Navigating Motivation: a Semantic and Subjective Atlas of 7 Motives

Running head: A Motivational Atlas

Navigating Motivation: A Semantic and Subjective Atlas of 7 Motives

Gabriele Chierchia*1,4, Marisa Przyrembel*1, Franca Parianen Lesemann1, Steven

Bosworth2,3, Dennis Snower2 & Tania Singer1

1. Max Planck Institute for Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Social Neuroscience, Leipzig;

2. Kiel Institute for World Economy, Kiel;

3. University of Reading, Reading, UK;

4. University College London, UK.

* These authors contributed equally to the manuscript.

Conflict of Interest:

All authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Motivational Atlas

Abstract

Research from psychology, neurobiology and behavioral economics indicates that a binary view of motivation, based on approach and avoidance, may be too reductive and that at least seven crucial motives are likely to affect human decisions, such as "consumption/resource seeking", "care", "affiliation", "achievement", "status-power", "threat approach" (or anger), and "threat avoidance" (or fear). As a preliminary investigation of the conceptual distinctness and relatedness of these motives, we conducted a semantic categorization task, in which participants were to assign provided words to one of the motives. Results suggest that, for each motive, subjects converge on how to make these differential assignments. Moreover, principal component analysis of these assignments suggests that the semantic inter-relations of the motives can be represented on a two dimensional space, or a “semantic atlas”. This atlas suggests that, while care and affiliation are conceptually close, affiliation is closer to threat-avoidance (or fear), while on opposite to these motives, we find achievement, consumption and power, with the latter lying closer to threat-approach (or anger). In a second study, we asked participants to rate how well motive-specific words described their currently experienced feelings. We find that semantically close motives also are more likely to be experienced together, that is, we replicate most of the semantic relations in a “subjective atlas”. In addition to these motivational atlases, we provide a database of motive-specific words, together with the valence and arousal scores, to be used for future research on the influence of motives on decision making.

Key words: affiliation, care, motives, motivation psychology, semantic categorization

Motivational Atlas

Introduction

Standard economic and decision theory is typically agnostic as regards to the types of goals that agents generally pursue (Samuelson, 1938; Stigler & Becker, 1977). Moreover, several neurobiological theories of decision making draw from behaviorism and associated models of reinforcement learning (O’Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornak, & Andrews, 2001;

Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008; Seymour & Dolan, 2008), a view on motivation most closely resembling motivation psychology’s most prevalent distinction between approach and avoidance or reward and punishment (see also Pessoa, 2014). In contrast, decades of psychological research have suggest that many decision are driven by particular motives, such as the motivation for achievement, power or affiliation (Deci & Moller, 2005; Heckhausen &

Heckhausen, 2010; Lewin, 1936; McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1955; McDougall,

1932; Mowrer, 1960; Thorndike, 1898). These motives are frequently conceived as both trait- related dispositions and context-sensitive state-based responses that lead subjects to experience particular types of incentives as pleasurable and rewarding, to strive for certain types of goals, and hence to activate particular behavioral tendencies and related decisions

(Atkinson, 1964; Emmons & McAdams, 1991; McClelland, 1965; Pang, 2010; Rheinberg &

Engeser, 2010; Schultheiss & Strasser, 2012). Similarly, recent advances in neurobiology have also begun to move beyond classic approach/avoidance interpretations of motivation, enriching it with a more motive-related vocabulary (Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, &

Hikosaka, 2010; Daw, Kakade, & Dayan, 2002; Eisenegger, Haushofer, & Fehr, 2011;

Terburg & van Honk, 2013). Finally, behavioral game theorists (e.g., Camerer, 2003), social dilemma researchers (Dawes, 1980; Ernst Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Kollock, 1998; Lange,

Balliet, Parks, & Vugt, 2013) and neuroeconomists (Glimcher & Fehr, 2013) have also documented that humans often pursue ends other than payoff maximization in economic interactions (Frank, 1988; Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2004) and speculated on their 3

Motivational Atlas potential evolutionary functions (e.g., Robson 2001). Despite this rich knowledge, a coherent motive-based framework of decision making, that may integrate findings from motivation psychology, biology and behavioral economics is still missing.

To lay the grounds for such an integrated motivation-based framework we focus here on seven motives that we identify to be crucial in one or all three of the literatures mentioned above (albeit sometimes with different terminology): achievement, power-status, affiliation, care, threat avoidance (anger), threat approach (fear) and an exploratory “consumption” motive, which we propose as a possible parallel to the motivation implied by the standard

“homo economicus” model. Following seminal efforts in the emotion literature (e.g., Russell,

1980), a first aim of the present paper is to investigate the semantic relations of these motives, by asking whether and how subjects coherently differentiate between them in a semantic categorization task. Then, we aim to explore which dimensions might allow them to do so, by applying principal component analysis to such categorization judgments. In second study, we aim to investigate whether the observed semantic inter-relations hold at the level of subjective experience, that is, whether semantically “close” motives are also more likely to co-occur in subjectively reported experience, and whether, vice versa, semantically distant motives may be more likely to emerge in an antagonistic fashion. Ultimately, we aim to produce and compare a semantic and subjective “atlas” of motives, which we hope will reduce the complexity of navigating motives in a framework that goes beyond approach and avoidance.

In the following, we introduce the motives of interests from a motivation psychology and neurobiological perspective, briefly illustrating their potential relevance in behavioral economics. We then pass to describing two empirical studies that address the semantic and subjective relations between such motives. We conclude by providing a database of motive- specific words (together with their valence and arousal scores). These could be used in future studies, to better qualify the relationship between motives and decision making. 4

Motivational Atlas

Motives in psychology

Three motives, namely, “achievement”, “power” and “affiliation” are among the most recognized motives in motivation psychology (Weiner, 1990). Achievement has been defined as the desire to do something better or more efficiently than before (Atkinson & Feather,

1966; Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2010; McClelland et al., 1955; Weiner, 1990), and. A power and/or status-seeking motive has been defined as the desire to have an impact (Fodor &

Riordan, 1995; Fodor, Schultheiss, & Brunstein, 2010), to be strong, and to influence others

(Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2010; McClelland, 1953; Reiss, 2004). Achievement and power are likely to be relatively similar motives (Bakan, 1966a), insofar as related concepts have been proposed to be part of a more general “agency” (Abele, Uchronski, & Suitner, 2008;

Diehl, Owen, & Youngblade, 2004) or “competence” dimension of motivation (Cuddy, Fiske,

& Glick, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). Agency is often described as “a person’s striving to be independent, to control one’s environment, and to assert, protect and expand one’s self”, while communion refers to “a person’s striving to be part of a community, to establish close relationships with others, and to subordinate individual needs to the common good” (Abele et al., 2008; Bakan, 1966b; Diehl et al., 2004). Indeed, proponents of the agency/communion division have suggested that achievement and power could constitute standard and “excessive” forms of agency, respectively (Abele et al., 2008; Bakan, 1966a;

Diehl et al., 2004).

Motives that can be subsumed under the “communion” dimension of motivation are for example intimacy (McAdams, 1980), nurturance (Murray, 1938a), prosocial altruism (J.

Heckhausen, 2000), help (Heckhausen, 1989b), idealism and family (Reiss, 2004), and affiliation (McClelland, 1953). Among these, the most prominent motive is affiliation, which has been defined as the need to be liked or the need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; J. 5

Motivational Atlas

Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2010; Jackson, 1974; McClelland et al., 1955; Murray, 1969).

This has been suggested (Weinberger, Cotler, & Fishman, 2010) to have a “bright” side, related to the joy of social approval/acceptance, and a “darker” component, related to the fear of social isolation/rejection (e.g., Eisenberger, 2012). In both cases, affiliation has frequently been associated with a variety of socially compliant behaviors (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004;

Langner & Winter, 2001; Over & Carpenter, 2009). Moreover, there is evidence from several psychological approaches that this social motivation can further be differentiated into two subsystems: one that expresses the need to belong and to affiliate, and one that deals with intimacy, care giving, nurturance, and compassion (also see Weinberger et al., 2010). Indeed, psychologists have frequently differentiated between wanting to be accepted, versus wanting to accept and nourish others. For instance, Murray (1969) contrasts nurturance and affiliation,

McAdams (1980) distinguishes an intimacy motivation from affiliation, Heckhausen (2000) discriminates affiliation vs. altruism/help and Jackson (1974) distinguishes between affiliation and nurturance. Interestingly, some agency/communion proponents have also recognized a gradient within the communion dimension, with notions related to “care” on one end and concepts related to “lack of independence”, which are closer to the affiliation motive, on the other (Abele et al., 2008; Bakan, 1966b; Diehl et al., 2004). Using the term ‘affiliation’ for both of these phenomenologically and psychologically differing sub-motives might be too general, and thus, we propose a distinction between two subsystems, namely care and affiliation (Weinberger et al., 2010).

In addition to classical motives such as achievement, power and affiliation discussed in motivation psychology, some have advocated a motivational threat system encompassing fear and anger – “harm avoidance” (Murray, 1938b), “avoidance” (Hull, 1943; Lewin, 1936;

Thorndike, 1898), “fear” (Heckhausen 1989), “anxiety” (Trudewind, 2000), as opposed to

“aggression” (Heckhausen, 1989b), “rage” (McDougall, 1932; J Panksepp, 2006), 6

Motivational Atlas

“vengeance” (Reiss, 2004), respectively. In the traditional literature, these two motives often bare the names of primary emotions. However, to stress the motivational dimension of anger and fear (Roseman -2011 - calls them "emotivations") we will speak of “threat approach” and

“threat avoidance” (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009).

This brief review on the concepts of motives, as discussed in personality and motivation psychology, suggests that at least five distinct context-sensitive motives, namely achievement, power, affiliation, threat avoidance (fear) and threat approach (anger), have been described consistently and have been empirically proven to differentially influence human decision- making. The distinction between affiliation and care is slightly less acknowledged, however, as we will see in what follows, the notion of a care-related motive is more prominent in biology (Alcaro, Huber, & Panksepp, 2007; Carter, 1998; Hall, Stanton, Schultheiss,

Schultheiss, & Brunstein, 2010; Insel & Young, 2001; Jaak Panksepp, 2005; O. Schultheiss &

Brunstein, 2010; Singer & Klimecki, 2014). Similarly, the optimization of one's own utility and welfare (i.e., the selfish accumulation of consumption or goods), which is typically assumed to be the backbone of neo-classical economic models, has received relatively less attention in the motivation psychology literature (Kasser, 2006; Kasser et al., 2014) but has often been associated with terms such as "wanting", “desire-seeking”, or “foraging” in the animal and neurobiological literature (Berridge, Ho, Richard, & DiFeliceantonio, 2010;

Berridge & Robinson, 1998; de Waal, 2007; Delgado, Gillis, & Phelps, 2008; Depue &

Collins, 1999; Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999; Lea & Webley, 2006; Panksepp, 2006).

Neurobiological Evidence for motivational systems

Typically, neurobiological research on motivation and affect does not refer to distinct motives, but rather to more general antagonistic approach-avoidance motivation associated to reward and punishment (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; Dayan & Balleine, 2002; Dayan & 7

Motivational Atlas

Berridge, 2014; Lang & Bradley, 2010; Montague, Hyman, & Cohen, 2004; Schultz, 2010;

Seymour, Singer, & Dolan, 2007). However, several researchers have started to characterize motivation on a more fine-grained level (Alcaro et al., 2007; Hall et al., 2010; Panksepp,

2005; Rodrigues, LeDoux, & Sapolsky, 2009; Schultheiss et al., 2008; Toates, 1986; Wright

& Panksepp, 2012). For example, Panksepp (Alcaro & Panksepp, 2011; Nelson & Panksepp,

1998; Panksepp, 2005) discusses seven distinct biological systems – seeking, rage, fear, care, panic, lust and play – which are proposed to be characterized by dissociable brain networks and neuromodulatory systems, as well as distinct psycho-behavioral functions and evolutionary purposes. In line with this multi-faceted approach to motivation, on the system neuroscience level, researchers have begun to investigate care-related motivation and behavior using imaging techniques, e.g. by studying maternal love (Bartels & Zeki, 2000,

2004; Strathearn, Fonagy, Amico, & Montague, 2009) and the effects of loving kindness and compassion training (Bornemann, Kok, Böckler, & Singer, 2016; Engen & Singer, 2015;

Hildebrandt, McCall, & Singer, 2017; Klimecki, Leiberg, Ricard, & Singer, 2014; Klimecki,

Leiberg, Lamm, & Singer, 2012; Valk et al., 2017; Weng et al., 2013), which is designed to enhance prosocial motivation and behavior (Leiberg, Klimecki, & Singer, 2011). These studies have highlighted a network of brain regions that frequently include the medial orbitofrontal cortex, the ventral tegmental area and striatum including nucleus accumbens.

Many of these regions are also rich in receptors of the peptide hormone oxytocin (OT), as well as dopamine and opioids (e.g., Dölen, Darvishzadeh, Huang, & Malenka, 2013), and OT has been suggested to play an important role in mediating a range of caring and affiliative behaviors, such as parental care and social bonding in several species including humans

(Bakermans-Kranenburg & van Ijzendoorn, 2013; Carter, 1998; Feldman, 2012; Gordon,

Martin, Feldman, & Leckman, 2011; Insel & Young, 2001; Cade McCall & Singer, 2012;

Rilling, 2013; Ross & Young, 2009). For instance, intranasal administration of OT in humans has been frequently shown to increase trust and prosocial decisions in economic decision 8

Motivational Atlas making tasks (Baumgartner, Heinrichs, Vonlanthen, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2008; Declerck,

Boone, & Kiyonari, 2010; E Fehr, 2009; Israel, Weisel, Ebstein, & Bornstein, 2012; Kosfeld,

Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005; Rilling et al., 2012). On the other hand, the steroid hormone testosterone (T) has been associated with different competitive or dominant behaviors related to power-status (Burnham, 2007; C Eisenegger et al., 2011; Christoph

Eisenegger, Naef, Snozzi, Heinrichs, & Fehr, 2010; Hall et al., 2010; Mazur & Booth, 1998;

Salvador, 2005; Stanton, O’Dhaniel, & McLaurin, 2011). For instance, administration of T has been related to decreased trust in economic games (Boksem et al., 2013; Bos, Hermans,

Ramsey, & Honk, 2012), lower offers in bargaining problems (Zak et al., 2009) and increased risk taking (Stanton, Liening, & Schultheiss, 2011). In line with the “darker side of affiliation” mentioned above (Weinberger et al., 2010), Panksepp (Panksepp, 2006) distinguishes, among others, between “care” and “panic/separation distress”, with the latter revolving around the anterior cingulate and the periaqueductal gray. Eisenberger and colleagues (Eisenberger, 2012; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003) found that similar regions are recruited when experiencing both the affective response to physical pain and the one elicited through social rejection. Overall, the neuronal bases of threat avoidance (fear) and threat approach (anger) are rather well explored, with the implicated brain regions and neurotransmitters for the two systems overlapping considerably (Adolphs, 2013; Bond &

Wingrove, 2010; LeDoux, 2014; Nelson & Trainor, 2007; Potegal & Stemmler, 2010;

Rodrigues et al., 2009; Siever, 2008). Finally, a large body of empirical evidence has suggested that the mesolimbic dopamine (DA) system plays a crucial role in mediating consumption-related appetitive, incentive wanting/seeking states and behaviors (Alcaro et al.,

2007; Berridge et al., 2010; Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Depue & Collins, 1999; Schultz,

2007).

This very brief review suggests that motivation should not be reduced to approach and

Motivational Atlas avoidance. Rather, different sectors of neuroscience suggest that characteristic neurobiological systems facilitate behaviors related to distinct motives, such as consumption, caring, fear of social rejection, fight/flight, and dominance.

Motivation in Economic Decision Making

Motivation psychology and neurobiology thus suggest that distinct motives or motivational systems could facilitate distinct action tendencies and decisions. This notion is not explicitly invoked in classical economic theories, which generally hold that decisions are determined by stable, context-insensitive and exogenously given "preferences" (Camerer & Loewenstein,

2004; Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, 1995; Samuelson, 1938; Varian, 2006). In spite of this, motive-related vocabulary has frequently been invoked to explain economic behavior.

For example, fear has been frequently been associated to risk-, loss-, or ambiguity aversion in economic decision making (Canessa & Crespi, 2013; Hartley & Phelps, 2012; Lerner &

Keltner, 2001; Maner & Gerend, 2007; Martino & Camerer, 2010; Porcelli & Delgado, 2009;

Raghunathan & Pham, 1999), while Anger has been associated with increased risk taking

(Fessler, Pillsworth, & Flamson, 2004; Kugler, Kausel, & Kocher, 2012; Lerner & Keltner,

2001), with so-called altruistic punishment towards experienced unfairness (Carpenter &

Matthews, 2009; Seip, Dijk, & Rotteveel, 2014; Strobel et al., 2011; Yamagishi et al., 2009), as well as with decreased generosity, trust and cooperation in game-theoretic paradigms

(Eimontaite, Nicolle, Schindler, & Goel, 2013; Polman & Kim, 2013; Small & Lerner, 2008).

In the broader economic literature, the closest construct to a care or affiliation motive is plausibly the notion of altruism (Andreoni, 1990; Becker, 1974; Bruce & Waldman, 1990;

Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003b; Hamilton, 1964; Palfrey & Rosenthal, 1988; Sally, 2001), which has been frequently been invoked to explain charitable donations (Harbaugh, Mayr, &

Burghart, 2007; Tusche & Böckler, 2016), cooperation (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson &

Moran, 1999; Ernst Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004), and trust (Baumgartner et al., 2008; Kosfeld 10

Motivational Atlas et al., 2005; McCall, Steinbeis, Ricard, & Singer, 2014; Singer & Steinbeis, 2009). The relevance of status and power concerns for economic decision making has also been frequently argued for in the economic literature (Cole, Mailath, & Postlewaite, 1992; Frank,

1985; Robson & Samuelson, 2010), and a Power-related motive has been associated with a variety of economic decision making patterns, from impatience to receiving monetary goods

(Joshi & Fast, 2013), to heightened reward sensitivity (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002), increased risk-taking (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006), norm-enforcement (Chierchia, Lesemann, Snower,

Vogel, & Singer, 2017; Straub & Murnighan, 1995; Yamagishi et al., 2012), and both prosocial decisions (Guinote, Cotzia, & Sandhu, 2015; Kumru & Vesterlund, 2010) - such as contributing more to public goods in social dilemmas (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003) - and selfish decisions - such as taking more from common resources (Lammers, Galinsky,

Gordijn, & Otten, 2008)1. Moreover, both seminal psychological studies on achievement motivation (Atkinson, 1957) and well-known economic theories (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 2001;

Gómez-Miñambres, 2012; Selten, 1998) have highlighted that, rather than maximizing mere monetary payoffs, experimental participants frequently behave as if pursuing subjective goals, where every outcome below that goal is considered a loss/failure, and every outcome above it a gain/success (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Selten, 1998). However, as discussed above, we suggest that the standard motivation of economic theory to maximize one’s own resources is captured by what we refer to as a "consumption motive", which is related to the "wanting" or

"resource-seeking" systems discussed in neurobiology. In synthesis, preliminary evidence suggests that many of the proposed psychological motives could underlie important decision making patterns that have been documented in the behavioral economics literature. However, before experimentally testing such a motive-based decision making model, we first aimed

1 This differential impact of Power-motivation could be due to power increasing agentic and approaching behavior (Galinsky et al., 2003).

Motivational Atlas with the present paper, to explore the relations between these motives on a semantic and subjective level.

A semantic and subjective atlas of seven motives

Based on an integrative approach of motivation psychology, neurobiology and behavioral economics, we have suggested that at least seven motives are likely to drive decision making:

1) Consumption/Resource-Seeking, 2) Care, 3) Affiliation, 4) Power-Status, 5) Achievement,

6) Threat Avoidance (or fear) and 7) Threat Approach (or anger). Clearly, this framework is to be viewed as a pragmatic starting point and will have to be expanded and refined, plausibly by investigating additional motives. However, as a first step towards integrating those fields and developing a common motive-related language, we first asked whether subjects can indeed semantically differentiate between each of these motives in similar ways. For example, do people agree on how concepts of affiliation and care differ from one another, or are these categories too similar to be semantically distinguished? What is the commonly conceived relationship between achievement, a well-known motive in psychology, and consumption, an important motivational system in neurobiology? In short, we asked whether people are able to distinguish between these seven proposed motives and how these relate to each other in semantic space.

To investigate these questions we conducted a semantic categorization task in which we asked subjects to ascribe a number of motive-related words to the seven motivational categories posited above. This approach is reminiscent of a long tradition of psychological studies on emotions, which assess subjects’ conceptualization of affective states (Kuppens & Tuerlinckx,

2013, for a review). Such studies typically assume that, throughout their daily interactions, subjects learn about emotions and form “mental maps”, which enable them to understand how emotions relate to one another and to behavior (Russell, 1980). Though such “laymen psychologists” may not be able to explicitly characterize their knowledge of emotions, their 12

Motivational Atlas conceptual maps can be accessed by asking them to make judgments on emotions. For instance, in a seminal paper, Russell (1980) asked subjects to categorize 28 emotion-related words to pre-defined emotional categories and found that 2 dimensions, namely valence and arousal, could predict most categorization judgments. In line with this, many psychologists

(e.g., Barrett, 2004; Shaver, Schwartz, & Kirson, 1987) have capitalized on categorization agreements/disagreements to spatially represent “closeness” of emotion-related concepts on a single (multidimensional) space. To our knowledge, these approaches have frequently been applied to emotions, but never to motives.

Our semantic categorization task thus had two complementary objectives: 1) to investigate whether the motives posited by our framework are conceptually differentiated across subjects in a coherent manner: if not, subjects should seldom (or never) choose the same words to distinguish one motive from its nearest neighbours. On the other hand, if subjects do have similar semantic representations of motives, it should be found that they agree on which words best distinguish one motive from each of the others. 2) As a second goal, by applying a principle component analysis (“PCA”) to the categorization judgments, we aimed to reconstruct subjects’ mental maps of motives, and thus to show how subjects generally think motives relate to one another on a single “semantic atlas”. Importantly, Russell (1980) argues that the cognitive structure of emotions should reflect the structure of actually experienced emotions. If the same were true for motives, than the conceptual-semantic proximity of motives could predict their experienced proximity (e.g., an increased likelihood of co- occurrence). In addition, Russell’s frequently corroborated circumplex model of emotions

(Kuppens & Tuerlinckx, 2013; Posner & Russell, 2005) suggests that many emotion judgments and experiences can be adequately described by valence and arousal, which were found to constitute the two main dimensions of his space. Along these lines, we aimed to assess whether the same may holds for motives. Correspondingly, after the categorization 13

Motivational Atlas task, we asked participants to rate each of the tested motive-relevant words on valence and arousal, to assess whether these dimensions alone could constitute the basis on which subjects made their categorization judgments.

Moreover, we expected the conceptual-semantic relations between motives to display at least four additional characteristics: first, we expected “care” and “affiliation”-specific words to be conceptually closer to one another, as we previously mentioned that these are often conflated within a broader “communion” dimension of social attitudes (Abele et al., 2008; Bakan,

1966a). Moreover, as mentioned above, psychologists focusing on the agency/communion distinction have frequently illustrated a gradient within the communion dimension, spanning notions related to care, on one side, to those related to “lack of independence” (i.e., affiliation), on the other (Abele et al., 2008). Second, we expected that words attributed to affiliation would have some conceptual proximity to fear, as research on the affiliation motive has made a link between the need to belong and fear of rejection, social pain and separation distress (Eisenberger, 2012; Panksepp, 2006; Weinberger et al., 2010). Third, following agency/communion theorists, we expected that power-status and achievement words would be relatively close (at least closer to one another than care/affiliation), as they are both related to agency, with words related to achievement on one end of a hypothetical agency spectrum, and words related to power on the other (Abele et al., 2008). Fourth, we expected words related to threat approach (i.e., anger) and threat avoidance (i.e., fear) to be relatively close, as these motives are both related to perceived threats. Moreover, as threat-approach (or anger) has been associated to feelings of agency, we expected it to be closer to the agency dimension than threat-avoidance, i.e., thus closer to power/achievement (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009).

Finally, as consumption was thought of as a parallel to the self-interested motivation traditionally assumed in economics, we expected consumption-specific words to be relatively

Motivational Atlas close to agentic motives such as achievement or power/status and distant from words related to care.

Finally, another important question we aimed to address is whether similar relationships will also be reflected in a “subjective atlas”. Thus, although concepts that are thought of as conceptually close generally also co-occur in self-reported experience (Russell, 1980)2, this needn’t always be the case. For instance, compassion tends to be prototypically conceptualized as a positive emotion, though when actually experienced (e.g., when witnessing the suffering of others) it can be accompanied by positive as well as negative affect (Condon & Feldman Barrett, 2013). Analog to such approaches in emotion research, we investigated here whether in the domain of motives, semantic categorization of motives and subjectively experienced motives would fall onto similar or distinct dimensions. To answer this question, participants self-reported (by providing ratings) in a second study how the seven motives of interest described their spontaneously occurring motives and feelings: if semantically close motives are also subjectively close (Russell, 1980), we expected semantically close motives to also be more likely to co-occur at the level of experience.

Study 1

Methods

Participants

79 participants (40 males, mean age = 32.4, SD=13) took part in one of 10 experimental sessions. Experimental protocols were approved by local ethics committee (of the Medical

Faculty of the University of Leipzig, n. 090-15-090032015) and all participants provided informed consent for the anonymized treatment of their data.

2 Russell suggests that this occurs because self-reports of affective states are also the result of a cognitive or “interpretative” process, which relies on semantic representations and their corresponding structures.

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Procedures

Sessions were conducted in the computer lab of the Department of Social Neuroscience at the

Max Planck Institute in Leipzig, Germany. Participants took part in the tasks from individually shielded computer cubicles. Participants of sessions 1 through 6 (n=38, 21 males, mean age=41.3, SD=18.2) took part in the categorization task only (see below), while participants of sessions 7 through 10 (n=41, 20 males, mean age=26.4, SD=3.8) additionally took part in the valence and arousal ratings (after the categorization task).

Word pre-selection

To pre-select motive-related words to use in the categorization task, we drew from a previously existing “free-association” database (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 2004), which was created by requiring participants to name the “first word that came to mind that was meaningfully related or strongly associated to the presented cue word”. This database provides over 72.000 “cue-associate” pairs and to draw motive-related words from it we proceeded in two steps. First, for each of our motives, we searched the database for one or two most closely related words. We called these “anchor words”. Second, we searched the database for adjectives that had been associated to the anchor words in either the 1st or 2nd degree3. For most of our motives, the identification of anchor words was trivial. Specifically, we took the word “care” as an anchor word for the care motive, the word “power” for power- status, “fear and fearful” for threat-avoidance (i.e., fear), “anger/angry” for threat-approach

(i.e., anger) and “achieve/achievement” for achievement. Two of the posited motives, namely,

“affiliation” and “consumption”, did not have obvious equivalents in the database. For affiliation we thus chose the anchor words “friend/friendly”, while for consumption we chose

3 For example, for our care motive we selected among associates of the anchor word “care” (1st degree), as well as among the associates of these associates – 2nd degree.

Motivational Atlas the anchor word “want”. After having obtained a preliminary set of motive-associated words, we expanded this set through online synonym vocabularies. A list of 174 words was used in sessions 1 through 6, and this list was extended to 305 words for sessions 7 through 10.4

Semantic categorization task

The pre-selected words were then used in the main categorization task of interest. Here, subjects were required to ascribe each word to one of the seven motives posited by our framework. Visually, participants were shown a list of candidate motive-related words (in randomized order), on the left side of the screen, and seven labelled “boxes” on the right (see figure 1 in the supplementary material, section A). All box labels began with the phrase

“motivated by…” and ended with one of the following: “…care for others”, “…the desire to belong”, “…power”, “…achievement”, “…anger”, “…fear” and “…the desire for possession and consumption”5. Subjects were then asked to drag and drop each word into one of the boxes. No instructions were provided as to how many words could be placed in each category

(see supplementary material, section B, for the specific instructions). The results of the semantic categorization task are available in the supplementary material (see also supplementary material section E, for a description of the data frame).

Valence, arousal and frequency scores

After the categorization task, participants of sessions 7 through 10 (n=41) also rated each of the 305 words on two scales: a valence scale and an arousal scale. Scales consisted of continuous scrolling bars, which could take values between 0 and 100 (in table 1 we subtract

4 With one exception (due to a programming error for the word “gemein”= mean), all of the words used in the first 6 sessions were also used in the last 4 ones. 5 For sessions 6 through 10, we slightly changed the label of this category to “motivated by wanting”. We did so to control for a possible overly negative connotation of the words consumption and possession. This label change led to no identifiable difference in the results (see supplementary material, section D, for details).

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50 from the mean valence and arousal scores, so that t-tests against 0 may suggest which words are statistically high/low in valence or arousal). The instructions for the tasks were taken from Kanske & Kotz (Kanske & Kotz, 2010). English translations in Table 1 were carried out by professional translators.

Analysis

We ran two types of analyses. The first searched for “motive-specific” words, that is, words that were attributed more frequently to one motive than any other. To obtain these, for each word, we took the two categories in which the word had been most frequently placed in and we then ran a chi-square test to assess whether the resulting proportion could be due to chance6. If it could not (p<0.05), we took the resulting word to be “motive-specific” and we took it to be “ambiguous” otherwise 7. We call words that satisfied this property “motive- specific”. Second, we ran a principal component analysis (“PCA”) taking the seven motivation-categories as variables/descriptors, and the single words as items. The PCA was conducted with the “PCA” function of the “Factominer” package (Lê, Josse, & Husson, 2008) in R (R Core team, 2013). As supplementary variables of interest we took: i) the results of the first analysis (namely, a vector indicating which motive – if any - each word had been specifically ascribed to); and ii) valence and arousal scores. Supplementary variables enable to relate variables to PCA space, without affecting its solution (Lê et al., 2008). As regards valence and arousal, we also ran parametric (t-tests) against 0 (i.e., neutrality) and non- parametric tests (Mann-Whitney), and compared each set of motive specific words to one another on these two dimensions. However, as these results added little to our supplementary valence and arousal results, we report them in the supplementary material (section D).

6 This could be considered a statistical parallel to Russell’s “precision” (which took a value of 0, if a given word was distributed randomly over the provided categories, and 1, if all subjects attributed a given word to the same category) (Russell, 1980). 7 P-values were also corrected for multiple comparisons (using the Hochberg method). In Table 1, we append an asterisk to the words that survived this more stringent criterion.

Motivational Atlas

Results

Motive specific words

For each one of the tested motives, we found a subset of words that significantly (p<0.05) differentiated this motive from each of the other presented motives. This was observed for

210 (68%) of the 305 words and an average of 30 words (SD=8.56) per motivational category. This suggests that participants can indeed semantically distinguish between the seven tested motives and, more specifically, that participants tacitly agree on which words best characterize each of the seven distinctions we proposed. The “motive-specific” words are presented in the database (see Table 1). Within each motivational category they are ordered based on how frequently they were placed in that category8.

word motive valence arousal hard-working [leistungsbereit] achievement*** 8.55 (24.09) 2.73 (27.4) industrious [fleißig] achievement*** 25 (16.07)*** 4.45 (24.52) capable [leistungsfähig] achievement*** 24.6 (15.83)*** 4.23 (26.29) productive [produktiv] achievement*** 22.83 (15.57)*** 1.77 (26.73) overambitious [streberhaft] achievement*** -6.35 (22.68) -11.75 (25.18) ambitious [ehrgeizig] achievement*** 13.25 (18.6)** 10.17 (22.12) pressure-to-achieve [Leistungsdruck] achievement*** -19.43 (18.8)*** 3.77 (30.8) talent [Talent] achievement*** 31.35 (14.35)*** 3.1 (30.85) success-driven [erfolgsorientiert] achievement** 9.38 (22.74) 2.95 (26.69) self-improvement [Selbstverbesserung] achievement** 18.7 (18.96)*** 5.65 (25.82) self [selbst-optimierend] achievement** 15.42 (22.18)** -9.67 (28.76) efficient [effizient] achievement** 18.78 (19.15)*** -5.48 (30.11) motivated [motiviert] achievement** 29.9 (13.61)*** 12.9 (23.84) determined [strebend] achievement** 12.48 (20.92)* 2.15 (26.91) drive [Eigenantrieb] achievement** 23.9 (16.6)*** 7.9 (24.5)

8 The slight label difference of one of the categories between the first 6 and last 4 sessions did not appear to elicit notable differences in the categorization results (see Supplementary material 4 for more details).

Motivational Atlas

pressure-to-succeed [Erfolgsdruck] achievement* -19.98 (18.47)*** -4.12 (31.02) gift [Begabung] achievement* 29.85 (13.42)*** 9.58 (26.44) competitive [wetteifernd] achievement* -2.23 (21.37) 4.98 (26.53) active [tatkräftig] achievement 23.92 (16.93)*** 15.9 (21.69)* outstanding [herausragend] achievement 24.47 (18.84)*** 16.3 (20.79)** obstinate [hartnäckig] achievement 10.17 (16.39)* 10.67 (23.07) rational [rational] achievement 11.02 (18.17)* -17.92 (25.17)* realistic [realistisch] achievement 18.88 (16.98)*** -11.42 (27.8) persistent [beharrlich] achievement 15.75 (16.28)*** 2.27 (21.16) victory-oriented [siegesorientiert] achievement 7.52 (21.83) 1.8 (27.01) well-calculated [wohlkalkuliert] achievement 9.33 (15.08)* -15.38 (23.71) self-critical [selbstkritisch] achievement 20.22 (20.01)*** 6.62 (26.16) conventional [angepasst] affiliation*** -13.98 (17.11)** -18.75 (24.38)** ingratiating [einschmeichelnd] affiliation*** -13.52 (19.67)* -13.05 (23.12) entertaining [unterhaltsam] affiliation*** 27.58 (12.81)*** 11.58 (25.31) peer-pressure [Gruppendruck] affiliation** -29 (18.52)*** -9.2 (26.53) excluded [ausgeschlossen] affiliation* -23.35 (29.77)** -2 (29.47) attached [anhänglich] affiliation* -10.67 (15.73)* -10.67 (22.01) popularity [Beliebtheit] affiliation* 23.25 (12.55)*** 7.48 (24.5) sycophantic [anbiedernd] affiliation -26.32 (17.36)*** -12.05 (28.09) assimilated [assimiliert] affiliation -10.65 (17.34) -14.17 (21.66) conformist [konformistisch] affiliation -16.92 (17.57)*** -19.43 (20.65)*** obliging [gefällig] affiliation -4.55 (18.82) -11.12 (22.22) inexperienced [unbedarft] affiliation 0.7 (20.17) -10.27 (23.38) affable [umgänglich] affiliation 27.62 (13.98)*** -1.25 (29.9) obedient [folgsam] affiliation -7.6 (19.21) -14.55 (22.26) talkative [gesprächig] affiliation 20.88 (17.11)*** 4.8 (27.71) popular [beliebt] affiliation 26.65 (13.82)*** 6.88 (27.15) communicative [mitteilsam] affiliation 15.03 (14.45)*** 2.45 (23.07) gregarious [gesellig] affiliation 30.5 (13.49)*** 6.58 (25.56) sociable [kontaktfreudig] affiliation 30.7 (14.87)*** 9.25 (27.91) livid [fuchsteufelswild] anger*** -23.98 (17.09)*** 12.08 (32.67) irritable [reizbar] anger*** -24.1 (15.7)*** 8.98 (25.9) excitable [erregbar] anger*** -2.3 (20.57) 18.47 (24.98)** quick-tempered [hitzig] anger*** -10.65 (17.89) 16.75 (23.58)* impulsive [impulsiv] anger*** -2.2 (18.79) 22.85 (20.46)*** short-tempered [aufbrausend] anger*** -20.95 (18.51)*** 14.35 (27.79) hateful [hasserfüllt] anger*** -42.33 (10.78)*** 8.12 (36.86) aggressive [aggressiv] anger*** -31 (18.46)*** 8.55 (34.89) argumentative [streitlustig] anger*** -21.62 (22.96)*** 7.05 (30.6)

Motivational Atlas

resentment [Groll] anger*** -30.25 (14.01)*** 2 (31.37) angry [wütend] anger*** -24.7 (18.67)*** 12.17 (30.5) upset [aufgebracht] anger*** -14.15 (15.68)*** 9.42 (26.02) ill-tempered [übellaunig] anger*** -35.08 (11.31)*** -0.1 (29.79) grouchy [grießgrämig] anger*** -29.75 (13.82)*** -9.17 (25.29) outrage [Empörung] anger*** -10.62 (20.64) 10.48 (28.98) raging [rasend] anger*** -24.68 (17.23)*** 13.17 (31.69) annoyed [genervt] anger*** -27.38 (15.11)*** 2.73 (28.29) offended [beleidigt] anger*** -25.75 (13.47)*** -5.38 (25.56) rebellious [rebellisch] anger** 7.95 (18.14) 20.1 (20.35)*** indignant [ungehalten] anger** -15 (17.15)*** 10 (22.86) tempestuous [stürmisch] anger* 1.52 (19.97) 18.15 (25.77)* spirited [temperamentvoll] anger* 9.05 (17.78) 20.45 (19.06)*** hostile [feindselig] anger* -36.8 (13.34)*** 3.3 (29.64) resistance [Widerstand] anger* 8.12 (21.37) 13.73 (20.25)* defiance [Trotz] anger -17.02 (17.27)*** 3.7 (26.81) booming [aufmüpfig] anger -10.92 (15.33)* 7.33 (22.65) willing-to-fight [kampfbereit] anger 7.67 (23.77) 17.08 (23.78)* stubborn [stur] anger -17.83 (20.7)*** 0.3 (25.88) destructive [zerstörerisch] anger -34.25 (18.44)*** 12 (32.11) warm-hearted [warmherzig] care*** 37.47 (10.95)*** 7.2 (28.53) affectionate [liebevoll] care*** 36.75 (11.83)*** 14.8 (29.07) helpful [hilfsbereit] care*** 37.05 (11.23)*** 4.27 (30.44) merciful [barmherzig] care*** 29.7 (15.45)*** -1.4 (30.76) cordial [herzlich] care*** 33.95 (17.02)*** 13.92 (27.63) soft-hearted [weichherzig] care*** 16.75 (15.21)*** -3.05 (27.44) paternal [väterlich] care*** 19.75 (18.27)*** -2.8 (29.76) kind [lieb] care*** 34.2 (14.9)*** 5.23 (30.55) self-sacrificing [aufopfernd] care*** 11.77 (22.95) 5 (24.31) selfless [selbstlos] care*** 18.5 (21.6)*** 2.98 (27.71) consoling [tröstend] care*** 26.3 (15.6)*** 2.65 (28.98) magnanimous [großherzig] care*** 34.28 (13.63)*** 6.3 (29.59) motherly [mütterlich] care*** 24.22 (18.81)*** -0.75 (29.53) caring [fürsorglich] care*** 31.3 (13)*** 0.88 (28.84) sympathetic2 [mitfühlend] care*** 29.55 (12.65)*** 10.17 (28.43) sensitive [feinfühlig] care*** 29.72 (11.55)*** 2.33 (26.72) supportive [unterstützend] care*** 31.17 (15.31)*** 2.73 (31.2) sympathetic [anteilnehmend] care*** 30.28 (12.49)*** -5.35 (27.84) prudent [umsichtig] care** 23.7 (13.37)*** -3.62 (28.1) protective [beschützend] care** 30.22 (12.28)*** 7.25 (26.58)

Motivational Atlas

kind-hearted [gutherzig] care** 29.44 (12.37)*** 3.54 (26.5) social [sozial] care** 29.5 (14.58)*** 4.05 (29.81) understanding [nachsichtig] care** 18.58 (12.86)*** -2.5 (25.75) unselfish [uneigennützig] care** 19.95 (21.47)*** -6.33 (30.29) cautious [behutsam] care* 19.2 (15.3)*** -8.25 (25.09) solidarity [Solidarität] care* 31.3 (14.16)*** 4.23 (31.09) pampering [verhätschelnd] care -19.05 (18.44)*** -11.92 (23.36) concerned [besorgt] care -8.4 (17.03) -3.48 (26.42) friendly [freundlich] care 35.17 (11.01)*** 2.02 (29.92) likeable [sympathisch] care 39.28 (11.79)*** 11.05 (29.38) comradely [kameradschaftlich] care 23.3 (22.75)*** 2.27 (28.06) generous [großzügig] care 30.45 (13.25)*** 9.6 (28.29) nice [nett] care 26.25 (15.1)*** -2.25 (30.69) frank [offenherzig] care 28.78 (13.51)*** 8.92 (24.59) consumerist [konsumorientiert] consumption*** -15.17 (19.74)** -14.38 (27.32) desire to buy [Kauflust] consumption*** -5.58 (20.35) 1.02 (25.92) shoppin-mood [Kauflaune] consumption*** -4.25 (19.21) 2.5 (25.89) passion-for-collecting [Sammelleidenschaft] consumption*** -0.88 (19.42) -7.25 (27.07) covetousness [Besitzdrang] consumption*** -12.38 (18.68)* 0.65 (26.86) pleasure-seeking [genusssüchtig] consumption*** -12.77 (20.25)* 12.33 (22.37) materialistic2 [besitzorientiert] consumption*** -15.83 (19.72)** -11.12 (25.97) materialistic [materialistisch] consumption*** -16.92 (22.84)** -7.65 (28.83) commercialized [kommerzorieniert] consumption** -20.7 (20.11)*** -6.4 (27.73) pride-of-ownership [Besitzerstolz] consumption** -0.38 (17.34) 6.23 (22.95) acquisitive [habsüchtig] consumption** -29.52 (14.85)*** 0.65 (27.42) avaricious2 [raffgierig] consumption** -34.45 (13.73)*** 4.98 (29.8) hoarding [hamsternd] consumption** -13.88 (18.76)** -12.83 (23.63) collecting-mania [Sammelwut] consumption** -20.07 (21.45)*** -8.95 (28.7) acquiring [anschaffend] consumption** -8.3 (18.7) -11.65 (21.35) appetite [Appetit] consumption** 16.7 (13.9)*** 10.17 (29.23) amassing [anhäufend] consumption* -13.17 (17.46)** -11.23 (22.16) accumulating [ansammelnd] consumption* -8.27 (15.81) -15.48 (21.07)* to-pocket [einheimsen] consumption* -16.02 (19.21)** -12.95 (22.95) sensuality [Sinnesfreude] consumption* 27.08 (15.5)*** 19.97 (25.58)** acquisitiveness [Besitzgier] consumption* -28.07 (16.6)*** 2.35 (29.56) avaricious [geldgeil] consumption* -29.77 (19.57)*** 2.17 (29.39) bon-vivant [genießerisch] consumption* 23.12 (15.28)*** 10.73 (27.89) ravenous [heißhungrig] consumption* -3.12 (19.8) 21.4 (20.46)*** opulence [Üppigkeit] consumption 0.2 (17.22) 0.62 (24.47) abundance [Überfluss] consumption -7.4 (25.17) -0.35 (27.03)

Motivational Atlas

yearning [Verlangen] consumption 2.7 (19.44) 24.55 (17.93)*** temptation [Versuchung] consumption 0.15 (17.76) 17.58 (21.44)** to-store [aufbewahren] consumption 6.77 (9.92)** -14.3 (21.65)* grasping [habgierig] consumption -31.82 (15.48)*** -2.5 (29.69) to-keep [behalten] consumption 1.23 (14.87) -17.52 (21.52)** accumulate [scheffeln] consumption -18.68 (20.04)*** -5.38 (24.96) cravings [Gelüste] consumption 3.95 (18.44) 23.9 (18.17)*** rummaging [stöbernd] consumption 6.2 (16.91) -10.85 (26.51) desire [Begierde] consumption 2.05 (21.21) 23.75 (19.9)*** possession [Besitz] consumption 3.25 (15.11) -1.23 (25.24) excessiveness [Maßlosigkeit] consumption -22.8 (23.72)*** 7.5 (31.16) gluttonous [gefräßig] consumption -26.77 (16.68)*** 2.38 (28.05) profit-maximizing [gewinnmaximierend] consumption -4.1 (28.35) -6.2 (30.34) wanting [wollend] consumption 9.73 (16.31)* 6.27 (23.14) lack of restraint [Hemmungslosigkeit] consumption -10.17 (22.89) 22.53 (25.7)*** addicted [süchtig] consumption -26.35 (16.59)*** 6.67 (30.84) venal [käuflich] consumption -26.55 (19.2)*** -13.52 (23.6) greedy [gierig] consumption -33.33 (14.73)*** 7.33 (26.13) eager [vorfreudig] consumption 29.8 (14.41)*** 20.72 (23.84)*** impatient [ungeduldig] consumption -21.82 (15.06)*** 0.1 (25.19) panic-stricken [panisch] fear*** -31.95 (15.68)*** 10.6 (35.96) apprehensive [ängstlich] fear*** -27.12 (16.11)*** 0.05 (27.16) frightened [verängstigt] fear*** -27.62 (14.09)*** -0.4 (27.64) timid [furchtsam] fear*** -21.2 (15.18)*** -4.35 (23.03) careful [vorsichtig] fear*** 2.3 (16.04) -13.92 (25.13) risk-averse [risikoscheu] fear*** -11.7 (12.8)*** -17.05 (20.83)** afraid [bange] fear*** -20.05 (14.94)*** -8.17 (23.8) distraught [verstört] fear*** -27.6 (13.4)*** 0.62 (27.85) nervous [nervös] fear*** -21.73 (15.98)*** 7.02 (26.36) overcautious [übervorsichtig] fear*** -19.07 (15)*** -8.5 (22.13) worried [beunruhigt] fear*** -17.9 (13.26)*** -0.85 (23.28) subdued [kleinlaut] fear*** -17.95 (13.98)*** -22.32 (19.58)*** alarmed [alarmiert] fear** -9.73 (14.28)* 10.62 (25.83) bemused [irritiert] fear** -11.92 (11.82)*** -3.98 (26.36) desperate [verzweifelt] fear** -33.3 (17.12)*** 5.88 (30.28) vigilant [wachsam] fear* 16.53 (12.79)*** 3.33 (21.53) self-protective [selbstschützend] fear* 15.62 (15.94)*** -1.88 (27.33) tense [angespannt] fear -15.6 (17.15)*** 1.48 (26.24) defensive [defensiv] fear -5.98 (18.39) -18.55 (23.14)** overwhelmed [überfordert] fear -28.07 (15.79)*** -2.75 (29.91)

Motivational Atlas

disconcerted [aufgewühlt] fear -16.85 (15)*** 8.95 (23.68) thin-skinned [dünnhäutig] fear -19.6 (13.77)*** -9.92 (25.43) obsequious [unterwürfig] fear -27.15 (17.19)*** -9.15 (25.81) fear of failure [Versagensangst] fear -33.98 (14.65)*** 8.25 (30.65) authoritarian [autoritär] power*** -16.88 (21.31)** 7.9 (27.8) officious [tonangebend] power*** -8.65 (18.7) 9.67 (22.16) mighty [mächtig] power*** -6.45 (20.87) 17.47 (20.01)*** influential [einflussreich] power*** 11.27 (16.6)** 6.33 (21.64) dominant [dominant] power*** -12.33 (20.44) 16.38 (23.66)* firm [bestimmt] power*** -9.98 (16.68) 8.55 (22.39) arrogant [arrogant] power*** -34.1 (14.01)*** -1.9 (31.51) manipulative [manipulativ] power*** -35.08 (11.78)*** -1.15 (31.65) despotic [despotisch] power*** -27.9 (19.84)*** -0.62 (30.6) conceited [eingebildet] power*** -33.65 (13.38)*** -8.15 (30.46) imperious [herrisch] power*** -33.65 (13.49)*** 6.12 (29.47) sly [durchtrieben] power*** -22.62 (24.31)*** 8.23 (30.44) self-centred [egozentrisch] power*** -22.07 (18.82)*** 2.88 (29.57) self-important [wichtigtuerisch] power*** -31.48 (14.48)*** -4.1 (28.07) tyrannical [tyrannisch] power** -43.45 (9.79)*** 5.15 (35.43) condescending [herablassend] power** -35.95 (17.67)*** -1.3 (32.62) stifling [bevormunden] power** -26.9 (14.51)*** -6.88 (25.14) important [gewichtig] power* 3.25 (11.06) -7.33 (23.66) ruthless [rücksichtslos] power* -31.93 (17.28)*** 1.33 (31.26) significant [bedeutend] power* 21.55 (14.39)*** 6.08 (22.16) self-seeking [selbstsüchtig] power* -33.45 (14.65)*** 0.2 (29.29) complacent [selbstgefällig] power -26.35 (16.92)*** -8.38 (25.2) selfwilled [eigenwillig] power 3 (15.42) 5.95 (21.52) vain [eitel] power -24.02 (19.01)*** -6.75 (23.66) boastful [prahlerisch] power -31.88 (13.56)*** -1.7 (28.09) paternalistic [paternalistisch] power -12.85 (17.08)** -8.73 (22.96) assertive [durchsetzungsfähig] power 21.78 (14.3)*** 7.55 (22.56) contemptuous [geringschätzig] power -30.6 (14.49)*** -6.25 (27.18) strong [stark] power 29.17 (13.28)*** 17.35 (24.74)* convincing [überzeugend] power 21.45 (16.76)*** 5.85 (23.35) disparaging [verächtlich] power -30.68 (14.57)*** 0.33 (29.1)

Table 1 Motive-specific words. Words that participants attributed to one motivational category significantly more than any other, together with their mean valence and arousal scores. *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***=p<0.001, Hochberg corrected.

Motivational Atlas

Semantic closeness of seven motives

To explore the relative “semantic distance” between motives we ran a PCA on the categorization judgments. The Kaiser rule suggested retaining the first 2 components (as these had eigenvalues higher than unity) of the PCA. The first component explained 26% of the categorization variance, the second 18%, for a total of 44.2%. The 1st component most clearly separated between affiliation, care and fear, on the one side, and power, achievement, and consumption on the other (all loadings were above 0.40 and below -0.40 respectively). The

2nd component distinguished between anger and fear, on the one side, and care, consumption and achievement on the other (all loadings above 0.4 and below -0.3, respectively) (see Fig. 1, left). With regard to the supplementary valence and arousal variables, valence was correlated to both the PCA components, but more strongly to component 2 (r=0.54, p<0.001), while arousal was not clearly related to either of the dimensions (both rs<0.21) (for statistical comparisons of the valence and arousal of each set of motive-specific words see section C of the supplementary material).

Fig. 1. A semantic and subjective atlas of seven motives. Left: A semantic atlas of seven motives. Principle component analysis (“PCA”) of a word categorization task in which participants were to assign words (points) to 1 of 7 motivational categories (arrows). Words more 25

Motivational Atlas frequently attributed to one motivational category than any other (p<0.05) are surrounded by 95% confidence ellipses. Words that did not have this property are labelled “ambiguous”. They were included in the PCA analysis but are not depicted (i.e., in white) to reduce visual clutter. Blue arrows represent how the valence and arousal of all words related to the PCA space. Right: A subjective atlas of seven motives. Principle component analysis (“PCA”) of a self-report task in which participants were rate on a visual analogue scale how well a number of motive-specific words described their spontaneously experienced motives and feelings at that moment.

Study 2

Methods

Participants

Participants (n=310, mean age=27.19, sd=5.97, females=163, males=147) were recruited via email through the Max Planck’s participant database to take part in two separate studies on economic decision making (Chierchia et al., 2017). As soon as participants were welcomed to the experimental sessions, and thus before being introduced to any of the experimental activities of interest for those studies, they took part in the task described below. Assessments were approved by the Research Ethics Committee (agreement number 090-15-09032015) of the University of Leipzig, Germany. All participants provided informed consent for the anonymized analysis of their data. We report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions in these studies, though no participants were excluded from the analysis.

Procedures

Participants were provided with a list of words and for each one, they were asked to rate in how far they felt “currently driven by these motivations, feelings or states”, on a continuous visual analogue scale ranging -350 to 350 (numbers were not visible to participants). These novel questionnaire items probed the seven motives of interest and were taken from the motive-specific words of study 1, above. Specifically, the fear-related items were

“apprehensive”, “afraid”, “timid”, “nervous”, “panic-stricken”, “overcautious”, “frightened”,

“reserved”; the anger-related items were “aggressive”, “angry”, “offended”, “irritable”, 26

Motivational Atlas

“argumentative”, “tempestuous”, “spirited”, care-related items were “caring”, “protective”,

“kind-hearted”, “cordial”, “helpful”, “affectionate”, “sympathetic”, and “consoling”; power- related items were “mighty”, “dominant”, “authoritarian”, “firm”, “influential”,

“condescending” and “officious”; achievement items were “hard-working”, “industrious”,

“capable”, “efficient”, “ambitious”, “success-driven”, “obstinate”, “productive”; affiliation- related items were “entertaining”, “ingratiating”, “excluded”, “conventional”, “attached”,

“obliging”, “popular”; and consumption items were “consumerist”, “hoarding”, “avaricious”,

“greedy”, “materialistic”, “cheap”, “pleasure-seeking”, “acquisitive”, “desire to buy”,

“gluttonous”. In addition to these motive-related constructs, affect was measured by asking participants to provide ratings on a number of items related either to happiness (“content”,

“happy”, “overjoyed”, “pleasant”, “enthusiastic”) or sadness (“sad”, “downcast”). Overall, the questionnaire consisted of 63 items. The order of the items was fully randomized for each participant, who viewed seven items per page.

Analysis

The ratings on items related to each motive displayed acceptable internal reliability: fear

(Chronbach’s α=0.87), anger (α=0.83), power (α=0.86), care (α=0.92), achievement (α=0.88), affiliation (α=0.67), consumption (α=0.84). We thus first ipsatized the ratings for each subject9 and then aggregated over the items related to each motive. This resulted in 7-motive related and 2 affect related measures, for each participant. As for study 1, we then subjected these measures to principal component analysis, focusing on the seven motive-related measures as variables of interest and using the two affect measures as supplementary

9 Ipsatization (i.e., subtracting a subject’s mean rating from each of that subject’s ratings) is recommended for studies employing unipolar ratings on single adjective items, which otherwise often result in all measures loading on a single component (Moeller, 2015; Russell, 1980).

Motivational Atlas variables. As we aimed to establish whether the dimensions that explain the most variance at the semantic level (as investigated in study 1) also do so at the subjective level (as investigated here), we focused on the first two components of the PCA solution.

Results

Subjective-experiential closeness of seven motives

Taken together, the first two components of a PCA solution explained 51.6% of the seven spontaneously occurring motives of interest, as measured by ratings on a visual analogue scale (Fig. 1, right). The first of the components (which explained 29.8% of the total variance) most clearly differentiated between fear, anger and consumption on the one hand (all loadings

> 0.56) and achievement and care on the other (loadings< - 0.50). The second component

(which explained 21.8% of total variance) differentiated between more clearly between care and affiliation on the one end (both loadings < -0.56), and power and achievement on the other (loadings > 0.35). As for the supplementary variables, happiness and sadness were both

(oppositely) related to the 1st dimension (with loadings respectively >0.54 and < -0.63), with the exception of consumption, these dimensions clearly resembled those individuated in study

1, as can be observed in Fig. 1 (right) where, to facilitate comparability with the corresponding figure of study 1 (Fig. 1, left), we plotted the 1st component (i.e., the component that explained the most variance) on the y-axis and the 2nd on the x-axis.

Discussion

As a first step towards an integrative framework of a motivation-based decision making model based on the integration of psychological, biological and behavioral economic literature, the main goal of the present paper was to investigate how seven different motives that have recurred in one or all of these fields (Consumption/Resource-Seeking, Care,

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Affiliation, Power-Status, Achievement, Threat Avoidance and Threat Approach) relate to one another, both on the semantic-conceptual as well as the subjective-experiential level.

First, the analyses of a word-categorization task revealed that subjects coherently differentiated between the identified seven different motives, as they agreed on which words were more related to one motive as compared to any other of the remaining motives. In spite of this general agreement, participants disagreed more frequently on how to categorize words to some motives more than others. This enabled us to obtain a spatial proxy of the relative conceptual overlap of each of the tested seven motives (Figure 1, left). The 1st dimension of the space differentiated between care, fear and affiliation on one side and power, achievement and consumption on the other. As anticipated, this separation is reminiscent of a communion/agency distinction (Abele et al., 2008; Bakan, 1966b; Diehl et al., 2004): with care and affiliation words loading on one side, and power, achievement and consumption loading on the other. The 2nd dimension was partially related to valence and especially differentiated threat approach, threat avoidance, and power, on the one side, from care, affiliation, achievement and consumption, on the other. More specifically, the four predictions delineated in the introduction appeared substantiated by the results. Notably, these anticipated inter-relations amongst motives were not only apparent in the semantic but also in the subjective atlas.

First, in both atlases, care and affiliation were indeed conceptualized and experienced as close. However, a previously reported gradient (Abele et al., 2008) that could differentiate between them was observed along the valence related dimension (rather than on a communality/agency one). In fact, most of the negatively valenced words on the alleged communion side of the space were attributed to the affiliation motive (e.g., “conventional”,

“excluded”, “attached/clingy”, “ingratiating”, “conformist” etc.), while most positive 29

Motivational Atlas communion words were attributed to care (e.g., “warm-hearted”, “soft-hearted”, “motherly”,

“kind”, “understanding” etc.). Indeed, care-specific words were almost entirely positive.

Indeed, of the 32 words that were specifically attributed to care, only 1 – “pampering” – had negative valence. On the other hand, many positively valenced affiliation words (e.g.,

“entertaining”, “popularity”, “talkative”, “affable”, “gregarious”, “communicative”,

“sociable”) did not survive correction for multiple comparisons, suggesting that, as affiliation- related words become positive, they also become more “confused” with care. We thus suggest that care and affiliation are partially distinguished by valence, with care almost exclusively linked to positively valenced concepts, and affiliation more clearly (but not exclusively) associated with negative valence. Also, in addition to the differentiation in terms of valence, and from a more conceptual perspective, nearly all care-specific words clearly denoted other- oriented motivation and behaviors (e.g., “selfless”, “generous”, “sacrificing”, “unselfish”,

“helpful”, “protective” etc.) while those related to affiliation (e.g., “clingy”, “popular”) seemed related to a more self-centred need to belong and to be liked. We thus suggest that, while care and affiliation are both plausibly related to communion (Abele et al., 2008; Bakan,

1966b; Diehl et al., 2004), they could have distinct self vs. other oriented focus: words that subjects agreed best differentiate care from affiliation clearly express a motive to protect/help/accept others, while affiliation-specific words could express the need to be protected/helped/accepted by others.

Similarly, and in line with our second prediction, we found that affiliation is semantically conceptualized and subjectively experienced closer to threat-avoidance (or fear) than care. In fact, previous literature has repeatedly linked affiliation to various negatively valenced states of social anxiety, social exclusion or separation distress (N. Eisenberger, 2012; N. I.

Eisenberger et al., 2003). Moreover, a separate line of studies on empathy for pain and altruistic behavior have shown that when distress prevails over empathic concern, subjects 30

Motivational Atlas tend to make more self-protective and avoidant choices rather than altruistic ones (Batson,

Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987; Batson, O’Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983). Our second finding could thus further qualify with our first one: Affiliation-related concepts may be more negatively valenced than care-related concepts, partly because the motive of affiliation being also connected to fear of separation and not belonging, and thus being more closely connected to the motive of fear. Such a view would further be in line with findings suggesting that fear induces a more selfishly oriented stance and decreases other-related altruistic behaviors

(Batson et al., 1987, 1983).

As for our third prediction, we found that power-status and achievement-related motives were relatively close and opposed to care and affiliation. Indeed, both of these motives have been previously indirectly associated with agency (Abele et al., 2008; Bakan, 1966b; Diehl et al.,

2004). In spite of this relative closeness, it has been suggested that agency could span from positive aspects of agency (such as “independence” and “achievement”), to more “excessive” forms of agency, such as “hunger for power and superiority”, culminating “in aggressive or rude behavior” (Abele et al., 2008; Bakan, 1966b; Diehl et al., 2004). Indeed, this agency spectrum appeared to be reflected in our motivational space, with power/status-related words

(e.g., “influential”, “dominant”, “mighty”, “despotic” etc.) standing vertically somewhere in between those related to more positively valenced achievement (“determined”, “success- driven”, “ambitious”, “motivated”, “capable”, “efficient”, “competitive” etc.) and those related to anger (“aggressive”, “hateful”, “hostile”, “argumentative” etc.). In regards to the content of the two sets of words, it also appears that achievement-specific words are more related to performance and seem only “incidentally” social. For instance, among the achievement-specific words, only the word “competitive” appears to imply some social comparison, while most power-related words more explicitly refer to dominance over others.

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Schematically, achievement could be conceptualized as socially neutral, or a-social, while power appears more frequently anti-social (Honk, Will, Terburg, & Raub, 2016).

Our fourth hypothesis, also substantiated in the results, was that threat-approach and threat- avoidance would be conceptually close to one another. The proximity of these two motives is in line with the notion that they can be considered as two opposing response tendencies

(approach vs. avoidance) to similar perceived threats (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009).

Indeed, anger and fear-related states are generally both low in valence and high in arousal, and they have been frequently found to cluster closely together in previous word sorting tasks

(Kuppens & Tuerlinckx, 2013; Posner & Russell, 2005; Russell, 1980), and are frequently experienced together (Moons, Eisenberger, & Taylor, 2010).

The only aspect on which the semantic and subjective atlases diverged was in regards to our more exploratory consumption motive. In both atlases, consumption loaded on our alleged

“agency” dimension, however, in the semantic atlas, consumption overlapped highly with achievement and less with power, while in the subjective atlas it shifted away from achievement, and towards threat-approach, or anger. Though unanticipated, we speculate that this difference could be due to the fact that consumption-oriented behaviors are frequently conceptualized as linked to achievement (or perhaps even self-justified in the name of achievement). For instance, it has been suggested that the self-interested maximization of profit or money is clearly “an indicator of achievement, respect, and freedom or power” (Lea

& Webley, 2006, p. 170). However, at the level of experience, it has also been suggested that the pursuit of profit (i.e., consumption) can be used as a socially acceptable or ritualized tool to express aggressive instincts (Behrendt, 2006), and that anger can be a “hidden motivator” behind the desire to buy products (Veling, Ruys, & Aarts, 2012). Our finding that anger and consumption are subjectively experienced but not semantically conceptualized as close are in 32

Motivational Atlas line with this notion, that anger and consumption may share a subconscious link (Behrendt,

2006; Veling et al., 2012).

Finally, in addition to showing that subjects agree on which words best characterize each of seven motives, and to characterizing their semantic and subjective-experiential inter-relations, our sorting task also enabled to obtain a list of 215 motive-specific words, together with the normed valence and arousal scores (Table 1). This database corroborates previous questionnaire and database items. For instance, many of our achievement-related and power- related words have been previously grouped together in a number of tasks and/or questionnaires (Abele et al., 2008; Costa & McCrae, 1992; Lachman & Weaver, 1998;

Lefcourt, 1991). Similarly, some of the words most attributed to care (such as “friendly” and cordial”) have been previously related to the "warmth" and "tender-mindedness" personality factors according to the NEO-PIR (Costa & McCrae, 1992); while the words “soft-hearted”,

“sympathetic” and “loving” are part of Batson’s “empathic response scale” (Batson et al.,

1987). Typical fear words (e.g., “apprehensive, worried, careful, risk-averse, tense, nervous etc.”) are reminiscent of the words that appear in paradigmatic anxiety questionnaires

(Spielberger's, 2010 State-Trait Anxiety Questionnaire), while several of our anger words

(e.g., “annoyed, angry, upset raging, short-tempered”) have also previously been used (e.g.,

Buss & Perry's, 1992 Aggression Questionnaire).

However, our findings also highlight the necessity of validating words for distinct motives. In fact, some words that have often been used in the literature may not be optimal to disambiguate between certain motives. For instance the words “excited” and “concerned” are both used in the State Anxiety Inventory, but while “excited” elicited ambiguous associations in our participants (because it was also frequently attributed to anger), the word “concerned” was actually related more closely to care. Similarly, the words “cordial” or “likeable” are 33

Motivational Atlas related to “warmth” in the NEO-PIR but also to affiliation tendency by Mehrabian’s scale of

Affiliative Tendency (Mehrabian, 1994). Our results indicate that, when confronted with the choice, participants indeed might associate these words with care rather than with affiliation.

Also, the word “careful”/”precautious” is used to describe “competence” in the NEO-PIR

(Costa & McCrae, 1992), but by our participants it was associated to care. Researchers juxtaposing self-report measures to (economic) decision making paradigms (Ben-Shakhar,

Bornstein, & Hopfensitz, 2007; Bosman, Sutter, & Winden, 2005; Eimontaite et al., 2013;

Hopfensitz & Reuben, 2009; Maner et al., 2002; Reuben & Winden, 2008) could use our motive-specific words to better identify the motives underlying specific decisions and investigate whether indeed such motives are related to the corresponding decision patterns anticipated above.

5. Conclusion

Integrating literature from psychology, biology and behavioral economics suggests that at least seven distinct motives are likely to be crucial driving forces of human decision making:

“consumption/resource seeking”, “care”, “affiliation”, “achievement”, “status-power”, “threat approach”, and “threat avoidance”. As a first investigation of such a motivational taxonomy, we analysed how participants differentiate between those motives, and how such motives are inter-related on a semantic-conceptual as well as subjective-experiential level. Results suggest that subjects converge in their semantic differentiation of these seven motives and specify which motives are generally conceptualized as “close” or “far” from one other, relations that we spatially illustrate on a “semantic atlas”. We also find that, with only one exception, semantically close motives also tend to co-occur in actual self-reported experience, while others appear to be antagonistic, and we illustrate these experienced relations in a “subjective atlas”. These atlases could help navigate the complexity of human motivation in a framework that goes beyond the traditional dichotomy of approach and avoidance. For example, they 34

Motivational Atlas suggest that, whereas care and affiliation are close, affiliation is closer to threat-avoidance (or fear) and could thus refer to a more self-centred need to belong and fear of social exclusion, while care is more positively valenced and could denote more altruistic orientation. On the other side of the atlases, we find achievement overlapping highly with power, but with power lying closer to threat-approach (or anger).

Overall, our results may inspire the formulation of new decision making models that highlight the importance of contexts in driving decisions (as recently suggested by Bosworth, Singer, &

Snower, 2016) and propose new distinctions in motivation research, involving motives such as care, affiliation, and consumption/resource seeking. Future research could show how each of the seven motives can be induced through contextual primes, and how utility functions may link these different motivational systems to clear computational predictions for psychological or (neuro)economic experiments. Finally, we provide a database of motive-specific words to be used in future research on the motivational basis of decision making, a subset of which has been recently shown to be sensitive to distinct motivational inductions and to be related to differential decision making patterns in game-theoretic paradigms (Chierchia et al., 2017). In conclusion, we prospect a decision making model that goes beyond approach and avoidance, that is psycho-biologically plausible, and that could justify policies focusing on how institutions, contexts and frames can modulate motivation, and possibly harness it to bolster cooperation across groups and the national boundaries it is generally restricted to.

Ethics

All procedures performed in our study involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and national research committee and with the 1964

Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards. Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study.

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Data accessibility

The data are provided in the electronic supplementary material.

Authors' contributions

TS and DS conceived of the study, and, together with GC, MP, and FPL, designed the study.

MP provided the theoretical backbone by carrying out a comprehensive literature review on motivation psychology and biology, and SB on economic theory. FPL and GC coordinated the empirical studies, collected the data and carried out the statistical analyses. All authors helped draft the manuscript and gave final approval for publication.

Competing interests

All authors declare no conflict of interest and no competing interests.

Funding

This study was funded by the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET - Grant ID

#INO13-00036).

Acknowledgements

The support of the Institute for New Economic Thinking to the authors is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Simon Bartke for remarks on earlier drafts of this manuscript, and

Yvonne Melzer for her literature research during early stages of this paper, especially regarding the biological review.

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Supplementary material

A. Supplementary figure 1: Example Screen display during the Semantic Categorization

Task. Participants were shown a list of either 174 or 305 words (random order) on the left and were asked to drag and drop each of the words into one of the seven boxes on the right. Each of the boxes represented one of the seven postulated motives. There were no further instructions regarding time limit or number of words that should be sorted into the boxes.

B. Semantic categorization task instructions

“Please think of a situation where you, or another person was driven by one of the following motivations. Which of the words on the left best describes which motivation? Which sentiments or conditions could have accompanied that situation? Please drag the words into the respective boxes. There are no right or wrong answers. We are only interested in your personal opinion.”

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C. Valence and arousal of motive-specific words

Parametric and non-parametric comparisons against 0 (i.e., neutrality) revealed that words specifically attributed to care were higher on valence than words related to any other motive

(all ps<0.01), with a mean score of 25 (95% CI [21 29], p<0.001). Words related to achievement were also significantly positive (m=13, 95% CI [8 18], p<0.001), but slightly less so than care-related words. Affiliation words were neutral on average (m=2, 95% CI [-6

11], p>0.5), while the remaining motivational categories – anger (m=-16, 95% CI [-22 -11]), fear (m=-16, 95% CI [-22 -10]), power (m=-18, 95% CI [-25 -11]) and consumption (m=-9,

95% CI [-14 -4]) - were all significantly negatively valenced (all ps<0.001). More specifically, fear, power and anger did not significantly differ in terms of negative valence (all ps>0.1), while the same motives were all slightly more negative than consumption (all ps<0.05). As for arousal, words related to anger were most clearly rated as “high-arousal” (m=10, 95% CI [7

13], p<0.001), and indeed more so than any other motive (all ps<0.001). Care-related words were also slightly, but significantly, high on arousal (m=2, CI [0.1 4.7], p<0.05)), while affiliation words were slightly low (m=-5, 95% CI [-9 -0.5], p<0.05). The remaining motives

(power, achievement, fear and consumption) did not significantly differ from “neutrality” (all ps>0.1). Affiliation however was also lower on arousal than all other motives except fear (all ps<0.05), while fear was only significantly lower than power (p<0.05) and differed from achievement at the trend level (p<0.1). Power, consumption and achievement did not significantly differ from one another on arousal. Finally, we observed a positive correlation

(r=0.23, p<0.001) and a weak trend for a quadratic relationship (p=0.09) between valence and arousal scores.

D. Consistency between experimental sessions

Since there was a slight label difference between the 2 experimental sessions for our experimental “consumption” category, we re-ran our analysis on the common set of words 58

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(n=174) of each session separately. In session 1, 99 words out of 174 were placed in one motivational category more than any of the others, while this occurred for 118 words in session 2. 86 words resulted to be “motive-specific” in both sessions, and all of these words were ascribed to the same motivational categories across both sessions. Thus 86% of the motive-specific words of session 1 were confirmed by session 2 and 72% of words of session

2 were corroborated by session 1. This speaks to a satisfactory reliability of our measure of motive-specificity across different participant pools (i.e., sessions 1 and 2). Indeed, no word was ascribed to different motivational categories in the two sessions (rather, some words appeared to pass the statistical threshold for motive-specificity in one of the sessions but not for the other). Finally, the number of words that resulted to be motive-specific in one session but not the other were distributed as follows over the seven motivational categories: achievement=7, affiliation=8, anger=3, care=6, fear=3, power=6 and consumption=6. This suggests that changing the label of the “consumption” category from session 1 to session 2 did not affect the categorization results.