Journal of Strategic Affairs

SSII Journal Summer 2018 Volume III, Issue No. 1

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Printed by: Asia Printers, Islamabad STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE ISLAMABAD

Vol. III Summer 2018 Number 1

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Kashmir: A Potential Blueprint for Conflict Resolution

Dr.Shireen M Mazari 1

The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review: Global and Regional Security Ambassador (Retd)Munir Akram 11

Articles

Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers

Muhammad Shoaib 21

Changing Nature of the Communist Party of China

M. Abdul Qadeer 53

The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence Cooperation

Moiz Khan 70

Afghanistan and the New Great Game: Implications for Pakistan Kashif Hussain 101

Book Review

Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments

Amina Afzal 124

Kashmir: A Potential Blueprint for Conflict Resolution

Dr. Shireen M Mazari

The Kashmir conflict has once again come centre stage in the aftermath of the continuing Indian violence being perpetrated by the Occupying security forces against unarmed Kashmiris. This time it is a UN body that has finally taken the initiative with the publication of the first ever Report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) released on 14 June 2018. Unfortunately the previous Pakistan government (PMLN) and the present Caretaker set up failed to move proactively on Kashmir in the wake of this Report – reflecting a serious lapse in responsible foreign policy. All that Pakistan did was meekly welcome the Report even as India was vehemently criticising it. The Report is a credible account of the Human Rights situation that prevails on both sides of Kashmir and is a first step, since the UNSC resolutions, of the UN recognising its responsibility to resolve the Kashmir issue in accordance with said resolutions.

The Report should have formed the basis for proactive diplomacy on the part of Pakistan in global capitals and international forums from the UN to the OIC beginning with an immediate invitation to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) to send in his team for assessing the situation on the ground in AJK. Pakistan should have done it when the report was being drafted, instead of indulging in the usual “we will if India will” approach, as it would have shown Pakistan’s good intentions. There are times in diplomacy when it is more advantageous to adopt a “we will do it

Journal of Strategic Affairs because we think its right regardless of what India does” approach.

Anyhow, beyond the invitation to the UNHCHR and taking advantage of the OHCHR’s Report, Pakistan should have moved proactively on the following and should still do so:

One: Drawn attention on all international forums, including INGOs dealing with human rights as well as legal forums, to the human rights violations by India in IOK as identified in the Report which are in violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary International Humanitarian Law.

Two: With the Report refreshing the memory of the international community on Kashmir, Pakistan should have reaffirmed at all forums the continuing legitimacy of the Kashmiris struggle for self determination. It seems Pakistan’s hidebound decision makers are not aware that even after 9/11, the principle of self-determination has been recognised as distinct from terrorism – the Almaty Declaration of 4 June 2002 reaffirmed its commitment to the right of self-determination for people remaining under foreign occupation (II:15). This Declaration was adopted by the Heads of State/Government of Member States of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Both Pakistan and India are parties to this Declaration. Not only does the Declaration reaffirm the principle of self-determination, it emphasises that this principle must be exercised “in accordance with the UN Charter and international law”. Non-fulfillment of this will pose a threat “to regional and international peace”. For Pakistan, what could have been a clearer reaffirmation of its position on the Kashmir dispute?

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Pakistan should also not be hesitant in reiterating the UNSC resolutions on Kashmir and stating their linkage to similar UNSC resolutions on East Timor (UNSC Resolution 384 of December 1975 and UNSC Resolution 389 of 1976), which were enforced in 1999 leading to East Timor’s independence from Indonesia through a UN-conducted plebiscite. It was not that Indonesia wanted this but it was pressured, especially by the US, into conceding to the plebiscite. While the struggle against Indonesian occupation was going on by the East Timorese, their leaders, Jose Ramos-Horta and Bishop Carlos Ximenes, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996. It is crucial to remind the world of the parallels between Kashmir and East Timor at all diplomatic forums including bilaterally by our diplomats in the countries they are serving in. Unfortunately our state and successive governments have chosen to remain ignorant on this linkage.

In fact, the case of the Kashmiris before the UN is even stronger because the occupying power itself took the dispute to the UN under Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes. So both Pakistan and India agreed to have UN intervention and to the plebiscite.

Three: In the wake of the Report, Pakistan should have immediately demanded the UNSC insist on the return of UNMOGIP and other independent observers into IOK.

Four: Most important, this was the time for the government to present a blueprint for conflict resolution premised upon the principle of self-determination and a plebiscite. At the end of the day, Pakistan cannot simply continue to pay lip service to UNSC resolutions and the principle of self-determination. Nor can it move away from the UNSC framework on which its legitimacy as a party to the dispute rests. It is unfortunate that the State

Journal of Strategic Affairs and successive governments have failed to work on a proper blueprint for conflict resolution on the Kashmir dispute within the framework of these resolutions and the self-determination principle. The Musharraf four points (which were never discussed or worked out in detail before being made public) were a non-starter because they failed to remain within this legal framework. Other “backdoor” diplomacy solutions have primarily rested on some sort of arrangement that seeks to legitimise the LOC as the border – not realising that the LOC is the problem and cannot become the solution.

Yet, there exist today a variety of conflict resolution models that have been successfully enforced in different parts of Europe where territorial disputes linked with the issue of self-determination prevailed. There was a short period a decade or so ago when the Europeans were even advocating different European models as viable for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

The Aland Island case

For many years Pakistanis visiting Sweden were cited the case of the Aland Islands, which were part of the territory ceded to Russia by Sweden in September 1809, and they became part of the semi-autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland. From 1917, the primarily Swedish- descent residents of the Islands kept up efforts to have the Islands ceded back to Sweden. A petition for succession from Finland was signed by 96.2 % of Aland’s native adults. Swedish nationalism grew as anti- Swedish sentiment grew in Finland as a result Finland’s own struggle to retain its autonomy in the face of Russification. Finland was not prepared to cede the Islands but was prepared to give them an autonomous status instead of renewing them. The dispute was brought before the League of Nations in 1921 and the

Comment decision was to allow Finland to retain sovereignty over the province but within this framework, the Aland Islands were made an autonomous territory. So Finland had to ensure that the Aland residents maintained the Swedish language as well as their own culture and heritage. Also, the Islands were to be given a neutral and demilitarised status. Aland has its own flag, issues its own postage stamps, has its own police force and is a member of the Nordic Council. Having visited Aland in 1989, one saw the whole arrangement for oneself. Obviously it works well for Sweden and Finland, but how relevant is this example in the context of Kashmir.

The relevancy is simply not there. To begin with, Kashmir was not ceded to India through a treaty between Pakistan and India in the aftermath of a war. Geographically, also, islands can be granted autonomy and be demilitarised more rationally than land-locked territories contiguous to both antagonists. Also, and most importantly, the Kashmir issue is not a territorial dispute but an issue of the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir – a right given to them by the international community through UNSC resolutions. The Aland solution would mean continuation of Indian sovereignty over Kashmir – something the Kashmiris have never accepted. The only relevancy of the Aland Islands case is that it went before the League of Nations, which offered a solution and both parties to the dispute accepted the solution. India took the Kashmir issue to the UNSC under Chapter VI of the Charter, relating to Pacific Settlement of Disputes. This signified that India accepted Kashmir as a dispute between itself and Pakistan and sought a peaceful resolution through UN intervention. It did not appeal to the UN under Chapter VII, accusing Pakistan of aggression against Indian “sovereign” territory. So the historical context of

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Kashmir and the prevailing dynamics make the Aland Islands solution inapplicable in this region.

The Trieste case

In 1921 Italy had formally annexed parts of Austria- Hungary that it had captured in World War I, including the city of Trieste. The area’s population comprised mainly Slovenians with some Croats and a large number of Italians who lived mainly in the city itself. After World War II the area was claimed by Yugoslavia, mainly because the population outside the city of Trieste was predominantly Slovenian. The Western powers opposed this claim. Hence, the Free Territory of Trieste was established after World War II in 1947, under the protection of the UNSC, as a neutral state that comprised the city of Trieste, a narrow strip of coastal territory connecting it to Italy, Slovenia and Istria. However, when the UNSC was unable to agree on a governor for the Territory, Anglo- American forces occupied Zone A, which comprised Italian-speaking city of Trieste and its surrounding areas, while the Yugoslavs occupied Zone B, which was the remainder of the Free Territory. Tension between Italy and Yugoslavia continued till 1954 when a compromise solution was reached in the Treaty of Osimo. The territory was formally divided along the zone border and basically this amounted to a partition of the Free Territory, which then ceased to exist.

Again, this was primarily a historical territorial dispute between two member states of the UN, so it is not applicable to the Kashmir dispute. Also, a Trieste-type solution basically means legitimisation of the existing status quo and division of Kashmir – which would not address the root cause of the problem: that of the right of

Comment self-determination. Nor does the Trieste-type solution allow for the option of a future referendum.

The Andorra case

This is a lesser-known case, but is extremely interesting and may well have a greater relevance within the Kashmir context. Andorra is located in the Pyrenees Mountains on the French-Spanish border and is a parliamentary co-principality comprising the Bishop of Urgel (Spain) and the French President. This joint suzerainty (but not sovereignty) of the French state and the Spanish Bishops of Urgel has prevailed since 1278. Andorra has closer ties to Spain with Catalan as its official language and has, over the decades, become an important tourist and winter sports destination as well as a wealthy international financial centre because of its banking facilities, low taxes and no customs duties. In 1993, a constitution was ratified and approved which made Andorra a sovereign parliamentary democracy that retained the “co-princes” as heads of state, but the head of government retains executive power. It became a member of the UN in 1993 as a sovereign state. The “two princes” serve coequally with limited powers that do not include veto over government acts. They are represented in Andorra by a delegate. Defence of the country is the responsibility of France and Spain and Andorra has no currency of its own but uses that of its two neighbours – which effectively now means a single currency, the euro.

The Andorra model has a certain attraction, especially for those who advocate the Independence option for a united State of Jammu and Kashmir. It also offers India a less unpalatable option than seeing the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir becoming a part of Pakistan – which would in all probability still be the

Journal of Strategic Affairs outcome if a general plebiscite was held in that State. But the stumbling block is on the issue of Independence – which both Pakistan and India have not conceded to, as this option is not part of the UNSC resolutions. Interestingly, some Kashmiris are also now referring to the Andorra model. It certainly needs greater exploration, with alternatives to full sovereignty in the form of UN trusteeship for a limited period, and so on.

The Good Friday Agreement (Northern Ireland)

The Good Friday Agreement, which resolved the Northern Ireland conflict. This Agreement was plugged actively by the US, which put pressure especially on the UK, in order to resolve the Northern Ireland conflict.

This model has a direct relevance to the case of Kashmir because it is premised on two interrelated principles. One, it recognises “the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland” (that is going with the Republic of Ireland). There is also a provision for a periodic holding (every seven years) of a referendum in case the people of Northern Ireland appear to change their minds. Two, that deweaponisation will follow the implementation of the settlement. Through this Agreement, the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 was repealed.

The Agreement is an international agreement between the British and Irish governments with two components: the legal agreement between the UK and the Republic of Ireland; and a lengthier agreement signed between eight political parties involved in the Northern Ireland conflict and the two governments (UK and Irish). While the

Comment agreement between the two governments is the actual legal agreement, it incorporates, in its Schedules, the two governments’ agreement with the eight political parties.

It is the principles underlying this settlement that are extremely relevant to Kashmir and need to be the starting point of any substantive solution relating to this dispute. In fact, out of all the conflict resolution models, this is the only one that is premised on the principle of the right of self-determination and not merely territorial control. Equally important Pakistan has to remember its legitimacy as a party to the Kashmir dispute rests entirely on UNSC resolutions so any solution, which Pakistan puts forward, has to be within the UNSC resolutions’ framework and that is premised on the principle of self-determination.

It is unfathomable why the Pakistani State has failed to move on this unless the assumption has been to simply manage the conflict rather than resolve it. After all, in a tunnel-vision approach, once Kashmir is resolved, both the Pakistani and Indian States will have to revisit their investments in the hostility paradigm. However many critical issues remain fluid for Pakistan until the Kashmir dispute is resolved – including the status of Gilgit Baltistan (previously referred to as the Northern Areas) and the international border between Pakistan and China. In the 1963 Border Agreement between Pakistan and China Article 6 clearly stated the following:

“The two parties have agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned will reopen negotiations with the Government of the People's Republic of China on the boundary as described in Article Two of the present agreement, so as to sign a formal boundary treaty to replace the present agreement, provided that in the event of the

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sovereign authority being Pakistan, the provisions of the present agreement and of the aforesaid protocol shall be maintained in the formal boundary treaty to be signed between the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.”

These issues need to be resolved on a permanent basis so that the state of Pakistan has legal clarity regarding its borders and so that the ambivalence being maintained by the state of Pakistan towards Gilgit Baltistan, causing increasing unrest amongst the people there, can come to an end.

The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review: Global and Regional Security

Ambassador (Retd) Munir Akram *

The US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 2018 is an important document. Its importance can be seen from a comparison between this document and the 2010 review issued by the Obama Administration. Whereas the 2010 review justified US nuclear weapons retention and modernisation it was done in the context of an effort or larger objective of containing nuclear weapons, avoiding nuclear war and promoting nonproliferation and arms control. By contrast, the 2018 review issued by the Trump Administration is a document which is a de-facto justification for America’s nuclear rearmament and the pursuit of an aggressive foreign and security policy which justifies the endorsement the number of weapons moderisation listed in the document. US Defence Secretary, James Mattis has said that competition between great powers, not terrorism, is now the main focus of America’s national security.1 The statement is important even from the perspective of Pakistan and our region because the game has become global rather than local.

The document seeks to justify a number of policy goals, and highlights the following: Firstly the threat from Russia. It accuses Russia of having violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

* Adapted from the author’s talk at the Pakistan Institute of Parliamentary Services (PIPS) Islamabad.

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(INF) treaty; they are also accused of a doctrine that envisages the use of low yield nuclear weapons; they have also been accused of another doctrine which envisages the first use of nuclear weapons and the American posture is justified in response to that policy.

An unstated fact is that Russia’s entire rearmament process started because of two developments. The first being the expansion of NATO. When the Soviet Union collapsed there was an informal understanding given to the Russians by the former US Secretary of State, James Baker, that NATO would not be expanded to the borders of new Russia and especially that it would not include any of the former Soviet Republics. However, NATO invited almost everybody from Europe to join in except for Russia and therefore it was quite clear that the purpose of NATO and the posture of NATO is an anti-Russia posture. This was the beginning of the rationalisation for Russia’s rearmament. Secondly, the US walked out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and this was the other significant development which led to Russian nuclear rearmament. It was one of the most important arms control treaties in history because it recognised that the threat of the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine would become less credible if there was a credible Anti-Ballistic Missile system (ABMs) in place and although systems had been developed by both sides it was agreed that they would be limited to one each, one system to protect the command and control by the US and one system to protect the command and control by the

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Russians. Once that treaty was abrogated by the US, the Russians obviously needed to rethink how deterrence would be maintained.

Deterrence would be maintained by taking the more expensive route of developing the comprehensive ballistic missile defence system which the US had developed. The US has got at least three systems in place: the battle field systems, the theatre systems and the strategic systems. The Russians decided to limit themselves to the mid-range systems, i.e. the S300 and S400 which are very good systems. The US chose the more extreme route and is still trying to perfect ballistic missile defence against ICBMs. However, in order to maintain deterrence the Russians had to multiply or re-multiply the number of warheads that they maintain but they have not yet breached the limits of the START treaty. Nevertheless, the plan was to cut down nuclear weapons to a very low level in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War but this objective had to be revised in light of the two developments that were initiated by the US. So, the justification against the Russian moderisation presented in this nuclear posture review is very partial and one-sided statement of the case, to say the least.

Secondly, the document justifies moderisation by a reference to China’s nuclear developments. When the cold war ended China had, by all estimates, 300 nuclear warheads as compared to approximately 22,000 plus that were maintained by the US and the Soviet Union. To now argue that China has expanded its nuclear forces and provides a

Journal of Strategic Affairs justification for a US response is a little rich, to say the least. Because China expanded from 300, it is not known publicly as to how many nuclear warheads China has and how many of these are ICBMs or mid-range or short-range weapons but certainly the numbers are nowhere close to 22,000 or even 4000 or so that are actively deployed by the US and Russia today. So, I think the justification of a US response to Chinese moderisation from 300 to whatever… 500, 1000, 1200 is not a very credible argument for the response that the US has developed.

The NPR then targets two specific smaller powers. One is North Korea and the other is Iran. I think the nuclear posture review perhaps is a little behind the curve as far as describing the situation of North Korea because in subsequent to the writing to this document the North Koreans have gone much far ahead in testing their ICBM capabilities which now pose a credible threat to the US. North Korea is ahead of Pakistan as far as the capability for ICBMs is concerned. It is a credible threat to the US because even with ABMs the US can never be certain that a nuclear missile fired by North Korea would not get through, therefore, it is a much more credible threat. But, who forced them? How did North Korea actually come to this stage of developing nuclear warheads and ICBMs? I think people forget that in 1995-96 there was an agreement by North Korea to scrap its graphite reactor and then in 2000 at the behest of the Chinese the 6-party talks started and they were making such good progress that the North Koreans were ready to

Comment scrap major parts of their nuclear programme. However in 2002 the US imposed sanctions on North Korea for completely unrelated reasons. North Koreans abrogated the 6-party talks, walked out of it and conducted nuclear explosions. The reaction therefore was provoked on part of the US imposing sanctions within a process that was making progress.

The last country focused in the NPR is Iran. Here, the justification provided for the Iranian threat is even less credible than the justification against Russia, China and North Korea because the Iranians have agreed in the joint programme to freeze their nuclear programme and give up the enriched uranium, to limit the enrichment to a lower level at least for 15 years. However, the US now feels 15 years is not enough and after 15 years the Iranians will be free to do anything they want. The understanding on which 15 years was agreed by the P5+1 was that in 15 years the security issues which may compel Iran to go down the nuclear route would be resolved and that there would be no further justification for Iran’s nuclear program. Of course, that is now being questioned by Trump and they want to re-open the whole issue and Trump has now demanded from his European partners that they must get from Iranians a commitment to indefinite oprationality of the joint agreement and a freeze on missile testing. Iranians have rejected both these conditions. So, these are the policy objectives for which the NPR seeks to acquire endorsement from the political system in Washington and from the

Journal of Strategic Affairs international community. It also seeks endorsement for a number of weapon systems that are justified by these policy goals and policy recommendations. In summary this implies a complete modernisation and replacement of nuclear triad i.e. the land based, sea based and air based systems. The sea based Ohio Class Submarines are to be replaced eventually by the Columbia Class submarines and with new SLBMs and SLCMs which would be a new development. The land based ICBMs are to be replaced by new ICBMs in re-enforced 450 silos and the air force with present fleet of 40 B-52s and 25 B-2s will be replaced by a larger fleet of the 2- As and new missile systems including stand-off missile systems with the B-52s. Nothing will be scrapped and much will be modernized. The nuclear force will be huge. The force which is below the strategic range is, of course, under no constraint except for the INF treaty so there are a numbers of short range nuclear weapons that are in the possession of US which would continue to be oprationalised. These are the two goals of the document.

So, what are the implications?

In my opinion there are five implications of the NPR. First of all, obviously there is a new missile and nuclear arms race that this will trigger and has already triggered. This huge arms race would be based on new technologies, using artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons and all kinds of new weapon systems. Secondly and because of the variety and complexity of the weapon systems there

Comment will be greater likelihood of the use of the nuclear weapons and the likelihood of the use of non- nuclear weapons. Thirdly, there will be greater threat to both nuclear capable and to non-nuclear weapon states. This would be a major detraction from international obligations that have been undertaken by the US and other five recognised nuclear power states under resolution 255 of the Security Council which provides negative security guarantees to states which are parties to the NPT. So, there will be at least theoretical strategic nuclear threat to the non-nuclear states and especially because the document states quite explicitly that the US reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in the case of a strategic non-nuclear attack and this is a clear violation of the resolution 255. Fourthly, and this is being widely discussed that wars have become more complex. People have been talking about ‘hybrid wars’, the phrase was coined by a Russian General some years ago but obviously the two wars that are likely to take place are ‘complex wars’, which could be fought at sub-conventional levels with new technologies and with new approaches so that the predictability of the outbreak of conflicts and outcome of conflicts will both become very uncertain thus complicating the task of peace makers and the United Nations. There is also the likelihood of more frequent preemptive and preventive wars. These are now explicitly justified in the doctrines that are coming out especially from the US and Western Powers with regard to the need for preventive wars, terrorism would take over nuclear weapons or response to terrorist incidents. And lastly for all those who have concluded the

Journal of Strategic Affairs nuclear ban treaty, they are likely to be disappointed because there is no time soon that nuclear weapons are going away.

In the regional context obviously there is Russia, China, North Korea and Iran all of which have been spelled out in the document itself. The policy towards Russia is most obvious. Regarding China too it is clear what the US wants. China’s containment would be at the technological level because the number of their nuclear weapons is not that high and recent decisions on US trade policy are clear indications of the fact that there will be constraints put on Chinese acquisition of US source technology and that is the core of competition vis-à- vis China.

On North Korea, Trump has agreed to the summit with Kim Jong Un. The stakes are very high and there is danger of coming back to square one if the summit fails.

On Iran, I think the danger of miscalculation of threats leading to a nuclear conflict is not so much because of the nuclear dimension. The nuclear dimension may provide a justification for what both the US and Israel want i.e. to eliminate Iran’s perpetuity to be an expansionist power. The Iranians have now created a corridor between Tehran and Lebanon which is directly threatening the Israelis and these are facts on the ground which are not going to be acceptable to the US for Israel and therefore there is a great danger in the fact that

Comment this particular situation could lead to the use of force in the near future.

Fortunately for South Asia it is not mentioned explicitly in the document, but it is covered in the context of non-proliferation. It is also covered in context of the American pre-occupation with what the document refers to as the Asia Pacific region and what is now being called the Indo Pacific region. Change in wording is very significant for Pakistan. We have to take into account that there is a profoundly developed alliance between the US and India and this alliance will have specific implications for Pakistan. For Pakistan’s defence posture, for India’s doctrines of limited war, threat of limited conflict, Cold Start etc have not invited any words of caution or criticism from the west. So, we have to presume that these threats enjoy implicit acceptance in Washington and some of the NATO capitals because these have been used by the Indians for their own regional objectives and have been reinforced to some extent by statement issued by the US. So, we have to be very careful in terms of this alliance that is emerging. If seen together with efforts which have been made to declare Pakistan a sponsor of terrorism the threat then transforms into a very real and dangerous scenario. May be it is not wise to read too much into how it will ultimately develop and where we are going with this kind of scenario. Perhaps we are too much into it, perhaps nobody is too foolish to take on a nuclear weapon state such as Pakistan but of course mistakes have been made in history and blunders are possible. The record of behavior that we have

Journal of Strategic Affairs seen and which is manifested in the NPR does not provide much comfort that a blunder of such a magnitude would not take place.

References

1. “Mattis: US National Security Focus no Longer Terrorism,” BBC, January 19, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42752298

Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers

Muhammad Shoaib

Introduction

As the conflict in Syria becomes increasingly complex, the country’s civil war has turned into a proxy war battleground for major powers. The current conflict in Syria presents a complex and unmanageable humanitarian crisis, with severe human rights violations.1 The Arab Uprising made its way to Syria on January 26, 2011 and it became the starting point for the ensuing unrest in the country. The Syrian regime forcefully resisted the wave of public protests that were demanding the ouster of Syrian President Bashar al- Assad. This created a new theatre whereby rebel groups started emerging and taking control of Syrian territory. The weakening of the Syrian state system and the subsequent power vacuum encouraged Daesh (ISIS) to infiltrate and take hold of much of the Syrian territory.

As the chaos unfolds, “unconstructive” foreign interference continues to prolong the war further. The proxy war in Syria is reminiscent of the Cold War period where two camps were engaged in establishing their dominance through indirect confrontations.2 Foreign powers are once again supporting the warring parties within Syria to serve their own national interests. The US, Turkey and some Gulf states including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are allied with the US and are pushing for Assad’s ouster. Although Turkey became part of coalition air strikes against Daesh and other al Qaeda- allied militants, differences over Kurds (YPG militia)3 have since taken over Turkey-US relations. Meanwhile Russia and Iran are supporting the Assad regime.

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Moscow maintains that it will continue its campaign against militants and remain involved in Syria. Iran also supports the Assad regime and remains involved in Syria against the US-led coalition.

Even after several cessation-of-hostilities resolutions by the United Nations Security Council, ceasefire implementation in Syria remains fractured. It is also unclear how efforts through the Geneva and Moscow peace processes would manage the complexities and help end the war. It is now believed that the conflict has transformed into a global race for influence between the US-NATO bloc and its Gulf allies and the Russia-led counter-alliance camp. This great power competition in Syria poses several questions that this study seeks to answer. These include:

What are the interests of great powers in Syria? How are these powers involved in Syria and what are their aims and objectives? What are the implications of the great powers’ involvement in the Syrian Crisis?

Although there are several actors involved in the Syrian war, this study focuses on the interests and involvement of US and Russia. Western perspective dominates most of the available literature. Secondary sources of data collection would be used, primarily from published journals, books and newspaper articles, from both print and online publications.

Background

On March 18, 2011, demonstrations broke out in the southern Syrian city of Dar’a and in several other cities and villages in the north of the country, including Hama and Banyas.4 This outbreak indicated the arrival of the

Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers

‘Arab Spring’, which had already made its appearance in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.5

Initially, the demonstrations in Syria were confined to rural and peripheral areas.6 However, they soon spread across the country. This can be attributed to the brutal means employed by the Assad regime such as calling the Army into action to repress the demonstrations.7 Within a few weeks, the protests turned into a widespread popular uprising against Bashar al-Assad’s government, and ultimately, into an intense and indecisive civil war.

Owing to the involvement of some Sunni rebel groups, the struggle in Syria took on an ethnic character, and subsequently, a religious character as well. It became a holy war for Islamic groups, some native to Syria and others made up of Sunni volunteers who reached the country from across the Arab and Muslim world. In their view, they were fighting against the Alawites. Alawites are a minority group accounting for a small percentage of Syria’s population. The group is an offshoot of the Shia sect of Islam and have ruled Syria for 40 years. Alawites are allies of the Shiite camp in the Middle East, comprising the Iranian state and the Hezbollah in Lebanon.8

In April 2011, when the Syrian Army sent a column of tanks to end the anti-government movement,9 the situation escalated into a military conflict leading ultimately to a civil war. The early insurgency phase started in July 2011 and lasted until April 2012.10 This period was characterised by the rise of armed opposition militias and the beginning of an armed rebellion against the Syrian regime. This period also saw the formation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), when some rebel officers of the Armed Forces declared the establishment of an organised opposition military force aimed at de-throning

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President Bashar al-Assad. Between 2012 and December 2013, the civil war intensified11 following the failure of UN supported cease fire attempts. On June 12, 2012, the UN officially declared that Syria was in a state of civil war.

In April 2013, Syrian rebel factions, including Ahrar al Sham12 and the Al-Nusra Front13 declared war on the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Daesh which was gaining dominance in the Syrian war. The militant group was carrying out indiscriminate killings against regime forces and rebels. Although Daesh was initially created in Iraq following the 2003 US invasion.14 The civil war in Syria and the emerging power vacuum there led to the infiltration of Daesh into the country. Daesh sought to capture Syrian territories and establish an Islamic Caliphate there.

In May 2015, Daesh took advantage of the Syrian Civil War to conquer further large swathes of Syrian territory. Different rebel groups were already fighting Daesh where the group had established its bases. The fighting intensified with the rise of several other Islamist forces who were fighting against Daesh as well as each other.

By June 2016, following five years of fighting, the number of people killed in the fighting had reached almost half a million.15 About ten million Syrians, approximately half of the country’s population, lost their homes, and about eight million became refugees.16 Although this exodus was the direct result of the war of extermination conducted by both sides, it can also be attributed to the Syrian regime’s deliberate policy of cleansing areas suspected of supporting the rebels.

The Syrian conflict led to the de facto dissolution of the Syrian state into several different political entities: the

Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers state of ISIS (Daesh), located in eastern Syria and northern Iraq; the remains of the original Syrian state, led by the Assad dynasty and enjoying Russian and Iranian patronage, located in western Syria; the autonomous Kurdish enclaves, located in the eastern and northern parts of Syrian territory; and the enclaves held in significant portions of northern and southern Syria by rebel groups, headed by Fatah al-Sham Front (formerly, the Support Front for the People of Syria, the al-Nusra Front, or Jabhat al-Nusra), affiliated until late July 2016 with al-Qaeda.17

Interestingly, a June 2006 article titled “Blood Borders” was published in the US Armed Forces Journal.18 Written by a retired US army officer Ralph Peters, the article carried a new map of the Middle East. Peters had predicted a collapse of the existing territorial boundaries and a division of Arab Muslim states based on sectarian and ethnic lines. The Blood Borders map divided Syria into several entities. It also predicted the creation of a ‘Free Kurdistan’ combining parts of Iranian and Syrian Kurdish majority areas. Blood Borders referred to Syria as a loser state in the new Middle East with much of its territory divided on the basis of ethnicity. Interestingly, the contemporary situation in Syria conforms to the same map of the new Middle East whereby chaos and divisions among regional states is evident. In order to analyse the external involvement in Syria and the interests of major powers there, it is pertinent to highlight the geopolitical and geostrategic significance of the country.

Geostrategic and Geopolitical Significance of Syria

Syria is located at the crossroads of the Middle East, Central Asia and South to Southeast Asia and, for these regions, provides a vital transit hub and outlet to the

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Levant and Mediterranean waters.19 As discussed, from an offensive-realist approach, great powers (the US and Russia in this study) always seek opportunities to acquire more power in order to feel more secure. Great powers thus have an inherent tendency to maximise their power. This theoretical analysis significantly describes the post-9/11 behaviour of these powers, which conform to the offensive-realist logic and exhibit their strategic objective of attaining primacy in the post-Cold War global order.20 Policy-makers have now started valuing the political control of hydrocarbon export routes beyond energy security. This means the political control of such routes has implications for national security. Therefore, the security of energy flows has now become a matter of interest for states rather than being just a corporate matter. As a result, the involvement of state governments in the security of energy routes has increased considerably.21 Therefore, to understand the involvement of major powers in the Syrian conflict, a discussion of the geopolitical importance of Syria is necessary.

Examining the Syrian conflict at the macro-level, especially in the realm of the impact of great powers on security concepts, reveals that Syria has become the victim of security and resource oriented international competition.22 On the one hand, Syria remains critical to the strategic stability of the region and, on the other, its energy offerings bear substantial implications for the finances and geopolitical advantage of external powers.23 In the first instance, Syria is relevant as a transit route for arms shipments from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon, a major component of the ‘Shiite axis’ or ‘Shia crescent’.24 This strategic corridor stretching from the Middle East to the Eurasian landmass doubles as a reverse pathway to sea, with its so-called ‘door to the sea’ located in the section of sea that lies east of the Mediterranean i.e. the

Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers

Syrian coastline.25 Regarding this, Syria offers Iran military resilience, enhancing its responsiveness to foreign assaults and air strikes.26 Whoever wields control over Syria would thus be able to manipulate the Shia axis’ ground supply route. Therefore, control over Syria would determine Iran’s military responsiveness at any given time.27

On the economic front, Syria has proven gas reserves of 284 billion cubic metres (bcm); oil reserves of 2.5 billion barrels (bb); shale gas reserves of 50 billion tonnes (bt);28 and usual outputs of 385,000 barrels per day (b/d).29 The conflict saw an increase in oil and gas production levels and the withdrawal of (foreign) investors from the country’s energy sector. The EU, which accounts for most of Syrian hydrocarbon sales,30 was unavoidably affected when shortages to European refiners raised prices in its physical oil market. Following the US sanctions on Syrian energy exports in 2011, the EU also imposed a ban on Syrian energy exports. However, the sanctions imposed by the EU were not as widely drawn as the US sanctions, because of increased involvement of some EU companies in Syria’s oil industry. Out of 385,000 barrels of oil produced per day, Syria exported about 150,000 barrels per day, of which most was being exported to European countries, particularly the Netherlands, Italy, France and Spain.31 This underscores the importance of Syrian hydrocarbons for the energy needs of Europe and, by extension, the world.32 Although the economic viability of energy resources in Syrian surroundings is still being debated, it assumes strategic significance based on findings that proven and potential reserves can improve the wider supply to international markets. Hence, the international rivalries for control of Eurasian energy resources extend to the geographic choke points and waterways of the Syrian locale which, according to

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Jeffrey Mankoff, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow at the CSIS, hold vast hydrocarbons crucial to the ever- evolving global industrial economy.33

External Involvement

Owing to Syria’s geostrategic importance, the Syrian Crisis is no longer an internal matter. It has become an arena of regional and international struggle. In this regard, Bashar al-Assad, as well as his rivals, were influenced by the superpowers, primarily the US and Russia, and regional powers including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and Iran. This outside involvement only exacerbated the crisis in Syria and led to the prolonged conflict.

As the conflict unfolded, Daesh expanded its influence and conquered more and more territory in the Middle East. The group took advantage of the Syrian Civil War to conquer Syrian territories in May 2015. Daesh wanted to establish an Islamic caliphate in the region, thereby exploiting the Islamic principles of governance in justifying its territorial gains in Syria.34 These principles envisage Jihad, a holy war, to bring the surrounding political entity into compliance with Islam.35 This concept led Daesh to fight for the creation of an Islamic state or a caliphate in Syria and Iraq.

Similarly, the expansion of NATO also undermined the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria. For example, when Russia suddenly raided territories held by Syrian opposition groups, it triggered a response from NATO. A Russian warplane was shot down by the Turkish Army (Turkey is a NATO member) on the Syrian border on November 24, 2015 because the plane had invaded Turkish airspace several times within five minutes, so they shot it down.36 NATO continued to

Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers strengthen and enlarge its Response Force.37 Six new command centres were built to plan military strategies and facilitate military exercises. Peace activists warned against NATO’s increasing involvement in the conflict. Sharat G. Lin, President of the San Jose Peace and Justice Centre said, “The main thing to understand is that no matter what the conflict is in Syria – and there are many factions – this is something that the Syrian people will have to solve on their own,”38 In other words, Intervention in Syria by NATO or Great Powers might probably further destabilise Syria.

Expansion of the NATO, invasion of Daesh and the intervention of Great Powers worsened the original civil war in Syria. In February 2012, Russia and China vetoed the Western-backed Arab Resolution at the UN Security Council, which was a plan calling on President Bashar al-Assad to resign. The US was angered by their vetoes and blamed these countries for protecting Bashar al- Assad. Russia and China actually acted in self-interest: Russia intended to preserve its influence in the region through its military ties with Syria.39

An original conflict between Syrian opposition groups and the Syrian government changed to a civil war and finally escalated into a global conflict. Western intervention undermined the internal sovereignty of Syria. Sovereignty, by definition, is the supreme power or authority of a state to govern itself or another state.40 In other words, one will not have power over another one. There are two types of sovereignty. Internal sovereignty implies every state can act as it wishes and independent of other powers within its own territory; External sovereignty implies all states are legally equal and no legitimate authority can tell a state what to do. This fundamental principle of international relations can

Journal of Strategic Affairs be traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia following the Thirty Year’s War.

Since great powers always seek opportunities to attain more power in order to feel more secure,41 this perspective exhibits the changing nature of the Middle East where there is a rivalry between camps led by the US and Russia, working to resolve regional crises. These camps are also engaged in a competition over the result of the settlement that would eventually be reached. The powers involved are also struggling to get a share in the emerging leadership and economic opportunities that have arisen in the region. Consequently, geopolitical realism and perceptions of security dilemmas shape much of their actions and permit the crisis to define the dynamics of global stability more negatively.

The intensification of external involvement whereby no single armed group exists without an international connection has seen scholars and analysts reconsider the roles of intervening global powers which they believe collide head-on. According to David Hartwell, Middle East analyst at IHS Jane’s, the intervening powers have simply made matters worse.42 Foreign powers in support of the warring parties, the US and some Gulf states pushing for Assad’s ouster, and Russia and Iran backing his rule, continue to defend their unmentioned national interests. The ongoing violence has seen Daesh overrun vast territory whereby it has committed bloodshed against local ethnic and religious minorities, moderate Sunnis, and hostages from various Western countries.43 The capability of terrorist groups to inflict severe damage to major powers and their forces, brought fears about the country becoming a refuge for extremist groupings and reinforced the basis for external military support.44 Great powers’ involvement in the Syrian conflict, both militarily and politically serves their

Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers individual geostrategic and geopolitical interests in the region.

US Interests and its Involvement in the Syrian Civil War

The Middle East was largely overlooked in US foreign policy until the mid-20th century when President Roosevelt declared in 1941 that “the defence” of the “Middle East” was integral for the defence of the US.45 This was mainly due to Saudi Arabia’s developing relations with the US, specifically American oil companies’ interest in exploiting the enormous oil reserves of the Kingdom.46 Therefore, Roosevelt became interested in the Middle East because of oil. As the Second World War burned oil at a massive rate, the President wanted to ensure American access to as much as possible.

In the wake of World War II, the Soviet Union began to look south and, in August 1957, in response to an accusation by the Syrian government that the US had sponsored an attempt to overthrow it, US Ambassador Loy W. Henderson was sent to Syria. Upon his return, Henderson wrote a report stating his concern that Syria would fall victim to “international communism”.47 Soviet designs in the region continued to worry Washington and it was President Nixon’s stance that “the US would view any effort by the Soviet Union to seek predominance in the Middle East as a matter of grave concern”.48 The hostile relationship between Washington and Damascus was historically caused by the Syrian government’s support of the US’ opponents, whether in the Arab-Israeli conflict, during the Cold War or the more recent “war on terrorism”.

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US-Syria relations in the aftermath of the Second World War were shaped by the politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Cold War.49 After 9/11, the US intended to ally with Syria in its war on terror. Syria’s longstanding hostility toward Saddam Hussein, US-Syrian cooperation against al-Qaeda and the Bush Administration’s opposition to a congressional bill placing sanctions on Syria at the end of 2002 reflected a relatively stable US-Syria relationship.50

However, Hezbollah activities, from 2002 and 2003, on the Israeli border created tension between Syria and the US.51 Following his ascendance to power, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was rather interested in reform related to economic liberalisation and establishing contacts with groups accused of terrorism such as Hezbollah and Hamas. The groups were considered a deterrent against potential American or Israeli attacks against either Iran or Syria.52

The US-led war against Iraq was the breaking point in Syria-US relations. Syria did not join the US coalition against Iraq and in fact became a vocal opponent of the war. Damascus didn’t adjust to the new US policies following September 11, 2001.53 After the Iraq war, Washington accused Syria of multiple offences, including hiding Iraq’s “weapons of mass destruction”, the destruction of which was the US’ actual goal in the war.54 The passage of the Syrian Accountability Act in 2003 allowed various sanctions to be imposed on Syria by the US President.55 As a consequence, relations between the two nations deteriorated further.

Bashar depended on the authoritarian structure of power.56 For instance, he ordered the Syrian Army to use a column of tanks to suppress anti-government protests by killing protesters and even the civilians. President

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Barack Obama said, “Assad must halt his campaign of killing and crimes against his own people now. He must step aside and allow a democratic transition to proceed immediately,”57 International condemnation for the Assad regime intensified further in August, 2013 in the wake of a chemical weapons attack on a suburb in Damascus.

A United Nations inspection team confirmed the use of chemical weapons at the site.58 After announcing in August 2012 that the use of chemical weapons by Assad on his own people could potentially lead to military intervention by the US,59 US President Obama agreed to delay any military action to allow Russia to pursue its proposed diplomatic solution.60 Russia remains Syria’s most powerful international ally, supplying the Assad regime with weapons and equipment to continue the battle with the growing rebel groups,61 and defending the regime from formal condemnation by the UNSC.62 Even though the US had stated its reluctance to give weapons to the rebels because of the groups’ extremist tendencies, on June 14, 2013, Washington finally announced “it would give the rebels “direct military aid” after concluding Syrian troops had used chemical weapons”.63 This change in policy toward Syria followed reports which stated that in 2012, US organisations were suspected of operating in other Middle Eastern countries to help oversee US military support of the rebel groups.64 The US’ position against extremist groups was widely known, but its arming of such groups raised many questions. While Syria itself is not a threat to the US, wider international implications of the Syrian civil war make it resemble the Cold War period, with the US and Russia arming their chosen sides as proxy combatants in order to achieve their goals and secure their interests.

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Hence, the US offered military training and provided a large number of military resources to some of the opposition factions in order to recognise the legitimacy of the opposite camp, even as Russia provided military and financial support to the Syrian Army. For the US and its Western allies, there are three major long-term goals and interests in Syria which they want to secure through their support to opposition factions in the Syrian conflict.65 These interests include isolating Iran and bolstering the strategic and economic alliance with Arab allies like Qatar, which invests in Europe and offers an alternative to Russian gas.

Isolating Iran

One of the pillars of the US foreign policy is to isolate Iran. This can be attributed to a number of reasons including Iran’s nuclear programme as well as its interference in regional affairs. The fall of a strategic ally of Iran such as Bashar al-Assad would be a blow to Iran in its showdown against the US and Israel. Indeed, the strategic alliance with Damascus allows Iran to maintain its Shia “axis of resistance” (Iraq-Syria- Lebanon with the Hezbollah).66 Indeed, these partnerships allow Tehran to counter the isolation imposed by the US sanctions. They also allow Tehran to maintain proxies that serve as a leverage utilised for negotiations on the nuclear issue with world powers.67 These proxies also help Iran to counter the threats of Israeli attacks. With this in mind, replacement of Bashar al-Assad by a regime that would agree to isolate Iran would favour the interests of the US, and also the rival Arab countries in the Persian Gulf (mainly Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE), as well as Israel.68

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Maintaining the Strategic and Economic Alliance with the Persian Gulf Allies and the Geopolitics of Gas

According to retired NATO Secretary General Wesley Clark, a memo from the Office of the US Secretary of Defence just a few weeks after 9/11 revealed plans to “attack and destroy the governments in 7 countries in five years”, starting with Iraq and moving on to “Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Iran.”69 In a subsequent interview, Clark argues that this strategy is fundamentally about control of the region’s vast oil and gas resources.70

Much of the US strategy in Syria was described in a 2008 US Army-funded RAND report, titled, “Unfolding the Future of the Long War”. The report noted that “the economies of the industrialised states will continue to rely heavily on oil, thus making it a strategically important resource.” As most oil will be produced in the Middle East, the US has “motive for maintaining stability in and good relations with Middle Eastern states”:71

“The geographic area of proven oil reserves coincides with the power base of much of the Salafi- jihadist network. This creates a linkage between oil supplies and the long war that is not easily broken or simply characterised... For the foreseeable future, world oil production growth and total output will be dominated by Persian Gulf resources... The region will therefore remain a strategic priority, and this priority will interact strongly with that of prosecuting the long war.”

In this context, the report identified several potential trajectories for regional policy focused on protecting access to Gulf oil supplies. Exploring different scenarios

Journal of Strategic Affairs for this trajectory, the report speculated that the US may concentrate “on shoring up the traditional Sunni regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan as a way of containing Iranian power and influence in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.” Noting that this could actually empower al-Qaeda jihadists, the report concluded that doing so could further Western interests by bogging down jihadi activity with internal sectarian rivalry rather than targeting the US.

The US also wants to maintain the security of its European allies. Therefore, it also wants to maintain alliances with some of the Persian Gulf states who are important for maintaining energy flows to Europe. Europe has significant gas energy needs and much of it comes from Russia. Qatar shares the largest gas field in the world with Iran, the South Pars or North Dome.72 Tensions exist between the two countries because Iran is unable to extract its gas as quickly as Qatar, mainly because of the sanctions imposed on Iran. Tehran disapproves of the Qatari extraction which according to it is “emptying” the common gas field. Iran, Iraq and Syria had also signed an agreement for the construction of a pipeline supposed to transport gas from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea in order to supply Europe.

However, Qatar transports its gas through the Strait of Hormuz and it remains dependent on Iran for its exports (with LNG tankers which then need to pass through the Suez Canal). The Emirate had plans to build a gas pipeline through Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. But, Bashar al-Assad blocked this project, preferring to sign an agreement with Iran instead. One of the reasons was to preserve its long-term energy deals with Russia.73 As a result, Europe, which is largely dependent on Russia’s Gazprom for its energy needs, has an interest in seeking a competitor to lower its increasing expenditure on gas.74

Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers

It is understandable that a Sunni power could protect a Qatar-Saudi Arabia-Jordan-Syria pipeline to diversify its sources.

Consequently, the centrepiece is Syria and geostrategic realities explain why Syria has become the victim of this proxy war. The different geostrategic interests in Syria explain the positions of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, and the existing deadlock. It also explains the difference in the actions and narratives from world powers competing and advancing their own national interest in the Syrian theatre.

Short-term Objectives

Apart from the stated long-term objectives, the US also aims to achieve some immediate goals in the Syrian theatre. In the short term, the primary US goal is to defeat Daesh. It was the emergence of Daesh threat which prompted the US to intervene directly in Syria and defeating Daesh appears to be its top priority. Even after the Syrian regime announced the defeat of Daesh in 2017, the terrorist group carried out significant terror operations in the country which suggests that the group is still active and has the ability to retake parts of the Syrian territory. The US would also want to defeat or at least weaken other Islamic extremist elements among the anti-Assad rebels. The United States’ second main interest is to end the civil war. Doing so is the only way to stop the killing, end the flow of refugees to Europe, and restore order. Peace in Syria would help end extremism and pose a lesser threat to the outside world. The third US interest is to oust President Bashar al- Assad. The US and its European allies blame him for turning an episode of domestic protest into a bloody civil war. They do not believe that any peace process can succeed in Syria with Assad in power. However, in

Journal of Strategic Affairs recent statements, they have softened this position to reflect a willingness for Assad to play a “transitional” role. The reality on ground may compel them to accept a longer-term role for Assad if there seems to be no prospect of displacing him. Finally, the US would want to dominate the peace process in Syria so that the post- war situation remains under its control and it could reassert its diplomatic strength and status in the international system. Notwithstanding the US’ goals, Russia remains actively involved in order to secure its competing goals and interests in Syria.

Russian Interests and Involvement in the Conflict

Russia has historical interests in the Middle East, particularly in Syria. Russia’s association with the ruling Assad family can be traced back to 1970. Syria was a Soviet client in the days of the Soviet Union; it is the only Soviet client in the area that Russia has managed to maintain. In 1971, a Russia-Syria agreement under Hafez al-Assad’s regime permitted the Soviet Union to build a naval military base in Tartus, allowing the Soviet Union to maintain its presence in the Middle East.75 Currently, Bashar al-Assad is Russia’s only ally in the Mediterranean. Russia now has ports at Tartus and Latakia and also a small airbase at Latakia. Russia needs to keep Assad in power and hang on to those bases, which complement their naval base in Crimea in projecting power into the Mediterranean. Before Russia intervened, Assad’s troops were being defeated in the war, and fewer men were available for Syrian Armed Forces. The Assad regime was becoming weak and unstable.

The Western regime and its involvement threatened Russia with the oldest and most important alliance in the Middle East. It was the increasing suspicions of Western

Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers intentions that Russia supported Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Alexander Golts, a Russian military editor said, “Russian leaders view Syria as our major ally in the Middle East, with whom we have good political, military, and economic ties. Foreign policy experiments, which include cooperating greatly with the West, would not probably occur under President Vladimir Putin’s regime.”76

Due to the weapons contracts between Russia and Syria, Russia has been resisting international pressure to impose sanctions against the Assad regime.77 In 2015, Russia suggested that Syrian opposition groups, pushed for the democratic revolution with the help of the US and its Western allies, led to the Syrian Civil War. Russia set up T-90 tanks, howitzers, armoured personnel carriers, marines and the prefab housing for personnel in the airbase located in Latakia.78 Former US President Barack Obama said those military build-ups would threaten both world peace and stability. He then blamed Russia for its presence and military establishment in Syria.

Russia continued to support the Syrian regime due to its national interests. In the contemporary scenario, Syria remains a battlefield between the US and Russia. The military actions of both the US and Russia continue to fuel the Syrian Civil War. They have widened the gap between Syrian opposition groups and the Syrian government, causing a perpetual Syrian crisis.

Russia is an energy-exporting country that considers the Middle East vital for dominating world markets. Russia’s monopoly via its ex-Soviet supply infrastructure from the East, next to its immense gas reserves, is the backbone of its supremacy in gas supplies to Europe.79 For instance, in the event of

Journal of Strategic Affairs heightened tensions in Russo-Western relations, the option of switching off the energy supplies to Europe is tantamount to vast political power for Russia. Russia’s management of energy flow to Europe holds massive political leverage for the country. For example, when the US-proposed Nabucco80 pipeline struggled, Russia profited immensely in gas purchases from Turkmenistan at US$100 per 1000 cubic metres, and sales to Europe at a minimum value of US$250,77 to include its 2009 energy agreements with Ukraine that drove the price of gas to US$350 and above.81

It should be noted that the operation of Russian strategy is subject to the ongoing debate, because it nests within several broader sets of policy concerns on engaging US influence region-wide as well as economic integration with states of the post-Soviet era, including domestic reconstruction and modernisation. However, since 2012, Moscow has upheld the function of a strategic policy or unified plan of action which according to it is based on dialogue.82 In spite of Russia positioning itself as a peacekeeper, supporting the constitutionally recognised government’s battle with jihadists in Syria and military support of Syria through the port at Tartus also remain important goals for Russia.

Moreover, Russia is also employing state-owned energy companies Lukoil and Gazprom, and pipeline network operator Transneft, as the key instruments for reinforcing links with the post-Soviet states. It is creating alternative economic structures that can help renew old ties and encourage new friendships. Therefore, the expansion of its existing pipeline system region-wide is very important for Russia.83 It can be argued that Russia’s use of ‘soft power concepts’ in its strategy of influencing public and policy discourse, transnational financial interconnections and reconfiguring

Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers geopolitical alliances, support its goals of having access to the hydrocarbons of the region and also to regain a dominant position in the post-Cold War order.

Russia views the US insistence on the Qatar‒Turkey pipeline as a strategy to project Turkey as a regional energy hub for the export of hydrocarbon resources of the greater Middle East to Europe, and hence isolate Russia strategically from Europe.84 Consequently, it has continually developed its well-known energy leverage as a counter-measure. Russia and its allies are considering an oil route to the West, from Iran via southern Iraq and Syria to the Mediterranean and to Europe, otherwise known as the Islamic pipeline.85 Outflows through the Islamic pipeline would undermine the US attempt to push the Qatar‒Turkey pipeline as the main export pipeline to Western markets, and defeat plans to bypass Russia and hence weaken its dominance regionally and globally. In July 2012, Syria’s conclusion of a wide range of agreements on pipeline construction86 marked a decisive victory for Russia over Middle Eastern export channels, reinforcing its grip on energy resources in the region as well as its monopoly in the supply of natural gas to US-led international oil markets.

Russian aid to Assad will also increase Russia’s leverage over him. As discussed, Syria is a potential path for natural gas pipelines from Russia to the Mediterranean, and Syria has signed gas exploration contracts with Russia. On the downside, Assad was accused of atrocities against his people, including attacks against civilians with sarin, chlorine, and barrel bombs. His refusal to negotiate with protesters, firing on them instead, was the beginning of the civil war. Even with all this mounting anti-Assad narrative, it is in Russia’s interest to keep Assad in power and stabilise the country.

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Although Russia and Iran are in the same camp in the Syrian crisis, Russia may also be keeping a check on Iran. Russia seems to have planned its Syria operation with Iran, but according to reports, differences have emerged between Russia and Iran over the preferred outcome in Syria.87 Russia’s interest is to prevail over Iran in influencing Syria therefore it may want to keep a check on Iran’s role in Syria. Putin is trying to stabilise the Middle East. This is one of Putin’s stated goals of the Syrian intervention.88 Western intervention destabilised Iraq and Libya, with no resolution in sight. Although Syria’s civil war originated within the country, Putin seems to believe that all such instability can be attributed to Western intervention.89 Therefore, supporting Assad’s existing government would serve to stabilise Syria and perhaps the surrounding area.

Instability in the area is particularly dangerous for Russia, as its population includes over 10% Muslims, many of them in the volatile Caucasus region, not far from Syria. Some Russians have even joined anti-Assad forces in Syria, and they could cause disruption upon their return to Russia.90 The downside is that Russia is entering the conflict on the side of Shia Iran and Alawite Assad, thereby alienating Sunni powers in the area.91 It should be noted that forty Syrian insurgent groups have vowed enmity against Russia due to its bombing campaigns against them.92 Within Russia, most Muslims are Sunni and not happy about the side Russia has taken. So Russian intervention may further inflame the very instability it wants to curtail.

Another Russian aim in Syria is to have a place at the peace negotiations. That probably would not have been the case without Russian military intervention. Russia wants to challenge Western domination and claim a more powerful position in the world. Putin’s tactics

Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers seem to be focused on gaining more attention for Russia’s military capabilities, like the cruise missiles launched at Syria from the Caspian Sea,93 and on attaining a Yalta-like conference with Western leaders to define great-power spheres of interest. Russia remained successful in convening Sochi peace talks which are parallel to the UN-led Western peace initiatives.

Conclusion

In Syria, major powers are influencing the warring parties towards a shared goal of achieving stability in the region, and also to ensure a role in defining the future of Syria. At the same time, the major powers continue their involvement in the country in order to secure their own crucial interests. The redefined competition between the US and Russia and their rival strategies in Syria reflect the offensive-realist arguments. Syria presents the main connection between the contending pipeline projects and export routes of great powers. The major powers are vying to regulate oil and gas production from the region and eventually dominate its global transportation and trade.

As the warring parties in Syria continue to receive increasing support from external actors, the conflict has acquired the character of a proxy war in which international, regional and subnational conflicts are being fought out. Great powers in Syria treat the conflict as a zero-sum game, where success for one is automatically a defeat for the other. The conflict in Syria provides Russia with the golden opportunity to consolidate its strategic footing in the Middle East. The political vacuum that had been created has allowed Russia to initiate a game changing move through direct military intervention in Syria and deepen its involvement in the region. Through its reinforcement of the Syrian

Journal of Strategic Affairs regime, Russian has attained the status of a dominant player in shaping the future of the Middle East. Russia’s new role has forced the US to accept Russia’s new dominant role in Syria in particular and in the Middle East as a whole. This has also made Russian President Vladimir Putin important for any political solution in the region.

Though there are strategic differences between Russia and the US regarding the Syrian conflict, the rise of extremist organisations, especially the emergence of Daesh is a matter of great concern for both global powers. The rise of Daesh has caused deep tension in the region and around the world by its killing of minorities, institutionalising sex slavery, defeating state armies and executing opponents through extreme acts of violence. The group has also waged terror attacks in other Middle Eastern countries and in Europe. Thousands of young men and women from Europe joined the group. The Cold War-like situation in Syria might be a zero-sum game for some but, common security threats are emerging from this conflict which need to be addressed collectively by all the stakeholders.

References

1. World Report 2018 on Syria, Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country- chapters/syria. 2. “The Cold War Never Ended...Syria is a Russian- American conflict says Bashar al-Assad,” The Telegraph, October 14, 2016, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/14/the-cold- war-never-endedsyria-is-a-russian-american-conflict-say/. 3. YPG are considered by the US a major force in its fight against Daesh in Syria. 4. Michael Slackman, “Syrian Troops Open Fire on Protesters in Several Cities,” The New York Times, March

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25, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/26/world/ middleeast/26syria.html. 5. Steven Heydemann, “Explaining the Arab Uprisings: transformations in Comparative Perspective,” Mediterranean Politics 21, no. 1 (October 7, 2015), https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2015.1081450. 6. Joe Sterling, “Daraa: The Spark that Lit the Syrian Flame,” CNN, March 1, 2012, https://edition.cnn.com/ 2012/03/01/world/meast/syria-crisis- beginnings/index.html. 7. Katherine Marsh, “Syria's Crackdown on Protesters Becomes Dramatically More Brutal,” The Guardian, April 25, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2011/apr/25/syria-crackdown-protesters-brutal. 8. Sam Dagher, “Syria’s Alawites: The People Behind Assad,” The Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/syrias-alawites-the-people- behind-assad-1435166941. 9. Adrian Blomfield, “Syria: Army Uses Tanks Against the People in Day of Bloodshed,” The Telegraph, April 25, 2011, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ middleeast/syria/8472570/Syria-army-uses-tanks-against- the-people-in-day-of-bloodshed.html. 10. Vince Tumminello, “Red Team: Regime Counterinsurgency in Syria,” Small Wars Journal, December 2015, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/red- team-regime-counterinsurgency-in-syria. 11. Ibid. 12. Ahrar al-Sham also known as Harkat Ahrar al-Sham al- Islamiya is a Sunni Salafist militant group operating in Syria aiming at replacing the Assad regime with an Islamic government. 13. Al-Nusra or Jabhat al-Nusra, also known as jabhat fatah al-Sham after July 2016 and also known as al-Qaeda in Syria is a Salafist militant organisation fighting against Syrian Forces and aiming at establishing an Islamic State in Syria. 14. Juan Cole, “How the United States Helped Create the Islamic State,” The Washington Post, November 23, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/

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wp/2015/11/23/how-the-united-states-helped-create-the- islamic-state/?utm_term=.f4b67677901f. 15. World Report 2017 on Syria, Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country- chapters/syria. 16. Ibid. 17. Eyal Zisser, “Syria – From the Six-day War to the Syrian Civil War,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 44, no. 4 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2017. 1360011. 18. Ralph Peters, “Blood Borders: How a Better Middle East Would Look,” Armed Forces Journal (June 1, 2006), http://armedforcesjournal.com/blood-borders/. 19. Jeffery Mankoff, “Eastern Mediterranean Energy,” Centre for Strategic and International Studies CSIS, Washington, DC, July 25, 2013, http://csis.org/files/attachments/130726_medenergy_ mankoff.pdf. 20. Vincent Ibonye, “Strategic Wisdom in the New Greater Middle Eastern Game? A De-escalatory Rethinking of the Syrian Conflict,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies (2017), http://10.1080/19448953.2018.1385268. 21. Robin Mills, “Risky Routes: Energy Transits in the Middle East,” Analysis Paper, no.17, Brookings Doha Center (April 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/ risky-routes-energy-transit-in-the-middle-east/. 22. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (London: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983), 106, http://press.ecprnet.eu/ documents/content/9780955248818.pdf. 23. Ibonye, “Strategic Wisdom.” 24. Mills, “Risky Routes.” 25. Ibonye, “Strategic Wisdom.” 26. Roxane Farmanfarmaian, “Redrawing the Middle East map: Iran, Syria and the New Cold War,” Al Jazeera, November 2012, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/ opinion/2012/11/2012111311424048459.html. 27. Jubin M. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran: Diplomatic and Power Politics in the Middle East (New York: I. B. Taurus, 2009), https://archive.org/stream/

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JubinGoodarziSyriaAndIranDiplomaticAllianceAndPowe rPoliticsInTheMiddleEastLibrar/Jubin+Goodarzi+Syria+a nd+Iran+Diplomatic+Alliance+and+Power+Politics+in+t he+Middle+East+Library+of+Modern+Middle+East+Stu dies_djvu.txt. 28. BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013, British Petroleum, June 2013, http://www.bp.com/content/dam/ bp/pdf/statistical-review/statistical_review_of_world_ energy_2013. 29. Syria, U.S. Energy Information Administration, February 18, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/countries/ analysisbriefs/Syria/syria.pdf. 30. Mikael Eriksson and Francesco Giumelli, “Why the EU’s Sanctions Against Assad’s Syria Will Backfire,” Foreign Affairs, December 1, 2011, www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/136705/mikaeleriksson-and-francesco- giumelli/why-the-eus-sanctions-against-assads-syria-will- backfire. 31. Syria Sanctions: EU Follows US Ban on Oil Imports, and Expands List of Designated Persons, HFW, September 2011, http://www.hfw.com/Syria-Sanctions-EU-Follows- US-Ban 32. Simon Mee, Giulia Segreti, and Anna Fifield, “Italy seeks to Delay EU Oil Embargo on Syria,” Financial Times, August 30, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4248317c-d326-11e0- 9ba8-00144feab49a.html. 33. Mankoff, Eastern Mediterranean Energy. 34. According to Islamic principles, there is no distinction between religion and politics. In theological terms, Islam does not draw a line between worldly power and divine authority, representing itself as a faith system as well as the moral guidelines of which apply to all aspects. However, certain Islamic conservatives argue that sovereignty belongs to the God only, so the sovereign claims of governments are illegitimate. According to the Islamic view, the world is separated into two domains: The domain of Islam (dar al-Islam) which implies those lands under Muslim rulers’ control; the domain of war (dar al-harb) includes territories without Muslim rule and

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with which they are potentially in conflict. See Louise Fawcett, Islam and International Relations in the Middle East in International Relations of the Middle East 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 168-171. 35. Ibid. 36. “Turkey’s Downing of Russian Warplane - What We Know,” BBC, December1, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34912581. 37. Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, “The US‒NATO March to War and The 21st Century Great Game,” Global Research (December 5, 2010), http://www.globalresearch.ca/ index.php?context=va&aid=22170. 38. Elaine Pasquini, “Activists Call for No Intervention in Syria By U.S., NATO Or Israel,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 32(7) (2013), 42, https://www.wrmea.org/013-september/northern- california-chronicle-activists-call-for-no-intervention-in- syria-by-u.s.-nato-or-israel.html. 39. “Syria Veto: No Heroes, No Villains,” The Straits Times, February 8, 2012, http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/ newspapers/digitised/issue/straitstimes20120208-1#. 40. Fawcett, Islam and International Relations. 41. Ibonye, “Strategic Wisdom.” 42. Cited in “Syria Becoming Wider Global, Regional Proxy War,” Reuters, June 13, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/ article/2012/06/13/us-syria-global-proxy- idUSBRE85C13720120613. 43. Regional Situation Report For Syria Crisis, UNFPA, 45, May 2016. 44. Bruce Crumley, “On Tracking Syria’s Western Jihadis,” News Deeply Syria Deeply, April 17, 2014, http://www.syriadeeply.org/articles/2014/04/5168/trackin g-syrias-western-jihadis. 45. Ismael, 1974. 46. Bruce Riedel, Muhammad bin Salman’s U.S. Visit Marks 75 years of U.S.-Saudi Ties, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/ 03/12/muhammed-bin-salmans-u-s-visit-marks-75-years- of-u-s-saudi-ties/

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47. Carol Sorby, “The Struggle for Syria (The Road Towards the United Arab Republic),” Asian and African Studies 9, no. 2 (2000), 213-234, https://www.sav.sk/journals/ uploads/ 080610437_Sorby.pdf. 48. Ibid, 116. 49. Reyna Harrison, The US in Syria: A Realistic View of International Relations, Diablo Valley College, kropfpolisci.com/ir.sample.paper.harrison.pdf. 50. Robert G. Rabil, Syria, the United States, and the War on Terror in the Middle East (London: Praeger Security International Westport, Connecticut, 2006). 51. Armenak Tokmajyan, “Hezbollah’s Military Intervention in Syria: Political choice or religious obligation?,” Approaching Religion 4, no. 2 (December 2014), https://journal.fi/ar/article/view/67554/27850. 52. Itamar Rabinovich, “Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis,” Analysis Paper no. 28, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, November 2012. 53. Mark Gasiorowski ed., The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2011), https://doi.org/10.1002/ pad.4230030123. 54. Ibid, 292. 55. Fact Sheet: Implementing the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 (Fact sheet), May 11, 2008, http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/05/2004051 1-7.html 56. Hillary Mann Leverett, U.S. Policies Toward Israel and Iran: What are the Linkages?, Middle East Policy Council, July 2010, https://www.mepc.org/us-policies- toward-israel-and-iran-what-are-linkages-1. 57. “Obama To Syrian Civilians: U.S. Stands with You,” Huffington Post, April 5, 2012, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/04/obama-to- syrian-citizens_n_1254348.html. 58. David Usborne, “Syria Gas Attacks: the Clear and Concise Evidence from UN Chemical Weapons Inspectors,” The Independent, September 16, 2013, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-

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east/syria-gas-attacks-the-clear-and-concise-evidence- from-un-chemical-weapons-inspectors-8820454.html. 59. James S. Brady, Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, August 20, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-whitehouse-press-corps. 60. Mark Landler and Jonathan Weisman, “Obama Delays Syria Strike to Focus on a Russian Plan,” The New York Times, September 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2013/09/11/world/middleeast/syrian- chemicalarsenal.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 61. “Who Is Supplying Weapons To The Warring Sides In Syria?,” BBC, June 14, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22906965. 62. “Russia Will Give UN ‘Proof’ of Syria Rebel Chemical Use,” BBC, September 18, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-middle-east-24140475. 63. “US Says It Will Give Military Aid to Syria Rebels,” BBC, June 14, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world- us-canada-22899289 64. “Who Is Supplying Weapons.” 65. Milad Jokar, “War in Syria: Geopolitics of the Conflict,” Huffington Post, December 6, 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/milad-jokar/war-in- syria-geopolitics-_b_2378683.html 66. Jane Kinninmont, “The Syria Conflict and the Geopolitics of the Region,” European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2014, http://www.iemed.org/publicacions/historic-de- publicacions/anuari-de-la-mediterrania/sumaris/ avancaments-anuari-2013/The%20Syria%20Conflict_ Med2014.pdf. 67. Jokar, War in Syria. 68. Ibid. 69. Nafeez Ahmed, “Syria Intervention Plan Fuelled By Oil Interests, Not Chemical Weapon Concern,” The Guardian, August 30, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/ environment/earth- insight/2013/aug/30/syria-chemical-attack-war- intervention-oil-gas-energy-pipelines.

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70. Ibid. 71. Christopher G. Pernin et al., Unfolding the Future of the Long War (Arroyo Center: Rand Corporation, 2008), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs /2008/RAND_MG738.pdf. 72. South Pars is the Iranian name and North Dome is the Qatari name of the gas field. 73. Jokar, War in Syria. 74. Ibid. 75. Tung Yui Li, “The Role of Power Plays in the Syrian Crisis,” Hong Kong Baptist University, 2016, http:// repository.hkbu.edu.hk/lib_ugaward/10/. 76. Fred Weir, “Why Russia Is Willing To Sell Arms To Syria,” The Christian Science Monitor, January 12, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2012/0119/Wh y-Russia-is-willing-to-sell-arms-to-Syria 77. Yossef Bodansky, “Russia, Syria, and the West: Finally, at the Crossroads?,” Defence & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy 43, no. 9 (2015). 78. Ibid. 79. Nikolay Kozhanov, “Russian Policy Across the Middle East: Motivations and Methods,” Chatham House, February 2018, www.chathamhouse.org/sites/.../2018-02- 21-russian-policy-middle-east-kozhanov.pdf. 80. The Nabucco pipeline is a US-proposed gas pipeline for construction across Europe via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to carry gas from Turkey across Europe to Austria. 81. Pavel Polityuk and Richard Balmforth, “Ukraine Signs $10 billion Shale Gas Deal with Chevron,” Reuters, November 5, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/ 11/05/us-ukraine-chevronidUSBRE9A40ML20131105. 82. “The President’s Address to the Federal Assembly,” Kremlin.ru, December 12, 2013, http://www.kremlin.ru/ transcripts/19825. 83. Philip Stephens, “How Donald Trump has Played Vladimir Putin’s Game,” Financial Times, July 6, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/a27e426a-6179-11e7-8814- 0ac7eb84e5f1.

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84. Emre Iseri, “The US Grand Strategy and the Eurasian Heartland in the Twenty-First Century,” Geopolitics 14, no.1 (2009), 26-46, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 14650040802578658. 85. Ibid. 86. Ibid. 87. Syria and Beyond: Managing Russian Ambitions in the Middle East, Policy Workshop Report, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, January 2018, http://wws.princeton.edu/ sites/default/files/content/USandRussiaPWFinalReport_0 3.07.2018.pdf. 88. Ron ben Yishai, “In Syria, Iran Is Getting In Putin’s Way Too,” Ynet News, May 31, 2018, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L- 5273601,00.html. 89. Judey Dempsey, “Should the West Work with Russia on Syria?,” Carnegie Europe, September 16, 2015, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=61294. 90. Cheryl Rofer, “Russian And American Interests in Syria,” Nuclear Diner, October 15, 2013, https://nucleardiner.wordpress.com/2015/10/13/russian- and-american-interests-in-syria/. 91. Paul Goble, “Some of Russia’s Sunni Muslim Majority Angered by Putin’s Support of Shiite Syria and Iran,” Window on Eurasia, October 7, 2015, http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/10/some-of- russias-sunni-muslim-majority.html. 92. Bassem Mroue and Sarah El Deeb, “Syrian Insurgent Groups Vow to Attack Russian Forces,” Al Arabiya, October 6, 2015, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/ News/middle-east/2015/10/06/Syrian-insurgent-groups- vow-to-attack-Russian-forces.html?utm_source= Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20 Campaign&utm_term=%2ASituation%20Report. 93. “Russian Missiles Strike Syria from Caspian Sea,” BBC, October 7, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world- middle-east-34462539/russian-missiles-strike-syria-from- caspian-sea.

Changing Nature of the Communist Party of China

Muhammad Abdul Qadeer

Introduction

In order to understand the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) exponential growth and its steady rise during the last century, it is necessary to study the Communist Party of China (CPC) which has maintained a firm political monopoly in the country. Although advocates of multi-party-political system have argued that only Western-style democracy can ensure progress, the CPC has proven otherwise. Not only has it remained successful in carrying out a range of internal reforms, it has also carried out reforms relating to other sectors of the state, society, and economy in China.

The CPC has also been successful in managing the country’s huge population because it has led the Chinese economy to long-term rapid development through trade liberalisation and export development. China has also seen a rapid improvement in people’s living standards. Between 2012 and 2017, the CPC lifted a total of 68.53 million people out of poverty and the country’s national poverty rate dropped from 10.2 % to 3.1 %.1 This is regarded as one of the CPC’s major accomplishments. In the realm of defence, achieving the modernisation of national defence and the armed forces is another important objective of the CPC. The Party has increased the military’s fighting ability through rapid modernisation of its army, navy, air force and strategic support force.2 In October 2017, China’s paramount leader, Xi Jinping announced that the CPC would build “world-class military” by the 2050.3

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Meanwhile, the most prominent objective of the CPC is its strong emphasis on the advent of a “new era” for China in which CPC will lead the country to a new round of economic reforms and to realise socialist modernisation by 2035.4 In this regard, the CPC has played a crucial role in pushing ambitious economic policies such as the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative. In the foreign policy domain, China has displaced US-led order in Asia by strengthening its defence and economic partnerships with long time American allies like Pakistan, the Philippines and Indonesia.5

This study will focus on the CPC as an institution rather than on the political system in China. It will examine the CPC’s strengths, weaknesses and flexibility in adjusting to new conditions. It will also explore the CPC’s evolution and development and examine how the CPC has survived when so many other communist parties failed to remain afloat.

Background

China remained in a constant state of turmoil between 1839 and 1945. It was the most turbulent era in China’s history as it suffered a series of military defeats at the hand of foreign powers and faced almost 100 years of wars, including the Opium War6 and the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression.7 In China, this period is dubbed the “Century of National Humiliation.”8

The military defeats weakened the Qing dynasty which had ruled China since 1644. In 1911, a group of revolutionaries in southern China led a successful revolt against the Qing dynasty during the Xinhai Revolution. The revolt led to the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in

Changing Nature of the Communist Party of the China

1912 ending centuries of imperial rule in the country. The end of imperial rule led to the establishment of the Kuomintang (KMT) nationalist government in China headed by a Chinese revolutionary, Sun Yat-sen. Many saw the establishment of the KMT as the beginning of a new age of nationalism in China. The KMT governed all or parts of mainland China from 1928 to 1949.9

However, the new government failed to unify the country under its control. The Qing withdrawal had created a power vacuum in certain regions, resulting in the rise of warlords. These warlords controlled their territories in China and claimed independence from the KMT government. This resulted in what is known as the ‘May Fourth Movement’ in which thousands of students rallied in Beijing against the KMT government in 1919.10 It was during this time, when Marxism started to spread throughout the country. Furthermore, the 1917 Russian October Socialist revolution which transformed Russia from an imperial monarchy into a Communist state also attracted the attention of Chinese masses.11 By 1921, communism had found its way into China and the CPC was formally established with the help of Russia’s Communist International (Comintern).12

The CPC and KMT remained primary rivals to each other most of the time due to their differing narratives. The KMT focused on nationalism and relied on intellectuals who were more worried about national humiliation. It staunchly advocated for cancellation of all “unequal treaties” signed between the Qing Dynasty and Western powers. The “unequal treaty” was most commonly referred to as the Treaty of Nanking which was concluded between Britain and China after the end of First Opium War in 1842. Under the treaty, China was forced to open a series of “treaty ports” along the Chinese coast to Britain.13 Over the next few years China

Journal of Strategic Affairs concluded a series of similar treaties with other powers including the United States, Japan and France granting certain rights to foreign-owned businesses while compromising China’s sovereignty.14 Meanwhile, the CPC focused on class struggle rather than national consciousness.15

However, in 1926 the two parties supported each other for a short period to fight against warlords.16 Also between 1937 and 1945, both fought together against the Japanese invasion. The Japanese forces surrendered and were forced to retreat from China after World War II ended in 1945. Following Japanese surrender, a power struggle began between the KMT government led by Chiang Kai-shek and the CPC led by Mao Zedong, a Chinese communist revolutionary, triggering a Civil War in the country.17 By October, 1949, the Communist Party of China was successful in gaining control in mainland China after Mao Zedong’s Communist Party defeated the Kuomintang government. Chiang Kai-shek fled to the island of Taiwan where he established a government in exile, whereas, the CPC rose to power in mainland China .18

Organisation of the Communist Party of China (CPC)

Initially, the CPC began as an underground, Marxist- Leninist party that operated on the principle of the communist doctrine of “democratic centralism”. In democratic centralism, the party is the only permitted political player and its decisions are binding on party members.19 According to basic principles of democratic centralism in China, individual party members are subordinate to the party organisations. Although, the CPC allows for debate and discussion on policy matters

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among party members, however, it requires absolute support of policy once a decision is made.

In China’s democratic centralism there is a political hierarchy whereby senior party officials expect disciplined compliance from junior officials.20 Promotion within the party requires experience and effectiveness in performing one’s job. However, the CPC’s meritocracy often suffers when dealing with those dubbed as “princelings”, meaning a relative of one of the early senior CPC officials. Some CPC leaders use their influence to secure positions of authority for their family members, regardless of their abilities or experience. The “princelings” remain a significant political force in China. Xi Jinping is one example of a “princeling” in China whose father, Xi Zhongxun served as a Secretary General and Vice Premier of the State Council during the 1950s.21

The Communist Party of China is headed by the party’s Political Bureau (Politburo) and its Standing Committee. The Politburo is headed by the party’s General Secretary. However, of more significance than the Politburo is its Standing Committee which is the most powerful policy making body in China.22

Meanwhile, the National People’s Congress (NPC) usually acts as a “rubberstamp” for decisions already made earlier by Communist Party. It is China’s unicameral legislative body.23 Despite the stature accorded to the NPC in China’s constitution, the NPC has very little political power. The Secretariat is another political institution for the CPC which is described in China’s constitution as an administrative body. Its role is to supervise party matters and implement decisions made by the Politburo and its Standing Committee.

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The other key institution in China is the CPC-controlled Central Military Commission (CMC) that exercises command and control over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). PLA is in charge of military and defence affairs, including the formulation of China’s military strategy.

Evolution of the Communist Party of China

China was governed until 1954 without a constitution and the CPC leadership comprised the same soldiers who had freed various parts of the country. During those years, the CPC mobilised all political and economic forces that were not opposed to the revolution.

However, over the years, the CPC pursued a variety of political reforms to strengthen a state governance system as well as the administrative systems of the country. Moreover, the CPC has undergone significant shifts in its economic policies since 1949. The economic reform policies were initially more gradual. For instance, after Mao Zedong gained power in China, he began a host of economic policies and reforms to rebuild the country. Among the most important were his land reforms. Under Mao, China seized land from wealthy owners and redistributed them to landless peasants. He transformed China from an agricultural economy to a Communist society and abolished private ownership of land, property and industry.24

Similarly, in 1958, Mao initiated the Great Leap Forward, a movement which sought to rapidly industrialise the country.25 However, the Great Leap Forward ended in failure. By 1961, there was a widespread famine and food shortage due to lowered agricultural production. Many people lost their lives due

Changing Nature of the Communist Party of the China

to the famine, and as a result, Mao lost political clout within the CPC.

In 1966, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in China to reassert his authority and to preserve true communist system in China.26 He warned the public that capitalism was a threat to the development of the country and urged citizens to eliminate anything related to capitalist culture.

The Cultural Revolution lasted for at least 10 years up until Mao’s death in 1976.27 After Mao’s death, a power struggle ensued within China which saw the marginalisation of Mao’s ‘Gang of Four’ supporters, a powerful group led by Mao’s last wife, Jian Qing and strong proponents of the cultural revolution. The members of this influential group were arrested and put under trial.

In 1978, Deng Xiaoping - viewed as the main architect of China’s economic liberalisation programme - became the de-facto leader of the CPC.28 He denounced Mao’s actions. Under his leadership, China saw dramatic policy shift. This period is called the “Period of Reform and Opening Up.”29 In 1975, Deng enacted the “Four Modernisations” programme, which sought to revive the Chinese economy so that the country could be transformed into an advanced industrial nation. It focused on the modernisation of Agriculture, Industry, Science and Technology and National Defence.30

Mao’s push for continuous socialist transformations was reversed by Deng’s policy of “de-collectivisation”. China also underwent major social and economic transformations and it was during his tenure that China experienced unprecedented economic growth. Deng introduced drastic economic reforms and liberalised

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China’s trade policies through opening up to the global economy.31

Deng also introduced collegial management in the party, replacing the cult of personality under Mao. The CPC under Deng opened its doors for intellectuals and re- established its mandate to carry out “socialism with Chinese characteristics”.32

During the reform era, Deng transformed the party from strongman rule to collective leadership among the elite and institutionalised the transfer of power from one leader to the next, with each president serving a maximum of two five-year terms.33 Deng also established a rules-based system for succession whereby leadership succession could take place according to legal guidelines rather than personality struggles.34

By the end of 1989, Deng retired from the Party’s top position and Jiang Zemin rose to prominence becoming General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission. In 1993, Jiang Zemin became President of China.35 Jiang was successful in establishing himself as a leader at par with Mao and Deng Xiaoping. He put forward the “Three Represents” Theory which was written into the CPC’s constitution at the 16th Party Congress in 2002. The theory embraced private entrepreneurs and focussed on the economic freedom and political control introduced by his predecessor Deng Xiaoping.36

In 2002, Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin as General Secretary of the CPC. Hu presented the concept of “Scientific Outlook on Development” which was eventually written into the CPC Constitution at the Party’s 17th National Congress in 2007. The scientific outlook concept called for the harmonious development

Changing Nature of the Communist Party of the China

of economy and society and improvement of science and technology.37

In November 2012, Xi Jinping set forth the new political slogan of the “China Dream” a concept for realising the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. The “Chinese Dream” involves multiple aspects including the “dream of a strong nation,” and the “dream of a strong army.”

However, soon after Xi took over as CPC’s chief in 2012, he began dismantling the architecture established by Deng Xiaoping to avoid succession fights. Xi took over the leadership of all of the top policy making committees such as foreign affairs, national security and management of the economy inside the party.38 In March, 2013, the National People’s Congress elected Xi as China’s President. In October 2016, the CPC declared Xi Jinping as China’s “Core Leader”, suggesting the rise of a new strongman in China. The title was previously held by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. In October, 2017 the 19th Party Congress enshrined Xi’s political thinking - “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” - into the CPC’s constitution. In February 2018, China’s Communist Party cleared the way for President Xi Jinping to stay in power indefinitely, by abolishing term limits on the Presidency.39 The rules on leadership term limits were set by Deng Xiaoping to prevent a repeat of the Cultural Revolution which was inspired by the cult worship of Mao Zedong.

Likewise, in the external domain, Xi broke Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of “hide your capabilities and bide your time” which meant that China should “keep a low profile” in the context of China’s diplomatic policy until the country is integrated in the global economic system.40

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Xi declared that China is ready to “take centre stage in the world.” His Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is as much an economic programme as it is a geopolitical campaign to take China to the centre of world affairs. Under the BRI, Xi expanded Chinese business, military and diplomatic influence around the world.

However, the party’s ideological foundation has remained Marxist-Leninist despite the changing leadership over the years. Consequently, the names of the most significant Chinese leaders and their theories have been recognised in the party’s constitution. In the most recent version of the party’s statute, “Mao Zedong Thought,”41 “Deng Xiaoping Theory,”42, Jiang Zemin “Three Represents” and “Xi Jinping Thought”43 are all part of the CPC’s fundamental doctrine, “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” which adheres to Marxism but at the same time calls for adopting pragmatic policies not otherwise seen as particularly socialist in their nature.44

The Challenges for the Communist Party of China

Despite Beijing remaining authoritarian at home, it has become more cooperative abroad especially on issues like climate change, trade and North Korea. Beijing is the third-largest donor of the United Nations. China’s new stance toward the world is a result of the continued strength of the Chinese economy and the growing political confidence of the CPC.

However, China faces a number of difficult domestic and external challenges that, if not addressed by the country’s leaders, could undermine its stability. Most important among these are issues related to China’s legal system which has drawn much attention in the press.

Changing Nature of the Communist Party of the China

China’s judicial system has seen number of positive steps since the 15th National Congress of the CPC, which includes, increased transparency of court proceedings, improved professionalism of judges, improvement in litigation procedure, method of trial and judicial management.45 However, despite these reforms, the CPC still has a final say over political cases especially in situations involving senior politicians.46

In China there is a consensus amongst ruling elite that the country requires a different kind of legal system from Western models which strengthen the Communist Party’s leadership instead of weakening it.47 Corruption is another issue for China’s Communist Party. It was reported that hundreds of party’s members including high-level officials were expelled or arrested for corruption charges in China by the end of 2016.48

Notwithstanding these problems, the CPC has assisted millions of people out of poverty during the last four decades and rapid economic growth has boosted the livelihoods of millions in China.49 However, after nearly 40 years of economic reform at home and opening to the global economy during the 1980s, China is amongst the countries with most unequal income distribution in the world.50 Therefore, on the domestic front, it is speculated that the next-generation of CPC leaders may bring about another round of reforms within the CPC. However, it still remains unclear what kind of reforms, the next generation of CPC leaders would adopt in the coming years.

On the foreign policy front, China’s territorial issues in the South China Sea and East China Sea have negatively impacted relations with its neighbours including, Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines and Taiwan.51 In years to come, the CPC leadership may

Journal of Strategic Affairs confront increased tensions between China and its neighbours in tackling these problematic issues. Thus, Chinese leaders and party members would be required to carry out effective diplomacy to peacefully resolve the territorial matters with its neighbours.

Conclusion

Western observers look at China’s political reform in terms of whether it is becoming more democratic or not. However, democratisation is not the only standard of measuring the development of a country. A strong regulatory and governing foundation laid down during Deng’s period has made China the world’s second largest economy after the US. Scholars across the globe are anticipating that China will soon become the world’s largest economy.

While China has emerged as a major player in international politics and a leading world economy, it views itself as the world’s other superpower assuming itself as an alternative to the US. In view of that, China is attempting to reshape the global economic system through trade and investment partnerships. Hence the CPC leadership has vowed to support the multilateral trading system and to promote economic globalisation.

References

1. “China Brings Nearly 13 mln People Out of Poverty in 2017,” Xinhua, February 1, 2018, www.xinhuanet.com/ english/2018-02/01/c_ 136942195.htm. 2. “China’s Communist Party Agrees on Government Reform, But No Details,” Reuters, February 28, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics/chinas- communist-party-agrees-on-government-reform-but-no- details-idUSKCN1GC1J7.

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3. “CPC to Build World-Class Armed Forces by Mid-21st Century: Xi,” Xinhua, October 18, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/18/c_ 136688500.htm. 4. “Xi Says China to Basically Realise Socialist Modernisation by 2035,” Xinhua, November, 18, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcong ress/2017-10/18/content_33404773.htm. 5. “China and Pakistan Launch Economic Corridor Plan Worth $46 Billion,” Reuters, April 20, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-china/china- and-pakistan-launch-economic-corridor-plan-worth-46- billion-idUSKBN0NA12T20150420; “China, Philippines Agree to Boost Trade, Economic Cooperation,” Xinhua, March, 17, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/ 2017-03/17/c_136137660.htm. 6. The conflict between China and Britain from 1839 to 1842, known as the Opium War. It started after British East India Company got involved in trafficking of opium to China. The Chinese tried to stop the trade and this led to the Opium War of 1839-1842. The Opium War ended with the Treaty of Nanking. The Chinese paid the British a multimillion dollar indemnity and ceded Hong Kong to Britain. China remembers this war as a beginning of century of humiliation. 7. In 1931, Japanese troops attacked three north-eastern provinces of China known as Manchuria and later launched a full-scale attack on China. This initiated the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 thus leading to the Japanese capture of large swathes of the Chinese territory including Shanghai. China was militarily weak and could not match the modern Japanese troops. 8. Alison Kaufman, “The Century of Humiliation and China’s National Narratives,” (Testimony before the U.S- China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on “China’s Narratives Regarding National Security Policy”, March 10, 2011). 9. Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign

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relations, (New York; Colombia University Press, 2012), 78-79. 10. “The Evolution of China’s Communist Party, 90 Years in the Making,” China Briefing, July 1, 2011, http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2011/07/01/the- evolution-of-chinas-communist-party-90-years-in-the- making.html. 11. Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation. 12. Ibid. 13. “The First Opium War, Episode 47”, BBC, February 21, 2006, https://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/history/empire/ episodes/episode_47.shtml. 14. Catherine Ladds, “China and Treaty-Port Imperialism,” Hong Kong Baptist University, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/97811184 55074.wbeoe079. 15. Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, 82. 16. Ibid. 79. 17. Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: The Political Struggle 1945-1949 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999). 18. “History Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975),” BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/chiang_kais hek.shtml. 19. “The Communist Party of China,” An Illustrated History of the Communist Party of China, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/45981.htm 20. Ibid. 21. Bo Zhiyue, “Who Are China’s ‘Princelings’?,” The Diplomat, November, 24, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/ 2015/11/who-are-chinas-princelings/. 22. “Inside China’s Ruling Party,” BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/asia_pac/02/china_p arty_congress/china_ruling_party/how_china_is_ruled/ht ml/politburo.stm. 23. “National People’s Congress,” The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Organization/node_28 46.htm.

Changing Nature of the Communist Party of the China

24. Mo Zhang, “From Public to Private: The Newly Enacted Chinese Property Law and the Protection of Property Rights in China,” Berkeley Business Law Journal 5 no. 2 (2008): 320. 25. “Evolution of China’s Revolution: from Bloody Repression to Capitalism Red in Tooth and Claw, The Telegraph, September 27, 2009, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/ 6235611/Evolution-of-Chinas-revolution-from-bloody- repression-to-capitalism-red-in-tooth-and-claw.html. 26. “History, Mao Zedong (1893-1976),” BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/mao_zedon g.shtml. 27. Ibid. 28. Alexander Pantsov and Steven Levine, Deng Xiaoping: A Revolutionary Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 29. David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washington DC: University of California Press, 2008). 30. David Wen-wei Chang, China under Deng Xiaoping: Political and Economic Reform (Macmillan, 1991). 31. Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, (Belknap Press, 2013). 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Catherine Keyser, “Three Chinese Leaders: Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping,” Asia For Educators, http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_leaders. htm. 35. “Jiang Zemin Biography,” ChinaVitae, http://chinavitae.com/biography/Jiang_Zemin/full. 36. “How will the world remember Jiang Zemin?,” CNN, November 7, 2002, http://edition.cnn.com/2002/ WORLD/asiapcf/east/10/29/profile.jiang.zemin/. 37. Scientific Outlook on Development becomes CPC’s Theoretical Guidance, ChinaDaily, November, 11, 2008, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/2012-11/08/content_ 15892786.htm.

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38. John Pomfret, “Xi Jinping’s Power Grab Could Lead to a ‘Political Catastrophe’ in China,” The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global- opinions/wp/2018/02/26/xi-jinpings-power-grab-could- lead-to-a-political-catastrophe-in- china/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.58574d8304a4. 39. John Ruwitch, “Timeline - The Rise of Chinese Leader Xi Jinping,” Reuters, March 16, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-xi- timeline/timeline-the-rise-of-chinese-leader-xi-jinping- idUSKCN1GS0ZA. 40. David Pilling, “No one is immune from Beijing’s ‘gravity machine’”, Financial Times, December 12, 2013 https://www.ft.com/content/32470bd8-619d-11e3-b7f1- 00144feabdc0 41. In China Mao’s Thought is part of the official doctrine of the Communist Party of China, however, since the 1978 beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s market economy-oriented reforms, the concept of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” has come to the forefront of Chinese politics. Mao has advocated that peasants should be the bulwark of the revolutionary energy, led by the working class in China. 42. The idea of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” was one of the most significant creations of Deng Xiaoping. Deng, by adopting a market economy to China’s own condition, successfully achieved unprecedented economic success. The theory does not claim to reject Marxism– Leninism or Mao Zedong Thought but instead seeks to adapt them to the existing socio-economic conditions of China. 43. Xi Jinping Thought promotes the supremacy of the Communist Party. Xi’s philosophy teaches that the goal of a powerful, unified China can be achieved only if the Communist Party stays firmly in control of China. 44. Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, People’s Daily, September 30, 2007, http://en.people.cn/90002/92169/ 92211/6275043.html.

Changing Nature of the Communist Party of the China

45. “Chinese Legal Reform,” Paul Tsai China Center, Yale Law School, https://law.yale.edu/china-center/programs/ chinese-legal-reform. 46. “With Legal Reforms, China wants Less Interfering in Cases, Fewer Death Penalty Crimes,” Reuters, March 10, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china- parliament-legal/with-legal-reforms-china-wants-less- interfering-in-cases-fewer-death-penalty-crimes- idUSBREA290C320140310. 47. China’s Top Court Says No to West’s Model of Judicial Independence, Reuters, February 26, 2015, https://in.reuters.com/article/china-law/chinas-top-court- says-no-to-wests-model-of-judicial-independence- idINKBN0LU07M20150226. 48. Visualising China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign, China file, January 21, 2016, http://www.chinafile.com/ infographics/visualizing-chinas-anti-corruption-campaign. 49. “China has Lifted 600 Million People out of Poverty,” CCTV, October, 18, 2014, http://english.cntv.cn/2014/ 10/18/VIDE1413584528072923.shtml. 50. Sidney Leng, “China’s Dirty Little Secret: Its Growing Wealth Gap,” South China Morning Post, July, 7, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/21017 75/chinas-rich-grabbing-bigger-slice-pie-ever. 51. Amanda Macias, “China’s in the Hot Seat on 2 Major Foreign-Policy Issues,” Business Insider, August 27, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-hot-seat- korea-south-china-sea-2016-8.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF INDIA AND ISRAEL’S GROWING DEFENCE COOPERATION

Moiz Khan

Introduction

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel in July 2017 and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s reciprocal visit to India in January 2018 are evidence of an intensification of the bilateral partnership between India and Israel in the areas of defence, intelligence and trade. Though the two countries are increasing their cooperation in other fields as well, defence remains the main pillar of bilateral relations. India serves as a major market for Israeli arms; between 2012 and 2016, the country was the recipient of 41% of Israeli arms exports.1 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India was the third largest arms importer in the period 2013-2017, and the country’s imports increased by 24% between 2008–12 and 2013–17.2 Russia accounted for 62 per cent of India’s arms imports in 2013–17 while the country’s arms imports from the US arms imports from the USA increased by 557% between 2008–12 and 2013–17. Moreover, during these two periods India’s arms imports from Israel also increased by 285%, making Israel the third largest supplier to India.3

Collectively, Israel’s military sales to India range from Phalcon airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) and Searcher, Heron and Harop unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Aerostat and Green Pine radars, and Barak air defence systems.4 Apart from arms procurements, India and Israel also conduct joint

The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence Cooperation military exercises to help India improve its military’s operational capabilities.5

With reference to the aforementioned developments, this paper is an effort to provide a comprehensive understanding of India-Israel defence cooperation and its implications for South Asian strategic stability. The study will discuss Pakistan’s threat perceptions and security challenges arising out of the military cooperation.

The study would examine the following questions: what sort of arms procurement deals are being signed between India and Israel? What aims and purposes do India and Israel seek to achieve with the help of their defence cooperation deals? What are the implications of Israeli arms transfers to India and how do they affect both Pakistan’s threat perceptions and defence policies?

Historical Overview

When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Israel in July 2017 to mark the 25th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries,6 he became the first Indian Prime Minister to officially visit Israel since the establishment of bilateral ties between the two countries in 1992. Though India-Israel relations go back a long way,7 they had become stagnant owing to India’s fear of upsetting its relations with Arab countries and its support for the Palestinian demand for statehood.8 Prime Minister Modi’s visit highlights a significant change in India’s foreign policy outlook. While reiterating India’s support for a ‘two state-solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’ during the visit,9 Modi clearly signalled that India’s relationship would not be hyphenating Israel and Palestine.10 The two countries announced a ‘strategic partnership’ and signed numerous

Journal of Strategic Affairs agreements in various key areas including water management, agriculture, research and development and space.11 In January 2018, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited India. His visit provided greater impetus to the India-Israel bilateral partnership.12 The visit was significant also because it occurred despite India’s vote in favour of a UNGA resolution rejecting US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.13

India’s Israel policy has always been guided by the notion of realpolitik. In a 1949 letter by the India Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to his Chief Ministers, he clearly articulated the flexible approach based on realism that would guide India’s policy towards Israel. In his letter he said,

Any action that we may take must be guided not only by idealistic considerations but also a realistic appraisal of the situation. Our general policy in the past has been favourable to the Arabs and, at the same time, not hostile to the Jews. That policy continues. For the present, we have said that we are not recognising Israel. But this is not an irrevocable decision and the matter will no doubt be considered afresh in view of subsequent developments.14

Throughout history, India’s economic interests in the Middle East determined the country’s policy towards Israel. After recognising Israel in 1950, India took nearly forty-two years to establish full diplomatic relations with the country in 1992.15 India had already delayed the recognition of Israel for two and half years after it came into being on May 14, 1948.16 It finally established its diplomatic ties with Israel in 1992 only when it was deemed realistic and economically advantageous for the country.17 There were various reasons behind these delays. India’s major concern was its trade relations with the Arab world. India served as a large market for the

The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence Cooperation

Arab World and their mutual trade included, tea, spices, gems, jewellery, and engineering goods.18 It was thought that the large volume of trade between India and the Arab countries would be jeopardised if India were to recognise Israel.19

India was reluctant to hurt Muslims’ sentiments attached to the partition of Palestine both within the country and outside.20 India, therefore, had to follow a pro- Palestinian policy for national cohesion at home and in order not to antagonise Muslims of Arab states. Another major reason for not recognising Israel was India’s position and role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) which prevented it from supporting Israel. Since NAM was supportive of anti-colonial struggles around the world, India considered efforts of establishing a Jewish state a last adventure of British colonialism.21 Notwithstanding Gandhi’s sympathy towards European Jews, he could also not overlook Palestinians struggle against colonialism. Gandhi considered imposition of Jews on Palestinians wrong and inhuman.22 Despite all these reservations, India awarded a de-facto recognition to Israel in 1950 after both Iran and Turkey two leading Muslim majority countries lent a de-facto recognition to the country.23

Though India still remained reluctant in establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel following the recognition, the end of the Cold War provided India an opportunity to review its policy towards Israel.24 After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India’s main diplomatic and strategic ally during the period, India had to revisit its foreign policy to adjust it towards the changing international order where the US had emerged as the sole dominant power. Indian leaders realised that normalisation of ties with Israel would be important for India’s eventual rapprochement with the US, since the

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American Jewish lobby had an effective influence over the US ‘political establishment. Moreover, the initiation of the Arab-Israeli peace process backed by the US also served as an opportunity for reluctant states to consider developing relations with Israel.25 The October 1991 peace conference in Madrid, a formal gathering with Israel sponsored by the US and the Soviet Union to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process involving majority of Arab countries, forced India to evaluate Israel’s importance in the Middle East and benefits that could be accrued by strengthening diplomatic relations with the country.26 Domestically, the ascendance of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the Indian political system helped remove hesitations about Israel. The BJP with its Nationalist and Hindu outlook perceived Israel not as a diplomatic burden but a potential ally.27 The first formal call for full relations with Israel came forward in the BJP convention of October 1991. This call made the Congress Party to also adopt a realistic approach towards Israel.28 As a result, India accorded full diplomatic recognition to Israel on January 29, 1992, and embassies were established in each other’s countries.29

Diamonds and Defence

The Indo-Israel relations are often described as being made up of ‘diamonds and defence.’30 This attribution to their relationship is based on the fact that diamonds and defence items are the two main commodities in their bilateral trade. Nearly half of the imports of the two countries comprise diamonds polishing and processing trade while approximately 40% of Israeli arms are transferred to India.31 Since India’s relationship with Israel has flourished across a wide range of areas including agriculture, water management, science and technology, tourism, agriculture and other forms of trade, defence cooperation between the two countries

The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence Cooperation continues to dominate the bilateral relations for last 25 years.

India emerged as a very vast weapons market for Israeli defence industries to export their weapons and help the country’s economy. For India, Israel became a preferred source for acquiring latest military equipment. India sought Israeli weapons basically for two reasons; Russian failure to provide promised weapons on time and at suitable price and; difficulties that India faced in developing the desired weapons at home.32 However, during the initial years, India sought Israeli military technology companies to help upgrade its aging Soviet- era military aircrafts and other equipment as Israel had a sound reputation in retrofitting of old weapons.33 Today, Israel is the third largest exporter of arms to India, after the US and Russia. Data from SIPRI shows that defence exports from Israel are related to aircraft, air defence systems, armoured vehicles, artillery, missiles, naval weapons, sensors, ships and other defence products and technologies.34 Netanyahu’s January 2018 visit to India also revolved around weapons deals. During Netanyahu’s visit, he confirmed that the $500-million Spike anti-tank guided missile deal between India and Israel was back on the table which had been cancelled by India prior to Netanyahu’s visit.35 Meanwhile, India’s Defence Ministry also confirmed in January 2018 a plan to purchase 131 surface-to-air Barak missiles from Israel in a $70 million deal36 and approved the purchase of assault rifles and carbines from Israel to meet the immediate requirement of troops.37

Apart from weapons sales, both India and Israel are also engaged in the field of co-development and co- production of weapons. This engagement helps India to redesign and to strengthen its firms in manufacturing latest military technologies as part of its so called ‘Make

Journal of Strategic Affairs in India’ policy. It also confirms with the Indian requests for technology transfer and emphasis on domestic production. A long list of Israeli military items, such as ammunition, UAV parts, and even missiles (Spike anti- armour, the Python-4 air-to-air, Barak-8 surface-to-air) are now being produced in India.38 This element of co- production in both the countries’ defence trade would also lower Indian dependence on importing weapons.39

Defence cooperation between the two countries can be attributed to several reasons. For India, the demonstrated capability of Israeli weapons systems remains its main interest. Similarly, for Israel, India’s market for weapons trade serves as huge impetus for strengthening of bilateral defence engagements.40 It implies that India’s quest for latest military technologies and Israel’s efforts to further widen the market for its military products complement each other. By enhancing defence trade with Israel, India also sought opportunities to emulate Israeli technology in developing its own defence industry.41

Defence Engagements in Various Domains

Defence collaboration between India and Israel started even before the establishment of diplomatic relations. The two countries helped each other in their individual conflicts even during the frosty years of their relations. Israel provided covert military assistance to India during its wars of 1962, 1965 and 1971 and the 1999 Kargil Conflict.42 India helped Israel covertly with military equipment during the ‘Six-Day War’ of 1967,43 by providing Israel with spare parts for Mystere and Ouragan aircraft, as well as AX-13 tanks.44

On the request of former Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru Israel came to help India in 1962 by

The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence Cooperation supplying mortars for the Indian Army delivered by ships flying the Israeli flag overruling Indian requests for anonymity.45 Similarly, during India’s 196546 and 1971 war47 with Pakistan, Israel again supplied mortars and ammunition. These mortars equipped two of India’s Artillery Regiments and proved highly effective with their steep trajectory and heavy calibre charge especially in mountainous terrain.48 After Research and Analysis Wing’s inception (RAW) in 1968, its relation with Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, commenced despite the killing of Indian soldiers serving in United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza by Israeli air and artillery strikes during Israel’s 1967 Six-day war.49

After the fruition of diplomatic relations in 1992, defence cooperation between Indian and Israeli Air Forces also commenced when the two countries signed a pact for the purchase of Searcher and Ranger Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in 1992.50 In 1993, Israel also showed a willingness to upgrade India’s old Soviet equipment. For this purpose, two Israel-based companies Elbit systems and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) entered into a contract with India to upgrade Indian Air Force’s (IAF) ageing MiG-21 fighter aircraft.51

Another important Israeli contribution came immediately in the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil War, in the domain of surveillance and target acquisition. India purchased the Long-Range Reconnaissance and Observation System for its army.52 The Indian Army deployed these systems along with hand-held thermal imagers that greatly enhanced its anti-infiltration measures and those reconnaissance and observation systems are still being used by the army deployed along the Line of Control and along the International Border.53 During the Kargil War India also received laser-guided bombs for modified IAF Mirages from Israel.54

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To overhaul its naval capabilities, India had signed a deal for the purchase of two Super Dvora Mk-2 fast patrol boats from the IAI worth $10 million in 1996. For the deal, Israel was also willing to transfer the technology of patrol boats. The IAI awarded licences for India to manufacture these boats in its Goa Shipyard. While two of these boats were purchased from the IAI, an additional six were manufactured in India in subsequent years.55 The Dvora MK-2 boats are significant for offshore operations, naval intelligence, and command and control at sea.56 As these vessels are equipped with day and night surveillance and weapon locating systems, they are important for detecting and destroy enemy fast boats.57 In addition to Dvora MK-2 boats, the IAI also supplied India the fast attack craft INFACT T-82 in 2003. With an operating speed of 40 knots in a 550-mile area, these vessels are the fastest ones so far in the Indian Navy. These vessels have also enhanced the Indian Navy’s offensive and defensive operational capabilities.58

Further in the domain of surveillance, India also purchased Heron Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (and Searchers) manufactured by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) in 2003. Heron UAVs are the main systems deployed with the Indian Army aerial surveillance operations.59

In order to upgrade its main battle tanks (MBTs), India had approached Israeli defence firms to refurbish its ageing T-72 tank with thermal imaging and better fire control. India’s Alpha Design Technologies (ADT) entered collaborated with Israeli firm Elop-Elbit company in this regard in 2014. In 2016, India received 170 upgraded thermal kits for its T-72 Tanks and upgradations for 1000 T-72 tanks with thermal imaging

The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence Cooperation or night vision capabilities.60 The upgradation of the T- 72 MBTs provide the Indian army with the capabilities required to fight without any time barrier at night. The Elop-Elbit is also in contract with India to upgrade the Infantry Command Vehicles in the IA.61 The company has already transferred over 300 thermal imager standalone kits (TISK) which would add night vision capabilities for main gun firing and missiles. Approximately, some 969 such command vehicles had been upgraded by the end of 2015.62

In 2015, the IAF also acquired the EHUD air combat manoeuvring instrumentation (ACMI) system from Israel.63 The IAF is among the leading air forces in the world having incorporated this system in its training modules.64 Apart from providing real-time high dependability weapons simulation and hit/miss assessments for live training, the system would also it would help the Indian military to improve its overall coordination and synchronisation among its three arms (Air Force, Army and Navy) in any future conflict. 65

Moreover, in order to enhance its land forces’ capabilities of anti-tank war, India has signed a deal with Israel for Spike Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM). On January 17, 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the $500-million Spike anti-tank guided missile deal between India and Israel was back on the table. Earlier, India had formally scrapped the deal for Spike missiles for unknown reasons with Israel’s state-owned defence contractor Rafael Advanced Defence Systems a week before Netanyahu’s visit to the country. On January 3, 2018, Rafael had confirmed the cancellation of the deal. However, India is now reviving the deal because the country considers the Spike missiles battle-proven. The missile has a longer range and is lighter than the Indian Nag missile.66

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Other specialised equipment, that India purchased from Israel, including the Tavor lightweight assault rifles and Galil sniper rifles, have also been inducted a few years earlier with all three services of the Indian military.67 Moreover, Punj Lloyd from India and Israel Weapon Industries (IWI) are also considering a deal to set up a factory in central India to manufacture these weapons.68 In order to further enhance the fire-power of the Indian Army, the Indian Government approved the purchase of another set of assault rifles and carbines from Israel to meet the immediate requirement of troops in January 2018. India’s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), headed by Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, cleared the procurement of 72,000 assault rifles and 93,895 carbines worth $553 million. According to media reports, the procurement would be made available to the forces in two tranches – one fourth by the state-owned Ordnance Factory Board and the remaining by local private industry.69

India-Israel Space Cooperation

As a part of growing ties, India and Israel also maintain a high-level cooperation in the field of space technology. This cooperation was officially initiated when Shimon Peres, then Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, visited Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) in January 2002. Following the visit, an agreement on space cooperation was signed between the former head of Israel’s Space Research Programme Col. Aby Har- Even and former ISRO Chairman Dr K. Kasturiarangan in November 2002. Consequently, India launched two Israeli satellites including Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) surveillance satellite in 2008,70 and SAR imaging satellite RISAT-2 on board a domestically built Polar

The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence Cooperation

Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) from the Sriharikota Space Centre in 2009.71

Given the interests and capabilities available in the domain of space in both India and Israel, cooperation in space is likely to be strengthened in future. The main element in space collaboration is that Israel remains interested in Indian space launching capabilities, while its small satellites have attracted Indian attention. Since Israel considers Indian space launchers reliable, India signed various MoUs with Israel in the domain of space during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Israel in July 2017.72

The Indian space programme has been thriving since its inception. With its successful space launches and various space programmes, the Indian space mission is emerging as a new space power. For example, in June 2016, the ISRO launched 20 satellites in a single payload.73 Similarly, in February 2017, it successfully launched 104 satellites on a single rocket and set a world record.74 This prowess of the Indian space programme has attracted the attention of other countries including Israel for mutual collaboration. However, India’s bilateral cooperation with Israel has raised concerns in Pakistan. Though India claims that its satellites are mainly for weather, communication and navigation purposes, they could ultimately be used for military purposes due to their multipurpose nature.75 Currently, the Indian military is using 13 satellites Cartosat-1 and 2 series and Risat-1 and Risat-2, GSAT-7 or INSAT-4F.76 As discussed earlier, Risat-2 is an Israeli satellite which can be used for multipurpose while the Cartosat-1 and 2 satellites are also fitted with Israeli technology for high resolution imagery.77 This dual-use satellite network gives India a technological advantage which can be used for tactical and strategic goals against Pakistan. These

Journal of Strategic Affairs satellites not only remove India’s dependence over foreign satellites for intelligence and surveillance but also provide the country with the capability to monitor activities around its borders through high-resolution imagery, intelligence gathering, and navigation. Not only do such capabilities help prevent possible attacks, they also enable a prompt response to incoming attacks against India.78

India-Israel Engagement in Air and Missile Defence Systems

The strategic collaboration between India and Israel encompasses engagement in the purchase and co- development of interceptor missile systems, radars and other related technologies. In this regard, India signed a contract with the IAI and Rafael for the supply of nine Barak-I Anti-Missile Defence (AMD) systems in 2001. With this contract, India not only acquired missile defence system for its naval vessels but also opened more avenues for cooperation and collaboration in future years. 79 In March 2018, the Indian Ministry of Defence contracted IAI and Rafael to deliver the Indian Navy 131 additional Barak-1 missiles. The contract is valued at $70 million. Barak-1 is a supersonic missile with an operational range of 10 kilometres.80

Similarly, in 2009, India signed a deal with Israel for the supply of quick reaction surface-to-air missiles (QR- SAM).81 Initially, the Indian Government approved proposals to augment air defence capabilities for eight regiments with QR-SAM worth $2.2 billion in 2012.82 The SPYDER QR-SAM has the potential to engage targets at 360° and the missiles can be launched within five seconds of its readiness mode. It has the capability of intercepting cruise missiles, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), aircrafts or drones at 15km range.83

The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence Cooperation

In May 2017, India conducted successful tests of its first newly acquired Spyder systems.84 A trial of system’s Python and Derby missiles was conducted to validate various parameters and checking its operational readiness.85

To further upgrade the strategic cooperation, India and Israel signed a major deal in March 2010 to jointly develop the Long-Range Surface to Air Missile (LRSAM) system for the Indian Navy (IN), involving the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) of India and the IAI. The deal worth $1.4 billion provided Indian with an opportunity to acquire design and manufacturing technology of the system.86 A similar contract has also been signed between the two countries for the development of same systems for the Indian Army and IAF. These systems for the Army and the IAF were called Medium Range Surface to Air Missiles (MRSAM) systems. These two systems, LRSAM and MRSAM are also called the ‘Barak 8’ or ‘Barak NG’ missile systems. Though the initial collaboration between the two countries on Barak 8 co- development began in 2006 and was approved in 2009, the Indian Government finally approved the deal worth $2.5 billion for the purchase of MRSAM in February 2017.87 The Indian Army will deploy the system by 2023. Similarly, India contracted IAI for the delivery of LRSAM for its navy in May 2017, and the delivery was made in September 2017.88

The aforementioned air defence systems will help India to maintain a multi-layered defence shield. Though these systems may prove effective against cruise and short- range ballistic missile, they are ineffective against long- range ballistic missiles. In order to fill the gap, India is indigenously developing a two-layered ballistic missile defence (BMD) system involving exo-atmospheric and

Journal of Strategic Affairs endo-atmospheric interceptor missiles. For an efficient system, India entered into negotiations with Israel to buy its Arrow-2 anti-missile system’s Green Pine radar. However, Israel could not transfer the radar system to India without US’ approval as the system had been jointly developed. The former Bush Administrator approved the Israeli Green Pine radar system for sale to India. After the approval, India purchased 3 Green Pine radars in 2001.89

The US influence was not limited to the sale of Green Pine radars. The US also allowed Israel to sell the IAI- developed Phalcon Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C). Israel’s dependence on the US, in terms of economic packages, access to dual-use items, and influence in multilateral forums, had a huge impact on its weapons trade. The US can easily block or pressurise Israel to suspend any weapons deal. In 2000, for example the US pressurised Israel to drop the sale of Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) sale to China. However, the sale of same strategic AWACS to India had been approved by the US. A trilateral deal involving Russia, Israel and India was signed in 2004 for the sale of AWACS on three similar IL-76 modified platforms.90 India received these AWACS during 2009-2011.91

The US influence over India-Israel relations has remained constant. The country’s role in the development of defence cooperation between India and Israel has been impressive, even if not favourable at all the times. For example, the Administration of former US President Bill Clinton opposed Israeli military sales to India owing to technology transfer regimes, Israel-US co-production provisions, and arms embargos over India’s nuclear tests of 1998.92 Israel did not join the US weapons embargo on India. Instead, Israel finalised a

The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence Cooperation deal to sell India advanced electronic equipment for its warplanes. Though the equipment had no American technology and it was indigenously developed by Israel, the US opposed the deal and called it contrary to arms control agreements. Despite the US opposition, Israel moved forward with the deal.93

However, this situation became favourable for India during George W. Bush’s tenure who openly supported the India-Israel partnership. The US’s approval for the purchase of Phalcon AWACS marked the evolution of the US position on its policy regarding transfer of technology to India. The success behind Phalcon AWACS was the result of BJP’s political lobbying in the US. In order to mobilise the US support, the BJP government in 2000s actively engaged Jewish organisations in the US and gave an effective push for India-US rapprochement for allowing Israel’s sensitive defence sales to India.94 With the help of Jewish organisations, India not only achieved US’ support for its defence cooperation with Israel but also had Israel an direct source for acquiring US defence technology including the Green Pine Radar.95 These developments imply that the US has, direct or indirect, leverage over India-Israel defence engagements. Since the post 9/11 time period has witnessed a convergence of interests between India and US, the US has tacitly been approving Israel’s military sales and transfer of technology to India.

However, the growing defence cooperation between India and Israel also started creating problems for US defence industries in gaining contracts from India. For example, India had originally considered purchasing the US-made ‘Javelin’ ATGMs and negotiations were ‘nearly completed’ for the two countries to jointly develop the ATGM by late 2016.96 Reluctance from the

Journal of Strategic Affairs

US on technology sharing stalled the negotiations. Alternatively, India reached Israel and successfully negotiated deal for Spike ATGMs.97 It implies that Israeli defence industries are appealing partners for India and their mutual cooperation in joint ventures, production and research and development in high- technology military equipment would remain intact in the future as well. It is because Israel has shown greater flexibility in its policy of transfer of technology. Moreover, Israel imposes minimal conditions over its arms contracts. This flexibility has helped Israel gain a stable position for its defence industry in the Indian weapons markets.98

The Future of India-Israel Defence Cooperation

Though the official acknowledgement of exact financial volume trade is not known, a large section of Israeli arms exports is made to India.99 The defence trade between the two countries ranges from sale of bullets to radars, air deterrent systems including AWACS, and UAVs, and co-development of missile defence systems. The bilateral defence cooperation is not merely restricted to sale of weapons but it has extended to joint ventures and joint manufacturing, including transfer of technology as well as joint research and development in defence and security fields,100 suggesting a strategic partnership between the two countries.

Although the ever-thriving Indo-Israeli defence cooperation has mutual benefits for both the country’s individual markets, there are also obstacles and disadvantages, especially for Israel. Israeli arms and military technology are popular in the world for their technological sophistication and integrity. Israel’s willingness to transfer technology to India under various trade deals would not only provide India the technology

The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence Cooperation but also help the country in acquiring the expertise in the development of arms and equipment. This possibility could allow India to use Israel’s technology for its own weapons and its sale for its own use in the future.101 The waning Indian dependence on Israeli weapons would also result in lowering of defence trade between the two countries, since at numerous times, India has tried to remain restricted to local weapons. For example India once cancelled a deal with Israel for Barak 8 interceptor missiles in favour of its Akash and Trishul interceptors. 102 In January 2018, India’s DRDO also cancelled Spike anti-tank missile deal with Israel for unknown reasons but it was revived back during Netanyahu’s visit to India.103 These examples imply that Israeli companies could possibly face challenges due to India’s policy of strengthening local manufacturing through its ‘Make in India’ programme.104 Consequently, India’s self-reliance and indigenisation in the defence sector could negatively impact Israeli defence trade and market in the long run. Notwithstanding these problems, India-Israel relations will continue to expand, with increased cooperation in the domains of defence and space.

Security Implications for Pakistan

Given that the defence aspect of the India-Israel relationship is the main pillar of their bilateral ties, Israeli defence cooperation is also increasing Pakistan’s security concerns and threat perceptions. India is engaged in a rapid modernisation of both its conventional and strategic military assets for deterrence and dissuasion. India’s huge military infrastructure continues to expand with the help of indigenous weapon development and foreign defence trade. Weapons trade with Israel is not only enhancing India’s military strength quantitatively but also qualitatively. Indian military modernisation is increasing Pakistan’s

Journal of Strategic Affairs vulnerability vis-à-vis India at both conventional and strategic levels.

Conventionally, the Indian military is already stronger than that of Pakistan. With a 2:1 disparity ratio in army,105 the IAF and the Indian Navy also has an advantage of 1.9:1 ratio over Pakistan.106 This quantitative disparity further increases with Indian imports of sophisticated weapons in the region. The mixed array of indigenous and foreign weapons adds into Indian confidence of launching a limited war with Pakistan under the country’s nuclear threshold. On the other hand, Pakistan is adopting measures against the increasing threat of India’s Cold Start doctrine that calls for rapid limited conventional attack against Pakistan.107 However, Israeli weapons including armed and surveillance and reconnaissance UAVs and AWACS efficiently enhances Indian intelligence surveillance capabilities against Pakistan. With these capabilities, India poses a potential threat to Pakistan’s Command and Control assets. During war time, these assets along with Israeli satellites may also be used to locate Pakistan’s military assets, their mobility, missile launch sites and radars. Even during peace time, India can maintain a constant watch over Pakistan’s military movement, giving the country an opportunity to develop counter-measures.

At the strategic level also, Israel’s help in developing India’s indigenous strategic BMD system and transfer of other air and missile defence systems are also increasing Pakistan’s threat perceptions.108 The growing number of anti-missile systems in India is also very destabilising the deterrence between India and Pakistan in the region.109 As effective deterrence rests on the condition of mutual vulnerabilities, the presence of an effective BMD systems with an actor in a given region

The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence Cooperation undermines the ‘fear of mutual assured destruction (MAD)’ between the states.110 Consequently, such a situation not only creates a security dilemma by inducing a false sense of security with BMD possessor, but also influences an arms race in the region.111

The deployment of multi-layered anti-missile systems both at land and sea would reduce Indian vulnerability against Pakistan’s ballistic and cruise missiles by affecting the possible penetration of these missiles into the Indian territory.112 India’s sense of invulnerability may induce a false sense of security to the country and would ultimately act as an incentive for conducting preemptive strike against Pakistan. Moreover, the growing BMD capabilities of India would also affect Pakistan’s strategic calculation.113 It has pushed Pakistan to consider enhancing its nuclear arsenal both quantitatively and qualitatively. In order to overwhelm Indian BMD systems, Pakistan is considering an increase in its offensive capabilities by adding more lethal nuclear warheads. Therefore, Indian import or development of missile defence systems would engage both the countries in an unending strategic arms race.

Pakistan has always expressed concerns about India’s military modernisation, development of the BMD systems and nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean region. These developments led Pakistan to adopt ‘Full Spectrum Deterrence’ nuclear posture in face of growing challenges from India. Pakistan maintains that the country “would not remain oblivious to the evolving security dynamics in South Asia and would maintain a full spectrum deterrence capability to deter all forms of aggression without entering into an arms race with any other country.”114 However, the FSD policy is not a shift from its decade old nuclear policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence.115 Moreover, Pakistan has always shown

Journal of Strategic Affairs restraint and responsibility while adopting measures aimed at preserving deterrence stability in the region. In April 2011. Pakistan conducted the first launch of its surface-to-surface short-range ballistic missile Nasr to deter the evolving threats at all the levels of the threat spectrum.116 Pakistan’s Nasr tactical nuclear weapon (TNW) was developed to fill the gap at the tactical level of conflict and as direct response to India’s Cold Start doctrine (CSD).117 The CSD basically calls for up to 8 independent armoured brigades to penetrate up to 50 kilometres into Pakistan to capture territory in an event of a limited conflict under the country’s nuclear threshold. Israel’s continued transfer of sophisticated weapons and air defence systems enhances India’s offensive capabilities which could allow the country to easily operationalise it’s CSD strategy against Pakistan. Therefore, to further augment its defence, Pakistan tested two other important weapons in January 2017, including Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM)118 and medium-range surface-to-surface ballistic missile Ababeel (MRBM), which is capable of carrying multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).119 The successful development of Babur-3 provides Pakistan with a credible second-strike capability, enabling the country to launch nuclear weapons from deep sea.120 In order to further augment the regional strategic stability, Pakistan developed Ababeel MRBM to ensure survival ability of its offensive missiles against India’s anti-missile systems. 121

Conclusion

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Israel in 1992, their bilateral relationship has now grown to a full strategic partnership. India-Israel relations have flourished across a wide range of areas including agriculture, commerce, science and

The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence Cooperation technology, space and trade. However, defence cooperation between the two countries is a dominating factor in the overall relationship. Indo-Israeli defence engagement comprises not only weapons sale but also involves elements of co-development and transfer of technology. Israel has proven to be an appealing supplier of state-of-the-art weapons and technology to India over the last two decades. Furthermore, India-Israel defence cooperation would continue in the coming years. Since US-India interests are now converging, the US would also likely not object to the transfer of weapons and technology from Israel to India. More significantly, India would also have an indirect access to US weapons components through Israel. Though India is still dependent on Israeli weapons and would remain so for at least a foreseeable future, the country may potentially become self-sufficient in the development of sophisticated weapons technology owing to the transfer of Israeli technology to the country under its trade deals. Israeli arms procurement by India including weapons for surveillance and reconnaissance and anti-missile systems directly influence Pakistan’s sense of security. Israeli weapons in the region not only affect deterrence stability but also intensify the arms race in South Asia.

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surveillance-gets-a-boost-with-RISAT-2/articleshow/ 4426913.cms. 72. “India-Israel Sign Seven MoUs on Space, Water Conservation, Agriculture; Plan to set up $40 million R&D Fund,” First Post, June 26, 2018, https://www.firstpost.com/india/india-israel-sign-seven- mous-on-space-water-conservation-agriculture-plan-to- set-up-40-million-rd-fund-3779445.html. 73. “PSLV-C34 Successfully Launches 20 Satellites in a Single Flight,” Government of India, Department of Space, Indian Space Research Organisation, June 22, 2016, https://www.isro.gov.in/update/22-jun-2016/pslv- c34-successfully-launches-20-satellites-single-flight. 74. “PSLV-C37 Successfully Launches 104 Satellites in a Single Flight,” Government of India, Department of Space, Indian Space Research Organisation, February 15, 2017, https://www.isro.gov.in/pslv-c37-successfully- launches-104-satellites-single-flight. 75. Raja Mansoor, “Pakistan Is Losing the Space Race,” The Diplomat, February 1, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/ 2018/02/pakistan-is-losing-the-space-race/. 76. Ibid. 77. Ibid. 78. Ibid. 79. Nicolas Blarel, The Evolution of India’s Israel Policy: Continuity, Change, and Compromise since 1922 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 300. 80. Rahul Udoshi, “India Orders Additional Barak-1 Short- Range SAMs,” Jane's 360, March 26, 2018, http://www.janes.com/article/78846/india-orders- additional-barak-1-short-range-sams. 81. “Govt Nod for Rs 4k cr Israeli Surface-to-Air Missile System,” Times of India, August 19, 2009, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Govt-nod-for- Rs-4k-cr-Israeli-surface-toair-missile%20system/ articleshow/4908764.cms?referral=PM. 82. Masood ur Rehm Khattak, “Strategic Significance of Indo-Israel Defence Collaboration: Implications for Pakistan’s Security,” IPRI 16, no. 2 (2016): 52. 83. Ibid.

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84. “Israeli Spyder Missile Test a Hit,” The New Indian Express, May 12, 2017, www.newindianexpress.com/ states/odisha/2017/may/12/israeli-spyder-missile-test-a- hit-1603851--1.html. 85. Ibid. 86. Efraim Inbar and Alvite Singh Ningthoujam, Indo-Israeli Defense Cooperation in The Twenty-First Century, Rubin Centre in Research for International Affairs, December 22, 2011, http://www.rubincenter.org/2011/12/indo- israeli-defense-cooperation-in-the-twenty-first-century/. 87. “India Approves $2.5 billion Missile Deal with Israel,” The Express Tribune, February 24, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1337386/india-approves-2-5- billion-missile-deal-israel/. 88. Lopamudra Roy, “IAI Delivers First Domestically Built LRSAM to Indian Navy, “Naval Technology, September 5, 2017, https://www.naval-technology.com/news/ newsiai-delivers-first-domestically-built-lrsam-to-indian- navy-5917555/. 89. R. N. Ganesh, “Nuclear Missile-Related Risks in South Asia.” In The Next Arms Race, ed, Henry D. Sokolski, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 305-355. 90. Yiftah S. Shapir, “Israel’s Arms Sales to India,” Strategic Assessment 2, no. 3 (2009): 30-34. 91. Khattak, “Strategic Significance of Indo-Israel Defence Collaboration.” 92. Nicolas Blarel, “Assessing US Influence over India–Israel Relations: A Difficult Equation to Balance? Strategic Analysis 41, no. 4 (2017): 394. 93. Ibid. 94. Jason A. Kirk, ‘Indian-Americans and the US–India Nuclear Agreement: Consolidation of an Ethnic Lobby?’, Foreign Policy Analysis 4 no. 3 (2008), 275–300. 95. Blarel, “Assessing US Influence over India–Israel Relations,” 395. 96. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “US, India Said to be Nearing Javelin Co-Production Agreement,” Defence September 21, 2016, https://www.defensenews.com/land/ 2016/09/21/us-india-said-to-be-nearing-javelin-co- production-agreement/.

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97. Rahul Singh, ‘India, Israel seal $2 billion missile deals: What it means for New Delhi?’, Hindustan Times, April 7, 2017, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india- news/india-israel-seal-2-billion-missile-deals-what-it- means-for-new-delhi/story- xgm5OC7iYHNtuX1YDCV10J.html. 98. Blarel, “Assessing US Influence over India–Israel Relations,” 395. 99. “Asia and the Middle East Lead Rising Trend in Arms Imports.” 100. Herb Keinon, “Netanyahu: Modi Is Revolutionizing Israel-India Ties,” The Jerusalem Post, January 16, 2018, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/India-Israel/WATCH- Netanyahu-and-Modi-pledge-strong-ties-in-joint- statement-536783. 101. Shapir, “Israel’s Arms Sales to India,” 35. 102. Ibid, 36. 103. Scrapped Spike missile deal back on table, says Netanyahu.” 104. Shapir, “Israel’s Arms Sales to India,” 36. 105. “The Military Balance”, International Institute for Strategic Studies (2015): 251, 278. 106. Ibid. 107. C. Raja Mohan, “Fernandes Unveils Limited War Doctrine”, The Hindu, January 25, 2000, http://www.thehindu.com/2000/01/25/stories/01250001.ht m. 108. Ganesh, “Nuclear Missile-Related Risks in South Asia.” 109. Frank P. Harvey, “The Future of Strategic Stability and Nuclear Deterrence,” International Journal 58, no. 2 (Spring, 2003): 321-22. 110. Robert Powell, “Crisis Stability in the Nuclear Age,” The American Political Science Review 83, no. 1 (March 1989): 61; 67. 111. Feroz Hassan Khan, “Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms Control,” in The Next Arms Race, ed. Henry D. Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2012), 358. 112. Ibid. 113. Ibid.

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114. Press Release, No PR-133/2013-ISPR, Inter Services Public Relations, September 5, 2013, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release- detail.php?id=2361. 115. Press Release, No. PR 133/2013 ISPR, Inter Services Public Relations, September 5, 2013, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t- press_release&date=2013/9/5. 116. “Press Release, No. PR94/2011-ISPR, Inter Services Public Relations, April 19, 2011. http://www.press.uchicago.edu/books/turabian/turabian_c itationguide.html. 117. Press release, No PR-344/2017-ISPR, Inter Services Public Relations, July 5, 2017, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/ press-release-detail.php?id=4097. 118. Press Release, No PR-10/2017-ISPR, Inter Services Public Relations, January 9, 2017, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release- detail.php?id=3672. 119. Press Release, No PR-34/2017-ISPR, Inter Services Public Relations, January 24, 2017, www.ispr.gov.pk/ press-release-detail.php?id=3705. 120. Press Release, No PR-10/2017-ISPR. 121. Press Release, No PR-34/2017-ISPR.

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Afghanistan and the New Great Game: Implications for Pakistan

Kashif Hussain

Introduction

For much of the late 19th and early 20th centuries the former British and Russian empires remained locked in what is known as the ‘Great Game’. With Central Asia forming part of the Russian empire and South Asia being colonised by the British, Afghanistan served as the buffer zone between their respective spheres of influence. With the end of the Second World War the Great Game also came to an end. However, the post 9/11 geostrategic maneuvers around Afghanistan gave rise to the so called ‘New Great Game’. In this new game, various regional and extra-regional powers are trying to increase their influence in Afghanistan in order to gain regional hegemony.

Ostensibly, the US intervened in Afghanistan to fight terrorism. However, the long term US’ presence in the country indicates that it is carefully, selectively and very deliberately deploying its resources on the Eurasian continent.1The vast landmass of Asia and Europe combined constitutes the Eurasian continent.2 Within Eurasia Afghanistan holds a significant geostrategic position for connecting Southern, Southeastern, Western and Central Asia. The reasons for the US to deploy its military in Afghanistan are also clear. Doing so has enabled the US to keep a check on China and Russia, both of which could eventually emerge as dominant and antagonistic Asian powers.3

In order to enhance its presence in the region, the US has also maneuvered the complex South Asian power

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Afghanistan and the New Great Game: Implications for Pakistan relations to its advantage.4 It has struck a strategic partnership with India, which already had tense relations with China. The growing Indo-US partnership in turn has strengthened the China-Pakistan strategic nexus. China has launched its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and selected the Pakistani corridor to access the Middle East, Central Asia and beyond, through the CPEC.5 The refusal of both the US and India to recognise CPEC not only adds complexity to the situation but is a manifestation of the rivalry between the two camps.6 Interestingly, Russia is also favouring China and Pakistan in matters relating to Afghanistan. Against the Indo-US wish to find a military solution to the Afghan conflict, Russia supports Sino-Pakistan efforts for a political breakthrough.7

Pakistan’s role is also pivotal for its geostrategic leverage8 vis-à-vis Afghanistan and for connecting West, Central and Southeast Asia. Pakistan also remains important in terms of its history of political influence over the Afghan Taliban.9 For the United States (US), Pakistan is also vital for ensuring a smooth supply of logistics to its mission in Afghanistan.10 The country’s significance for China is evident in its mega investment in the shape of the CPEC. Meanwhile, Russia is also enhancing its bilateral relations with Pakistan, keeping in view its central role in the changing geostrategic environment. In view of the emerging geostrategic trends this paper discusses the following:

 What are the key strategic objectives of various players involved in the New Great Game in Afghanistan?

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 How does Pakistan’s geostrategic location influence the US, Chinese and Russian policies in pursuance of their interests in the region?  What implications and policy options exist for Pakistan in light of the emerging New Great Game?

The US Geostrategy in the Region

The interplay of strategy and geography in world affairs led to the creation of the term ‘geostrategy’. Coined by Frederic L. Shuman in 1942, geostrategy was the translation of the German term ‘Wehrgeopolitik’ used by the German geostrategist Karl Haushofer.11Zbigniew Brzezinski is one of the most prominent contemporary advocates of geostrategy. His famous book The Grand Chessboard is an instrumental guide available in order to comprehend the US’ underlying geostrategic maneuvers in the Eurasian continent. He defines the subject as, “the strategic management of geopolitical objectives”.12 In explaining the required elements for the US to be able to exercise its geostrategic power and employ its geostrategic skill, Brzezinski emphasised ‘the careful, selective and very deliberate deployment of American resources on Eurasian chessboard’.13According to the writer, the global primacy of the US will depend on how America deals with the complex Eurasian power relations and its ability to prevent the emergence of a dominant and antagonistic Asian power.14

In pursuit of Brzezinski’s geostrategic recommendations15 to wield greater geopolitical advantage over the Eurasian continent, the US has adopted attributes of ‘offensive realism’.16John J. Mearsheimer’s theory of ‘offensive realism’ is built on five core assumptions. The first assumption is that there is anarchy in the international system, which means that

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Afghanistan and the New Great Game: Implications for Pakistan there is no hierarchically superior, coercive power that can guarantee limits on the behaviour of states.17 Second, all great powers possess offensive military capabilities, which they are capable of using against other states.18 Third, states can never be certain that other states will refrain from using those offensive military capabilities.19Fourth, states seek to maintain their survival above all other goals.20Fifth, states are rational actors, which means that they consider the immediate and long-term consequences of their actions, and think strategically about how to survive.21Mearsheimer further argues that the best way for great powers to ensure their survival is to maximise power and pursue hegemony.22 The prospects for a state becoming global hegemon23 are meagre due to vastness of the world territory hence the need for great powers to pursue regional hegemony.24China’s bid for regional hegemony has thus prompted the US and most of China’s neighbours to try and contain China.25

Afghanistan serves as a focal area for the US to keep a check on China’s growing interests in South and Central Asia which could ultimately become a threat to US’ hegemony in the overall Asia Pacific region.26To this end, the US has chosen to partner with China’s unfriendly neighbour, India.27

Interestingly, the US is not only encouraging India’s involvement in Afghanistan but also favours a greater position for New-Delhi in the greater Asia Pacific region.28India plays an important role within US’ counter China policy in South Asia and the wider Asia Pacific region.29 The 2018 US National Defence Strategy (NDS) clearly singled out China as a strategic competitor possessing revisionist objectives to attain regional hegemony in the Asia pacific region.30 One of the objectives outlined in the NDS document is clearly

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Journal of Strategic Affairs bolstering partners against coercion.31 In December 2016, the US Embassy and Consulates in India outlined a fact sheet endorsing the defence relations of both countries; and finalised India’s designation as a “Major Defence Partner”.32 The Indo-US nuclear deal and the defence partnership between the two countries can also be explained in the light of the US’ efforts to contain China. The US struck a civil nuclear deal with India in 2008. It was followed by close cooperation in building India’s anti-ballistic missile systems.33 Over the years, the US has become one of India’s largest arms exporters.34 Both countries signed the Logistic Support Agreement (LSA) in August 2016. The agreement governs the use of each other’s land, air and naval bases for repair and resupply. Moreover, the US is enhancing India’s military capabilities in order to bring New-Delhi at par with China.35

The fact that the US remains wary of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is evident from the fact that Alice G. Wells, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia voiced concern about China’s fast-moving Belt and Road Initiative during the US- India forum held in April 2018.36 Wells emphasised that through this initiative Beijing pumps cash into infrastructure projects to buy access to resources around the region.37 The CPEC, which is a flagship project of the BRI, envisages taking China’s peaceful rise to new heights by overhauling Pakistan’s infrastructure; moreover it also acts as a counter-balance to the growing Indo-US partnership.38

At the same time, Russia’s role is changing in the region owing to the Afghan situation. Traditionally, Moscow has been a close ally of India in the region.39 Although, both India and Russia still maintain cordial relations, their interests seem to be diverging in Afghanistan.40

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Even as India and the US remain focused on fighting the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, Moscow wants a political reconciliation and streamlining of the Taliban in order to focus attention on the rising Daesh threat.41 In fact, the danger of Daesh for both Pakistan and Russia has brought the two countries closer.42 In 2014, Russia lifted its arms embargo on Pakistan.43 Since then, Russia-Pakistan strategic relations have been growing. In addition to that, Moscow’s endorsement of the BRI and its plans to connect it with Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) has meant Russia siding on the Sino-Pak camp.44

The New Great Game

US’ Interests

The Bilateral Security Agreement signed between the former Obama Admiration and Government of Afghanistan in 2014 clearly reflects the US’ strategic objective to ensure its long term presence in Afghanistan. The agreement permits the stay of the US and NATO troops in Afghanistan until the end of 2024 and beyond.45 The US Military will have access to nine major land and airbases, including Bagram, Jalalabad, Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Helmand, Gardez and Shindand.46 For the US, Afghanistan serves as a vital geostrategic point not only to keep a check on Russian influence in Central Asia but also to deny any prospect of China becoming a regional hegemon.47

Additionally, the US has shown its willingness to connect the Central Asian energy resources through pipelines with South Asia. In 2011, former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, shared her vision with her German and Afghan counterparts on the sidelines of 66th United Nations General Assembly’s conference. It

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Journal of Strategic Affairs asserted the revival of the old concept of Silk Road. Clinton expressed her willingness to build rail tracks, highways and energy resource pipelines.48

The revival of the New Silk Road would promote economic growth throughout Central Asia by integrating the region into the global economy through introduction of advanced infrastructure and effective cross-border trade.49Yet another important objective of the new Silk Road initiative is to provide an economic boost to Afghanistan.50Various initiatives have been taken as a result. Projects like Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan- India (TAPI) pipeline and CASA-1000 which aim to provide energy from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India are integral parts of the US’ new Silk Road Strategy.51 On February 23, 2018 Afghanistan’s section of TAPI pipeline project was launched in Herat.52 The 1,814-kilometer pipeline would pass through the territories of Herat, Farah, Nimroz, Helmand and Kandahar provinces of Afghanistan, then via Quetta and Multan in Pakistan the final destination of the pipeline would be the Indian town of Fazilka. The envisaged $22.5 billion project is expected to be completed by 2019.

China’s Interests

China’s unprecedented economic growth during the last couple of decades has helped the country reduce poverty and unemployment at home and increase its national wealth. Though, the south and centre remain wealthier and more prosperous, the largest western autonomous region of Sinkiang is comparatively underdeveloped.53 One of the reasons for the underdevelopment of Sinkiang is its location far from the sea-lanes of South China. An even the bigger challenge exists in the shape of the rise of extremism in Sinkiang.54 In order to ensure

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Afghanistan and the New Great Game: Implications for Pakistan the spillover effects of economic prosperity to the northwest of the country, China needs complete stability in conflict ridden Afghanistan (adjacent to Sinkiang) to stop the spread of extremism to the chinese mainland.55 Achieving this strategic goal would also help the country to successfully implement President Xi’s geo-economic vision (BRI) to replace the Northwest’s costly communication dependence from South China Sea to the sea-lanes of Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf.56

In order to ensure cheap access to energy resources China has enhanced its relations with Pakistan through its mega investment in the shape of the CPEC. China is also making efforts to enhance Pakistan’s military capabilities, so that the country would serve as a counter-balance to India.57 Pakistan is significant for China to keep a check on India at such a time when the former has become a key part of the US’ counter China policy.58 Interestingly, military assistance from China is also vital for Pakistan, especially because the US has cut-off almost its entire military related support to the country.59China has become the largest arms exporter to Pakistan surpassing the US.60 In August 2017, the former inked a deal with Pakistan to provide it with eight new stealth attack submarines to form the sea-based arm of Islamabad’s growing nuclear second-strike triad.61

One of China’s key interests in the region remains stabilising Afghanistan in order to curb the spread of extremism to Sinkiang. To that end, China is making serious efforts for Afghanistan’s economic reconstruction and political reconciliation. The country is an active member of the ‘Heart of Asia - Istanbul Process’ (the process sought to bring cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbors). The resolve for a political reconciliation between the National Unity Government of Afghanistan (NUG) and the Taliban is

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Journal of Strategic Affairs also reflective in China’s efforts to activate the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG).62 Though the QCG has not been able to yield any viable results, Afghanistan continues to look towards China for asserting influence over Pakistan to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table.63 In this regard, China continues its efforts to ensure a smooth relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. On June 24, 2017, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi after consulting both the foreign offices in Islamabad and Kabul established a crisis management mechanism.64 Most recently, Beijing hosted the first China-Pakistan-Afghanistan tri-lateral dialogue mechanism to maintain a smooth and workable environment for Afghan political reconciliation.65 The political reconciliation would lead to a stable Afghanistan which is essential for China to curb the spread of extremism to its mainland.

As far as Afghanistan’s economic reconstruction is concerned, China remains one of the largest sources of foreign direct investment.66 The country is also investing in Afghanistan’s housing sector.67 Additionally, efforts are being to uplift the quality of higher education in Afghanistan.68 Most importantly, under BRI China is working on at least three infrastructural projects in Afghanistan which would not only uplift the economic conditions of the conflict ridden country but also assist to connect entire Eurasian continent.69

Russian Interests

Afghanistan has always remained geostrategically important for Moscow. Even during the late 19th and early 20th century the former Russian Empire did not allow the British to take control of the Afghan territory. Afghanistan served as a buffer zone keeping the British influence away from Central Asia. The Soviet invasion

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Afghanistan and the New Great Game: Implications for Pakistan of Afghanistan during the 1980s also reflects the country’s importance for Moscow. The former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in order to support the communist government of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) against a growing insurgency.70 However, experts have also pointed towards the Soviet Union’s larger objective to access the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and markets of the Middle East through Pakistan.71 Another reason which prompted the Soviets to invade Afghanistan was the threat of the US influence’ spreading to Afghanistan and Central Asia from Pakistan and Iran.72 This can be attributed to the fact that during 1970s, Pakistan and Iran were part of the US led Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).73 However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan failed and the USSR collapsed as a result in 1992. Almost a decade later, the US embarked on the second Afghan invasion in reaction to the 9/11 terror attacks. Russia initially supported the US invasion.74 However, Washington’s inability to bring stability to the Afghanistan during the last 17-years and the consequent rise of the Daesh in the war torn country has changed Moscow’s perceptions. Russia deems it necessary to politically reconcile with the Taliban in order to collectively fight the Daesh threat.

Moscow deems it necessary to curb the Daesh threat before it spreads to mainland Russia through Central Asia. Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov has stated his concern that the Daesh’s presence in Afghanistan “increases the risk of terrorists entering Central Asia, from where it’s not difficult for them to get to Russia, and further.”75 For that purpose, Russia wants political mainstreaming of the Taliban in order to collectively fight the Daesh threat. However, the United States and National Unity Government of Afghanistan seem more concentrated on fighting the Taliban than

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Journal of Strategic Affairs confronting the Daesh.76This may be because Daesh has been a rival to the Taliban in Afghanistan, with both groups clashing as a consequence of rising strategic competition.77In fact, observers have accused the United States and the NUG of collaborating with the Daesh against the Taliban. While the United States has denied this claim, it may be true that the United States and the NUG are underestimating the threat of Daesh because it perceives the group’s struggles with their primary adversary (the Taliban) as a strategic asset to their ongoing conflict in Afghanistan.

Owing to the situation, Moscow has not only transferred significant military technology to Islamabad after lifting its arm embargo in 2014 and increasing military to military collaboration by holding joint exercises but also by establishing an anti-terror commission to counter the rising threat of Daesh from Afghanistan.78

As far as Central and South Asian integration is concerned, Russia has endorsed China’s BRI and plans to connect it with its vision of Eurasian Economic Union.79 That in turn would serve to fulfil Russia’s access to the warm waters of Arabian Sea via Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central.80 A considerable Russia presence in the Arabian Sea would help to strengthen Sino-Pak nexus to counter the US.

Pakistan and the New Great Game

Notwithstanding the 16-year long Pak-US collaboration in Afghanistan, the situation in the country is far from stable. The Pakistan-US collaboration in the immediate aftermath of the 2002 US-led invasion of Afghanistan was fruitful. Consequently, in 2004 the US extended its ‘major non-NATO ally’ status to Pakistan recognising the country’s efforts in the war against terror. The real

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Afghanistan and the New Great Game: Implications for Pakistan shift in Pakistan’s attitude towards the US followed the invasion of Iraq.81 It was at that time when Pakistan became skeptical about the US’ willingness to remain in Afghanistan once the war was over.82 The Pakistani leadership recognised the fact that once the military operation was over, Afghanistan would require a new government and reconstruction efforts for which the Taliban leadership would be useful.83 Pakistan thus urged the United States to distinguish between the Taliban that wanted to strike a peace deal and those who wanted to continue fighting.84 However the US wanted Pakistan to not distinguish between different Taliban factions.85 Since then it continues to criticise Pakistan’s policy vis-a-vis the Taliban. The US alleges that Pakistan assists various factions of the Afghan Taliban in their activities against the US mission in Afghanistan.86 This suspicion in turn has encouraged a greater Indian role in Afghanistan, which has resulted in a worsening of Pak-US relations.87

On its part, Islamabad contends that the greater Indian involvement in Afghanistan allows New-Delhi to help fuel anti-Pakistan segments in Kabul. Those anti- Pakistan entities, in turn, carry out various illegal activities, including terrorist attacks from across the porous Durand Line.88

Not only does the US encourage India’s greater involvement in Afghanistan, despite Pakistan’s annoyance, it has also reduced its defence collaboration with Islamabad. Even as Pakistan is being criticised for its alleged differentiation between good and bad Taliban, military aid to Islamabad is declining. There was a 73% drop in US security aid to Pakistan from 2011 to 2015.89 In 2016 the US also cancelled the subsidised sale of eight F-16 fighter jets.90 Pakistan received $225 million in US foreign military financing in 2016 and in 2017 a

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Journal of Strategic Affairs reduction of $125 million has been proposed for the first US budget under President Trump.91Recently, the US suspended its entire security aid to Pakistan.92

However, for the US’ strategic objective of long term survival in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s cooperation is essential as the country provides the shortest sea route to Kabul. The US has been utilising Pakistani territory to maintain logistics to its mission in Afghanistan. In addition to that, without Pakistan’s assistance, it would be difficult for the US to convince the Taliban for political settlement of the Afghan conflict, due to the history of the Pakistan’s influence over the insurgent group.93

Moreover, Pakistan also holds a central role in the US’ New Silk Road concept. The implementations of TAPI and CASA-1000 projects would not be possible without Pakistan’s collaboration. However, the US seems to be undermining Pakistan’s significance for the achievement of its own objectives in the region.

As far as China is concerned, Pakistan is not only the largest market for Chinese armaments but Islamabad also secures Beijing’s larger interest in the Indian Ocean with respect to its energy security. China’s aims to achieve superiority over India in South Asia cannot be fulfilled without Pakistan’s assistance. Pakistan’s crucial location and the establishment of one the world deepest sea ports of Gawadar are vital in this regard. Moreover, the CPEC and its centrality to the overall BRI increases Pakistan’s significance for China. The 3000 km road link under CPEC connects the Gawadar port with China’s Sinkiang province and provides Beijing with a shorter route for the markets of Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East.94 The corridor would also serve to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Malacca in the

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Indian Ocean, through which more than three quarters of its oil imports are currently being shipped.95 China deems its dependence on Malacca Strait a strategic vulnerability due to the US’ predominance over these maritime expanses.96

For Russia too Islamabad remains important to achieve its changing strategic interests in the region. Russia acknowledges the Taliban’s position in Afghanistan as the US remains unable to defeat the insurgent group. Russia also acknowledges that Pakistan holds considerable influence over the Taliban. In addition to that, the rising threat of Daesh in Afghanistan is a common danger for Russia, Pakistan and the Taliban. Keeping this convergence of interest in view, Russia has extended its strategic relations with Pakistan during the last couple of years. Secondly, the successful implementation of CPEC and Russia’s Plans to connect the EEU with the BRI provide Moscow with the opportunity to access the warms waters of the Arabian Sea.

Conclusion

‘Containing China’ is one of main reasons for the prolonged US presence in Afghanistan and its growing strategic partnership with India. Their offensive policies in the region have strengthened the already strong Sino- Pak relation. Moreover, the CPEC offers immense opportunities for countries to uplift the socio-economic condition of the entire region.

With China surpassing the US in fulfilling Pakistan’s military and civil nuclear needs, Washington has much to lose as result of weak relations with Islamabad. The US cannot maintain the logistics to its mission in Afghanistan without Pakistan’s help. Pakistan is also

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Journal of Strategic Affairs vital for bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table, without which the end to the US problems in Afghanistan seem improbable.

As far as Russia is concerned, Islamabad must capitalise on its growing relations with Moscow by further exploring its defence industry and making way for its energy market. The increased Russo-Pak cooperation should be viewed in the context of increasingly complex challenges being faced by Moscow in the evolving Afghan scenario. Russia considers Pakistan an important player for the stabilisation of Afghanistan. Keeping in view Russia’s longstanding relations with India and its growing relations with Pakistan, Moscow could ultimately be in a position to mediate to help resolve the outstanding issues between the two countries.

References

1. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 3-4. 2. In addition to many other geopoliticans and strategists, Brzezinski has widely used the term ‘Eurasia’ in his writings. 3. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, 38. 4. Ibid 5. Zahid Hussain,“The China Pakistan Economic Corridor and the New Regional Geopolitics,” Asie.Visions, (2017):3. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/ files/hussain_china_pakistan_economic_corridor_2017.pdf 6. “US backs India’s stand on OBOR, says CPEC crosses disputed territory,” India Today, October 4, 2017. www.indiatoday.in/india/story/on-obor-us-backs-india- says-it-crosses-disputed-territory-1057313-2017-10-04

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7. “Russia Offers to Host Talks between Govt and Taliban,” Tolo News, January 18, 2018. https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/russia-offers-host- talks-between-govt-and-taliban 8. Pakistan provides shortest sea route to the landlocked Afghanistan. Moreover, the political reconciliation between Afghan government and the Taliban is highly depended on Pakistan’s cooperation keeping in view the history of Pakistan-Taliban relations. 9. Alex Vatanka, Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence (London: IB Tauris, 2015) 10. Statement of General Joseph Votel Commander US Central Command before the House Armed Services Committee on the Posture of US Central Command, February 28, 2018, 12. https://docs.house.gov/meetings/ AS/AS00/20180227/106870/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate- VotelJ-20180227.pdf 11. Ask Define, “Geo-strategy”. https://geostrategic.askdefine.com/ 12. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, 3. 13. Ibid, 4. 14. Ibid, 38. 15. Joseph E. Fallon, “U.S. Geopolitics: Afghanistan and the Containment of China,” Small Wars Journal, (2013). http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/us-geopolitics- afghanistan-and-the-containment-of-china 16. Perveen, Khalil, Muharram, Ayaz, “US military engagement in Afghanistan’s turmoil: an analysis of security situation of Afghanistan,” FWU Journal of Social Sciences, (2016): 188. http://www.sbbwu.edu.pk/journal/Summmer%202016%2 0Vol.10.No.1/21%20The%20US%20military%20engage ment%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf 17. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 30. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid, 31. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid.

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23. Mearsheimer defines a hegemon as a “state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system. 24. Mearsheimer, John J. “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, (2010): 387. 25. Ibid, 382. 26. Fallon, “U.S. Geopolitics”. 27. There is 4000 km long disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) between China and India and both the nation have gone to war with each other in the year 1962. 28. The US’ South Asia strategy announced in August 2017 clearly outlines India’s growing role in Afghanistan whereas the recent attempts to rename Asia Pacific to Indo-Pacific and US Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific Command reflect that US is favoring Indian greater role in Asia Pacific. 29. Dipanjan Chaudhury “US seeks to Counter China in Indo- Pacific,” The Economic Times, May 2, 2018. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/us- seeks-to-counter-china-in-indo- pacific/articleshow/63996039.cms 30. Summary of the 2018 National Defence Strategy of the United States of America, The US Department of defence, 2. https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018- National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf 31. Ibid, 4. 32. “US-India Defense Relations Fact Sheet,” US Embassy and Consulates in India, December 8, 2016. https://in.usembassy.gov/u-s-india-defense-relations-fact- sheet-december-8-2016/ 33. Zafar Khan, “India’s Ballistic Missile Defence: Implications for South Asia Deterrence Stability,” The Washington Quarterly, 40, No.3 (2017): 189. 34. “India’s Arms Imports from the US up by 550%,” The Hindu, March 13, 2018. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indias-arms- imports-from-us-up-by-550-report/article23166097.ece 35. Sumit Ganguly, “Is India starting to flex its military muscles?,” Foreign Policy, October 17, 2017.

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http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/17/is-india-starting-to- flex-its-military-muscles/ 36. The India-US Forum is a platform for both American and Indian leaders across the spectrum to discuss complex global and bilateral issues and promote greater cooperation between the two countries through consultation and collaboration. 37. Guy Taylor, “Taming the Dragon: US India see urgent need to forge ties against Chinese influence,” The Washington Times, April 8, 2018. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/apr/8/us- india-seek-counter-chinas-aggression-military-e/ 38. Mehmood Hussain, “Impact of India-United States Civil Nuclear Deal on China-Pakistan Strategic Partnership,” Journal of South Asian Studies, (2017): 18. 39. Both the nations signed treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation in 1971 that specified mutual strategic cooperation. 40. Sachin Parashar “Putin’s Special Envoy reaches out to India on Afghanistan,” The Times of India, October, 23, 2017. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/putins- special-envoy-reaches-out-to-india-on- afghanistan/articleshow/61176543.cms 41. “Russia, Pakistan, China warn of increased Daesh threat,” Tolo News, December 28, 2016. https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/russia-pakistan- china-warn-increased-daesh-threat 42. Ayaz Gul, “Russia Pakistan form anti-terror military cooperation commission,” VoA, February 20, 2018. https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-pakistan-military- cooperation-commission-against-islamic- state/4262801.html 43. Mateen Haider, “Russian Defence Minister Arrived in Pakistan to Discuss Defence Cooperation,” Dawn, November 20, 2018. https://www.dawn.com/news/1145759

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44. Reid Standish “China and Russia Lay Foundation for Massive Economic Cooperation,” Foreign Policy, July 10, 2015. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/10/china- russia-sco-ufa-summit-putin-xi-jinping-eurasian-union- silk-road/ 45. “Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Afghanistan”. http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/text-of-security-and-defense- cooperation-agreement-between-the-islamic-republic-of- afghanistan-and-the-united-states-of-america 46. Spencer Ackerman, “New Afghanistan pact Means America’s Longest War will last until at least 2024,” The Guardian, September 30, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/30/us- troops-afghanistan-2024-obama-bilateral-security- agreement 47. Joseph E. Fallon, “U.S. Geopolitics”. 48. “Remarks at the New Silk Road Ministerial Meeting,” US Department of State, September 22, 2011. https://2009- 2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/09/17 3807.htm 49. Fedorenko, “The New Silk Road Initiatives in Central Asia,” Rethink Institute, (2013): 4. 50. Ibid, 5 51. Joshua Foust “The Brilliant, Unworkable New Silk Road,” The Atlantic, October 11, 2011. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/1 0/the-brilliant-unworkable-new-silk-road/246425/ 52. “Work On Afghanistan Section of TAPI Project Launched,” Tolo News, February 24, 2018. https://www.tolonews.com/index.php/business/work- afghanistan-tapi-section-launched 53. Andrew Fischer, “Comparing Tibet and Xinjiang through the structural dimensions of socio-economic change,” The online journal of the China Policy Institute, (2016). 54. “Religious Extremism is Spreading to Inland China: Official,” Reuters, November 28, 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security- xinjiang-idUSKBN13N12P

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55. Michael Clarke, “China’s Afghanistan Dilemma,” Australian Institute of International Affairs, (2016). 56. Shiekh Fahad, “China Pakistan Economic Corridor and Defence Pact,” Stratagem, June 19, 2015. http://www.stratagem.pk/economic-review/china- pakistan-economic-corridor-and-defense-pact/ 57. “China’s Military Assistance to Pakistan and Implication for India, Pakistan Defence,” August 24, 2010. https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/chinese-military-assistance- to-pakistan-and-implications-for-india.70404/ 58. Iskandar Rehman, “Keeping the Dragon at Bay: India’s Counter-Containment of China in Asia,” Asian Security, (2009), 120. 59. Anwar Iqbal, “America Suspends Entire Security Aid to Pakistan,” Dawn, January 5, 2018. https://www.dawn.com/news/1380876 60. “Pakistan Shuns US for Chinese High Tech Weapons,” Financial Times, April 18, 2018. https://www.ft.com/content/8dbce0a0-3713-11e8-8b98- 2f31af407cc8 61. Franz-Stefan Gady, “China to Supply Pakistan with 8 New Stealth Attack Submarines by 2028,” The Diplomat, August 30, 2016. http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/china- to-supply-pakistan-with-8-new-stealth-attack-submarines- by-2028/ 62. Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) is a four-nation group working for reconciliation in Afghanistan which includes Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and the US. The group aims to initiate reconciliation process between civilian government in Afghanistan and the Taliban to preserve Afghanistan’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity and achieve lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region. 63. Arushi Kumar, “Why China’s One Belt One Road Matters for Afghanistan,” South Asia Voices, May 12, 2017. https://southasianvoices.org/why-china-one-belt- one-road-matters-afghanistan/ 64. Baqir Sajjad, “China Brokers Pak-Afghan Crisis Mechanism,” Dawn, June 26, 2017.

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https://www.dawn.com/news/1341752/china-brokers-pak- afghan-crisis-mechanism 65. “China Hosts Meeting to Improve Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations,” Xinhua Net, December 12, 2017. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017- 12/26/c_136853473.htm 66. “The Belt and Road Upgrades China-Afghanistan Relations,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Afghanistan, March 25, 2016. http://af.china- embassy.org/eng/sgxw/t1350774.htm 67. “Afghanistan Housing Project Underlines China’s Growing Role,” Reuters, March 22, 2017. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-china- housing-idUSKBN16T0KV 68. “China will Provide 500 scholarships over 5 Years to Afghans to Study in China,” Aid Data, June 1, 2015. http://china.aiddata.org/projects/37861 69. China intends to extend CPEC into Afghanistan through a set of six proposed projects including the Turkmenistan- Afghanistan-Pakistan energy transmission line; a motorway or rail connection from Peshawar in Pakistan to Kunduz and extending into Central Asia; a motorway project between Peshawar and Kabul; a road link between Torkham and Kabul to join an existing road with Pakistan; railway lines linking Pakistan’s Landi-Kotal with Jalalabad and Pakistan’s Chaman to SpeenBoldak. Additionally, the Five Nations Railway Corridor (FNRC) is another project under BRI which runs through China, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Iran, connecting China with the Iranian ports of Chabahar and Bandar Abbas. 70. “Afghan War,” Encyclopedia Britannica. http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/turabian/turabian- notes-and-bibliography-citation-quick-guide.html 71. David C. George, “Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Causes and Future Options,” Air War College (1986): 1, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a178357.pdf 72. “Russia and Afghanistan,” Institute for the study of war, February 5, 2018. http://www.understandingwar.org/russia-and-afghanistan

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73. “Central Treaty Organisation,” Encyclopedia Iranica. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/central-treaty- organization-cento-a-mutual-defense-and-economic- cooperation-pact-among-persia-turkey-and-pakistan-wi 74. Russia and Afghanistan, Institute for the study of war, February 5, 2018. 75. “Pakistan Shares Russian Concern over Daesh Presence in Afghanistan,” Pakistan Today, February 20, 2018. https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/02/20/pakistan- shares-russias-concern-over-daesh-presence-in- afghanistan-says-asif/ 76. “163 Rebels Dead in Weeks of Helmand Operation,” Pajhwok Afghan News, November 5, 2017. http://archive.pajhwok.com/en/2017/11/05/163-rebels- dead-weeks-helmand-operation 77. “Islamic State-Taliban Clash in Afghanistan Dozens Killed,” Business Insider, April 26, 2017. http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-islamic-state-taliban- clash-in-afghanistan-dozens-killed-2017-4 78. Kashif Hussain, “Russia-Pakistan Strategic Convergence: Countering Daesh in Afghanistan,” South Asian Voices, April 11, 2018. https://southasianvoices.org/russia- pakistan-strategic-convergence-daesh/ 79. Reid Standish, “China and Russia.” 80. Raza Khan, “Russia’s CPEC Dream is Pakistan’s Dilemma,” Express Tribune, September 6, 2017. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1498597/russias-cpec-dream- pakistans-dilemma/ 81. Hussain Nadim, “Neither Friend nor Foe: Pakistan, the United States and the war in Afghanistan,” Lowy Institute (2017). https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/neither-friend- nor-foe-pakistan-united-states-and-war-afghanistan 82. Ibid. 83. Ibid. 84. Ibid. 85. Ibid. 86. Mushahid Hussian, “Trump’s Afghanistan Policy: the View from Islamabad,” CNN, August 23, 2017.

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https://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/22/opinions/pakistan- view-on-trump-afghan-hussain-opinion/index.html 87. Ibid. 88. Ibid. 89. “US Security Assistance to Pakistan Declines to 73%, Dawn,” August 23, 2016. https://www.dawn.com/news/1279382 90. Ankit Panda, “US won’t Subsidies Pakistan’s Purchase of F-16 Fighter Jets,” The Diplomat, May 4, 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/us-wont-subsidize- pakistans-purchase-of-f-16-fighter-jets/ 91. “US military Aid to Pakistan to have $125m Cut,” The News, May 26, 2017. https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/206723-US-military- aid-to-Pakistan-to-have-125m-cut 92. Iqbal, “America.” 93. Alex Vatanka, Iran and Pakistan. 94. Hussain, “The China Pakistan,” 20. 95. Ibid. 96. Ibid.

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BOOK REVIEW

Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments: US Crisis Management in South Asia Moeed Yusuf Stanford University Press, 2018 PP 320

Following the end of bi-polarity, nuclear weapons have become an important part of the foreign and security policies of not only South Asia but also the Middle East and East Asia. In the second nuclear age, a strategic environment characterised by a multipolar nuclear order, the prevention of nuclear war no longer depends on the security calculations of the two super powers. The emergence of the second nuclear age implies that the only way to handle regional nuclear crises would require a new strategic framework and also the political means to deal with regional rivalries. Moeed Yusuf’s theory of brokered bargaining offers both an innovative framework and within a analysis of the important role played by a third party mediator with enough political influence to avert nuclear war in South Asia.

In “Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments,” Moeed Yusuf, Associate Vice President of the Asia Centre at the US Institute of Peace critically examines the South Asian nuclear rivalry in the context of a unipolar world. According to Yusuf, third party mediation, led principally by the United States, has played an important role in managing three South Asian crises after May 1998. Yusuf’s book is an effort to explain how the three-way interaction between India Pakistan and the United States unfolded during the Kargil Crisis, the 2001-2002 Military Standoff and the Mumbai Crisis between India and Pakistan. Yusuf contends that the dynamic of brokered bargaining by the United States

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Book Review was as much a consequence of the United States’ “sensitivities” to escalation risks as it was to India and Pakistan’s sensitivities to “third party preferences given its power to tilt the crisis decisively against them.” In doing so he also highlights that this three way dynamic involved signalling to multiple audiences and hence introduced elements of misperception and inadvertence.

According to Yusuf, traditional deterrence frameworks evolved during the Cold War are inadequate to understand regional nuclear rivalries whether in South Asia or elsewhere.The emergence of the second nuclear age has indeed resulted in a strategic environment, which cannot be understood using the traditional deterrence models. In South Asia for example the US has played a decisive role in diffusing several crisis situations, hence the need to understand “crisis behaviour centered on third party mediation.” Although third party roles remained important during the Cold War also, Yusuf argues that the role played by third parties was “ in the context of formal alliance politics” and “did not take away from the overbearing reality of the superpower rivalry defining the bipolar global order.” Highlighting the role of third party mediators in the regional context, Yusuf outlines the reasons that shape a third party’s outlook on regional crises. He argues that the choices that the third party makes rest on the condition of “regional nuclearisation” on the one hand and global uni-polarity on the other.

Yusuf then goes on to examine the outcome of three Indo-Pakistan crises using the brokered bargaining model to draw out both differences and similarities between the three situations. Using the trilateral model Yusuf highlights how Delhi, Islamabad and Washington DC, each used signaling in order to influence the other two players and their respective policies. Yusuf

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Journal of Strategic Affairs concludes that the US played an essential role in diffusing the Kargil conflict by throwing its weight behind India vis-à-vis Pakistan even as it sought “India’s assurance that it would not expand the conflict outside the Kargil theater.”

According to Yusuf, the so called Twin Peaks Crisis of 2001-2002 once again saw the importance of third party mediation in helping avert conflict in South Asia. Despite the US’ heavy commitments in Afghanistan, decision makers in Washington DC supported US involvement in South Asia to end the crisis. On their part, both India and Pakistan ultimately “wanted the United States to act as a separator” leading to a situation where “India was urged to show restraint and Pakistan was pushed to deliver” on the pledges that it had previously made. The US also played an important role as “a conduit for information sharing” between India and Pakistan as leadership in both countries failed to communicate directly.

Yusuf argues that the Mumbai Crisis was different than its predecessors in that India decided to “collate all the information, piece together the picture and then act” rather than taking swift action against Pakistan. It chose instead to use “aggressive and threatening rhetoric “ to convince Pakistan to make concessions. In this situation to the United States played a crucial role in the context of information sharing between the two countries and helped prevent a crisis that otherwise had the potential to spiral out of control.

Despite the strong arguments made in favour of third party mediation and the successful role it has played in managing conflict in South Asia, Yusuf’s assertion that the brokered bargaining model can offer lessons for crises between potential rivals in the Middle East, on the

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Korean Peninsula or between China and India is perhaps too simplistic. The role of the third party mediator depends on several factors, which are unique to every crisis and Yusuf himself identifies these differences in comparing the three conflicts in South Asia. These factors include but are not limited to the roles and attitudes of the individual leaders, the regional and global environment and also the time frames within which a crisis matures. All these factors together create a unique dynamic every time a crisis occurs and a mediator may or may not be able to deal effectively with crises in different settings.

However this does not mean that Yusuf’s theory of brokered bargaining isn’t without merit. Third party mediation has assumed an important role in managing regional nuclear conflict and will remain relevant in the future also. The requirements for deterrence in the regional context have become more complex not only because deterrence relationships have multiplied but more so because they are more interdependent and interlinked. As such, the decision-making and policies in one relationship will invariably impact other relationships. Yusuf’s book provides sufficient food for thought for policy makers to envision how future conflicts in South Asia or other regions may unfold. It also cautions the reader however that brokered bargaining remains fraught with risk. In a real crisis regional rivals and third party mediators could easily create greater confusion and instability in the absence of a clear understanding of crisis behavior or proper tools to ensure peaceful outcomes.

Amina Afzal

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