IPCS Special Report 13 February 2006

INDIA’S CREDIBLE MINIMUM DETERRENCE A REPORT (Report of the IPCS Panel Discussion held on 7 February 2006, with Air Cmde Jasjit Singh, Lt Gen BM Kapur and Prof Rajaraman as panelists)

KS Manjunath & Beryl Anand Research Officers Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

PR Chari Air Cmde Jasjit Singh The draft nuclear doctrine of There is a need to constantly review spoke about a ‘credible minimum’ the purpose of nuclear weapons. India nuclear deterrent. The Cabinet needs nuclear weapons only for one Committee on Security finalised contingency; that is against the threat India’s nuclear doctrine which also of nuclear weapons targeted at India. spoke about maintaining a ‘credible Sixty years of nuclear weapons and minimum’ nuclear deterrent. deterrence shows that credibility was However, the 2002-03 annual report of based on a capability. the Ministry of External Affairs dropped the word ‘minimum’. The The doctrine of counterstrike has not Hindu, on 6 September 2004 in a been adequately examined in India. report cited Pranab Mukherjee saying Deterrence has to be looked at that India needs a credible nuclear theoretically. Politically, deterrence is deterrence. Why has ‘minimum’ been available and is a dropped? Besides, the size of India’s political tool; militarily it has no arsenal and what is credible and utility. As regards the quantity and minimum also needs to be taken into quality of nuclear weapons, two to account while discussing India’s three dozens of nuclear warheads are security and nuclear doctrine. sufficient for India and there is no need to pursue megaton range Also the following needs to be capabilities to strengthen deterrence discussed on the domestic credibility . constituencies: What is India’s force structure and basic principle The main issue however is the underlying them? How do they work delivery system. The missile defence is with doctrines such as Limited War unlikely to work and one can expect it and Cold Start? Are the Armed forces would address only one fourth of the satisfied with the nuclear doctrine and problem. The focus should rather be deterrence? How about the political on the delivery systems. While more leadership and the nuclear scientists? attention has been paid to the What prompted Anil Kakodkar to warheads and the delivery system has make the statement about fast breeder been ignored. India is twenty five reactors? What are the strategic years away from an operationally purposes of fast breeder reactors? deployed Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) system.

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IPCS Special Report 13 February 2006

India is almost fifteen years away from The doctrine of No-First-Use (NFU) is getting a credible delivery vehicle. negative. It is based on losing one city or more, which is not acceptable. Also India needs a triad and should including the biological and chemical especially have a credible SLBM. weapons attack in the nuclear doctrine SLBM is essential for survivability. has diluted the same. India should address these questions to finalize the On force structure and tactical nuclear kind of nuclear doctrine it is looking weapons, there is no such thing as a for. On deterrence, India should focus tactical nuclear weapon. Any nuclear on ‘recessed deterrence’ which would weapon used anywhere will have a be politically available at any given strategic effect. It is not in anybody's time, but militarily recessed. interest to allow nuclear weapons to be used and implications are very On the question of how minimum is clear. Ensuring survivability depends minimum, as Jaswant Singh stated, the on the targeting philosophy and as question is only an academic one. The regards testing, it is desirable but not nuclear doctrine, as mentioned earlier necessary. Disarmament is a national is dynamic and cannot be defined in security interest but disarmament permanent terms. Besides, the purely on defense and security numbers also depend on the point of policies is important. reference – whether the weapons are defined against Pakistan or China. If Lt Gen Kapur the point of reference is Pakistan, then Nuclear deterrence works only for India should have signed the NPT responsible nation-states and not long back; if it is China, then there is “outer” state actors. Deterrence would much to be discussed. work against Pakistan and China. Hence, credibility comes based on In terms of quantity, if the deterrence India’s doctrine of no-first use (NFU) is against China, then two to three if a proper second-strike capability is dozens of weapons would be available. Analysis shows that the acceptable. As time progress, one may second strike has to be credible. The need less number of nuclear weapons. fact of the matter is that for the second Expansion in terms of quantity would strike to be credible, the following only make a country more vulnerable. ingredients are necessary. India, after thirty years, perhaps may need less nuclear weapons. While First, is the capability of protecting discussing the number, what is one’s weapons after the enemy’s important is the survivability factor. strike. Silos won’t work in the Indian Even two dozens would be sufficient if context and the triad becomes the rate of survivability remains high. important. Multiple delivery systems Hence the number is dynamic. such as the tria d is important in terms of the range whether it is the air or On the quality of nuclear weapons, a naval launched weapons or mobile section in India has argued for thermo army platforms. Deterrence is the nuclear bombs. In practical terms, capability of striking Beijing and weapons of 40-50 k ton would be beyond. As far as the range of the sufficient and as mentioned earlier it surface launched missile is concerned, would depend on the delivery systems India should go for Agni V with a and their effectiveness. On this issue, range of 5,000 km, which can go

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beyond the North China Sea. Aircraft communism for United States and and air refueling capabilities and Soviet Union was merely acting in nuclear submarines are needed to response to the United States with the work beyond the Straits of Malacca. absence of a single minded deterrence principle. By 1998 it was India’s turn As far as destruction of the enemy is to determine the size of our nuclear concerned, assured destruction is arsenal. The size of the arsenal doesn’t necessary and herein comes the depend on the concept of deterrence probability of arrival. Probability of alone. arrival on target is dependent on technical flaws, prelaunched problems Obviously, deterrence has to be and problems of the first strike hitting credible but ‘minimum’ is a very some of our own delivery means. The important word. Minimum deterrence other is getting through the enemy’s does not call for an open ended defences and the type of targets. Also, boundless arsenal but is the capability the number of weapons needed to to inflict unacceptable damage to the deter the enemy. The weather other side in a second strike. The conditions and the desired ground- question is how much damage the zero, i.e., how much of circular error of other side is willing to take as a probability India has in the systems possible retaliation from India for an and aiming points. If the range, target, unprovoked attack on their part for yield, mobility can be made known to purely military or geopolitical or the enemy, which is the beginning of economic or strategic reasons. The deterrence. Openness is itself extent of the acceptability of the deterrence. damage depends on the nature of the provocation and on the situation. Second, inter-service rivalry is good India has repeatedly said that its and not bad. The Air Force might need nuclear force is certainly for the Army and the Navy and vice deterrence. Therefore India is worried versa. The future is in the combined about other parties attacking her in an three services synergizing together unprovoked manner. Also, the and multiplicity is necessary. The triad concept of deterrence does not work or the capability in all three services for adversaries beyond the pale of adds to the deterrence. rationality because a government always plans to survive and continue Prof Rajaraman after an adventure. The concept of nuclear deterrence has been around ever since the creation of In the past there was little thought the nuclear bomb. The notion of over how big India’s arsenal should be deterrence is a very complicated and but for the Indo-US nuclear deal. subtle notion. It is as much There is a serious talk about the ceiling psychological as is logical and now. It is true that greater the arsenal , involves major elements of guess greater the level of deterrence but work. The United States and the Soviet India wants a minimum deterrence Union never calculated their arsenals and also having more weapons is not based on deterrence. During the Cold cost free in terms of instability, War, there were mixed strategies of security of arsenal, bucking the war winning and demolishing international trend and lastly, the

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IPCS Special Report 13 February 2006 amount of fissile material needed. The be 8-10 kg and again, it depends on issue of the amount of fissile material the skill-levels available. Hence, all needed is coming into play in terms of these are flexible numbers, but the the Indo-US nuclear deal. And considered opinion is that the amount therefore ‘minimum’ is important. In of plutonium already available is practical terms just about a dozen enough for a reasonable arsenal. weapons are sufficient. Speaker A But, India has to work on survivability At the outset, the implosion-explosion factor as well. Nuclear weapons misconception over the nature of include delivery vehicles also. The nuclear weapons testing must be put chance of a nuclear submarine built by paid to. It is a nuclear explosion that is India is very far probably about two set-off by chemical reaction as the decades. It is better to have trigger. The US Army still maintains submarines built than allowing the the field testing range due to the weapons to stay on land for long. exigency of testing in the future due to Probably scientists could work on a the unreliability of computer temporary arrangement while waiting simulations. Moving on, to maintain for uranium enrichment and building credible nuclear deterrence with our own nuclear submarine. The China, 425 nuclear warheads are Chinese are already working on that. needed. To acquire 425 warheads, India requires its breeder reactors as it Finally, the concept of deterrence is doubles the amount of fuel the most important dynamic element consumption. R. Ramachandran’s and a missile defence can completely calculations that 9 tonnes (Rajaraman screw up these calculations. It is one of arrived at a two tonne figure) are the most destabilizing thing in the available are wrong because the figure region. There has to be diplomatic is arrived at after taking into measures to curb any such moves for a consideration the procured plutonium missile defence. Chinese are most from dismantled American warheads worried about the National Missile and, provided that India puts the Defense (NMD). These can change breeder under safeguards. India’s calculations but barring that minimal deterrence is very important. But, the breeder is required not so much for plutonium weaponry but for Main Interventions the thorium, which acts as propulsion PR Chari for the nuclear submarines. It is used On the technical side, according to R because thorium concentrates the core, Ramachandran’s calculations, Indian hence reducing the size of the reactor stocks of reactor grade plutonium in and submarine. The breeder is also the unseparated fuel is about 10 required because it converts thorium tonnes and to make a 15-20 kilo tonne 232 to uranium 233 in case a trigger is weapon, 3-8 kg of weapons grade required for a thermonuclear bomb. plutonium is required. This is keeping The moment the breeder is put under in mind the design skills and technical safeguards, the propulsion for the N- skill level available. As far as a submarines is compromised. weapon made of reactor grade plutonium is concerned, the consensus Bhabha had envisaged a thermal is that more plutonium than the earlier breeder in 1944, and made a mistake estimate of 3-8 kg is needed; it could of pursuing the fast breeder

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programme under the influence of Dr based on this logic that seeks to stay Ramanna. The J-Rod experiments clear of the perpetuity clause. conducted by Dr Rodriguez can be reworked and redesigned to get a Speaker B breeding ration of 0.9. The debate over The issue of number of warheads the number (ranging from needs to be investigated further. In Rajaraman’s 12 to Bharat Karnad’s terms of adequacies, there is enough 1,000 warheads to inflict plutonium for N-weapons. Several “unacceptable damage” is contentious. factors affect the determination of the Robert McNamara was the only number of warheads a country like person who quantified unacceptable India possesses. damage by pegging the figure at 200 million fatalities, leading to wide First, the yield level and technology of subscription for Mao’s bluff that the warhead. If India has a 200KT China’s six nuclear bombs were warhead (Dr Chidambaram is on enough to attack its adversaries. record saying that India’s 0.2KT Hence, realistically 400 warheads can thermonuclear warhead can be be considered to be “credible” extrapolated into a 200 KT warhead) deterrence. then it requires lesser number of warheads as compared to the number The need for further testing is needed if the yield is a mere 10-20 KT. compelling. Technical aspects of This is because targets like cities (or testing are as follows. If accuracy is counter-values) being large, more than improved by a factor of 10, the need one warhead is necessary for its for thermonuclear weapons does not destruction. arise. This argument can be extended to assert that with an accuracy rate of Second, the technology of the delivery 10, even conventional weapons will be systems of these warheads. India’s effective and there is no need for missiles are relatively inadequate, as nuclear weapons. If this were the case, they have not been tested adequately. India can stop pursuing nuclear To offset the inaccuracy of missiles weapons and concede to US demands there is a need for more number of over the Indo-US deal and hence missiles and hence, in the number of devote those resources to other areas warheads to cap these missiles. of concern. Conversely, India can also adopt a cautious approach owing to Third, the air and missile defence the uncertainties of future capability of the adversary. After all, administrations’ commitment to the aircrafts, along with missiles may get deal. shot down. Here aerial and ground air defence capability becomes important. The notion of using reprocessed fuel Detectability also matters here. for Tarapur is false due to the Possession of cruise missiles changes principle of joint determination, the scenario. India possesses the which, since 1956, the Americans have Brahmos, but it is not capable of used to deny such transfers from carrying nuclear warheads, for now. taking place. Dr Kakodkar has done a The adversary’s future missile defence wise thing by insisting that the capability is another factor. It might be breeder must be out of safeguards feasible to cap the number of

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IPCS Special Report 13 February 2006 warheads in the current scenario, but When talking about credibility, it it might not be an option in the future appears that India is a “reluctant” due to better missile defence capability nuclear weapon power. For e.g. a of the adversary. Hence, greater former Army chief has opined that number of warheads will be necessary Pakistan can be “obliterated” or then. something to that affect. But, is that Lastly, the capability of the adversary the capability India wants? Further, to absorb a nuclear strike. This N- credibility means second- strike absorption capability varies for strike/counter-strike capability and different countries. For example, the different governments take that US might be deterred due to threat to decision. Also, different numbers for a two of its major cities, but China will credible minimum deterrence have not be deterred. Mao had stated that in been presented. As mentioned, the case of World War III, 120 million nuclear doctrine is dynamic and must Chinese would survive to rebuild a account for contingencies in the future, glorious civilization. It is difficult to for e.g. Iran is not a threat today but ascertain whether China still follows will be a threat when it eventually the same logic. acquires nuclear weapons.

The calculation for the number of It is difficult to quantify the number of warheads can be determined by taking warheads. Instead, what is required is these factors into account. Instead of to focus on the capability that needs to striking two cities, India needs to have be developed in order to reach a the credible capability to strike 10 position to develop a credible locations/cities in China. Given deterrence. Credibility also depends India’s low kilo tonne yield capability; on whether the weapons are deployed four warheads are needed per target. or not. China for example has 20 That makes it 40 warheads. These 40 warheads as a credible deterrent must survive a first strike and if the against the US. Instead of debating adversary can destroy 50 per cent of facts like yield of the weapon, India’s nukes and delivery systems technology, etc. what is necessary is to then 80 warheads are necessary debate “how” many warheads India initially. The systems assurance level wants? India is not in a position to as a composite system (i.e. warhead, take that decision today, as it is subject missile, and command and control to revision by both, current and future structure) must also be taken into governments. Although it is desirable account. Taking this assurance level at to proceed on a path where the 50 per cent, India now needs 160 number of warheads decreases, it is warheads. Therefore, India needs 160 not possible for now. warheads in its arsenal, but reserves also need to be kept for unforeseen On testing, apart from technological eventualities, escalation dominance, requirements, the Chair’s question etc. A prudent level of reserve is one- about the comfort level of the armed third. This takes the number to 200 forces to accept a weapon that is only warheads in total for India to have a tested in computer simulations needs credible deterrent that is also a further debate. Traditionally, the minimum deterrent. military is loath to accepting any weapons system that has not been Speaker C tested. Also, the unilateral moratorium on testing that India has accepted to in

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a bilateral deal like the Indo-US deal whole process is very dynamic as of can be viewed as a semi permanent now. treaty, and hence is a cause for concern, especially the armed forces as •As a brief reference to context, in it would prefer further testing. This addressing the question as to whether issue is all right in the short-run. stable nuclear deterrence feasibility can be worked at, the answer has The nuclear doctrine that the CCS always been negative. Wide outlined on 4 January 2003 is precisely discussions were held after the nuclear because the doctrine is dynamic. No doctrine was formulated over what other country has a permanent constitutes “credibility,” “minimum,” doctrine and reviews it periodically. and the factors that will contribute to For a comprehensive structure, there both. Three factors contribute to has to be a general agreement among credibility: Transparency, different constituencies to agree that Survivability and Time factor. we are not a reluctant nuclear weapons state. It is not a moral issue • A second strike infers that India will since other countries continue to wait for a first strike and the clock possess it without any significant starts to tick for India’s counter-strike. reduction in numbers. Disarmament is A dichotomous situation arises here an ideal and eventual goal that needs between time frame and defining to be strived towards. “unacceptable damage.” Does one expect India be ready for this time DISCUSSION factor for unacceptable damage? This • The issues that are being discussed does not happen anywhere in the have a direct bearing to the Indo-US world. How many warheads does one nuclear deal and how it affects India’s need to deploy in such a situation? nuclear deterrence. Hence the focus must be on broader issues like India’s • The deletion of the word threat perception in determining its “minimum” is intentional in light of arsenal, rationale behind India’s the ambiguity over the definition of nuclear submarines programme, “unacceptable damage.” But, targeting whether India’s arsenal is being also needs deliberation. The principle capped and the question about the of targeting in a nuclear environment possibility of India’s future testing is to inflict damage to the ‘will’ of the options. adversary country. How much damage needs to be inflicted to this •Does the new UPA government ‘will’? Is it ‘unacceptable’ damage or subscribe to the CCS doctrine of 4 ‘acceptable/adequate’ damage? Once January 2003? They’d like to subscribe this is resolved, the deployment to it, only a few members of the question is automatically resolved. Consultative Committee from the Therefore, India is considering two Congress have discussed this and are time factors. First, when it will not willing to divulge any respond when attacked and second, information. The government Defence India will inflict damage to the ‘will’ Consultative Committee has not been of the adversary depending upon the allowed to discuss it and hence the situation and environment. These factors will never be constants.

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IPCS Special Report 13 February 2006

Therefore, the crux of the matter is the Once again, we are debating these time frame vis-à-vis definition and issues with the Indo-US deal as the thereof, continuing on a policy either backdrop. Needless to say this deal is based on inflicting adequate or critical to the shaping of India’s unacceptable damage to the foreign policy. Also, the debate must adversary’s will. Unacceptable factor in the robustness of the Indian damage discounts the time factor. On economy and India’s comparative the other hand, time factor merges advantages and disadvantages vis-à- when there is a steady build-up of vis China and India’s energy security precautionary stages leading to a to drive its economy. This requires nuclear exchange. Therefore, what is adoption of a farsighted policy based deployed here is a ‘cold scenario’. on a realistic assessment of national interests. • Taking the issue of survivability of the arsenals, it is clear that the Navy • The omission of the word (viz. the submarines) is the safest “minimum” is deliberate and option to carry these arsenals, but it highlights that greater weightage is strains the command and control being attached to “credibility.” (C&C) structure relative to its Regarding the NFU, is it now the case communication ability with the Army, that India is considering abrogating Air Force or even the national this commitment in keeping with the command authority. dynamism of the nuclear doctrine? Official sources privy to the CCS • With regard to anti-ballistic missiles, decisions in the late-1990s called the it is an open question. However, NFU a political statement that would restricted ABM systems must be be reviewed periodically. If so, how available to India to ensure its does it affect India’s missile stocks? survivability and counter-strike capability. Similarly, the option of • Is India capping its weapons testing must be kept open irrespective programme by including the FBRs in of the authenticity of the computer- the civilian list? How does this affect tested nuclear simulations. the calculations if a future government decides that more warheads are • It is clear that delivery systems have necessary for a credible deterrence? to be developed and tested, particularly long-range missiles. When Final Comments talking of nuclear weapons, it must Jasjit Singh consist of both, the warhead and The word doctrine by definition only delivery system. lays down the principles and not the policy. But will the principle change • The Indian government’s nuclear with the change in government. For doctrine is clearly elucidated in the 4 e.g. if NFU is dropped, how credible is January 2003 paper issued by the CCS the deterrence with a less than optimal and it clearly states “credible delivery system? For India, a counter- minimum nuclear deterrence.” This strike strategy based on a credible policy also has a national consensus, deterrence defined by NFU, and which has been built over the years. which in turn is based on survivability The definition of “minimum” can be will remain the best doctrine to adopt debated. The “” policy is for any policy options for the future. another issue needing further inquiry. Using the word “minimum” causes

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confusion, but just using the “credible deterrence” leaves the question open- The question of numbers is also crucial ended. Is this the desired objective? as it will continue to remain a dynamic number. The presence of ABM The ballpark figure of two to three missiles will surely destabilize the dozens of warheads is not the initial region. However, an argument can be number that India possesses but the made for a ‘limited’ missile defence to final number that reaches the enemy limit the damage to crucial locations. based on its survivability and the When taking missile defence into capability of the enemy. Both these account, its stability, cost and time factors are non-static. Also, what are factor are important. It must not be the political circumstances today or in rejected outright but it’s an illusion the foreseeable future where there will that it will provide complete be a necessity to use nuclear weapons. protection.

A closer look at the doctrine also In conclusion, the survivability and reveals the change in the wordings resolve of the nation and the too. There are two changes in sub- transparency in showing that resolve paragraph three. One, in the 4 January is paramount and there seems to be a document, a “massive” response is disagreement over the fundamentals assured to a first strike. In the first amongst the security establishment in document, the word was “assured India. retaliation.” The latter indicated both transparency and resolve to act while Lt Gen Kapur the definition of the former is murky. India’s nuclear technology is ahead of The initial document also stressed on its delivery system technology. India the “resolve.” Secondly, there is a does not need ICBMs, yet. India needs difference between “unacceptable to be careful about what it commits to damage” and “unacceptable the US over the nuclear deal. India punishment.” Further, the 4 January must retain all options for achieving 2003 document came close on the heels credible deterrence not only today but of Operation Parakram, a factor that in the future too. Doctrines and policy must be factored in. are dynamic but must not change drastically. Finally, missile defence is The delivery system is the most critical necessary because it is used to element in the nuclear weapons minimize the effect of the enemy’s programme in terms of range, strike. If procurement of such a system reliability, operational readiness and means an increase in the number of numbers. India just does not have enemy’s arsenal then so be it. enough of all these and needs to be worked upon. Similarly, testing is Prof Rajaraman another area with significant With regard to the question of ramifications not only to the country whether India’s weapons programme but to the region and the world, is being capped by including the FBRs especially in today’s political in the civilian list, it must be kept in environment. Therefore, testing is mind that if all the spent fuel available desirable but not necessary for till date is set aside for warheads then credible deterrence. 10-11 tonnes are available. This reactor

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IPCS Special Report 13 February 2006 grade plutonium can provide for 1000 warheads but it is unlikely that this number is necessary. The physical difficulties of separating weapons- grade plutonium from the spent fuel are great, but can be achieved. Hypothetically, even if that number is not enough 10 years from now then the Indo-US deal does not preclude setting up weapons-grade plutonium facilities. Of course, construction of these facilities will be time bound. Therefore, India’s programme is not capped. But if the FBRs are being excluded from the civilian list then it raises doubts about India’s future military plans in the US Congress, which considers this deal to be an energy pact.

Even if FBRs are put under safeguards, the thorium propulsion for the N-submarines will not be compromised because although the submarine is a military object, it is not a proliferating object and therefore in principle, this aspect must not draw opposition from the IAEA and even if it does it can be negotiated with the IAEA during the bilateral negotiations. The safeguards permit India to use the output of the FBRs for use in the submarines. The Canadian and Brazilian proposal to plug this option of allowing nuclear propulsion as peaceful activity at the next IAEA meeting is another issue.

The number of warheads is controversial because it is a matter of magnitude. More so, it is also the cost India is paying for having an open- ended unstated fuel levels and it is coming under strain from the Indo-US deal.

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