Chapter 5 Institutions and New Institutionalism Key Themes of This Chapter

Understanding Public Policy: Theories and Issues 2nd ed Paul Cairney Chapter 5 Institutions and New Institutionalism Key themes of this chapter: Institutions are formal and informal rules which influence political behavior Formal rules are usually written and highly visible, such as the ‘structures of government’ that vary across policymaking systems. Informal rules are unwritten, less visible, and profoundly important but difficult to detect ‘New institutionalism’ is the study of ‘institutions’, but both terms are difficult to define. We know that institutions matter, but often struggle to define institutions. Instead, we focus on the different messages provided by key variants of institutional studies: historical, rational choice, normative, constructivist, feminist, empirical, network. ‘New institutionalism’ identifies the rules, norms, practices, and relationships that influences patterns of behaviour in politics and policymaking. ‘Institution’ once described policymaking organizations such as legislatures, courts and executives (Judge, 2005: 2). Now, it describes the formal and informal rules that guide action. Institutions are not the buildings or arenas within which people make policy. They are the rules of behaviour that influence how they make it. Formal rules of political systems include the US federal model and its constitution which sets out the rules governing the separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches and guarantees a degree of subnational policymaking autonomy. We may compare these rules with those of other political systems, such as the ‘Westminster model’ which has an executive, within the legislature, and less automatic subnational autonomy. Or, a focus on particular formal rules may allow comparisons of policymaking ‘styles’. For example, Lijphart (1999) differentiates between the styles in ‘majoritarian’ systems with first-past-the-post electoral rules and ‘consensus’ democracies which use proportional representation. Informal rules are more difficult to define, identify, and study. Broadly speaking, they are the norms of behavior that we find in many different settings, from societal norms on gender roles to the expectations about policy goals that are taken for granted in specific organizations. Although we write and speak about them, rules are often unwritten, unspoken, and difficult to unearth. They ‘exist in the mind’ of people who may know 1 what they are but struggle to describe their meaning and effect (Ostrom, 2007: 23). As in Chapter 3’s discussion of power, the impact of some rules is measurable, while others rely on theory and interpretation. Our aim is to identify patterns of behavior, then relate them to the relationships and share understandings that policy actors develop. Institutionalism studies are tricky because no-one is entirely sure what an institution is and what new institutionalism means. Lowndes (2010: 65; 2017) lists nine approaches, which suggests that it represents an umbrella term. Studies may be held together by the belief that institutions are the ‘central component of political life’ and that ‘they matter more than anything else that could be used to explain political decisions’ (Peters, 2005: 164). However, we may have to work hard to make sure that we are talking about institutions in comparable ways. There are two main ways to do so. First, describe the key messages associated with each variant. Second, identify the ‘causal mechanisms’ of institutions: how exactly do they cause patterns of behavior – such as via socialization or enforcement – and why do institutions change? Key messages include: many institutions are akin to structures which endure for many decades (historical); they provide incentives or constraints on action (rational choice); and, they are communicated via socialization (normative). Some approaches seek to go beyond these three variants to add new insights: rules and norms are communicated via the spread of ‘ideas’ (Chapter 11) which are more flexible than structures (discursive/ constructivist); and, institutions generally make it easier for men to engage in politics and policymaking (feminist). Others are better understood in terms of specific debates, such as when empirical institutionalism identifies formal rules as the cause of different policy styles, while network institutionalism emphasises common informal rules and policy styles across many political systems. Overall, we can agree quite easily that institutions matter, but have to work harder to say how and why. Identifying formal and informal institutions Newton and van Deth (2010: 9) describe formal institutions as ‘structures of government’. For example, constitutions represent a ‘set of fundamental laws that determines the central institutions and offices, and powers and duties of the state’ (2010: 71). In this context, the list of rules and associated organizations is long, and the potential for different policy outcomes in different political systems appears to be considerable: Confederal and federal. Confederal arrangements exist when countries give some powers to supranational bodies to work in their common interests, but retain significant autonomy. Federal suggests a greater integration of territories, with common institutions more likely to have enforcement powers (2010: 107–9). Federal and unitary. In federal systems, there is a balance of power between the executive, legislature and judiciary, and between central and territorial levels of government. The latter have powers and rights guaranteed in a written constitution. In unitary systems, the central government controls, and can reform 2 or abolish, territorial government (2010: 109). These distinctions are blurred by a trend towards centralization in federal states and the ‘quasi-federal’ status of some unitary systems that guarantee some autonomy to regions (2010: 114–15). Presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential. In presidential systems, an elected president is head of government and state. Many systems are based on the US model in which the president heads the executive and can initiate but not control the progress of legislation. In parliamentary systems, the head of government is a prime minister or chancellor. For example, in the ‘Westminster model’ the executive forms part of, and is accountable to, the legislature. Most legislation is initiated and controlled by the governing party which tends to have a majority under a plurality voting system. In semi-presidential systems there is a fusion of executive and legislature, but the prime minister is chosen by an elected president. Presidential and semi-presidential systems are the most likely to distribute power and are often associated with inertia and ‘deadlock’, with parliamentary systems associated with strength or effectiveness (2010: 92–8; Weaver and Rockman, 1993: 2; compare with Chapter 4) Unicameral and bicameral legislatures. While many federal states (Australia, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, US) have a ‘strong’ second chamber, most are ‘weak’, with limited powers to initiate and amend legislation or control finance (2010: 79; compare with Galligan, 2006: 272–3). The role of the judiciary. Most states have judicial review, but some also have constitutional courts (e.g. the EU, South Africa) and others have particularly active judiciaries (the US, Germany) (2010: 79–81). Direct democracy. Countries such as the US and Switzerland have procedures for holding referendums regularly, prompted by popular local initiatives (Budge, 2006). There is also a series of rules embedded within such political systems, including: Electoral systems. In first-past-the-post systems, the candidate with a plurality (not necessarily majority) of votes in a constituency is elected. In proportional systems there is often more than one vote cast (or candidates are ranked in order of preference) to ensure a closer link between the share of votes and seats that political parties gain (Newton and van Deth, 2010: 248–9; Karp and Banducci, 2008). Party systems. The number of political parties is influenced by the number of ‘cleavages’ within society, such as between those representing labour or business, and ethnic and religious populations. Party systems are influenced heavily by electoral systems, particularly under plurality which exaggerates the results for the two largest parties at the expense of small parties (which are better represented under PR). 3 Rules of government formation and executive–legislative relations. The need for minority or coalition government is more prevalent under multi-party PR systems (Newton and van Deth, 2010: 272–7). It combines with different rules in different countries regarding, for example, how long parties are given to negotiate government formation, how susceptible they are to motions of no confidence, and the extent to which parties can have policy influence in opposition (Strøm, 1990; Shugart, 2006). Group–government relations. ‘Corporatism’ refers to a close relationship between government and groups representing labour and business, in which ‘umbrella’ organizations are integrated within government policymaking structures. This is joint decision making, with the results often implemented by groups (e.g. by trade unions enforcing wage agreements on members). ‘Tri-partism’ is a less formal arrangement. ‘Pluralism’ describes groups competing with each other to influence government. In this case, informal ‘rules of the game’ are more important than formalized arrangements. Groups are

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