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Exemplary Paternalism: a Consideration of Confucian Models of Moral Oversight

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Exemplary Paternalism: a Consideration of Confucian Models of Moral Oversight Culture and Dialogue 8 (2020) 220-250 brill.com/cad Exemplary Paternalism: A Consideration of Confucian Models of Moral Oversight Sarah Flavel School of Humanities, Bath Spa University, Bath, UK [email protected] Brad Hall King’s College London, University of London, London, UK [email protected] Abstract In this article we examine Classical Confucian political thinking through the lens of paternalism. We situate Confucianism amid contemporary models of paternalism to show that Confucianism can be understood as a soft form of paternalism regarding its method. Confucianism stresses cultivation of the people by moral exemplars to guide the people to act in ways that are in their own best interests. This is in contrast to use of law and punishment as a deterrent of unwanted behaviours of the people. We demon- strate that Confucian paternalism does not advocate for a static top-down structure of governance that is incapable of reform, underscoring its non-authoritarian ideal. We do this by stressing the vital upward momentum constituted in general cultivation of the wider population utilizing li (rituals). The picture that emerges from an examina- tion of Confucian political thought through the lens of paternalism is what we name “exemplary paternalism.” Keywords paternalism – Confucian political philosophy – political paternalism – Confucian politics – exemplary paternalism © Sarah Flavel, Brad Hall, 2020 | doi:10.1163/24683949-12340085 This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0Downloaded license. from Brill.com09/24/2021 09:42:51PM via free access Exemplary Paternalism 221 1 Introduction In this article, we consider how examining Classical Confucian political think- ing through the lens of paternalism can offer valuable interpretive and com- parative insights into the nature of Confucian philosophy. Further, we aim to show how such consideration of early Confucian thinking can contribute to general discourse on paternalism. This exploration is especially useful be- cause, we would suggest, the underlying principles of paternalist thinking can be identified as a common thread across most of the dominant Classical schools of Chinese political thinking.1 Confucianism as a school of thought spans over two thousand years and has undergone many transformations. In what follows, we use the term “Confucianism” to refer mainly to the philosophy of The Analects of Kongzi (Confucius). To a lesser extent we also draw on the writings of two other im- portant early Confucian thinkers, Mengzi and Xunzi, to support our reading. By doing this we do not mean to suggest that there are not important differ- ences and disagreements between these figures. Where relevant, we highlight these. Further, in the following we limit our focus to the early Confucian ideal image of political arrangements and societal structures rather than the more pragmatic, and often less utopic, theories for application given in certain Confucian thinkers. We do not mean, with our assessment, to suggest that this ideal form has been fully exhibited in any particular concrete historical periods of supposedly Confucian social or political structures.2 Gerald Dworkin defines paternalism as “the interference of a state or an individual with another person, against their will, … defended or motivat- ed by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or protected from harm.”3 Paternalism is unpopular in contemporary discourse, often being identified as the hallmark of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Any sign of pater- nalist activities being undertaken by a government therefore tend to lead to 1 This present work follows on from our previous research into the “maternalist” principles un- derlying the Daodejing (a classical Chinese foundational text of the school of thought known as Daoism): Sarah Flavel and Brad Hall, “State Maternalism: Rethinking Anarchist Readings of the Daodejing,” Dao 19, no. 3 (2020): 353-369. 2 Joseph Chan provides an excellent discussion regarding these different currents of thinking in Confucianism and how the two interact; Joseph Chan, Confucian Perfectionism: A Political Philosophy for Modern Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2014), 1-23. 3 Gerald Dworkin, “Paternalism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edi- tion), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/paternalism/ (accessed August 31st, 2020). Culture and Dialogue 8 (2020) 220-250 Downloaded from Brill.com09/24/2021 09:42:51PM via free access 222 Flavel and Hall derogatory claims that they are movements towards a “nanny state” or worse. Referring to the association of paternalism with authoritarian regimes, Sarah Conly aptly explains that: “Even if we remind ourselves that paternalistic mea- sures must, by definition, be beneficent in intent, which the Nazis and Khmere Rouge obviously were not, it is not much of a comfort.”4 In fact, many would regard the development of human rights and associ- ated individual freedoms as a long-fought victory over paternalism.5 The birth of the notion of the rational individual capable of reasoning and thinking for themselves brought with it a distrust of authority. Due to the unpopularity of paternalism, the term is not often understood to be a useful diagnostic con- cept, let alone framed as a positive political and social theory to be supported and implemented. As Michael Barnett notes, “more often than not, it [pater- nalism] is hurled as an accusation and allegation.”6 However, directly equating paternalism with authoritarianism is both ab- stractly and concretely inaccurate. Paternalist models of social control argu- ably inform the activity and legislation of all modern states in both the Western and Asian contexts. As Christopher Wolfe argues: Paternalism, from one point of view, is simply unavoidable. It would be an illusion to believe that the form and content of the law – all law, in liberal regimes as well as others – do not have a powerful influence on the lives of many human beings, subtly shaping their attitudes about what a good human life is.7 Generally speaking, paternalism is a characteristic function of the legal sys- tem where we benefit from a wide variety of laws designed to protect us from our own potentially harmful behaviors. Paternalist mechanisms can be seen in laws that instruct people to wear seatbelts in cars whether they want to or not, in those that compel parents to take their children to school, and those that prohibit people from carrying guns just because they would like to do so. It can also be seen in more indirect forms in the raising of taxes and prices on harm- ful products such as cigarettes to deter people from buying them. It can also of course be seen outside of the legal system in anti-tobacco and anti-drink 4 Sarah Conly, Against Autonomy: Justifying Coercive Paternalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013), 24. 5 Michael N. Barnett, “Introduction,” in Paternalism Beyond Borders, ed. Michael N. Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 7. 6 Barnett, “Introduction,” 5. 7 Christopher Wolfe, “Liberalism and Paternalism: A Critique of Ronald Dworkin,” The Review of Politics 56, no. 4 (Fall 1994): 639. Culture and DialogueDownloaded from8 (2020) Brill.com09/24/2021 220-250 09:42:51PM via free access Exemplary Paternalism 223 driving advertising campaigns funded by the government that seek to influ- ence people’s perspectives and thereby inform their behaviors. All these pater- nalist practices are common and even subject to wide approval by populations in modern liberal democracies. To suggest that Western governments are sub- stantively non-paternalist is descriptively inaccurate. Various recent historical events in the West underscore further need for a reappraisal of views on paternalism and its role in legitimate governance. Populist movements in the election of Donald Trump and the UK vote on Brexit have increasingly underscored the dangers of trusting direct democratic mechanisms in deciding what is in the best interests of a nation. These events show how easy it is for public opinion to drastically veer away from the insights provided by those with relevant expertise in, for example, economic projec- tion. Globally, the outbreak of Covid-19 has also brought to the foreground the benefits of paternalist tools in relation to those governments who enforced harsher lockdowns earlier upon their citizens and seemingly appear to have had better outcomes in response to the crisis, at least in terms of controlling the virus itself to date. Overall, such phenomena lead us to re-think whether Eamon de Velera might have been right (at least in spirit) in his famous but controversial paternalist claim that: “The majority have no right to do wrong.”8 Paternalism, as an approach to governance, has two closely related under- lying principles. Firstly, that if people are left to their own devices, they have tendencies not to know what is in their own best interests and are therefore not likely to act in their own best interests. Secondly, that the state, if properly organized, can be in a better position to know what is in the best interest of the people and to make certain decisions on their behalf. Classical Confucian po- litical philosophy holds to both underlying principles of paternalism, making paternalism an apt term to use when discussing Confucian ideas of political governance. We are not the first to apply paternalism to Confucian thinking. However, in existing scholarship there has been a lack of attention paid to the variety of definitions and models of paternalism in contemporary literature and how these relate to the Confucian model. Such oversight can serve to con- ceal the unique positive elements of Confucian philosophy and particularly those that can enhance Western discourse on paternalism. Further, it can lead to the negative connotations of paternalist systems of oversight being trans- posed onto our understanding of Confucianism, and in so doing, support an authoritarian reading.
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