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The Criterion of Habit in Peirce's of the Author(s): Winfried Nöth Source: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 46, No. 1, A Symposium in Memory of Peter H. Hare / Joseph Palencik & Russell Pryba, Guest Editors (Winter 2010), pp. 82- 93 Published by: Indiana University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/TRA.2010.46.1.82 . Accessed: 10/01/2015 15:34

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This content downloaded from 141.51.215.234 on Sat, 10 Jan 2015 15:34:48 PM All use to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Abstract The paper examines the of habit and its relevance to Peirce’s theory of the symbol. In contrast to other semioticians who defined by using the criteria of convention- ality, arbitrariness, and codedness, Peirce The Criterion proposes a much broader concept when he defines the symbol as a having “the vir- of Habit tue of a growing habit.” With this new and original criterion of habit, Peirce enriched the theory of the symbol with an evolution- in Peirce’s ary perspective that remained unnoticed by those who restricted the category of the sym- Definitions of bol to characterized by codedness and arbitrariness. In particular, Peirce’s evolution- the Symbol ary concept of the symbol is incompatible Winfried Nöth with Ernst Cassirer’s of Symbolic Forms, according to which the symbol is the unique characteristic of human culture, whereas nonhuman is a devoid of symbols. In Peirce’s broader per- spective, the concept of habit serves as a synechistic bridge to overcome two dualisms that prevailed in the traditional definitions of the symbol, that between culture and nature and that between the conventional and the innate. Against the first Peirce proposes that a habit by which symbols are interpreted is “natural or conventional”; against the sec- ond, Peirce postulates that a habit which de- termines a symbol is a disposition “acquired or inborn.”

Keywords: Conventionality, Habit, Natural, Peirce, , Sign, Symbol.

1. Peirce’s of the Symbol against the Background of the History of Semiotics It is known that was well acquainted with the history of semiot- ics since antiquity. In this tradition, those

TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOCIETY Vol. 46, No. 1 ©2010 82

This content downloaded from 141.51.215.234 on Sat, 10 Jan 2015 15:34:48 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Criterion of Habit in Peirce’s Definition of the Symbol • Winfried Nöth 83 ------signa or data signa 908 908 [EP 2:478])—that 1 62). Instead of conventional Instead 62). 1 : 5 (cf. Meier-Oeser 1997). Meier-Oeser (cf. , W , 5 89 1 sign, and Peirce himself once characterized 909 as well as many other later definitions of definitions later other many as well as 909 1 All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions is an of implicit formulation the ancient crite 909, Peirce describes symbols as those signs which which signs those as symbols describes Peirce 909, 1 is is not This content downloaded from 141.51.215.234 on Sat, 10 Jan 2015 15:34:48 PM

and the “given” or conventional conventional or “given” the and arbitraria signa

In a definition of of definition a In Against the background of this millenary tradition, Peirce’s own Convention, Convention, the major traditional criterion of these signs, can If If Peirce, nevertheless, makes to the criterion of conven . All of these signs were fundamentally opposed to the the to opposed fundamentally were signs these of All placitum. ad signa naturalia of natural signs, the ity, however, which Peirce discusses more frequently as a criterion of the the of criterion a as frequently more discusses Peirce which however, ity, definition of the symbol was radically new, insofar as it extended the category of the symbol in two directions: first,by postulating “habit” as a instead new of distinctive “conventionality” feature of this class of by extending it from signs signs and created by secondly, cultural con ventions ventions to signs which could have their origin in natural habits and dispositions. tion tion of symbol to its even at tradition, semiotic the risk of minimizing is, in order to make his definition better understood to those acquainted acquainted those to understood better definition his make to order in is, with compliance In sign. conventional the of notion traditional the with also sets Peirce great store on his ethics linking his of no terminology, similar similar context in his letter of to Lady Welby certainly be circumscribed as a “regularity” or “general rule,” - agree intentional and voluntary since a by about a comes typically convention indeed may convention A community. a of members the between ment and law “stipulated” a but “acquired” an not is it then but law, a become less even so is it a “habit,” since in ontogeny a habit or evolves phylog the symbol focus on the new criterion of habit. habit. of criterion new the on focus symbol the explicitly (he does so, e.g., in (he so, does e.g., explicitly of definition his symbol, preters insure their so understood” (EP 2:460f). This formulation formulation This 2:460f). (EP understood” so being their insure preters characterizes the symbol in contrast to the icon, the sign “by blance,” and resem the index, the sign with to a its connection” “real . characterization negative this tradition, semiotic the with accordance In of what a symbol rion of a arbitrariness, semiotic criterion which rarely Peirce mentions social agreement. eny but not by tionality in several of his definitions of the symbol, it writes in a adopts (as this rather as criterion Peirce to a seems Cerberus” “sop that he “represent their objects, independently alike of or any any independently their resemblance objects, “represent or real because dispositions connection, habits factitious of their inter term symbol with the a that remark use he of was the “following word me the In (ibid.). ” including logicians among infrequent not his category of the (EP symbol 307, 2: as genuine the sign” one of “the 1903). At the same , he justified his terminological optionfor the signs signs which definedPeirce as symbols had mostly been studied“ar as bitrary” or “conventional” dieval tradition, the signs which belonged to this class were the arbi trary

84 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 46 Number 1 orinborn), is so much anew as areturn to the original mean to it, that of a conventional sign, or one depending upon habit (acquired to add a new one. I do not think that the signification I attach word innovativethedefinition.own his element ofIn definition of this class of signs, has prevailed in 20 in prevailed has signs, of class this of definition Peirce’sdespite innovativewhich, signs, conventional and arbitrary as symbols of definition this is it and definition, traditional its to symbol the Peirceof least, discussion born”at his point, restricts this At habit. in “acquiredor an upon depend that of signs to symbol extension of category the the illustrates really them of as none symbol sign, the conventional illustrate a to indeed serve examples these of all While which introduces “habit” asacriterionofthesymbolicsign: of text the of continuation in symbol of concept the excursuson historical a in Peircedoes which symbols, of examples further present 2.307, CP in also (as Greekantiquity to back symbol of ing” (CP 2.297, ae rvie i te itr o smois te uls o clue vs. culturenature and the dualism ofthe conventional of vs. the innate, i.e., dualismbetween the semiotics, of history the in prevailed have which dualisms two overcome to bridge synechistic a as serves habit phylogenetic and onto- by guided sign a as symbol the of perspective accordingthepresenceto absenceor symbols,of Peirce’s muchbroader lish a strict separation, a semiotic threshold, between culture and nature “ of man” and of human culture (Cassirer), and which thus estab In contrast to these latter theories, which postulate that the symbol is the 2. Symbols asHabits semiotics philosophyfrom Ernst Cassirer toUmberto Eco. to be a rhetorical gesture which allows its author to trace the concept the trace to author its allows which gesture rhetorical a be to concept of convention is indeed a remarkable sop to Cerberus; it seems traditional the to inborn” disposition, or an “acquired as specification o soit “ai, ee mr s i is no ad phylogenetic and onto- its in so more even “habit,” associate To [EP 2:9;CP2.297,1894] not seriously wrenching the word in employing it as I propose to do. reader will judge whether they suffice to establish my claim that I am were the principal meanings of the word in the original language. The Such“symbol.” a called was sentiment of expression Moreover,any “symbol.” a is anything receive to one entitling check or ticket any “symbol”;a called is theatre-ticket a shibboleth; or badge a as serves “symbol,”“symbol”;a a it called is because is creedchurchbadge a a agreed asignal is, upon; a standard that or ensign is aa “symbol,” “symbol,” a watch-word is a “symbol,” is watch-fire a Greek, In sign. “symbol,”conventionala a noun is, a that calls Aristotle contract. or convention a mean to used often and symbol .early find do We Symbol This content downloaded from 141.51.215.234 onSat,10 Jan201515:34:48 PM has so many meanings that it would be an injury to the to injury an be would it that meanings many so has 1 894; EP 2:9). All usesubject toJSTORTerms andConditions 1 894, he writes: “The he894, th century cultural century ) and to and 190) 1894 - - - The Criterion of Habit in Peirce’s Definition of the Symbol • Winfried Nöth 85 ------power - - consisting natural. Against the Against dualism natural. or ). it ). is More “aspecifically, sign to being a representa a being to interpretant 3 90 1 some f, f, 1 4 904). The determination of by the symbol The determination 904). 5 1 . conform to it. It is a general mode of suc of mode general a is It it. to conform will , , 1 ” (CP 5.467, 1903). All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 335 This content downloaded from 141.51.215.234 on Sat, 10 Jan 2015 15:34:48 PM 1902, in which “habit” is circumscribed by notions such as

is a Representamen whose Representative character consists character Representative whose Representamen a is Symbol cession of three sounds or representamens of sounds, which becomes which sounds, of representamens or sounds three of cession replicas cause will law, acquired or habit, a that fact the in only sign a of it to be interpreted as meaning a man or men. The word and its ity of the indefinite . . . future. But a law necessarily governs, or “is [CP qualities. their of some prescribes and individuals, in” embodied 1902] 2.292f, meaning are both general rules . . . . A Symbol is a law, or regular A precisely in its being a rule that will determine its Interpretant. All words, sentences, books, and other conventional signs are Symbols. a only is it but “man”; word the pronouncing or writing of speak We , replica or embodiment of the word, that is pronounced or written. being, real a has it although no has itself word The existents that fact the in

The The essence of a to can symbol, according Peirce, only be fully ac Thus, despite the necessary embodiment of a symbol in a particular a in symbol a of necessaryembodiment the despite Thus, What Peirce meant by “habit” as a determining factor in the process process the in factor determining a as “habit” by meant Peirce What rences rences nor is it a class of signs that in the states sense he of when some affirms set containing Peirce the what is This members. its of total sum the up fill completely ever can happenings actual of agglomeration “no symbol the which in , of process the to reference with for counted sym the process, this In interpretant. its creates and object its represents of bol, like any the other representamen type of with sign, together its a “in consisting relation a triadic forms interpretant, its and object determine to representamen the of sign token or replica, sign the token essence or of replica, the symbol can neither be reduced to any particular instance nor to all instances of symbol cannot to be the reduced of actual any occurrence of its occur its embodiment. A pretation. Peirce describes this potential by means of the metaphor of the the of metaphor the of means by potential this describes Peirce pretation. logical the mood: conditional and tense future of grammatical so interpreted” (CP 8. so interpreted” is of one the of a inter effect habit whose a is potential hence object its which is determined by its dynamic object only in the sense that it will be be will it men that of sense [its] object” (CP the in only object dynamic its by determined is which be’ meaning of a ‘would nition of rule”: or “general law,” “acquired “regularity,” genetically inherited and interpreted by instinctive dispositions. Against Against dispositions. instinctive by interpreted and inherited genetically that proposes the habit by which the vs. Peirce culture dualism nature, is conventional are interpreted symbols human human signs by transmitted culturally teaching and learning and signs of the interpretation of symbols becomes clearer in the following defi of the conventional vs. the innate, Peirce postulates that the habit which which habit the that postulates Peirce innate, the vs. conventional the of disposition. inborn” or “acquired an is symbol the determines

86 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 46 Number 1 conditionalmood”; it acts as a “ interpretantsymbolabelongs of“the to species future oftense . , come into being by developby being into come “Symbolsgrow. , that the . attention intheframeworkofhistoricalandevolutionary some given been have other the on species as well as organisms logical bio and hand one the on or words between analogies The place. their take that symbols new by substituted being by or oblivion they “grow” in age and meaning, and they can also “die” invented, by falling into first are they when “born” are they metaphorically, ; imputes lifetosymbols?Is asymbol alivingbeing? Peirce that mean this Does procreation. by species to own its and reproduce individually survive to is being living a of purpose biological is copied,thisbeingtheoriginalmetaphor.” word norm in the sense of a precept, but only in that of a which sification of Ends” (CP1.586,c.903),addingthathenever uses“the “AttemptedClas his of context the in Peirceelaborates as norm,” [a] 2.315, (CP conduct” under ing (CP law” a to obedience “in interpreter an of action the describe it “precept,”does a nor not is it understood; themselves make to necessary conventions the with ing the of interpretant. a This habit is not merely the interpreters’ is habit of comply , of potential semiotic the as object dynamic its in implied although symbol, a with associated habit The 3. Are Symbols Organisms? vehicle inwhichthepurposeofsymbolbecomesembodied. interpreter’san the intentionality; only their is and users symbol the of the by determined not thus is symbol a of purpose The 2:308, (EP symbol” a of interpretant the precisely is purpose a Indeed, intended. is meaning very Itsview. in interpretant an “has it Santaella (cf. cause final a evinces symbol purpose. The a ‘would-acts’, ‘would-dos’ of habitual behavior” (CP ject “than any feeling . thetoicon and theindex, thesymbol hence conveys more about itsob termined by its object, it is really the symbol, not its utterer, that has utterer,that its not symbol, the really is it object, its by termined symbolo is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow. but also with the insight that only symbols procreate symbols, since “it grows,” meaning its , in and use “in that and peoples,” the ment out of other signs,” that “a symbol, once in being, spreads among “rulegeneral a accordinginclud to so conduct, does of symbol pretsa Symbols have indeed several characteristics in common with living with common in characteristics several indeed have Symbols Purpose and intentionality are defining criteria of life. The ultimate About de thus is sign symbolic the which in semiosis of process this In ” (CP2.302,c. 1895). , Peirce comments on the life of symbols not only with only not symbols of Peircelife 1895, the on comments This content downloaded from 141.51.215.234 onSat,10 Jan201515:34:48 PM All usesubject toJSTORTerms andConditions

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. more, too, than any existential fact, namely, the 86, c. 1.586, would-be ). Instead, the one who inter who one the Instead, 1903). ”(CP 902) and in “conformityto in and 1902) 5 .482, 5 .467, Omne symbolum de 1 90 5 1 ).In contrast 90 999), since 1999), 3 ).

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, the , ------The Criterion of Habit in Peirce’s Definition of the Symbol • Winfried Nöth 87 ------animal . What Peirce What. Peirce

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896) . 1 , 92). Almost half a century 33 3 88) and that “in denying the .4 3 3 904, Peirce writes:symbol “A is 1 964, for example, recognized but clearly, 1 All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ) or ‘received’ (CP 3 87 This content downloaded from 141.51.215.234 on Sat, 10 Jan 2015 15:34:48 PM 1 who produces the symbol, but that, instead, it is the very 6, c.

35

22). This argument concerning the survival of the life of symbols Hence, Peirce goes so far as to ascribe to the symbol not only the Peirce Peirce claims that symbols procreate in the form of their interpre 3 87).The that“error” Boler sawaccount in of Peirce’s the autonomy interpreter any significant role, Peirce has placed an intolerable burden an placed has Peirce significant interpreterrole, any upon the series of ” (ibid. after this criticism, postmodern insights into the processes of evolu 3 of the sign was to go so far as to “dispense with the individual mind that functions as an interpreter” (ibid. tion and the situatedness of the human subject in a semiotic restrictingtheautonomy theindividual,of revisiona theanthropoof centric position is on the semiotic agenda. tants, which are new symbols that carry on and renew their messages. The habits by which symbols procreate are not the ones of their inter preters, in whom they are merely embodied. The purpose of the sign cannot be determined by its users since, independently of their indi vidual and purposes, the sign is determined by its This object. purpose, which is the final cause of the process of semiosis, is to create an interpretant. Since those who interpret the it, with associate symbol to wish might they meaning are any with it endow to not free but have to comply with the meanings associated with them through the habits that determine the interpretation of the symbol, they can deter Being instruments. mere their as symbols the use themselves not way, a in users, symbol the use, they symbols the of habits the by mined (CP 7. contends is that a sign signifies only if it is taken to signify” (ibid. objected to, thesesPeirce’s concerning the autonomy of the in relationsymbol to its interpreter. According to his summary, “Peirce does not avail himself of the standard kind of argument: that an is an accident requiring substance, an event that must‘used’ bemustsign argues rathera that He doer. a havemustthatdeedhave a place, or a on “HabitsThought” of of 2: in new symbols goes beyond the commonplace metaphor of the life, growth, and death of symbols, which change and evolve in the his autonomy of a living being, which has purposes of its own, but the alsocapacity of procreating itself. In something which has the power of reproducing itself, and that essen symbol which reproduces itself in the process of unlimitedby semiosisdetermining other symbols to represent their object of an in interpretant. Such the have form been the scandal of anthropocen tially, sincetially, it is constituted a symbol only by the interpretation” (EP tory of cultures. thesisPeirce’s is that it is symbolicum not a Cassirerian tric philosophers, who cannot accept the idea of the dethronement of the individual in the processes of semiosis. John Boler, in his paper

88 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 46 Number 1 the autonomy of the sign does not go as far as to make the sign user sign the make to as far as go not does sign the of autonomy the whose messagetheyconvey intheprocess ofsemiosis. and use to believe they symbols the of instruments the be to out turn the mental image of the Sphinx is only “expressive of the impression impression the of “expressive only is Sphinx the of image mental as the such idea an that saying by circularity semiotic this of insight the 2. with Emerson’s say to sphynx, man, ‘Of eye thine I am eyebeam’ Sphinx the interpreted whom being really not is traveler she that tells the like is: symbol a creates that the symbol and traveler the addressing Sphinx the between parallel ity.The circular beholder-beheld a of idea the conveying of line this symbols to alludes from symbols of growth the on argument 1868, whenhewrote that: a constitute not users are intertwined in a cybernetic master-slave circularity which does symbol and symbols sense this In semiosis. of process the in co-agents also are users, sign the that so sign, the of the objects the of of embodiment loci the are their and us memories, sign their the minds, ers’all, After user. sign its by sign the of determination par- tial the exclude not does sign the by user sign the of determination phenomena.” meaning occurrenceof the in roleThe important an has agency human that deny not does interpreter, an otherwise, or human of agency the to than rather itself sign the of agency the to primarily due always as . semiosis regard“to that clearly very autonomy,sees semiotic on paper his in (1992), Ransdell sign. the of agent blind the the interpreter. Peirce’s words, in this context, are: “The symbol may, symbol “The are: context, this Peirce’sinterpreter. in the words, in embodied becomes only expression whose habit the but nothing is the being who miotic since what symbol interprets he or she interprets to interpreter se autonomous an its as interpreter the to not is it turn that her or him may remind symbol the eye, own his of eyebeam name and says: “Of thine eye I am eyebeam.” In conclusion of his his of conclusion In eyebeam.” am I eye thine “Of says: and name her of enigma the interpret to was it task whose traveler the to turns the in four than less Emerson’s from line a poem mutual semiotic growth. Peirce’s insight in this circularity dates back to 3 h prs “n wy ms b udrie i ti cnet since context, this in underlined be must way” a “in phrase The Peirce illustrates this semiotic circularity with the poetic image of of image poetic the with circularity semiotic this illustrates Peirce 02, c. c. 02, educate eachother.1] [W2:24 yourof Intant thought.” therefore,fact, wordsand men reciprocally interpre the as word some address you as far so only then and you, taught not have we which nothing “Youmean say: and round turn think only by means of words or other external symbols, these might has not made it mean, and that only to some man. But since man can man the which nothing means word the and word, the makes Man 1 89 This content downloaded from 141.51.215.234 onSat,10 Jan201515:34:48 PM 5 ); elsewhere, he uses the image of the Sphinx to convey convey to Sphinx the of image the uses he elsewhere, ); but a synechistic a but vitiosus circulus All usesubject toJSTORTerms andConditions Collected Papers Collected The Sphinx The , to which occur no no occur which to references , . In this poem, the Sphinx Sphinx the poem, this In . by his eyes since she she since eyes his of virtuosus circulus 1 89 5 Peirce , -

” ” (CP is the the - - - The Criterion of Habit in Peirce’s Definition of the Symbol • Winfried Nöth 89 , - - - - - 5 1903) but 1906 he in 1903, when he 5.119, 1895, Peirce stated that it 1901), and in 1901). Hence, natural icons All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions , Peirce explicitly 1901, extends Peirce his class of symbols , Peirce 1885, calls Peirce the habit that determines the signs This content downloaded from 141.51.215.234 on Sat, 10 Jan 2015 15:34:48 PM every symbol . . . consists in a habit, in a regularity,” and ������������������������������������������������������������� 1895). In

). 1901, which goes on to specify that a sign is a symbol when it 3

89 Now, if symbols Now, can be natural signs, but evidently not all natural As early as in The characteristics by which Peirce describes the symbol as a sign Concrete Concrete examples of natural symbols can only be inferred from 1 terpretation terpretation of a symbol is hence not necessarily the habit embodied in a human interpreter; this apparently, habit can determine the sign signs are symbols, how can the symbol be distinguished from the other the from distinguished be symbol the can how symbols, are signs natural signs, and what kind of natural symbol mind? Among does the many Peirce examples have which Peirce gives in to illustrate the natural of instances concrete find to difficult is it signs symbolic of class symbols. It is true that in some of his grand visions, he presents the “every “every regularity consists in the future conditional occurrence of facts imals. If “ nally governed its selection” (CP 2.307, and natural indices are not symbols because, by definition,kinds of motivation. other to their objects by related they are guided by habit can easily be found in the signs of nonhuman an tion of origi which motives the to regard “without habit natural a by guided is contexts in which Peirce discusses this class of contexts sign, in firstwhich ofPeirce all when he opposes natural symbols to natural indices and icons, as in the defini calls the world “a vast representamen, a great symbol of God’s purpose, God’s of symbol great a representamen, vast “a world the calls working out its conclusions in living ” (CP and to belong symbol a as world the on deliberations such not to semiotics. whole universe as an example of a symbolic sign, as in cludes “natural dispositions” among the kinds of this habit dispositions” (CP 4.531, cludes “natural Nöth 2008). 1906; cf. 2.340, c. from conventional to natural signs, when he states that the habit which by a symbol is determined in the process of its interpretation may be “natural or conventional” (CP 2.307, production production of any biological organism. In (CP signs conventional to symbols of class the restrict to “error” an was of the category of symbol a “general rule to in which the determining conduct of rule the The (W5:162). subjected” organism become has c. Nature in as Habits Symbols 4. Natural Let us now examine the natural symbols he speaks Peirce of has the sign in determined by mind “acquired or inborn” habits when (see above). That merely conventional signs are no longer the ones Peirce has in mind in his writings on the symbol becomes in apparent several of his later definitions. which has naturally been made upon our understandings” (CP 7.42

90 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 46 Number 1 uh yblc ytm a hmn agae ae h dfeec be The are. languages human as systems symbolic much as thus are habitat, geographical their to according differ species same the and one of languages animal some which by dialects well-known and all animals communicate by habits which are natural dispositions natural are which habits by communicate animals all and acquisition, habit of form a is which learning, on depend which signs also certainly are there animals, higher of signs the among but mans, hu of ones the than kind iconic the and indexical the of more much are zoosemiosis in signs the that true is It symbols. natural are indices or icons not are which and communicate animals which by signs all c. writes Peirce as regularity,” that themselves not c. 1867). is a symbol which is creating this another furnace’, (CP within gas itself” a denote Kax ‘Let write I If . procreation. of that a symbol only by the interpretation” (EP 2: power of reproducing itself, and that essentially, since it is constituted as (CP 2.292, symbol the of embodiments a replica of the symbol” (ibid.). The self-replicative power thoseofeach call word.same aretheembodimentsI inkand oneof of patches of triplets of millions those all printed, are copies of myriads ‘man’. followingpassagewhichPeircein argues:“Take, example,forwordthe dichotomy to the theory of the symbol as a habit becomes evidentPeirce’s in ofrelevance the tokens.The type-token or replicas its of form the 4.447, (CP rule” 2.249, (CPlaw” or “atypegeneral is it a self-replicativeautopoieticcreativity.as because,is symbol A or procreation and self-replication arePeirce, by described also istics, evolutionarytheory,contemporaryterminologycharacterof thesethe humansymbols share with biological organisms and their evolution. In degrees ofsymbolicity. between difference a is it but symbols, conventional and signs natural between one the not thus is zoosemiosis and anthroposemiosis tween natural habits������������������������������������������������������������������ which signs Such 2005). Nöth (cf. law, will cause replicas of it to be interpreted as meaning a man or men” in common with all animals and in one sense with all plants, I mean I plants, all with sense one in and animals all with common in possesses it which one is humanity of faculty marvelous most the haps “Perfollows: - as symbols of potential autopoietic this Peircedescribes symbols. new creating by themselves by growing of potential the have symbols creativity: autopoietic is evolution their and organisms logical In addition to habit, there are two other significant features which features significant other two are there habit, to addition In h scn cpct wih ybl hv i cmo wt bio- with common in have symbols which capacity second The

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. symbols. The so-called “languages” of animals, especially the especially animals, of “languages” so-called The symbols. �������������������������������������������������������������

. If the word ‘man’ occurs hundreds of times in a book of which 1 This content downloaded from 141.51.215.234 onSat,10 Jan201515:34:48 PM 902). In sum, the symbol is self-replicative since it has “the man 1 90 thus consists “in the fact that a habit, or acquired or habit, a that fact the “in consists thus All usesubject toJSTORTerms andConditions 3 ), and it has existence only in its replication in replication its in only existence has it and ), constitute species-specific semiotic species-specific constitute ������������������������������������ 1 90 3 3 22, ) which acts as a “generala as acts which ) 1 904, see above). (CP 4.464), (CP 1903 are hence legisign 3.590, - - - , The Criterion of Habit in Peirce’s Definition of the Symbol • Winfried Nöth 91 ------All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions This content downloaded from 141.51.215.234 on Sat, 10 Jan 2015 15:34:48 PM

Admittedly, the argument sounds daring, and it is likely to provoke the argument sounds daring, and it is likely to provoke Admittedly, Although Peirce never reflected explicitly on the semiotics of the the objection that it is not the symbol itself which creates a new sym of Culture in the Habits 5. The Natural The traditional study of natural signs oriented itself, and insofar as it still prevails, is still orienting itself, along were the symbols Whereas nature. nonhuman and culture human between dualistic dividing line the signs of human culture, natural signs were the ones of the remain dualism between culture and nature, his insights into the iconic and indexical elements of language and culture have contributions brought to important the study of natural ingredients in the However, study human of nature culture. in culture along the lines se- of Peirce’s miotic synechism does not only lead to the discovery of the biological in ingredients attention our to brings also it culture, human of heritage conventional signs which are natural in a different sense, not deriving from the semiotic behavior of animals, but from natural and of life. independent a laws that have bol, but the symbol in maker, other words, the human being who in the claim behind this argument is more However, the newvents word. theory of complex synechism and taking requires into account Peirce’s which postulates gradual transitions between nature and culture, mat ter and life, rejecting also the dichotomy of the symbol maker vs. are the signs above, introduced semiosis of theory the to According symbol. neither mere products nor tools of the human mind, but to a certain degree, autonomous agents in sign processes, , and the sym create humans that true is it that degree the To signs. of evolution bols, it is equally true that the human mind is not independent from, but determined by, symbols, semiotic systems, syntax and , and the laws of which operate in thought, verbal expression, and communication. Hence, to the degree that the human mind, human of logic and laws the by molded are expressions symbolic and thought, its underlying symbolic systems, they are determined by symbols. In this sense, the symbols are, to a certain degree, co-authors and hence, humans which in semiosis of processes the in agents semi-autonomous re cannot they that fact the of unaware “themselves,” express to believe “themselves.” expressing ally claim to be fully autonomous agents ing biological and physical world. This dualistic semiotic approach to semio the obscured has nature to or culture to either belong that signs contrast, Peirce’s view of symbols. By of the natural ingredients ticians’ synechistic approach to the symbol as a sign guided by habit in both human and nonhuman sign processes can draw the semioticians’ at tention towards long neglected natural components of the symbols of cultural conventions.

92 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 46 Number 1 classifies them as natural signs because, in his semiotic framework, they Bacon semiotics. pictorial modern in emphasized much so ingredients was so familiar. In Roger Bacon’s treatise miosis. Such views can be found in medieval semiotics with which Peirce not subscribe to the dualism between human and animal or physical se semiotics with a very different approach to the natural sign, which does conventional symbolsiscalled“natural language.” of system a of prototype the language, human that coincidence mere a not is it all, After nature. of a is such as habit the but inborn, or acquired be may sign a as function to symbol a determines with share they which and the laws of nature which constitute habits. evolutionary change The habit that not do they as long as evince its hab which continuity of characteristic the is conventionality.It their despite natural way a in them a makes which nature, with share characteristic Symbols too. symbol, the in feature natural a see to possible icon naturallysuitabletorepresent itsobject. selves because of a naturally inherent in them which renders the or physical nature. Instead, they were considered to be natural in them biological in interpretation or production of mode their to according natural as classified werenot signs that and incompatible means no by werebeings human of the by produced signs the of that and subclass ofnaturalsigns(cf. ibid.202). remained a natural sign, since artificial signs came to be considered as a but even in this new classification as an artificial sign, the ( pictorial sign signs artificial as classified be to became pictures the intentions of their producer. In the subsequent history of semiotics, talking about, are natural signs because of their irrespective of was Bacon pictures the call Peircewould as signs, iconic that position the defends thus Bacon 68f). (ibid. similarity” of relation a of means not,” argues Bacon, or “the picture it always represents what it wants represents by artist the “Whether represents. it what with similarity its of because essentially sign a is picture the Instead, sign.” a as the to essential not “is intention painter’s the that was argument his but picture, a producing when intentions has painter a that deny not ” a of intention the by not and nature own their “by signs are and agines ( and pictures classifies which signs of typology a find we signis If we adopt this view of the naturalness of a natural sign, it becomes signs natural of class the that is context, our in interest, of is What In this context, it may be of interest to confront anthropocentric confront to interest of be may it context, this In I.4, quote from:quote I.4, Meier-Oeser 1997: picturae This content downloaded from 141.51.215.234 onSat,10 Jan201515:34:48 PM )���������� among the among All usesubject toJSTORTerms andConditions despite their conventional their despite naturalsigns De signis 4). Of54). Baconcourse, could University ofKassel [email protected] (1276), for example, ), artificiale signum � (De im- - - - The Criterion of Habit in Peirce’s Definition of the Symbol • Winfried Nöth 93 �� In In http:// . Fisch et Fisch . Pragmata. Pragmata. . �� In In ������������ Amherst, MA: Amherst, 1.1, 145–157. 1–6, ed. Hartshorne, 13, 2003 from ������������������������� Balat, M. & J. Deledalle- J. & M. Balat, , vols. , eds. 1, , 2nd rev. ed. Stuttgart/Weimar: Studies Studies in the Philosophy of Charles , vol. vol. , Journal of Journal Collected Papers Die Spur des Zeichens: Das Zeichen und seine Funktion Funktion seine und Zeichen Das Zeichens: des Spur Die All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 1931–58. Handbuch Handbuch der Semiotik 1997. , Edward C. Moore & Richard S. Robin (eds.). (eds.). Robin S. Richard & Moore C. Edward , Natural Natural Signs from a Synechist Perspective.” This content downloaded from 141.51.215.234 on Sat, 10 Jan 2015 15:34:48 PM 992. “ and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process.” Process.” Semiosis the of Autonomy the and “Teleology 1992. 999. “A 1999. New “A for the Understanding of the Living.” The Writings of Charles S. Peirce. A Chronological Edition Chronological A Peirce. S. Charles of Writings The , vol. 2, ed. Peirce Edition Project. Bloomington: Bloomington: Project. Edition Peirce ed. 2, vol. , Peirce Essential The 1964. “Habits Thought.” of In 127: 497–519.

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