Northern Ireland's politicians remain deadlocked in intransigence, all comfor,tably underwritten by the British exchequer. 209 In the absence of governmental ' ., initiative, the people in Ulster have little choice but to accept the activities of the paramilitaries as a legitimate means of filling in the void that exists there. While the void continues, the paramilitaries are ascendant and thus can intimidate anyone who , may have . second thoughts about the UDA' s or PIRA' s criminal transgressions. Furthermore, no matter how the British government tries • to insulate Great Britain from the affects of "the Troubles, " Northern Ireland's twenty years of violence has had a 80 . ' • deleterious effect on the mainland. Aside from the fatal bombings, such as in Birmingham in 1974, there is a more fundamental, and perhaps subtle, consequence. The Government has justified, and continues to justify, non-democratic domestic rules in Northern Ireland as necessary for the security of the state. Measures such as the recent ban on radio and television interviews with terrorists ·or supporters of terrorists, and the revision to the right to silence doctrine (which is soon to be applied to England and Wales) have important consequences for civil liberties. Since Britain does not have a written constitution and relies on the respect that Parliament gives to tradition and precedent, the survival of the broadcasting ban after judicial review210 , as well as other aspects of Direct Rule, have caused a debate as to whether Parliament should adopt a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland and even Great Britain. 211 Regardless of whether one believes that a Bill of Rights in Britain is necessary to safeguard civil liberties, the central point is that British policies in Ulster are being viewed by some as undemocratic. These efforts are a dangerous precedent that could lead to further restriction on the traditional rights oi Englishmen. Thus_ the continued lack of a poiitical initiative in Ulster, and the single minded concern with the problem of terrorism, threatens the mainland in ways that are just as significant as the deeds 81 wrought by the gunman . ... It continues to be evident that it is in Britain's interest to devote more attention to the Ulster problem. An independe~t Ulster would alleviate the trend toward anti- .> democratic measures, would lessen the financial drain on the treasury, would enable greater flexibility in the use of military personnel abroad, and end twenty years of battling terrorism so close to home. The need for action was never more urgent. A change in the composition of the House of Commons such that the ruling party had only a slim majority with which to govern would perhaps enable Northern Ireland to become a political football. In such a situation, prospects for Ulster would be worse than they are now. It is today's opportunity that offers tomorrow its glimmer of hope. .\ . 82 '-' \ , ~. " ' • N O T E S 1. Descriptions of the events surrounding Irish and the creation of Northern Ireland are many. independence that However, for a very good account of the politics concerned the issue of partition see T.G. Fraser, Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), chps. 2 and 3. 1922 2. The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (NI) the minister of home affairs discretionary powers provided to to search without warrant, to prohibit publications, arrest suspects without warrant and hold them for forty-eight for interrogation, to restrict the movements of hours M. suspects or to intern them, and to impose a curfew. See Wallace, British Government in Northern Ireland (London: David and Charles, 1982), pp. 22-3. 3. Richard B. Finnegan, Ireland: the Challenge of Conflict and Change (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, pp. 125-6. See also Raymond Mull~n, The Politics of 1983), pp. Northern Ireland (Hong Kong: Longman Group, Ltd., 1986), 9-10. Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political 4. p. Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), See also Mullan, pp. 9-10. Bernadette Devlin, a civil 173. of rights activist at the time, provides a personal account the movement in her book The Price of My Soul (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,. 1969). 111 5. Terence o 'Neill, The Autobiography of Terence O'Neill (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1972), pp. 99, 116. 6. Finnegan, pp. 126-7. 7 .Richard Rose, "Is the UK a State? Northern Ireland a·s Case." !in The Territorial Dimension in United Kingdom a Test . l ' 83 ' . . , • Politics, eds. Peter Madgwick and R. Rose (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1982), p. 109. See also Wallace, p. 21. 8. Peter Kellner and Christopher Hitchens, Callaghan: the Road to Number Ten (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1976), p. 102. 9. Harold Wilson, A Personal ·Record· (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), pp. 692-93. 10. Connor Crui~e O'Brien, States of Ireland (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), p. 181. 11. The Downing Street Declaration, August 19, 1969, paragraph 2, printed in Wallace, p. 36. 12. J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army (New York: The John Day Company, 1971), pp. 337-52; Finnegan, p. 119; Richard Rose, Northern Ireland: Time of Choice (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), p. 51. See especially John Darby, "The Historical Background," in Northern Ireland: the Background to the Conflict, ed. J. Darby (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1983), pp. 23-4. 13. Wallace, p. 40. 14. Wilson, p. 693. 15. Kellner and Hrr~ens, p. 106. 16. Cf. Anthony Kenny, The Road to Hillsborough (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1986), pp. 6-18. 17. O'Brien, pp. 202-6. 18. Edward Maxon-Browne, "Terrorism in Northern Ireland: the Case of the Provisional IRA," in Terrorism: a Challenge to the State, ed. Juliet Lodge (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981) , p. 152. 19. Kenny, p. 12. 20. Finnegan, p. 128. The Northern Ireland Government published a report, A Record of Constructive Change (Belfast: HMSO, 1971) which outlined its reforms. r 21. Paddy Hillyard, "Law and Order," i~ Northern Ireland: the Background to the Conflict, pp. 36-7. 84 L ",._,,_ .., .. '.'! j< ...... ,,, ...... 22. Northern ·Ireland Government Statement (on Internment), Sept. 22, 1971, Verbatim London Press Service, in Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Northern Ireland: Hearings, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., 28 February - 1 March 1972, p. 479. / 23. Ibid. 24. Northern Ireland: Hearings, pp. 188-9. 25. Hillyard, p. 37. 26. Amnesty International, "Report on Allegations of Ill-treatment Made by Persons Arrested under the Special Powers Act after August 8, 1971," in Northern Ireland: Hearings, p. 345. 27. Barry White, ''From Conflict to Violence: the Re emergence of the IRA and the Loyalist Response," in Northern Ireland: Background to the Conflict, p. 186. 28. Northern Ireland: Hearings, p. 189. 29. Finnegan, p. 129. 30. These figures are taken from Albert Parry, Terrorism: from Robespierre to Arafat (New York: Vanguard Press, 1976), p. 378. 31. Finnegan, p. 129. 32. See White, p. 186. 33. See Kenny, p. 28; as well as Hillyard, p. 38. 34. Enloe, p. 15. 35. Darby, pp. 14-5. 36. Ibid. 3 7. Ibid. , p. 17. 38. Ibid., pp. 17-8. 39. P. 0 1 F·arrell noted that 11 ••• it was, above all, the Industrial Revolution which drove England and Ireland irrevocably apart." o' Farrell was referring ·to Ireland in general which, of 6ourse, meant the agriculturally-oriented . ' . "·" .. 8·5·". • South. See England and Ireland Since 1800 (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 114. 40. For this and what follows see Wallace, pp. 13-21. 41. Lord Prys-Davies quoted in "Employment Fairness 'a Right,'" The Times. 30 Jun 89, p. 9. 42. Mullan, p. 9. 43. Devlin, p. 49. .. 44. For the following descriptions of the political parties I relied on the ~esearch of Rose in his Northern Ireland: Time of Choice, pp. 37-41; 49-55. 45. Ibid., p. 37. 46. A.T.Q. Stewart, The Narrow Ground: Aspects of Ulster 1609-1969 (London: Faber & Faber, 1977), p. 164. 47. Rose, Northern Ireland: Time of Choice, p. 40. 48. Donald Doumitt, Conflict in Northern Ireland (New York: Peter Lang, 1985), p. 22. 49. Maxon-Browne, p. 155. 50. Edgar O'Ballance, "IRA Leadership Problems" in British Perspectives on Terrorism, ed. Paul Wilkinson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 76-7. 51. Rose, Northern Ireland: Time of Choi1e, pp. 53-5. 52 •. J:-aA McAllister, The Social Democratic and Labour Party (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 3. 53. Ibid., p. 13. 54. Kenny, p. 20. 55. Ken Heskin, Northern Ireland: a Psychological Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 25. 56. Ibid., pp. 28-9. . 57. Rosemary Harris, Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster ·(Manc~ester: Manchester University Press, 1972), p. 146. 58. Ibid., p. 147. ,., . - 86 /, 59. Finnegan, p. 144. 60. Ibid., pp. 143-4. 61. The Times, in an editorial on the June 15, 1989 general election, remarked: "ijorthern Ireland and Anglo-Irish relations have been almost completely absent from the hustings which have been dominated by economic and social issues." See "Fifth Time ... ," The Times, 15 Jun 89, p. 15. 62. Micheal MacGreil, Prejudice and Tolerance in Ireland {New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 128. 63. Ibid., p. 377, 380. 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid, p. 391. 67. See the note on "Fifth Time ... ," The Times, supra. 68. Direct Rule essentially means government by executive orders, called Orders in Council, through the secretary of state for Northern Ireland. Drafted orders, which are outlines of policy, are laid before Parliament for its consent. The particulars of day to day operations, however, are the province of the Government of the day and the secretary of state. 69. For much of the following discussion, I relied upon Wallace, chp. 4. 70. The Alliance Party was a minor party in the scheme of Ulster politics because it did not attract the quantity of adherents that flocked to the main parties: the OUP, DUP, and the SDLP. Alliance was founded in 1970 and advocated union with Britain while also supporting the participation of Catholics in Ulster's political institutions. In respect to the latter they were in agreement with the SDLP. Its main goal is to bridge the religious divide in the interest of peace. See Rose, Northern Ireland: Time of Choice·, pp. 58-9. 71. Cf. Wallace, p. 125. The "fringe parties" were the Alliance Party, the Northern Ireland Labour Party {NILP), and the Unionist Party of Northern Ireland (UPNI). NILP is now ,,lg, • defunct, and never had a meaningful impact on Ulster politics (Cf. Rose, Northern Ireland: Time of Choice, p. 59). UPNI was not a constituency party, but an "assembly-based party". It .' 87 .. • , - ... • • \ was founded by Brian Faulkner in 1974 as a breakaway faction of the Official Unionist Party to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate with London on the issµe of the power-sharing .. executive (Cf. Rose, ibid.~ pp. 42-3). 72. Wallace, p. 127. 73. White, p. 186. 74. Rose, "Is the UK a State? Northern Ireland as a Test Case," p. 121. 75. Diplock Report, chap. 1, par. 1. 76. Ibid., chap. 2, par. 7, sec. a. 77. Ibid., chap. 2, par. 7, sec. c. 78. Ibid., chap. 2, par. 7, sec. d. 79. ,Ibid. , chap. 2, par. 7, secs. g and i. 80. Hillyard, p.39. 81. Ibid. 82. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, sec. 2, par. 1. 83. Ibid., sec. 3. 84. Ibid., secs. 10 and 11. 85. Ibid., sec. 19. 86. Ibid., sec. 23. 87. Ibid. schedule 2. 88. Doumitt, p. 24. 89. Hillyard, p.41. 90. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, sec. 1, par. 3. 91. Ibid., sec. 1, par. 6. 92. Ibid, sec. 2. 88 93. Ibid., sec. 3, par. 3, sub-par. a. 94. Ibid., schedule 3, parts I,II. 95. Moxon-Browne, p. 159. See also Rose, ''Is the UK a State? Northern Ireland as a Test Case," p. 125. 96. Moxon-Browne, p. 159. 97. John E. t,inn, "Public Support for Emergency (Anti terrorist) Legislation in No~thern Ireland: a Preliminary Analysis," Terrorism (Vol. 10, No. 2, 1987), p. 119. • 99. Denis Donaghue, "The Hunger Strikers," in Northern Ireland, ed. Jonathan Bartlett (New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1983), pp. 63-4. 100. Jack Holland, "The Men on the Blanket," Northern Ireland, p. 72. 101. Donaghue, p. 64. 102. Holland, p. 70. 103. Parry, p. 378. 104. Finnegan, p. 136. 105. Parry, p. 378. 106. Ibid. 107. Ibid., p. 379; See also Heskin, p. 92. 108. Hillyard, p. 43. 109. Ibid. 110. Kenny, p. 33. 111. Ibid. ,,, 112. Ibid. 113. Holland, "The Men on the Blanket," p. 74. 114. Ibid. . /. "' 89 C, I ----:i 115. Ibid., p. 75; Kenny, pp. 33-4. 116. Kenny, p. 34. 117. Hillyard, p. 57. 118. Maxon-Browne, p. 160. 119. Kenny, P.• 31. 120. Maxon-Browne, p. 157. \ 121. Ibid., p. 158. 122. Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Ireland, (Hillsborough Agreement), preamble. 123. Ibid. 124. Ibid., Art. 2. 125. Ibid., Art. 6. 126. Ibid., Art. 8. 127. Ibid., Art. 9. 128. Ibid., Art. 1. 129. W. H. Cox, "Public Opinion and the Anglo-Irish Agreement," Government and Opposition (Summer 87), p. 341. 130. Ibid., p. 338. 131. Kenny, p. 102. 132. Ibid., p. 103. 133. Ibid., p. 123. 134 .. Craig R. Whitney, "Stamping Otit the Fire of Religious Violence Is as Hopeless as Ever," New York Times,· 21 May 8 9, sec. 4, p. 2. This article provides the only reference to the name "Ulster Resistance" and this "nom de guerre" should thus be viewed with skepticism. Loyalist ,groups have been known to invent cover names to hamper police investigations into their activities. An example is the continued use of the name Ulster Freedom Fighters which is 90 .. a cover name for the Ulster Defense Association. Cf. Kenny, p. 24. 135. M. Evans, "The Last Straw for Thatcher," The Times, 22 Oct 88, p. 4.; Robert Harris and Mary Holland, "Gag that Cannot Hold," Observer, 23 Oct 88, p. 15. After Omagh Prime Minister Thatcher said to Secretary of State for Northern Irelan·d Tom King, "This time something has to be done." 136. "Ulster Terrorism Groups Banned from Broadcasts," The Times, 20 Oct 88, p. 13. 137. Ibid. 138. M. Evans, p. 4. 139. For opposition to the broadcasting ban see "Ulster . Terrorism Groups Banned from Broadcasts," The Times, 20 Oct ' 88, p. 13; Richard Ford, et. al., "Critics Attack Sinn Fein TV Ban Loopholes," The Times, 20 Oct 88, p. 1; and Allan -\ Watkins, "A Good Year for the IRA," Observer, 23 Oct 88, p. ) 13. For criticism of the right to silence policy see Michael ,- Jones and David Hughes, "War on Words," Sunday Times, 23 Oct 88, p. B4. For the response by the· Irish Government see Jamie Dettmer, "Haughey Distressed by Government's Attack on Sinn Fein," The Times, 22 Oct 88, p. 4. 140. White, p. 181. 141. Clive Walker, The Prevention of Terrorism in British Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), p. 178. 142. Jack Holland, Too Long a Sacrifice (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1981), p. 196. 143. Ibid., p. 196. 144. Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 5th ser., vol. 498 (1988), col. 1046. ~ 145. Edward Gorman, "IRA Turns to High-Tech Terrorism," The Times, 15 Jul 89, p. 3. 146. Ibid. 147. Ibid. ... ... 91 J',:, /• 148. Cf. Adria_n Guelke, "Loyalist and Republican Perceptions of the Northern Ireland Conflict: the UDA an~.t~e Provisional IRA," in Political Violence· ahd Terror, ed. Peter H. Merkl (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), p. 103. 149. James Adams, The Financing of Terror (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 180. 150. Ibid., pp. 168-9. 151. Ibid., p. 171. 152. Ibid., p. 172. 153. Ibid., pp. 173-4. After the PIRA's success, the Ulster Volunteer Force took control of taxis in the Protestant ghettos of Belfast. 154. Ibid., pp. 175-6. 155. Ibid., p. 131. 156. Ibid, p. 181. Cf. Anthon·y Bailey, Acts of Union (New York: Random House, 1980), p. 159. 157. Tom King was replaced as secretary of state by Peter Brooke on July 24, 1989. It was reported that Brooke was demoted from Conservative Party chairman to his new post because of his perceived responsibility for the Tories' poor performance in the 1989 European parliamentary elections. If true, it demonstrates the very low position that Ulster maintains on the current Government's agenda. Cf. Richard Ingrams' column, Observer, 9 Jul 89, p. 16. 158. Whitney, "Stamping out the Fire of Religious Violence Is as Hopeless as Ever," New York Times, 21 May 89, sec. 4, p. 2. Emphasis mine. 159. This same ambivalence toward terrorism existed as far back as a century when, o' Farrell noted, " [ In the nineteenth century] , ( t) he goyernment' s tendency was to differentiate between Protestant and Catholic violence: both were condemned, but that of 'loyalists' was the more: understandable and excusable." Cf. England and Ireland Since 1800, p. 162. 160. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 6th ser., vol. , 138 ( 1988) , cols. 1011-2. t' 92 .. 161. Dermot McAleese's "comment" in The Constitution of Northern Ireland, ed. David Watt (London: Heinemann, 1981), p. 118. 162. Leslie McClements, "Economic Constraints," in The Constitution of Northern Ireland, pp. 112-3. 163. Norman Fowler, Secretary of State for Employment, in Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 6th ser., vol 134 (1988), col. 703. Tom King put the figure at 115,640 unemployed as of June 9, 1988. See ibid., col. 557. The chronic condition of unemployment in Ulster is not new, see Bailey, p. 86. 164. Lord Prys-Davies, Opposition spokesman on Northern Ireland, in "Employment Fairness 'a Right, 11 The Times. 30 Jun 89, p. 9. 165. Padraig O'Malley, The Uncivil Wars: Ireland Today (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1983), p. 243. 166. Ivor Stanbrook, Letter, The Times, 18 Nov 88, p. 17. 167. Hugh Roberts, "Sound Stupidity: the British Party System and the Northern Ireland Question, 11 Government and Opposition, XXII (Summer 87), p. 319. , ..,. 168. Devlin, p. 205. See also Roberts, p. 329; and P.W. Duncanson, Letter, The Times, 10 Nov 88, p. 17. 169. Stanbrook, supra. 170. James O'Fee, Letter, The Times, 9 May 89, p. 17. See also Teresa Gorman, et. a1.,· Letter, The ·Times, 10 Nov 88, p. 17. 171. Duncanson, supra. 172. Peter Clarke, Letter, The Times, 10 Nov. 88, p. 17. 173. Rose, Northern Ireland: Time of Choice, p. 155. 174. Ibid. 175. Hillsborough Agreement, Art. 4, sec. b. 176. Ibid., Art. 1, sec. c, which reads in part: "If in the future a majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ii;-eland, [the Governments of Britain and the 93 Republic] will introduce and support in the respective Parliaments legislation to give ef{ect to that wish.'' 177. Cf. George Brock, "Let Ulster Tories Unite," The Times, 9 May 89, p. 16. 178. Merlyn Rees, London to Anthony J. Killian, Bethlehem, 8 March 89, author's papers. Emphasis mine. 179. In fact, it is not uncommon to see in The Times one news article about an event in the Republic followed immediately with a paragraph or paragraphs of an event in Ulster set off simply with an asterisk, and vice-versa. The philosophy of this editorial policy must be that events on either side of the border are Irish events. For a critique of media reporting on Ulster events see Heskin, pp. 14-5. 180. Rose, Northern Ireland: Time of Choice, p. 155. 181. Cf. Wallace, p. 66. 182. Heskin, p. 37. 183. R. Rose, Northern Ireland: Time of Choice, p. 3. 184. Rees, Northern Ireland: A Personal Perspective (London: Methuen, 1985), p. 346. 185. Ibid. Connor Cruise O'Brien, a former Member of the Dail (the Irish parliament) and a former cabinet minister agreed with this view during remarks in his lecture on Northern Ireland whieh was part of the "Inter-University Seminar on Foreign Affairs" series sponsored by the University of Pennsylvania's Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, April 18, 1989. 186. Terence Brown, Ireland: A Social and Cultural History, 1922 to the Present _(Ithaca, New ·York: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 197-9. \ . I'• ! 187. Quoted in Heskin, p. 5. 188. Hillsborough Agreement, preamble. 189. Paul Foot, "Why the Troops must Leave Ulster," Observer, 4 Jun 89, p. 16. 190. Finn~gan, pp. 143-4.· I - . -· ,_,,..r ( 191. P. O'Malley, p. 340. 94 ' ,( 192. Kenny, p. 24. 193. O'Brien, States ; of Ireland, p. 110, 194. The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 was latest only the document to reiterate this guarantee, which is found in Art. 1, sec. a. 195. Brendan Walsh, "Comment on Chapter 5 " in The Constitution of Northern Ireland, p. 93. ' 196. Kenny, p. 133. 197. Even in the midst of a polarized society, has not Sinn Fein been able to poll a significant number of votes in local council elections. In the May, 1989 local with the elections exception of West Belfast, Sinn Fein lost ground in all council districts to the Social Democratic Party. and Labour Cf. Jamie Dettmer, "Ulster Poll Reversal for Extremist Parties," The Times, 20 May 89, p. 4. 198. See chapter 3 above. 199. Walker Connor, "Nation-Building o-r- Nation Destroying?" World Politics. XXIV (April 72), 319-55. 200. Ibid., p. 333. 201. Connor therefore concludes that the conventionally understood term "nation-building" is really a misnomer and should ideally be substituted with the term destroying" "nation because in areas afflicted with ethnic strife what is sought is the break-down of the distinctiveness the of nations in such a way that would lead to a peaceful settlement. Ibid., p. 336. 202. Ibid., p. 334. 203. Rees, Northern Ireland: a Personal Perspective, 348. p. 204. Ibid. A concurring view is found in P. O'Farrell, p. 8. 205. O'Malley, p. 346. 206. Ibid., p. 347. 207. See the map showing population distribution in Fraser, p. xi.• 95 L ,. . • ••. ;< .• r("J'~-· , I • 208. While an exact count of Protestants and Catholics within Ulster does not exist, historically approximated the ratio has 2:1 in favor of Protestants. According Whitaker Almanac to the 1988 (London: Whitaker's Almanack, 1987), p. 689, the population of Northern Ireland 1,566,800. in June 1986 was 209. Terence O'Neill, a former Ulster Prime decried the general Minister, ease at which those in Northern Ireland took for granted Britain's largesse: "The is that truth of the matter the vast majority of the people of Northern take all Ireland . _.--.. our UK advantages for granted and cannot they are at risk. believe Keep out of our affairs and give us some more money is unfortunately a common The Ulster attitude." Cf. Autobiography of Terence O'Neill, p. 104. 210. Richard Ford, "High Court Upholds Broadcast Clamp on Sinn Fein Members," The Times, 27 was May 89, p. 4. The ban initiated through a notice to media organizations the Home Secretary from under a prior Act of Parliament (the Broadcasting Act 1981) . The court constitutionality was not passing on the of the Act, a power which British courts do not have, but on whether the Home enjoin Secretary could legally such a ban. The court ruled that he could. 211. 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Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986. Wallace, Martin. British Government in Northern Ireland. London: David and Charles, 1982. Watkins, Allan. "A Good Year for the IRA.'' Observer. 23 Oct 88, p. 13. Watt, David, ed. The Constitution of Northern Ireland. London: Heinemann, 1981. Whitaker's Almanack 1988. 12 0th ed. London: Whitaker's Almanack, 1987. Whitney, Craig. "Stamping Out the Fire of Religious Violence is as Hopeless as Ever." New York Times. 21 May 89, sec. 4 , p. 2 . ~ Wilkinson, Paul. "British Policy on Terr·orism: an Assessment." in The Threat of Terrorism. Juliet Lodge, ed. Boulder, Colorado: 1 Westview Press, 1988, pp. 29-55. Wilson, Harold. A Personal Record. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971. 102 ., • ·- B I O G R A P H Y Anthony Joseph Killian was born in San Bernardino, California on March 28, 1963, to Anthony Peter and Barbara Elizabeth Killian. Raised in Philadelphia, Killian graduated from Father Judge High School in 1981. During his college years at Allentown College of St. Francis de Sales, where he received.a scholarship, Killian served as editor of the J student newspaper and president of the student government association, earning membership in Who's Who in American Colleges and Universities (1984) and Delta Epsilon Sigma (1984). In his senior year, he spent a semester in London as a research assistant to a member of the British House of Commons. He graduated cum laude with a Bachelor of Arts degree in politics on May 19, 1985. After graduation, Killian was employed by st. Joseph's Preparatory School, Philadelphia, as Assistant ' Disciplinarian and Director of Forensic Speech for the 1985- 86 academic year. Since July, 1986, he has worked as an ( analyst for the United States Government. 103