VOICE, PARTICIPATION and GOVERNANCE in a CHANGING ENVIRONMENT: the Case of Jamaica
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CgCED CARIBBEAN GROUP FOR COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT VOICE, PARTICIPATION AND GOVERNANCE IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT: The Case of Jamaica DISCUSSION DRAFT Professor Trevor Munroe The University of the West Indies VOICE, PARTICIPATION AND GOVERNANCE IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT: The Case of Jamaica June 2000 The University of the West Indies VOICE, PARTICIPATION AND GOVERNANCE IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT - THE CASE OF JAMAICA PROFESSOR TREVOR MUNROE The University of the West Indies DRAFT 25th March 2000 1. INTRODUCTION • Purpose of the Paper • Jamaican Democracy in context 2. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND CONVENTIONAL PARTICIPATION – DOWN BUT NOT OUT 3. THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT – THE RISE OF NON- CONVENTIONAL PARTICIPATION 4. THE STATE RESPONSE TO STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY – STRONG WORDS; WEAK IMPLEMENTATION 5. CONCLUSION • Policy implications 2 Purpose of the Paper The purpose of this paper is to review critical aspects of Jamaican democratic governance, examine the issue of voice and participation in the changing Jamaican environment and draw policy – relevant conclusions on strengthening Jamaican democracy. 3 Jamaican Democracy in Context On any generally accepted measure Jamaica is a `consolidated democracy’ [LINZ & STEPPAN, 1997]. For well over half a century governments have been chosen and removed through relatively free and fair elections. No government has ever been overturned by popular uprising, military coup or extra- constitutional means. On the basis of election results, ruling parties have handed over power and oppositions have peacefully acceded to office in 1955, 1962,1972 and 1989. By the 19990s two party competition and electoral participation had become more institutionalized in Jamaica than anywhere else in the Caribbean or indeed throughout the Third World. [MUNROE, 1996] Electoral democracy has been reinforced and complemented by high levels of freedom [cf. FREEDOM HOUSE – ANNUAL SURVEYS]. Political rights and civil liberties are constitutionally recognized and effectively utilized. The rule of law has for much of the post-independence period, by and large, been observed despite increasingly high levels of violent crime. The foundation of Jamaican democracy has rested on many pillars, viz.; the strong historical commitment of the people to freedom; the weakening of the old plantocracy and along with it, the conservative anti democratic oligarchy; a tradition of constitutional rule, welfare statism and liberalism which formed part of the British colonial heritage; government effectiveness during the process of decolonization and the early post-colonial state; clientelistic relations between competing party elites on the one hand, and rival segments of the mass public on the other which provided the major political parties with strong activist cores as well as significant outreach capability. [MUNROE, 1972; STONE, 1986] Nevertheless, despite these deep roots during the 1990s the gradual weakening of both the foundations and the structures of Jamaican democratic governance has become increasingly evident. Jamaica’s freedom rating has slipped both absolutely and relative to the rest of the Caribbean. [MUNROE, 2000] As Table 4 1 indicates, at the end of the 1980’s, seven Caribbean territories had a freedom rating superior to Jamaica’s. By the middle of the 1990s Jamaica’s slippage and the improvement of other Caribbean states meant that Jamaica had fallen behind ten of fifteen countries rated in the Caribbean. TABLE 1. FREEDOM INDEX COUNTRY 1989 – 90 1995 - 96 ANTIGUA (-) 2.5 3.5 BAHAMAS (+) 2.5 1.5 BARBADOS (0) 1 1 BELIZE (+) 1.5 1 DOMINICA (+) 1.5 1 DOM.REPUBLIC (-) 2 3.5 GRENADA (+) 21.5 GUYANA (+) 4.5 2 HAITI (+) 6 5 JAMAICA (-) 22.5 ST. KITTS (-) 11.5 ST. LUCIA (0) 1.5 1.5 ST. VINCENT (0) 1.5 1.5 SURINAME (0) 33 TRINIDAD&TOBAGO (-) 1 1.5 Key: Source: Freedom House 0 = stable Freedom Rating - = decline in Freedom Rating + = increase in Freedom Rating Its score on the index of democracy has fallen. [VAN HANNEN, 1997] Violent crime has undermined the rule of law and placed Jamaica among the most murder-prone countries in the world. [HARRIOT, 1996] Government 5 effectiveness has declined to the point where Jamaica’s ranking on the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index has fallen dramatically whilst other Caribbean states have remained stable or improved. [UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORTS 1991-1999] TABLE 2 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX – RANKING OF CARICOM STATES GLOBALLY AND WITHIN CARICOM ( ) designates ranking within CARICOM COUNTRY 1990 1997 BARBADOS 20 (1) 29 (1) TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 30 (2) 46 (4) BAHAMAS 31 (3) 31 (2) DOMINICA 52 (4) 53 (7) ANTIGUA/BARBUDA 53 (5) 38 (3) GRENADA 54 (6) 52 (6) JAMAICA 63 (7) 82 (10) ST. LUCIA 65 (8) 81 (9) ST. VINCENT 66 (9) 75 (8) ST KITTS/NEVIS 68 (10) 51 (5) BELIZE 73 (11) 83 (11) GUYANA 92 (12) 99 (12) Source: Human Development Reports – 1992; 1999 Corruption, in perception and in reality, has grown to become a major popular concern and public policy issue. 6 TABLE 3 Greatest Threat to Democracy in Jamaica %age Corruption 48.7 Drugs 31.8 Armed Groups 8.8 Unemployment 5.5 Poverty 2.5 Economic management by .3 government Source: Don Anderson/Market Research Services Poll, April 1999 [Don Anderson commentary: A significant number of persons see corruption as a major threat to democracy in Jamaica. Over 48% of the persons interviewed in a survey conducted on behalf of The Gleaner Company by Don Anderson and his team from Market Research Services Ltd., indicate so. The survey was conducted over the period 18th to 21st April, 1999 and involved interviews amongst a nationally representative sample of 1000 persons aged 15 years and over in all parishes. The sample error was + or – 3.4%.] It is in this context that the strengthening of voice, accountability and participation has become a major condition for the renewal of Jamaican democracy and the enhancement of its governmental effectiveness. The achievement of this condition is not only necessary, but is, with the appropriate policy interventions, possible given the prevailing dynamics of the Jamaican political process. 7 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND CONVENTIONAL PARTICIPATION – DOWN BUT NOT OUT Two primary measures of voice are the right to vote, and the extent to which citizens do in fact participate in the selection of government. On these measures Jamaican democratic governance has for some time been on the decline. One indicator of this decline is that the “garrison communities” and constituencies, in which elections are neither free nor fair, have been increasing in number. [NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON POLITICAL TRIBALISM, 1997] For the tens of thousands of Jamaicans who live in the garrisons, the right to vote freely (or at all) for the party other than that which controls the garrison, either does not exist or is severely circumscribed. Election-related violence scarred the elections of 1986, 1989 and 1993 and, despite not reaching the levels of the 1970s, constrained freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, free speech, as well as other important political rights and civil liberties. Moreover, as election campaigns became more expensive, the absence of any meaningful regulations governing party funding and campaign finance further undermined the integrity of the electoral process. Central party manipulation of candidate selection, voter registration, voter identification and balloting also contributed to their ineffectiveness as mechanisms of voice and participation. At the same time governmental effectiveness, during the 1980s and 1990s, declined on traditional criteria of welfare provision. Under the impact of programmes of structural adjustment and economic liberalization the state retreated from its historic role as provider. One consequence of this, particularly in the context of economic stagnation, was that allocations to health, education, and other social services contracted. [DAVIES AND WITTER, 1989/; LeFRANC, 1994] Furthermore, employment levels and opportunities in the public sector fell as the state reduced its role in the economy. On the other hand, the formal economy in the private sector failed to expand, and indeed, in many instances, levels of production, income and employment declined with the onset of an 8 economic liberalization for which the sector was inadequately prepared. The net result was the contraction of the formal and expansion of the informal economy; the growth of mass impoverishment and higher levels of inequality, [P.I.O.J. SURVEY OF LIVING CONDITIONS, ANNUAL] particularly as sections of the elite benefited from investment in high interest yielding government securities. In this context, dissatisfaction amongst the disadvantaged sectors with available means of popular influence on the policy process was bound to grow. [RODRIGUEZ, 1996] The moreso as traditional channels of grassroots interest representation and articulation weakened or proved inadequate. One such was the Member of Parliament. Relatively deprived of resources as the configuration of fiscal budgets shifted from service provision or employment generation to debt servicing, MPs had less largess to dispense to party clients and were minded to spend less time with constituents. Moreover, very often drafted into expanded Executives and pre-occupied with ministerial responsibilities, fewer hours were spent in constituency offices and proportionately fewer citizens were able to “see” their representatives. [STONE, 1990] The coincidence of this relative deprivation with deteriorating economic infrastructure, more