Creational Aesthetics & The Challenge of Conceptual Art

by Steven Félix-Jäger

A trend in theological aesthetics is to advocate for a “creational aesthetic” when discussing the ontology and calling of the artist. In its essential form, a creational aesthetic affirms that artists honor the Creator God by creating art. In some way artists are functioning as

God’s image when they make art. While this view is popular in the Christian engagement of the arts, it is uncertain if such an observation is the preeminent way of understanding the role of the artist. Can one be considered an artist if he or she is removed from the tactile process of making? In the contemporary artworld, the role of the artist in visual art has come into question with a stronger emphasis on conceptuality over against construction. Is the conceptual art movement of the 1960s, which has influenced so much of contemporary art, at odds with a creational aesthetic?

I would like to address this issue first by outlining a sketch of what I have come to call

“creational aesthetics.” I will draw on the work of L. Clifton Edwards to show that the Christian narrative of creation is an integral feature of theological aesthetics. I will then engage the work of Donald Brook and artists Henry Flint and Sol LeWitt to discuss the nature of conceptual art.

Finally, I will return to the preliminary question concerning conceptualism’s apparent tension with creational aesthetics, and argue for an alternate way of understanding creation that makes room for conceptuality in art. My main dialogue partners in this section are theologians Jeremy

Begbie and James Watkins. My thesis is that conceptual art can be incorporated into a more robust creational aesthetic that emphasizes the incarnation and redemption. Steven Félix-Jäger 2

Creational Aesthetics

L. Clifton Edwards argues for a creational theology that allows us to grasp beauty and natural revelation as authoritative sources for theological reflection.1 Edwards contends that our knowledge of God is creationally mediated in the created world.2 We are creatures living in a material world, and this world is the arena in which God was ultimately made known in Jesus

Christ. While Edwards admits that our experience of God is a “created subjectivity,” creation itself confines our knowledge of God while concurrently making it possible.3 Because creation is aesthetically rich and mediates a new understanding of God,4 we can know God in fresh and profound ways. This occurs by reflecting on the world’s beauty, which echoes the beauty of its

Creator. Such enrichment comes from nuanced contemplation of the Creator’s handiwork, and leads one to further explore the implications that surround the doctrine of creation. Herein lies the task of what I am calling a creational aesthetic – the drawing out of principles that concern sense perceptions and the arts in relation to the doctrine of creation.

Perhaps one of the clearest articulations of a creational aesthetic was put forth by

Abraham Kuyper in his book Wisdom & Wonder when he wrote, “God creates in reality, people create in semblance. God created the living person in the individual of Adam, the artist creates the human image out of marble.”5 Kuyper saw human creativity as an outworking of the imago dei, and since God is the Creator, humans too can create as a fulfillment of their divine purpose.

However, since God is the only one who creates ex nihilo, humans create from an already existing created substance. Francis Schaeffer writes, “God, because he is infinite, can create out of nothing by his spoken word. We, because we are finite, must create from something else that

Steven Félix-Jäger 3 has already been created.”6 In a creational aesthetic, then, we must understand human creativity as a creaturely act, and as a gift from God.7

The underlying theme that “we create because God creates” is found consistently in a creational aesthetic. Watkins writes, “The desire to pattern one’s creativity after God’s creativity may actually be an attempt to participate in the creative work God is doing in the world.”8 The role of the artist may be more complex than mere imitation, but at the end of the day, the creative acts of a creature reflect those of the first Creator. So if contemplation of the created order leads to a greater understanding of God, and if creation as reproduction allows us to participate in our calling as image-bearers, then what do we make of those artworks that are neither aesthetic nor made? Is it simply the case that such conceptual art is in fact not art, and that those conceptual artists are theorists rather than artists? Avant-garde art, which values concept over percept, seems to have put creational aesthetics at a crossroads: Either one must deem conceptual art as not compatible with creational aesthetics, or one must broaden his or her understanding of creation so as to make room for conceptualism. Before exploring this issue, however, we must take a closer look at the challenge of conceptual art.

The Challenge of Conceptual Art

As a contrast to the creational propensity towards the physical object, conceptualism claims that art is not indebted to artifactuality, but only to ideas. Donald Brook attempts to explain the meaning of “conceptual art” by distinguishing some defining principles. First, conceptual art is “sensory mode indifferent.” By this Brook means that the concept takes precedence over the percept.9 A percept refers to an object that is perceived, and since aesthetics is a philosophy that deals with perception, conceptualism is an anti-aesthetic form of art.

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Another defining principle is that conceptual art is “sensory mode independent.” By this Brook means that conceptual art is an art of ideas rather than an art of physical objects.10 So conceptual art is indifferent to the senses as it is anti-aesthetic, but is also independent of the senses as it upholds the idea whether or not there is a physical manifestation of it. Finally, conceptual art is a restricted meta-activity.11 This is an essential quality of conceptual art because it properly appreciates the fact that conceptual art comments on the notion of art itself.12 Conceptual art thus carries the mantel of suspicion that grew from the mid-modern meta-discourse concerning the nature and reception of art.13

The conceptual art movement of the 1960s finds its roots in Marcel Duchamp’s concept of the “readymade.” Duchamp famously submitted a urinal as a readymade work of art entitled

Fountain to the first exhibition of the American Society of Independent Artists in 1917.14

Duchamp submitted it under the pseudonym “R. MUTT,” in order to conceal his identity so as not to affect the piece’s deliberation. Ultimately Fountain was rejected, as the jury could not find aesthetic value in the work.15 Nevertheless, Fountain has prevailed as a pivotal example of the extent of art in the modern era. In fact, Duchamp was able to radically redefine what is meant when speaking about art. Under Duchamp art no longer needs to exhibit aesthetic value.

Duchamp said as much writing, “A point which I want very much to establish is that the choice of these ‘ready-mades’ was never dictated by esthetic [sic] delectation.”16 Duchamp’s agenda was one of destruction by picking apart the concept of art.

The first casualty was the idea that art had to require aesthetic value. Duchamp sought to see the word “art” as descriptive rather than evaluative. Art can be good or bad, but the status of a thing’s arthood is not contingent on its aesthetical value.17 He preferred the term “art coefficient” to describe art in its raw state, before its value is assessed.18 A readymade is a work

Steven Félix-Jäger 5 of art devoid of aesthetic features, but is nevertheless art as a conceptual object. Urinals are not artworks, but Fountain is. The distinction lies in the appropriation of the object. The distinction is conceptual and intrinsic, not physical and extrinsic. The meaning of the object has changed when it was contemplated as art at an institution of art. When an object’s meaning is changed, the object’s ontology has changed from a piece of plumbing to a work of art.

The idea of the readymade caused conceptual artist Joseph Kosuth to make the provocative statement, “All art (after Duchamp) is conceptual (in nature) because art only exists conceptually.”19 Kosuth claimed that readymades changed the nature of art from a question of morphology to a question of function.20 The change from “appearance” to “conception” marked the start of modern art and the conceptual art movement.21

American artist Henry Flynt is commonly associated with the conceptual art movement of the 1960s. This is in part due to his influential 1961 essay entitled “Essay: Concept Art.” In this essay Flynt defines “concept art” as “an art of which the material is ‘concepts,’ as the material for ex. music is sound.”22 Concept art, for Flynt, supersedes the visual sense arena, and can rather embody any form. It is not the artifactuality of concept art that distinguishes it as such, but rather the idea itself.23 Likewise conceptual art is a cerebral endeavor, and visual artifacts are unnecessary, while common, aftereffects. The difference between Flynt’s notion of concept art and conceptual art as a movement is that concept art focuses on the “artist as thinker,” whereas conceptual art is art that explores concepts over and against the object. The general exploration of the concept is the crux of conceptual art. Nevertheless, what is essential to both is the internal idea.

One cannot help but wonder why artists like Flynt choose vocations in the visual arts.

Perhaps this is because he is first and foremost a philosopher who lets his ideas dictate how they

Steven Félix-Jäger 6 will be expressed, whether visually, audibly, or otherwise. This seems to be the true method of conceptual art, to begin with the concept, but then to allow the concept the freedom of expression. The concept indeed is the art, but it can be expressed in any way, and by any means.

The best conceptual art happens as a result of accurately conveyed ideas.

One of the most successful artists from the conceptual art movement was American artist

Sol LeWitt. Part of LeWitt’s fame came from producing over 1200 wall paintings. The paintings are abstract pieces that usually consist of lines, basic colors, and simplified shapes.

What set LeWitt apart was his radical view of the artist. As conceptualism gives precedence to the idea over the artifact, LeWitt followed this process and applied it to the role of the artist.

LeWitt did not physically create these wall paintings, but rather had other artists, trained assistance, or novice volunteers carry out the linear systems that he designed beforehand.24

LeWitt saw himself like a composer who wrote the score that musicians would play. This score can be played for many years to come. The score is the concept, which is constant, and the wall drawings are like the mutable performances.25

LeWitt discusses conceptual art and the role of the artist in his influential 1967 paper entitled, “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art.” As the idea takes precedence over the artifact, LeWitt sees the idea as becoming a “machine” that produces work. The planning and decisions come beforehand, and the execution is “a perfunctory affair.”26 The artist’s task is to generate something that is mentally stimulating to the spectator, yet is free from a dependence on skill as a craftsman.27 For LeWitt, art is the concept, but if the artist carries his or her idea through and makes it into a physical form, then every step of the art-making process is significant. The concept is art regardless if it is made or not, but if it is made, then the process becomes part of the piece’s substance.28 Thus the idea is as much part of the process as the finished product.

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LeWitt is clear to point out, however, that conceptual art is merely one way to make art, and there are other viable options for art-making.29

The conceptual art movement changed the way we look at art and the artist ontologically, and ultimately redefined what is meant by “creation” in a postmodern era. Duchamp set the artworld ablaze with the idea that an object becomes a work of art when it is appropriated as such. This leads to the distinction between concept and percept, emphasizing that the idea is the actual work of art. Furthermore, the artist is the planner or director of the art, regardless if the art

(concept) sees a physical manifestation or not. If this were the sole mode of art, then conceptual art would in fact challenge a creational aesthetic. Conceptual art would be too restrictive as it does not account for, or acknowledge, the necessity of physical creation. The doctrine of creation begins with matter being created ex nihilo, but conceptual art sees true creativity happening in the preceding state of concept. But the “challenge” of conceptual art is a façade, since one of its founding artists, LeWitt, candidly acknowledged that conceptual art was just one legitimate mode for making art in the midst of other valid approaches. If conceptual art claimed to be the sole approach of art-making, then it would be antithetical to some creational principles, but it does not. Conceptual art forced the modern mind to expand the way he or she thinks about art in general. In the same way a creational aesthetic must be broadened in order to account for the notions advanced by the conceptual art movement. One does not need to reject conceptual art in the face of a creational aesthetics, but rather one must adopt a more robust theology of creation that can account for the creativity of the concept.

Towards a Robust Theology of Creation

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To view creation holistically, one cannot stop at creation ex nihilo.30 To do so would be to ignore the creative work that God continues to do in the world. It is this deistic idea that creates the false dilemma of either corporeality or conceptuality. Although matter was brought into existence in the beginning, God continues creating in different ways after the initial act of creation. The incarnation and redemption are creational acts. Both work towards re-creating what has been broken. It is a sort of creation that, when given attention to, can broaden our understanding of creation as a doctrine. For Dorothy Sayers, an artist participates in creation ex nihilo when he or she externalizes an idea.31 The artist’s “creation” is not a product of the matter, or simply a rearranging of it, but is rather the act of bringing something forth from the creative imagination.32 Thus Sayers sees conceptualism as part of the creative act, but in order to do so, Sayers broadened the concept of creation ex nihilo to include the imagination. In a similar way, we must adopt a more robust theology of creation in order to subsume conceptualism.

Jeremy Begbie asserts that the metaphor of “Christ as mediator of the cosmos” allows one to better comprehend the ontology and work of the triune God, and by extension the nature of the created world, and human creativity.33 Begbie frames a robust doctrine of creation that not only honors the themes of God as the originator of all things, but also shows God as mediator, in that God is involved throughout the world’s history. Creation is not separated from the incarnation, but rather they are linked.34 Eschatology is also not separated from creation but also tied to God’s work through the incarnate Christ.35 When looking at creation theologically,

Christ’s mediation is resolute and cannot be avoided.

Begbie draws out from the “Christ as mediator” metaphor what human creativity in

Christ should look like. For Begbie, humans are called to be “priests of creation” articulating

God’s good work.36 As God draws all things back to God’s self through Christ, it is our task to

Steven Félix-Jäger 9 share in God’s creative purposes. Our creativity will echo, and function within, God’s creation as we respect, develop, and redeem God’s creation in a communion with each other and the triune God.

Like Begbie, James Watkins also begins with creation, claiming that creation and the incarnation are inseparable as biblical motifs,37 so a robust doctrine of creation will include thoughts on redemption. As such, Watkins grasps onto the root metaphor of incarnation as a redemptive act but prefers the “sacrificial offering model” for theological reflection on creativity.38 In this model, the artist should respect the materials, traditions, and communities of which he or she creates.39 This is because the artist is acutely aware that his or her creation is as an extension of God’s foundational creation. Christ as mediator anticipates a creaturely response in the process of creation.40 Redemption is thus present at the core of creation as the act of creation was always intended to be a sort of collaboration with the created order. Through redemption, Christ identifies with his creation, and requires a response from the world in order to bring God’s work to completion.41 This is an invitation to participate and collaborate with Christ in his eschatological efforts. In this way we are not only trying to create as God creates, but also to create with God as creation is being redeemed. Watkins’ model, therefore, helps us align a creational approach to the human aspect of creativity, arguing that it was God’s intention to draw out creativity from God’s own creation.

So when a creational aesthetic is rooted in a robust doctrine of creation, there are implications of the incarnation as Christ is the redeemer of creation, and of eschatology as Christ comes again as the re-creator of the cosmos. The artist’s role in a creational aesthetic is multifaceted as well. While there is a sense that humans participate in the image of God as they create,42 the more mature work of Begbie and Watkins view artists as “priests of creation,” and

Steven Félix-Jäger 10 collaborators of creativity. The incarnation sees God’s logos becoming sarx, which is the enfleshment of a concept. But God was still God prior to the incarnation, and in a similar way art is still art even when it is a concept. Brand and Chaplin read Paul’s passage about the incarnation of Christ (Col. 1:15-20) as involving conceptuality writing, “…the invisible things include the whole realm of ideas and imagination, emotions, instincts, memory, sensitivity, intuition and the ability to dream and fantasise [sic]. These things also were made by the Creator and pronounced good.”43 If God created all things, then God also created the cognitive, imaginative, and conceptual faculties of the human mind. Ignoring either material or concept in creation will lead to some Christian heterodoxy. One will be lead to adopt materialism or

Gnosticism, both of which work against the belief of a robust dichotomistic creation.

Conceptual art does not require artifactuality, and creating art by virtue of concept is still creational. Christian artists should view the challenge of conceptual art not as a challenge to their artwork and practice, but rather to their theology of creation. This challenge should be welcomed, however, as it can help Christians define a deeper and more robust theology of art.

Conceptuality is central to the contemporary artworld, and if Christians want to engage the broader artworld in meaningful ways, then they must learn how to dialogue regarding the ostensibly difficult concerns raised by today’s artists and theorists. If we as Christians are up for the challenge, I think this sort of engagement will strengthen our art and cultural engagement.

1 L. Clifton Edwards, “Artful Creation and Aesthetic Rationality: Toward a Creational Theology of Revelatory Beauty,” Theology Today, Vol. 69, No. 1 (2012), 57.

2 Edwards, “Artful Creation,” 57.

3 Edwards, “Artful Creation,” 59.

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4 Edwards, “Artful Creation,” 57.

5 Abraham Kuyper, Wisdom & Wonder: Common Grace in Science & Art (Grand Rapids: Christian’s Library Press, 2011), 155.

6 Francis Schaeffer, Art and the Bible (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1973), 52-53.

7 Hilary Brand and Adrienne Chaplin, Art & Soul: Signposts for Christians in the Arts, 2nd Ed. (Downers Grove, InterVarsity Press, 2001), 44.

8 Watkins, 103.

9 Donald Brook, “Toward a Definition of Conceptual Art,” Leonardo, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1972), 49.

10 Brook, “Toward a Definition of Conceptual Art,” 49.

11 Brook, “Toward a Definition of Conceptual Art,” 50. By “meta-activity,” Brook means that it is art about art, which deals with the ontological question of the nature of art.

12 Brook, “Toward a Definition of Conceptual Art,” 50.

13 Edward Shanken, “Art in the Information Age: Technology and Conceptual Art,” Leonardo, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2002), 433.

14 Dalia Judovitz, Unpacking Duchamp: Art in Transit (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 124.

15 Judovitz, Unpacking Duchamp, 124.

16 Marcel Duchamp, “Apropos of Readymades” (1961), in Salt Seller: The Writings of Marcel Duchamp, Eds., Michel Sanouillet and Elmer Peterson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 142.

17 Marcel Duchamp, “The Creative Act” (1957), in Robert Lebel, Marcel Duchamp (New York: Paragraphic Books, 1959), 77. George Dickie expands on the differences between the classificatory and evaluative senses of art in his institutional theory of art. See Dickie, Art and Value (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2001)

18 Duchamp, “The Creative Act,” 972.

19 Jospeh Kosuth, “Art After Philosophy” (1969), in Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology, Eds. Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 169.

20 Kosuth, “Art After Philosophy,” 169.

21 Kosuth, “Art After Philosophy," 169.

22 Henry Flynt, “Essay: Concept Art” (1961), in Kristine Stiles and Peter Selz, Eds., Theories and Documents of Contemporary Art: A Sourcebook of Artists’ Writings, 2nd Ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 974.

23 Flynt, “Essay: Concept Art,” 974.

24 “Focus: Sol LeWitt,” MoMA, http://www.moma.org/visit/calendar/exhibitions/305 (accessed, 4/24/15).

25 “Focus: Sol LeWitt.”

26 Sol LeWitt, “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art,” Artforum, Vol. 5, No. 10 (1967), 79-83.

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27 Sol LeWitt, “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art,” 79.

28 Sol LeWitt, “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art,” 82.

29 Sol LeWitt, “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art,” 83.

30 Watkins, 34.

31 Sayers, 29.

32 Sayers, 29.

33 Jeremy Begbie, Voicing Creations Praise: Towards a Theology of the Arts (London: T & T Clark, 2000), 170.

34 Begbie, Voicing Creations Praise, 175.

35 Begbie, Voicing Creations Praise, 176.

36 Begbie, Voicing Creations Praise, 177.

37 James Watkins, Creativity as Sacrifice: Toward a Theological Model for Creativity in the Arts (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 71.

38 Watkins, Creativity as Sacrifice, 135.

39 Watkins, Creativity as Sacrifice, 136.

40 Watkins, Creativity as Sacrifice, 140.

41 Watkins, Creativity as Sacrifice, 143.

42 Watkins, 68.

43 Brand and Chaplin, 41.