Is Cultural-Historical Activity Theory … • Ines Langemeyer & Wolff-Michael Roth 20

Ines Langemeyer & Wolff-Michael Roth1 Is Cultural-Historical Activity Theory Threatened to Fall ShortofitsOwnPrinciples and Possibilities as a DialecticalSocialScience?

1 Introduction to change today, in which direction will CHAT In recent years, many researchers engaged be heading? Will it continue to be one of those in diverse areas and approaches of “cultural- projects “unique for its practical, political, historical activity theory” (CHAT)2 realized and civic engagement” committed “to ideals an increasing international interest in Lev S. of social justice, equality, and social change” Vygotsky’s, A. N. Leont’ev’s, and A. Luria’s as it was in the beginning (Stetsenko & Ari- work and its continuations. Not so long ago, evitch, 2004, p. 58)? Although a positive fu- Yrjö Engeström (1993) noted that the activity ture of CHAT seems to lie ahead, we consider approach was still “the best-held secret of aca- in this article some of the problematics that demia” (p. 64) and highlighted the “impressive may challenge all those who want to pass the dimension of theorizing behind” it. Certainly, “impressive dimensions of theorizing” from this remark reflects a time when CHAT was off “insider” circles to a larger audience and from the beaten tracks. But if this situation begins one generation to another as well as encourage newcomers to become part of this tradition through critical engagement in its theory and 1 The major part of this article is written by Ines Lange- meyer. Wolff-Michael Roth contributed mainly to the practice. A key to these engagements, we sug- outlineofdialecticsinHegel’sphilosophy. gest, is not only the comprehensive empirical 2 Thisterm(anditsabbreviation)hasemergedafew and philosophical basis, but also the role of years ago and tries to address simultaneously Vy- gotsky’s “cultural-historical school” and Leont’ev’s dialectics as both topic and method. There- “activity theory” to emphasize the continuous elabo- fore, the challenge for newcomers (as well as ration of the theoretical basis. However, the thesis of for “old-timers”) to take on the tradition of a continuous development is still contested and also todayapproacheswithinthistraditionhavenotbeen CHAT is not a small one indeed. We assume unified.Inthisarticle,wewillrefertothisneologism that a major reason for the increasing inter- to name the diversity of approaches that relate to the est in CHAT lies in its potential to provide a work of Vygotsky and his collaborators. We will also usethisabbreviationhere,butmoreforconvenience non-reductionist approach to human develop- and without any allusion. ment, which is due to its affinity to dialectics; Outlines • No. 2 • 2006 21 however, the close interrelation to a tradition WhatarePerspectivesof that reaches back to the theories of Georg W.F. Dialectical Thinking? What Hegel and Karl Marx, among others, is not the easiest to master. are Dialectical Concepts? In consideration of these difficulties, the To realize the capacity of the dialectical ap- purpose of this article is to investigate how proach, we first articulate how dialectical contemporary approaches within CHAT can concepts were developed and how dialectical continue to provide a dialectical framework to thinking proceeds. This philosophical back- preserve and renew the critical intention of this ground helps to understand CHAT’s con- tradition, and how we run the risk of losing ceptual roots and highlight its potential for this sting. Thereby, we sensitize researchers to critical research. We begin by acknowledging the problem of developing a cultural-histori- that we cannot deny, as Wolfgang Fritz Haug cal approach within a historical situation that argues, a fundamental problem of dialectical confronts us with new, unanswered questions. thinking is already inherent in each attempt In this light, we also problematize the use of to grasp the nature of dialectics: “It appears scientific language, for it may lead us tospeak almost impossible to speak about dialectics and argue un-dialectically when in fact we in- without speaking un-dialectically, and thus, tend or ought to think dialectically. as the dialectician Brecht warned, to transform This article seeks to convey insights and ‘the flux of the things itself into a static thing’ arguments of how we can relate our theoretical (6.1.48, Arbeitsjournal, Brecht 1993, 384)” approaches to a tradition of dialectical think- (Haug, 1996/2005, p. 241). ing and in what ways this is paramount for a In what follows, we do not claim (nor intend) critical engagement in theory and practice. In to do justice to the entire history of dialectics. the first part, we therefore discuss not only We merely seek to highlight in an exemplary some major theorems in Hegel’s and Marx’s way how and why dialectics are important work but also, and above all, Vygotsky’s way in Hegel’s and Marx’s philosophies and why of developing the cultural-historical approach this has nurtured critical ways of theorizing. of psychology. Second, we argue that the con- This provides a sufficient basis to explain how temporary, widely known version of CHAT, dialectical thinking has been at work in the related to Yrjö Engeström’s theoretical and development of Vygotsky’s thought. Finally, empirical work, neglects different aspects after dealing with these sources of dialectical of dialectical thinking and consequently nar- thinking, we summarize what characterizes rows its potential to a socio-critical approach different perspectives inherent in them in order to societal practice and human development. to develop a more general idea of dialectics.3 A crucial question of this scrutiny will be the notion of contradictions and how develop- Dialectics as a (Self-)Critical ment is supposed to be achieved. In general, Way of Thinking our intention is not only to clarify the role of The first insight we can extract from Hegel is dialectics as a method for activity theory but to grasp how and why he rejects a philosophi- also to problematize the role of the subjects of cal distinction of subject and object as separate research in CHAT and to confront ourselves with the problems of practicing and develop- ing a critical science in face of a complex and 3 Forreaderswhowanttogetabetterorientationin viewofthisdifficultmatter,wesuggesttobeginwith challenging societal world. thissectionsummaryandthenreturntothefollowing subchapters. Is Cultural-Historical Activity Theory … • Ines Langemeyer & Wolff-Michael Roth 22 entities in favor of the idea that both, in the it is “only then revealed for the first time in realm of consciousness, mutually constitute its actuality and truth” (p. 21 [§36]). Conse- each other. To this day, this radically ques- quently, everything we know is a product of tions those theories that take the independent this movement of thinking (thought). This can existence of the subject of an epistemological be critically reflected upon only by making the or practical activity4 and its object for granted, movement available to another movement of as stable “elements,” without any interest in thinking. Yet, the philosopher admits that “it is their interrelations, their histories, and their far harder to bring fixed thoughts into a fluid changes in different contexts. state than to do so with sensuous existence” We begin with Hegel’s reformulation of (Hegel, 1977, p. 20 [§33]). the problem of knowledge (of what we can Connected to this problem is the question know for sure or hold true) as a problem of where this movement of thinking comes from the self: in so doing, he described a movement and how it relates to our reality, which we seek of thinking (consciousness) that stands for a to comprehend. Hegel’s solution will become powerful notion of dialectics in relation to clearer as we explain the inner contradiction German Idealism. To theorize this movement, between subject and object. It may not satisfy Hegel starts with an undifferentiated subject us, however. of consciousness (“Geist,” translated by some As mentioned, Hegel argues that subject as “Spirit” by others as “Mind”). Conscious- and object are not independent entities but that ness, he argues, cannot remain subjective and they form a new unit. This new unit sublates as such identical with itself, because the notion (“hebt auf”)—i.e., overcomes, includes, tran- implies an object of consciousness, for con- scends, and destructs—the opposition between sciousness always is consciousness of some- the two, which is articulated (following Jo- thing. This object of consciousness is other hann G. Fichte and Friedrich W.J. Schelling) than the subject of consciousness, in fact, is as activity. This activity stands for the idea the negation of the subject and thus unfolds a that subject and object are mutually presup- specific movement: “Spirit becomes object be- posing and constitutive opposites that cannot cause it is just this movement of becoming an be thought independently and therefore are other to itself, i.e. becoming an object to itself, complementary but irreducible expressions and of suspending this otherness” (Hegel, of the same unit. But it is paramount that the 1807/1977, p. 21 [§36]). This becoming other unit does not result from a collation of the to itself, negating and thereby alienating itself, two—”since object and subject, etc. signify allows consciousness to evolve when it “re- what they are outside of their unity” (p. 23 turns to itself from this alienation,” because [§39])—but rather, it sublates their difference. Hegel terms it “an inner difference”—a differ- ence of the thing with itself, which leads to 4 In this sentence, the word “subject” indicates an indi- inner contradictions of the unit. Thus, contra- vidualoragroupofpeoplewhoact(s)intentionallyon somethinginacertainway;by“object”weaddressthat dictions are included into the very nature of thing which is transformed by that action. Thus, we al- thought (cf. Tolman, 2001). ready interpret the subject-object-relation as a theorem Such an inner contradiction now provides that stands for the societal relation mediating between realhumanbeingsandtheirrealsocialandnatural Hegel with a “mechanism” for movement environment. But in what follows on Hegel’s philoso- which explains why contradictions can in fact phy, subject and object are merely poles or extremes make a unit: “The movement of a being that within each movement of thinking. This difference is important to acknowledge before tranferring Hegel’s immediately is, consists partly in becoming an dialectics to “real” phenomena. other than itself, and thus becoming its own Outlines • No. 2 • 2006 23 immanent content; partly in taking back into that has to be rethought especially in view of itself this unfolding or this existence of it, i.e. the appalling dialectics of “instrumental rea- in making itself into a moment, and simplify- son” in the 20th century.5 Second, it has often ing itself into something determinate” (Hegel, been argued against Hegel that the bridge to 1977, p. 32 [§53]). This self-movement— overcome the difference between reality and brought about by the inner difference—gives thinking still remained wishful thinking. Let rise to self-differentiation, because conscious- us therefore take a look at Marx’s understand- ness, having turned a part of itself into the ing and use of dialectics that also has been object, discovers contradictions. Conscious- one important background for the mentioned ness resolves these contradictions by means of counter-arguments against Hegel. a process of sublation (“Aufhebung”), which Marx acknowledges Hegel’s method and his both deconstructs and overcomes a contradic- idea to comprehend “every form in the flux of tion in articulating new units of which the old movement” (MECW 35, p. 20). However, he contradictions are but moments and external also develops a fundamental critique of it and expressions. Here, the term moment means that rejects it for its “mystified form” (MECW 43, the units are identifiable structures in the new p. 31; cf. MECW 42, p. 544 and 40, p. 249). unit, but structures that cannot be thought in- For Marx, the problem is that “Hegel fell into dependently from each other—they therefore the illusion of conceiving the real as the pro- are not elements. The movement, as Hegel as- duct of thought concentrating itself, probing its sumed, could be observed not only in scientific own depths, and unfolding itself out of itself, thought but also in “common understanding by itself” (Marx, 1973, p. 101) and that [which], too, is a becoming, and, as this be- “empirical actuality is admitted just as it is and is coming, it is reasonableness” (p. 34 [§55]). also said to be rational; but not rational because of This strong belief in an epistemological as well its own reason, but because the empirical fact in as societal process in which reason constantly its empirical existence has a significance which is progresses essentially characterizes Hegel’s other than it itself. The fact, which is the starting philosophy as he conveys that not only a con- point, is not conceived to be such but rather to be clusion (“Schluss,” translated with regard to the mystical result. The actual becomes phenom- the philosophy of logic as “syllogism”) would enon, but the Idea has no other content than this phenomenon. Moreover, the idea has no other than be rational, but everything rational would be the logical aim, namely, ‘to become explicit as infi- a conclusion (cf. Science of Logic, Doctrine nite actual mind’.” (Marx, MECW 3, part 1) of the Notion, Subjectivity, ch. 3, §1437). Hegel’s insights to the movement of think- Marx warns us not to overestimate the power ing may lead us to a dialectical praxis of theo- of Hegel’s method, because in so doing, dia- rizing that challenges researchers not to con- lectics could be misinterpreted as a univer- geal the object in their thoughts by identifying sal law (as Engels did later, for example, cf. it with a single concept or by “fitting it into” MECW 24, p. 301). In contrast to this, Marx a predetermined category, but “to allow the seeks to transfer and employ it in a “critical phenomenon to speak as such” (Adorno, 2005, and revolutionary” way (MECW 35, p. 20). Aph. 46). It is important to mention two major counter-arguments against Hegel’s understand- 5 Cf. Horkheimer/Adorno (1947/2002): Dialectics of ing of dialectics. First, the assumption of a Enlightenment; cf. Adorno (1955/2005): “Dialectical historical progress by which society would reason [Vernunft:reason]is,againsttherulingone, unreason [Unvernunft]: only by carrying over and sub- become increasingly rational and reasonable latingthelatter,doesitbecomerational[vernünftig: has been criticized as a hope of Enlightenment reasonable, rational]” (Aph. 55). Is Cultural-Historical Activity Theory … • Ines Langemeyer & Wolff-Michael Roth 24 We clarify how this contributed to a self-criti- activity – and with it its societal basis and its cal way of thinking in this next step of our natural resources. brief outline of dialectical thinking. Against this ideological effect, dialectics be- An important dimension of Marx’s criti- come salient in Marx’s own theorizing to re- cal use of dialectics can be traced to his First construct reality from the standpoint of praxis Thesis on Feuerbach. Here, Marx develops and, in doing so, to study “the connection of one of his three major critiques (Haug, 2001),6 that which at first appears to be without con- the critique of the “form of the object” within nection, the connection at the point of origin of the non-dialectical and a-historical epistemic the phenomena which appear as disparate in the activity (“Erkenntnistätigkeit”): result” (Haug, 2005, p. 246; original emphasis eliminated). To avoid the “speculative dialec- The chief defect of all hitherto existing mate- tics” of Hegel, Marx emphasizes that in each rialism (including that of Feuerbach) is that the object [“Gegenstand”], reality, sensuousness, is case the limits of dialectics need to be deter- taken only in the form of the object ["Objekt"] mined and that the difference between the real or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human object and the epistemic object, between reality activity, praxis, not subjectively. Hence, in contra- and thinking, should not be neutralized (Marx, distinction to materialism, idealism developed its 1857/1973; MEW 42, p. 43). This may clarify active aspect, but only in abstract form, because, why Marx claimed that his version of dialectics of course, it does not know real, sensuous activity as such. (Marx, 1969, p. 533) is “not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite” (MECW 35, p. 19). As Haug (2001, pp. 92-94) explains, this cri- tique makes a simple but revolutionary turn Building on Dialectical Theorizing by posing the question of how reality comes The way towards a cultural-historical approach into the form of the object. Like Hegel, Marx to human development in Vygotsky’s work presupposes here the complementary unity of exemplifies how dialectical thinking became subject and object, but instead of searching for both an inherent topic of theorizing as well their progressive mutual relationship in a ratio- as a method to overcome the limits of given nal historical process that is allegedly reflected theoretical insights about consciousness. From in the movement of thinking, he acknowledges its very beginning Vygotsky’s collaborative the difference between the epistemic and the project rejects (a) any dualism between physi- real object and detects an ideological effect of ological and mental phenomena (and accord- any purely epistemic activity relating subject ingly between their materialistic/objective and and object: Within this movement of thinking, idealistic/subjective explanations) and (b) any Marx conveys, reality would no longer appear dichotomy of the individual and the society in the form of objects of practice. It remains of which the individual is a constitutive part. passive contemplation that disregards sensuous Consequently, dialectics is used for detecting (a) the connections between physiological and psychic phenomena and (b) the individual and 6 Haug(2001,pp.92-93)arguesthatthreecritiquesare societal dimensions that were considered the developed in Marx’s work beginning with the critique result of their co-evolution. oftheformoftheobject,whichweexplainhere;sec- ond the theory of ideology, which goes far beyond the But this insight did not come from a sudden critique of false consciousness for it investigates ideol- revelation or discovery of dialectics. Dialecti- ogyasafunctionofdominationandregulation;and cal thinking can be seen already in the early third, the analysis of the form of value starting with use and exchange value and reaching to the inquiry of works of Vygotsky when he started to elabo- the complex forms of capital. rate his own approach as a young researcher in Outlines • No. 2 • 2006 25 the Institute of Psychology (Moscow). At that Vygotsky recognized that each reality as an time, he was concerned with the shortcomings object of investigation as well as each scientific of Pavlov’s reflexology and its physiological theory and methodology must be conceived as concepts that neglected human consciousness. a historical product of human labor. Thus, “a Nevertheless, Vygotsky applied the concept theory of method is, of course, the production of reflexes to mental processes and aimed of means of production” (p. 253). For his own at developing a wider notion of behavior by psychological approach he emphasized: making consciousness an integral part of it. We wish to obtain a clear idea of the essence of Thus, he still followed the principle of an “ob- individual and social psychology as two aspects jective psychology,” but by transferring it to of a single science, and of their historical fate, not the domain of consciousness, he imbued the through abstract considerations, but by means of an concepts with inner contradictions and finally analysis of scientific reality. […] The methodologi- disrupted the framework of reflex theory. (Sil- cal investigation utilizes the historical examination vonen [2005] therefore applies Althusser’s no- of the concrete forms of the sciences and the theo- tion of an “epistemologic break” to Vygotsky’s retical analysis of these forms in order to obtain generalized, verified principles that are suitable for theoretical development.) guidance. (p. 237) Influenced by Gestalt- and Ganzheits-psy- chology, Vygotsky criticized the behaviorist Accordingly, Vygotsky (1978) came to postu- associationism for explaining developmental late that psychological matters should be stud- processes on the basis of isolated elements. ied “in the process of change,” in its “develop- Although he sympathized with the integral or ment of all its phases and changes” (p. 64-65) holistic approach of psychologists like Kurt to fulfill the demands of a dialectical method. Koffka, Wolfgang Köhler, or Kurt Lewin, he More precisely human development was in- found that their analysis lacked a genetic or terpreted as a process of enculturation and socio-historic understanding of psychologi- humanization, in which biological and cul- cal phenomena. Vygotsky started to rethink tural lines of development were interrelated psychological methods according to dialecti- through a co-evolution of the societal basis cal thinking. Following Darwin’s and Marx’s as an “environment,” on the one hand, and the historico-genetic insight that “the anatomy of individual development in different forms of man is the key to the anatomy of the ape,” he social agency and activity, on the other hand. postulated transferring “basic categories and To take the various mediations of this de- concepts from the higher to the lower” level velopment into account, Vygotsky (1934/1987) only (Vygotsky, 1927/1987, CW 3, p. 235). introduced the notion of a “unit” for the analy- But this method was exactly rejected in Pav- sis of human behavior. He argued that such a lov’s theory that applied a physiological con- unit has to be the smallest “part” of the whole, cept (“reflex”) observed in animal behavior to which nevertheless embodies the whole and human psychology. therefore does not reduce the complexity of From the historico-genetic perspective, Vy- the research objects in process. gotsky built on the dialectical insight that “the In our view, an entirely different form of analysis elaboration of concepts, methods, and theories is fundamental to further development of theories takes place within the science itself during the of thinking and speech. This form of analysis relies whole course of scientific knowledge acquisi- on the partitioning of the complex whole into units. tion, i.e., the transition from one pole to the In contrast to the term “element”, the term “unit” other, from fact to concept, is accomplished designates a product of analysis that possesses all without pausing for a single minute” (p. 253). the basic characteristics of the whole. The unit is Is Cultural-Historical Activity Theory … • Ines Langemeyer & Wolff-Michael Roth 26 a vital and irreducible part of the whole. […] In his thinking. It also allows us to see the opposite precisely the same sense, the living cell is the real relationship, the relationship that links his thoughts unit of biological analysis because it preserves the to the dynamics of behavior, to the concrete ac- basic characteristics of life that are inherent in the tivity of the personality. (Vygotsky, 1934/1987, living organism. A psychology concerned with the pp. 50-51) study of the complex whole must comprehend this. It must replace the method of decomposing the Vygotsky excavates three dimensions of me- whole into its elements with that of partitioning diation taking place—the use of sign, the use the whole into its units. Psychology must identify of tools, and social interaction or cooperation. those units in which the characteristics of the whole are present, even though they may be manifested in Therefore, the late Vygotskian approach can altered form. Using this mode of analysis, it must be acknowledged as a theoretical perspective attempt to resolve the concrete problems that face that comprises all these different forms of me- us. (pp. 46-47) diation in relation with each other (Silvonen, 2005), thus providing a dialectical method to Vygotsky suggested that the notion of “word comprehend matters of research in its move- meaning” (as well as “emotional experience” ments, transitions, interactions, conflicts [perezhivanie], Vygotsky, 1934/1998, p. 294; and contradictions. Yet, although Vygotsky cf. van der Veer, 2001, p. 101) would enable (1927/1987) believed that “the laws of thinking such a unit analysis, because it is not only “a and the laws of nature correspond necessarily unity of thinking and speech" but also “a unity with each other as soon as they are known of generalization and social interaction, a unity properly” (p. 256; see also Engels, 1925/1978, of thinking and communication" (1934/1987, p. 493), he also recognized the socio-historical p. 49), and thus, it would not “divorce the limits of theorizing, because “when the mate- communicative function of speech from its rial [of scientific investigation] is carried to intellectual function” (p. 48). the highest degree of generalization possible On the basis of this unit analysis, Vy- in [one] science, further generalization is pos- gotsky’s approach provides an understanding sible only beyond the boundaries of the given of the development of higher psychic func- science and by comparing it with the material tions and their “the genetic roots” (p. 51) that of a number of adjacent sciences” (Vygotsky, no longer sees them in isolation, only to be 1927/1987, p. 254). added or associated to one another in differ- ent stages; instead, each psychological func- Section Summary tion is comprehensible only when we see it Within the development of Vygotsky’s work, as a part of an interfunctional structure which we conceive a practice of theorizing through ontogenetically co-evolves within a certain so- the lenses of Hegel and Marx, but which nev- ciocultural environment. Feeling and thinking, ertheless shows its own history of transferring for example, could not be understood when and transforming these approaches in view of they are investigated as separated phenomena specific objects of study (“Forschungsgegen- detached from a person’s social life. stände”) and its determinations through scien- tific research. Most salient about Vygotsky’s There exists a dynamic meaningful system that dialectical thinking is that it radically takes constitutes a unity of affective and intellectual processes. Every idea contains some remnant of into account that human practice as social in- the individual’s affective relationship to that aspect teraction, collaboration, and human develop- of reality which it represents. In this way, analysis ment cannot be adequately theorized if it is into units makes it possible to see the relationship reduced to a self-reliant, thing-like “object”. between the individual’s needs or inclinations and It is a socio-historical, shifting, and multi-di- Outlines • No. 2 • 2006 27 mensional object of study (“Gegenstand”) that need to be reflected as products of societal cannot be investigated by looking at isolated forms of perception, thought, and practice and elements or components but by determining therefore, scientific investigation may lead to relevant “units” of it only. discover possibilities to intervene. To extract a more general idea of the previ- But dialectics precisely does not (and ous discussion, we argue that several dimen- should not) serve here as an “instrument” to sions of dialectics are important in order to overcome the shortfalls of traditional forms of understand and recognize the potential of investigation. This would imply a misunder- CHAT’s theorizing of human practice and standing, namely to look for dialectics merely development, as it builds on the following as a method. We should not expect it to be principles of dialectical thinking: something that could simply be “applied” to research matters like a standardized procedure • study a phenomenon in its most developed or even a tool. Instead, dialectical thinking be- form as a way toward explaining its previ- comes a challenge to constantly question a ous forms (historico-genetic perspective); variety of presuppositions concerning research • study the whole instead of isolated parts practices: why and how something should be or elements to preserve the inner relations investigated and how this precipitates certain between the parts of a whole (holistic per- scientific representations of reality, which in- spective); terrelations can be recognized as essential and • reduce the complexity of the objects of in- how their genesis can be explained, who gets vestigation without reducing them to false involved in a research project and who is not, abstractions (structuralist, integral, or or- what are the means and methods of inquiry, ganic perspective); where do they come from, and what role(s) are • study a phenomenon in the process of they playing in the research process (cf. Nis- change (perspective on dynamics, media- sen & Langemeyer, 2005). This questioning is tions and transformations); and paramount when a critical approach is elabo- • reflect the process of theorizing and de- rated and when scientific thinking is developed termine the (historical) limits of scienti- as a practice of emancipatory intervention. fic concepts, insights and generalizations (self-critical perspective). How can Dialectical These perspectives, of course, do not guar- Notions be Misunderstood antee a socio-critical theory, but they help to understand a practice-based co-evolution be- in a Functionalistic and tween the natural and the social or between Systemic Way? the social and the individual lines of develop- It is in this spirit of CHAT as dialectical sci- ment (instead of their dualistic comprehen- ence that we also raise fundamental questions sion), and to conceive such objects of study as concerning our own subject position as re- something constituted and changed by societal searchers within a certain research field—what relations instead of a constantly remaining and roles we are playing in it and how we deal stable thing. Everything needs to be seen both with the presuppositions of our own research as determining and determined within its re- activities—which has become a tightrope walk lation to other things but the scope and the for probably every researcher nowadays, since scale of their impact can differ. Accordingly, increasingly, the conditions and the guidelines in research activities, also the objects of study for research are predetermined by institutions Is Cultural-Historical Activity Theory … • Ines Langemeyer & Wolff-Michael Roth 28 or enterprises that finance projects, how they of Engeström’s own commitment to dialectical select applications, or accredit research activi- thinking to determine what his theory aims ties and their outcomes. Therefore, the main at. intent of problematizing the use of concepts and visual representations in Engeström’s pub- Some Problematic Implications lications is not so much to show a lack of qual- of “Activity Systems” and their ity, because his texts consistently develop their Triangular Representation argumentation and often corroborate it with In a general reflection on human activity, wide empirical research; rather, we want to Engeström acknowledges the importance of make those researchers attracted to this version dialectics, or more precisely, of dialectical of CHAT aware of several fundamental prob- concepts because “[c]ontrary to the common lems in it—related to a misinterpretation of notions, dialectics does not see ‘concrete’ as dialectical concepts—that tend to impair criti- something sensually palpable and ‘abstract’ as cal engagement in the contemporary academe something conceptual or mentally constructed. and today’s research fields. Thus, we discuss ‘Concrete’ is rather the holistic quality of sys- the ways CHAT needs further elaboration to temic interconnectedness” (Engeström, 1987, meet these challenges so that it continues to ch. 4). While searching for systemic interre- develop. lations inherent to human activity and its ho- Following the self-critical perspective, our listic notion, Engeström defines “the task of analysis questions the notion of activity as it genuine concept formation” as to find out “the is represented and interpreted by a triangular developmental ‘germ cell’, the initial genetic model to discuss its impingement on guiding abstraction, of the totality under investigation” and interpreting empirical research. Accord- and “to develop it into its full concrete diver- ing to the holistic perspective, we examine sity.” Herein would lie “the kernel of the ‘other how subject, object, and their relationship logic’ Vygotsky pleaded for but could never are theorized by Engeström as “units” and formulate” (1987, ch. 4). To compensate this in what ways they tend to be reified as iso- lack, Engeström determines and depicts the lated elements. With regard to the historical “activity system” as a triangular model: development of societal practice, we explore The lineage from Hegel to Marx and En- why Engeström’s notion of activity (and its gels, and further to Ilyenkov and Davydov triangular representation) proves rather in- […] suggests that the models needed here are different about the broader societal relations of the germ cell type, expressing the geneti- that determine practice and by which human cally original inner contradiction of the system activities develop historically. Connected to under scrutiny. Such models function not just this, we discuss why a genetic reconstruction as devices for diagnosing the behavioral state of specific human activities including the ex- of the given closed system but as means for amination of their dynamics and transforma- tracing and projecting the genesis and expan- tions is quite difficult by means of an “activ- sive transitions, or ‘fluctuations,’ of an open ity system” that tends to blur the distinction system. I suggest that the triangle models of between the individual and the societal level. activity […] may be considered as an attempt From the structuralist perspective, we inves- at such modelling. (Ch. 4) tigate the capacity of the triangular model to grasp essential interrelations of human activity and how these interrelations are considered. But first of all, we begin with a brief outline Outlines • No. 2 • 2006 29

means and proposes, that in order “to take full ad- vantage of the concept of activity in concrete

subject PRODUCTION object research,” it would be necessary “to create and EXCHANGECONSUMPTION N IO test models which explicate the components IBUT outcome TR IS D and internal relations of an activity systems” rules community div of labor (p. 29). If this demand includes the triangular Figure 1. The “triangle of activity,” has model of an activity system, we can acknowl- become emblematic for cultural-historical edge that Engeström’s approach is consistent activity theory. with what has been exposed in the last section as the perspectives of dialectical thinking. He agrees with the general objective of activity In Developmental Work Research, this triangle theory to overcome dichotomies between the is presented as the extension of Vygotsky’s individual and cultural or societal nature of model for a psychological mediation,7 enlarged activity (p. 20), between object-related activ- by three triangles at the bottom to represent an ity and communication (p. 32), and thereby activity as the new unit of analysis (Engeström, surmount “the individualist and ahistorical 2005, p. 60). This unit now contains, besides biases inherent in theories of action” (p. 22). the subject, object, and the mediating artifact Engeström also aims at taking account of the in the upper triangle, the mediating conditions real practices not as “fully predictable, ratio- of an activity indicated at the bottom: the divi- nal and ‘machine-like’” actions, but rather as sion of labor, community, and rules. Thus, an processes that “involve failures, disruptions activity system is supposed to represent col- and unexpected innovations” (p. 32), and seeks lective forms of practice and should allow not to “illuminate the underlying contradictions only grasping the entire structure of an activity, which give rise to those failures and innova- but also the history of practices, its changes tions as if ‘behind the backs’ of the conscious and developments. This “history may become actors” (p. 32). In addition, he considers the manageable” if “a collective activity system is activity system to be “a multi-voiced forma- taken as the unit” of analysis” (p. 25). In the tion” in which “the different voices” are “lay- context of workplace learning, Engeström sug- ers in a pool of complementary competencies” gests including even two interacting activity (p. 35). systems in the “unit of analysis” to understand, Each theoretical explanation about the tri- beyond individual learning, collective learning angular depiction of an activity system may processes by which societal practices (activi- be connected to a convincing argument; how- ties) are developed and transformed across the ever, in sum, they seem to be questionable and boundaries of activity systems (p. 62). rather unclear: Since the model is supposed Engeström problematizes that “the con- to represent the entire activity, it evokes the cept and structure of activity are treated as questions about how it can simultaneously rep- if something rather self-explanatory” (p. 25) resent a “germ cell” and reduce the complexity of the whole in a “manageable way” when we investigate work place structures and theo- 7 In fact, Vygotsky did not invent the triangle to model a mediated act as Engeström interprets it. He only used rize their implications for human development the triangle to contradict the associationism of Pavlov’s (cf. Langemeyer, 2005a). And if the triangular reflexology that depicted learning as an immediate con- model is to guide us here, does it really pro- ditioningofastimulustoareflex.Themediationdid not refer to the relation between subject and object, but vide a holistic perspective on the basis of an still to the one between stimulus and response. activity system or does it turn to an unfortunate Is Cultural-Historical Activity Theory … • Ines Langemeyer & Wolff-Michael Roth 30 encounter with a systemic totality? In other to reinvent the perspectives of dialectical words, does the model really register those thinking in her/his research activity? interrelations that render an activity system We acknowledge that models always ex- into an irreducible and undividable whole or clude some aspects and interrelations to does it suggest completeness by means of a highlight others. But if we follow the sub- systemic figure only? In the latter case, we ject-object-axis, the triangular model favors a would run the risk of losing the social and third-person perspective, rather than a subjec- societal complexity of human practice, before tive or an intersubjective view. This inherently we have been able to recognize it. implies that the logic of the system is that of This leads us to question more concretely the analyst, the “neutral observer,” rather than how the single triangle can help to compre- that of the participant.8 Otherwise it could be hend any change or movement within the important for example to represent the reasons activity represented except in its outcome. for acting (“Handlungsbegründungen”) and It is invisible, for example, how the subject the perceived possibilities for acting (“Han- transforms the object of activity and how it dlungsmöglichkeiten”) of those who are in- simultaneously appropriates its own nature, volved in a certain practice. In work relations, its body, and how it develops its potentials for example, the possibilities to assign a task and capacities. The representation appears to to somebody, to take on a certain responsibil- suggest that the subject’s motives and inten- ity, or to refuse it are in general very different tions to become engaged in a certain activ- for employees. Since the participants’ power, ity would be identical with its outcome(s). influence, competence, and interests vary, their It therefore reminds us of an instrumentalist subjective reasons to get engaged in a certain concept of action that focuses—like Max activity and the ways in which they act are Weber—on the rationality of means and ends. heterogeneous. If we identify every employee Furthermore, one can get the impression that with the “subject” in the model, we would (a) the constituents of this system (subject, favor a homogeneous subject position and object, tool, community, rules, and division neglect the differences in subjective reasons of labor) are mutually determining each other, to act and consequently heterogeneous ways of (b) these determinations are essential for acting, too. But if the triangle may be read as every component, and (c) as long as the activ- representing our, the analysts’ perspective, it ity is going on, these components remain the does not depict our position in or our relation same. Otherwise we would have to conclude to the activity system either. that the model does not capture an irreduc- We admit that up to now, these critical ible and holistic unit of the essential inner questions have been directed at the triangular structure of human practice. But because it model only. But can we also detect such am- simultaneously tries to recognize the entire biguities and lacks of clarity in other texts that complexity of any activity in general, we ask theorize and deal with empirical data? whether this model leads researchers to find its constituents, before looking for its specific relationships, interdependencies, determina- 8 Itisirrelevantforthisargumentthatinseveralresearch projects,participantsalsousethemodeltocometoa tions, and changes in practice. This would betterunderstandingoftheirownworkpractice,for imply seeing them, first of all, as self-reliant example. We do not deny that the triangular model elements. In other words, is there a danger that could be an opportunity to reflect and discuss different perspectives of those who are involved. However, such a researcher is led to start from a perspective an appropriation of the model does not refer to what it that s/he immediately has to repel, if s/he tries actually visualizes. Outlines • No. 2 • 2006 31 Reading exemplary cases of new type of written record. (Quoted in Engeström, 2005, p. 139) theorizing and research practice First case: Let us take an example from Engeström presents this example as a “nice Developmental Work Research (Engeström, illustration” for how “organization emerges 2005). To clarify the inseparable unity of in the interplay between conversation and activity and communication, a work situa- text,” namely through “a new type of writ- tion described by Hart-Landberg and Reder ten record as a response to the breakdown” (1997, p. 365) from a manufacturing plant is (p. 139). The text is used to problematize presented: conversation and critical discourse analysis for neglecting the “continuous change and The Rexford, a machine for grinding metal bars into developmental struggle” (p. 141) and to criti- components for automobile accessories, “crashed.” Teresa was just concluding her first week operating cize the “‘distance’ between practical activity it. Team members milled around, trying to figure and discourse” (p. 144) as well as the lack of out the cause of the crash. To anyone who was “an explicit interest in and analysis of radical listening, Teresa expressed her guilty feelings: “It transformations” (p. 155). Although this cri- had to have something to do with the operator.” tique may be adequate and striking, we shall Jeff disagreed. “The same thing has happened read the way in which Engeström proceeds to to all of us.” Then he warned her that the tool- ing experts assigned to troubleshoot this problem argue in a symptomal way: we shall look for probably would tease her as they teased all opera- aspects, questions, and explanations that are tors involved in such breakdowns. Immediately an left out and assumptions that are not further expert arrived and took Teresa aside to talk to her. explicated for they seem to be evident. In other Later another young machinist of the team, Car- words, we want to pay attention to issues that rie, told the observing author that the problem of Engeström leaves unproblematic. Teresa’s machine had not been her fault: It was the Most significant in the introduction seems machine’s. “Some of the best machinists come out from a situation where the machine crashes all the to be the fact, that we, as readers, are not time,” Carrie maintained. informed about how the authors of the quoted In the aftermath of the breakdown, an item on passage were engaged in their “ethnographic the team meeting agenda was: “Update on the Rex- study of teamwork and literacy” (p. 139). ford.” Chuck, the team’s oldest worker, with years We are not provided with an explanation of experience operating and fixing the machine, about what the original authors were doing recounted that after the crash he had “rebuilt,” “remade,” “realigned,” and “recentered” all the in their research project and why. Neither do Rexford parts which had been “wiped out really we know who really observed and reported bad,” “burnt up,” “shoved back,” and “had gullies this situation, what has been selected to pres- in them.” After participants stopped chuckling at ent and what has been ignored. Therefore, the extent of Chuck’s chores, he asserted, “It’s not the purpose and status of this original text Teresa’s fault.” But Teresa still seemed worried remains rather unreflected. Neglecting all this about her culpability: “It was only the second time presupposes something like an unproblematic I’ve loaded bars... but Emily loaded a similar bar [with no resulting breakdown].” third-person’s perspective. Thus, it becomes Participants then launched into a technical analy- significant that another text is quoted and sis of a bar size and developed a new recording interpreted as if it were a neutral record of procedure for tracking undersize bars to prevent a situation that only “looks for” a scientific future breakdowns. Thus the team’s response to analysis. Because Engeström does not prob- the breakdown was to support Teresa and attempt lematize it as a theoretically biased percep- to improve the production process by creating a tion and product of research activity, he also omits other plausible ways of interpreting the Is Cultural-Historical Activity Theory … • Ines Langemeyer & Wolff-Michael Roth 32 object of study that would be contrary to his the activity of Chuck telling a story about the conclusion. repairing and the “outcome being a closure on Engeström suggests that “the conver- the repair of the machine” (p. 149). A fourth sational events […] may be interpreted as figure depicts the “development of the new attempts to influence the recipient’s beliefs recording procedure in the team meeting” and actions” as for example: “The team (p. 149). members reassured Teresa, and the tooling It is surprising that these figures represent expert assumedly teased Teresa making her certain ways of being of a singular person and feel guilty” which could be a sign for “com- others show at best their individual actions, peting ways of enacting organizational power but illustrated as activities. This is confusing structures by asserting authority over an indi- with regard to Leont’ev’s distinction between vidual worker” (p. 140). Engeström argues action and activity where the latter is the col- that this conclusion would be insufficient, if lective, cultural-historically developed prac- we do not relate it to the fact that “the crucial tice of humans to achieve a certain form of outcome is a new production procedure for need satisfaction and the former is a contribu- tracking the bars” (p. 140). And instead of tion to this collaboration. Since the triangular reducing organizations “to small fragments model seems to be applicable to intra- and of discourse,” we would have to acknowledge interpersonal activities (like inner speech, that they “carry histories” (p. 142). How- communication, and collaborative activities) ever, in the Rexford case, Engeström does as well as societal practices (like an entire not present additional information about the production process) and tends to identify a histories of that specific work procedure and personal motive with the outcome(s) of an the workers’ relationships or the management activity, it seems to ignore essential differ- and the organization that characterize their ences between the societal, the intra- and the work places as well as their forms of col- interpersonal plane of human practice. This laboration within the company. He suggests would surely impair a historico-genetic per- that the “whole incident [that Teresa showed spective on how specific activities develop and self-criticism] may be interpreted as a fairly change under certain, more general, societal complex systematic disturbance in the activ- conditions.9 Furthermore, our assumption or ity, rather than just another demonstration of fear that subjects, objects, tools and so on are power relations” (p. 147). But what is the “assembled” as isolated elements can also be evidence for this thesis? To corroborate it, affirmed for neither Teresa nor Chuck appear Engeström invokes the triangular model and as subjects who are situated in the given col- reinterprets the moment and the aftermath of laboration due to their subjective vital inter- the breakdown of the machine as a “distur- ests (Lebensinteressen), to a certain mode of bance” of an activity system. participation and to the ways of being recog- A first figure shows “Teresa’s doubts and nized by others (cf. Dreier, 1999; Holzkamp, confusion regarding her own possible contri- 1993).10 Instead, the figures represent them as bution to the disturbance” as well as “reas- surance and support from team members to 9 Anexampleforthiswouldbetheinvestigationofdif- Teresa” (p. 147-148). Another figure visual- ferent work processes that get reshaped through the izes the “conversation between Teresa and the implementation of information and communication tooling expert” to find out “with what intel- technologies. 10ErikAxelandMortenNissen(1993)havealreadydis- lectual tools might one diagnose and repair cussed in what ways work the distinction between the the crash” (p. 148). A third figure represents individualandthesocietallevelofactivityisblurred Outlines • No. 2 • 2006 33 actors without subjective reasons to act, sepa- the supposedly activity “systems” neglect the rated from their own interpretive horizons, ambivalent and contradictory nature of such biographies, and social positions or status relationships and the entire situatedness of the (as gender, age or competence/qualification, subjects involved. This indicates that the sub- for example). We do not know, for example, jects, tools, and objects and so on are treated what it really means for Teresa to experi- as “constituents” or “elements,” and tend to ence the breakdown of the machine while be reified with all the other “elements” ofan operating it. Is she afraid of sanctions or of activity to fit into a system structure, because being disregarded as an unqualified woman, each of them is divorced from several cultural- for example? Nor can we really interpret the historical dimensions and social-individual motives for the support coming from other meanings that vividly bring about and influ- team members. This could be a fair manner to ence societal praxis. deal with problems at work, but it could also Certainly, this focus on systemic structures be a strategy to ensure the competitiveness corresponds to what the analysis seeks to re- of the team according to what currently is veal as “‘invisible’ disruptions and creative investigated as new economized organization efforts in activity and communication” to make structures and forms of “lean management.” “visible the scripts and boundaries of ‘normal In such a case, we might expect that beneath operation’” (Engeström, 2005, p. 152). This the support remains a quite painful pressure implies—actually quite similar to conversation to perform. Such a plausible scenario could analysis—that individual perspectives are only explain why Teresa keeps worrying about her of interest in so far as they explain something own contribution to the breakdown despite of these scripts and boundaries. Engeström getting support from different angles. Yet, this suggests that there is a striving inherent in conclusion would need more empirical data activity to overcome boundaries by creating and a thorough investigation that would also new scripts, operations, communications, and require a dialectical analysis of that praxis, procedures but we do not find sufficient reflec- especially in face of a co-existence of coop- tions on this striving as a personal motive/mo- eration and competition. tivation for change. By showing some alternative ways of Furthermore, Engeström’s argument against inquiry and interpretation, here, we seek to conversation and discourse analysis that, clarify that the triangular representations of “while power and domination are at work in contradictions, it is important to distinguish contradictions from a general assertion of in Leont’ev’s work and which problems are connected asymmetric power relations” (p. 152). How- to this: “Paradoxically, […] the attempt to unify social and individual activity by the category of motive opens ever, we may doubt that a full understanding the road to separate options: Determining activity by is achieved in the presented framework con- its motive, we are caught oscillating between the two cerning the scale of how power relations af- poles in a dichotomy in the theoretical functions of the concept of motive. At one pole, motives depict fect practices through their impact on human how the individual merges into societal activity; at relationships and subjectivities. To investigate the other, they depict how the individual regulates her these shortcomings, we draw on another case individual and not necessarily societal activity. Fur- thermore, defining an activity by its motive paves the study, published and conducted by the same way for subjective arbitrariness in research. Deciding author. whetheranobjectofinvestigationisanactivityoran actionisamatterofwhatsortofmotiveconfiguration the researcher sees or reads into the individual under Second case: In what follows, we discuss investigation.” (p.71) a project carried out in 1998 and published Is Cultural-Historical Activity Theory … • Ines Langemeyer & Wolff-Michael Roth 34 with the title “Expansive Learning at Work: method called Boundary Crossing Laboratory" Toward an Activity Theoretical Reconceptu- (p. 139). But what we do not know is whether alization” (Engeström, 2001; republished in this decision was supported by everyone in this 2005). It took place in the area of children’s context or whether there has been even a form health care in Helsinki and sought to improve of resistance against the changes to come. In the collaboration between two different institu- many countries, the imperative to economize tions. The report presents it as an exemplary public services is currently prevailing. Under case for a real developmental process achieved this condition, the employees of that hospital through “expansive learning at work.” Such a could likely have distrusted any attempt to collaborative learning process maintained by reduce costs, since this might be the onset of these institutions would have been necessary, further cuts. Maybe nothing like this affected because “the issue at stake was organisational, the intended learning process, because the not resolvable by a sum total of separate indi- changes seemed to lead to a win-win situation viduals” (Engeström, 2001, p. 140): for everyone, yet it is nothing but extraordi- nary when resistance and ill-will against the A critical structural issue in the Helsinki area is the pressure to re-organize and economize one’s excessive use of high-end hospital services, histori- cally caused by a concentration of hospitals in this work or against a normative pedagogical ven- area. In children’s medical care, the high-end of ture arise already beforehand. medicine is represented by the Children’s Hospital Disregarding such impacts of a more gen- which has a reputation of monopolizing its patients eral political situation, the article explains the and not actively encouraging them to use primary “learning challenge” concerned “a new way care health centre services. Due to rising costs, of working in which parents and practitioners there is now much political pressure to change this division of labour in favour of increased use of from different caregiver organisations will primary care services. The problem is most acute collaboratively plan and monitor the child’s among children with long-term illnesses, especially trajectory of care, taking joint responsibility those with multiple or unclear diagnoses. […] Such for its overall progress” (p. 139). Moreover, children often drift between caregiver organiza- Engeström emphasizes that “there was no tions without anyone having overview and overall readily available model that would fix the responsibilities of the child’s care trajectory. This problems” and that “top-down commands puts a heavy burden on the families and on the society. (p. 139) and guidelines [were] of little value when the management [did] not know what the content Given that political pressure was exercised of such directives should be” (pp. 139-140). on the hospital and services indicates that, However, he does not highlight the fact that already from the beginning, the problem of neither the employees nor the families had in- the collective learning process was more or fluence on how the problem was defined from less defined. Only the way of improvement the beginning. Their perspectives were not was practically unresolved. Thus, the idea to present nor articulated when the Laboratory change something came from the outside, from was initiated. Furthermore, the presupposition a higher political level. However, the employ- for what Engeström calls, following Gregory ees in the health care system and the families Bateson, “Learning III” (which means that, in were determined to be the subjects of learning. the beginning, the solution and the meta-theo- Engeström reports: “The Children’s Hospital retical problem are unclear), was actually not decided to respond to the pressures by initiat- fulfilled: first, because the task was determined ing and hosting a collaborative redesign ef- from a higher political instance so that the pur- fort, facilitated by our research group using a pose of learning represented a normative goal, Outlines • No. 2 • 2006 35 second, because the researchers already knew learning. Furthermore, also the setting in about similar “disturbances” in organisational which the Laboratory took place was shaped structures and workplaces and introduced an according to the ideas of the research group, elaborated method to guide the participants to namely the three assumed activity systems: solve the underlying problem. Later the article the children’s hospital, the primary health care states more precisely where the actual problem centre, and the child’s family. would lie. It explains that, in the past, “care In the Boundary Crossing Laboratory, the basic relationships and critical paths were solutions constellation of the three activity systems was created in response to particular historical sets implemented so that hospital practitioners sat at of contradictions.” However, “they do not help one side of the room and primary care health centre in dealing with patients with unclear and mul- practitioners sat on another side of the room. The tiple diagnoses and they tend to impose their voices of patients’ families came from the front disease-centred world view even on primary of the room, from videotapes made by following care practitioners.” Consequently, the prevail- patients through their hospital and health centre visits and also from actual parents we invited to ing concepts would have caused “great diffi- join in the sessions. (p. 140) culties in representing and guiding horizontal and socio-spatial relations and interactions First of all, one recognizes that room for in- between care providers located in different tersubjectivity (the text includes the terms institutions, including the patient and his/her “multiperspectivity” and “multivoicedness”) family as the most important actor in care” was given, but it was limited for anticipated (pp. 143-144). reasons: The videotapes of families and pa- We do not intend to question here the cor- tients, as Engeström explains, “made it virtu- rectness or the advantage of this interpretation. ally impossible for the participants to blame We rather want to highlight that it represents the clients for the problems and added greatly the official discourse within these institutions to the urgency of the double bind” (p. 140). but not the different individual perspectives of Later on readers are informed about another the practitioners and the families. Their beliefs conflict, a “tension” between the perspectives and views (their interpretive horizons) may of centres and hospitals, but it is not evident have been in agreement with the official line, how this became apparent during the discus- but we cannot take this for sure. Sometimes sions in the Laboratory: “Health centres in the people only reproduce what they have been Helsinki area [were] blaming the university told while thinking in fact quite differently. hospital for high costs, while the university Therefore, we have to reflect on the quality hospital criticize[d] health centres for exces- and validity of verbal data. A well-known sive referrals and for not being able to take problem is that personal beliefs and perspec- care of patients who [did] not necessarily need tives are also quite problematic and disturbing hospital care” (p. 145). Although the delimita- for researchers and are therefore neglected, tion of such a conflict potential can be justified disregarded or even excluded as irrational or for several good reasons, it would be impor- non-representative. tant to theoretically reflect these strategies to In fact, in what follows, we notice that the prevent certain dynamics and developments in research group advised the practitioners to ac- communication and interaction and to foster cept exactly the perspectives of “horizontal others. Thus, despite claims to the contrary, and socio-spatial relations and interactions”. aspects of “learning III”—multiperspectivity, This ‘insight’ therefore seems to be a product multivoicedness, and expansive learning—are of instructions rather than one of (expansive) not salient in this research report. Is Cultural-Historical Activity Theory … • Ines Langemeyer & Wolff-Michael Roth 36 Since the learners’ subjective perspective suggested the term ‘knot-working’ to capture on the situation is neglected to a certain ex- the idea of the new pattern of activity” (p. 147), tent, we shall look closer at the answer to: which is an expanded one, and in a “Change- “Why do they learn—What makes them Laboratory”-session the idea of a “‘care agree- make the effort?” (p. 141) Without referring ment’ emerged as the central new concept” to interview data, Engeström suggests that (p. 148). The question of how it “emerged” “motivation for risky expansive learning pro- does not seem so important, because in what cesses associated with major transformations follows, we can only read the transcript of a in activity systems is not well explained by discussion about the practicability of such an mere participation and gradual acquisition of agreement. While the nurse attempts to see the mastery” (pp. 141-142). Instead he consider “care agreement” as a chance for improvement, (according to Bateson) “double binds gener- she also problematizes the additional work for ated by contradictory demands imposed on the nurses. But exactly this argument against the participants” to be the driving force for their “care agreement” and the problem of how the learning. Therefore, “we made the participants increased responsibilities and the work load face and articulate the contradictory demands could be dealt with according to the new divi- inherent in their work activity by presenting sion of labor did not become a matter of con- a series of troublesome patient cases cap- cern. A data security specialist in fact inter- tured on videotape” (p. 142). Here again we rupted the nurse by giving an argument for the notice that not only the initiation for learning newly found “solution.” Then, two physicians came from the “outside,” from the research implicitly denied that there would be any ad- group, but also the introduction of the object ditional work—which might have been correct, of learning (Lerngegenstand). The question but the article does not make it clear. Finally, whether this raised in fact the motivation of an information system specialist concluded eu- the participants to learn, to solve the problems, phorically: “In my opinion, this is a great sys- and to take risks, however, remains unclear. tem, and as an outsider I say, implement this as Engeström articulates contradictory demands soon as possible so that after a sufficient trial to be the motive of learning, but without con- period we can duplicate this system elsewhere. sidering that motivations can be torn apart or This is a great system” (p. 148). go in different directions: The assumed motive In sum, the excerpt may reveal discursive to solve contradictions could be mixed with strategies to suppress the nurse’s objections to other motives like pleasing the boss to gain the “solution” that was partially introduced and or reassure some privileges. This could bring favoured by the research group and partially about competitive behavior among team mem- “found” by the practitioners. In this quoted ex- bers, or disapproval and resentment, which change, the nurse, as being in a lower position would affect collective learning unintendedly than the physicians and the specialists, could or even unconsciously. But Engeström does have been engendered as the only woman in not develop any concepts or representations this context, and therefore was unable to pres- in relation to his triangular model to reflect ent her fears as powerful as it would have been such contradictory dimensions. In the follow- necessary to raise interest for her concerns. ing paragraphs that are supposed to clarify, All these signs that might indicate some prob- what the practitioners were learning, we can lems of power relations are not discussed nor see even more clearly which and why certain reflected in the text. Moreover, different inter- dimensions are neglected. pretation possibilities are not considered or at Engeström reports, that “the researchers least not presented. And there is more in the Outlines • No. 2 • 2006 37 specialist’s conclusion: Although it may not be system,” which represents a collective learn- a surprise for the technical vocabulary it con- ing process that brings about such transitions, tains, as it fits with other specific professional Engeström also highlights the significant role expressions of the specialist’s work, readers of “internal contradictions as the driving may wonder why this is not problematized as force of change and development” (p. 61). a functionalistic or technicistic misunderstand- Elsewhere denoted as “systemic”, contradic- ing of expansive learning, of its nature and its tions are interpreted “as tensions within and purpose. between the nodes of the activity system ag- At this point, we have to relate these blank gravated by the asynchronous development spaces in the text to the theoretical framework, of the different elements" (Engeström, 2000, because technical terms like “system,” “knot- p. 153, our emphasis). Furthermore, “outside working” and “implementation” are used influences from neighbouring activity systems (pp. 153, 155). Although such a vocabulary [would] constantly enter into the local systems is used metaphorically, it nurtures reifications and trigger novel developmental processes” of societal human practice and functionalistic (p. 165). Engeström distinguishes between dif- views suggesting that an activity is something ferent types of contradictions: that could be taken from one context and be In the analysis of human activity, four levels or installed in another. This interpretation of an layers of contradictions may be discerned. […] activity system as a unit of analysis neglects The primary contradiction of activities in capitalist a subjective as well as a wider societal plane socio-economic formations lives as the inner con- in which contradictions occur. Accordingly, flict between exchange value and use value within we continue to investigate where fundamen- each corner of the triangle of activity. The sec- tal problems of the concept of activity system ondary contradictions are those appearing between lie and proceed by dealing with the notion of the corners. […] The tertiary contradiction appears when representatives of culture […] introduce the contradictions (cf. Langemeyer, 2005b). object and motive of a culturally more advanced form of the central activity into the dominant form What are Contradictions? of the central activity. […] The quaternary con- tradictions require that we take into consideration HowisDevelopmentAchieved? the essential ‘neighbour activities’ linked with the central activity which is the original object of our study. (Engeström, 1987, chap. 2) Engeström’s Notion of Contradictions and Development The inner contradiction would manifest itself Drawing on Hegel’s discovery of “inner con- above all in a “primary contradiction,” which tradictions” as responsible for a movement of derives from that “dual existence" of any tool consciousness, Engeström adopts this concept or instrument in capitalist societies as use- and and considers them also to be “the source of exchange-value (1987, ch.2). An example for dynamics and development in human activ- this issue is the work activity of a physician ity” (1987, ch. 2). A contradiction would be that “includes a tremendous variety of medica- a “historically accumulated dynamic tension ments and drugs” which are “not just useful between opposing forces in an activity sys- preparations” but “above all commodities with tem” that “constantly generates disturbances prices, manufactured for a market, advertised which open up opportunities and call for novel and sold for profit.” Accordingly, “every doc- solutions that can lead to transformations in tor faces this contradiction in his daily deci- the system” (Engeström, 2005, p. 152). In re- sion making” (ibid.) and, furthermore, would lation to the “expansive cycle of an activity have to face “patients as people to heal” as Is Cultural-Historical Activity Theory … • Ines Langemeyer & Wolff-Michael Roth 38 well as “sources of income” (Engeström, 2000, mately reproduce “the ‘failure to comprehend p. 152). the labour process as an independent thing and “Contradictions” may therefore accumu- at the same time as an aspect of capitalist pro- late within some tool, such as a drug, or be- duction’ (Capital, Vol. 3: p. 1000),” because tween two “elements” of an activity system it would “simply enumerate different aspects (e.g. between instruments and objects) since of the capitalist production process, aspects they are interpreted as “tensions within and which are, of course, all present simultane- between the nodes” (see above). According ously […], but which need to be distinguished to the thesis that such tensions (“inner con- as opposites" (Jones, 2003). tradictions”) would lead to a change in the In sum, an error in Engeström’s theory does system, contradictions could also appear as not only consist in a lack of comprehending “small innovations in practitioners’ everyday the subjective and intersubjective plane of work actions” (Engeström, 2000, p. 153). But human activity but also in a missed articula- in the particular example of a primary contra- tion of societal contradictions. By referring to diction, we may doubt that it leads to such a the concept of an “inner contradiction” (cf. a desirable change. Political interventions would “double-bind” situation), Engeström tends to be necessary to control the market of drugs, psychologize the societal level of human prac- but these do not emerge through a physician’s tice. He tends to identify societal, social and central activity “from below” or within its individual dimensions (like the motive and the own domain, nor would they be immediately object of activity) instead of comprehending a consequence of “contradictions” between the dialectical interrelation and distinction of a hospital’s and a pharmaceutical company’s societal, social, and psychic processes. Thus, activity system. The tension between the use- the driving moment for development and and the exchange-value as well as the distur- change would have to be rethought not only bances of two interacting “activity systems” on a subjective but on a societal plane, too. are misinterpreted as “inner contradictions” and therefore do not serve as an explanation The Contradictory Comprehension for development. With regard to the capitalist of Human Activity and Development rationality of profit making, we would need a in the CHAT Framework societal concept of contradiction instead of a A problematic and even contradictory use notion that actually refers to a state of indi- of the concept of an activity system and its vidual consciousness. triangular representation thus manifests itself These counter-arguments relate to what as Engeström tries to capture simultaneously Peter E. Jones (2003 and 2004) criticizes as the "germ cell" and the developed "totality" of a misconception in Engeström’s version of any activity in general, second, as he seeks to CHAT. His theory, Jones argues, fails to realize explain the state of an inner contradiction as the analytical difference of use- and exchange- well as the process of practical development value, because Marx “was distinguishing and change but fails to discern sufficiently the [the] process [of concrete work] as a labour subjective and societal plane of practice, and process—as ‘free, conscious activity’—from third, as he attempts to grasp the interrelations ‘work under the specific circumstances of of a specific activity, but mainly enumerates capitalism’, i.e. from the capitalist produc- isolated elements of it and locates them in tion process, the process of valorization.” By a fixed system structure. Most problematic neglecting the valorization process, the activity about this conception of human activity is system as the “unit of analysis” would ulti- that Engeström’s approach consequently loses Outlines • No. 2 • 2006 39 the ability to analytically conceive the soci- ing in its collective form—becomes overes- etal as well as the intra- and inter-individual timated and overdrawn. dimensions of practice dialectically: to grasp Since Engeström’s own reports and rep- it in its specific historical form in which it resentations of empirical studies articulate emerges and in which it is reproduced and both a limited idea of societal practice and transformed. Because the societal structures a problematic view on contradictions, we are and relations inherent to human practice are reminded of the challenges of critical research products of historical development—that to understand how societal contradictions are means, of various actions undertaken by “transverse” and cut “across” the plane of local heterogeneous subjects in different societal activities (which the triangular model repre- contexts on a specific societal basis within a sents), to investigate how they affect the forms certain constellation of power relations—it is of human relationships, the forms of identities necessary to “investigate” and “explore” these or subjectivities, including the activities of our scientifically instead of locating them within own research. As we show in our exemplary a predetermined and a-historical system analyses, Engeström’s approach disregards structure. Following Engeström’s theory, we that contradictions tremendously mediate so- can either explain contradictions too gener- cial relations and thereby narrow the scope for ally as an all-contaminating tension between development and empowerment. The societal use- and exchange-value, or identify them contradictions unfold their effects in a dialec- with local disturbances or partial ruptures tical way and therefore require a dialectical that would demand for an “expansive learn- analysis. But several aspects to guide such an ing” process only.11 But how could we find analysis are missing in Engeström’s theory. new action possibilities to change practice Instead of merely encapsulating systemic by means of his approach? We acknowledge interrelations of practice, it would be important that the assembled components of an activity to investigate how subjects, by their actions, can be helpful for excavating and describing are confronted with certain societal structures disturbances within institutionally established (like power relations). These structures may be routines. However, since the elimination of determining for individual actions, but since the sources of friction or dysfunctions tends they emerged historically through human ac- to be Engeström’s main concern, a more tivity, they are always determined by individ- fundamental critique of the broader context ual actions as well. A critical theory therefore of societal relations is neglected. Given the needs to proceed dialectically: first by analyz- limits of his notion of activity and contra- ing how societal structures bring about certain diction, the dialectics between the levels actions and how they impair others, how they of individual and societal development and are internalized by subjects and embodied in between the levels of particular and general their behavior; and second, by excavating—on societal processes gets ultimately lost. The a social and societal level—action possibili- process of learning as a process of societal ties to intervene and to change those structures change—even if Engeström considers learn- that have become problematic for free human development. Social relationships—like forms of coop- 11 Not surprisingly, some scholars who neglect the dia- eration and modes of participation—come to lecticalnotionofactivityargueinrelationtothetri- be reshaped and transformed in the dynamic angular model that contradictions could be designed into constructive learning environments (Jonassen & of struggling with those structures and their Rohrer-Murphy, 1999) underlying power relations that detach the sub- Is Cultural-Historical Activity Theory … • Ines Langemeyer & Wolff-Michael Roth 40 jects from taking influence and gaining power A. Mortensen (eds.), The Societal Subject. Aar- to act (cf. Langemeyer, 2005b). Only if we hus University Press (pp. 67-79). Dreier, O. (1999). Personal Trajectories of Par- question and criticize our accumulated experi- ticipation Across Contexts of Social Practice. ence with such problems and conflicts and de- Outlines, 1(1), 5-32. velop our presently rudimentary knowledge of Engeström, Y. (1987). Learning by Expanding: societal interrelations and contradictions col- An Activity-Theoretical Approach to Develop- lectively for intervention (“Zusammenhangs- mental Research. Helsinki: Orienta-Konsultit. und Widerspruchswissen” [Holzkamp, 1988]) (Available at: http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Paper/ in form of a coherent conception of our world Engestrom/expanding/toc.htm) (Gramsci, Prison notebook 11, §12, comment Engeström, Y. (1993). Developmental studies of 1), do we open up opportunities for tackling work as a testbench of activity theory: The and resolving the fundamental contradictions case of primary care medical practice. In: S. Chaiklin & J. Lave (Eds.), Understanding of our society. But we should not expect them practice: Perspectives on activity and context to be a “mechanism” of or even an “automa- (pp. 64-103). Cambridge, England: Cambridge tism” for development. Rather we experience University Press. that our engagements to change and enhance Engeström, Y. (2000). From individual action to practice are themselves quite contradictory. In collective activity and back: developmental the most challenging entanglements, we there- work research as an interventionist method- fore need to generate—each time anew—criti- ology. In: P. Luff, J. Hindmarsh, Ch. Heath cal perspectives on these societal practices in (eds.). Workplace Studies. Recovering Work which we participate, and on our own social- Practices and Informing System Design. Cam- bridge University Press (pp. 150-166). individual basis to act and to reflect on the Engeström, Y. (2001). Expansive Learning at problems and conflicts to be resolved. This Work: Toward an Activity Theoretical Re- is why dialectics play beyond its historical conceptualization. Journal of Education and influence on CHAT an important role inthe Work, 14 (1), 133-156. practical and theoretical struggles for eman- Engeström, Y. (2005). Developmental Work cipation and why we should not abandon it to Research. 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