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A United State of Injustice by Alexa Lee Wach | Department of Philosophy

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A United State of Injustice by Alexa Lee Wach | Department of Philosophy A United State of Injustice By Alexa Lee Wach | Department of Philosophy Defended April 5, 2016 Thesis Advisor Michael Huemer | Department of Philosophy Defense Committee Dominic Bailey | Department of Philosophy Jeffery Willett | Leeds School of Business Abstract: There are actions carried out by government under the guise of political authority that are immoral and unjust. I hope to show that the fact that government is the entity carrying out the morally questionable action is not sufficient to satisfy conditions that make prima facie wrong actions morally permissible. I will explore some political theories that attempt to explain why government has political authority, then challenge those theories. In an attempt to make clear why political authority is unjustified, I provide an argument in the form of a variety of extreme examples in which political authority might be justified. By using extreme examples I hope it becomes obvious that political authority is unjust in a normal society. The main concept that I hope can be taken from this paper is this: while the parent/child, employer/employee, doctor/mentally ill patient, morally superior person/morally inferior person, and expert/average person, relationships are all examples of valid authority, the relationship government has with the governed is not an example of valid authority. I wish to show with a discussion on morality, an analysis of various political theories, and my extreme examples of appropriate authority that government authority and actions are unjust. Wach 1 0. Background This paper is going to discuss not only how government in the present day United States performs unjust acts, passive or active, but I will also discuss how people choose to justify these actions. This is an important topic to the author for several reasons. Firstly, regardless of what political party one chooses to align themselves, citizens of a state ought to concern themselves with any injustices taking place by their government. Many are unaware of these injustices, or they choose to ignore them because it is socially preferable. I wish to start discourse so that people begin to at least acknowledge the actions of the government. My second purpose for writing this is to hopefully ignite a spark in those who read this. Someday I hope to live in a state where government is held to the same, if not more stringent, standards as the laymen within the borders. The state cannot be held accountable unless a large number of those within the state take some sort of action. And this action ought to be brought about by all people, however it needs to begin with the educated so that they can make the arguments against government accessible to those who do not understand the workings of government. Finally, I wish to take a personal journey with this project. I, like many of my fellow American citizens, have been compliant or at times even accepting of the government’s various explicit moral violations taking place in modern times. If I can become aware of what ways the state is explicitly violating moral codes and why the citizens of the state allow them to continually violate them, then I can have personal accountability. Once I, personally, am aware, then I won’t stand by idly and watch these injustices take place. Through this research my political ideology has changed. No longer do I wear rose colored glasses when looking at government. Instead I see the moral violations A United State of Injustice 2 taking place and, now, I understand why people stand by idly. Hopefully my warning at the end of this project will help my readers understand that action must be taken. We cannot continue to let those who are supposedly the guardians of morality in our state violate the moral standards that they hold their citizens to each and every day. We need to hold our government to the same, if not higher, standards than the people of the state. Wach 3 Table of Contents 1. Introduction 4 2. Definitions 7 2.1 Authority 7 2.2 Freedom 8 2.3 Obligation 8 2.4 Prima Facie 8 2.5 Right 8 2.6 State 8 3. Moral Values and Principles 10 3.1 Morals Involving Property Rights 11 3.2 Morals Regarding Human Rights 12 4. Government Actions 15 4.1 Imprisonment 15 4.2 Taxation 16 4.3 Law Enforcement 17 4.4 Military Actions 18 5. Justification 20 5.1 Social Contract 21 5.2 Tacit Consent 24 5.3 Consent Theories Are Question Begging 28 6. Why Most Let Government Do As Government Wants 31 6.1 In Our Best Interest 31 6.2 Morally Superior 32 6.3 People Are Brainwashed 34 6.3.1 Stanford Prison Experiment 34 6.3.2 The Milgram Experiment 35 6.3.3 Stockholm Syndrome 36 7. Valid Authority 39 7.1 The Parent Child Relationship 43 7.2 The Employer/Employee Relationship 47 7.3 The Relationship of a Violent Mentally Ill Person and the Mental Hospital 53 7.4 The Authority of Experts 57 8. Why It Matters 64 9. Conclusion 68 10. Bibliography 69 A United State of Injustice 4 1. Introduction The United States of America, founded in 1776, is seen as a nation of freedom, liberty, and justice for all. The thirty second “Pledge of Allegiance” that school children say at the beginning of each day engrains the idea of “justice for all” in the malleable minds of the youth. So what is this concept of justice? Many think of justice as a concept regarding moral issues in terms of property and personal liberty. In the Republic, Plato describes justice as a virtue of both individuals and their societies. In “A Theory of Justice,” John Rawls outlines justice as the “first value of social institutions” (3). He further explains justice as a societal value, a value that allows persons a free and equal society in which there is a means of making use of these freedoms. In the primitive original position, a hypothetical society in which people do not know their social status position or the position of anyone else, along with a lack of knowledge of any strength, intellect, or other asset that one may possess, all people are equal (Theory of Justice 3). Thus, if all persons are equal in the original position, they ought to remain equal even after others become aware of the status and assets of their neighbors. If we are all equal, shouldn’t all people and entities, regardless of their status or place within a governmental system, be held to equal moral standards? This is the question that has prompted my enthusiasm and investigation into this matter. To begin my investigation, I will begin with a discussion on moral principles. I will list and explain which principles are relevant for our discussion regarding the injustices of government. This is important because justice is based upon certain socially relevant moral principles. In order to assess the actions of the state in moral terms we must be first clear on what moral terms are relevant. Because the focus of this paper is on Wach 5 the United States government, I will be focusing only on moral principles and norms relevant to modern American society. After going into depth regarding social moral values, I will examine which ones government chooses to ignore. I will go into depth on what actions specifically violate moral principles in both legalese and laymen terms. I will then delve into specifically why these actions violate moral principles. Following this will come a discussion on how the government or political scientists and philosophers justify these actions that go against modern American societal values, norms, and moral codes. This justification will include political theories such as the social contract theory and its extensions. To make clear exactly how outlandish these justifications are, I will give examples of cases in which it would be appropriate for authority to carry out actions similar to those of the American government. I will then show how American government is not at all analogous to the given examples. After all this persuasion I hope to explain why these ideas matter. I hope to show why it is imperative that we stop these injustices. Not only is the violation of moral norms intrinsically bad, this behavior can prevent social growth and violate freedoms. Not only is the violation of these norms a harm for society, but it is essentially un- American. This country, after all, claims to value freedom above all else. If this is true, then I aim to prove that the actions of the American government are not just unjust but are also un-American. So what do we do about these injustices? Do we resist with civil disobedience as Henry David Thoreau suggests? Or is a warlike response the better option? Is there a way A United State of Injustice 6 to minimize government to solve these problems? Or, as most do when faced with unpleasant truths, do we turn away and act indifferent? My hope is that those who become aware of the behavior of the government will stand up. They will make change through modes such as education, protest, and other peaceful methods. Over time, hopefully government will no longer be allowed to pick and choose the morals by which they govern and instead all entities will be held to the same moral codes and standards. To conclude I will recap my arguments and then present an idea of what I believe the solution to the problem of governmental injustice should be. Hopefully I will be able to inform, if not persuade, fellow citizens of the United States to hold their government to the same moral standards that the government holds her people to.
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