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The Forgotten Jurisprudential Debate: Catholic Legal Thought's Response

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The Forgotten Jurisprudential Debate: Catholic Legal Thought's Response Loyola University Chicago, School of Law LAW eCommons Faculty Publications & Other Works 2015 The orF gotten Jurisprudential Debate: Catholic Legal Thought’s Response to Legal Realism John M. Breen Loyola University Chicago, School of Law, [email protected] Lee J. Strang Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/facpubs Part of the Legal History Commons Recommended Citation Breen, John M., Strang, Lee J., The orF gotten Jurisprudential Debate: Catholic Legal Thought’s Response to Legal Realism, 98 Marq. L. Rev. 1203 (2015). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE FORGOTTEN JURISPRUDENTIAL DEBATE: CATHOLIC LEGAL THOUGHT’S RESPONSE TO LEGAL REALISM* JOHN M. BREEN** LEE J. STRANG*** I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1205 II. THE RECEIVED WISDOM IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: WE’RE ALL REALISTS NOW, AND RIGHTLY SO .......................... 1209 A. The Dominant Narrative: The Triumph of Legal Realism ... 1209 B. The Nonexistent or Weak Rejoinder to Legal Realism by Catholic Legal Scholars ....................................... 1210 III. THE RISE OF LEGAL REALISM AND CATHOLIC LEGAL THOUGHT’S RESPONSE .................................................................... 1217 A. The Rise of Legal Realism ........................................................ 1217 B. Catholic Legal Thought’s Response to Legal Realism .......... 1227 1. The Forgotten Jurisprudential Debate .......................... 1227 2. Three Major Catholic Legal Scholars ............................ 1228 a. Brendan F. Brown ................................................... 1228 b. Walter B. Kennedy .................................................. 1230 c. Miriam Theresa Rooney ......................................... 1232 d. Clergy Serving on Catholic Law Faculties ............ 1236 * The authors wish to thank the participants at the Creighton University School of Law workshop, the University of Dayton School of Law workshop, the University of Detroit Mercy School of Law workshop, the Duquesne University School of Law workshop, the Loyola University New Orleans College of Law workshop, the St. Mary’s University School of Law workshop, the participants at the Joseph T. McCullen Symposium on Catholic Social Thought and Law at Villanova University School of Law, and Professor Dan Ernst for their comments and suggestions. We also gratefully acknowledge the work of Joel Graczyk and his colleagues at Marquette Law Review in the preparation of this Article. ** Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.A., 1985, University of Notre Dame; J.D., 1988, Harvard University. *** Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law; B.A., 1997, Loras College; J.D., 2001, University of Iowa; LL.M., Harvard University. Professors Strang and Breen wish to thank the University of Toledo College of Law and Loyola University Chicago School of Law for their financial support for this Article. 1204 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:1203 e. Summary of the Catholic Respondents to Realism ....................................................... 1237 3. The Architectonic Role of the Neo-Scholastic Revival ......................................................................... 1238 4. Catholic Legal Scholars’ Critique of Legal Realism ......................................................................... 1243 5. The Attempted Institutionalization of Catholic Legal Thought’s Response ............................................. 1253 C. Summary of the Catholic Response to Realism ...................... 1256 IV. THE UNTOLD STORY: EXPLAINING THE ABSENCE OF CATHOLIC LEGAL THOUGHT IN THE HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM ......................................................... 1257 A. The Relatively Insubstantial Amount of Catholic Legal Scholarship Published in Response to Legal Realism ........................................................................... 1257 B. The Good Faith Exercise of Historical Judgment .................. 1262 C. Three Factors Behind the Standard Narrative: The Contemporary Rejection of Natural Law, the Confounding of Natural Law and Religion, and the Prevalence of Secularism and Anti-Catholicism in American Society and Academic Culture ............................................................. 1265 1. Skepticism of Natural Law .............................................. 1271 2. The Confounding of Natural Law and Religion .......... 1274 3. Secularism and Anti-Catholicism in American Society and Academic Culture ...................................... 1281 a. Anti-Catholicism at the Time of the Catholic Response to Legal Realism..................... 1284 b. Anti-Catholicism in the Historical Accounts of Legal Realism in the Post-JFK Era ....................................................... 1293 i. The Passage of Time Since the First Histories of American Legal Realism......... 1294 ii. The Persistence of Anti-Catholic Bias in American Society ..................................... 1295 iii. The Presence of Anti-Catholic Bias in American Academic Culture ....................... 1303 V. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 1310 2015] THE FORGOTTEN JURISPRUDENTIAL DEBATE 1205 I. INTRODUCTION Jerome Frank was one of the leading lights of Legal Realism and also one of its most extreme proponents.1 He stunned the American legal academy with the publication of his 1930 seminal Realist text,2 Law and the Modern Mind.3 Utilizing a Freudian perspective,4 Frank argued that the existing legal profession and academy sought an unattainable5 legal certainty.6 In doing so, the legal profession deceived the public and itself7 because it was playing out an emotional need for permanence and stability, seeking an authoritative father figure: The Law . inevitably becomes a partial substitute for the Father-as-Infallible-Judge. That is, the desire persists in grown men to recapture, through a rediscovery of a father, a childish, completely controllable universe, and that desire seeks satisfaction in a partial, unconscious, anthropomorphizing of Law, in ascribing to the Law some of the characteristics of the child’s Father-Judge. That childish longing is an important element in the explanation of the absurdly unrealistic notion that law is, or can be made, entirely certain and definitely predictable.8 1. See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 81–82, 85 (1973) (describing Frank as “one of the most extreme realists” who, nonetheless, “had an immediate impact”); see also Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 269 (1997) (describing two phenomena—first, “the now dominant tendency to treat Jerome Frank’s particular interpretation of the Core Claim as identical to Realism,” and second, the idea that “Frank’s view represented a particular sort of extreme”). 2. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Law and the Modern Mind by Jerome Frank, 103 DAEDALUS 119, 119, 121–22 (1974) (“Jerome Frank’s book, Law and the Modern Mind, . is probably the most comprehensive Realist effort to expose the fallacies involved in the Classical effort to state legal rules clearly and to systematize them around fundamental legal principles.” (footnote omitted)). 3. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). 4. Id. at 326 n.1 (discussing Freud). Frank had undergone six months of psychoanalysis. Walter E. Volkomer, Frank, Jerome N. (1889–1957), in THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 201, 201 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009). 5. See FRANK, supra note 3, at 6 (“The law always has been, is now, and will ever continue to be, largely vague and variable.”). 6. See id. at 7 (“Lawyers do not merely sustain the vulgar notion that law is capable of being made entirely stable and unvarying; they seem bent on creating the impression that, on the whole, it is already established and certain.”). 7. Id. at 9. 8. Id. at 18; see also id. at 203 (claiming that “the continued craving for excessive legal stability” can be found in the “undisposed of childish longings for a father-substitute, longings 1206 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:1203 Frank’s critique of existing legal perspectives was based on a deep- seated skepticism concerning the existence of moral absolutes.9 Thus, Frank devoted an entire chapter to deriding the “blighting medieval prepossession” of “Scholasticism.”10 According to Frank “[i]n no other field of human thought [was] that prepossession to be found in a more exaggerated and persistent form” than in legal thinking.11 Frank rejected the “vague, abstract, sky-swelling, super-experiential principles and rules of law” that constitute “Absolutism” and “Fundamentalism” in legal thought.12 However, fifteen years later, Frank published Fate and Freedom, where he reversed some of his earlier views: The word “Scholasticism” is sometimes used to indicate a patronizing attitude towards the aridity of the subjects to which the Scholastics devoted themselves. The charge of aridity is not too well founded, for many of these scholars busied themselves with matters of government and economics, often, as in the case of Thomas Aquinas, in a distinguished manner. Moreover, they achieved skills in the techniques of analytic thinking
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