A Quantitative Analysis of Security, Anonymity and Scalability for the Lightning Network

Sergei Tikhomirov Pedro Moreno-Sanchez Matteo Maffei University of Luxembourg TU Wien TU Wien Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg Vienna, Austria Vienna, Austria [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

Abstract—Payment channel networks have been introduced This issue has received prominent attention from both to mitigate the scalability issues inherent to permissionless academia and industry. Current efforts can be roughly decentralized cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. Launched classified in two groups: (i) more efficient and scalable in 2018, the Lightning Network (LN) has been gaining consensus algorithms (on-chain scalability) and (ii) pro- popularity and consists today of more than 5000 nodes tocols aiming to process the bulk of transactions off-chain and 35000 payment channels that jointly hold 965 bitcoins resorting to on-chain transactions only to resolve disputes (9.2M USD as of June 2020). This adoption has motivated (off-chain scalability). The latter approach is backwards research from both academia and industry. compatible, a crucial aspect for large scale adoption. Payment channels suffer from security vulnerabilities, The Lightning Network [50] (LN), the focus of this such as the wormhole attack [39], anonymity issues [38], work, is an off-chain scalability solution in the form of a and scalability limitations related to the upper bound on payment channel network.A payment channel allows two the number of concurrent payments per channel [28], which users to perform off-chain payments, using the blockchain have been pointed out by the scientific community but never only to open a channel and to close it (either collabora- quantitatively analyzed. tively or through a dispute resolution mechanism). The In this work, we first analyze the proneness of the LN cost of creating a payment channel prevents a user from to the wormhole attack and attacks against anonymity. We creating a channel with every other user in the network. observe that an adversary needs to control only 2% of nodes Instead, a user only opens channels with a few others, leveraging paths of payment channels to carry out trans- to learn sensitive payment information (e.g., sender, receiver, actions with users who are not directly connected. and amount) or to carry out the wormhole attack. Second, we While the LN has the potential to deliver a large study the management of concurrent payments in the LN throughput given that transactions are not stored on-chain, and quantify its negative effect on scalability. We observe the number of in-flight transactions per channel is limited. that for micropayments, the forwarding capability of up to Otherwise peers would not be able to close the channel, 50% of channels is restricted to a value smaller than the as the resulting transaction would exceed the size limit for channel capacity. This phenomenon hinders scalability and an on-chain transaction. The LN community [28] observed opens the door for denial-of-service attacks: we estimate that that this could limit the network throughput more than its a network-wide DoS attack costs within 1.6M USD, while capacity and lead to DoS attacks, but the impact of this isolating the biggest community costs only 238k USD. limitation has never been evaluated in practice. Our findings should prompt the LN community to con- The LN (and off-chain protocols in general) was sider the issues studied in this work when educating users initially proposed not only for scalability but also as a about path selection algorithms, as well as to adopt multi-hop mitigation of privacy concerns. Unlike on-chain transac- payment protocols that provide stronger security, privacy tions, which are stored in a publicly accessible blockchain and scalability guarantees. database (and are hence available for data analysis), Index Terms—Bitcoin, Lightning Network, privacy, security, LN transactions are neither globally shared nor publicly anonymity, scalability stored. However, recent work has shown that LN’s security and privacy guarantees can be undermined by on-path attackers. Specifically, Malavolta et al. [39] described 1. Introduction the wormhole attack where on-path adversaries prevent honest intermediaries from participating in the successful Bitcoin [47] is the first cryptocurrency in market completion of a payment and steal the transaction fees capitalization and arguably the most widely deployed originally intended for them. Another work [38] showed one. However, the decentralized nature of its consensus that sender and receiver anonymity, as well as the confi- algorithm limits the transaction throughput to tens of dentiality of transaction values, can be easily broken by transactions per second [20], [31], hindering its capability observing the message payload. to cater for the growing number of users and transactions. These works describe the possibility of security and The research described in this paper was partially supported by the privacy attacks but lack a quantitative analysis to deter- Luxembourg National Research Fund (FNR) through CORE project mine their likelihood and severity in the current LN. Given FinCrypt (C17/IS/11684537). that, in this work we answer the following question: What is the quantitative impact of the aforemen- of the LN can be used to improve the scalability of other tioned scalability, security, and privacy limita- cryptocurrencies. For instance, similar networks operate tions in the current Lightning Network? with Litecoin [15] and Ethereum [8]. In this section, we introduce the basic notions of the LN and refer the reader 1.1. Contributions to [33] for further reading. LN nodes. A node in the LN is governed by a pair We answer the question above through a systematic of signing and verification keys from the ECDSA sig- evaluation of the LN based on a recent network snapshot. nature scheme, and identified by the hashed value of First, we assess the vulnerability of the LN to the the verification key. Additionally, the owner can assign wormhole attack as well as attacks against value privacy a handcrafted identifier (alias) to their node. Operations (the attacker estimates the payment amount) and rela- from a node are authorized with a digital signature created tionship anonymity (the attacker learns the pair sender- with the corresponding signing key. Thus, whoever holds receiver for a given payment). We show that the network is the signing key is the owner of a node. One user can vulnerable if the attacker compromises a moderate number potentially own several nodes. of highly connected nodes. For instance, with selected 100 LN channels. An LN channel (i.e., an edge) is jointly compromised nodes (less than 2% of the total number of controlled by the two counterparties. Its capacity is deter- nodes), nearly all paths are prone to value privacy attacks, mined by the amount of coins initially deposited. While around 70% are prone to anonymity attacks, and around the total capacity of the channel stays constant during its 30% are prone to the wormhole attack. As a countermea- lifetime, the balance of each counterparty varies according sure, we propose path selection policies to defend against to two operations: (i) single channel updates, where the these attacks, though a fundamental tradeoff is present: a two users agree on an updated balance; and (ii) multi- high payment success rate involves reliance on large hubs, hop transactions, where the balance of several channels which may become honeypots or collude to deanonymize forming a path are simultaneously updated. users. LN transactions. A multi-hop transaction (or simply a Second, we study the effect that the limited number of transaction hereby) leverages a path of channels between concurrent channel updates has on the utility and security a sender and a receiver (who might not share a channel of the LN. In particular, we show that for an average between them). A transaction must ensure the atomicity transaction amount of 550 satoshis (0.05 USD) this limita- of the transfer: either all balances along the path are tion reduces LN performance by 80%, with 50% of chan- updated or none of them are. For that, the LN relies on nels being limited by the number of in-flight payments Hash Time-Lock Contracts (HTLCs), excerpts from the rather than capacity. This effect is gradually decreasing Bitcoin’s scripting language that permit a node (u ) to for transaction amounts up to around 0.25 USD. However, 1 lock x coins in a channel between two nodes (u and u ) micropayments where a few satoshis are transacted is one 1 2 and release them according to the encoded conditions. The of the most compelling use cases of the LN. terms for the HTLC(u , u , y, x, t) are defined with a hash This limitation opens the door to DoS attacks. Our 1 2 value y := H(r), where r is chosen uniformly at random, empirical results show that an attacker can block a channel an amount x of coins, and a timeout t, as follows: (i) If by investing only 527k satoshis (around 50 USD) and u reveals a value r such that H(r) = y before t expires, the complete Lightning Network with a cost of 164 BTC 2 u pays x to u ; (ii) if t expires, u receives x back. (1.6M USD). The attack cost can be significantly reduced 1 2 1 LN relies on HTLCs to enable multi-hop transactions. by targeting channels with high capacity and connectiv- All HTLCs along the path use the same hash value ity, as well as channels between communities – highly y = H(r) aiming to achieve atomicity expecting that none connected network subgraphs. For instance, by blocking of the intermediate balances can be updated before the re- selected channels representing 13% of the total node count ceiver reveals r, and all of them can be updated after that. (which would cost around 238k USD), the attacker can cut An illustrative example of an HTLC-based transaction is off the largest community from the rest of the network. depicted in Figure1. Here, the user u transfers 1 bitcoin We suggest using cryptographic techniques such as 1 to u using u , u and u as intermediaries. For that, u anonymous multi-hop locks (AMHL) [39] to improve 5 2 3 4 5 locally chooses a value r uniformly at random, computes upon this limitation of the Lightning Network. the cryptographic challenge for the HTLC as y := H(r), The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We and sends y to the sender (step 1). The message encoding present the required background in Section2. We describe y is called an invoice. Then, the payment starts with the datasets we use for this study in Section3. We evaluate a commit phase (steps 2-5) where every pair of nodes, the proneness of LN to security and anonymity attacks starting from the sender, establishes an HTLC using y. in Section4. We study the effect of the limit on concurrent After the commit phase is finished, the transaction enters LN channel updates in Section5. We review the related the release phase. Here, the receiver reveals r to u4 to work in Section6 and conclude in Section7. fulfill the contract (step 6), triggering thereby the release phase where every pair of nodes fulfills their contract from 2. Background the receiver to the sender (steps 6-9). It is important to note two aspects here. First, every The Lightning Network (LN) has emerged as the alter- intermediary user charges a fee for the forwarding service native to the scalability issue of Bitcoin with the highest provided. For instance, u2 receives 1.3 coins but only adoption in practice [21]. As of June 2020, LN facilitates forwards 1.2 coins, getting a fee of 0.1 coins. Second, the off-chain exchange of over 900 BTC. The principles the time parameter of the contracts throughout the path is 2. HTLC(u1, u2, y, 1.3, 4) 3. HTLC(u2, u3, y, 1.2, 3) 4. HTLC(u3, u4, y, 1.1, 2) 5. HTLC(u4, u5, y, 1, 1) u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 9. r 8. r 7. r 6. r

1. y := H(r)

Figure 1. An HTLC-based payment in the LN. The node u1 pays u5 using u2, u3 and u4 as intermediaries. Here we assume that each node charges a fee of 0.1 and time is measured in days. decreasing to ensure that no user loses coins. For instance, 103 the HTLC between u1 and u2 sets a timeout of four days whereas the timeout in the HTLC between u2 and u3 is 102 only three days. This facilitates that u2 has enough time u r u to settle the contract with 1 after receiving from 3. 1

Node count 10 LN implementations. The development of the LN, which was originally introduced in [50], is guided by a set of 100 request for comments (RFC) documents called ”Basics 100 101 102 103 Node degree of Lightning Technology” or BOLTs [12], which are then followed by several implementation teams. The three most Figure 2. Node degree distribution. advanced implementations available today are LND [6], c-lightning [3], and Eclair [1]. Additionally, there exist implementations at earlier stages of development: Elec- 103 trum [26], [27], lit [5], lpd [36], ptarmigan [2], and rust- lightning [9]. Our analysis is concerned with the definition 102 of the LN as described in the BOLTs and thus the results 101

apply equally to every implementation. Channel count

100 3. Datasets 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 Channel capacity (satoshis) We obtained a snapshot of LN on 2020-02-25 from [30] and parsed with the code in [59]. This snapshot Figure 3. Channel capacity distribution. consists of 5929 nodes and 35233 channels. We model this data as an undirected multi-graph (i.e., may contain multi- LN study [38] shows that privacy of LN users and their ple edges between each pair of nodes), as several channels transactions can be breached. While the aforementioned can be shared by two LN nodes. We only considered the works demonstrate the feasibility of these attacks, their 5862 largest connected component, which contains nodes effectiveness in practice depends, among other factors, on (98.87%) 35196 (99.89%) and channels . We observe that the topology of the LN. In this experiment, we aim to this subgraph contains a representative sample of the LN. identify the impact of these security and privacy issues in LN20 We refer to this dataset as . our snapshot of the LN. Based on LN20, LN nodes have an average degree of 12.01 and a median degree of 3 (see Figures2 and3). The majority of nodes have very few channels, whereas 4.1. Security and privacy attacks: background there is a small number of nodes with many channels. In particular, there are more than 1744 nodes with degree Value privacy [38]. Intuitively, value privacy ensures that 1, and the most connected node has 1198 channels. The for a transaction involving only honest users, corrupted capacity is also unequally distributed. These observations users outside of the path learn no information about the motivate the methodology in our experiments in Section4. transaction value. This notion thus heavily relies on the ex- We also derive a series of historic snapshots which istence of paths without adversarial nodes. Otherwise, an represent the state of LN on the first day of each month adversarial intermediary node can trivially learn the (upper from April 2018 to February 2020. We refer to this dataset bound of the) amount of a transaction that it forwards. For as LNHist and use it in our experiments in Section5. instance, in Figure4 the adversary u3 forwards 1.2 coins Ethical considerations. Our analysis is based solely on to u4, estimating the transaction amount at around 1 coin publicly available data. All our calculations are based on plus forwarding fees. a local representation of the LN network graph obtained Relationship anonymity [38]. Intuitively, relationship from [30], without connecting to LN nodes. We do not anonymity ensures that given two simultaneous transac- interfere with the LN activity, nor deanonymize any node. 0 0 tions between two pairs of nodes (u1, u2) and (u1, u2) routed through the same path of intermediary users 4. Security and privacy: theory and practice i1, . . . , in, the adversary controlling some of those in- termediaries cannot tell who is paying to whom with As introduced in Section2, the LN builds upon probability better than 1/2. However, this is not achieved Hash Time-Lock Contracts aiming to achieve atomicity in in the LN. An adversary controlling i1 and in can use multi-hop payments. However, [39] argues that due to the the cryptographic challenge included in the HTLC to wormhole attack atomicity does not hold in LN. Another determine who pays to whom. For instance, in Figure4 Transaction amount is 1

2. HTLC(u1, u2, y, 1.3, 4) 3. HTLC(u2, u3, y, 1.2, 3) 4. HTLC(u3, u4, y, 1.1, 2) 5. HTLC(u4, u5, y, 1, 1) u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 9. r 8. r 7. r 6. r

1. y := H(r)

u1 pays u5. They u1 pays u5. They use same y use same y

u1 2. HTLC(u1, u2, y, 1.3, 4) u5 5. HTLC(u4, u5, y, 1, 1) 3. HTLC(u2, u3, y, 1.2, 3) 4. HTLC(u3, u4, y, 1.1, 2) u2 u3 u4 3'. HTLC(u2, u3, y', 1.2, 3) 4'. HTLC(u3, u4, y', 1.1, 2) 2'. HTLC(u1, u2, y', 1.3, 4) 5'. HTLC(u4, u'5, y', 1, 1) u'1 u'5

HTLC with u2 Get 1.3 Pay 1 and u3 expire

2. HTLC(u1, u2, y, 1.3, 4) 3. HTLC(u2, u3, y, 1.2, 3) 4. HTLC(u3, u4, y, 1.1, 2) 5. HTLC(u4, u5, y, 1, 1) u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 8. r 6. r

7. r 1. y := H(r)

Figure 4. An illustrative example of value privacy (top), relationship anonymity (middle), and the wormhole attack (bottom).

the adversary controlling u2 and u4 can determine that u1 1.0 is transacting with u5 as the same value y is used along 0.8 the whole path. Similarly, u2 and u4 can determine that 0 0 0 u1 is transacting with u5 as the same y is being used 0.6 along the path. Max 3 intermediary nodes 0.4 Max 2 intermediary nodes The wormhole attack [39]. In the wormhole attack, Max 1 intermediary node 0.2 two colluding nodes in a transaction path prevent honest Payment success probability 102 103 104 105 intermediaries from participating in the successful com- Transaction amount (satoshi) pletion of the payment, stealing the fees initially intended for honest intermediaries. An example of the wormhole Figure 5. The share of experiment runs where paths with sufficient attack is depicted in Figure4. Here, u4 does not send the capacity exist between sender and receiver. opening value r to u3 (step 7 in Figure1) to fulfill the HTLC previously set in this channel. Instead, u4 sends the value r to u outside of the LN protocol, which only the paths with at most three intermediary nodes. 2 We observe that paths of this length suffice to allow allows u2 to settle the HTLC with u1. As a consequence, contracts with u expire, simulating transaction failure more than 85% of transactions between a random pair 3 of nodes (Figure5). We also note that these paths allow and preventing u3 from participating in the successful completion of the transaction. Note that the funds in us to exemplify all attacks that we want to study in this experiment. We note that considering longer paths would u3’s channel are temporarily blocked, which effectively leads to a denial-of-service attack over that channel. This only increase the absolute number of paths considered. attack can be amplified if multiple honest intermediaries We leave a more exhaustive study for future work. Let paths be the set of paths between u1 and u2 are located between the colluding adversarial nodes. Note hu1,u2i thereby computed. We further prune the set paths that the funds in u ’s channel are temporarily blocked, hu1,u2i 3 into a subset paths , containing only the paths which effectively leads to a denial-of-service attack over hu1,u2i,x that channel. This attack can be amplified if multiple that allow to transfer at least x satoshis. For instance, paths contains the paths between u1 and u2 honest intermediaries are located between the colluding hu1,u2i,10 adversarial nodes. allowing to transfer at least 10 satoshis. For a channel to be capable of transferring x satoshis from ui to uj, ui must have a balance of at least x satoshis. 4.2. Methodology However, the current balance of each counterparty in a channel is not publicly available. Thus, we consider a In this section, we describe how we study the prone- path suitable for a given transaction if the total capac- ness of the LN to attacks with respect to the value privacy, ity of every channel in the path is not lower than the relationship anonymity, and wormhole attack scenarios. transaction amount, independently of how this capacity We first compute the paths between pairs of nodes. is distributed among the two channel counterparties. This Given a pair of nodes u1 and u2, we compute the list of heuristic might consider a path suitable for a transaction paths that connect them with one restriction: we consider while it is not. We nevertheless follow this heuristic as it is also used in practice by LN nodes when selecting paths the probability that a transaction between ui and uj is to perform payments. vulnerable to the attack. Averaging across all the pairs As the next step, we study the effectiveness of of nodes tested, we extract the final probabilities reported the selected attack. For a chosen transaction amount in Figure6. x paths , we split the set hu1,u2i,x into two subsets: (i) paths-prone hu1,u2i,x: The subset of paths that are prone 4.3. Results and discussion paths-safe to the attack; (ii) hu1,u2i,x: The subset of paths that are not susceptible to being attacked. The definition In this section, we present the results shown in Fig- of a path of the form u1 → i1 → ... → in → u2 being ure6 and discuss their implications. prone to the specific attack depends on the type of the For every attack and a given number of compromised attack as described as follows: nodes, the share of prone paths is relatively stable for all • Value privacy: We say that a path is prone to the payment amounts. This indicates that the payment amount value privacy attack if any of the intermediary nodes is does not significantly affect the security of payments. under adversarial control. The three attacks differ in how quickly the share • Relationship anonymity: We say that a path is prone of prone paths changes as the number of compromised nodes increases. For value privacy, the effect of additional to the relationship anonymity attack if nodes i1 and in are under adversarial control. highly-connected nodes being compromised is the most profound: the share of prone paths is 50% if only the • Wormhole attack: We say that a path is prone to the wormhole attack if there exist two non-neighboring 5 most connected nodes are compromised and nearly 100% if the 100 most connected nodes are compromised. intermediary nodes ij and ik that are under adversarial control (i.e., j < k and k 6= j + 1). We conclude thus that an adversary needs to corrupt only 2% of the nodes to (almost) completely nullify any value We remark that there exist a difference in the definition privacy guarantee in the LN. of a prone path in the wormhole attack and the relationship We observe that the average share of prone paths anonymity attack. For the relationship anonymity attack decreases for relationship anonymity. Yet, the adversary we do not require that there is an honest user between the controlling the 100 most connected nodes can launch two adversarial nodes. For instance, a path of the form the relationship anonymity attack on about 70% of the u → i → i → u where i and i are under adversarial 1 1 2 2 1 2 paths. Interestingly, the adversary has fewer possibilities control, would be considered prone to the relationship to launch the wormhole attack. For instance, even with anonymity attack but safe against the wormhole attack. 100 most connected nodes corrupted, around 30% of the Another aspect that we consider is which nodes are paths are prone to the attack. While this is still a crucial under adversarial control. We follow three strategies. First, security issue, this reduction in the effectiveness of the we assume that nodes with highest degree (i.e., highly attack may be explained by the fact that the wormhole connected nodes) are colluding to carry out an attack. attack is the most restrictive on path structure, and thus it Highly connected nodes are interesting to study as they are has the lowest share of vulnerable paths. the ones with the highest stake in the network. Thus, an Increasing the number of compromised nodes results adversary might attempt to corrupt them (e.g., by bribery in fewer vulnerable paths if compromised nodes are those or stealing the private key) to maximize the effect of the with the channels holding the highest capacity, as opposed attack. Second, we assume that nodes with the highest to highest degree nodes. This distinction is most pro- total capacity in their adjacent channels are corrupted. found for relationship anonymity, e.g., there are around Finally, we consider that random nodes in the network 50% for 50 highest degree corrupted nodes, but only are colluding to carry out an attack. We model here that around 25% vulnerable paths for 50 highest capacity any node (independently of its node degree) might be corrupted nodes. This may be explained by the fact that corrupted. For instance, the same user might create several routing algorithms optimize for low path length. Note that LN nodes and place them at strategic positions in the LN capacity of forwarding channels is not as important as to carry out the attacks we study here. good connectivity, especially for payments of small and We refine our aforementioned path datasets to con- medium amounts. sider these three attacks strategies. In particular, for each Finally, we consider random nodes compromised in- number of malicious nodes (y) and each strategy, we stead of the most connected nodes. In contrast to the re-split the set paths-prone between those prone hu1,u2i,x previous results, we observe that less than 10% of paths to the attack and those otherwise safe. For instance, we are prone to value privacy and nearly no path is prone to denote by paths-prone the subset of paths hu1,u2i,x,y-con relationship anonymity and wormhole attack. We conjec- between u1 and u2 that allow to transfer x satoshis and ture that this is because randomly selected nodes have few that are prone to the attack if y nodes with the highest connections (note the degree distribution in Figure2), and node degree are corrupted. Correspondingly, we denote thus their compromise does not affect routing at large. by paths-prone the subset of paths between hu1,u2i,x,y-ran In summary, the results of this experiment show that u1 and u2 that allow to transfer x satoshis and that are highly connected nodes and nodes with high capacity prone to the attack if y nodes chosen uniformly at random links have a high impact on the security and privacy of are corrupted. the LN. Assuming that paths are selected uniformly at Finally, for each attack strategy, we consider random from the set of available paths, an adversary that selectively corrupts 100 (i.e., only 2%) of LN nodes can |paths-prone | hui,uj i,x,y effectively learn all the transaction values, the sender and α := hui,uj i |paths-prone | + |paths-safe | the receiver for the vast majority of transactions, as well as hui,uj i,x,y hui,uj i,x,y Value privacy Relationship anonymity Wormhole attack

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102 103 104 105 106 102 103 104 105 106 102 103 104 105 106 Payment amount (satoshi) Payment amount (satoshi) Payment amount (satoshi)

Figure 6. Share of vulnerable paths for each attack, considering that highest degree nodes are compromised (top), highest capacity nodes are compromised (middle), or random nodes are compromised (bottom). carry out the wormhole attack in about 30% of the paths. Routing protocols for the LN is an active research This shows that the security and privacy attacks shown in area [16], [32], [37], [48], [49], [51], [54], [56], [61]–[63]. theory are indeed crucial in practice. Our results suggest that, although largely omitted so far, Carrying out such an attack might not be infeasible in the security and privacy attacks here studied are a crucial the live network. We note that a large number of highly variable to consider when designing routing protocols. connected LN nodes is controlled by an unknown entity under the pseudonym LNBIG. It controls 23 out of top 50 5. HTLC limit in the Lightning Network highest connected nodes [14] and 40% of the network capacity [17]. In this section, we describe a limitation in the LN design stemming from the way it manages concurrent 4.4. Countermeasures payments. A payment channel, even with sufficient ca- pacity, can hold only a certain number of concurrent pay- ments (governed by HTLCs), leading to capacity under- We assume in our study that every two nodes carry out utilization. We study the effect of this limitation. First, their transactions along a subset of paths chosen uniformly we evaluate how the number of concurrent payments at random from the set of all available paths between in LN is mainly bounded by the number of concurrent them. However, LN nodes might implement different rout- HTLCs allowed at each channel. Second, we show how a ing strategies. For instance, while routing through well- malicious node can abuse this limitation to isolate parts of connected nodes improves the chances to reach the re- the network, which ultimately results in a network-wide ceiver through a short, highly liquid path, the sender might DoS attack. We provide estimates for the cost of such an connect to low degree nodes. This would make the node attack, showing that it is within range for a moderately degree distribution more even at the cost of connectivity resourceful attacker. We finally discuss countermeasures. and reduce the probability of choosing paths prone to the attacks studied in this experiment. We envision thus that 5.1. Background there is a tradeoff between connectivity on the one hand and security and privacy on the other, which constitutes a Bitcoin Core, the reference Bitcoin implementation, venue for future work. A node may also route transactions imposes a 100 KB transaction size limit [4], [7]. An through a trusted proxy node, thus guaranteeing that the LN channel cannot contain more than 966 unsettled first node in a path is not compromised. This would HTLCs [10]. This limit ensures that both counterparties mitigate the relationship anonymity and wormhole attacks can close the channel using one standard Bitcoin transac- (if the total path length is bounded to contain at most three tion. We refer to this limitation as the HTLC limit. intermediaries). As the LN protocol is still evolving, the Despite the perceived focus on micropayments, LN results of the experiments presented in this section should does not fully support transactions of very small value. Ev- be considered for the next design decisions. ery HTLC makes the potential closing transaction larger, and the on-chain fees higher. Redeeming very small out- 50 puts on-chain can be more expensive than their value. Share of channels affected by HTLC limit Therefore BOLT specifications prescribe that nodes ne- 40 gotiate the dust limit before opening a channel, and do 30 not create HTLCs for payments below this limit (see trimmed HTLCs [13]). Out of the three most popular LN 20 Affected channels (%) implementations, c-lightning and Eclair use the default 10 dust limit of 546 satoshis. LND estimates the dust limit 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 dynamically. We thus assume 546 satoshis as dust limit. Average transaction amount (satoshi)

Figure 8. Share of channels affected by the HTLC limit for different 5.2. The HTLC limit effect on LN scalability transaction amounts.

In this section, we estimate the effect of the HTLC 546 sat (dust limit) 40 limit on the number of concurrent channel updates. 1k sat Let D be the dust limit. We only consider amounts 10k sat higher than D. Let C be the total network capacity (i.e., 20 100k sat the sum of the individual capacities of all channels). Let 0 aavg be the average transaction amount. Then, we say that Affected channels (%) the limit on concurrent updates based solely on capacity u := C/a is defined as cap avg. In contrast, the limit on 2018-03-01 2018-04-01 2018-05-01 2018-06-01 2018-07-01 2018-08-01 2018-09-01 2018-10-01 2018-11-01 2018-12-01 2019-01-01 2019-02-01 2019-03-01 2019-04-01 2019-05-01 2019-06-01 2019-07-01 2019-08-01 2019-09-01 2019-10-01 2019-11-01 2019-12-01 2020-01-01 2020-02-01 Date concurrent updates considering the HTLC limit is uHTLC = N ∗ 966, where N is the number of channels. We remark Figure 9. Historic share of HTLC-limited channels. here that uHTLC does not depend on transaction amounts. Given those two values, we define the effective update rate ureff as the ratio between the actual limit on concur- this as follows. Given a fixed average transaction amount rent transactions when considering the HTLC limit and aavg, we consider a channel affected by the HTLC limit the theoretical limit based solely on capacity: if uHTLC,aavg < ucap,aavg , i.e, ueff,aavg < 100% (Figure8). The effect of the HTLC limit over time. We study the min(ucap, uHTLC) ureff = effect of the HTLC limit on the LN using our historical u cap snapshots LNHist. For each monthly snapshot and four Note that the effective update rate ureff depends on the assumed average transaction amounts, we calculate the average transaction amount, as shown in Figure7. Starting share of channels affected by the HTLC limit (Figure9). from D, there is a gap between the effective number As expected, the HTLC limit becomes a more pressing of concurrent updates and what could be theoretically issue with smaller transaction amounts, if they are higher possible in the absence of the HTLC limit. We observe than the dust limit. We also observe that the share of that 2677 satoshis (0.25 USD) is the borderline amount: affected channels has been increasing in the early months for higher average transaction amounts, the limiting factor of LN and has remained stable since mid-2019. for the number of concurrent channel updates is channel We finally study how the borderline amount has capacity. For amounts between D and 2677 satoshis, the changed over time. As Figure 10 shows, the HTLC limiting factor is the HTLC limit. limit finds its inflexion point in transaction amount at Affected channels. The ureff is an aggregated measure- approximately 2500 satoshis, with the borderline amount ment that does not shed light on how the issue affects stabilizing in mid-2019, after the initial growth. individual channels. Given that, we now study how many channels are affected by the HTLC limit. The number 5.3. Depleting the Lightning Network of affected channels depends on the average transaction amount aavg. For high values of aavg, it is more likely The HTLC limit opens up the possibility of a network- that the effective update rate of a channel is limited by wide DoS attack. An adversary connects to both end- its capacity, whereas the HTLC limit would determine points of the target channel and forwards multiple small the update rate cap for small values of aavg. We quantify payments to itself, but does not finalize them. After 966 HTLCs are added, the channel loses its ability to

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60 1500

1000

40 Borderline (sat) 500 % concurrent updates Concurrent channel updates (% of theoretical limit) 20 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 Average transaction amount (satoshi) 2018-03-01 2018-04-01 2018-05-01 2018-06-01 2018-07-01 2018-08-01 2018-09-01 2018-10-01 2018-11-01 2018-12-01 2019-01-01 2019-02-01 2019-03-01 2019-04-01 2019-05-01 2019-06-01 2019-07-01 2019-08-01 2019-09-01 2019-10-01 2019-11-01 2019-12-01 2020-01-01 2020-02-01 Date Figure 7. Ratio between the current limit on concurrent channel updates and the theoretically possible capacity-based limit. Figure 10. Historic borderline amounts. ( approximately to requirements capital total case, worst the of in actions send, all would block attacker To the LN. nels, complete the block to tacker limit dust the implementations). to equal it of assume We amount. unusable. transaction it making channel, a deplete attacker The thereby expire. can HTLCs some until payments, forward ntemxmmnme fcnurn TC ( HTLCs concurrent of number maximum the limit. on HTLC of Real capacity combined with nels requires channels. it highest-capacity example, targeting For by maximized be can channels. highest-capacity affordable.Targeting optimiza- more following it the estimate cost, make bound attack tions high upper rather rough a this suggests While for users. useless LN channels regular render can around attacker around for the capacity that the implies block can no HTLC timeouts provides HTLC of receiver rate that the see long: we if are dataset, sender, our the From preimage. to returned are rmtascigt ahohr oeaut hspossibility, this evaluate To network other. the each communities. of to parts transacting different on from prevent to based wish may attack attacker requirements. capital the lower much Optimizing griefing never with capacity-based that but to itself [34], similar to attacks is payment This a a completed. of performing gets committed and ends the path both of ment to effect the connecting multi- multiply capital, leverage to can transactions attacker hop An transactions. single-hop transactions. Multi-hop 442 by (which another nodes opposed up LND makes as and nodes support calculations default Eclair chan- theoretical block and to to c-lightning HTLCs fewer between create nels to needs default attacker In lower the parameter. ( a this limit enforce for c-lightning HTLC and values Eclair default implementations particular, lower LN choose specifications. BOLT may by defined as 1

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Countermeasures We quantitatively study for the first time the proneness of the current Lightning Network to the wormhole attack One of the limiting factors for transaction throughput as well as attacks against value privacy and relationship is the total available capacity. This limitation is overcome anonymity. We observe that a moderately resourceful ad- by opening new channels, a countermeasure that will be versary controlling only 2% of the total node count can naturally implemented with the growing LN adoption. The carry out these attacks with high success probability. issue of the HTLC limit is more challenging as it comes We also quantitatively analyze the negative effect on from the limitations of the Bitcoin and Lightning pro- scalability produced by the limit on concurrent payments tocols themselves. Therefore, more fundamental changes in the LN. We calculate that the limited concurrency in the are needed to reduce the information required to carry LN implies that an adversary can block the complete LN out the functionality encoded in HTLCs. One countermea- investing around 1.6M USD (18.5% of the network capac- sure involves replacing HTLC with AMHL [39]. While ity), and this cost can be substantially reduced by targeting an HTLC requires including a digital signature, a hash highly valuable channels (e.g., high-capacity channels or value and a timelock, an AMHL contract only requires a those connecting the biggest communities in the network). digital signature and a timelock while providing the same functionality. Acknowledgments. This work was partly supported by This countermeasure would reduce the number of by the European Research Council (ERC) under the Eu- bytes required per in-flight transaction and increase the ropean Unions Horizon 2020 research (grant agreement number of payments handled concurrently. While not No 771527-BROWSEC), by PROFET (grant agreement removing the limitation on the number of concurrent trans- P31621), by the Austrian Research Promotion Agency actions, this countermeasure raises this limit, reducing its through the Bridge-1 project PR4DLT (grant agreement negative effect on LN scalability. 13808694); by COMET K1 SBA, ABC, by Chaincode Labs and by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) through 6. Related work the Meitner program (project agreement M 2608-G27).

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[34] describe an adversarial [6] Lnd, 2017. https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd. strategy to determine the current balance of a channel in [7] Max standard tx weight, 2017. https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/ the network. Tang et al. [58] study the tradeoffs between blob/c536dfbcb00fb15963bf5d507b7017c241718bf6/src/policy/ balance privacy and routing effectiveness. Martinazzi [40] policy.h#L24. and Seres et al. [55] study the evolution of topological [8] Raiden network: high speed asset transfers for Ethereum, 2017. aspects of the LN graph. Conoscenti et al. [19] study the http://raiden.network/. dependency of the LN on payment hubs and the rebal- [9] Rust-lightning, 2017. https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning. ancing mechanisms that ameliorate the effect of depleted [10] Bolt 2: Peer protocol for channel management, 2019. channels. Tochner et al. [60] analyze a DoS attack vector https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/ based on route hijacking. Perez-Sol´ a` et al. [52] introduce 78bc516f96efd7e0f8734e73e171dff57005f6bf/02-peer-protocol. the LockDown attack where the adversary prevents an md#rationale-7. LN node from transacting by depleting the capacity in all [11] Bolt 4: Onion routing protocol, 2019. https://github.com/ its channels. In comparison, our HTLC depletion attack lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md. achieves the same result (a victim node can not forward [12] Lightning network specifications, 2019. https://github.com/ payments), but exploits the HTLC limit at each channel lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc. rather than its capacity. Finally, concurrently to our re- [13] Bolt3 - trimmed outputs, 2020. https: search, Mizrahi and Zohar [41] study the HTLC limit and //github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/ dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions. its effects. 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