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India's Credible Minimum Deterrence: a Report

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India's Credible Minimum Deterrence: a Report IPCS Special Report 13 February 2006 INDIA’S CREDIBLE MINIMUM DETERRENCE A REPORT (Report of the IPCS Panel Discussion held on 7 February 2006, with Air Cmde Jasjit Singh, Lt Gen BM Kapur and Prof Rajaraman as panelists) KS Manjunath & Beryl Anand Research Officers Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies PR Chari Air Cmde Jasjit Singh The draft nuclear doctrine of India There is a need to constantly review spoke about a ‘credible minimum’ the purpose of nuclear weapons. India nuclear deterrent. The Cabinet needs nuclear weapons only for one Committee on Security finalised contingency; that is against the threat India’s nuclear doctrine which also of nuclear weapons targeted at India. spoke about maintaining a ‘credible Sixty years of nuclear weapons and minimum’ nuclear deterrent. deterrence shows that credibility was However, the 2002-03 annual report of based on a second strike capability. the Ministry of External Affairs dropped the word ‘minimum’. The The doctrine of counterstrike has not Hindu, on 6 September 2004 in a been adequately examined in India. report cited Pranab Mukherjee saying Deterrence has to be looked at that India needs a credible nuclear theoretically. Politically, deterrence is deterrence. Why has ‘minimum’ been available and nuclear weapon is a dropped? Besides, the size of India’s political tool; militarily it has no arsenal and what is credible and utility. As regards the quantity and minimum also needs to be taken into quality of nuclear weapons, two to account while discussing India’s three dozens of nuclear warheads are security and nuclear doctrine. sufficient for India and there is no need to pursue megaton range Also the following needs to be capabilities to strengthen deterrence discussed on the domestic credibility . constituencies: What is India’s force structure and basic principle The main issue however is the underlying them? How do they work delivery system. The missile defence is with doctrines such as Limited War unlikely to work and one can expect it and Cold Start? Are the Armed forces would address only one fourth of the satisfied with the nuclear doctrine and problem. The focus should rather be deterrence? How about the political on the delivery systems. While more leadership and the nuclear scientists? attention has been paid to the What prompted Anil Kakodkar to warheads and the delivery system has make the statement about fast breeder been ignored. India is twenty five reactors? What are the strategic years away from an operationally purposes of fast breeder reactors? deployed Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) system. INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDES B-7/3, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi 91-11-5100 1900 (Tel); 91-11-5165 2560 (Fax) IPCS Special Report 13 February 2006 India is almost fifteen years away from The doctrine of No-First-Use (NFU) is getting a credible delivery vehicle. negative. It is based on losing one city or more, which is not acceptable. Also India needs a triad and should including the biological and chemical especially have a credible SLBM. weapons attack in the nuclear doctrine SLBM is essential for survivability. has diluted the same. India should address these questions to finalize the On force structure and tactical nuclear kind of nuclear doctrine it is looking weapons, there is no such thing as a for. On deterrence, India should focus tactical nuclear weapon. Any nuclear on ‘recessed deterrence’ which would weapon used anywhere will have a be politically available at any given strategic effect. It is not in anybody's time, but militarily recessed. interest to allow nuclear weapons to be used and implications are very On the question of how minimum is clear. Ensuring survivability depends minimum, as Jaswant Singh stated, the on the targeting philosophy and as question is only an academic one. The regards testing, it is desirable but not nuclear doctrine, as mentioned earlier necessary. Disarmament is a national is dynamic and cannot be defined in security interest but disarmament permanent terms. Besides, the purely on defense and security numbers also depend on the point of policies is important. reference – whether the weapons are defined against Pakistan or China. If Lt Gen Kapur the point of reference is Pakistan, then Nuclear deterrence works only for India should have signed the NPT responsible nation-states and not long back; if it is China, then there is “outer” state actors. Deterrence would much to be discussed. work against Pakistan and China. Hence, credibility comes based on In terms of quantity, if the deterrence India’s doctrine of no-first use (NFU) is against China, then two to three if a proper second-strike capability is dozens of weapons would be available. Analysis shows that the acceptable. As time progress, one may second strike has to be credible. The need less number of nuclear weapons. fact of the matter is that for the second Expansion in terms of quantity would strike to be credible, the following only make a country more vulnerable. ingredients are necessary. India, after thirty years, perhaps may need less nuclear weapons. While First, is the capability of protecting discussing the number, what is one’s weapons after the enemy’s important is the survivability factor. strike. Silos won’t work in the Indian Even two dozens would be sufficient if context and the triad becomes the rate of survivability remains high. important. Multiple delivery systems Hence the number is dynamic. such as the tria d is important in terms of the range whether it is the air or On the quality of nuclear weapons, a naval launched weapons or mobile section in India has argued for thermo army platforms. Deterrence is the nuclear bombs. In practical terms, capability of striking Beijing and weapons of 40-50 k ton would be beyond. As far as the range of the sufficient and as mentioned earlier it surface launched missile is concerned, would depend on the delivery systems India should go for Agni V with a and their effectiveness. On this issue, range of 5,000 km, which can go 2 INDIA’S CREDIBLE MINIMUM DETERRENCE beyond the North China Sea. Aircraft communism for United States and and air refueling capabilities and Soviet Union was merely acting in nuclear submarines are needed to response to the United States with the work beyond the Straits of Malacca. absence of a single minded deterrence principle. By 1998 it was India’s turn As far as destruction of the enemy is to determine the size of our nuclear concerned, assured destruction is arsenal. The size of the arsenal doesn’t necessary and herein comes the depend on the concept of deterrence probability of arrival. Probability of alone. arrival on target is dependent on technical flaws, prelaunched problems Obviously, deterrence has to be and problems of the first strike hitting credible but ‘minimum’ is a very some of our own delivery means. The important word. Minimum deterrence other is getting through the enemy’s does not call for an open ended defences and the type of targets. Also, boundless arsenal but is the capability the number of weapons needed to to inflict unacceptable damage to the deter the enemy. The weather other side in a second strike. The conditions and the desired ground- question is how much damage the zero, i.e., how much of circular error of other side is willing to take as a probability India has in the systems possible retaliation from India for an and aiming points. If the range, target, unprovoked attack on their part for yield, mobility can be made known to purely military or geopolitical or the enemy, which is the beginning of economic or strategic reasons. The deterrence. Openness is itself extent of the acceptability of the deterrence. damage depends on the nature of the provocation and on the situation. Second, inter-service rivalry is good India has repeatedly said that its and not bad. The Air Force might need nuclear force is certainly for the Army and the Navy and vice deterrence. Therefore India is worried versa. The future is in the combined about other parties attacking her in an three services synergizing together unprovoked manner. Also, the and multiplicity is necessary. The triad concept of deterrence does not work or the capability in all three services for adversaries beyond the pale of adds to the deterrence. rationality because a government always plans to survive and continue Prof Rajaraman after an adventure. The concept of nuclear deterrence has been around ever since the creation of In the past there was little thought the nuclear bomb. The notion of over how big India’s arsenal should be deterrence is a very complicated and but for the Indo-US nuclear deal. subtle notion. It is as much There is a serious talk about the ceiling psychological as is logical and now. It is true that greater the arsenal , involves major elements of guess greater the level of deterrence but work. The United States and the Soviet India wants a minimum deterrence Union never calculated their arsenals and also having more weapons is not based on deterrence. During the Cold cost free in terms of instability, War, there were mixed strategies of security of arsenal, bucking the war winning and demolishing international trend and lastly, the 3 INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDES B-7/3, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi 91-11-5100 1900 (Tel); 91-11-5165 2560 (Fax) IPCS Special Report 13 February 2006 amount of fissile material needed. The be 8-10 kg and again, it depends on issue of the amount of fissile material the skill-levels available. Hence, all needed is coming into play in terms of these are flexible numbers, but the the Indo-US nuclear deal.
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