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HEGEL'S THEOLOGICAL LEGACY A Descriptive Reassessment of Hegel's Philosopby of Religion in the Light of Karl Barth's Critique

Patrick D. M. Patterson 009624722

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Wycliffe College and the Theological Department of the Toronto School of Theology. In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Theology awarded by Wycliffe College and the University of Toronto.

Thesis Director : George P. Schner SJ

Toronto, Canada September 27, 1998

O Patrick D. M. Patterson National Library Bibliotheque nationale 1*1 of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliog rap hic Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. rue Wellington OttawaON K1A ON4 OrrawaON K1AûN4 Canada Canada

The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or seil reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic fonnats. la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d' auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts f?om it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or othewise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. ... for Beth Akitt Patterson Hegel ... the misiinderstood one. Again and again we find we mast think three times before contradicting [his phiiosophy], because we might find that everything we are tempted to Say in contradiction of it has already ken said within it, and provided with the best possible answer.

Karl Barth Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to Ritschl CONTENTS

Abbreviations vi

Introduction ...... - ...... - ...... - 1

Hesel and the Knowledge of God A pproxi mate Interpretation or Poiesis In Karl Barth's Company Three Perenniat Issues New Resources Ourline

Chapter 1. Barth's Threefold Critique of Hegel ...... - . . 13

Three Demands and Three Criticisms Surnmav Response

Chapter 2. In the Beginning, Cod ...... 20

The Inalienable Self-sufficiency of God Cod for the Whole Human Person The Subjective/Objective Distinction The Closed Circle

Chapter 3. The Ecclesial Vocation to Philosophy ...... 27

Section 1. The Context ...... - . . - ...... - . - -28 An Urgent Summons 28 Philosophy and the Creclo of the Church 32 Classical Studies or Church Dogma: A Shift of Emphasis'? 35 The Eclipse of God by the Enlightenment 36 Barren Orthodoxy 40 Neo-Kantian Theology 33 Schleiermacher and the Religion of Pure Subjectivitj- 46 The Question 47 Section 2. The Cal1 ...... 4û A Cod-Given Vocation 43 Fait h and Reason 49 Three Pi tfalls 52 Section 3. The Fall . . . - ...... The Doctrine of the Fd1 Infinite Antitheses and Pseudo-Reconciliations

Section 4. The Gospel ...... * ...... God Was in Jesus Christ Reconciling the World to Himself One Has Died for Ail: Therefore Al1 Have Died Philosophy's Presupposition: the Gospel Section 5. The Community ...... The Primitive Church The Institutional Church Doctrine in the Early Church Phi losophy: Devet oped Wortdt iness

Chapter 1. Necessity and the Sovereign Freedom of God . - . . . .

A Threefold Task Theology and Philosophy in Conflict From Patristic to Schofastic The Scholastic Complementan ty of Theology and Philosophy Anselrn and Necessity The Renaissance and the Refomation: The Recovery of Subjectivity Luther. the Lutherans. and Company Modem Philosophy: The Loss of Necessity

Chapter 5. Conclusion: Necessity, the Philosophical Task, and Theological Resources ......

Necessi ty Responsive Actualization Hegelian Resources for Theology

Appendix 1. Barth's Four Criteria for Doing Historical Theology Appendis 2. The Vitality of the Word: Hegel's Poetical Last Will and Testament Appendix 3. Hurnan Theology or Gd's Very Own Theology: Barth and the Pure Fantasy of the Hegelian Solution Appendix 4. Hegel in the Chrirch Dogmarics ABBREVIATIONS

Banh's Works: A or Anseh = Anselm :Fides Quatmns Inrel lecricm. CD = Church Dopnatics. HT = 'TheTask of a History of Modem Protestant Theology".'

= Proresrant ïïioughr: From Rousseau ro Rirschl. = The Theology of Sc%leiemacher.

Hegel's Works: HF = the 1822 Fonvard that Hegel wrote for H. F. W. Hinrichs' Rdigion. ' = Hegel: The krrers. ed. Butler and Seiler. Referenc- es to particutar letters are to page nurnbers. not letter nurnbers.

LHP = Lectrrres on the Hisron of Phihsophy. \.of. 3:' LPR = kc-trrreson rhe Philosoph v of Religion. oc5 = "On CIassical Studies".' PR = Phitosophy of Right.

: Thcrc arc rit Icrrst ttvo English trmslritions of this tvork. 1 has.c uscd both. Whcrc the pgc rcfcrcnccs arc in rhc ZOT,'.;. ihc translation 1s that by X.V. .Miller for an appcndis to Rqorrd Episrenrolog~:~Vew .S!wii~s itt [lie Phikosv- ph! of Hqt~l.cd. Frdcnck G-Wiss. Thc Haguc. 1974.22744. Whcrc thc pagc rcfcrcnccs arc in thc IOo's. ihc trxwlririon is thrit b>-J. blichricl Smt-art. "Font-ard to Hinnchs' Rrlipiort ( 1822): Thc Rcconciliation of Friirh ancl Rcrtwn". incl udcd in G.W.F. Hegel: 771eol0,pimrof rllu Spirit. cd. Pcicr Hcdgson, Minncripoiis, 1997, 155- 7 1.

' .-\II rclcrcnccs to [HP in this cssay arc to \xi. 3.

This 1 8W spccch 1s includcd as thc "Appcndis" to Ort Cluisriatrity: Edy TIieological Writi~rqs& Frirderic-li He- yrl, rrrins. b'. T..LI.Knos. n~than ~ntrduction.and I'ngmcnis tmns, b!. Richrird Kroncr. Glouccstcr. 1970.32 l-30, vi INTRODUCTION

Hegel interpreted modern cultural awareness to itself in an unprecedented fashion by saying that at the deepest and ultimate level it was concerned with the daim of truth. This ctaim takes a form possible only if the truth is God, and Cod is the Master of men.... Will mdern man recognize his joy in truth, his quest for truth, his fanaticism for trath... in this looking-glass? Will he put up with being taken so serioaslp, with being thus seized upon in his penchant for trnth?...Or wiH he shrink back before the last things, which are pointed out to him as his own; before the discovery of the revelatory nature of absolute truth and aU real knowledge, and stiU, now as ever, seek to faIl humbly into the left hand of Cod, instead of exalting his thinking to a divine service, as is here demanded of him? Barth

"HegeI thought throush his whole system from the perspective of Christ - or was it the 0th- er \{,a) round?"" From the perspective of Christ will be my contention in this essay. The other \rFay round has been the consensus of rnany philosophers and theologians in the second half of the 20th Centur).. H. S. Hams.- B. Cooper.". Jaeschke.' and W. Kaufmann" are just four of man). \$:ho

- "Thc consistent intcrprcration 01' Hcgcl's scicncc oi cspcncncc rictudly reqttirrs us io rcjcct c\ cc. spin tuai h>.p~hc- sis ot LI irrinwcndcni kind. ln thc phcnomcno1r)gy oi thc absdutc rcligion. Gddics in c~rdcrto bc rcsurrcctcd xi thc 'spirit 01' tlic cc~mmuntty"' (H.S. Huns. -Hcgcl's Phcncirncnolog>. 01' Rcligion". in Thorr,pltt (mifilitli i/r 11rr IW- lo.w~plr\*of Hr.;.rl. cd. John Wtilkcr. Dcirdrccht. 199 1. 100).

"1 cfon'i bclic\ c !.CN.I crin bc ri Hcgclirin md a Chnstim. Thcrc arc thosc \vho bclics-c !.ou cm. - somc ci( thcm arc stxd l'ricndc; 01' rninc. But. I don't think !.cw c3n JO il. In rhc lïnd rinalysis Hcgcl's s'srcm 1s rithcisric". c Btimc CO- opcr. I nicn icud in Pan 2 of ri thrcc-pan scncs cm Gcorgc Gmt. 'Thc Moving Imrigc oi Etcrnity". bniadc-LS~on /c/tw(~\.b> ~hcCanadian B roadcristing Corp,niic>n ( CBC), 1%).

" "Hcgcl's philosoph> bcgins by priincwncing thc Jcath oi Gai. and cnds tvith thc insigfit into rhc cnd oi rcligion .... Rcligion crrcmcously undcrsunds \\.ha[ it is... Oncc thc philosophy oi rcligion has gonc bc>wxl n-har IL rs implic~tl!-. rcli gion in gcncml. including thc Christian rcligion. 1s ... incripriblc of satisl-yin€ thc highcst conccm of spirit, and ha rhcrcb! rcxhcd i ts cnd" ( Waitcr Jricschkc. "Philosophical Thcology and Philosophy of Rcligion". in :\rrrc*I'rr.vpc~-- rilm ott Hqcl 's Pliilosupll~of Relipiotr. cd. Dri\.id Kol b. Staic University of Nc\r York Prcss. 1992. 1 . 15).

Kriui'nirinn rcprcscnrs Hcgci as saying. "In Gcd I do nor bclic\-c: spint sut'liccs Ior rnc" (Walter Kaut'mann. Hrqrl: .4 Rzirr~erprrlarioti.Grirdcn Ci t!-. 1%. 274). 1 believe that Hegel's system contradicts the Christian doctrine of God and theism ofany kind. Stuart Barnett has recently reminded us" of the extraordinaneidluence upon the modem renaissance in Hegel studies. not only in France but in the rest of Europe and in North America.'' of Alexandre Kojève's atheistic reading of The Plnmontcnoko~cgSpirir deli\.ered in lectures in Paris in the Iate 1930's. Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Kojève's interpretation was his insistence on an anthropological foundation to Hegel's thought. Dismissing issues of theology. indeed. of cntology itself. Kojève focused on the notions of seif-consciousness and history.--For Kojève. Hegel's philosophy is fundamentally a theory of the histoncal evolution of consciousness.';

The persistent interest in Kojève's interpretation up to the present da! is explained in part by his reading Hegel in terrns of the central notion of discourse. again tvith anti-theist implications: Hegei's Spirit is not therefore truly a dii-inc. Spirit... it is h~i~?zunin the sense chat it is a discourse that is immanent to the natural World and that has for its srrpilorr a natural being limited in its existence by tirne and space ... Spirit is the Real revealed by Discourse."

Spirit is not the self-manifestation of the Absolutc. Rather it denotes the façt that discourse has tichie\-edan nutonornous existence w-hich it is the task of philosoph>.to elucidate." Yet Kojè1.e is not able to a\.oid a tendency to di\,inize discourse. to veer from his anthropoIogica1 assessrnent of Heyl in gi\.ing an account of the constitutii-e function of discourse for human being as such."' That Kojève's intluence on European and North Arnerican Hegelian studies is alrnost impossible to esqgerate is due in part to the remarkable audience that \vas dratr-n to hear him. incl iid-

' "1 DIiw~wrscbccomcs ihc condirron (il' possibilit~01- mari L\ such ... Dixoursc. \t h~chir-n~li~~s nhrurc. gi\ CS birth io ihc human." ( Barncit "Inircduction". I-le.prl.4fierDerrid~i.17). 2 ing Bataille, Lacan. Aron. Queneau. Sartre. Merleau-Ponty, Weil, and Levinas. It is no wonder that anthropological readings of Hegel which ignore or translate al1 religious and especially Chris- tian vestiges predominate in the contemporary setting. Hegel would not have ken surprised: [alnyone who grasps the thought. or tries to, of entering upon the cognition of God. of comprehending his nature in thought. can therefore expect that no one will pay any attention at dl. that such a thouet is regarded as a long-refuted error. deserving no further attention..,. It is no lonser a grief to Our age that it knows aothing of God: rather it counts as the highest insight that this cognition is not even possible (LPR 1, 860. Ne\?enhelessthere have ken. and are theologians who have wanted to look to Hegei as a continu- in= resource for theology."Too often. however, Hegelian theologies appear to do less than full justice to the integrity of God. humanity. grace. the Incarnation. or creation as these have been understood wi thin the classical tradition of the Christian church and in accord with the church's Ciutk).Hegelian theologies seem to be inevitably compromised by that modemity of which Hegel is said to have been the consummate philosopher.'* if also the source of its eventual demise." So it is that Karl Barth and Hans Urs von Balthasa? caution against looking to Hegel as a resource for thcology. In Barth's words. Hegel cm only be considered if he is seriously rethought. "understood... better than he perhaps understood himself ... vigorously translated and transformed"

( PT 300f). Or. is it rather that Hegel stilI waits to be understood better than either his theological or anthropological al lies or opponents have hitherto read him?

- Among thcm. Tillich. Kung, Xlolirnmn, ruid Pmncnbcrg.

"Hcgcl - accc~rilingto a gcncral cnticsil consensus - dcfincs thc modcrnity that our postmcxicrn cri sccks to csc-apc" ( Brirnctt. "1 niroduction". Huqul AJur Dcrrih. 1 ).

'', "Thc dctcrmincd rr~nstonnaiionof thc cntirc Chrisiirui pisris into a dcfinitit-c gliosis 1s ... in Hcgcl's crmsciousncss ...a long-owrduc qmhcsis of thc cntirc rcligious histoc of thc \vorld". "(T)hcrc 1s no rcawn no[ io Jmt. thc athcistic conscqucnccs ol' ihc Hc_rclian Lcftn (Hans Urs \.on Bdthasu. nie (;lu- of rlir I~rd:A Thun- loqic-al .-ksrhrrit-S. C'drr~nr V: Tite Rrcilrn of ,Cfrrnp/~yicsin !lie :Modurrr Aqe. San Francisco. 199 1. 573. 589). 3 Appros-i~?u~rrfnrrrpreru~irm or Poi esi s Hegel lias shown himself remarkably hospitable to very different readings.:' William Des- mond suggests that. alongide the rnultiplicity of interpretations that ha\*e"fed on the disjectcr mm- hr~~of his systeni" developing one aspect with a view to "dismember[ingI the system's fuller claims". and rilongside the pst-Hegelian efforts to detem~inewhar is Iii-ing und whut i.s rlc.~di~z HL',yi.:' therc rire four pairs of striking oppositions around which major interpretations ciuster: the first sets Hcgel the panlosist against Hegel as the one \vho precipitated "the floodgates of the irn- tional": the second. the arheist against the one who -reinstated religious mystification": the third, the Soundationalist. the philosopher of identitj,, against the deconstrtictionist. the philosopher of ~liflrcm-e:and the fourth. the enemy of science against the one who was "enamored of scien~e".~ Though this may seem to lease the field of Hegeiian studies open to \vhat O'Regan calls a skeptical manifold ~vhcreinterpretation pivrs pince to production and poiesis." not al1 cntrria of critical jiidyient are to be jettisoned lea\.ing the field open to just an!. reading. There remains the lcgitiniate in~eitaiionio "uppn~t-imurto the internai complrsity of Hegelian thought"." Without clniniing io lia\-esaid the final bvord. according to this criterion thc interpretative endeai-oiir is an attempt to correspond to an object that sets dcfinite constraints on iniventionand promotes ctitical approsimation. If final definition is not gi\.cn. if ndequation is never fully rcalized. this says more about the ineshaustibilit>.of the object than the subjectii-ity of inter- My reading in this essay tries to meet this criterion. in pan at least. 1 have Iimited myself almost entirel), to Hegel's -religious' texts and letters of the 1820's." Apart from revisions of earlier ~vorks.onlj- bis Forward to Hinrichs' Religion (HF) and a few book reviews, noteworthy among them the 1829 review of Goschel's Aphoris~ns.were published during his lifetime. None of the

four sets of Lectrrrrs on the Philosophy of Religion ( LPR), nor the Lectures on the Hisiop of Phi- /oropl'y (LW)were published uniil after his death. and then in editions gleaned from his own and students' lecture notes. My neglect of the great works from the Phenomenology ofspirit through the L/JJ,J~L-.the E~~~:\.c-Iop~)diu~ and the Philo.st,phy /,I Righi necessarily limits rny effort at appros- imate interpretation. That does not canceI the value of a close reading of the retigious works: too often Hqel is read the other wa!. round from the perspective of the earlier works. the religious \r.orks being assessed in their light. if at ail."

1 am approaching Hegei's texts in the company of the 20th Century theologian, Kari Barth: in partictilar. his reading of Hcgel in Proresrunr T'o~cght:Frnm Rnrr.sseurr ro Rirsc-hl iPT). a collec-

tion of essays ( al1 of them by Barth) on 19th Century Protestant philosophers and theolo,'olans. Though it is prirnaril), w-ith his three-fold critique in mind. - a critique that has a noble pedigree. incl udi ng Schelling. Trendelenburg. and Kierkegaard. and noble contemponry company in the

: ll~tl..2. C'j: Burbtdgc's c.hrirxien/riiit>n ol' intcrprcicrs 01' Hcgcl as morc olicn than no[ "scc(ing1 in Hcgcl ri \ crsion 01- [thcirl cwn imrigc'-. and so tclling us morc ribout thcmscl\~csban about Hcgcl (John Burbidgc. "ls Hcgcl ri Chn siirin'!". in .Vr~r.Prrspr<-rirus .... cd. Kol b. 1995. 94). That HcgcI approtcd 01-cymsitcie cncfczi\.ors rit cltxc rippnnimaiion in inicrprcmticin is cl-idcnt in rhiv c\- ccrpr I.rom ri lcilcr ccimmcnding his onc-iimc srudcnt. Gcorg Andmm Gablcr. on thc thoroughncss ol'c\p<~tiiondcm- onsrrarcd in his rcccnrl! pub1 ishcd Ilrst book, Tlw Prnpcrc.~k.rrfic-ro PI~ilosop/i~.\ml. 1 ( 1827). In parriculrir Hcgcl sa! S. his Jigrcssions on r\ns~otlcrind ihc rinu-Hcgclirin, Johann Fricdcrich Hcrbm. arc mdcls of cyxw[ion: "[~(ont'usion01' ihought5. shrillr~~vncsç.and c\cn ignoriincc arc cqudly glaring in much thrit ialks big rind struts. &)ut I'ull 01. lis importrincc. This c~nnoibc countcr~ictcdby dcclamations. bui ml>-by cspsitions. such ;LS yours. tvhich

ti jl l( il\ prccisci 1 ihc author's siritcrncnr~"(I,rrrrrs 535). 11 is Griblcr tvho is rclcrrcd io in Hcgcl's c~piicrcmark ncar thc cnd of his lifc. thrit "cvcn ihc onc rnrin \\ ho hrid bci; rindcraxxl him rnisundcrsior>d him" r'Butlcr's cd. commcncs, in I,c.tr~.rs533).

-. - For Iack 01- spricc I ha\-c hrid Ioc\;cludc Hcgcl's rc\-isions. cornplcicd in ihc 1810's. of his 011-n carlicr uwks: tn paniculrir. rhc 1830 cdition of thc E~rr-y-lnpredi(~.I'irsi publishcd in 181 7. theologian. von Balthasar. - 1 have chosen Barth ahead of these others for two reasons. First. his critique is but a relatively brief conclusion to an assessrnent that is to a signifiant degrer syrnpathetlcally disposel toward Hegel and the -'peculiar preatness" of his philosophy ( PT 28O)-" - and that for theological reasons. In the introduction to the Geman edition Barth wrote. 1 believe one. holy. catholic. and apostolic Church. And if 1 senous- Iy intend to iisten to a theologian of the past [incl uding. by implication. Hesel. as the subject of one of the essays in the book]... then 1 must mcan this '1 beiieve' seriously. unless 1 have been released Erom this obligation by private inspiration! That is. regardless of my ni).riad opinions 1 musc include these people in the Chnstian Church. And in view of the fact that 1 rnyself. together with my theological work belong to the Christian Church solel!. on the basis of forgit-e- ness. 1 have no right to den' or even to doubt that they were as fundamentally concerned as 1 am abut the Christian faith."

1 haieti endcrivoured to read Hegel in ihis same spirit, as a colleague in Christ in the church. Hegel hin~setfconfessed that his philosophy had only confirmed him in his Christian faith (Lttrter.~520). Owr ngriinst the contemporav revival of Hegelian studies in the spirit of Kojève's anthropological approach. I take seriousl!. Barth's chal lenge: Thcre can be no denying that knowledge of God was what [Hegel1 meant.[" 1 and that he was speaking from \.ery close to the hean of tlie matter. But.-.\vil1 modem nian tolerate such a theoIogical invasion. and one of such ri particularly menacing aspect'?... Or had not Hegel already understood him in far too deep and far too Christian a way. by demanding of him that he should thüs found his philosophy upon theology. and eventuall y aIlow his philosophy to be trans- forrned into theology? ( PT 298)

The second reason esplains both mjrchoosing Barth as a companion and rny effort at de- monstnting tliat Hegel ma) be trusted as a resource for theology more uncompromisingly than Banh bclie\*es,In setting forth his objections to Hegel. Barth ackno\\:ledges that apin and again we must think three times before contradicting [his philosophy 1. because \Le might find that eve~.thingwe arc tempted to say in contradiction of it has dready been said \vithin it. and pro-

ouorcd b! Jarosla\. Pclikan in his "lntrduciion" to thc English cdition 01' PT. Scn York. iCXi9.S. vided with the best possible answer (PT 280)."

My readinp endeavors to show from Hegel's own words that he may be read as having provided Banh's criticisrns tvith the best possible answers. answen that are determined to be consistent with the Credo of the Christian church. In Küng's tms. Hegel did indeed think throuph his whoIe 5)-stem from the perspective of Christ and not the other way around."

It \vill become evident that. in serving as a resource for theology at the close of the 20th Century. Hegel need not inevitably give rise to a theology compromised by the worst vestiges of niodemitj,. This is not surprising. for Hegel himself was. as 1 shall endeavour to demonstrate. sharply rtivare of the estent to which modem philosophy and theology. at least since Descartes. had betrayed their God-given vocation to serve the gospel. "to found [theirj philosophy upon theology, and eventiial ly allou [ theirl philosophy to be tnnsfonned into theology" (PT298). Descri bed b\- Hegel as "the point of dcparture of modern philosophy.' (krters 637),Descartes wrote his .Cl~diru- riom as an apolog). for theism and the immortality of the soul. As such. he understood himself to be defending the faith of the churchSuHis apology established the ground for certainty (ulu Mon-

taisne. "my metaphysics is myself') in the self. and not only the self. but rny self: cogiro rr:qo

stlm. Though Hume masterfully undermined the apologetic. Kant restored it and it became defini- ti~.efor theologj. from Schleiermacher to Tracy. Kant to Rahner. Butler to Lewis. Kierkegaard to Tillich.

' : X \ cr' Jillcrcnt rhinkcr. llichcl Foucriuli. ..ri!.s cry nctlrly thc samc ihing though c\.idcnlly u.i thoui an!. con\ IC- Lion rcgard~ngcomprinionship in thc church! -Bui to truI!' c~cxpcHcgcI in\.ol\.csrui csixt apprwiriiion of thc pncc uc h;it c io pa! 10dctach ourscl\'cs liinn hrm. fi assumcs rhat \vc arc a\\.arc of ihc cxtcnt [O n-hich Hcgcl. insidiriusi~ pcrhrips. 1s ilri~cto us; it implics ri ho\\-lcdgc. rn thai ivhich pcmitc us io ihink agriinst Hcgcl. oi thrit n,hich rcmain.; i-icgclicrn. \Vc h3\c [odcicrrn~nc ~hc cxicni to 1i.hic.h ciur rinti-Hcgclianism is possibl! onc of his tncks dircctcJ apnst US. ai thc cnd of\\ hich hc stands. moticmlcss. ~vtiitingfor us" (Quoicd in Cimpcr. Tiir Elrd of Hh~on..1. and r n Barnci t c cd. ) . Hc:,t>/.4]jt~fkrricltr. 21).

'- Scc cqxctrill~Dcscrirics' Lcitcr oi Dcdicaiion of his :Wedi~miorrs."To thc Wiscsi and Most Distinpishcd lfcn. thc Dcrin and Dtxinrs of thc Friculty of Srrcrcd Thcology of Paris". in lvhich hc csplains thrit Holy Scnpturc sufficcs l'or bcIic\crs ("likc ourscl\cs"i. but no[ Ior unbclicvcrs \\,ho svould judgc ri biblicdly bascd argumcnt for ihc cwr- cncc 01' Gdand ihc imrnomlii?-of ihc sou1 as ci~ular.L'nbclic\ms musi bc convinçcd "by rason dn\\.n I'rom ri wwrcc nonc ciihcr than our ri\\.n mind" (Dcs~rincs..Mdi~~rriorrs. trms. by Donald A- Crcss. Indianapolis. 1979. 11'1-1. 7 But there is another tradition whose mots are older than Descartes. In this tradition there cnn be no frvi tful beginning in the self. Its heart is dogrnatic: its foundation. revelation: its criteria. ChnstologicaI and trinitarian. Barth is its 20th Century representative: Anselrn. Hegel's favounte theoIosian. its 12th Century representative. 1 intend to demonstrate that Hegel not only belongs to this tradition. but reint~entedit for modernity. from within modernity. and as such engineered modernit!.'~ inalitable demise. subvertint the modem project from within. Resources for theolog!. in a post-modem world lie in the rediscoven of Hegel.

T/wcJ~:P~.rcrlniuiI.wir.s Barth's critique of Hegel ccnters around three issues that have perenially provoked intense e\ cn acrinionious dcbate amon= thedogians and philosophers of religion. The issues conccrn thrce pnirs of concepts: God and \r.orld. histor) and reason. freedoni and necessity. With regard to God and \t orld it lias been obsewed that accounts of their relationship tend to opposite poles. stressing

1C ci thcr thri r uni 1)- or thei r disparitjp. The sanie tendency may be obsemed in accounts ~f the relations that hoici ivithin cach of the other ttro pairs. Hcgel and Barth are usually taken to be advocates of opposing accounts of each of these pnirs: Hegel tending consistcntlj to a rnonist description ivhich. accordin2 to his cntics at Icast. nbsorbs one side of cach pair into an identity with the other: Barth tending in a dualist direction. emphnsizinp the antithetical distinction betwren the poles of each pair. and accused of ovenr-helm- irig oric sidc of each pair. As Barth is often caricatured as a theologian ofantithcses at the cspense of rccoiicilintion. so Hegel is cancatured as a theologian of s~mtheses.evcn identitirs. at the expense of his claini to do justice to the integrit) of those realities wiïosc rcconciliation he wants to dcmonst rate. Both chancterizations are caricatures. While Barth's is beyond the confines of this essay.* it is Our intention to consider carefully Hegel's contribution to the debate around these three issues and in so doing to get behind the caricature by recovering an account of his position that approxi- mates more closely to his own texts. We shatl see that perceptive as Barth's reading is. even it does not do justice to Hegel." Nevertheless his caricature of Hesel is much less extreme than that of rnany other readers fa\,orable and unfa\?orable,He applauds Hegel's detemination to begin with Goci. the God w-ho has already made his beginning before ever we make our's. Equally he acknowledges his concern to honour the fullness of the iife of the world in alt its manifold complexity and particularity. as nlso its being in time. its historical becoming. And he appreciates Hegel's earnest intention to rein- tegrate religion and triith. Havins said that. Hegel remains a problem for Barth. In even case tvhcre he is able to be positive. he is compelled to point up a shadow. a corresponding failure to do justice to the fullness of God and the tvorld in ternis of the gospel. 1 shall endeavour to show that Hegel is able to provide satisfactory answers to al1 of Banh's charges. Relying on close reaciing of his writings 1 shall also take account of Hegel's his- tonca1 context. and in particular the theological imptications of the thought of his predecessors and conternporriries as it influenced his o1c.n thinking. Whereas it was a too easy identification of di\.ine and human realities and interests. especially in the theologies and religious philosophies of the Iate 19th and earlj. 20th Centuries. that influenced Barth towards an insistence upon certain profound anritheses neccssary to an adequate appreciation of the gospel of reconciliation in Christ: it was He- gel's coritemporaries' banishment of God from the world. exclusion of religious reality from sen- L ous intcllectual rctlection. divorce of religious truth and Iife. and exaltation of human autonomy to

" Suifïcc il ~osri! hcrc ihrir Banh's cmphasis on thc antithcsis tviihin cxhof the pairs is I'ur thc srikc ddcmonsrrrir- ing ,!hc rctilit! and intcgnty olvthc rccrmcilirition bctwcn Gid and tvorld: thrir thrit rcconciliriiion 1s by =a*r~c~. - achr c\ cd in sol crcign l'rccdom b!. Gd.in thc midst of thc ncccssiiics OC histon in Jcsus of Nuarcth: thrit ir is crip- riblc of-bang rcf ccrcd upm and prrxlrii mcd by rhc shurch ris thc first hiu.and for thc .dc. of ihc rcçonci 1 cd \\.orlif. - [O Gcd's ctcrnlil &q.. Banh's insistcncc upm rhc antithcscs is in othcr ~vordsfor thc szikc or thc grcritcr and morc l undarncnlril rcril ~i! oI' rhcir rcccmcil irition in Christ. To insist on antithcsis as Barth's prirrurn. criicgoq- 1s to cana- turc. io misrcprcscnt. him cvcn [hw~hsclccti\.c quoution might bc mridc to suppori it.

- Both Xhlcrs and John XIackcn SJ rckr to Michricl !frdkcr's \iwk on thc inllucnçc or Hcgcl on Banh and his conclusion rhat "Bmh had rcaci no morc [han 200 pgcs of LPR" (John hlackcn SJ. ï7tu Atrroriorriy TI~rrrtviri Cl~irn-11 Doqrrrnric-.Y:firrl [hrrfl~crrrcl Iris Crilic-.Y.Cam bridgc. 1990. 135. Ahicrs. Tlie Corrrtrirrrri/y of Freuciorrt. 336. 1fichricl \Vclkcr. "Banh und Hcgcl: Zur Erkcnnrnis cincs rncthdischcn Vctfahrcns bci Barth". in Er.. T/~rol..43:1. ful! Augus;. lY83.307-28). Thc insight and inrclligcncc OC Barth's rcading OC Hcgcl bclic ihc claim. 9 the exclusion of al1 claims upon hurnanity by God. that influenced him in the direction of insistence upon the essential relatedness of God and worid. with corresponding1y significant implications for the inherent relatedness of history and reason, and freedom and necessity.

.\'cita Re.\ orrru-es A reassessment of Hegel's philosophy of religion as a resource for theoiogy is the more ur- cent in lisht of recent important advances in Hegelian scholarship. Signficant new editions of b LPR. LW. and the Lerrrr-s have been produced in the past fifteen years making available hitherto ma\-aiiable material and protridingestensi~se and much needed ret-isions of what \vas available. .Much material only norv made available was unavailable to Barth. and the Lasson edition of LPR tvith tïohich he u.orked \ras "marred by serious defects"." The best tvay to handle this material with a view to O'Regan's approximate interpretation tvould be a running commentan. on the tests themselves. The confines of this essa). do not alIo\\ for it. l have ~vorkedas closely as possible with the texts open beside me. Much of the essa is therelore paraphrase of Hegel 's \\ritings wi th a view to getting at \vhat he really said. That has in- c\.itab1y en triiled ruthless précising of his work. The challenge to clarity and conciseness is most dcmanding ti-ith regard to LPR and LWas they benefit and suffer from being the records of lec- turcs that Hegel was unable to edit for publication in written form. The benefit is great in that one seems nlmost to hcar Hegel first-hand. The problems arise because oral delivcry as compared with

N rittcn text tends toivard repetitious discursiveness. made the more problematic in the case of LPR tï.here there are multiple revisions of the sarne material. I have limited m>.seIf to quoting directl!. ~vlierei klt compelled to substantiate my reading over against more familiar interpretations. Even thcn I have had to esclude much that 1 tvoiild rather ha\-e included. git-ing only pape referenccs to the urigi nal.

OLtrli~w Chaptcrone is a summar). of Barth's account of what he caIIs the three landmarks of He- sel 'sthinking. in temof those landmarks Barth articulates the three worthj. demands that Hegel

' Htxfgson's "Witonril Introduction" to /.PR 1. 3 1. An riccount 01- thc production (II thc ncn. cditions. toscthcr wth cornparisons n irh oldcr cdilions. is inciudcd in thc "Wiional Inrroduciions" to [-PR dnd /-HP, and in the second scc- Ilon cjl' Chapm 1 01. I-cffer.~(3-6). 10 rnakes of modem culture and theology. but also the three temptations he discems and on the basis of ivhich he formulates his three criticisms. each of which centers on one or other of the three per- ennial issues described above. Chapters two, the. and four address the three temptations in tum. endeatrouring to show that Hegel may be read as having avoided them. Chapter two is relatively brief. limited as it is to adducing evidence from the introductions to the four series of LPR in order to show that Hegel does not rcduce God to humanit). nor rYcr rurni. but honors the integrity both of God in his inalienable self-sufficiency and of hurnanity in its multifaceted fullness. Further material of the same kind emerges as other texts are investigated in subsequent chapters: as that occurs I have made explicit reference back to this second chapter. Al1 three issues and Barth's three criticisms are really variations on one issue and criticism. Barth himself says that his third criticism includes and bnngs to a head the first two (PT304). In leaving chapter t~vothen we do not really leave the first issue and criticism behind. Chapter three responds to Barth's second criticisrn by demonstrating Hegel's commitment to the irreducibly and uniquely constitutive characterof the gospel for philosophy. Gospel in- fomed phi losophy semes what Hegel calls JrwIopcd worfJIiness. the consistent application of the gospel to al1 of life. The chapter is disproportionately long because it also addresses Hegel's historical context and his understanding of contemporary intellectual forces. Certain of his letters. HF. and his account in the third part of LPR of the Christian doctrines of faII. reconciliation in Christ. and the church are the foundational texts for this chapter. Chaprer four. devoted aimost entirely to LW.contains perhaps the most prolrocaii\.e material. an account of Hqelian nece-s.sir~-as the seIf-authenticating character of the truth. an account that is fundarnentally different from what Barth believes Hegeiian necessity to be. Chapter five is an adventurous conclusion in which I undertake to develop the rudiments of a metaethics of delight. discemment. and responsive action. finishing with a summary statement of t hc rcsources for theology that may profitably be looked for in Hegel. At the heart of my argument is Hegel's description of the nnrologiccilreconsrit~~fionof human subjectivity in the Incarnation of the God-man Jesus Christ. Redeemed from autonomous opposition to al1 objectivity and otherness. humanity has been set free for willing and appropriate re- sponsitreness to the real God and to the real world. The argument is based upon w hat I perceive to be for Hegel the as-enriulcornpfettze~~rc~rir~~ of Cod and created humanity. which is not ultimately undone even by humanity's fail into absolute antithesis. That essential complementaritg is itself grounded in the eternal union of the Father and the Son in the Spirit. It is recovered in the Incarnation of the Son. the once for al1 reconciliation of God and the world. The end of the argument is what Hegel describes as the voc-arion af the church. That vocation. for the fulfrlment of which the church is fomed and Iiberated by the gospe1. has as its goal the uniiwsal interiorization and comprehensive actualization of the gospel in the world. The vocation is both Iiberating and impemtii-e: both. because it derives from the gospel. the self-authenricar- i ng pan-er of LV hich is i ts t~ecessi~.Thegospel is God's necessary. sovereign and thcrefore Iiberat- in? daim on humanits It is philosophy's business comprehensively to describe and demonstrate ihat clai m. 1 Barth's Threefold Critique of Hegel

Theology ... has no occasion to assume an attitude of alarm and hostility to ang renaissance of Hegel which might come about.... We must...be content to onder- stand him as the man he was: as a great problem and a great disappointment, but perhaps also a great promise. Barthm

Re\-elation. dogma. and theology are for Hegel about God consummately revealed in Jesus Christ. His philosophy of religion is about the human thinking of God. human knowiedge of God. human consciousness of God. human experience of God. Always though. and with remarkable consistency. the reality of God. God in himself. is deteminative of our knowledge of God. The initiative is absolutely with God. Religion is the human response evoked by Gd:the philosophy of religion. the descriptive appropriation and conceptuai refomdation of that response for its application to the totality of life. While almost every word of the previous paragraph remains to be explained and accounted for in terms of textual elidence from Hegel's works. it will serve for the present as context for a summary description of Barth's assessrnent of Hegel in his relative!^ early essay in Prorwrunr

Tllorfgh!:From ROIISSC'ULIro Rirschl ( PT).

Three Derniincl'; und Thrw Criticism.s Barth identifies what he calls the thrce landmarks of Hegelian thinking. They are truth. the rnot4inzcognition of tmth. and the dialectical character of this movement. or as Barth also describes them. the absolute daim of tnith. truth as event arid history, and truth as contradiction and the reconciliation of that contradiction (PT2%. 301). These issue in what Barth calls the three demands that Hegel makes of modern culture and the church. Mile Barth is almost wholeheartedly approving of the demands. the same landmarks also give nse to his three criticisms of Hegel. More than anything else i t is Hegel's deli berate preoccupation with God and the absol ute clairn of the tmth of Cod that wins Barth's approval. Of modern cultural awareness Hegel demanded rhat it recognise itself as fundamentally accountable to the daim of tmth as a theological claim: "the tmth is Gd.and God is the Master of men". That explains Hegel's often maligned in- tellectiialism ivhich is realIy nothing other than that "man lives from the truth. and only from the tmth" (PT295). Tragically. modem culture will shrink back from this prociamation of the revela- toc nature of absolute truth and all real knowledge. shrink back into the left hand of God and re- fuse this invitation to thinking as a divine service (PT2950. Addressing theology. Hegel first con- fronts it too with the claim of truth. That daim is absolute. imperialistic. because the truth is God and therefore ultimately it alone must form the agenda. Can theolosy "absolve itself from the ear- ncstness \rith kf-hich Hegel equated the knowtedge of truth and the knobvledge of God'l" (PT2991 At the same time. Hegel's preoccupation with God is e.lcclusive of sufficient attention to the fullness and integrity of the world. and in particular of human nature as more than mind and iniei- lect. First. there is what Barth calls the single-track nature of Hegel's concept of truth. which is trrith 3s thoi~ght.Ought not Hegel to ha\,e learned from Kant and Schleietmacher that the human person --nl~vaysexistlsl at the invisible intersection of.--thinking and wiiling?" That being so. 3sa theory of truth n-hich builds itself up upon the inner logic of a thought ivhich is divorced from pncticc stiil the theory of man as he reaiiy is. the theon. of his truth?" (PT301)Underlying this is Hcgcl's tmnscending of the distinction of the divine and human natures in the higher unitive reality

O!' niirid. Hcge1.s Gri\r. God and humanity are moments in the unfolding of mind. More accurate- 1'. hiimanity is a moment in the unfolding of the one redit' which is mind. - which is God. Un- dcrl~ing.and ultimately undermining. the reconciliation of the holy Cod and sinful humanity is the conccptual unit). of the divine and human natures in the one ideri of mind. For Hegel that conceptual unit'. is basic. absolute ( PT 30 If). Moving to the second Hegelian landmark. Barth is impressed by Hegel's determination to restorc reason and thought to culture and theology as the attendant response to the initiatitve and vi- talir~.of truth as self-rcvclatory in history. Barth acknowlcdges Hegel's concern for Christian doc- in nc. ndmitting the truth of Hegel's 0u.n claim chat mtich more of dogrnatics was presen~ed.maintained. and safeguarded in Hegel's philosophy than in the theology of his contemporaries (PT293: cf LPR 1. I56ff). He applauds Hegel-s demand of modern culture and theologj*that they know the truth "onty las] history. event ...only ...in the form of a strict obedience to the self-movement of truth": truth is revelation: truth is "the God ivho presents himself to Our knotvledge. and can be kno\vn. only as the Living God": and Barth is confident that -'hc saw God's aliveness well. and saw it better than rnany theologians" (PT2940. More than that. he acknowledges Hegel's affirmation of "the positive and historical nature of revelation. the uniqueness of Christ" as the incarnation and revelation of the living truth that is the living God (PT 299). Again howeiPer.it is a too exclusive preoccupation with thought that undermines the inte- -znty of the gospel and the church as essentially determined by God's self-revelation in Christ. That reïelation is supplanted by the higher and immediate manifestation of etemal truth in human thousht which the Hegelian dialectic shows to be identical with the mind of God. Barth summariz- es Hegel's argument as follows. God is truth. Truth is thought. Thought is God's self-movement: it is also humanitfs. Thought. therefore. is the highest mediation of God and humanity. In thought humanit). thinks God's thoughts after him. Barth calls this Hegel's confusion of hurnan \vith divine self-movement. Hegel's affirmation of the positive and historical nature of revelation. the iiniqueness of Christ. is compromised by his insistence upon the task of the philosopher to ad- lPancebeyond historical revelation to the higher level of God king manifest in thought. Another basis for kno~vledgealongside theology's only proper basis which should be revelation is pro\-ided in philosophv. That other basis is reason. pure thought. Reason is divine revelation. As the highest form of di\.ine re\relation. reason transcends historical revelation. What Hegel describes as the rrp- revenrurionul chancter of historical revelation tums out to be what makes it penultimate. at best. Reason's task is "to raise [revelationl to the fom of thought as the fonn suited to the reality of mind" (PT3020. As ~vithBarth-s first criticism. here too the root problem is the conceptual unity of God and humrinit>. The dualit). of God and humanity that is maintained in historical revelation is overcorne in thought and ultimately annulled. God's self-revelation in Christ is shown more fundamentally to be the self-manifestation of humanity to itself: Hegel's living God - he saw God's aliveness well. and saw it better than man). theologians - is actually the Living man .... The Hegelian doctrine of the Tnnity coincides with the basic pnnciples of Hegelian logic. which is at the same time quite explicitly the basic principle of HegeIian anthropology and the Hegelian teaching of life (PT 302f). In these first t\vo responses to Hegel. Barth's approval though not unqualified is enthusiastic. With his third response the mood changes. He is grudgingly impressed by Hegel's commitment to teconciliation as the original and final purpose of God for the world. Achieved in Christ. the gospel Iiberates humanity to think and to live on account of that otherwise inconceivable recon- 15 ciliation. Hegel demanded of modem culture that contradiction be recognised as "the law of tmth understood as histoq" (PT297). There is no possibility of resting in truth as a unity once and for al1 actained. "In despite of the whole of western logic .... life itself'. - and Banh acknowtedges that Hegel is interested in nothing less than the fiillness of life. - "is ...a perpetual cr = non-u" (PT 297'1. Hezel sought the unity of tmth passionately. and as the unity of contradictions. their reconciliation not their setting aside. This too is fundarnentally theological. Reality is based in nothing less than the trinitanan nature of God. It is the knowledp of God that yields "the knowledge of irreconcil- able contradictions and theiretemal vanquishing in the mind" (PT297).Barth sets aside for the present the question urhether Hegel's method really does yield knowkedge of God. For the moment the important thing is that "there can be no denying that knowtedge of God \vas what he rneant" (PT297). Again. modem culture could not bear this theological invasion. And Banh asks provoc- aci\.el!.. "had not Hegel already understood [modern man) in far too deep and far too Christian a wa),. by demanding of hirn that he should thus found his philosophy upon theology. and eventual-

1 y al lo\v his phi losophx to be transformed into theology?" ( PT 2970 Hegel similarly demanded of theoiopy that it should face up to the contradicton nature of

Hegel with his concept of mind must wittingly. or unwittingly have been thinking of the Creator of hem-en and earth, the Lord 01-er nature and spirit. precisely by virtue of the unity and opposition of clic- nmand conrm-dicr~rin.in w-hich Hegel had the spirit concei\.ing itself and being real (PT 299). This is pnralleled in -'the other Hegelian synthesis- that of renson and hisiop in Christianity i tself' (PT3OO).Both syntheses are contradictory in that they are the incornprehensiblc synthesis of God iPT3OO).As ive shall see Barth is critical of Hegel for not tating this synthesis seriously enough and so not appreciating that it is achieved incomprehensibly by God alone. Nevertheless. theologians ought to have learned the contradictory nature of their knou4edge from Hegel instead ot'ca- pitulating to a revi%:al of a neo-Kantian '-upriori way of thinking. within which it imagined it was

~.ellhoused and secured in producing a special. religious upriori method" (PT301 ). Barth's approval of this third demand is qualified because he is afraid thnt so to rad Hegel is really to iinderstand him better than he understood himself (PT3M).His quarrel is again with Hegel's reduction of the gospel to thought: the miracle of reconcifiation. inconceivable apart from re\,elation. is comprehensivel!. explained and so explained away. God's gracious and sovereign 16 freedom in Christ is. at best. penultimately determinative. The Hegelian dialectic thinks behind and bej.ond uphat was hitheno taken to be inconceivable. It demonstrates the necessity. for God and for the world. of both reconciliation and the fall. Barth says this is "probably the weightiest and most significant of the doubts about him which rnight be raised from the theological point of view" (PT 30-C). lndeed it is the origin of the other two. It is Hegel's failure to recognise that God is free. Reconciliation for Hegel is a necessary act of God. When God acts he acts necessarily and the philosopher can demonstrate that necessity. Hegel is able to do this because he identifies God with the dialectical method. The unfolding of the Hegelian dialectical logic is the unfolding of the purposes of God. As such. God is a prisoncr of finite consciousness: --1 am necessary to God". God comprehends al1 things including ultirnately himself "bj. virtue of the fact that he does this in the consciousness of man" (PT 3M). Humanity's rational conceptualization of al1 of reality including God is necessary to God's being God. It is his self-manifestation not only to the world but to himself. He musr so manifest himself: "it is necessac*to him to re\peal himself' (PT304). Barth acknon-ledges that. for Hesel. God's necessap. dialectical reconciliation of al1 things is accomplished in the church: "[tlhe church is necessary to God himself. for in it he can be the mind of the church: and it is this alone which first makes it possible for hirn to be mind and God" (PT304).God is bound inevitably to unfold himself and the reconciliation of al1 things. in the church: --if he ivere not the mind of the church he would not be God. And he is God only in so far as he is the mind of the church" (PT3W).The effect of ail of this is "the abolition of Goci's own so~.ereignt>*...The Cod of Hegel is at the least his own prisoner" (PT303:at the least. because Hegel's God is realty no God at all. The identification of God with the dialectical logic of human consciousness is. - and here we come again to the probtem at the root of Barth's first and second criticisrns. - the reduction of God to humanity. or what is the same thing. the elevation of human consciousness to God. The implications for soteriology are disturbing. The neglect of practice in his theorizing about truth that Banh identified in his first cnticism. leads Hegel ro trespass beyond bounds which "a theory of pnctice" would othenvise have led hirn to honour. He ought tirst to have "callledl a halt before the concept of sin": instead. he includes it as a moment to be passed through in the unity and necessity of mind (PT301 ). In so doing he involves himself in the further trespass of rendering reconciliation understandable. He does not finally take seriously the unfathomable mystery of either sin or salvation. Sin belongs as a necessan moment in the unfolding of the concept of rnind. Lvhich is identical with the course of truth and the existence of God (PT3O6).Sin therefore makes sense and may even be said to be necessary to the full unfolding of mind. It follows that reconciliation too makes sense and is necessary to the "continuation of the eventual course of truth". That sa1 teationis a radical ly iinpredictable and incornprehensibly new beginning is enti reh lost sight of PT 3r)lf). Barth calls this an unacceptable thinking beyond the mystery of evil and salvation. Hegel is only abte to do it by proi~idinganother basis for knowledge aiongside of theolog~.'~only proper basis n-hich should be revelation. That other bais is pure thought which seems to permit and make possible the solution of the dual mystery of sin and sal~~ation.The di\?ineand human natures are irnited conceptuall~..and therefore absolutely and necessarily. in the idea of rnind. No! Barth pro- tests. Theoiogy can have no other foundation than revelation. And retvetationis "of God's inco~~r- prdten.sihir reconciling... to man who is frsr in sin". (PT301 0"' "The diatectic in wwhich we ourselves exist ..A not the actual dialectic of grace" (PT3051. Hegcl's necessitj. annihilates trace. The acts of God. whether in creation. reconciliation. revelation. or ecclesiolog-. are his own. God is essentially free. As such he is incomprehensibly so\.er- eign. The actual diaiectic of grace. over against the dialectic of human existence. has its sole and sirfficient foundation in the freedom of God. Where Hegel speaks of the necessit>.of the acts of God and of his abilitj. philosophically to demonstrate their necessity- Barth speaks of the sufficien- ci and extra\-aganceof God: suffrcienttj- constituting himself in the relations of the Father and of the Son in the Holy Spirit: extravagantly wilting hirnself to be etemally the Lord of another (ivho is not God 1. his creature: knoum to be this Cod by his self-revelation in Jesus Christ. If Hegel had gnsped this actual dialectic of pce. "the attempt to speak of a necessity to liehichCod hirnself is supposcd to be subject would be radically impossible" (PT3O-I).Failing to perceit+ethe actual dialectic of grace. he failed also to "open the gate-way of this knowiedge to theolog>."( PT 305 1.

-'. In Barth's cssiq. this mritcnril crinccming thc ncccssity and comprchcnsibiiiiy ol'sin and s;ii\riiion is includcd u-ithin his i'irsr cnticism. I hti1.c rncx,cd ir inro ihc contcxt of thc third criiiçism. as [akc IL to bc morc d~rcctl>.rciatcd IO thc problcm rit- ncccssi ty and 1-rccdorn. 18 Srmrnun Rrsponse In responding. as it were. on Hegel's behalf." we shall demonstrate. with respect to Barth's first criticism. Hegel's cornmitment to the sovereign freedom. the inalienable self-sufficiency. of God. and the integrity and manifold complexity of human nature (chapter two): with respect to his second criticism. Hegel's insistence on the consistentiy determinative priority of the church's Credo for philosophy and theology (chapter three); and with respect to bis third cnticism. Hegel's dedication to the ipocationof philosophy as a handmaid to the church's preaching and teaching ministries. in serving God's own purpose of iiiipressing on al1 people the necessanly exclusive daim of the gospel (chapter four). It will be especially Hegel's high view of the doctrine of the church over against the neo- Kantians. Schleiermacher. and the theological positivists. as also his radical rethinking of human subjectivity over against the autonomous subjectivity of modernity at least since Descartes. that will occupj. the bulk of our attention. Hegel's dedication to the consistent and constitutive presence of the multi-layered content of the church's Credo will counter the charge that he supptants the revelation of the gospel and reduces life's fullness to thought. His account of human subjectitrity tvill disclose Barth's misunderstanding of Hegeiian necessity which. far from limiting God's gracious freedom. denotes the inherently self-evident and indelible character of the tmth of the gospel. As the consummate. comprehensive. and exclusive revelation of reality the gospel cannot be condi- tional upon a human decision and judgment for its authentication. It is the revelation of the real and as such lays a necessary and universal claim upon humanity. Philosophy's vocation is comprehensivel>,to think throush the appropriation and application of that claim for human Life and culture.

'. Thc claim is arrogam bc>.c)ndbclicf but Ibr thc 1-ci thiu my intcnt is to hmcss Hcgcl's rcsourccs sci [ha, by paraphrase and direct quoution. hc himsclf ma!' makc his cru: in rcsponsc io Barth's accusations. 19 9 œ In the Beginning, God

Above all...direct your sou1 to the thonght of God, and...receive into yonr mind [Gemut] strength and con- solation €rom this higber love. Hegel"

Hegel's emphasis upon the sovereignty and the determinative initiative of God consistently compels him CO begn with God. And to begin with God as the Cod who is already the beginning. There can be no getting outside God. no deducing of Gdfrom some prior or independent position. logical or pnctical. Barth npplauds this bold beginning with God as a theological demand kvhich Hegel "hurled at modem man more forcibly than any theotogian ... had done for centuries."

( PT 296 1. Hegel begins his 1827 Lectures on The Concept ofReiigion. "[tlhe question with which

1s.e haiveto begin is: -How are ive to secure a beginning?"' (LPR 1.363 The long answ-er takes up sci.era1 pages: the short answer. one sentence: "[t lhe beginning of religion. more precisely its content. is the concept of religion itself. that Cod is the absolute truth. the truth of al1 things. and subjectively that reiigion alone is the absolutely true knowledge" (LPR 1, 366). More striking still are the operiing paragtaphs of the Introductions of al1 four series of LPR. God is the beginning of al1 things and the end of al1 things: everything starts from God and retums to God (LPR 1. 84).As the suprerne (LPR 1, 1 13 1. the ultirnate focal point (LPR 1.150). Cod is the highest. the absolute. that ivhich is absolutely true or the truth itself (LPR 1. 83). Lest this seem at best to set God only at the head of a series. or at one end of a continuum. so that. as Barth accuses Hegel of saying. the divine and human natures are but aspects of the one higher idea of mind. Hegel is careful to articulate Gd's sovereign and inalienable self-sufficienc>.. '-If we consider this object [God 1 in relation to others. then we can Say that it is strictly for its own sake": because of the potential for misunderstanding in his use of 'relation'. he immediately adds. . - -- Hcgcl \\-rcitc ihis cmAupst 3 1. 1822. to his sistcr Christianc ttho hiid rcccntly bccn rclcascd Irom ;in ~s>lum. f-ct/cOrs4201.

'' 1 ha\ c b

Hegel is equally committed to the full integrity of human nature in relation to God. a relation that is never oiVercome.as in Barth's accusation. through the reduction of human nature to a mere moment of the divine. a mere aspect of the higher unitive reality of mind. That integrity includcs the freedom. feeling. action. and faith of the whole human penon. Freedom looms large: the free Cod sets us free. Relision is the consciousness of this freedom: [tlhis concern [with Godl is the true liberation of the human being and is freedom itself. true consciousness of the truth (LPR 1. 150). Occupation with this object [Godl is fulfilling and satisfying by itself. and desires nothing else but this. Hence it is the absolutely free occupation. the absolutely free consciousness t LPR 1. 1 14).

But religion is more than consciousness. It is also a feeling. Hegel's quamel with Schieier- maçher nor~vihstndinAs a feeling it is bliss. attaining to that region where ail the sonon+sof the hcnrt are resolved. in which even pain of feeling is dissolved and healed (LPR 1. 1490. It is de\.otion's present feeling and the absolute enjoyment that is called blessedness (LPR 1. 1 I-Sf ). Most notable of all in light of Bünh's fint criticism. religion. through faith. is directly pro- ducti \.e of action on the part of the indi\-idual ~vill.Cod is glorified through the deli berate. iVolition- al nctivit>.of the individual believer. As an activity religion has to manifest God's gloq and rnajes-

1)- < LPR 1. 13): it is the present glorification ofGod (LPR 1. -161 1. Though "[the bliss of1 religion is put off into the future. it is stiil radiant in life here and now ... in the actuality within which lit1 is effecti\-eand siibstantial" (LPR 1. 1501. In a similar irein. Hegel speaks of the light and l0i.e of religion as "not a remote but an actually present liveliness. certainty. and enjoyment" (LPR 1. 1%).

" ii'c .hall considcr thc "Jcath 01- Gd' In Chaptcr 3: n~thrcspcct io Hcgcl'?;apprcciat~on of Lhc lrccdom ol Gd. howc\ Cr. ihc lscdlo\\ing cornmcnt ol' Eberhard Jungcl is ~iluminritin~:"in Hcgcl. hc lvnics. 'thc iclcl~sol absoluie I.rxdom anci absolurc sut'tQnnp arc bound togcthcr. sincc Gd himsclC gi\.cs hirnscll' up to annihilation. and 50 in ab-

4( 4 UIC t'rccdom cho

" \Vc ?;hall rcturn io Schlcicmachcr bclo\t. (scc chrip. 3. scct. 1. and thc subscctions cntitlcd "An Ergcni Summons" and "Schlcicnnxhcr ruid thc Religion ol' Purc Subjcci~\IL!-"). 21 It is faith that makes the connection between hoped for and otherwoddly light and love on the one hand. and. on the other. life here and now.. The iight of Etemity. "the image of the absalute that reli gious devotion has before it... ndiates into the temporat present";" the faculty for its dis- cernrnenr is faith \vhich "is cognizant of it as the truth. as the substance of present existences" (LPR 1. 1 1-0. More than that. through faith this content of refigious devotion makes a difference to the de\-otee's present activi ty. It "animates the present world and "operates effectively in the life of the individual. ruling over one's commissions and omissions. over one's volition and action" < LPR 1. 1 l-if).Again. highlighting the obvious. in that last phrase there is the explicit mention of the will of the individual. Barth is critical of what he calls the single-track nature of Hegel's concept of truth. which is truth as thought- Ought not Hegel. he asks. to have learned on the one hand from Kant that the human person always exists at the invisible intersection of thinking and willing. and on the other from Schleierrnacher the centnl significance of feeling? That king so. he asks further. '-is a theory of truth which builds itself up upon the inner logic of a thought which is divorced from practice still the theoc. of man as he reaI1y is. the theon of his truthm?"(PT2911 This is evidently unfair to Hegel. Feelins and action are. as we have just seen. at least as important as thought in his account of the religious person: "the sorrows of the heart. ...every pain of feeling... healed": the content of reli_oious de~rotion"ruling over... one's volition and activity"."

Tlic Sr rt,j~~~.ri~.rlOhje~-~il'~'Disrincrion We have seen that God is the absolute beginning and end of al1 thinss. the sacred center \{.hich animates and inspires all things. We have seen further that God calts forth frorn humanity the relioious- response. the al 1-consuming and liberating concern and occupation with God that comprchensively affects and effects the human person. As such, religion is universal. though variable. Hegel is explicit conceming the universality of religion in the 1821 series of LPR: "ail per- çons haL1e... a consciousness of Cod. or of the absolute substance. as the tmth of evevthing that

"This rditrritiq ttikcs ;i spcctlk t9rm. namcly cduc;ition and prcriching addrcsscd to the \t,holc human pcrson ris a untquc indt\.idual. no[ ncglcctins rhc hctin: "[religion] is a\ra)rened tirs[ by thc gencril rcligious insinic[ion thrit ivc rccct\ c l'rom cjur > outh [upl'-: [rlcliyous iccting rinsjingl in a person ... ivhat is cailcd cdilicrition ... is thc aim 01' prcxhing. dircctcd to [hc hcrirt. to thc t;inguIruity ol' thc subjcct as this onc pcrson" ([,PR 90). . - - CI. Hcgcl'~lcwr ~ohis sistcr qut~cdat thc hcid of ihis chripicr. 22 the! are and do... This is the universal intuition. sensation. consciousness - or what you will - of rrii.yion" (LPR 1.850. ln the 1824 senes. this sentence disappears. In its place Hegel introduces a refiection on the variable character of rel igion: [thel image of the absoiute that religious devotion has before it can have a greater or lesser degree of present liveliness. certainty. and enjoyment. or can be presented as something longed or hoped for. something far off. otherworldly (LPR 1. 1 15). No doubt this variation is the case both within the experience of the same person. as also between different persons. Hegel goes on to say that it is faith that is cognizant of the content of religious detrotion "as the tnith. as the substance of present existences" so that the "content of de\rotion... rinimates ...opentes effectively ...ruling over" the particular individual (LPR 1. 1 15). The ivariabilityof religion. dependent as it is on faith. suggests that Hegel distinguishes betweeen the univenality of religion as an objective reality. and the subjective experience and confession of indi\.iduals. This impression is reinforced by Hegel's derikVingthe universality of the consciousness of God theotogically: it follows from who Cod is: "(slince God is... the principle and goal. the truth of each and every deed. initiative. and effort, al1 persons have therefore a consciousness of God" (LPK 85). That the objective/subjective distinction accurately represents Hegel 's view is further con- tïrrned by his startlingly juxtaposing on the one hand religion as "present and presupposed in e1.e- r)'one" so that -'it is not a question of bringing something substantially new and alien into humani- t!." (LPR 1.89). and on the other. actiral people -'\\:ho have ne\.er enlarged their herirts ... who ha1.e noi felt the joy and peace of the eterna!. even if only dimly in the fom of yearning. [whol do not possess the stiiff 1i.e. religion 1 that we here speak or' (LPR 1.89).He continues ueith tvhat amounts to a statement of the objectiveisubjective distinction. depicting it as the root of an experience of contlict: -'[tIhe>*ma? perhaps have an image of [religion 1. but the content is not their own thing: i t is an alien matter they are wrestling with" (LPR 89). To underline the obvious. Hegel has. as alread quoted. only a fefv lines before denied that the religion he is taIlring about is "substantially...alien". In other words. objectively. universally. religion is not alien: it is the ir~qoDriin which humanit). is made. Hegel 's terms. presrrpposed and srthsrunficrii~.as quoted above. could just as \r-.ell be replaced with ohjecrii'e!~.Religion as a universal reafity is religion as an objective reality. irrespective of the subjective enperience of religion which varies greatly and includes atone extreme being tvithout religion. being set against, in confiict with, God. To anticipate. Hegel's philosophy of religion is concemed with overcoming this objective/ subjecti~~ejustaposition and pandox at the heart of religion, overcoming it by learning to think subjectively and comprehensively. both with regard to content and implications, the objective reality of the Cod of the gospel as expounded in the preaching and dogrnatic teaching of the Christian church. It will be Hegel's insistence on the indispensable priority of the church's preaching and doctrine that it.ill show Barth's accusations to be wide of the mark. Gd's sovereign initiative in his self-revelation in the gospel cmbe thought philosophically only to the extent that such thought deril-esoriginally and consistently from church dogmatics. which in turn derives from the gospel and i ts exposition in preaching and teaching. But this is to anticipate much that remains to be dernonstrated from Hegel's wntings." For the present. we have demonstrated Hegel's commitrnent to the sovereign and inalienable self-sufficienc), of God as the uni\.ersal and objective condition for religion. as. indeed. for al1 of iife. And we have seen his insistence on God's determination to address. lay claim to. and liberate humanity. and to do so subjectively. at every level of their existential being. - heart. mind and will."

Hegel's fondness for Anselm will be a recurrent therne in this essay.' It can be introduced here rhrough ipenturinga cornparison between Hegel as he has so far emerged in our study and An- selm as he appears in Barth's An.s~?lin.-Fides Qrrcierens Intellecrurn (A).Barth suggests that An- - - Scc bclo\\. chrip. 3. sccr. 1. and thc subscction cntrtlcd "Phitosophy and thc Credo of ihc Church". SCCI 4. and thc wbscct ion cn tt tlcd "Philosophy 's Prcsupposition: Thc Gospcl". and scct.5. and thc subscctions cnti~lcd"Dcictnnc in thc Lrl! Church"anJ "Phiiosoph!.: Dcwlopcd Worldlincss".

"' Bcrnud Cullcn addrcsscs Kicrkcgrirird's cntiçism. of\\-hich Banh's is but a vanation. thal spccultiti\~philosc~phy ~innihllarcsthc subjcct. "Hcgcl 1s damant". hc tintcs. and thcn quotcs from LPR: "'thc diffcrcncc [bctwcn subjcct and cib~ccl.scII and Gd]crnphaticail>- docs no[ disappcrtr. hr it bclongs to the pulse of [thc subjcct'sl iiisilit>..to thc impcius. morion. anci rcs~lcssncssof spirituai as \i.cll ris of naturai lifc. Hcrc is 3 unification in uhiçh rhc dift'crcncc 1s no[ cwnguishcd, but dl rhc samc il is c~rtJqel~oixri[sublatcdJ*(LPR 1. 173)-. (Bcmrd Cultcn. "Hcgcl on thc Hu- man and thc Di\.inc. in rhc L~gh:of rhc Criticism of Kicrkcgrirud", in HqeI orrd Iiis Cririrs: Pliilosopliy it~r/w .4J renrid! of Hrqrl. cd. William Dcsmrind, Striic University of Nctv York Press. 1989, 101). .-lr~flwhc~riand i~scompounds includc thrcc scnscs. dialccticaily rclritcd: to mise up. to abolish. and to prc- icn c ( /.4iiihael In~vcxd.A ffrpel Ilirriorrcrm. Cambridge. 1 W-. 2831î). T~vocumbcrsornc bu1 hclpCul corn piund rcndcnngs arc. "bnnsing again into a t\.hofcncss ihat \\.hich is fngmcntq-". and "to transccnd and prcscnc" (hIichric1 Gcorgc. "Man's Hcgclirtnism: An Exposition". in Hqcl nrrdrnarlrrn Ptrilosopltv. New York. 1987, 121)-

"Hcpl ivas limilirir \vith rhc major n-orks of Ansclrn - the Crrr Dvrrs Homo. thc Moriologiori. and ihc IJms/opinn - and ccmsidcrcd this clc\mih-ccntuc thcologian to bc ri scmind figure in the histo~of spcculativc thought about Gd"I Htxigwn, IJ'R 1%. n. 9).Scc bclo\v. chap 4 and the scction cntitlcd "Ansclm ruid Scccssity". 24 selm's confidence in God and God's objective truth would not permit him to take cvith final sen- ousness the unbelief of worldlings: that whatever they may have had to say for themselves subjec- tivel y. he addressed them as they were objectively. "in the lighi of the great 'as iT' which is really not an 'as if' at all. but which at al1 times has ken the final and decisive means whereby the believer could sprak to the unbelievei' (A71 1. In that light. objectively or Christologically Anselm addressed "the sinner as one who had not sinned. the non-Christian as a Christian. the unbeliever as believer" (Barth. A 6û. 70f). Hegel is as convinced as Anselm and Banh of the victory of God in Christ." so that he intends for us to take him a

The relation of God and world \vil1 continue with us through the rest of this essay." lndeed al1 of Barth's criticisms are closely bound up ivith each other so that the response to each is also a response to all. Nevertheless. as an interim conclusion to this first issue. ~-r.cturn to a piece of indirect etidence of Hegel's refusa1 to collapse the distinction beuveen God and world into what

As tic hatc drcridy sccn (chrip. 1. and ihc .=Lion cnlrticcf 'Thrcc Dcrnands and Thrcc Cnticisms") Bmh himscll' is conlïdcni ihat "[Hcccll ';ri\\-Grni's rili\cncss n.cll. and sa\\. it bcttcr than mriny iha~logitins". Mire than thlit- hc x- know Icdgcs HcpA's ril*timationof "thc p~rtl\c and histoncril narurc 01' rc\ cirition. thc uniqucncss 01- Chnhr" a?;thc incrimriti

. - - Brirrh \\ ritcs 01' .Anscl rn \\ hrir I am suggcsting could pst as WC tl bc said 111' Hcgcl. ihrir in his "Jcsi rc io pro\ c: pcr- haps hc n as dmng IO assume rhat Jisbclicl-. the c/rri-\\-ithin thc prccincts of thcolor!.. but morc imponsint \ri thin ihc prccinclc; ot- thc church .... I t ma! bc ... thrit .-lr?sclm could quiic \i.cll hwc nskcd thrit astonishing assurnpiion ~~CILLUSC01- thc pmwr 01. thc objcctl\ c rmio 01' thc objcct (II' I'airh thrit cnlightcns and is cnlightcncd from ribci\.c b>. thc si~tnimrwrirtrs and u.hich. riccordrng to .Ansclm. usable to tcach and al1 dong did tcrich ~ruthsihrit arc bcyrmd ~hcpitvcr ol'cinc hurnrin bang to icach anorhcr" ( A~t.v~l~i~.701+). . . C'J csp.. chap. 3. scct. 1. and thc subscct. cntitlcd "Schlcicmachcr...": ihap. 3. scct 3. "Tlic FiII": chap. 3. scct. 4. and ihc Jiscussion of rhc unrqucncss ofChns1: chap. 4. and thc scct. cnriilcd "hlrxlcrn Philrisclph> ...". 25 Barth describes as the one absolute unity of mind. The anti-Hegelians of the late 1820's included Christian Hermann Weisse. a member of the philosophical faculty of the University of Leipzig. In a letter addressed to Hegel. Weisse explains that his desire is to follow Hegel's own method, but with greater consistency. Specifkally. he says t hat Hegel had argued for the infini te progress of the dialectical process of the deepening of the concept through its negation. at every level of reality except the highest. God himself. God alone. though he is involved in and with the dialectical unfolding of creation, according to Hegel does not progress. deepen. enrich. or perfect himself. He is the same at the end as he is at the beginning. "a closed circle" (kners539fn. Weisse will not have it so, insisting that God too must progress infi- nitel), towards ekPerdeeper and richer self-realization. The image of the ciosed circle is a striking one. It represents Weisse's recognition of Hegel's cornmitment to the absolute and inalienable self- sufficiency of God: Cod is not imprisoned" within the dialectical pmess but is set apan frorn and sovereign over it. Sadly. Hegel died before he could realize his wish to review Weisse's treatise.

On rhe Prcsenr Srundpninr of rhr Phifusophic~tfDiscipline wirh PurtictifurRrspecf 10 Hqel's Sxs- rem ( 1829). Immanuel Hermann Fichte objected to the same contradiction in Hegel 's philosophy and offered his own resolution in his work of the same year. Conmiburions IO the Churucreri~urion of Rrcenr Philosop& und fo fhr :bIrdi~ionof irs Contrdic~ions.The contradiction w hich Weisse and Fichte objected to in Hegel is very like the antithesis of God and world so dear to Barth. If Weisse and Fichte are correct in their assessrnent of Hegel. then far from threatening the antithesis of God and world Hegel stands as Barth's ally over against those who would dissol\-e it."

" This is Bürrh's tcnn. PT 292.

" \Vclssc's Icacr inci udcs thc lollo\ving: "1 havc MN bccn able to rcply [to Hcgel's account of spccula[i\~chon.1- cdgcl cuccpi b~.thc conccpt of a di\.init>-\\.hich. bcin_e rhc sclf-conscious unity of thc ribsolutc Idca. is at thc amc irrnc an cndlcss prrigrcss in thc dccpcning. cnriçhmcnt, rind pcrfcction of itsclf. For this dcrnand for a grmvth by dia- Iccticril ncpri\.ity ril\\ays and m.cr rccurs to mc. It has sccmcd to mc thrit it could in no way bc put risidc by thc sup- position ol'a closcd circlc in \\.hich \vhrtt is rnost clcvatcd rciums to lis bcginning wifliorif grotr-ing by this Ikct ...No rnatrcr ho\\ I crmsidcr it. to mc thc dcmsnd is [for] such a progrcss towrird thc infinitc as, 1 fcci obligcd to infcr. must rcrilly cwst in thc divinity" (Butler includcs Wcissc's lcttcr in l.e~ters53x0- 26 The Ecclesial Vocation to P hilosophy

[Your] letter expands upon ...the position of knowledge with respect to truth. 1 immediatel~add...that when - in mind, in sensibiiity, and especially in religious feeling - faith, certainty. conviction, or however else we wish to qualify it, holds steadfastly for itself to truth, to Cod, it is not of primary importance to acquire this conviction through knowledge. In your first letter, in connection with both your career and your situation as head of a household and as a family father, puspoke of such religious feeling not only with fdhess of feeling and firmness but equally with kindhearted intimacy. Grant- ed. people also often attain to this conviction by the path of philosophical insight. Yet far more important than attaining it by knowledge is recognizing and conceptually grasping [begreifen] this solid foundation that already exists for the heart. In this situation the mind is, so to speak. sure of itself vis-a-vis knowledge. If one's conceptual grasp is not satisfying, such certitude does not suffer. This certitude can remain unshaken. whether one attributes the failure of knowledge to the particular path followed or to the very nature of knowledge in general. According to this position, knowledge can be viewed more as a luxury than as a need of the mind. Hegel"

In this chapter we shall be concerned Lvith the reiationship between histoc and reason: rnorc specificall>..between the histoq. ofJesus of Nazareth and philosophical reflection. Barth contends that Hegei supplants the gospel history as the unique re\dation of God \vith the higher manifestation of God in human thinking brought to fulfilment in the Hegelian dialectic. My description of Hegel's response to Barth's criticism is in four parts. First. and u-ith particular reference to HF. I examine Hegel's conrexr. his analysis ot the theological and philosophical perspectives of his contemponries. He developes his o\vn philosophjr of religion u-ith direct rcferencc to their particiilar t-ailures. Secondly. I take note of Hegel's insisitence upon the vo- cational charactcr of true philosophj.: it is a senricerendered in response to God's cd. Thirdl~..I foilo~vHegel- accounts. particuiariy in LPR. of the Christian doctrines of creation. fall. and reconciiiation in Christ. concentrating on the absolute ontological difference that he belie\.es Jesus Christ

" \Vnitcn Xpnl 29. 1823. Lc) EJc~uird-CasimirDuboc. ri. French-txxn hat mrinufic~urcrIn inp tn Hrimburg \\ hcj hd rcc.cn[l! bcccimc inrcrcsicd in thc Hcgc1iri.n philosophy (I~rrrs49241'). 27 makrs to al1 of reality. but especially to human nature. That difference is the gospel. This leads founhly into Hegel 'saccount. again in LPR. of the church. the Christian conzrnriniry. as the means whereby God the Holy Spirit brings the world into the new reality as it has kenreconstituted in Christ. The church's mission is described in terms of its three-fold task. the third part of tvhich incl udes philosophy. In effect Hegel's philosophy of religion discovers the proper business of al1 of philosophy to be not the provision of another higher means of revelation but the application of the oospel to every aspect of life so that its having been once and for al1 reconstituted in Christ may be b comprehensivel>,realized. actualized. in the here and now. But if philosophy is the third aspect of the church's three-fold task. Hegel is insistent upon the priority of its first and second aspects- e\.an~elicalpreaching and dogmatic teaching. for the awakening of the subjective religious response to God. as weil as for authentic philosophy and theology. Hegel's respect for church dogma is n recumng theme in this chapter. Neither philosoph~nor theology is possible except on the basis of the dogmatic teaching of the Christian church."

Section 1: The Contest

Wliat was it that pro\-oked Hegel into lecturing on the phiiosoph>.of religionb?It is evident t hat he took it up nther suddenl', u-ith real urgency and that i t became his chief interest for the lasr tcn >rt.rirsof his iifc.

,411 l..~-,y~~rusfft?z~?zot?.s In May of 1820 he addressed a memorandum to the Rector of the University of Berlin. tvhere he \\.-asa professor. concerning the appropriate topics for a philosophical curriciilurn. He did not mention the philosophy of religion as an independent discipline.* Yet less than a year later he

\$-asoffering a nenr course in just that subject. It seems almost certain that it was the imminent ap- peannce of Schleiermacher's Glüubenv[rhre" that provoked Hegel into a counter-blast. Nor chat Hegel had not been interested in religion for many years. From his days as a theological student in Tubingen there was no topic in which he had a deeper and more abiding c~ncern.~But the philosophy of retigion nas unknown as an independent philosophical discipline: philosophy's handling of Cod was customady dealt with as ratiunalrhrologv within metaphysics. Hegel's effons were pioneering. tvhich goes some way to explaining his continual revision of the subject. Nor was Schleiemacher a stranger to Hegel. As early as 1802 Hegel had "advanced a bnef

but ptircepti1-ecritique of Schleiermacher's Speeches on Religion"."' Since 1818 they had been

colleagutts at the University of Berlin. uneasy colleagues almost from the beginning. From stud- enis n.ho heard both cf [hem lecture and from Philipp Marheineke. also on the theological faculty in Berlin and close to both Hegel and Schleiermacher. Hegel no doubt learned of the content of Schleiermacher's impending tome. and "may well have concluded that it was necessan to provide

a countenveight to a theological position about which he had reason to believe he would have deep

Ttr.0 letters provide important clues as to what Hegel believed himself to be doing in con- tmsr to Schleiermacher. The first is to Car1 Daub. a former colleague and friend at Heidelberg. and indistes Hege1.s particular interest in dogmatics. He had just commenced his first series of lec- tiires: Schleiermacher's book had not yet been published: Schleiemacher. from what 1 hear. is presently having his dogmatics published as ~vell.The .YL.nien just came to mind in this regard: -Yeu can get away with paying with IOU's for a long time but you still finaII>*have to open your purse'.- It remains to be seen. hoive\*- cr. whether this purse will dispense anything but more [OU'S. In any case h is treati se on predestination. pu blished in his theological jour- nal. has impressed me as highly threadbare (Lrners. -).

Hegel is concemed about dogmatics and. if we take the .'as well" xriously. is not averse ro refer-

. ' Primphr~sc01' Lin cplgmmriric quotarion Srom Ihc .Y~rrirri('?) b'. Schiller. 29 ring to his own work as dogmatics. or at lest. as dogmatically groundeded The second letter shows Hegel's urgent concern for the welfare of the church and in particular its dopmatic foundations. He is writing to his younger colleague. H. W. F. Hinrichs.* also in response to the recent publication of the first edition of Schleiermacher's GZutbenslehre. From Daub I expect public clarification of whether that is really, as \ve have so impertinently and superficially been told, the do-matics of the United Protestant Church - although naturally we have only been presentedprsr with the fint part (kners. ML" Hegel's ongoing conflict with Schleiennacher. including most farnously his Foward to Hinnchs' 1822 treatise on the philosophy of relision (HF). should be viewed in the same light, as demon- strariive of his passionate. ecclesial concern for "religious poiicy in regard to the fundamental theological principles of the Evangelical Church of the Prussian Union" and "notas private disparage- [nent of a colleague"."' Turning to HF. Hegel's ecclesial concern is evident in an eariy passage in which he writes of the importance of soning out "for the church" the relation between faith and reason so that "the church-s teaching is not opposed by a creed of man's own making, nor has changed into something estemai- untouched by the Holy Spirit" (HF228). Hegel 's work is. by implication. of senvice to the church in i ts ail-important work of education: the church's work in relation to its members will consist primarily in educatinp them to the stage where the Truth. which at first could be communicated to them only in the forrn of something to be learnt by rote. has developed into an interior possession which touches their hearts so deeply that in that Tmth alone do they find their own fulfillment and their essential. permanent being (HF228).

( We shall see that this "interiorization". or "inwardization" [Erinnentngl through education is one

." Ttiough IL shuud bc wdthai thc tcu could also bc rcad as rckrring to contcmpormcs \\.ho arc prcducing dcigmar- ics '-a\\ ~11".

"" In his prcfricc to thc (;lnr~lwrrd~/rreSchlcicrmxhcr had cicscribcd his nurk as the Iirst dopatics to gi\-c an açcnunt ot' thc "Fundrimcnttil Pnnciplcs of thc Evruigclical church" (pmof thc fuit titlc of his \\.orkI. Thc E\~ringclic~Ichurch includcd borh rhc Rcbrrncd and Luthcran communions. and Sch1cierm;uiticr intcndcd thrit his tcst tvould pro\-tdc ihc thcoloycal bws L'or thcir union. of the main tasks of the church that is sened by doctrine and the philosophy of religion"). Hegel does not forget this ecclesial purpose as he returns at the end of HF to set his own philosophical ivork in perspective as one part of a largerenquiry into the way in which the contemporan church

"is again to procure respect. reverence and authonty for its doctrines" (NF241 )."" Hegel's main objection to Schleiermacher's dogmatics is its reduction and limitation of the relationship between humanity and God to feeling so that theology is repudiated and subjecti\-e opinion. which Hegel describes as capricious. fortuitous. arbitrary. and incapable of knowing the trurh, is put in its place (HF210fn. A dogmatics of feeling is a dogmatics of IOU's that is i-acuous unless backed up b*opening one's purse and bringing out real money. real dogrnatic content. Not that Hegel denies feeling its proper. even necessary place and function. But feeling by itself is con- tcntlcss. The important thing is that feeling should be directed to and evoked by its true and proper objcct. Hegel is as opposed to an understanding of faith that emphasizes content '-learnt by rote" to the utter exclusion of its "communication ... to man's innerrnost self'. as he is to "the merely sub- jecti1.e state of belie\ring" that "leav[esi iintouched the nature of the content ...of the belief-. In- stead. "1 hold that faith. in the true. ancient sense of the word. is a unity of both these meaninos. including the one no less than the othei' I HF 228 ). Without this fullness of faith. this knowledge of God. the church. theoiogy. and philosoph' arc altogether nothing. "a sounding brass and a tinkling q.mbal" (HF 213).That the church should bc ~vhatit is intended by Cod to be requires that it recover its dogrnatic foundations. that. "in face of mcrc arbitraq. opinions-..lit f create for itself a bond of objecti1.e faith- doctrine and cultus" ( [IF 211 ). We must not be mislead by his use of the phrase. create for itseif. He docs not mean L? rein~~entionof doctrine. It is the original doctrine of the Christian church that inust be re-

n hich thai Spint Ica& ihc mcrnbcrs into thc biowiitipe rl/(;ocl just bc~xuscIL is Spin1 anci ~hcdi\ inc. hol!. Spi nr. covered. it is preciseIy those doctrines. "the Credo. the church's confession of faith" (HF 228)." that are the irreplaceable foundation for philosophy. as for theoiogy and the Christian community.- So important is this to a true understanding of Hegel. and furthemore so often is it ignored or forgotten in interpretations of Hegel. that it merits Our funher investigation.'

Philosophy ami the Credo of the Churc-h We begin wich a letter from Hegel. written in Apd. 1822. to the liberal reformer Baron Karl Sipund von Altenstein. the Prussian Minister responsible for religious. educational. and medical affairs.'? Hegel's report addresses what he himself describes as "the cornplaint arising

from many quaners that students tend to corne to the university without the requisite preparation for the study of philosophy" (Lrnrrs 390). Proper preparation he suggests should include both /mm-id andfr,rt?rul matters. Though the rnoretn~eriul"is at once indirect and more distant'.. ne\.-

ertheless he considers it to be the true foundation of speculative thinking (Leuers 391 ). It would include the srrcdy ofrhr uncirnn. alerting students to ethical principles and piety. It would also in-

- Cc)mrncnting on thc phr-SC."thc Cido. thc church's confession", Mcroid Wcstphai in his lntrducrion ri) A. V. LIillcr's English tr~nsiationol- Hcgcl's H/.'cxpltuns chat "this \sudd ha.c [ci rcfcr primtlrily io thc cxncmicA conlcs- sicms 01 I'arh n hich cmstitutc thc Biblc. luid sccondrinl>-to thc crccris 01 Chnsicndom" (N'cstphal. "lnirtductron" [O Hcgcl's HF. 325).

- - - El cn Barth. ihough hc rickno\vlcdgcs Hcgcl's clriim io ha\-c fionorcd chu~hdtxtnnc (PT 293). di-wounrs Hcgcl'.; daim rn t'ri1 our of his oivn chrrrxtcn7;irion of Hcgcl ris onc tvho rcndcrs such docrnnc imrnritcnaf ti-hcn it cnmcs to rhc hichcr xtr\ of purc philosopn>-\\-hich is undcmkcn cntircly si.ithin rhc lirnitlcss and dl--gcncraiing contincs ofautonomous human thoughi. ft ma" bc truc [O wy this of Hcgcl's tvritings up till 181 1. I t cannot bc susrtlincd r hcrcdtcr.

- < Von Xltcnstcin hrid hcld thc position sincc 181 7. and wris rcspmsiblc lix Hcgcl's rippointmcnt. in IX 18. ris pro- icssor 01' philosoph!- at thc Cni\~crsityof Bcriin. Thc lcttcr rs (i rcpn in ud~ichHcgcl dcli\.crs hts gcncnI conclu- wons and rccornmcndations bascd on his Iour ycars cspcncncc ri mcmbcr of thc Ro\d Acdcmic Brud of- Esamin- crs hrrhc prmmçc OC Brandcnburg Von Altcnstcin hrid appointcd Hcgcl ro ihc position in part fuifillmcnt oc his prornisc 10 augrncnt his incornc and opcn up sphcrcs of acti~itybc\-ond his tcriçhing rit thc Lfni\,crsity. Ii cnlriilcd his taking part in thc csarnination of candidsiics hrrcriching psrtions and for admission to thc unit-crsit).. xs si.cII a. thc wpcn.rsion

-'Scc chaprcr 4 and rfic scction cntirlcd "Thcolog~and PhiIosophy tn Con11 ict".

-'1 am indcbrcd to Oli\-crO'Donovrtn 10r thcsc tcms. tvhich hc usa 10 dcscribc thc Icgitimatc and illcgitimtiic rclri- iionships of rhcology ro Scripturc. (Ourltr Tllirry ;Vitre Arficle5. ziudiotapcs cil'lwiurcs. zrvailablc from thc libr-n ol' \'!.cl i l'fc Collcgc. Toronto. s.4. 33 fashion of what he elsewhere describes as the three universal prejudices of bis age. dogmatism. popular Kantianism. and religious subjectivism (Cf.HF 237):'" whether this content is to have a preparatory connection to speculative thinking will depend on whether church dogma is treated in re- Iigious instruction as something merely historical ...or al ternatively whether attention is chiefly directed to deistic generalities. moral teaching. or even mere subjective feelings (Leners 392).

Hegel 's use of "merely" and "mere" in his modifying "historical" and "subjective feelings" is criti- calIy important here. As we have already seen in his criticism of Schleierrnacher. and as we shall see when we consider his fuller treatment of these prejudices in HF. history and feeling are essential to true religion. Reduction to the mer&- historical is the fault of d~~matistsand histoncal cntics. ~vhoread history and dogma critically with the Understanding only. and who are therefore unable and un\villing to treat them in other than finite catepories. to read them as bearing authentic ~vitnessto eternal and absolute truth and reality. And it is the religious subjectivists who insist on reducing religion to rnrrr feeling. The triviality and unbelief of the three universal prejudices must be avoided in favour of reverent faith. tvhat Hegel describes here as "that true. deep respect for those dogmas". a respect ~vhichhe says '-is not generally implanted" (LLitters392).And the image of implantation is important. We shall see this again in LHP.- Reverence forchurch dopma does not come natunlly: as he says elsewhcre. commenting on St. Paul's the nuturd man perceiverh nor rhe rhings ofrhr spirir (f God und cmnor krzori. rhem7 --the natural man .As not supposed to know anything: ...a natural feeling of the divine and the spirit of God are two quite different thinps" (HF 238). Reverence for church doctrine is Ieamed specifically rhrough religious instruction and the preaching of the church. Wherever such education is neglected. the universal prejudices give nse to a mode of instruction [that 1 cultivates rather an attitude of opposition to speculative thinking. The self-conceit of the understanding and of caprice will be put first. either leading irnmediately to simple indif-

" Scc bclow. rhc lasi tour subscctions of chzip. 3, scct. 1. - - Scc chriptcr 1 and ihc scciion cntitilcd "Frcjm Patnsric [O Scholasric".

Quorcd Itxxcl!- trcm thc Luthcr Bibtc's translation of I Cor. 2.13 (cf. Pcier Hodpn's cditorid comrncnt on "Foniard ro Hinnchs's Religion" (HF)278, notc 5. in G.W.I.. Huqel: T/ieologicrn of the Spirif. cd. Hcdgson. 1997). 34 ference to philosophy or falling into sophistry (lrners 392)." *'The real essence of philosophy lis I...the addition of specrrhri~vforrnto (the 1 solid content" of Christian doctrine. That doctrine then .*I would view as the substantial side of preparation for philosophicd study": and he concludes his report. [i Indeed. 1 would even daim that when the sense and spirit of youth are not filled with it there remains to university study at this late date the scarcely soluble problem of for the first time awakening the mind to substantial content. of overcoming an al ready established vanity and orientation toward ordinary interests. which othenvise. as a rule. so easily find satisfaction (krrers 392).

Mention has already been mademof the possibility of a change and development in Hegel-s understanding of philosophy and its relation to theology and the Christian gospel. Even a some- u.hat sudden change. as suggested by the 1820 memorandum on philosophical cumciilum at the irni\*ersitj.which made no mention of philosophy of religion. and the 182 1 commencement of the first series of lectures in j ust that subject. which became Hegel's chief area of concentration for the rest of his life. Along the same lines there is Hegel's sharp reaction to Schleiermacher and the threadbnre chancter of his dogmatics. provoking an urgent need for a more adequate dogmatics. Both of these instances signal a shift in the focus of Hegel's attention. A fuller exploration of the realit). and extcnt of such a shift is well beyond the confines of this paper. Nevertheless. one further indication is suggested by a comparison of this 1822 report for von Altenstein on high school preparation for universitg education. and a speech Hegel delivered thirteen years earlier

(Septernber. 1809)"'as Rector of the Gymnasiurn at Nuremburg. There too the subject was high school preparation for learned study at the universitl*.But. without even the briefest allusion to

- ' Xcarl> rcn >-carsIriicr in 1830 tiic Hallc rillt'air as Hcgcl dcscribcû IL pitchcd orthorte)\;and r~rionrilistthcoiogitins agarnst onc anothcr. Tliough Hcgcl \\-as\van. oCorthocio\;!.'s tcndcncy to hrrcn ricigmatrsm. ii is clcrir l'rom ti Icrtcr it) Karl Fncdcnch Giicchct (to n hom u'c shtill rcturn) thar his symprithics tvcrc u~ihihc orihcJci\;rigainst ihc ".;O- criIlcd libcrty" 01' rhc rxionrilisu tvho dcspisc dcl'cndcrs ol' thc church's Credo. 'Thc cithcr sidc [thc tzitirmrilistc) ha incd [osh~cld i~scll ln its 0n.n \\.a>-bchind (thc cusc otl lormd Iibcp. and ha takcn gc~dctirc noi to bctm- rts na- kcdncss. Tlic ;rsscnicin ol' ~hisso-cdlcd libcrry cnjays for ilsclf immcnsc popularit!.. Ii is dcliani in ihc Iicc of at~tick in pan ~CC;IUSC It I s ;L t oncc rcady io g~\-can>.onc \\ho dclcnds thc dugrna and form 01' rhc church thc hriicÏuI ap- pcarJncc 01- rittrichng the cmploymcnt and lit-clihcxxiC$ indi\-iduals" (f-erxrrs54).

" Hcgcl. "On Clrissrcal Studics" (OC.57. Appcndis io Otr Chrisficrrrify:Etrr(v ~woloyicuiIVririrrys !)y Fric~titvir-11Hr- y/.trans. b>-T. 11. Knm. Pcicr Smith. Gleiuccstcr. 1970. 35 Christian doctrine. the entire speech is devoted to an apologetic for classical studies king given pnde of place in the syllabus." As we have already indicated. there is a significant shift of focus

w hen we turn to the 1822 report. The ancients remain important to Hegel. But they are equalled and surpassed by the dogrnatic system of the church fathers as preparation for higher learning and in particular for the study of philosophy."

Access to Hegei's more explicit and expansive handling of philosophy's relationship to the church's Credo entails supplementing our reading of that episrolary report with the HF of the sarne

'' B'. sl~ssicilstudics hc intcnds. as in thc 1812 rcpon, Lhc Iruigurigcs and lircnturc ol'ancicnt Grcccc and Romc. "Grcck Iircmturc in thc first plricc, Roman in thc second" (OC...324). Hcgcl's cltiims on bchall'of thesc anclcnts arc cxtr~i-apnrin thc cstrcmc. Thc~arc "thc &is ol' Imrncd kno\vlcdgc": if "csccllcncc" is to bc "our starring point". r hcn rhc!. "must bc and rcmain ... thc foundation oÏ highcr stud!--. Hcgcl 's languagc k)r thcir cstcem bccomcs rcligious. including tcrms such a5 baptisrn and paradise: Thcpcrfcction and gloq cil' thosc mris~crpicccsmust bc thc spir- i tual birh. the sccular baptisrn thal t?rst and indclibl y attuncs and tincturcs thc sou1 in rcspcct ol' titc and knrn\.Icdgc. For this initimon 3 gcncr~l.pcrt'unctc~n. xquainmcc tvirh thc mcicnts is not sultic~cnt:tvc must trikc up ciur Mg- ing -!\ ith ihcrn so that \\-ccrin brcathc thcir air. ribsorb thcir idcas. thcir rnrinncrs, onc migh~c\.cn sa? thcir crrors and prc~udiccs.and bccornc at hornc in this tvorld - thc laircst that c\rr ha bccn. Whiic ihc tirst pradisc na5 that of human trrtrrrrr. ihis is ihc scccind. thc higher pirïdisc of thc hurnan spirir. thc prïdisc tvhcrc rhc human spirit cmcrgch I i kc ri bndc Ïrom hcr chrimbcr. cndo\vcd tvith a liircr naturzilncss, uiih frccdom. Jcpth, and .sucni&-. ALthc cli ma\. Hcgcl'.; daims arc ribsolutc. and appïrcntly csclusii.~of an!' othcr sourçc in thc histoq. ot' humanit)., inciuding thc BibIc and thc Traditron of thc church. providing anything ot'such tunûamcnul wonh (or ought n.c to allci~vfor an clcmcnr ol rhctoncal hypcrblc?): "[tlhc humrin spint mrinifcsts irs prcii'undity hcrc no Icmgcr in ccinfusion. gicxirn. or arrogance. but in pcri'cct chty.... If tvc makc ourscI\.cs at hornc in such ;in clcmcnt. al1 thc pnvcrs of thc sou1 arc stirnulatcd. cic\,clopcd. and cscrciscd: and. Iurthcr. this clcmcnt is a uniquc matcrial through \\.hich WC cnnch Our- scl\.cs and irnpro\.c thc \'CE subsmncc 01-our bcin $.... Thc tvorks of thc ancicncs conun thc most noblc IcKd in thc mcw noblc Imn: goldcn ripplcs in silvcr hi\\-1s.Thcy arc tncornprirabl>. nchcr than riIl thc ~vorkscil' an!- rilhcr nation and ot. any ahcr iimc" (OC'S 3341'1).

' ' Tlic I XOY spccch iiï.ts Jcfiicrcd shortly al-ter Hcgcl hricl complctcd ihc Plwrrotrrut~olu~yof Spirit. Thc Pi~utiotttmol- O is morc c~i'tcnthrin not lhc cr)ntrolling tcst in trcatmcnts of Hcgc!. 1 cmml!. rmsc it ris LI question. as I am Iim- iting m?.sclf almost cntircl!. to çonsidcntion ol' Hcgcl's nntings of rhc 1820's. but ~vhatt\.ould bc thc rcsult 11' Hc- gcl's nntings bcforc 1831. tvhich also includc ~hcl~),gir.anJ the ~.it(-.~c.kOpdk.\s.crc rcad in thc light of Iiis nntings dtcr thar datc. including thc HF. 1-PR. and IHP. \vhich arc briscd on an apparcntly nctv cmphasis on thc liirmatn-c plricc ot- thc pspcl and thc dmtnnc ol thc church Ïathcrs in rclation to philosophy? Which is not to suggcst that Hcgcl did not continuc to dc\'clop in thc 1820's. a.. cvidcnccd. not tcast. rn his rc~ïorkingsof7 I-PR. It is inicrcsting to notc in this rcgrird. and \viih thc diffcrcncc that \t-chri\.c alrcady notcd bct\wcn thc 1SOC3 and 1 H12 cducaiion rcports. rhc chringcs in LPR \\.iih rcgard to the religions of Grcccc and Romc. and Juda- ism: in Pctcr Hcdgson's \\-ords. "Hcgcl's intcrprctaticm of Grcck and Roman rcfigion did not chmgc fundamcntdl> atlcr I X2 1. but ri p\\.ingapprcciation and morc positi\-c risscssmcnt of Judaism c\.idcnt". iPctcr Hodpon's cdi- tonal introduction to a sclcction from LfR 2. includcd in C.W.F.Heqc1: 7ïteokoqinrr (frite Spiri!. cd. Pctcr Hcdg- .;on. Fortrcss Prcss. Minncripoiis. 1997. 202). WC might dso comparc Hcgci's unqualiticd prdisc of thc grcritncss ol' thc ancicnts in thc 18OY spccch. with his description (to \vhich \t.c shall rcium bclosv, çhaprcr 3. sccticin 3) oiJcsus' tcxhing as thc ovcrthroning olal[ that thc svorld rcgards ris grcst. and "in cornparisrin wth svhich cvcc-thing clsc counts kir nothing" (IYR3. 1 18). 36 year ( 1822). 1n HF we find Hegel providing his diagnosis of the diseased state of the religious philosophy and theology of his contemporaries. Our analysis of it will serve to fulfiI Barth's fourth criterion for doing historical theology" by disciosing Hegel's historical context and more important]!. his o\vn perception of that context. It is almost inevitable that without that context one will misunderstand Hegel's account of what theology and philosophy should be as the approptiate ivedding of faith and reason on the firm foundation of the Credo of the church. Hegel uses techni- cal language which he shares in common with his contemporaries. All the time however and often xvith great subtlety he is adapting that language to articulate content that is profoundly different from that intended by his contemporaries. At the same tirne his detennination to use that teminolo- ov sets him apart from the dogmatists and historical critics among his contemporaries w ho merely L. repeat by rote or investigate as fossilized remains the traditional language of church dogma and the Bible. lt is in HF. perhaps better than anywhere else. that Hegel defines what he means by the Cizticr.rrccnding and expiains why. contrary to the near universal conviction of his contemporaries. i t is unsuitable for philosophical and theologicai enquiry. We shall consider Hegel's historical treatment of this as the fate of religious truth in modem theology and especially in the Enlighten- ment when we corne to LHP." Here in HF Hegel provides a conceptuai analysis of the same phe- nomenon as preparation for his analysis of its philosophical and theological oiispring. the three ap- proaches to religion that he calls the universal prejudices of his owr. day. The Understanding in Hegel's terrninology denotes finite thinking. thought which directs i tself to finite objects. So directed it functions properly and the Kantian categories serve to define its basic concepts (bnrr-r393). Problerns arise when that which is infinite and absolute. the content of philosophy and theology. of religion, is made the object of the Understanding. This confusion happens because of a struggle Lhat takes place within the human person where she is most God-like. "in that which signalites his [herl divine ongin". Faith is "stubbom[lyl" threatened by "independent thinking ... bvhat is caIled human thought. one's own understanding. finite reason.7 HF 228). At first the Understanding may seem to be supportive of religion. "adoming ..A with pro-

" Thc i-ourth cntcnri 1s kisroriciiia~v~rre~~es~s.For a 1-dl dcscnption of the Ibur cnrcriri scc Xppcndrr 1.

" Scc chrrptcr 4. 37 ducts of its own invention, curiosity and acumen"fHF 228). These are of two kinds: first. -'inferences" and "ends". concl usions apparently drawn from the gospel: and secondly. "presuppositions" and "grounds". conditions of possibility supposedly required by. and providing support for. the very existence of religion. By virtue of their king set within the context of the --eternal Truth" of the gospel these inferences and grounds assume the same status, "easily becom(ing) endowed with the same worth. importance and validity, as the Truth itself'(HF 2291. Appearances however are deceptive. The fatal flaw in both cases is that their content is finite: it cannot be anything else. for that is al1 that can be conceived by. or corne within the pumiew of. the Understanding. "They lack the testimony of the Holy Spirit" (HF 229). Finite in content. the) were in\.ented for finite interests. And their authority inevitably rests in human structures and arguments: -'they natunlly require to be defended by extemal authority". They therefore inevitably provoke "contradiction and counter-arptments" so that religion becomes "a field for impassioned dispute". and that. not only concerning its finite accretions. but essentially (HF 2280. The situation is the more complicated because of the essentid nature of revelation which inevitably entails the mediation of the Eternal by means of what is finite. God is unavailable imrne- diatel).. indeterminatcly. to humanit!*. He is known mediately. as he has manifested hirnselr: knowledge has to do with a determinate content. with movement: .At is only through shape. content and a determinate nature that any thing can exist fer spirit. cmexist as Reason, actuali ty. life. can possess an intrinsic being of its own (HF 232).

Though this determinate nature of God is in the first ptace God incarnate. the gospel history. it is aiso revealed therein to be the immanent and essential king of God. God as Trinit).. Here too an image or niodel that is fini te is CO-optedby God to bear witness to his intrinsic king as eternal Fa- ther. Son and Holy Spirit. For Hegel it is meaningless to speak of God as if he is somehow even more fundarnentally the indeterminate God behind or beneath or above God the Trinity. God as an empty abstraction. emptied of al1 content. is no Gd, is "the void ...lackjing) a content .. Andeter- minate and possess[ing] no immanent life and action". There is no getting from this empty abstraction to the living Cod: The doctrine of Truth is wholly and solely this, the revelation of ~vhatGod is. of His nature and works.... [Tlhe absolute Tnith ir- .srffassumes a temporal shape with the extemal conditions. relationships and circumstances associated with it (HF 23 10. Supremely. consummately. God has revealed himself in the "etemal history" that is the gospel of Jesus Christ (HF 230). It is the manifestation of the infinite God in the finite realities of the gospel history that provides a foothold for the "enemy"(HF 229). That foothold is gained with the failure to distinpu- ish between God himself in his self-mediation, and the tinite and temporally relative realities that become associated with the gospel in particuiar generations and cultures. A clear distinction must be made between the etemal manifestation which is inherent in the nature of Truth and the transient, local. external phenomena of its inessential side, else the finite will be con- fused with the infinite, the inessential with the essential (HF 3130). With the faiiure to make this distinction, the gospel itself becomes identified with the finite inven- tions of the human understanding. is assumed therefore to rest on the same external authority. and so becomes a subject for contradiction. counter-argument and impassioned dispute (HF 230). Again it needs to be said. the culprit is the Understanding: or. more exactly. the application of the Understanding to that which is essentially unavailable to it. The Understanding can pspthe finite rneans of Cod's self-reveiation but it cannot grasp God. It is nevertheless seduced into believing that because it possesses that through which God makes himself known. it is therefore cornpetent to assess. supplement. and even critique and evaluate religious and philosophical truth at every lebPel.In reality and by definition al1 that is more than finite, God himself. the tmth as infinite and absolute, the testimony of the Holy Spirit. indeed al1 that is of the essence of religious tmth is missed: not so much ignored as simply unobserved and unavailable. its content reduced to an empty abstraction (HFî30). Hegel vanously describes what is left of God once he has been reduced to this empty abstraction: the pure negative, the capur mortuurn of a merely abstract Being ....the Unknowable .... the void [thatl lacks a content, is indeterminate and possesses no immanent life and action. ...[ God] veiled ...from human knowledge: ...from such a God. in Him. there is nothing to be had for he has already been emptied of al1 content (HF 232). Correspondingl y bereft of their tme content the fini te means of Gd's self-mediation. "procured for itself from the divine content" by the Understanding, are "reduced to the extemality of merely ordinary historical events. to local opinions and particular contemporary views" (HF 232). Strictly speaking this marks the demise of theology, for theology requires objective content (HF 233). The abjective is "a substantial content that is independent and self-subsistent, a tmth that is not a matter of opinion and intettectuai conceit" (HF232); it is self-rnanifesting, it cannot be wrested or grasped at will by autonomous. independent human understanding: "it must manifest itself. and its manifestation must be an accomplished fact" (HF 230). So it is that. as we shall see when ive corne to LHP," the church fathers assumed and were convinced of the fact of the Incar- nation: their work begins from that fact. developing from that given content their theology and philosophy. In Hegel's own words. at the root of their work is "the testimooy of the Holy Spirit" or, ivhich is the same thing. the self-authenticating revelation of God in the gospel history of Jesus Christ (HF 23ûfO. [The 1 narratives and circumstances which enter into the etemal history. the narrative and doctrine which surrounds [sic] the eternal Tmth. deserve ...at least the greatest respect and a reverent treatment (HF 23 1). The Understanding however robs them of their objectivity, tbeir self-evidently divine authority, grasps them. claims to give them their rneaning and establish their authority, and subjects their being understood to itself. in the name of divine tmth. Divine tmth having been ernptied of its content. this demand for subjection derives not from the divine spirit of faith but from the Understand- in^ itself which has abrogated to itself the sole right to speak with authority on divine rnatters. In- evitabty. it is the products of its own acumen that are stressed at the expense of divine tmth (HF 2300. The catastrophic result for religion is its disintegration into any one of three counterfeits: the barren orthodoxy of dogmatism (which for HegeI includes positivist biblicism); the secularized idealism of popular Kantianism; and subjectivist religion with its reduction of theology and piety to feeling alone.-

The barren orth~doxyof dogmatism treats of that through which God manifests himself. - Hegel has in mind. in particular. the Bible and the doctrines of the Christian church, - in such a "" Scc chriptcr 4, cspccidly rhc opcning sections.

'-For lack of spricc. in this cssay 1 ha\.c lirnitcd rn'wlf to Hegel's oripnd works of the 1820's. It would othcnvisc bc insuucti\.e to cornparc Hegel's pariillcl account in the bgic of what hc calls the three "Attitudes of Thought to Objccti \.i ty" ( Hcgcl 's bgic.king part onc of the Erlqcloprredia ofthe Pliilosophicni Scierices, first publishcd in 1517 and rcvised for the 1830 cdition. tnns. by WilIiam Wallricc, Oxford, 1975-47-112). 40 way that their divine character is ruled out of court and they are handled as ends in themselves, finite and temporal bumm constructs." "Codine[d] within that finite sphere of the Understanding". religion is reduced to "literalism" and "the barren leaming of orthodoxy" (HF 23 1). It is preoccupied with the outer shell of religion. the "extemal[s]" as ends in themselves. which is al1 that is left to it. "All that remains [of religion] as material for thought" is the deteminate content of religion surrendered to. or better, wrested by "the consciotrsness that is merely temporal and finite in characteiq(HF232). Hegel variously and colorfully describes the character of this restricted. pseudo-religious thinking. "It must find its satisfaction in the vain elaboration in various ways of a subject-matter lacking any substantial import and in pmuring for itself in scholady fashion a vast mass of such material" (HF î32). It is interesting to compare an arnusing letter that Hegel addressed to Friedrich August Got- treu Tholuck. a major representative of pietistic revivalism. In the letter Hegel defends the dogma of the Trinity which according to Tholuck had ken falsely read into practically motivated biblical tests by later theologian~.~Commentinp on Tholuck's recently published book on the Tnnity He- gel writes. 1 have found the transition on page 40 likewise very facile: 'Much as Chris- riun t heoiogians under the infl uence of Platonic and Aristotelian philosoph y derived a speculative theorem from indeterminate (?) expressions in the

:Vw Testarnent introduced only (?) with practical (?) reference....O Does not the sublime Christian knowledge of God as Triune meri t respect of a whot ly different order than comes from ascribing it merely to such an extemally historical course? In your entire publication 1 have not ken able to fee! or find any trace of a native understanding of this doctrine. 1 am a Lutheran. and through philosophy have been at once completel y confirmed in Luther- anism. 1 do not allow myself to be put off such a basic doctrine by externally historical modes of explanation. There is a higher spirit in it than merely that of such human tradition. I detest seeinp such things explained in the same manner as perhaps the descent and dissemination of silk culture. cher- ries. smallpox. and the Ii ke (Leners 520). In other words the trivialization of biblical and dogrnatic texts was a temptation to the pietists as well as to the historicai critics. the pietists falling to the temptation in the name of practical moralism.

" Bmh is in complcrc accord with Hcgci hcrc: "Of tvht usc LO hcology \vas dl knowlalgc of rcpincd histoc. that oL thc Biblc too. and of rhc Biblc in particuiar, ifat thc samc timc it \vas incapable of rccognizing rcal histoq, oï rccogtizing rhc Living God?" (PT300).

" CC/. Butler's cditcxial commcnt in Lefters. 518. In its posi tivist guise dogmatism withdraws into a fortress and repeats &nauseam its dogmatic and biblical fonnulae without ever breakingihrough to the eternal and spiritual realities with w hich the fathers of the church understood them to be weighted God and the gospel are lost and one is left with the shabby shell* of Protestant and Catholic scholasticisms. in its other guise, orthodox formalism moves ineluctably toward the secular ideaiism of popdar Kantianisrn. That is not its original goal. On the con-, it set itself to defend and uphold Christian religion by establishing itself within the Academy. Hegel's language is not so neutral. For him it is more a rnatter of its disguising its nakedness in scholarly garb, - "a rnass of arid in- significant determinationi' and "formal weapons" derived therefrom. - and looüng to the Acade- my for recognition and even justification. It is "vanity" (HF 233). I ts main feature is that it is systemaiic, preoccupied with %air-splitting, metaphysicai. casuistic distinctions and determinations into which the Understanding split up the substantial content of religion" (HF 233). This is undertaken specificall y within the spheres of the bi bIical and dogmatic content of traditional Christianity. Thereby the transition is begun towards Kantian secu- larism. The Understanding plants its own finite determinations in the soi1 of the divine doctrine itself and ... use[s] the absolute, divine authority for its own rank weeds; ... al1 definite character and with it al1 content receive a finite significance. thus destroying the specific fom and character of the Divine (HF 234). The con tent of Iegi timate theology and philosopophy (the particular character of which we have yet to in\.estigate) is superficially the same as that of barren orthodoxy: however, because the latter's investigation is li mited to the Understanding with its inability to countenance anything other than what is finite and temporal. that content is emptied of substance and reduced to data simitar in kind

1 have borrowcd this ph- from Lionergan, who uses i t in Mehd in -ï7wo/ogy to descri bc the manualist ihcology r)t- scholastic Cathoiicism. 42 to that of secular science, "the aim of [which] is a knowledge ofJinite objects" (HF 236)P' The Achilles' heel of this barren orthodoxy is its havinp wrested authority from etemal tmth and claimed it for its own constnictions. It was not its original intention to make that rebelli- ous claim. Rather it was the inevitable but initially unperceived consequence of its having surrendered. with the noblest of motives, theology, philosophy, and biblical studies to the Understand- ing." In spite of a11 efforts to the contrary it cannot hide the fact that in this role of usurper thought shows itself to be autonomous and independent. Once that becomes obvious to al1 but the most ob- tuse the Understanding turns against its own religious constructions "and fin& its ultimate principle in pure abstraction itself. the characterless supreme Beingw(HF 232)' spawning various foms of the secular idealism of popular Kantianisrn. to Hegel's analysis of which we now tum.

Secular idealism refers to the autonomous rationality that had become fashionable at least since the Enlightenment, and which. precisely because it was not informed by the content of church dogma and the method of the church fathers, was at the mercy of the whims and senti- ments. the caprice. of mere subjectivity. The Understanding thus employed on the one hand. and tme philosophy and theology. the speculative thinking consistent with true religion on the other. are for Hegel mutuaily exclusive. Secular idealism was originally a reaction to the barrenness of sterile theological onhodoxy on the part of what Hegel calls the better rnind (HF 23 1 ). provoked by sheer frustration into for- rnulating a substitute for religion. a system of moral ideals resembling those of the discountenanced religion but shorn of supernaturd and dogmatic associations. Hegel calls it Kantianism. the all-pre-

"' So ir 1s that, "from this standpoint, evcn a doctrinc rccognizcd as di\.inc crinnot itsclf as suçh bc the objcct of cn- quiq., but oniy thc Iàçts and circumstanccs surrounding it. The doctrinc itsclf rcmains outsidc ihc inicrcst 01- intcllcc- tual xtiviry and bcca~scits conicnt is assumcd to bc unattainablc, it is idlc to scek an insight into thc doctrine. a bclicf in it and a conviction of iis tmth. Accordingly, intclligcncc in occup>ing itsclf with rcligious doctnncs rnust conrinc itsclf to thcir phenorncd aspccîs. must conccm itsclf ~viththe outer circumstanccs and thc intercst bccomcs ri mrittcr or histoc \t.hcrc spirit has to do with things pt. wtth somcthing it has lcft bchind it. in which spirit is Ilor irsul/presetzr. Thc producs of the mestefforts of scholarship. of industq. of acumcn. etc.. arc likctt.isc callcd tnith, and an ocmof such tmths is brought to light and propgatcd: but thcsc arc not thc sort of tniths which thc crimcst rcligious spirit dcmands for its satisfaction" (HF 35).This rcrnarkriblc passagc ivould hardly nccd to change in ordcr to dcscribc bibtid studics oncc thc divinc chmctcr of Scripturc is rulcd out olthc intcllcctud court.

'' "[Hcgcll \vas much more cxcrciscd than somc maicm 'biblid' thcologians about hm. insidequate philosophicd hcrmcncutic prcsuppositions could in fxtobscurc or dcform the rcs-elational 'content' of the scrïptunl witncss io Christ" (Jamcs Ycrkcs. nie Clirisfdogyof Hegel. Missoula, 1978, 311). 43 vailing philosophy of his age (HF23 1). These ide& are not gven from above, or developed through dogrnatic reflection on the gospel history; but are developed by abstract thinking alone. - deduced irnmanently, from within." God, if his existence is not denied altogether, is conceived of as a merely âbstract Being, granted existence by reason (Hegel's Uaderstanding) as a necessary --postulate" for the gmunding of the universality and coosistency of the already established ethic of reason." "Thought appears as autonomous... and finds its ultimate principle in pure abstraction itself. the characterless supreme Being*'(HF 233). As Enlightenrnent religion and theology "no longer possess a tmth that is known, an objective coruenr, a &trinul theology" (and Hegel adds that "strictly speaking, it is only religion of which this can be said, for where there is no such content there can be no theology" (HF 233). theology without the doctrinal content of the Christian church is no theology), so Kantian philosophy too lacks the same objecriveconre~.* This philosophy set out originally with the purpose of freeing religion fmm error and su- persti tion. 1t "sought to make room for the Tmth; it sought eternal Truthsw(HF 235). It successfully accomplished its rescue mission as it believed by providing new foundations. criteria, and guidance for those eternal truths in reason (HF 2340. It failed in its task because it relied on the Understanding alone w hic h as we have already seen can grasp and conceive of only finite things. Much that in the doctrine of the church is more than finite, participating as it does in the Divine, was stripped of that more and reinterpreted in finite tems. What could not be so reinterpreted. above al1 God himself. was pronounced unavailable to human Understanding (correctly, Hegel ac- knotvledges. given the finite lirnits of the Understanding), necessarily emptied of al1 content. and

"' "it is ~hcbettcr mind ht....restorcd and asscncd thcfieedorn of rliespirir, thc principle of ri spintual rclipion. ycr ...as ml? an absrmct thinking. Im rror krrown Irow fo disrUtgrtis1~bct~vecn the chanctcristics of a mcrcly finitc contcnt and thosc of Trrrrh itsclT' (HF 31 1).

"'Barth's intcrprctation of the placc of Gdin Kant's philosophy closcly panllels Hcgcl's. According io Bruth, for Kanr Gdis unrtvaiIablc to human niional investigation cxccpt as a necessaF "prcsupposition" (Barth nom that Kant's tcrm. "not a vcq happy choice linguisticsilly," is "postulatc~for cthics, God is at thc limit of huma rcason as hat n hich lies bchind ihc univcrsai ruid catcgariui impcntivc to do what is riat and to refrain fmm svhat is i\.rong: nght ruid wrong bcing dcfinsiblc by rcason. That is why only thc moral pmfof Gd's cxistcncc rctains any i-rtlidity for bt(PT loi ). "IL is impcntivc to sec that Hcgcl is absolutcly corrcct in cmphsisizing ... that uic Kantiui position grants to Gd(includcd arc also frccdom and immomlity) only hypothcticril status" (Rolf Ahlcrs. cornrncnting on L PR 3. 95, in n~eCornrnrrriiiy of Freetiorn: Barrh and Presripposi~ionlessîXeology, NCWYork 1989,396n. 72).

'' "For L~Cdcfcct from u-hich phiiosophy now suffcr~proves to be likcwise a lack of objective conrerrr. It is thc scicncc of thinking Rcason ... the consciousncss and the absofutc conviction of the tnith of Rcason ...and for this scicncc thc subjcct-rnattcr hris bccomc just sis attcnwtcd as i t hrrs for faith" (HF233). 44 banished to an unattainable reaim (HF 235). Hegel draws the startiingly obvious conclusion. No matter how noble its original intention. which was nothinp lesthan the liberation of the religion of Truth from sterile and pharisaical dop- rnatisrn. philosophy has become the enemy of religion. at least of the consummate religion. It cannot acknowledge that the condition of possibility for the knowledge of God rnight be, not "the insight of reason", but the initiative of a Cod whose -'fundamental detemination" is that he is "in and for himself'. "possesses inminsic Being", is inalienably self-sufficient (HF 235). Such a fundamental determination is inconceivable to the Uadentanding to which this philosophy has reduced al1 human knowinp. The conclusions of Kantian philosophy, particularly with regard to its hostility to religion other than in its severely attenuated fom as limited to reason alone. are Hegel believes. in spite of al1 daims to the contrary, the almost universal prejudice, the presuppositions and acknowledged truths, of his contemporaries." Given the generally assumed impossibility of the self-revelation of God and therefore of a philosophy rooted in and consistent with such impossible knowledge. what route is left to someone whose religious aspirations penist. unsatisfied by barren onhodoxy and unrepressed in the face of popular Kantianism? Or as Hegel himself puts the question "[wlhere can the human spirit still find a place where it could meet with substantial, absolute Being. where the Etemal could approach it and it could attain to union with the Etemal. to the certainty and enjoyment of it?' (HF 237) In passing, we underline the suggestion, in this short quotation, of Iife and initiative that Hegel attributes to the Eternal. God is seeking the human person with at least as much energy as the human person is seeking God; and their corning together, while spoken of as union is dso descnbed as a "rneet[ing] with". There are in other words ingredients that point to that antithesis between God and humanity which is so important to Banh as safeguarding the inteprity of both God and humanit).. but also their union as authentic relationship."

- "" "In holding spirit to be orrly thc Undcrstruiding, btianism hagivcn currcncy io thc gcncrd proposition that man crin hri5.c no kno~vlcdgcof Gd,... no knosr.ledgc of \\.bat posscsscs irrrrirrsic- Beirig. If religion dcclarcs thsi[ mm's glop and salvation lic in his kno~vingGod and that rcligion's .senicc to man consists in ha\-ing impsirtcd to him this kno\vlcdge and in having rcvcalcd the unknown naturc of Gd. thcn this philosophy fonns thc most mon- .;trous mtithcsis to rcligion .... This rcsuIt may tvcll bc rcgardcd sis having bccomc. csccpt in ri feu- instrinccs. thc univerd prcjudicc of our culturc" (HF 235).

.- " Scc ah\-e. chrip. 1. and thc scction cntitlcd "Thc Closcd Circlc" 45 Schkknwcher adthe Religion of Pure Subjec?iv&y Dissatisfied with dogmatisrn and rationalism the religious spirit retreats into the realm of feeling. Hegel here has in mind especially Schleierrnacher.* Again, it is not that Hegel denies feeling its righdul place in religion. Feeling is among the evidences of genuineness in religion. It is significantly even fatally absent from both the barren orthodoxy and the popular Kantian moralism of which Hegel is so critical. It is the reduction of religion to feeling abne, "the opinion that feeling is the true and even the sole fom in which the religious spirit preserves its genuineness*', to which he is opposed (HF 237). Underlying that reduction to feeling, and wfiat makes it a retreat, is the tacit or in some cases overt assent to the Kantian commitment to the Understanding as the sole means of rational thought in philosophy and religion.*The consequences of such a reduction are a threadbare theolo- gyZmand an inability to appreciate the essentially ecclesiai character of the religious life. which in turn lead to schismatic withdrawal from the community and indiscriminate syncretism."' The sole cnterion for religious truth becomes depth and sincenty, existentid authenticity of feeling. purely subjective e~penence.'~ HegeI leaves us in no doubt of his contempt for this religious attitude. He cannot dignify it

""cc abo\.c, chrip. 3. scc~1, and ihc t'irst nvo subscctions.

"'"n]hc objccri\.i t~.and dcfinitcncss which bowlcdge and an awdiened faith demand... the Undcnmding hii~Imcd io dcstro!.:.. .for this rcason ... chc rcligious spirit which fcars this danger withdraws into this vcilcd form [fccling J ivhich sccrns ro offcr no aspcci n-hich could bc dialcctically attaÊkcd by thoughi" (HP 237).

''" CJ Hcgcl's Ictlcr to Daub in which hc rcflccb on Schlcierrnachcr's fonhcoming Giaukmfel~re,quotcd abovc. chrip. 3, scct. 1. rind thc subscction cntitlcd "An Urgent Summons".

'" '"[Tlhc scat olauihonry in maitcrs or bclicf and conduct is transfcrred from dlcdrcason (but it is rait). the fi- nrtc Undcrstrinding ...) to fcciing", with the rcsult chat "there has vanished cvcn thc scmblancc of objcctivity". "An cupansion inro the cultus" [srhich Hegcl has just panphrascd ris "an csirp;uision into acts which proclairn thc com- rnunIt' cil-spirits in rcligion'l, and into a body of doctrinal belicfs, is no longer compatible with the forni of fccling: on thc cont~,"rcligiosity ... has flcd from any dc\.clopment and objectivi~to fceling, which it has chdlcngingly dcclarcd to bc the csclusivc and prcdominant focm.... [FJccling is a form which, itsclf indetcnninatc, embnccs mai- tcr of rhc rnost ditasc and oppositc kinds. Fccling... is cqually capable of king gdas evil, pious as ungocilyu (HF 2370. "If fccling is madc into a principlc that dctcnnincs a content [in nrciigïon". as in al1 other ^human conditions" and "relationships"l, ail chat has to bc donc is to Ica-c it to thc individual wliich fcelings hc will have: it is an absolutc i ndctini tcncss that constiturcs the standard and authorin., i.e. the capricc and inclination of the individuai, to bc and to do t\.hac plcascs hirn and to rndc himsclf the oncle for what shall bc acccptcd as rrue as rcgads religion. duty. righi. rind ivhat is finc and noblc" (HF 239).

'X "I t {vil1 stn \.c to make pood bu intcnsi ty and inwardness what its faith has lost in dcfinitc chmctcr and cstcn- sion- (HF =7). 46 as even bad theology. Theology and philosophy, good or bad. must contain. more, mus

The Qrresr ion Given this massive cntical analysis and refutation of the theology and philosophy of his contemporaries. \vhat is the philosophy of religion that Hegel has to put in its place? Whatever else it is. we know now that it wiII attend to the means of God's seif-revelation. the biblical witness and the chureh's dogmatic formulations. not in the manner of barren onhodoxy as ends in them~el\~es. but for God's sake. with a view to grasping and king gnsped by the very being of the infinite. triune God. Yet too. we aIso know that in contrast to the neo-Kantians it will know God in no other way than by attending to the Church's Credo as the means through which God has chosen to manifest himseIf. We know further that Hegelian philosophy will not permit the neo-Kantians to empty the knowledge of God of al1 determinate content. nor the subjectivists to close off the way of reason to the knowledge of God. Instead it will proceed confident that God can and may be known specifically as Father. Son. and Spirit. precisely through rational thought rooted in faith. and with a view to the engagement with God of the whole human person. But if these are the implications of Hegel's critique of his contemporaries. it remains for us to foilow Hegel in his explicitly constructive accounts of a true philosophy of religion. What is philosophy when i t is informed. given its substantial content. by the dogrnatic confenr of our religion? What is the spec~ilutiveforrn that it is the real essence of philosophy to add to such solid content (kners392)? What is the philosophy of religion when it relates essentidly (as it must do according to what we have already seen in Hegel's Introductions to LPR. his report to von Alten- stein. and HRto the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. to the Bible. to the dogmatic system of the church fathen. and to legitimate theology? It is to Hegel's answen to these questions that we now tum. Section 2: The Cal1

A God-Given Vocarion The philosophical and theol~gical'~enterprise that Hegel identifies as the pàilosophy of religion is first of al1 a God-given vocation. Early in LPR Hegel describes the philosophy of religion as a senrice rendered to God: "philosophy is theology, and one's occupation with philosophy - or rather in philosophy - is of itself the service of God" (LPR 84). Hegel uses the word for worship.'" For the specific character of that vocation, its what and its wherefore, we retum to HF. In a phrase, that vocation consists in the reconciliation, or the demonsiration of the inherent compatibility. of faith and reason. None of Hegel's contemporaries' various claims to have established that reconciliation. neither the neo-Kantians', nor the positivists', nor Schleiermacher's, convinces him. Al1 of them he says work by emptying both faith and reason of objective content,'" so that there can no longer be any great discord for there remains no object of dispute. But such reconciliation is hollow. Born of an indifference to the real issues through merely overlooking or looking down upon what in either faith or reason offends and estranges, the claim to have achieved peace is frivolous and barren. and the continuing implicit scission remains festenng with the promise of dangerous damage (HF 156). By contrast. Hegel intends to dojustice to both faith and reason by demonstrating their true reconciliation. thereby "satisfying...the deepest genuine needs [ofl the sanctuary of spirit" (HI= 1%). To do j ustice to them entails first recovering the proper sense of faith and reason.

' HcgcI 1s \ruy OS thc icrm 'rhcology' bccsiusc it has bcen rcduced in modcrnity cithcr io the pictism of rncrc Icci- ing. conicntlcss conviction. or to thc positivism of biblicd and dogrnatic propositionalisrn, convictionlcss contcnt. O\.cr against thcsc thcologics Mcgcl sets his 0n.n spcculative philosophy of religion- As WC shdl sec in UIP hc dis- covcrs ri rhcology ihat corresponds to his philosophy in thc tvork of the Medieval scholastics, prcemincntly in St. Ansclm. But bccriusc that thcology has dl but bccn forgottcn by his contcmponrics Hcgcl finds it lcss confusing to prcfcr thc tcrm 'philosophy' [O 'thcology'; though it too is not without its problems, which is why hc modifia it tvith the tcms 'spcculati\.c' and 'rcligion'. Ai the samc timc WC should rcrnembcr that LPR includcs thc asscnion "phi Iosophy is thcology" (LPR 84, i talics Hcgcl 's).

!" Hodgson contnbutcs the following cditorid footnotc. "Gortesdierw is the customq word for 'worship'. ~vhichis ri 'di\inc scmicc'. In this contcst the more Iitcnl rcndcring 'sewicc of Goci' sccms appropriate stncc philosophy is thc 'tvorship' of God not in a cdtic but in ri scnVingscnsc" (UR84). Wcarc reminded of Barth's description. alrcady quotcd (in chrip. 1): for Hcgcl "thinking [is]... a divinc scn-icc" (PT 2%).

!" Faith "has bccomc dc\.oid of contcnt and nothing has rcmaincd of it but the cmpty shcil of subjcctit.~cont.iction*'; rcmn "has rcnounccd thc cognition of truth. and spirit is left no issue other than onc pimîally in appc;irzuiccs ruid partial 1'. in t'cclings .... ncithcr ...my longcr comprises any objective contcnt" (HF 156). 48 Fuith und Reason Genuine faith combines subjective conviction and objective content. The former includes inner certainty and personal appropriation such that the believer's very identity as self is fundarnentally and inextricably bound up with the content of the gospel: the latter is the Credo, the gospel and creeds. the content of the confession of the Christian church. Neither one without the other is faith, but only "their being combined in undifferentiated unity"; their distinction is purely formal (HF 1%) .'" Reason is the human response evoked by, and appropriate to the infinite and etemd content of faith. That is why. as we saw at the start of our whole argument. the philosophy of religion. the rational appropriation of faith and its content. must begin with God. This beginning with God is not undertaken in the guise of an independent arbitrator treating God as an initial postdate in an argument, with a view to determining whether reality and significance is to be attributed to him. according to some set of criteria arrived at through pnor analysis of human rationality or any other human capacity. No, instead our beginning with God is to be God's beginning, the beginning chat he as the living God already is. immanently as Father. Son and Spirit. and extrinsically as the absolutely self-sufficient condition of possibility for al1 that is. The speculative philosophy of religion. in fulfilling its God-given vocation as the niionai exposition of the Christian faith, must avoid certain pidalls. al1 of them due to there not king an immediate orexistentia1ly"- original union of natural human identity. human subjectivity, the self. on the one hand. and, on the other. the gospel, the authentic content of genuine faith: "these two

;" "By taith I do nor ... mcan thc mcrcly subjcctivc Sact of king convinccd. kvhich rclaics only to thc lorm dccrtrun- t~.rind Icri\.cs it stili undccidcd whcther this king convinccd tris my contcnt. and, if so, tvhat; nor do 1 mcrin mcrcl'. thc crccd. thc church's confession of f'th. rvhich is compilcd in rrords wd rvriting and can bc ridoptcd odly. in rcp- rcscntriticm and mcmoc, u-ithout having pcncrntcd thc inncr corc. trithout ha\.inp bccn idcntificd with thc ccrtaint). humm bangs harc of thcmsclvcs. with human sclf-consciousncss. In accord with thc gcnuinc. mcicnt scnsc of thc \vord. 1 rcckon faith ris consisiing in thc onc moment no lcss than thc othcr. and I locatc it in thc Tact of thcir bcing corn bincd in undiffcrcntiatcd unity" (HF 156). Hcgel is dcscribing in phitosophicdlthcolopicd tcrms trhat SL Paul intcnds in such statcmcnts as. -it is no longcr I rvho li\.cs. but Christ who lires in mc" (Gd. 2-20), md "[Christ] dicd for dl. so that thosc \\-ho iivc rnight 1i1.c no longcr for thcmsclvcs, but for him who dicd and nas raiscd for thcm" (3 Cor. 5.15).

"- Thc contcnt of thc gospcl is subjcctivcly, immcdiritcly. csistcntially alicn to thc human pcrson. WC saw ihis (sec chap. 3. and thc scction cntitlcd "Thc Subjcctivc/Objcctivc Distinction") in our radine of Hcgcl's "Introductions" to (89).Ar thc smc timc \rc sasr thrit hc \vans to insist upon Gd's bcing objcctivdy "not ... substrintiall!- ncrv and alicn": \\.hich sccms to bc Hcgcl's dctcrmination to think human fdlcnncss \vithin thc widcr contcst of humai- ty's ha\.ing kcn crcarcd by and for God. in his imrigc. WC have ihcrcforc modificd Our use of 'original' withrcgard to thc union undcr discussion by introducing thc tcnn 'cxistcntidly'. 49 sides are not united with each othereither in immediate fasbion or permanently and secureiy in al1 determinations, but rather... the immediate ceriainty of oneself is divorced from the authentic content." (HF 15'7). Originally they are divorced. And Hegel meam this divorce in the full sense of the word. ranging as we saw at the start of this essayl* from indif'ference to conflict, "wrestling w ith...an alien matter" (LPR 89). This separaiion and estrangement is what he understands to be represented by the doctrine of the fall, to which we shall return.la Barth seems to forget this when he asseris that Hegel identifies human and divine thought and so achieves by means other than the gospel the reconciliation pmlaimed in the gospel. The reconciliation achieved in the Hegelian dialectic, Barth argues, dispenses with revelation. Hepl on the other hand States that natural humanity is without faith, estranged from both the subjective conviction and the authentic content of that conviction. This natural estrangement is the underlying reason why faith for Hegel is granted only thmugh education by the church. It is the vocation of the church to instmct the world in chat which the world does not yet possess, even though, unbek- nownst to the world. the world is possessed by it: or, to use language with which Hepl was more familiar. the church is to instruct the world in the tme character of the real, as revealed consummately in the Christian gospel. and about which the wodd is deceived.

As we have already seen,"' the primary means whereby the church is to fullil1 its vocation are preaching and religious education (LPR 90). We shall see further below"' that the gospel sets forth a threeiold task. the first and second aspects of which are preaching and dogmatics (LW 27). And here in HF Hegel writes of the spiritual regeueration of the individual which necessarily begins in the church's bringing the gospel externally in speech and writing, in Scripture and its exposition in preaching and teaching. to each person (HF 1560. It is important not to miss Hegel's insistence upon the fact that the gospel cannot come to a person other than externally; it is not inherent in the natural. created spirit of humanity. Nor is the natural spirit creative or transfomative of itself in response to the inspiring example of the gospel that rernains other than and external to the self.

!Os Sec chap. 2, and thc section cntitlcd 'The Subjcctivc/Objccti\.e Distinction".

'O9 Sec bclotv. chap. 3. scct. 3. and the subscction entitled 'The Doctrine of the Fallu.

"" Scc chap. 2. and thc scction entitlcd The Subjectivc/Objective Distinction".

' ' ' Sec bciotv. chap. 4. and the scction cntitlcd "A Thrcefold Task". 50 Which is why the church cannot be content with a mereiy extemal knowledge of the truth. a content maintained in the memory as stories and doctrines. repeatable by rote but having no impact upon a person's inner nature. hidher self. The church will therefore press on with her preachinp and teaching. content with nothing less than the transformation of her hearers. as the gospel itself, ..what was mere letten", enters into the inner sanctum of a person and is inexvicably bound up ~vithand deteminative of hidher very king and identity. "becornes its own living spirit" (HF

157).'" This is the "interiorization", the "inwardization" (Ennmrung).to which we have already al- ludeci."' And it really is just that. persona1 appropriation. not a transcendinp or supplanting of the gospel as Barth argues."' The church's instructional task does not cease once a person has intemalized the truth. The stnigple between the natural spirit and the divine Spirit is continuous as the Spirit of God presses toward increasingly engaging the whole fullness of the muitifaceted king of each person. In a passage we have already looked at"' with regards to the existentiaily original and immediate divorce of human nature and the gospel (--the fact that these two sides are not united with each other... in immediate fashion... .O HF 1571. Hegel insists funher that neither is their union subsequently established "perrnanently and securely in al1 determinations". These two facts "p ertain ...to the way in

,' \Vc ma' cumpcG. Schncr's xcount of Hcgcl's "intcnorizsition" as thc uhng into oncscll of thc rcalit?. of thc c)rhcr. a prtxcss kvhich assurncs thc csscntid unit?. as in thc bIcdic\.d synthcsis. OC Gd,ivorld. md scif. "untoidcd through thc rncdi um of Iringuagc md thoughtn ("1 ntroduction" by Gcorgc P. Sçhncr SJ. to fqriaricrtr Spirifrcdifyiti a Srr-rrlclr Aqr. d.Schncr. Waicrloo. 1981.6fn. "Intcrioriir~tion" is also "iniiïudi;r~tion"and "rccollcction". in Gcr- mm. I.Jirt/tcwq ((5/.liehacl Inn-ood. Heqef Bic-fioriary.Cmbridgc. 1993.

: ' Scc chrip. 3. .;cc[. 1. and thc scctron cntidcd "An Urgcnt Summons".

"'"Thc church's oivn inncr activity nill consist primarily in thc cduc-ation of thc human bcing, in the rnattcr of in- tcrnalizing the ni th. tvhich initially can bc givcn only to rcprcscntation and mcmoq. .sa that thc mind ma!. bc camcd auay with it and pcrmcatcd by if. and sclf-consciousncss may find itsclf'ruid its csscntial secunty only in that tmth .... hc gcnuinc conicnt at first impingcs on spirit cxtcrnally. in tvords and Icttcrs. Rcligious cducation untrcs thc [\\.O [thc pcrson and thc gospcil so that thc fcclings that human bcings havc only immcdiaicl)- in natud fashion Iosc rhcir forcc. and so thrit 1vh3t uvasmcrc icttcrs bccorncs iu otvn li\.ing spirit" (HF 157). Hcgcl's passion. cx- prcsscd in ti.orJs and phrascs likc"carricd rit\-ay ~vith". "pcmcatcû", "csscntial sccurity only in Lhat tmth". should not bc ignorcd in ~hisaccount of thc cffcct of the gospel oncc it cngagcs tvi th and libcntcs thc humm pcrson. Hcgcl's description of the biblical storics of Jcsus as r~pr~serirritiormlis indicrtivc of his antagonism both to his biblicist contcmporrirics tvho arc contcnt with mcrc rcpctition or thc storics. and also his contcrnporriq histor- [cal critics \\.ho invcstipc thc tcsts but arc blind to thcir thcologicrl and spiritual signifimcc. It is thc ripostlcs and rhc church hthcrs \\.ho have triurht us to attend bath Io thc storics and to thc ctcrnal rcalitics (as for cxamplc thc Tnnity, r-J HcpA's lcttcr to Tholuck quotcd in chap. 3, scct. 1. and thc subscction cntitlcd "Barrcn Orthodosy") iv h i c h t hcy reprtP.wrrf.

''' Scc chrip, 3. scct. 2, and thc subscction cntiticci "Faith and Rcrison". 51 which such prrmnr education becomes apparent" (HF 15'7, italics added).

The reference to a stnipgle is associated wiih certain pitfalls or temptations which, according to Hegel. theology and the preaching and instructional ministries of the church risk falling into. I t i s these pi tfalls which particularl y relate to the need for the educational ministries of the church to be supplemented by philosophy. The first pitfall is the temptation to positivist pmpositionaIismit6in which the church's

Credo is treated as an extemal content %uch as leaves the Holy Spirit indifferent to it*'. repeatable by rote and exploitable as a discreet object possessed by the church for her own use (HF 157). This is dnmatically illustrateci in the wax nose image that Hegel uses to descnbe subjective reading of tlne Bible without reference to the church's Credo and uninfluenced by the Holy Spirit, which he impllies has become the typical way of reading the Bible in his own day: [il t can be said, therefore, that the Bible has been made into a wax nose: one person finds this in it. another finds that. and something firmly established shows itself equally to be not so, since it is treated by the subjective spirit (LHP 3 1). Using the same image in LPR. Hegel provocatively describes the consequence for biblical commentaries: "Bible commentaries do not so much acquaint us with the content of çcripture as with the mode of thought of their age" (LPR 1, 123). The second temptation derives from the individual as dhe is addressed by the church. The gospel i ni tiall y provokes a rebefIious response in i ts hearers because they have already constructed their own identity together with their own sense of certainty about that identity, and it is as so self- constructed that they exercise will. heart. and intellect."' With reference to Barth's accusation that Hegel reduces the human person to thought and intellect, Hegel insists that "[tlhe certainty of oneself is. to begin with. natural feeling and natural will. together with the opinions and idle notions that correspond to them" (HF 157). It is the whoie person who responds to the tmth: the will and

: '" C'/. abt-e.chap. 3. scct. 1, and the subscction entitlcû "Bmn Orthdoxy".

! '- "Flhc hurnan spirit csmbfishcs out of itsclf ri contcnt of irs own in opposition to the contcnt of the church." Thc i ntcmdiring of "tvhat is rit first cxtcrnd matcrial is immcûiately confrontcd wiih an cnemy with which i t hato dcrii: it ha,an irnrncdiatc opponcnt in ... natunl spirit" tvhich of itsclf cngcndcrs only "a naturai lifc"; "frcc spirit" on thc othcr hmd "is to bc cngcndcrcd" by the gospel, "because free spirit cxists only ris si rcbom spirit" (HI; 157). 52 the heart are involved in genenting the response and the content of the intellect. As so formed, or deformed, individuais contradict the gospel with their own account of reality and truth. The church must not be deceived by this response but must confide in the power of the gospel to overcome such opposition,"* and penist in its ministry of educatioo with a view to the actualization in each individual of that victory wrought once for al1 by God in his Son at the Cross. That victory shows al1 opposition to the gospel to be empty, the nothingness of deception; it only appears to have any substantial content and for~e."~ The third pitfall is the most important for our purposes, as it in particular calls forth specu- iative philosophy of religion as a further resource in the church's fulfillment of its vocation to serve the gospel for the undeception of the world. Like the second. it is found in the individual's response to the church's confession. Human nature is mukifaceted and the gospel lays claim to each person at every level of their king. That includes the intellect which for Hegel is the highest level. w here the imugo Dei is most clearly manifest. Nevertheless, though it may express humanity's glory, it is also the source of humanity's pervenity. A person may at fint applaud the gospel en- deavouring to support it with hidher own intellectual apologetic. yet almost inevitably and often with great subtlety he/she will tum against it and become its opponent."O thinking hidherself into

'"cc Xppcndis 2 Sor my trcritmcnt of Hegcl's pocticai 1st \vil1 and rcsramcnr ris cvidcnçc of his confidcncc in ihc inhcrcnt \.iulity and poncr of the gospd ~vord.

"" Thc gcnuinc contcnt of thc church's confcssion. through reiigious cducation so impingcs on thc human spirit "chat thc fcclings that human bcings have only immcdiatcly in naturai frrshion losc thcir torcc.... This natunl cncmy... is sponmcously ovcrcomc by the divine id= and frcc spirit is rcl casai... The strugglc 1~1thnatural spirit is only a mattcr oiappcarancc in thc finitc indi\.idualW(HF 157).

"O "Thc indi\idual. howc\w, givcs rïsc !O ?CL anolhcr cncmy - an cncmy htdm not originaic in the mcrc natuni- ncss of human bcing". as the second tcmptation did, "but nther in iis superscnsuous essence. hi rliirikirrg: thinking is thc primd statc of inncr bcing i tsclf, thc mark of human bcings' divine origin. that by kvhtch thcy arc distinguishcd from animais, and what donc is thc root of thcir nobility no lcss than of thcir dcgndation" (HF 157). 53 autonomy ."' Made in the image of Gd.human beings set themselves up as gods over against God. This is reproduced witàin the life of every person as intellectual self-assertion, a thinking for oneself. or just plain human thinking. Such autonomous thinking is stubbornly opposed to faith.I2 Its most daring and outrageous accomplishment is the negation of God, rendering him empty of al1 content (HF 157). With the eradication of God as objectively reai "the finite understanding ... is made the deciding criterion in regard both to what 1 am to deem true and to what is to be my maxim for action"; the heart, subjective feeling, is coopted as "the basis for deciding what I am and what is valid for me" (HF 157).

Section 3: The Fall

The Doctrine of the Full The third pitfall to which we have just given our attention describes the effects of what He-

. .. .-' Arirot~orri;.is an ambiguous tcnn. ,Mackcn notcs that Barth uses the ccrm in a positive and a neetive sensc: "[u. lhat crin bc sil'firmcd is not sovcrcign or absolutc autonorny, or siumchy, but a relativc autonomy which smds in rclriiionship to Rc\dation* (John blackcn SJ, 77re A~ttorrornvTheme in fkChurch hgrnarics. Cambridge, 1990. 192 n. 93, 9).Hcgcl knows this distinction. though 'Autonomie' seldom occurs in his rvrïtings. Freedmri, sevde- mrriitrclriuu, md sel/-c+ormio~~s~~essarc his prcfcrrcd tcrminology. On his view, fallenncs (absolrrre ariforrurriy) is an opting for frccdom and self-dctcrminruion through ri constructcd self-consciousness that is defincd and protcctcd through thc absolutc assertion of self ovcr against othcr selves, the world. and Gd;it is chaactcriscd by indcpcn- Jcncc and isolation. Rcdcmption from fallcnncss yiclds what Hcgcl dcscribcs as the discovcry and cnhrinccmcnt of cmc's affi ni ty 10 and for thc othcr (relative arilorrorny): "[slincc sclf-consciousncss consists in sceing the affini ty of thc othcr to oncsclf and in thus cnriching onc's conception of oncself. fdomand self-consciousncss ad\mcc togcthcr" (Michaci Innrd. Hegel Bicrioriq, Carnbridgc, Mu., 19E. 1 12). C'Inwood's entrics on "In and "Consciousncss and Sclf-consciousncss": csp. "no onc can bc solely a self-awarc 1: 1-awarcncss invoh7csa bd\-... [and 1 cntails. and is cntriilcd by, consciousncss of a world distinct from itsclr (Ibid, 123); dso, "self- çonsciousncss... is csscniidly intcrpcrsonal ...' it is an I ihat is a we, and a WC that is an I'...md it is pnctid...[ it] in- \.ol\.cs thc cstablishmcnt and opcntion of social institutions" (IW., 63). Throughout this cssay 1 shdl usc "*autonorny" COdenote thc fallcn, sclfdcccived qucst for frccdorn in scif-a- scni\.c indcpcndcn~r,thc ribsoluic autonomy which for Barth (and for Hegel as I shall try to show) is opposcd to thai rclriti\.c autonom!. which is propcrly situatcd in rclationship to Rcvclation.

'" "[Tlhinking makcs itscif indcpcndcnt to thc point whcrc it bccomcs danprous to faith, a highcr. morc stubborn srrugglc is cngrigcd than thc forrncr stniggic [i.c. the sccond pitfdl] .... This thinking is then what has bccn cdled human thinking. onc's own undcrstrinding. finitc rcason. ... [As] the opinions and conccirs of the undcrstrinding ... it is thc c\d consisti ng in rhc fact chat thinking cornes on the stage as independent" (HF 157). Hcgcl's account of indcpcndcnt human thought rcads vcry Iike Peter Bcrger's 'hcrctiui impcntivc". But u.hcrcas Hcgcl rccognizcs an dtcrnati\-c to it in redecmcd thinking, Bcrgcr identifies it as thc only rivailablc option for thinking today. (Pctcr Bcrgcr. Tlie Herericcll Imperutive: Conternporary Possibiliries of Religiorlî Aflrmarion. Garden Ci[!'. 1979. csp. 90f. 136. 148). 54 gel understands by the doctrine of human fallemess: a falling away from God into persistent and independent autonomy. Hegel variously describes-the effects of the fa11 as arbitrary free will. the choice to be and do as it pleases and to make itself the oracle of what is deemed of value, what kinds of religion. duty. and nght are deemed of high value.... rï]he pewersity, the conceit. and the absolute selfishness that... makes one's own will, opinion. and inclination the rule governing religious sentiment and cight.-.. [Vlanity, conceit. shallowness and pride .... [Tlhe conrin- genr and cCapriciomnature of subjective feeling and its opinions.. .. [Tlhe vanity of its own assening and revealing .... n]he arbitrary fonning of opinion (HF 157, 160f, 162f, 165, 167, 168). In three of the four series of LPR Hegel gives significant attention to "The Story of the Full ...the familiar story of Gene~is."'~To that we now tum in order finally to put to rest any suspicion that Hegel believed in an immediate manifestation of God in human thinking alongside and independent of his self-revelation in Christ- Originally, "God created human beings in his own image...[ in] the state of innocence": this is the essential being. "the concept. of the human king" (LPR 3,300). Seduced into that which God has forbidden through the promise that the knowledge achieved thereby will make hidher like God. humanity falls to the temptation of evil. deceit. and pride (LPR3. 105): "humanity has elevated itself to the knowledge of good and evil: and this cognition. this distinction. is the source of evil. is evil itself" (LPR 3.301). Hegel is careful to underline the self's responsibility. The fall is humanity's self-elevation: "evil is itsfcurlr ... evil is its self-seeking ...evil is a matter of human responsibility" (LPR 3. 102). It will be the acceptance of that responsibility that will constitute the beginning of redernption: "[hlumanity has dignity on1y through the acceptance of puilt" (LPR 3. 102). The fall involves both the will and the intellect: "[c]ognition. intelligence. and theoretical capacity corne into a closer relationship with the will. and the nature of evil cornes to more precise expression" (LPR 3. 205). Before considering the more precise expression of evil. we should notice in this last selec- tion the comprehensive description of the intellect as it is originally and actively caught up in evil. Barth accuses Hegel of identifying human and divine thought so that throuph the dialectic God is manifest immediately in human thinking: another source of revelation alongside of and in the final

"' Pqc rclcrcnccs bcloiv 900 arc to thc 1821 scrics of LPR: in thc 2ûû's. to the 1824 scrics: ruid in thc 300's. to thc 1827 scrics. In thc Strauss csccrpts of thc 183 1 scncs (which is al1 \vc ha\.c of thc last scncs of LPR) thc trcatrncnt OC thc stoq ol the fall drops out complctcly. Whcthcr this rcflccts thc rictual content of thc Iccturcs. or only Strauss's scIccti\.ccdirorializing accmding to his otvn intcrcsts. cannot bc dctcnnincd with an>.dcgrccof ccrrrirnty. 55 analysis superior to God's mediate revelation in Christ is discovered. It is clear however that Hegel recognizes human thought. far from king identified with the rnind of God, as intricately and comprehensively bound up in the fall, as autonomous, independent, and the enemy of faith. God cannot therefore be manifest immediately in human thinking nor can human thinking be a source of revelation. The cooperation of the fallen will and intellect issues in the conviction that I exist for myself for the first time, and that is where the evil lies (UR3, 206). Evil Asthe willing of separation, the setting of one's singularity aqinst othen (LPR 3. 102). [Tlhe human being is constituted as an individual opposed to others, that which puts up resist- ance and establishes separation" (LPR3, 93).

This autonomy is creative in a perverse way, turning the self into its own project, defining its own identity which in spite of al1 appearances to the contrary is finally nothing, a deception and a flight from reality: the subject ...here defines itself, grasping itself as the extreme of abstract being-for-i tself, or abstract freedom: the sout plunges into its depths, right down into its abyss. This sou1 is ... the empty sou1 lacking fulfillment (LPR 3. 209)."' A Il the ti me. objective1y, the contradiction between created humanity and its proper purpose and calling on the one hand. and this fallen distortion on the other, persists: "this emptiness or abstraction contradicts its vocation, which is to be concrete" (LPR 3,209). In place of what is alone real. the concrete individual created by and for God. there appears the hollow self-deception of independent and self-assertive autonomy which is Mstakenly taken for what is real." Hegel describes it in a letter to his friend. Karl Fnederich Goschel, as the deceptive phantasmagoria that is the constant temptation to illusion. the opposite of the reality of God's reconciliation in Christ

( Letters 545).

Infinire Antifheses und Pserrdo-Rec-onciliatiom This willful and autonomous independence is productive of antitheses and contradictions:

"'C'/. Burbidgc's panphrasc of Hcgel's account ol- ihc làllen self: "[tlhc return into isolation for the selC The sclf Icti donc to crcatc its otvn rvorld" (Burbidgc, "1s Hcgcl a Christian?", in New Perspectives.... cd. Kolb, 1995, 95).

' " "Thc sou1 finds nothing bcforc i t but dcsirc. selfishncss, ctc." (LPR 3.20.Evil "drircs and prcsscs human bcings brick inro thcmsclvcs:... thcy scek happincss and satisfaction in the harmony of the self with itsclf ... through in- JcpcnJcncc and ngid sclf-containmcnt ...in-..abstnct self-absorption" (UR3, 3071). 56 [oln the one hand ...the antithesis of evil as such, the fact that it is humanity itself that is evil: this is the antithesis vis-a-vis God. On the other hand, it is the antithesis vis-a-vis the world, the fact that humanity exists in a state of rupture from the world.... And the contradiction [whether between the self and God, the self and the world. or the self and its original vocation] remains, no matter how one twists oneself about (LPR3, 305, 307). The antithesis. the contradiction. the estrangement. the distance, between God and humanity is infinite. it is reflected in infinite contradictions between humanity and the world. and within each human being. These antitheses express themselves as human repulsion from whatever is at the opposite pole: "this is the inflnite anguish, the suffering of the world" (LPR 3, 210). This suffering is not however redemptive. The human response to it ody serves to further exemplify the autonomous perversity of human fallenness. A kind of reconciliation is sought. But not in God. The reconciliation is sought within, in the pursuit of an "inner equilibriurn of the ego" (LPR3.308). It is a reconciliation in thought. an abstract reconciliation, an ideal reconciliation. a thinking away of the estrangement with self. world. and God. that is profoundly seductive but entirely unsatisfactory because it is produced by and for the human self as at best a hypothetical, postulated reconciliation. a reconciliation that has no higher grounding than human desire.Iz6The real self. the real world, and the real God remain untouched by it, unreconciled. The apparent reaching out to these polar opposites for reconciliation is in actuality the subtlest taking flight away hm them into an even more profound independence and estrangement.lZ Surely here Hegel is rejecting the very reconciliation in thought. the identification of human thought with the thought of God. which Barth accuses him of holding to be tme. We will retum to this in its modem guise below.'"

.:" "Ir kn0n.s iisclf as a thinkcr, and its objcct is svhrtt is ihought, thc univcrsai; this is for it absolutcly cvcqthing. it 1s ihc gcnuinc csscncc for it, so thai this univcrsril is \.alid for IL. Somcthing that is thought bclongs to the subjcct. kcriusc it is positcd by it". Hcgcl cxplains \vhy thc subjcct "cannot.-..brin€ about this rcconciliation by itsclf. through ILS onm cfforts. its own activity,..through its picty and dcvotionn c\-cn though "it is commonl~.bclic\.ed rhat it crin ... bring rhis about on its own. tis subjcct". It mnot. bcuusc it is "for itsclf". it "has thc çhanctcnstic of p- siritlg . - somcthing is so thmugh rny ngerrcy ... the prcxiuct [in this casc. rcconciliaiion] is only somcthing pcisitcd ...and this is aiu*qsonc-sidcd" (LPR 3, 1 lof). . .- '- "But a rcconciliation of this hnd is itsclf onl). abstnct: dl dcicrmination lics outside this thought. \\.hich is mcrcly IQmd idcntit?. with itsclf. An abstnct rcconciliation such as this cannot and should noC takc placc at thc ab- snlute standpoint lvhcrc tve no\v arc". Ir only scncs to make morc clcar "ihc standpoint at \\.hich tvc non- Tind our- sclvcs. ix.. thc standpoint of infinitc tlight and abstnctncss.... rrlhc subjcct is now dcfincd as this profound bcing- ~vithin-irsclf.this flight from rcality. this complctc \\-ithdnw-al from immcdiatc csistcncc. from fulfillrnent" (LPR 3. 2 i orn.

':" Sce chap. 4. and rhc section cntiticd "Mcxicrn Philosophy: The Loss of .Vecessify". 57 Section 4: The Gospel

God Chin Jesus Christ Reconciling the WorZd tu Himself We have seen that the Hegelian philosophy of religion is a God-given vocation that belongs to the ministry of the church. In light of Hegel's account of the falt we can further describe it nega- ti vely in terms of its opposite, using Hegelian terminology. It is not autonomous, arbitrary, contingent. capricious, self-assertive, whimsical, natural, or independent. Above all, it does not generate its own criteria, its own standard and justification, for detennining the character of God, tnith, personal identity. relationship to God. the world, religion, duty, or right. Instead, and over against this autonomous human thinlung that is dangerous to faith, He- pl's philosophy of religion is the human thinking that is God-piven, the exercise of the redeemed human intellect as servant of the gospel, as appropriate response to the truth, to the genuine content of the self-reveiation of God in Christ. Al1 of which Hegel can describe by the one word Reaton. God. the truth, the gospel evoke and liberate this Reason, faith's inteiIec~m,as their proper response. Which means that it is through giving an account of the gospel, the content of faith. that he makes known the more exact nature of this redeemed Reason. To that we now tum. If. as we have seen,'" the absolute antitheses and the anguish and deception they occasion cannot be overcome from the side of the human subject, their reconciliation must be acbieved, if at all. for the subject. from the other side. As the absolute antithesis of God and humanity lies at the root of a11 the other antitheses, it is God alone who can achieve it."' And God has achieved it in the particular and unique history of his Son, Jesus Christ. Achieved it moreover in such a way that the apparent opposition of subjectivity and objectivity which characterises fallen human nature is overcome. The original peace between God and human-

"" Human ihinliing. one's own undcrstanding "is rightly distinguishcd from the thinking thal alrhough ii is within hurnan bcing, is noncthclcss divine, from the understanding that secks not its own but the universid, from thc re;ison ihat knoivs onl~.the infinitc ruid ctcmal to bc tvhat done has king, and contemplatcs i t as such" (HF 157).

''O Scc rib

'" "'What is ii that cffccts rcconciIiation for it [the human subjcct]?' This rcconciliation can come about only by thc scpantion king subiaicd for if.... The subject is in need of this tmth. and this uuth must come into bcing for if (LPR 3.11 1. itaiics arc mine). "[Tlhc unity of divinc and human naturc ...has to be given to humanity... ut1 must thercforc cornc to it" (LPR 3, 1 IO. itrilics arc Hegel's). We have yet to consider the issue of "rieces.s@" suggcstcd hcrc by "can...only". "mustn, and "has to" (scc cbpter 4. bclow). 58 ity, represented by the state of innocence in the garden before the fall, was rooted in the eternal in- tegration of the Father and the Son. That same eternal union and cooperation is the reali ty that now informs the reconciling reality of Enunmuel, God with us.*' The fall. as a flight from that reality into the unreality of the autonomous independence and self-assertion of the human subject. marked the apparent dis-inte=gation of subjectivity and objectivity. But dlthe time within the beinp of Gd subjectivity and objectivity remained at peace in the eternal relatedness of the Father and the Son. The Incarnation is the redemption of human subjectivity from the lie of autonomous independence through its assumption by the Son. so that the essential relatedness and mutual indwelling of the Father and the Son is restored to humanity in the man, Jesus Christ (LPR 3, 21 1, 3 1 1). Furthemore i t is made known and knowabIe as the truth? "brought forth, [though] not for philosophical speculation or speculative philosophy" (LPR 3.3 11). It is not an idea but an actuality, just one actual human being, Jesus of Nazareth, obtaining the form of irnmediate sensible intuition and external existence for humankind. so that it appears as somethinqthat has been seen in the worid, something that has been expenenced... More precise(1y] ...[ it] appears in jus? one hriman being (LPR 3. 3 13). It is not an idea or a thought. neither the idea of God nor "the thought of humanity, but ...sensible certainty ...j ust one human being ...humanity as singular" (LPR 3.3 13). But even this singularity in grnerul might be thought to be a universal and abstract idea. It is not singuiarity ingrnerai as a universal idea that is intended. but Jesus as "this exclusive singularity" (LPR 3. 3 13 )."' Jesus is "the determinate form of this exclusive singularity" (LPR 3.3 14): he is this unique and particular person who lived in the world and was seen and heard by other human beings at a specific. undtime and place within human history. As God incarnate he is the othenvise incomprehensible reality of the consubstantial unity of God and humanity. Hegel. in spite of Barth's ac-

' " Hcgcl dclibcntcly, n-ith thcologid intentions, named his son Immsinuel Thomas Christian (cf csp. kfrers 3 13)-

:" Jüngcl argues that Hcgcl faifs to dojusiicc to thc cniqueness oC the ewnr that is thc identification of Gdn-ith Jc- sus. rcducing it. in John Wcbstcr's praphrasc. to "simply the highcst instantiation of a more gcncral, structunlly- fiscd reiritionship of Gdand man". Wcbstcr then quoies Jüngcl as follo\vs: "'Hegel's dcfinition. in \\.hich through the incarnation and dcath of God thcrc occurrcd the mising of an absolutc spirit uniting di~incand human naturc in gcncd. mus[ bc çhdlcnged by thedogy...ris a threat to the concrcte king of Jesus Christ as well as to the proper distinction bctw-ccn God ruid man. The fkolqpical critcrion of a correct dcfinition of thc Christologid unity of di- \.inc and human nature is rcspect for the uniqucness of Jesus Christ'" (J. B. Wcbster. EkrIufrdJiiripcl:,b hfroclitc- riott IO his ïïteology, Cambridge. 1991. 350. I am cndavouring to show that this is not altogether fair to Hegel. 59 cusation to the contrary. kaows of no other way that this mystery could k discl~sed.'~It is nowhere to be found within or by human thought except as an idea. as an hypothesis. as a myth, posited but without actuality. That is exact1y w hy the unity in question must appear for others as a singular human king set apart: it is not present in the others, but only in one from whom ail the others are excluded (LPR 3, 3 12f). This content is nothing other than the life. passion. and death of Christ (LPR 3, 219).

Jesus is the full revelation of Gd.As such he is the revelation of the reconciliation of humanity with God. And he is that. not as a mere cipher or visual aid. not as a mere syrnbol of a higher or deeper reality. Mslife, including his passion and death, is itself the content synonyrnously described by 'Cod', and therefore the content synonymously described by 'reconciliation'.

One hus Diedfar AIl: Therefore All have Died More than that. his Iife'" and above al1 his death is revolutionary as the overthrowing of the old. failen world order and as the establishment of the new. The old order was defined, as we have seen in our discussion of the fall.'w by antitheses and dichotomies rooted in humanity's setting itself up over against God as independent and autonomous. Jesus has overcome the estrangement between God and humanity. above al1 in his death takinp into himself humanity's hostility and infinite anguish.ln He has canceled it. rendered it bankrupt. shown it to be founded upon a lie, cruci-

' 'A "Thc substanlitil unity of God and humanity .As somcthing that Iics bcyond immcdirrtc consciousncss. bcyond or- ciinan consciousncss and knowlcdgc. Hcncc it must stand ovcr against subjective consciousness, which rclatcs to itsclf as ordina5 consciousncss and is dcfincd as such" (LPR3.3 12).

"'"Throughout [his lifc and tcachingsl Jcsus' sadncss ovcr the lost condition of his pcoplc and oc humanity is con- \.cycd"(LPR 3, 1 17).

:'"Scc abovc. chap. 3, sccr. 3.

' '- "Thc horrcndous notion that God himscff hrts died on thc cross, which has ken obscurcd by harmlcss convcntion- al rcndcnngs of thc stoc. is hcrc rcstorcd not mcrcly as an historid cvcnt but as a suprcmc speculatiw insight rcstorcd in al1 its origind forcc and pitiless scvcnty" (Stcphcn Crim. quotcd by Robert R Wiilims. in 'Thcology md Tngcciy". in New Perspectives .... cd Kolb. 1995.51). Have John Burbidgc and EmiI Fackcnhcim graspcd thc full horror of thc dath of Gdas Hcgcl conceives itwhcn they suggest that Auschwitz dicalIy undcnnincs Hcgc- lian rcconciliation. corn pclling us to movc bcyond i t. or cvcn awq from i t altogcthcr? E.g. "no wisdom is rcquircd todrry for thc insight that thc Hcgclian s>nthcsis, if cvcr a genuinc possibility, has broken doun bcyond dl possi blc rccm-cq." (Fackcnhcim. ïïte R2ligiorrs Dimerrsiorr in Hegel's Iïwttght. Bloornington, 1%7. 12. and cf. 234ff): "[thcl tmth tvill not bc Christian, at Icat not thc kind of Christianity chat Hegel cspouscd" (Burbidgc, "1s HegcI a Chn s tian?-, in :Vqw Perspectives .... Kol b. 1995. 105). 60 fied and buried it. once and for dl. Hegel writes at length on the cross in al1 four of the series of LPR, most strikingly in the last. unfinished series of 183 1. the year of his death. The cross is the touchstone of faith. Al1 that Christ is and has done is brought to a head at the cross, though the resurrection "belon,os j ust as essen tiall y to faith".'= In his death Christ has taken on hirnself the fulhess of what it is to be human. .-even unto death ...and indeed Christ has died the aggravated death of the evildwr: not mere- 1y a natural death. but rather a death of shame and humiliation on the cross''. More than that. he has died as God: Cod hus dilird. God is deud - this is the most fnghtful of al1 thoughts. that everything eternal and true is not. that negation itself is found in God. The deepest anguish, the feeling of cornplete im- trievability. the annuling of eveqthing that is elevated, are bound up with this thought.

But it is not an inevirable process within some kind of universal monad that may be described from one perspective as God. and from another as the world or humanity. Hegel is very specific. Hu- man nature. finitude. humiliation and sin are "taken upon himself" by Christ, as that which is "alien to him and has been taken over from an other: this other is the human beings who stand over apainst the divine process". The evil in the human condition is above ail its aggressive willingness to be -'on its own account (as against God)". In Christ's death that fallen human nature has died once and for all: Christ "has taken it upon himself in order to put it to deatb by his death". The reconciliation of God and humanity may be described as "the monstrous unification of these absolute extremes''. But therefore. "this shameful death is at the same time infinite love. It is out of idnite lo\.e that God has made himself identical with what is alien to him in order to put it to death". And Hegel looks to St. Paul to summarise his understanding of the cross: "it means that Christ has borne the sins of the world and has reconciled God with the world (2 Cor. 5.18f)". And he adds. "thus the world has been reconciled: by this death it has been implicitly delivered from its evil". impiiir~*.because it still remains for the victory to be appropnated by the world; the once for al1 objective reconciliation of the wodd must be proclaimed by the church so that the wodd may know itself to be what it already is in Christ: [tlhe subject feels the anguish of evil and of its own estrangement. which Christ has taken upon himself by putting on hurnanity, while

' '* I,I'R 3. 323-5 n. 199. and dl lirnhcr quc>uiions in this pruagnph. 61 at the same time destroying it by his death.Iw Jesus Christ is the new humanity, the humanity originally created in him. the humanity that bears the image of the Son's own eternal relatedness to the Father, created humanity rooted in the on1 y - begotten Son. Hegel is uncomprornising in his insistence on the absolute, ontologîcal difference benveen the worid before the Incarnation and the world after. Jesus Christ is the revelation and the actualization of reality. Whatever is not in him is finally not real but a lie and a deception that has already been exposed for what it is, and that must fade away into the nothingness and un- reali ty that it has been shown once for al1 to be. [W]e are here [in the historical. sensible presençe of Christ1 in the presence of a new consciousness of humanity, or a new religion. Through it a new worid is constituted, a new actuality, a different world-condition ...The kingdom of God, the new religion [Christianityj... contains implicitly the characteristic of negating the present world. This is its polemical aspect, its revolutionary attitude toward al1 the determinate aspects of that outer world, ail the settled attitudes of human consciousness and belief. ..The previous state of things is now altered: the way things used to be, the previous condition of religion and the world, cannot continue as before ...In al1 of [the teaching of Jesus] there is language of inspiration that displaces al1 other human interests, eradicating them comp1eteiy - penetrating tones that shake the very foundations... In brief. his teaching is a complete abstraction from what is regarded in the world as preat (LPR 3, 1 17f).la That reality and Jesus Christ, ontology and Christolopy, are to be identified, is the final and decisive argument in the case against Barth's charge that Hegel sets up philosophy and more specifically his own dialectic as another and in the final analysis higher revelation of God alongside the Incarnation. That cannot be. The new reality, the new world, the new creation is identical with. and is inaugurated by Jesus Christ. above al1 in his death upon the cross when Pilate was Gover- nor in Judea. That is a once for al1 event. The divine coup d'etat has taken place. There is no poing back. The new beginning is once again Godosbeginning. the beginning that he has made. The initiative is essentiaiiy and originally his. 'The Spirit that was shed abroad is the beginning, that w hich makes the beginning, which mises up" (LPR 3.334). When rhe rime hcrclfiilf-~corne, God sent jhrrh his Son (Gal. 4.4). is a verse Hegel quotes in the 1821.24, and 27 series of LPR. in

: " Thc diSfcrcnt accounts of the dcaih of Christ in LPR may be found in \.ol. 3, 125-3 1 f 1821 scrics). 219-22 ( 1824 scncs). 321-28 ( 1817 scrics). and 33-25 n. 199 ( 183 1 scrics).

"OC' "if imyonc is in Christ. thcrc 1s" (not mcrcly, 's/he is') "ri ncw çrcation: ct.cnthing old bas passcd away: scc, c\.cp-thinghas bccomc ncw" (1Cor. 5.17). 62 each case in the context of giving an accouat of the historical particularity of the Incarnation (PR 3. 14,215310) and of the radical and comprehensively new beginning God made there.

Phifosophy's Presupposirion: the Gospel What then is the task of philosophy as Hegel understands it? First of dl, it has as its unique and exclusive "presupposition" (LM3,214) or condition of possibility the gospel of the Incama- tion."' Apart from that. as we have already seen.'* it can ody postulate and hypothesize from the one-sided perspective of human subjectivity. thinking as though God &asnot corne in human flesh. as though the old world order of hurnanity's independence and estrangement from God is dl1in place. holding on to the lie which was once for al1 exploded at the Cross. The gospel on the other hand sets humanity free to think the truth, reality, as it has been revealed by Gd in Christ.

Section 5: The Community

The Prinlirive church The relation of the gospel to philosophy is not immediate. Between the Incarnation and the philosopher there is the church. the community of the Spirit. Hegel discems this in the resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ. Only with these events does a spiritual perspective on the life and death of Jesus become possible for humanity. That spiritual perspective. which is the same for He- gel as the discerning of what is real. the tmth, is granted initially to the immediate disciples. And it is their's through the gift of the Holy Spirit. It is the Spirit of God who enables them to recognise in Jesus. above al1 in his death, the inauguration of the new world order and therefore the over- throw of the old which they had hitherto taken to be the real. It is the Spirit who undeceives them

!" -1 cntircly agrce with tvhat you say in your Icttcr as to the irnpossibility of rcitcnting too oftcn rccognition liom philosophy's side of the contcnt of living. mtud faith" (Larrers 544). 'The one thing that philosophy, and of course al1 scicncc. has to accomplish is to find thc forrn of thinking and to rccognize in this the form of thc tmth; but the tmth ha. also becn a\.ailriblc for itsclf in thc pious faith of Christianity for a long time in ils otvn p;inicular rom, and this. in its divinc confidcncc. msikcs its dcmand on rhc results of thinking, that 'thcy show thcmsclves to be in rigrcemcnt n.i th it'" (Hcgcl 's rcvictv of G~hd'sAp/torism The original is in G.W.F. Hcgel. Werke II. Berliner Srlzrifteri 1818-18.3 1. Frankfurt am Main. t 970,353-389, corresponding to Hegel Werke XX. in the standard cd.. 276-3 13. 1 have proiidcd my own translation as the rcview has not been translated into Engiish).

'"' Sce chrip. 3. scct. 3. and the subsection entitled "Infinice Antithescs and ReudeRcconciliations". 63 and initiates hem into the God-given real. With that. they are given. and empowered for. their particular vocation which is the apostolic proclamation of the gospel, telling forth and expounding by the Spirit the story of Jesus. This initial phase in the unfolding of the new worid order has what Hegel calls a representationâl fom. It is narrative and story together with charismatic exposition. The '-Kingdom" (LPR3.3 18) is marked by an intensity and spontaneity appropriate to the new- born community of faith establishing a foothold in the world. which for the most part remains convinced of the old lie and unaware of its exposé in the revelation of God in Christ. The content of the gospel which is the etemal truth of God never changes. Its form however does. At this initial stage iiu forrn is "polemical" (LPR3.3 18). I t defines i tself over against the settled attitudes of die world in general. Cod's purpose is that through the church. the world should learn of its new and tme character as reconciled to God in Christ, that the condition. consciousness. and belief of the world should become "coinherent". in harmony with the gospel (LPR 3.3 18). However. for the church to bnng the message of reconciliation to the world. it must ini- tiallg become unreconciled to it, estranged from it. The first adherents of this new religion must "fight and struggle" in order to unleam old habits of belief. thought and action. and establish thern- selves timly in that "sole. eternal interest... which they were bound to believe [but]... were still in danger of losing" (LPR 3.3 18). This apostolic phase of the church is continuous with the earthly ministq of Jesus and. in its '-renunciation. surrender. and setting aside of al1 vital interests and moral bonds". has the "essentid charactenstic of the concentrated manifestation of the tmth" (LPR 3.3 18). Bound to God in Christ by the Spirit. "elevate[dl...to an infinite energy ....al1 other bonds - indeed. al1 things hitheno reparded as ethical and nght - are to be set aside" (LPR 3.3 18). And Hegel ci tes vanous of the most provocatively radical of Jesus instructions regarding famil y. respect for the dead. property. etc., conflatinp. quotinp. and paraphrasing Matt. 12.43.9: Mark 333C Luke 9. 59f: Matt. 8.2 If: and Matt. 1034-38.

The fnsrirrrrional chrtrc-h In the second phase of the church's life this radical overthrowing of natural relationships. institutions. and ethics gives place to a new form of existence appropriate to the established character of the church in which the tmth of the gospel "has achieved a secure existence". The emerging community becornes the suhsisting community (LPR3.333). This happens as the primitive church completes the process of internalizing the gospel. The reconciliation of the worid, which was external and objective to them in Jesus Christ, increasingly engages and infonns their own subjectivity so that they know within themselves that they together with the wodd are reconciled to God. Their being reconciled and their king within the world as reconciled is their new identity. This is accomplished by the Spirit of God within them testifying to the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus as the reconciler, and persuading and convincing them of their own new identity as individually reconciled within the reconciled world. It is accomplished by the Spirit of Gdtes- tifying to the historical achievement of Jesus and in no other way: Hegel writes specifically. "n«r...through speculative philosophy" (LPR 3. 329, my italics). The Spirit alone can instill the cenain ty of faith wtuch God intends for humanity to enjoy. Certainty characterises the objective content of the reconciliation of the world in Christ Its certainty is its having reality in and for itself quite apart from my knowledge or ignorance of it. 1 am made certain of it as it is given to my subjectivi ty. my persona1 identity. 1 do not postulate, conceive or imagine it 1 do not grasp it or achieve it. It is quite independent of me: but it isfor me and for the world, unwilling to remain independent of me. detemined to include me so that 1 know myself and the world to be included (LPR 3.3290. The primitive and emerging church becomes the subsisting church through the resurrection and ascension of Jesus. whereby the first believen are brought to cenainty through Chnst's Spirit. Henceforth the charismatic character of the church as a community of individuals in immediate relation to God in Jesus. gives place to the church as the means of ,-ce. the cornrnunity of the Spir- it. This is the church as institution. as a culture. Now it is within the church thst subsequent pner- ations meet God. The objective gospel engages individuals in their subjectivity, bringing them to their new identity as reconciled to Gd.through the church. its cultus, actions. beliefs and teaching (HF 165). Hegel is careful to explain that the spiritual experience of subsequent generations of Chris- tians is not different in kind from that of the Apostles. They too are brou@ into relationship to God himself. They enjoy the presence of God as fully as did the primitive church.'" They intemal-

!'' "[1 ln the hcm ruid souIs of bclicvcrs is thc firm bclicf ihat thc issuc is not a moral tcaching, nor in gcncnl thc [hi nking and n.illing of thc subjcct wi thin itsclf and from itsclf; nthcr what is of intcrcst is an infini tc rclationship io Cod. to thc prcscnt Gd,thc ccrtrunt?. of the kingdom of God - finding satisfaction not in monlit'., cthics, or con- scicncc. but nthcr in thar than which nothing is highcr, thc rclationship to Gdhimsclf ...The dcfining chanctcristic of thi s ki ngdom of Gd is the preserrce of Cfld." (LPR3, 322). 65 ize and live out of the gospel as fully as did the Apostles, and with the same depree of cenainty of faith. It is just that whereas the first peneration of-disciples had seen. heard. and touched Jesus in the flesh and it was that direct connection to the histoncat Jesus that was the content and means whereby the Spirit brought them to their new identity. it is for subsequent generations in the life of the church and therefore in a different fomthat the identical content of the gospel is made available to them. - in the church as the means of the Spirit's inner testimony and conviction (LPR 3, 333).

Docrrine in rhe Euriy Church Hegel is particularly interested in the development of doctrine in the few centuries following the apostoiic period.'" The srtbsisring church develops doctrine as the explicit and conceptual articulation of that which is initially given through the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit. The certainty of the gospel. which is faith. - that the world and 1 in the world have been reconciled to God in Christ. - is a content that engages and transfomis people at the deepest level of their being. a content appropriated through the inner testimony of the Spirit to the objective reality of Jesus Christ. This content is known. As such it bhgs with it the incentive to its ar

C'/. Hcgcl's 1822 rcport to thc Prussian Minisicr oC Education, with its cmphrrsis on thc tcriching ol' Christian dcxltrinc in ihc gymn~.iuma. ncccssan. prcpaniian for the study of philosophy at thc univcrsity. Sec ribrn.c. chap. 3. scct. 1. and thc subscction cntitlcd "Philosophy and thc Crecto of thc Church". 66 The first and determinative fom of the gospel is the apostolic telling and interpreting of the story. the history- of Jesus. The second form is the church's doctrinal exposition of that same gospel content.

Phiiosophv: Developed UinrIdIiness The third form is philosophy. Again the content is the sarne, the gospel of the reconciliation of Cod and humanity in Jesus Christ.'" It is the fom alone that alten."And again this new form is in order that the community, the church,ln may fulfill a particular and God-given task.'= In LPR Hegel descri bes that task as dewloped worIdZiness (LPR3.339), extending the gospel to the world; but not as evangelism, not as the bnnging of individuals to an awareness of their new identi ty in Christ. not as what Hegel himseif describes as "new birth" (LPR 3.2340. This continues to

'"' 'Thc dcvclopmcnt olrhc mind ncvcr lcads kyorrd Christian faith: Ihat hith crorrfi~~uesto providc ihc content of phi losophicd thought" (Louis Duprc. quoicd b\. Phi1ip hlcrklingcr in P/rilosopliy. 771eology.crnd Hegel's Berlirt Phiiosopl~vo/Reii.qirw. 1821-1827, State Uni\-crsity of New York Press, 1993, 189).

"" H. Rctcrsmri in unpu blished notes for a gnduatc seminar (April 8th. 1997. at the Universit\. of Toronto) on Kicrkcg-wd. csplains thrit Kicrkcgmd \vas not convinccd that in Hcgcliiui philosophy it is ody thc form and noi thc contcnt of Christian rc\.clation that changes. "According to Kierkegaard ... the change of Tom affwts thc content as {\.dl. Thc liim spcculativc philosophy would givc to Christianity dmnot prcscnfcthe form ofriuthority intrinsic w Chnstirin faith. Hcgcl rakcs the incrunation, and in parcicuiar the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. to mcm thrit rhe hurnrin king is no Iongcr bcholdcn to an extcrnd authority. Faith thcrcforc loses its rclation to a Gd who addrcsscs thc human frcirn an estemal and indcpendcnt standpoint. It is no longer a listening to an ~~~~~~~~~~~c voicc hcard in thc \\.or& oc Jcsus ris rui historid figure." I t is my case in this paper chat such ri chargc is ans~wrcd,first. by thc radical change in thc vcq naturc of human subjcctivit>. brought about by the Incarnation ris thc rcspclationol the one. ncw and only rcrtlity ovcr ripnst thc phanrasmagoria or fallcn subjectivity: sccondly. by Hcgcl's understanding of the self-authcntiating chmctcr of thc Ch ris tirin rc\.dati on ~vhich itscl f dnvcs totvard its irtferioricntion and acrr~aIi;afiorr.mattcrs about \v hic h \vc shd 1 hm~more to say whcn WC considcr Hcgcl's undctstiuiding of necessin, ris the authoritritive daim of thc gospel on human subjccti\-ity (sec chnp. 4. bcfon-):thirdly. by intcrprcting Hcgcl's conccm with going bc\.ond thc mcrc ~vords of Jcsus in tcms of his antagonism to positivist ruid pietest Biblicism ii la Tholuck (cf csp, Hcgcl's lcttcr to Tho- luck quotcd abovc. chap. 3. sect. 1. and thc subscction cntitlcd "Barren Orthodoxy").

"- "Thc rcfcrcncc to a cornmunit\. (Gemeirrde).1 bclicvc, rcfcrs as much to thc community of Christian bclicvcrs as it ciocs io thc cornmunit>-of human discourse b!- which philosophical knowledge is sustained" (John WaIkcr. "Absoiutc Knotvlcdgc and thc Evpericncc of Fith. Thc Rel~\~anccof thc Religmus Dimension in Hcgcl's Thought". in T/mrq/irtrrid Ftrirli in rlie P/iilosophy of Hegel. cd. John Wdkcr, Dordrccht. 1991. 167 n. 19).

"" Almost riccidcntril ctidcncc for Hcgcl's scnsc of philosophy as a Gd-givcn vacation in the Kingdom of Grd 1s to bc found in ri icttcr he wotc in 1826. as profcssor at thc University of Berlin. to his fricnd. Victor Cousin, with pdnm's «Ia ncn. collcague in thc Deparment of bwiuid of a studcnt who will soon gnduatc upon dcfcnding his disscmtion on Dcscancs: "[tlhcy arc finc acquisitions for work in the Lord's vineprd (Lafrers638). 67 be. as we saw in the earliest pages of Hegel's Introductions to LPR, '* the vocation belonging to the preaching and teaching offices of the church. The task of philosophy as developed worldliness is to provide for the fashioning of the world. human community as it is other than religiously, according to the gospel. The totaiity of hurnan existence is to be defined by the kingdom of God. He- gel has in mind human comrnunity in every manifestation other than as the church: political, social. ethical. familial. scientific, artistic, Philosophy develops out of the gospel, principles for ordering every aspect of worldly life. Those principles are really one principle which is that the gospel is "the truth of the worldly" (LPR 3.339). Philosophy as developed worldliness is the extension of the "vocation to ...freedom" that is granted to every human being "as an object of divine grace and as one who is reconciled with God (LPR3.34). As one who already has idnite value, the worldly Christian is free to live in the ivorld as one who. at peace with God, is also at peace with the world and with himlherself. "at home with itself. reconciled with itself, ...utterly secure" (LPR 3, 340). Knowing God and knowing the world and self in truth reconciled to God as revealed in Christ, the believer allows this knowledge to be "foundational in its relation to what is worldly" (LPR 3,340). That is its rationality. that is philosophy. reason wedded to faith. philosophical faith. Hegel concludes with a succinct description of the task of philosophy as developed worldliness: -'[w]hat is required, therefore, is that this reconciliation should also be accomplished in the worldly realm" (LPR 3. 340)."

"' Scc chap. 2, and the scction cntidcd "Thc Subjccti\-c/Objcçti\.c Distinction".

< 0 Thc comrnitmcnt to nctriciliznrioti. to cippiicnriorr. posscssed He@ frorn his >.outh. As far brick as thc I7W's hc hcld out against thc challcngc rcpcatcdly addrcsscd to him by Schelling to bccorne a philosophcr. In his corrcspondcncc ci( thrit pcrirxi hc csprcsscd doubts about the "applicability" of philosaph>.. His passionate conccm for "pnct~cal"changc. for rcrolutionq panicipation in thc affairs d' the world. \vas the main causc of his reçistancc. "May thc Kingdorn of Gtxf corne. and our hmds not be idle" (Lurters 32). Even ris at last hc yieldcd. achowledging to Schelling in 180his "conversion ...to philosopher". thc commitmcnt to application rcmaincd: "1 nou. ask myself. n-hile I am sti Il occupied ivi th [rcflcction], ivhat return [O intcn-cntion in the lifc of men cm be found" (I~trrrs W).In L~C1820's. developed ivorldlirress. the acntnIi=nnon and nppiicarion of thc gospcl in the ivorld. is his answcr. 68 Necessity and the Sovereign Freedom of God

What faith guarantees, reason clarifies.... In eovering the same ground and holding the same conclusion, faith and reason each add something to the other. Faith adds the glory of self-abandonment to the statements of reason; reason adds the glory of systemtic anderstanding to the statements of faith, Neither the nature nor the conclusions of faith are chamged by reason, bat the concepts of Eaith, in becoming clearer in the understanding, becorne more active in the soul, more systematically inter- related in the mind, more joyfully embraced. SouthernU'

In order to appreciate more fully what Hegel understands by philosophy we now tum to the third volume of his Lectures on the Hisfory of Philosophv (LHP).lmThereHegel develops the task of phi losophy with particular reference to his own historical cootext, the modem pend (stretching from the Renaissance and the Reformation, and especially Descartes), but also within the wider historical context of the development of Patristic and Medieval philosophy and theology. What is described to a large extent a-historicaily and conceptually in LPR, is recounted in LHP as history, and the very particular history of Europe as the conversation partner of the Spirit of God in the church bearing testimony to the gospel of Jesus Christ. Etemai, absolute reality engages with the changinp actuality of the European worid for the reaiization of its once for al1 redemption and reconciliation in Christ. The story provides a case study in developed woridliness. for better (e.g . An- selm) and for worse (e.g.modem subjectivism). In LPR we have seen Hegel develop an understanding of human reality, fallen and redeemed. in terms of subjectivity and objectivity. Seduced into comprehensive deception. fallen humanity was cut off from objectivity, from reality as it is in itself. Imprisoned within the one-sided perspective of finite subjectivity it was estranged from everything absolute except in so far as it postulated it; and then by definition it could have no certainty about it. no conviction that the abso- Iute had reality other than as its own construct, a figrnent of its own imagination, an abstraction. an ideaI. With the Incarnation al1 of that changed. Jesus Christ is the absolute, the infinite, God, self-

' " R. W. Southcrn. Sairrr Airsehi: A Portrait in a Lmidrcape, C;im bridgc, 1993, 126f.

' " Ail rcfcrcnccs to this third rolurnc arc indicaicd in this cs.q by thc abbrcviation LHP. 69 revealed as he is in and for himself. Jesus Christ is objective reality giving itself to human subjectivi~.or objective reality taking to itself human subjectivity, and in so doing setîing it free to ac- knowiedge and to know it. He is objective reality because he is the revelation of God. He is the reconciliation of that realit y with subjective consciousness because he is the revelation of God in his own humanity. in making God known, Jesus sets human beings free also to know God's worId as he made it and as he knows it. In Christ humanity is taken up into God's knowledge of hirnself and of his creation. The Holy Spirit enabies the human person to participate in the Father's knowledge of the Son and the Son's of the Father. Now in LHP Hegel considers the philosophical task with regard to modem philosophy. Seduced into autonomous subjectivity, it has lost its hold on reality as revealed in Christ. In following Hegel as he sets about recovering that reality as the only proper content of philosophy, we shall see why necessity plays such an important part in his philosophy. and in so doing will be able to respond to Barth's third and weightiest accusation. Hegel does not mean by 'necessity' what Barth thinks he means. It is not that God is answerable to some higher necessity that compromises his freedom. Rather it is a necessity that is laid upon humanity, the wedding of human subjectivity and divine objectivity such that autonomous subjectivity. a way of being that was occasioned by falling victim to a lie. is mled out of court. Hegelian necessity is the appropriation of human subjecti\.ity bjpreality. the vision and awareness of which is granted in Gd's once for al1 self-revelation in Christ. Objective reality being what it is. human subjectivity is set free to know it and to live in accord with it. Its necessity is its reaIity. the only reality there is. the reality for which and within which human subjectivity was created to be. But we are running ahead of ourselves. In turning to LHP we shall begin by going over some farni 1 iar material. in particular the three tasks of preaching, doctrine and philosophy . But the different perspective will serve to confirm the comprehensively reconstitutive role that the church's preaching and dogrnatic expiication of the gospel play in Hegel's account of philosophy as developed ~vorldliness.

A Threefold Tmk There are. He@ says. three tasks laid upon humanity in the light of the absolutely decisive and consummate revelation of God in Jesus Christ (LHP 27. Those three tasks serve what he has ôlready descnbed as the world's task whîch is to make Chnstianity "into the principle of the world. ...to actualize it inwardly, with a view to king reconciled with God" (HP26).'" It is the worId9stask and not merely the church's because Christ's i.ictory has made not just the church but the world his own. That it is the church and not the world that knows the nature of the task, is a privilege granted to the church not for its own sake but us the world and on behalf of the world, so that through the church the world will come to know its proper task. The church is the world coming to an awareness of what it (the worid) already is. The three tasks are denvative from and serve this one great task. With regard to the three tasks, first there is "the dissemination of the Christian religion, its establishment in human hearts", or in other words, "propagation of the gospel in the heart" (LW 260. Strictly this he says "lies outside our consideration". Nevertheless he is careful to explain that his use of the terrn 'heart' is deliberate. denoting "the human king gua human ...the hurnan subject as rhis man or woman" (LHP 26, the italics are Hegel's). or as we have already seenlY rhis particular individual. Christianity is first and foremost Goci's address to the individual. This must be assurned and is not by-passed, set aside, left behind, or overcome by the philosophicai endeavour. But as we have seen."' neither is it philosophy's proper task; it is the proper task of the preacher and of reiigious education, and Hegel could wish that the church might retum to it with renewed zeal (LHP 260. The second task is dogrnatic, "the development of the Christian religion for thoughtful cognition" (LHP 27). This he says was the task of the church fathers. a task that they accomplished. It does not need to be redone but oniy recovered as the foundation for the fulfilling of the vocation of the church in each succeeding generation (LHP 27). Again, and we are reminded of his 1822 report on education in the gymnasium," Hegel could wish that the church might recover its proper foundation in. and vocation to teach. this "Christian system of doctrine" (LW27)- Wi th the third task we come to the particular vocation of philosophy. Its fulfill ment be-

''? Pcrhrips Hcgcl haSt. Paul's words in thc back of his mind, "God \vas in Christ rcconciling the ivorld to himself ... WC cntrcrit you on bchalf of Christ, be reconciled to God" (2 Cor. 5.19f). C' LHP 18n: LPR 3. 65, 314.

"'Sec chap. 2. and the scction cntitlcd "Gd for thc Wholc Human Person".

' " Sec chap. 3. scct. 4. and the subscction entiilcd "miilosophy: Dewloped Worldliness".

:'" Sec chap. 3. scct. 1. and the subscction entitled "Philosophy and the Credo of the Church". 71 longs. though not exclusively, to philosophy. The task is in each generation the confonning of e\?eryaspect of human life. public and private. to the gospel. This cannot be achieved apart from the Christian conversion of individuals. - hence the priority of the first task. But neither is that enough. Beyond there being "a multitude of believing hearts". there must also be "the establishment of a kingdom". It is not enough to look to "a heavenly kingdom lying in the beyond"; the gospel must be "reaIized in actuality". "implanted in actuality", "accomplished in the world (LW 27). Hegel has in mind primarily the public realm, "the laws, customs. and political constitu- tions" and he adds. "whatever generdly belongs to the actuality of subjective consciousness" (LHP 27). Acrrtuiin is contrasted here with merely inward and private piety; as he says. the gospel "must...be consummated not just in the heart but in a realm of actual consciousness" (LHP 27). Corzrciorrsrrtrss is the term he chooses here because this third task can only be accompiished on the shoulders of the first and second tasks: or to put it another way, gospel faith is to issue in the application of the gospel to al1 aspects of the public realm. corresponding to and following from its interiorization at every level of the private realm. Individual. personal conversion to the new reality. the Lvay things are on account of the Incarnation, entails a commitment to the conversion of ail of life. the Lvorld order from most personal to rnost public. so that al1 of it is ordered by the gospel.'" This is the task to which Hegel believes himself to be called in his own day; with some urgency. given the reiigious bankmptcy of the Enlightenment which has cut itself off from both the gospel and church dogma. and of the contemporary church which has split apart into irreconcilabie factions: on the one side. the subjectivists who have given up on the content of the gospel as significant for religion, on the other side. the positivists. we might cal1 them the objectivists. who w hoIl y neglect the gospel cal1 to persona1 conversion for the sake of a pseudo-scholastic preoccu-

I .-In thc tcrminology of more contcmporar)' philosophy, (c$ csp Kojcvc's rcsuling of Hcgci in tcns ut'discoursc. as bncll>-outlincd ribac in rny Iniroduction) tvc might put ii in anothcr \va?.: thc Christian lringuagc gamc is to bc gnspcd aî ha\.ing mctanmtivc forcc. such that al1 oiher language giunes arc to bc rcconcilcd with it. to find rhcir cohcrcncc in and wirh Ir. 72 pation with doctrinal and bibiical texts as ends in thernselve~.'~

Thedogy and Philorop& in Confïict At the mot of the contemporary situation is the tragic divorce of philosophy and theology. The Enlightenment and Kant have set the course of philosophy as necessarily independent of theology. The Positivists have deliberately punued theology over against philosophy. The Subjectivists have acknowledged the inevitability of the divorce and chosen to go their owu third way by means of feeling. In order to account for this tragic state of affairs and to justify bis own claim that the divorce is neither final nor inevitable, Hegel undertakes in LHP to examine the original synthesis of theology and philosophy in the church fathers, and to reteII the story of the Scholastic, Renais- sance. Refonnation. and modem handiing and mishandling of that original and trustworthy depos- it. with a view to its contemporary recovery and renewed development toward the universal actualization of the once for al1 redemption of the wdthrûugh our LurdJesus Christ. And Hegel's hope is, as we have already seen,'* really nothing less than that. We shall attend to his account listening especially to what he has to Say about the continuing prionty of the Patristic "system of doctrine" (LW27) as the indispensable condition of possibility for true theology and philosophy, and the equally indispensabie subjectivization of that doctrine in the world through the church and philosophy. It is the pursuit of one of these at the expense of the other that repeatedly undermines the theological and philosophical enterprise in both the medieval (doctrine at the expense of subjectivity) and modem (subjectivity at the expense of doctrine) worlds. and so hinders the world in the fulfillment of its God-given task of making the gospel its own universal pnnciple, "with a view to king recoaciled with God" (LW 26). Hegel insists on speaking of the gospel for the individual as a vocation (LW2 1. 250. The human subject as the "object" of the gracious address of God "has a different status from what human subjects had heretofore" (LHP 26). The heretofore is not the individual's time before conver- "" As but onc of many csamplcs in UiP of allusions to this thcologcal schism and banhptcy of thc contcmpow church. T cite drnost rit mdom Hegel's prcrunble to his description of the church's/world's three-fold mk. On thc onc hand hc wams against "misconstruc[ing]" and "discardfing] ... the content of [chwch] doccrine[s]", and on the othcr. of "cIin_r[ing] to thcm as absolute foms in the way ~hatci stedc orthodoy wishes to rccognize and hold fast the contcnt in thcse forms done* (LHP26). The repeti tion of what we have dready seen in Hegel's account of the three uni\,crsril prcjudiccs in HF is cvident. Popular Kantianisrn and rcligious subjectivism discard the content of church doctrines: stcrile orthdoxy here is the dopatism and biblicism of HF.

!" Scc csp.. chap. 3. scct, 5. and the subsection cntitlcd "Philosophy: Developed Worldiiness*'. 73 sion. but the time before Jesus when human subjects had a different status. It is not merely the individual's autobiography that Hegel has in view as an absolute but private conversion and change of status. but rather as we have seen in LPR'* the individuai's participation in the new reality established objectivety. once and for atl, by the grace of God in Jesus Chnst. It is the preaching of the gospel that initiates individuals subjectively into the objectively aew reality, the new status of humanity in Christ. out of what is now seen to be unreality, a way of being that is outmoded, rendered obsolete by the Incarnation. Too often in Hegel's view the church has allowed itself to become one-sidedly preoccupied with either the objective or the subjective. The philosophy which Hegel wants to recover and develop through his account of the history of philosophy avoids both of these traps. psping and reflecting upon the gospel reconciliation of objectivity and subjectivit)..

Frotn Purrisric ro Schofasic Early in LHP Hegel describes the difference between the Patristic and Scholastic periods. The Patristic is marked by the consolidation of the church through doctrinal elucidation of the gospel. Its doctrinal character is due in large part to its historiccal context which is that of the later Ro- man and Byzantine civilizations. Unable to transfomi either from within because both were too highly and fimly developed according to the old pre-Christian world order, the church was com- pelIed to establish itself over against them, sornetimes harrnoniously. sometimes in conflict. Hegel is noc critical of the church for this. Indeed it was a course determined by the actualities of the situation ~vhichsewed it well for future generations (LHP 41). The transition to the Scholastic period is CO-tenninus with the fa11 of the old Roman world to the Germanic peoples. Lacking a developed culture this new Germanic. "barbarian" world was established through conflagration and destruction (LHPa). As such it was stnngely susceptible to the Christian message. The gospel found fallow ground. not an already planted garden as with Roman culture. and took mot. eventually pmducing a profoundly Christian culture. one aspect of which is Scholastic philosophy (LW41). The image of failow ground and the seed of the gospel serves to characterize the newness and the objectivity of the gospel with respect to the human heart. it is not produced from within the human heart by human subjectivity; neither is it produced by or from within the highest and most

"* Sec ribovc, chap. 3. scct. 5. and ihc subscction cntitlcd "Onc has Dicd for All: Thcrclorc Ali have Dicd. 74 complex of human cultures. be they Roman, Byzantine. or any other. God himself through his Spirit and the church's preaching and teaching of the gospel of Christ must plant the seed of true religion within the human heart. Apart from the preaching and teaching of the gospel human thought cannot approxirnate to the mind of God. But Hegel supplements the image of the seed with the image of the sword or the surgeon's scalpel (LHP41). The barbarians may not resist the gospel through their having already developed a sophisticated culture: they are nevertbeless one with fallen humanity, defined by autonomy and independence. so that Hegel characterizes their initial relationsbip to the gospel as a moostrous antithesis and contradiction. - they are infinitely opposed to it so that it must pierce them. claiming them for itself through initial tonnent and a great imer ~trug$e.'~'

The SL'IIO~USI~L'Comp[ernenrariry of ïhrologu and Philosuphy The gospel was however victorious. in part at least. That victory gave rise to the Scholastic phi losophy w hich Hegel so admires. The Scholastin rnaintained the essential relationship between theology and philosophy that is unique to. and rooted in the gospel. Theology is the dogmatic ex- plication of the gospel: philosophy. the application of that dogmatic exposition of the gospel to eveq sphere of life outside the ecclesial. Philosophy must remain rooted in theology othenvise it loses the connection between the objective and subjective aspects of reality. Being and thought are originally complementary and united in the mind of God. in the consubstantial unity of the Father and the Son. Originally created participant in that complementarity, created in God's image. humanity fell into that self-assertive, independent autonomy in which subjective consciousness. in a vain bid for sovereignty, divorced itself from. set itself up over against. objective being as that which was to be mastered. As antithetically and exploitatively disordered toward self. the world. and God, it was consummately exposed at the Cross in what proved to be its ultimate act of rebellion and exploitation, the murder of God. The exposé of the lie proved aiso to

'"' "[TJ hq- cmc undcr thc riuihority of a new and dien spirit, which was irnposed on thcm ...Thcir hcart was as ihou@t picrccd by iL Thus thc idca bccamc immancnt in thcir cmdc and duIl naturc as somcthing inlïnitcly opposcd to it: in othcr words. rhc infinitc tonncnt !vas Lrindled within thern ... Thcy had to endure rhe prcrit inncr stmggle in- \.olvcd in this monscrous nntithcsts. and the philosophy that subsequently established itself mon€ thcm and wsat first rccci\-ed as a givcn is onc aspect of this struggle... The principle of the spiritml has been sown tvithin them. and with it is ncccssarily positcd this torrnent this battle of spirit with the natud. Culturd dcvcloprnent begins hcrc (rom ihe most monstrous contradiction. and this contradiction has to rcvolve itsclf. ILS two sidcs are cssentially so rclatcd to each other thrit the spirituai is what is supposed to nile. to be master" (LHP410. 75 be the revelation of the reconciliation of God and humanity. In the Me and death of Gd in Jesus Christ. complementary and mutually indwelling thought and being, subjective consciousness and the objectively real, triumphed over human autonomy and gave itself to humanity, took humanity to itself. in the divine and human king of Jesus. Living in and from the gospel. philosophy is able to think through the implications of that once for al 1, unique. exclusive. and comprehensive reconciliation, for al1 of life: doing so on the bais of the conceptual formulation of that same gospel as it was accomplished in the domatic achievement of the church fathers. The gospel and its comesponding system of doctrine, which to-

3oether are the Credo. the confession, of the church, contain within them what Hegel calts "a summons to thinking" (LHP49).It is not enough to leam by rote. to have by mernos.. the Credo. as the biblical and dogrnatic positivists believe. People in every age through the preaching and teaching of the church are brought into a living relationship to God as present to and with them. God claims and engages with them in their thinking as in every other aspect of their being. Their new identit)? in Christ is a "cohering with God and in God" (LHP49) that includes the vocation to think throush the Credo, both in terms of its inner depth and relationships. and also its implications for eLreqraspect of human life. private and social. The pioneers in answering this sumrnons to thinking are -'the church fathers earlier. and now the Scholastic philosophers .... In this way Scholastic philosophy is essentially theology. and this theology is immediately philosophy" (LW.)W.

Anselm above al1 others exemplifies the best of Scholastic philosophy. In doing so he sets forth what Hegel means by necessic with regard to theology and philosophy. Above all. phiiosophy worthy of the name undertakes rationally to demonstrate, to elucidate. to prove, what it already know ivith certainty by faith.'" Hegel acknowledges that Anselm's procedure is unfaShionable. disapproved of as human conceit: the modesty of modem theologians and religious philosophers

,"' "His chicl-cndcavor \vas to trcrit church docrnnc in a philosophicd muincr. to pi\-c prmls Ior it-..In this rcgard hc sutes thrit Chrisrians must comc to rcflccti\.e cognirion (durikerid~Erkeririu)through füirh. not corne to faith through thc rntcllcct. If thcy succccd in winning through to rcflectivc cognition. thcy ~111rcjoicc at pro\-inp to thcmsclws by th~iught\\ha[ thcy alrcady ùciicvc. If the'. do no1 succdin proving the firiih of the church by thought. thcn thcy must stay \vith the tcriching of thc church. not abandon it. Vcq notewonhy is ihe fallowing passage, which capturcs thc ~.holcol' his rncaning. In his trctitise Clir &ru sit homo, ... he says thar il sccms ncgIigcncc to him - tirgli,periria rnilti r.ider~ir- if. after having ken cstriblishcd in faith. WC do not scck to undcrsrand. itifelligere, what WC bclicvc. Itirrlliqere is rcflccti\.c cognition" (LHP 53). This is remarkably close to Southern's rcflcction quotd rit thc hed of thrs chaprcr. 76 compels them to hold apart reflective cognition from faith, to be content with immediate knowledge of. or faith in God. The summons to thought which is integrai to true Christian faith is ignored. or denied. or slandered. - anything but answered. Needless to Say Hegel is impatient of such modesty (LHP 54). Philosophy rooted in Christian faith is able to ihink God's thoughts after him because and in so far as it thinks according to the coinherence of thought and king revealed in Jesus Christ and imparted by the Spirit. Anselm. the Christian philosopherparercelIeme. thinks througb that coinherence. dernonstrating its necessity. its coherence. by assurning for the sake of argument (or faith's undentanding) the unrithesis of thought and being. Over against the unity of thought and beins revealed in Christ Anselm articulates. Hegel says for the first time in human intellectual history. the fact that human beinp can think anything, including Goci, and contemplate the real possibility that there is no brins that corresponds to that thought. Our thinking unicoms for example does not necessarily entaii their existing other than in our thinking. If that is true of unicoms it may also be true of God. Except that the thought of God includes the thought of that which is most perfect. And the thought of that which is most perfect must exist because the thought of that which is most perfect but does not exist is less than the thought which includes existence within its conceiv- ing of that which is most perfect. The proof is effective only because the perfection of the God who is and who is conceiv- hie has been already self-disclosed by that perfect and perfectly conceivable God in Jesus Christ for human comprehension. It is faith seeking undentanding. not the Understanding seeking faith. The perfection. because also the reality of the coinherence of the being and the thought of God. is the necessary presupposition for Anselm's proof. To make the proof, Anselm thinks thought and being apart. in antithesis. That the antithesis cannot hold for God is demonstrable only because the coinherence of the thought and the existence of God as that which is most perfect has been revealed

" Cy Banh's sirnilar irnpaticncc in his account of "modcm man's... faliing Irrrrnbly inio the lcït hand oc Gd" (PT 2%. rn!. italics). 77 by the God who is, and who is for human faith and rational conception. in Jesus Christ.lu The proof is deemed unsuccessful by Descartes and Kant. even by Anselm's contemporary, Gaunilo. because they have let go of God's self-revelatîon in Christ as the unique source of the true content for theology and philosophy (LW2%). They aiong with most of late Medieval and modem philosophy have assumed the absolute antithesis of thought and being to be foundational for. even definitive of what philosophy is. They have further reversed the Scholastic order of faith and understanding so that one does not believe in order to understand but understands in order to believe. Philosophy is a summons to thought that does not originate in the gospei. in the essential coinherence of thought and being in Jesus Chnst, but rather in human subjectivity interpreted as independent and autonomous. We have already considered at length'" Hegel's critique of this modem move, the attempt to think the eternal and infinite God by means ofthe Undeatanding which is limited to categories that are adequate only to temporal and finite content. Here. in LHP, he describes it as the tragic divorce of faith and God on the one hand and reflection and cognition on the other. The best that can be done for God is his being rendered an abstract postdate required as a means to some usuaily moral end. as for example in the establishment of the moral law as categorical and imperative. That the moral law should be categoricai and imperative however is proven through an analysis of human nature. reason. and community, which in turn provides the foundational or transcendental condition of possibili ty for determining the existence or not, and the nature of God. The conclusions which follow are various. ranging from the postulated theism of Descartes and Kant. through the skepticai theism of Hume. the pantheism of Eastern philosophy, Spinoza's acosrnisrn, Herbert

:"; "Thc simple conicnt of this proof cmbodies the antithcsis of thinking and being. It is suiking for us to sce that only non.. and not rit somc cariicr tirnc. do thinking (or thc univcd) and king comc to bc mutualiy opposcd in this ribstmction - and in this way thc highest antithesis entcrs consciousncss. Bringing the highcst mtithcsis to consciousncss is the grcatcst depth of profundi ty...' We think somcthing, n-c have a thought: this thought is on thc onc hrind subjccti\c but thc çontcnt of the thought is what is wholly universal. This univcrsal is at first oniy uni\.crsal as thought. Bcing is distinct from it. Notv if \vc think something and cven if. for cxample. Ive think Gad (thc contcnt docs not matter). what u-c think perhaps may not cvcn be. But Ive regard as most perfect svhat is not only thought but at thc sarnc time csists. Consequently Gd.who is what is most perïecf would be irnpcrfcct if he werc on1y in thought and the attri buic of king did not belong to him. Consequentl y WC must ascribe bcing to Gd.' The contcnt of the proof is of the highest kind. It expresses this identity of thinking that is, or the thought of Gori...\\~thbeing. WC grant Lhat what is truc is not what is mcre thinking, but what dso is. But hcrc \vc must not mkc thinkinz to bc rncrel'. subjccti\.e, for by 'thought' \vc mean hcrc the ribsolutc, pure thought" (WPWf).

:"5 SCCchap. 3, secr. 1. and thc section cntitld "Hcgel's Criuque or Contcmpomy Philosophy and Thcology-. 78 of Cherbury 's deism, and the atheism of certain Eighteenth Century French philosophers.lY How- ever. because thinking has cut itself off from revelation and from education within the community established by that revelation, the one conclusion which cannot be reached is the philosophical fait h. the reflective cognition, the intelkminformed by the certainty of faith, exemplified in the proof-theology of Anselm. The necessity of theological philosophy, "the philosophy that is theology and the theology that is philosophy" (LW49), is displaced by the abstraction and arbitrariness, the skepticism, of subjective and autonomous speculation. Al1 of it derives from the pursuing of philosophy independent of revelation. For Hegel however, God. or the absolute, or objectivity coiaherent with subjective consciousness, is only known where it is made known as that which exists in and for itself. As there is no absolute outside of Gd.and as the absolute includes the tnith for rational cognition about al1 that God has made. philosophy must look to God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ for its true content. Apan from that revelation al1 intellectual reflection on God is contingent, hypothetical. The gospel alone so unites thought and king that it overrules every temptation to human autonomy, laying claim to humanity for the tmth. It is the self-authenticating character of this philosophy, consistent with the Credo of the church. that is its necessity. For HegeI. the demonstration of the necessity of the reconciliation of the world to God in Jesus Christ is the reflective co,onition. the rational elucidation, of reality as it has been revealed and proclaimed in the Credo of the church. What is believed to be tnie through Christian preaching and teaching is so explained as to cornpel the assent of the intellect. Faith's summons to thought. to understanding, is answered according to the content of faith, and therefore compellingly, necessarily. with the burden of proof. Such proof is part of what Hegel cdls the interionzation of faith. Gospel reality becomes so deteminative of a person's rnind that s/he is equipped. Hegel prefers the terni "liberated".'" to think tmly about al1 of reality. Hegel thinks that this was lost, or grasped only sporadically (e-g.Anselm) even by the Scholastics. This exptains Hegel's designation of the victory of the gospel in the medieval world as partiaI.IMMore often than not, church authority, which is extemal authority, compcelkd the alle-

"" C'f. LHP 163. norc 177.

'"- CJ csp. IffP %ff; sec bclow, chap. 3, and the section enutlcd "Luther".

Sce rtbvc. chap. 4. and thc sccrion entitlcd "The Scholastic Complerneniarity of Theology and Philosophy-. 79 giance of the human person and in so doing quenched or repressed subjectivity. This by contrast with the method exemplified by Anselm which sought to educate (a favorite term for Hegel) a person to the place where they were themselves in their own subjectivity coavinced of the certainty and rationality of the gospel. their own mind having so intenorized it that they rnay be said with St- Paul to have the mind of Christ. though never in isolation from the Christian community.

The Renaissance und rhe Reformation: the Recoven. of Subjectivig At the Reformation this intenorization as the fullness of the human response to the gospel was recovered (LHP 9W.The Lutheran faith in its earliest days epitornized it. redeeming the recovery of subjectivity that had been achieved by the Renaissance in its reaction to the ecclesiastical authoritarianism of the late Middle Ages. The Renaissance recovery of subjectivity was in need of redemption because, in rightly re- acting to medieval authoritarianism. it also rejected the God of the gospel." In so doing it found its way to a reduced subjectivity, something very li ke the fallen. autonomous subjectivity of LPR.'" Here in LHP Hegel describes it as "sheer human subjectivity. sheer human freedom". and "barbaric self-will" that Yinds its satisfaction only in subjective purposes ...[ unljustified" by God. Recognizing that Renaissance subjectivity may be expressed with greater sophistication in tems of "universal ...humanAghts and freedoms... the right that belongs to the other as well as to me'.. Hegel insists that it is nonetheless "[un]sanctified". - asserted. posited. but not ultimately grounded. without ultimate necessity. *g[un~confirmed(LHP 95). Only when this principle of activity [my willing and doing what is rightn'J is established and recopized in relation to the object that has bang in and for itself, namely. in relation to God - only when it is thus grasped in its perfect purity freed from impulses and finite ends - only then does it receive its confirmation (LW95).

;"" An riccount of Hegel's proïound analysis of the way in which the Nominalists contributed, for the rnost part nef- riti\xA!.. to thc cmcrgencc OC thc Renaissance 1s. for txk of spacc. kond the contincs of this essay.

' -3 Sec ribovc. chap. 3, sect. 3.

:-' Or tvc rnight paraphme the pnnciplc as the npht to be and to becorne what I redly (idedy, cschatologicall!.) am. For Hcgcl thc dissonancc bctwrccn nritural or fallen humani5 and redeemed hummity is rhc dissonance betwecn immcdiatc human subjcctivip ruid humanity as it is in Christ The latter is @\-en to faith. It is what Hcgel intcnds by thc idcal. I~trvriorisnriorris the @ud appropriation of that idd. which is also the rd. until human subjcctivity is tmsformcd from ~r-ithinand. relcased from its bondagc to the lie of thc old ordcr, knows itsclf to bc what it is in Chnst. WC crin thcreforc not unjustifiribly equtc Hegel's ided with the eschatologically rd, - rmlity as it is in Chnst. 80 The underlying reality that gives derivative reality to human subjectivity is "that human beings acquire the inner certainty of their worth in relation to Gd(LHP 95). Necessity and imer certainty are the same for Hegel.

Lurher. rhr Lurheram. and Company Luther recovered the inherent togethemess of the gospel of reconciliation in Christ and individuai (existentid) human subjectivity so that human subjectivity was wholly detennined by the gospeI. That determination was not extemal, but from inside; so much so that the believer's very identity at every level of his/her king was bound up with. one with, that of Jesus Christ. The reality of God. of God for me and for the world, of God as, in Jesus Christ, the sovereign and comprehensive reconciler of the worid and therefore of me in the world, becarne through Luther the real i ty, the only reality, the reality which made a necessary, absolute, etemal claim upon me, and to w hich ail else must be referred for redefini tion and response (LHP 9Sff). Luther represents moderni ty 's rurn ro the selfredeemed. The self is radically reconstituted in Christ as the self that is for God. - who is for us. Given the infamy of Hegel's critique of Schleiermacher's subjectivism. He- gel's own passionate cornmitment to redeemed, reconciled subjectivity cannot be overemphasized. Tragically the Lutheran insight was al1 too quickly lost sight of even by Lutherans. As with Scholasticism. the extension of redeemed subjectivity to the whoie world, to every sphere of life. to the totality of life. was lost sight of. The fullness of Christian freedom was reduced to conscien- tious certainty regarding extemal religious matters, the biblical and doctrinal texts of the church learned by rote. "grasped mainly ...for the rnemory" (LW98). Treated as merely historical docu- ments, their inherent sumrnons to thought and reflective cognition was entirely neglected. It is the fundamentalist and do-matist positivism that Hegel criticized so virulently in HF and LPR. '" The restriction of Christian faith to this "unspintual mode", this "arid form", rendered Christian freedom vacuous. Exclusive preoccupation with "dogrnatic content speculatively elaborated" meant that the interionzation and comprehensive application of the gospel to every sphere of life "got entireiy set aside" (LHP 98). Alternatively, in reaction to this arid dogmatism and biblicism, redeemed subjectivity was reduced in the opposite direction to scholastic pietism. an inwardness restricted to the elaborate '-' Scc abovc, chap. 3. sect 1. and the subscction enutled "Barren Orthodo!cy", and chap. 3, sect 3, and the subsection cntidcd Threc Pithlis". 81 analysis and cultivation of subjective feelings and dispositions. Thefom of subjectivity - as faith. 1onging .repentance. conversion - became established as the preponderant element*' (LW98). The subjective response to the gospel became an end in itself. The hem of religion became more and more "the subject[s] ... delv[ingJ deeply within itself. within its own heart" (LHP98). Again the God-given vocation to reflective extension of the gospel, to phjlosophical application of the church's Credo to the totality of human existence. was lost sight of. This delving deeply within the self. its penitence, contrition, and conversion. this preoccupation of the subject with itself. was the moment that was said pri'ncipally to have -ken legitimated [at the Reformation] (LHP 99). With this increasing concentration upon subjectivity, albeit religîous even Christian in form. the content of the gospel. whether in its original representational forrn as the eyewitness history of Je- sus. or in its Patristic. doctrinal form. or in its Anselmian. philosophical form, was gradually lost: [tlhe subject did not delve more deeply into the content but cast away the mundane version of the universal content. though with it cast away as well the eartier plumbing of the depths of spint: speculative elabration was left to one side and abandoned (LHP 99). Hegel suggests that on the whole the Catholic church fared rather better than the Protestant in this

the philosophical or speculative element is much greater in Catholic dogmatics... In the Catholic church the linkage of theology with philosophy has in substance always been preserved. in the Protestant church. by contrat. the subjective religious principle parted company with philosophy (LHP 99). itfodern Philnsophy: The Loss of Necessity With this detenoration of the Reformation into dogmatism and subjectivism we move into the modem era and the complementary emergence of modem philosophy as -'independently abstract thinking". philosophy that "leaves behind thinking's unity with theology" (LW 1070. Within the limits of this essay we cannot treat Hegel's often profound account of modem philosophy from Descartes to Kant. It must suffice for our analysis of Hegelian necessity to treat of a remarkable passage (LHP 430 in which Hep1 distills the peculiar character of modem philosophy t hrough implicit companson with its opposi te. namely his understanding of the necessi ty that characterizes Christian theological/philosophical tnrth. Contrary to Barth's charge we shall see that ne- 82 cessi ty does not bind God but binds the autonomous, self-assenive independence that always threatens to distract the human person from the exclusive and cornprehensive reality uniquely reveaied in the gospel. What Hegel describes and disapproves of reads very like Barth's characterization of Hegel according to his threefold critique: ultimate reconciliation achieved through the identification of God and human subjectivity ;the Incarnation supplanted by the thinking, conviction, and con- science of the human person as cnterion of vdidity; and the reconciliation achieved having about it an immediate, self-authenticating, necessary character because it is the realization that al1 is one, that the self is the universal that is identical with itself, an abstract reconciliation that is the coming to awareness of the monadic oneness of everything in human subjectivity. Hegel describes this counterfeit philosophy not as its most notorious representative but in order to reject it as passionately as Barth does. Hegel says that it is a recent phenornenon. Though he mentions no names he has in mind an Enlightenment and pst-Eniightenment way of thinking which he elsewhere associates with Fichte, Jacobi, and Novalis among bis near contemporaries." This counterfeit daims to have achieved ul timate reconciliation through the sersresting in itself as the summation of dlthat is, in a fom of inner reflection that is self-contained and self-authenticating, absolutely valid for itself.'" This abstract unity achieved within human subjectivity has no need of the Christian gospel which has ceased to be of any persona1 significance as entirely a matter of the past, of historical interest only. an outmoded fotm of reconciliation, a museum piece. It has been supplanted by the higher reality of what human subjectivity knows imrnediately within itself and constnicts upon it. That which, however subjective its implications, relies upon something extemal, some fom of media-

'-' CJ: LHP 229ff; LPR 3.241 ff ruid 343ff- Also cf LPR 3,210ff and our tre;itment of it above (chap. 3, section 3, and the subscction cn ti tled "Infinite Antithescs and Rcudo-Reconciliations"). C'tm Hodgson's editorial footnote (UR3,241, n. 207): "Hegel hem describes the ideology of Enlight- cnmen t ntiondisrn. 1t acccpts the reflective critique of tradi tional reiigious dogma but substitutes for i t merel y subjective ethicai and cognitive criteria. ending wiih absuact and cmpty self-identity over against the equally empty beyond",

'-' "[Tlhc subject is inwardly contented with itself just as ii is, contented wiih its thoughts. its volition, its spiritual srnie. so that the subject, its owhowing. thinking and conviction, has becorne the summum - hathc character of the divine, of what has validity in and for itsclf. This reconciliation, something universally spirinial, is thus posited within my subjective spirit and is identical with me, so tbat I myself am what is universally spirituai. so thal 1 sub- sist ivithin my immediatc spirit and that my immdiate howing is the sole criterion of validity- This is the rnost recent Corn of reconciliation" (LHP 43). 83 tion not continuous with human subjectivity, - whether it be the chutch, doctrine, the Bible, or Je- sus of Nazareth. - cannot hope to compte with the self-mediation of immediate subjective knowledge and conviction. which is at once imrnediate and mediated because it is the self-mediation of what is essentially identical. The human subject is the summum.'" That God is absolutely, inalienably self-suficient; that he is not therefore to be found, however deeply searched for, within individual, human subjectivity or the collective subjectivity of humanity; that he can be known only as he reveals himself where he has chosen to reveal himseIf; that his self-revelation is within the particularities of human history, has a deteminate, concrete form and content. is in fact just one, exclusively singular human being, ksus, God in human flesh: that the human subject must be engaged by, and itself engage with, enter into, this God so revealed: and that this mutual engagement, this mutual entering into, is accomplished by the Spirit of God through the preaching. doctrine. and reflective cognition of the content of the church's confession; - a11 of this, which is true religion, theology and philosophy for Hegel, has vanished and. consi gned to the past. has been supplanted by "the standpoint of the subject's immediate reconciliation with itself' (LHP 44).176 The tmth of the gospel. - grounded as it is in the objective and self-authenticating king of God self-revealed in Jesus Christ as in and for himself the reconciler of the world. - makes a necessary. a sovereignly compelling, daim upon the human person. it does so because in that revelation the Spirit of God reconstitutes human subjectivity, restoring to it its original created identity so that the human subject in thiaking itself, thinks itself as reconciled to God, and not only thinks it-

'-' "Once rcconciliütion bas attruned ibis latter shape, the position of the Christian religion that we set forth carlicr holds no funhcr intcrcsr: it is only somcthing pst, a matter of history. What we houror arc convinccd of. thc way things rct.cril dicrnsclvcs immcdiatcly in e;lch subjcct's inwrudnçss, that is what is uuc. what subsists in and for itscif. XII of the modcs and proccsses by which the truc, as what subsists in and for itself or as God, gets mcdiated t\.i th thc human bcing, no longer hold any but a historiui interest. That is al1 sorncthing se no longcr nccd or carc about. And in likc fashion thc tcachings and systcm of doctrine of the Christian religion have the sutus of sorncthing stnngc. somcthing belonging only to a prticular timc that the pplcof that timç took scriousty ...Thus dl that 1 have said about thc pnnciplc of the Christian systcm of doctrineAs of intcrcst on1y frorn the (earlicr) siandpoint WC hm.c suicd, that is. whcrc the id- has validity in iis concrete dctenninatcncss. but not from the standpoint of the su bjcct 's immcdiatc rcconciliation with itself' (LUP 43).

'-" 'This ...most reccnt forrn of reconciiiaüon.-.is one-sidai, since what is spiritual is not graspcd as subsisting ob- jcctivclj- in and for itsclf but only as it is within my subjectivity as such. in my consciencc My conviction ris such 1s takcn to bc what is ultimatc ...The idea in iind for itsclf - that the idca is concrcte, is spirit, and that the subjcct itself must cntcr into this idcri - ail this has vanished and appzus oniy as somcthing in the psst" (IUP43.44). 84 self but thinks the world as so reconciled.'lT The Gd who made me and ail the world, in whom objectively 1 and the world live and move and have our being, the Gdconceming whom I and the world have hitherto kendeceived so that we have reconstructed hurnan identity as autonomousl y independent of God. - that same God has restored me and al1 the world to himself in Christ so that 1 and the world are participant in the identity of Jesus as Son of the Father. More than that, this God wills that through education in the Credo of the church 1 and the world should be rebom (cf. LPR 3,2340 in the Spirit to subjective consciousness of our new identity, - existentiaily restored to the image of God in which we were made. The necessity in al1 of this is the exclusively compelling daim of reality, the christological reaiity which tbrough the Spint in the church determines my very identity. Reaiity is what it is because it is the work of the God who is sovereign and therefore free. absolutely self-sufficieut. That reality musr be what it is, is the compelling character of reality as demonstrated to the believing subject by philosophy. by reflective cognition. by interiorization and application of the gospe1.l" By contrast. the grounding of the claim of this more recent, subjective forrn of reconciliation is '-my conviction". my having constituted reality and posited universal reconciliation "within my subjective spi rit" (LW43). The one sided character of this grounding, its abstract disconnec- tion from what is other than me (thaugh on the way to positing ultimate reconciliation that other bas been show n to be "ernpty of content"). ensures the inevitable contingency of its conclusions (LHP

The atheism of this abstract unity that is achieved by emptying of content al1 that is not

. -- Cf. csp. the discussions of rcconciliation in the contest of Hcgcl's giving an acçount of thc [nc;irn;irion. in LPR 3 (sec abo\.c. chap. 3. scct. 4); also his discussion of Luthcr in LHP (sce abovc. chap. 4 and the section cntitled "Luthcr. thc Luthcrans. and Company").

'-X Thc rcconstitution of human subjcctiviiy through its bcing madc participant in thc immancni kno~vlcdgcof Gd thc Holj. Trinit'. is csplaincd by *Martin Ws in terms of philosophy's reflcction upon the affirmations of thc Chns- tian rcli~ion.Ns writcs of Hegel's philosophy that it is thc "ration al...ripp ropriaiion of the contcnt of religion and thc proccss of alloning that contcnL..to disclose what on ifs otvn tcms bclongs to it": hc continues. "religion- ris Hcgcf undcrstands i t, is not mcrcly a human consciousncss of a di\-ine othcr. but 'the sclf-consciousncss of absoiutc spin['. In and through rcligious undcrstanding. human sclfhood know itsclf in kno~vingits self-surpassing rclation io what is absolutc and divine. and hows tvhat is absolutc and divinc as it knotvs itsclf in its howlcdpc of ils othcr". By svay of summw Nys includcs his osvn panphrasc/tnnslation of fiq-clopedia #%4: "'God is God insotàr as Goci knotvs Godsclf. This knowldgc. which Gd cnjoys of Godsclf. is sirnultruicously but dsoJivifwr thc self- consciousncss that God cnjoys of Godself in humim sclfhood. Divinc knowledgc of the divinc indwclling in human scl lhmxi brings aboui and is in this manner identid with thc sdfs knowledgc of Gd.Thc self s knotvlcdge of Gd is. in turn its knowlcdgc of its king as constituted in ruid through thc divinc indwclling' " (Manin J. Dc Nys. "Philosophicd Thinking and the Clairns of Religion", in New Perspectives.... Kolb. 1995, 93ff). 85 within my subjectivity is no more satisfying and cornpelling than the ac~smisrn'~of that oppode but strangely complementary abstract unity that is achieved by "submerg[ing]" human subjectivity "in the unity of God, of the infinite", so that "subjectivity has no kingon its own account" (LPR 232). Though both of these resemble the abstract reconciliation in thought that Barth suspects He- gel of propounding, they are rejected by Hegel as hollow ptecisely because they do not dojustice to reality. to the integrity of God in his absolute self-s~~ciencyand of the human subject in its "king on i ts own account". its ''affirmative private sphere" (LPR 3: 242). One or the other is ne- gated. The relational identity of real reconciliation, the paradigrn of which is the mutual indwelling of the Father and the Son in the Spirit, is replaced by an abstract identity that is monistic and therefore. in Hegel's terrninology, atheistic or acosmic.

i -'CJ cspccidly Hcgcl 's discussion of Spinoza's acosmism which he says is too often mistakcn for athcisrn (LHP 163: LPR 1: 377). 86 Conclusion: Necessity, the Philosophical Task, and Theological Resources

To me it al1 seems to corne down to Faith in [the Holy Mystery of the Person of Jesns Christ]... as the Divine Actualizer of the Idea of eternal trath, as the Living Truth itself assigning to all spedation its trne and complete content, as God Himself who as man walks among men, who by His entry into the world first made possible a genetically progressive, ever more closely self-determining knowledge of bath in its divinely homan and complete form.... 1 am happy to see €rom gour judgment of the Aphori~rns,"~?..thatas far as the important relations of faith and knowkdge are concerned you have expressed yourself just as I expressed the hope yoo WOU~~~..YOUhave borne an important testimony to truth bv declaring yonrself so decisively Christian, seeing that precisely on this point jodgments were not yet settled. Windischmsnn"'

Can we Say more about philosophy as Hegel conceives of it when it is true to its God-given vocation? If Hegel's objective idealism is not the manifestation. from the transcendent perspective of his dialectic. that God is ait. and al1 is God: if in other words it is neither acosmism. rhe worid is reuiI~God coming ro be, nor atheism. God is realiy rhe worid coming ro be; if instead i t is the philosophy of the gospel. the content of the gospel in speculative form. - what will that mean that its task looks li ke? In an adventurous three-part conclusion to this essay 1 shall venture first to define further. and in explicitly theological terms. what 1 think Hegel's trinitarian necessity of reconciliation is. 1 shall then explain what 1 think the forma1 shape of the philosophical task. informed by the trinitan-

$"" Hcgcl rc\.ic~vcdKxl Friedrich Gijsche1.s Aphorisrns in 1829, His 40 page rc\.ietv includcd the follo~ving:'Thc nrc csccllcncc of this work...consists in ihc fact thai thc author's pious mind pro\.cs itsclf to bc thoroughly imbucd both wiih the tnith of ihc old, ix., of the authentic docuincs of the Christian faith and with thc need for the thinking rcason and (uhat is morc) in its diiigcntly practiscd formation .... The distinction bettvccn Christirnit?. and philo- sophicxl thinking which is wont to ôc Iàlsely prcscntcd as an infinitc cxistcncc and ri pap hat mnot bc fillcd, is at oncc put asidc; at this dcpth this pretcndcd distancc is not prcscnt at dl" (quotcd by Philip Merklingcr in Pliilosopliy. 771roloqy. arrd Hqel's Berlin Philosophv of Religiorr, 1821 -1827. Siate Uni\-crsity of New York Press. 1993. imn.

"' This conflatcs tn.0 lcttcrs rcccived bu Hegel from his long-tirnc fricnd (rheir compondcncc conrinued frorn 1&09 to 1829). the medical doctor. "philosopher of some repute". and "noted Iay Critholic thcologian" (Butlcr's cditorid corn ment. LPrters 558). -1 Joseph Hieronymus Windixhmann (Leiters 566). 87 an paradi gm of the gospel, would look like as deve Loped worIdLiness: CIChial&zion that combines Niteriori-rirorz in the private realm and opplcution in the public realm. Fmall y, 1 shall briefl y summarise the resources for theology which I believe may be profitably looked for in Hegel's philos* ophy. The adventurous character of this material is its venturing to some extent beyond what Hegel has explicitly stated in his writings, though it is not I think inconsistent with their implications and as such should follow quite naturally from ail that we have observeci so far.

Necess i~ Necessity is the compelling character of the logic of the God whose acts always precede and reveal their own possibility. As Barth says of Hegel's God: "God is God only in his divine action, revelation. creation. reconciliation, redemption; as an absolute act, as cu:nc~purus"(PT 283). Where the possibility of something logicall y precedes its enactment, and where that possi bility is attainable independently of its subsequent enactrnent, the ability to demonstrate its necessity would imply having transcended the apparent initiator, enactor, of the act in question, and dirovered a cause for the action outside of. pnor to, its enactor. On the other hand. where actuality precedes and defines its own possibility. carrying with it its own logic, its necessity is within itself. Its necessity is its self-consistency. its faithfulness to itself. '1 am that 1 am' is its own necessity. The gospel includes God's gracious invitation to penetrate some way into the logic of his acts. It is the invitation to theo-logic. It elicitsfa*lh seeking unclerstanding; it is the certainty of faith. the self-evident character of the saving acts of God. calling forth reflection upon that certainty, that self-evidence. The necessity attaching to the acts of God is the logic of God's absolute freedom. his being accountable to himseIf alone. The doctrine of the Trinity is the conceptualization for thought of the self-reflexive freedom. the inner necessity, the theo-logic. of God. The necessity of the gospel of reconciliation is the absolute freedom for absolute faithfulness of the Father and the Son, - revealed in the incarnate life of Jesus and illurninated by the Spirit of God. The necessity inherent in the freedom of the Son is his king absolutely free p~ciselyin his king the one who says. "the Son can do nothing on his own. but only what he sees the Father doingg': "1 bave corne down from heaven. not to do rny own w il 1. but the will of him w ho sent me".'" The necessity inhe~ntin the freedom of the Father is

'" Jn. 5.19; 6.38. precisely his being gionfied by the Son whose freedom is his uncompmnising obedience to the Father. Necessity. far from compromising the sovereign freedorn and grace of God, is the abso- Iutely compelling character of the revelation, in act, of God. tts necessity is its laying upon humanity an absolute and exclusive claim. Unbelief, the rejection of that clairn, can only be the impossible possibility: "Jesus was arnazed at their unbelief'.lo Philosophy is refiection on the certainty of faith as the only appropriate response to the logic, the self-authentication, that attaches to the acts of God.'" The necessity that attaches to the gospel of the mighty acts of God is the dynamic of that gospel as it evokes faith and presses on to its cornprehensive inwardization and application, until the whole earth is the Lord's in actuality, as it already is the Lord's ideally. really. in Christ.

Responsive Acrual izaîion 1 might also have entitled this. First Steps in (what Paul Ramsey called) me ta et hic^.'"^ Above all. the Trinity and Chnstology are paradigrnatic for thinking about the ~orld.'~~In Christ. the world has been reconciled to God. That reconciliation is its king set free for participation in the unity of the Son with the Father in the Spirit. The same trinitarian Spirit that is integral to the immanent 1ife of Cod is at work in the world realizing, actualizing. the gospel of recondiation through the church as the first-fruits of that reconciliation. Philosophically, as developed worldliness. the trinitarian paradigm is the threefold concept of unity or identity. difference. and reconciliation. It is perfectly realized in the immanent trinitarian life of God revealed in the gospel and developed for thought, conceptualized, in patristic doctrine.

:" ..MC;. 6.6

'"' "If nc rcccivc humm tcstimony. thc tcstimony of Gd is pater. for this is the tcstimony of God that hc has tcs- tificd to his Son. Those tvho bclievc in thc Son of God have the tcstirnony in thcir hcam. Thosc who do not belicvc in Gd havc made him a liar by not believing in the tcstimony that Gd has givcn conccrning his Sm. And this is the testirnon)-: God gavc us ctcrnal life. and ihis lifc is in his Son. \hocver hu thc Son has lifc; whoc\.cr docs no[ hrr\.c thc Son of Gocf does not have life" ( I ln. 5.910.

'"*'Chnstmn thcologrcd ethic3 is metaethics, and thc Christian community in al1 ages is ri standing rnctacthicxd cornmuni ty of discourse" (Paul Ramscy, quotcd by Oliver O'Donovan in Res~wrectioriartdMoral Order. Wm. B. Ec- rdmans PubIishing Company. Grand Rapids. 19û6,S).

'" ""{Hcgcl]sought to rclate the significancc of the christological truth daim to the iota1 inhcrired arid prcsent cultural cspcricncc of mmkind. Hcgcl was convinccd that tmth is one and so he ancmpted to dcmonstnte that the rd- firttalriy con~.incingpowcr of the Christian witness lies in its poiential for intcgrating and unif'ing the whole of human lifc - pcrsonai and corponte" (James Yerkcs. nie Cliristology of Hegel. Missoula, 1978, 3220. 89 Philosophy serves the world by discernent, and by the application of that paradigm, that concept, to al1 aspects of life in the ~orld.'~ The logic of the world is analogously trinitariaa. The unity out of which the difference, the otherness, that is the created world emerges is the world's king conceived by the Father in the Son who, as the Word of God, is the Word of creation. Hegel insists on the creation of the world being contained within, bound up inextricably witb, the Father's begetting of the Son. The Patristic doctrine of creation is the affirmation that difJmerzce, othemess, in the world as in Gd is good. The doctrine of the fa11 is the negative description of differeme when it is self-absolutized. self-as- sertively independent. over against the rest of creation and over against God. The Christian gospel, the salvation of the wortd in Christ, affirrns the essential goodness of difference, - it is of God; at the same time it shows it to be penultimate. Unity, reconciIiation, that has as its paradigm the unity of the Father and the Son in the Spirit, is ultimate. Phi Iosophy cannot on its own know this apart from the gospel, except perhaps hypotheti- cally, abstractly, and therefore inevitably distortedly. That reality is this way. that reconciliation is the law of the world, that created reality is set free in Christ from the lie of absolute and independent subjectivity. - is the gift of the gospel. conceptualized for thought in the doctrines of the Patris- tic church. Creation and everything witbin it is teleologically orderedW8to reconciliation.

:" Fm an rinccount of a striking exampie of Barth's rejection of dl of this see Appendix 3.

''* 1 mcan bu "telcogically ordcrcd" what Hegel intends by his notorious anci controversial statement, IVhuf is rufionaf is rtcrual alid wimr is acrïial is rarional (Philosophv of Right (PR).transe T.M. Knox, &Tord. 1952, 10). Sean Say- crs nritcs that "Hcgcl is at pains to insist that he distinguishes mere 'existence' from whaî is 'actual' and that he is not jusfifying al1 that e-risfs as rational ... It is also vital to see that he is not merely reducing the actual to the rational or vicc vcmThc rclationship bctween thesc opposites is conceîved as a coricrete and didcctiui one... Thcrc are thines nshich c'cist and yct which Iack 'actuality* in Hegel's sense, for actuality is 'the unie of essence and cirist- cncc, inivard andouttvard' (Logic, tryis. W. Wallace. Osforci, 1W5, 142). An erùsting thing is actd only when its cxistcncc is in harmony with its essence: when its existence corresponds with its propr function or idea. On the othcr hand. 'whcn thk unity is not prescrit. a thîng is not actual even though it mas have acquired enistcnce. A bad statc is one w hich merely cxists; a sick body exists too. but i t has no genuine rcality* (PR 383)...'objects are truc if thcy are as they ought to be; i.c. if their rdity corresponds to their notion. When thus viewed. the untruc is much the same as to bc bad. A bad man is an untruc man*(Logic 276).... [In fact] nothing finite is fully actuai or rationai ...' Gddone is the thorough harmony of notion and reality. Al1 finite things involve an untnrth: thcy have a notion and an existence, but their existence does not meet the rcquirernenis of the notion' (logic 41) .... The world as it is. the cxisting state of things. must be criticid and transformai: reason must be nalised. it must be rd rictud .... 'To considcr a thing ntiondly means not to bnng reason CObear on the object from the outside and so to taper with it. but to find that the object is ntionai on its own ûccount' (PR 340" (Sean Sayers, Theactuai and thc Rational". in Hegeland modern Philosophv. ed. David hb,New York. 1987, I43f0, 90 Hegel was asked for an expianation of his thoughts on tmth by Edouard-Casimir Dub~c.'~

His response. tao long to quote here. nicely illustrates this teleological account of reality. and of knowledge as discernrnent of the concept, the purpose, the truth, immanent in each thing, the un- distoned realization or reenactment of which it is philosophy's vocation to serve.'90 At the same tirne it must be said that the comprehensive recoaciliatioa io which al1 things are intrinsically. teleologically ordered does nothing to compromise the diflerence, the plurality, of God's world: rather it is a reconciliation that delivers the world from humanity's enslavement to the lie of fuifilment through absolute. self-assertive independence. Philosophy redeemed by the gospel is set free for comprehensive and unprejudiced attention to the multifarious diversity and purposive interrelatedness of the fullness and vitali ty of ail of life. And the philosopher is so set frec as partic-

'" Du& was a Frcnch-boni hat manufacturer li\.ing in Hamburg who had become interestcd in thc Hcgclian phiiosophy (c$ abmc the yuontion rit the head of chap. 3).

'"O The lcttcr is long. but is hclpfully summaïzed by Butler as folIows: "[tjmth for Hegel is no[ primiuily an atuib- urc of subjective rcprcscntritions insofar as thcy confonn to extcmally givcn objects. Nor is it such a corrcspondcncc insolàr ris the objcct is not cxtcrnaIly given but is constituted by the howing mind a la Vico [ad the ictkr includcs a lcngthy discussion of Kant]. It is nthcr, in the first insiance, an attribute of objectively existing things thcmsclvcs insofar zis thcy succccd in o\.crcoming iheir 'fitude' or selfcontradiction to e.xist in conformity wiih thcir own im- mruicnt concepts. [Butler docs not mention that Hegel relates this first instance of the tmth in things to the kno\vI- edgc of Gdwho is "donc mly me" and who gives the trinitarian paradigm, the "Ideawof being. becornir~ganà rec- ori<-iliariorr.as thc tmth of contingent redis, for our knowledge of the world (Letrers 493).1 Follotving thc Icad of ordi nqlanguagc, w hiçh itsel f speaks inicrchangeably of, for e.xample, 'tme friend' and a 'good friend'. Hegef identifies in quasi-Platonic rashion the uuc with thc good and. ultimately. with the beautiful. The qucst for tmth is first convertcd into a pnctid qucst to actudize the concept But sincc the concept of things is a standard of self-devclop- ment intcrnal to thcm. pnctical srnving for the gdissues in aesthetic contemplation of thc diaiectic by tvhich things actualizc thcir otvn immanent good or tnith without extenial Fichtean strivîng on our part- The good as immanent in things. acuons, persons, and institutions is prccisely zhe beauuful. Le.. the beauty of the objcc~cxisting in harmonious correspondencc wi th i [self. And the rccnactment of the conceptuai developrnent of the good and beautiful in things - which Hcgel dlsthe 'scientific presentation of the Idea' - yields mth in the secondxy sensc of a rai thful rcconstmction" (Lerrers 49 1). 91 ipant within that fullne~s.'~' Barth brilliantl y captures Hegel's determination to doj ustice to the fullness of Me. For He- gel. he says. everything must be known to be. essentially. event (PT282).AU is life. movement. process. There is no possibility of stopping, standing back from the comprehensive reality that is ceaselessly in motion. identifying this or that moment. and claiming to bave got hold of the tmth once and for ail, and in such a way that surrender to the movement of redity is no longer necessary. that one now stands, as it were, above it al1 and summons it to answer before oneself. Barth calls this the grossest misunderstanding (PT283).It is "error, lying and sin", which are nothing other than "obstinate one-sidedness, a blind lingering and stopping" that refuses "obedience to the self-movement of the concept" (PT286).We must know life and do philosophy by jumping in and swimming with it. in direct contrast to the Gascon/Scholastic who would leam to swim before getting into the water.'" And if that is true of life and philosophy, it is preeminently true of God. "God is God only in his divine action. revelation. creation, reconciliation. redemption: as an abso-

"' "A philosophy which tries to talk about the sort of thing which Hcgel talk about can, of ncccssity, only speak ridcquritcly if it is aiso silcn~only know if it is aiso ignorant This is indced the problcrn with Hcgel's philosophy; but it is also thc problem of that philosophy. It is what that philosophy. at its innermost corc. is about" (John Waikcr. "Hcgcl and Rcligion" in Hegel arrd Modem PIulosopiiv, cd. David hb.Ncrv York, 1987, 219). "Hegc! ...might tcach us that the spherc of our knowdedge is equd to the sphere of our king. But no amount of logic cmtcll us tvhcthcr or not thc sphere of our philosophy is equai to the sphcn: of our lifc.... [His] thought is not just ri philosophical sl'stern. but a system \vhich knows about its oum relationship to the rest of expenencc tvhich is not philosophy, and knows ribovc ail that its own knorving cannot cxhaust this rclationship.... What makcs Hcgcl's rhought so ciifficuit to dcfend is that the particular way in whiçh [it] is 'absolure' in relation to e'tperience is aiso the nay in tvhich it is \.ulncnblc to espcriencc... Philosophy is itsclf a Criad of cxpcricncc. onc which is connectcd to thc \v holc of cspcricncc In ri tvay \vhich philosophy can at bcst on1y partially control .... We should not cspect rhar thc knotvlcdgc Hcgcl 's philosophy givcs us about our cxpcricncc witl cnabtc us to rcducc our cxpcricncc to the objcct of our philosophicd E;no\vlcdge... the more we hou. philosophically about Our experiençc, the more our philosophy is. in rnorc scnscs than one, 'al the mcrcy' of that cxperiencc.... Hcgcl's philosophy has a grcatcr daim on our ascnt than thc systcms of his ruiaiytic and criricd nvals. not because of its hcunstic pou-er, its crpacity for ntionsll synthcsis, or its rcd or supposcd imrnuni~frorn thc neccssity for criticism and rcvision: but bccausc of its rtdcli~to espenence. and bccclusc such fidclity is what Hege! mems by tmh" (John Wal kcr. Thorcglii cirtd Fdlr in rtie Philos- uplly of Hegel, Dordrccht, 1991. 158ff). That is as truc of philosophy's relation to thc gospcl as to the rcst of cspcncncc: indccd, it is the gospel that redcems philosophy for such fidclity: "Hegel's philosophy rcspccis thc autono- rn y of rcli @on not on1 y as an object, but as a subjcct of discoursc. 1t does not prcsupposc chat philosophy and rcli- sion crin on!' tîlk either to themselves. or aborrr each orher. it opens up. afihough it does not fiII. a spacc in which rcal dido_euccan fdcc plricc on thc ground of articulatc cxpcricncc: cxpcricncc which doesn't know, in ad\.ancc of Our critegonca! distinctions. csactl y SV ha1 'philosophy ' and 'religion' are. nor where thc bound~mns bcrwecn them- (Waikcr, "Hcgcl and Rcligion". 218).

:"' Though it is ri Gascon in one source for the 1834 "Introduction" to LPR 1. 139. in evcq othcr casc. including HcpA's usc of this anecdote in the 1827 "Introciuction" (LPR 1. 169) and in UIP . it is ri Scholasric. as it is in thc onginai. 'The Fricnd of hughtcr". a collection of witticisrns from late antiquity, writtcn in Grcck (c/. Pctcr Hdg- son's cdi~onalcommcnt. LPR 1. 169 n. 51 ). 92 lute act, as actuspurws" (PT283). If we are to appreciate Hegelian philosophy, "we must not think of a rigid, stable construc- tion". There is no possibility of arrivinp at a "tranquil picture of his views". He will not let us. "With him we are only to look, and look again and again, and anyone who thinks he sees stable points and lines. quantities and relationships. is not in fact seeing what Hegel is seeking to show us" (PT 283).'* And what he is seeking to show us is nothing less than life itself. Barth is careful to guard against any compromise of Hegel's appreciation of the fullness, the totality of life. So he wntes of the full movement, the obsewed fullness, the rhythm of tife itself (PT 283). Pùilosophy is the exact and continual recollection of this life. The rhythm, the heartbeat of life is the heartbeat of philosophy. This in turn is "the famous dialectical metMof thesis, antithesis and synthesis". Life. *-thepicture itself' is continually recollected and reproduced in and by the method. The method of philosophy is the method of Reason. and life is the event of Reason. In the recalling and re- producing of the fullness of its movement. life is given permanency and validity (PT 2830. If anything is missing in this thrilling description by Barth of the realism and vitality of He- gel's thought and vision, it is the gospel revelation of the redemption of this abundant life which. for Hegel. is inextricably bound up with what he intends by Reason, philosophy, and the dialectical method. Philosophy that is rooted in the gospel revelation of reconciliation is philosophy attentive to the fullness of life, and active in serving the undistorted realization, Iiberation, and reconciliation of that fullness which as a whole and in al1 its parts is purposive, teleologically ordered. As such, philosophy will be characterised by delight, discernment, and responsive action. Redeemed philosophy may. and is called to. delighr in the world. in its actudity. its sheer. God- given facticity: "affective[ly] attent[iveJ to something simply for wliol it is and for the fact tha it i s".'" Deli ght and enjoyment characterise Hegel 's correspondence: as one example, remem bering their trip together in France Hegel expresses his gratitude to his friend, Victor Cousin, for "procuring for me the facilities, counsel. and rneans to instruct myself and enjqv evetyhing:" (Lenus.665, my italics). When he is away, his letters home to his wife are rich in detailed de-

!'' Could noi Banh be svnting of his own work in thcse words? Does this not portny Hegel as a wimess to a redit>- thrit hc has not mastercd but by which hc has bcen mastcrcd?

19' 1 n providi ng succinct descriptions of dciight, disccrnmcni and resopnsive action 1 have quoted Lhrcc cimes from O1 i vcr O'Dono\m's dcscription of the wisdorn of love in the i nuoductoq chapter of Resurrectiotr andMord Or&. (Lciccstcr. 1986.26). Hcgcl is nowherc to be round in that chape 1 have expropriatcd O'Donovan's dcscriptions. as rhcy sccm so aptly ta describc Hegel's understanding of the philosophical task. 93 scriptions of countryside. art galleries, cathedrals, and people that he has seen as he has traveled: his delight is palpable (cf.Leners. 594597.599, etc.). The same delight is evident in his fondness for his family and friends, his wanting time with his sons whom he "loves": "1 will embrace you al1 with deep joy" (cf. Leners. 660. 656. 661, etc.). Redeemed philosophy may also, and is called to. give itself to patieat discernment of the world. "the intellectual apprehension of the order of things which discloses how each king stands in relation to each other".'%Thereby it serves the world in its response to God's cal1 to realize in every aspect of its life its having already ken reconciled once for al1 in Christ. This reconciliation is to be worked out. maintained and developed at every level of the life of the world whether ecclesial. politicai. scientific. familial. artistic. educational. or any other level. Philosophy is to articulate the God-given and multivalent coherence of the world. And it is to do so not from some transcendent. angelic point of view. but from within the almost infinite diversity and changing reality of the world in tirne.'" Again and again this discemment is evident so naturally in Hegel's correspondence: the lengths to which he would go in order to get the latest material on the reli$ons of the world. espe- ciaily first-hand material:ln detailed descriptions and cornparisons of works of art, as Correggio's ~Vighrthat surpasses Holbein's Macionnu uncl Child because. among other things. "the Iight radi- ates iikewise from the child ...She [the Madonna] smiles on the child as do the sunoundings. Eve- rything is serene and yet more senous [than in the Holbeinj" (kners.595.609): detailed and passionate cornparisons of English and French acting: of the English actor, Kemble, "ghastly, craqp... English rage ...[ theyjcompletely lose their minds... raging about ... homd... Equally botched Romeo and Juliet's first encounteroo;this is not Hegel's obsession with thought and intellect at the

"" "Phiiosoph\., Hcgcl insists. should study actuali ty. Thc contcnt of Hcgcl 's u.ork is thoroughly rdistic: to a rc- markablc and umquc degrce for a modern philosopher. II covcrs a rruly cncyc~opcdicrang of topics. trcatcd in a thor- ought y conçrctc ruid crnpirically detailcd manneru (SmSaycrs. ThcActual and the Rd" in Hegel arrd rrderrr Phi- losopiq. cd. David Lruri b. New York. 19û7. 144).

"- Louis Duprc witcs of Hegel's "conccrn Tor an cmpirid investigation of the contcnt 01- =ch religion. In his discussion of Roman rcligion he was wcll in advmcc of his contempo~cs.His analysis of thc Greek religion of thc clsicai pend. houevcr rcstriçtcd in scope, has temaineci dcsewedly famous. But cvcn his trcsiunents of Hinduism and Buddhism arc surpnsingly perceptive, considering rhe scarcity of sourccs at his disposal. Prcciscly a mature invarcncss of thc cornplcsity of thosc faiths causcd Hegel consmtiy to rcarrange their order- (buis Dupré. "Transitions and Tcnsions in Dctcminate Rcligion". in hkw Perspecrives.... Kolb, 1995. 90). 94 expense of heart and will: rather it is bis appreciation of acting that dœs not impose itself upon and exploit the script. but with intelligent discementdraws out and allows to be seen. heard and felt. the essential integrity of the text:'" as is also evident in his description of the French actress, Mlle. Mars. in I/*drie."quiet deportment ... unfailingly correct, intelligent, full of feeling at the proper places. Not a single eye had an easy time staying dry...She is supremely rnoving, but just as essentially expresses a correct understanding of the roie. ie., the inner thoughtfulness" (Leners 657, 659).In a similar vein are his cornparisons of French, German, and Itaiian operas and opera singers. He is especially partial to Rossini and to Italian singers. and for similar reasons to those given for his fondness for Mlle. Mars: the passion is not forced and alien but free, responsive to and arising out of the particular character of the music, "immediately free of mere yearning... the true ringing of naturalness is igniteddhe sound is freedom and passion"; and again there is Hegel's enthusiastic. rapturous responsiveness to the feeling of it dl. not at ail reduced to thought and intellect: -'the singers blissfully ... with open breast and sou1... the divine furor... melodic Stream spread- ing rapture. penetrating and freeing every situation ... Rossini whose operas are essentially passion and soulfulness" (krrrrs.628). We may cite tm the long and wonderful reflection on his visit to Cologne Cathedral. too long to quote here. but expressive again of responsive discernent at several levels. not least, theologïcal; and this incidentally in the same letter in which he tells his wife of his friend. Windischmann's healing "through prayer", which Hegel simply accepts as a miracle. disclosing his faith in the unpredictable and incomprehensible grace and freedom of God. uncompromised by his cornmitment to necessiry (Leners. 585). It is not only culture and beauty as evocations of the ideal that cal1 forth his attention, but particular and present actuality in every guise: a slaughterhouse in Paris (Lmers 660). and the poor. Amidst al1 the beauty and plenty of bourgeois Belgium and Holland he wonden "where the common people and the poor are put up ... Dilapidated houses. broken-down roofs. decayed doon. and broken windows are nowhere to be seen". rhough "from around Aachen to Liege the road crawls with beggars" (Leners 599.597). Finz!!y. as responsi?~nr?icn redeemed philosophy "achieves its creativity by king perceptive: it attempts to actfor any king oniy on the basis of an appreciation of that beicp".lR WCCZE compare again Hegel's rejection of "extemal Fichtean striving on Our part" (Leners 491) in favour

''?C/. abovc. in this scction. Hcgei's rcjcction of"cxtcmal Fichtcan striving on our pan". Lefrrrs 491.

: '"O 'Donotxn. Resirrrecriorl and Moral Order. 26. 95 of "aesthetic contemplation of the dialectic by which things actualize theirown immanent good or truth". issuing in the reenactment. the reconstruction. the realization or actualization "of the conceptual development of the good and beautiful in things".'OOWe recall words. aiready q~oted:'~' -'Iflai th ...is cognizant of [the light of Eternity ]...as the truth. as the substance of present existence" (LPR 1. 113f). Hegel objected to the Catholic claim on behalf of ecciesiastical sacmlization and artistic aes- thetisization of the world and the gospel, that they are the highest forms of developed worldliness. An even higher expression was its modem philosophically comprehended Protestant plincd expression. Through the incipient descent of the Kingdom of God. the finite is politically sacralized: and the Protestant final ly achieves a deeper participatory actualization of the Incarnation than is possible aesthetically." In a letter to his fnend Victor Cousin. written in 1828. Hegel reflects on the present political scene and demonstrates somerhing of what this responsive action. this political actualization that does not impose itself externally but serves the inherent purposes in things. looks like in practice. It is by no rneans an old man's reactionary surrender to the status quo. expressive of an immanent fatalism. He rejoices in the recent electoral defeat of the ultra-Royalists by the Liberal opposition: [a 1 bove all. I share... satisfaction...of seeing a philosophy professor ...at the head of the Chamber of Deputies [in Parisl. whose composition has so furiously surprised the powers that be. But there is still rnuch to be done. especially the resumption of your lectures. It seems that the field is yielded only gradually, and that they are letting themselves be gently forced ...Actually have the feeling that what is essential has been won. which is to have instilled at the highest levels the conviction that the course taken so far can neither be con- tinued nor resumed. that it has been - ai beit wi th regret - inwardl y re- nounced. so that it is now only a question of following through in rnatters of detail and of consequences. though it is often precisely from them that one shnnks back (lerrers 665).

1 have sketched an Hegelian metaethics of delight. discernment. and responsive action for life within a world analogously ordered dong trinitarian and Christologicat lines. The idrcilisr character of this philosophy is its seeing the actuality of the world Chnstologically. reconciled in Christ. the world is to become actzlul

"" CJ crirlicr in this conclusion the Icngthicr rclcrcncc to Lcttcr 422, kfrers.49 1ff.

"' Scc abw.c. chap. 3. and rhc scct. cnlitlcd "God for thc Wholc Human Pcrson". tion. Had Hegel been writing in the twentieth century he might have described bis philosophy not as objective idealist but as Chnstological eschatoIogical: 'eschatological' in that it points to the teleological orderedness of creation; 'Christological' because it describes God and the world as reveaied in Christ.

Hegeliun Resources for Theolog-v Ln what ways is Hegel a resource for theology today? First, he exemplifies the determination to do justice to the created and the fallen dimensions of the world. Acknowledging the absolute antithesis between God and humanity by virtue of the fall, he nevertheless insists upon the essential complementarity of the divine and human natures by virtue of creation- The priority of created cornplementarity over fallen antithesis derives from the mysterious groundednesr of creation in the eternal begottenness of God the Son. Hegel exemplifies, secondly, a cornmitment to the Incarnation, including climactically the cross and the resurrection. as the unsurpassable and central event for time and eternity. The death and resurrection of God in Christ is the death and resurrection of humanity. As such it includes the or.tologica1 reconstitution and 1i beration of human subjectivi ty and therefore of human rationality. No longer in Adam autonomously and antagonistically disposed towards ail objectivity, whether God's. the world's. or the selrs. in Christ it rediscovers willing opemess and appropriate responsiveness to the divinely constituted real- God and bis creation are appreciated, known. and knowable as God. and as his creation. Hegel knows and invites us to know, thirdly, the self-authenticating power of the Word of God as the real that is God's reality. ideal reality. That Word, that reaiity, underlies and gives rise to the new human subjectivity. The Gd-given real in Christ lays its sovereign, necessary claim upon humanity 'sallegiance, which is the appropriate responsiveness of faith seeking understanding. That allegiance is perfect freedom. Hegel exemplifies the confident willingness to articulate and champion chat necessary claim. Hegel. fourthly, recovers for the church its proper vocation. As the community of Goci's Spirit possessed of the rnind of Christ it is cailed to serve the universal personal interiorkation and public actualization of the gospel. It does so by discerning and acting for the full reaiization of the inherent prociivity to reconciliation in Christ of al1 created being.

97 In these ways at least theology may look to Hegel for nch resources as it endeavours to ariculate in modern and pst-modem contexts the doctrines of creation and fall, Christology and sotenoIogy. pneumatology and ecclesioIogy, ethics and eschatology. in looking to him as a fellow member of the catholic church. we will find much to confinn his claim to have respected and defended in his philosophy the doctrines of the church, more faithfully than his contemporaries and near contemporaries in their philosophies and theologies. But as Barth asks. will we tolerate such a theotogically invasive demand to "found [our] philosophy upon theology, and eventually allow [our] philosophy to be transformed into theology"? (PT 298) Will we allow ourselves "to be taught by him much more thoroughly" than his theological contemporaries and successors down to the present day? Or. will we too shrink back? We would do well to heed Barth's suggestive and cautionary question of theologians since Hegel, n[w]ho knows whether it was not in fact the genrtindy theological element in Hegel which made [them] shrink back" (PT3M)? APPENDIX 1

Barth's Four Criteria for Doing Historical Theology

Barth developed his four criteria for doing historical theology in bis introductory essay to Proresrunt 7hought: From Rousseau ru Ritschl. He called the essay, "The Task of a History of Modem Protestant Theology" (HT).The four cntena are, 1. participatory encounter: [wJeknow history only when and in that something happens in us and for us,..an event concerns us.--we are there... we participate in it (HT 16); [A]n action of our own... somehow encounters. corresponds to or even contradicts the action of another... another's action somehow becomes a question to which our own action has to give some son of answer (Hï17)- 2. ecclesial collegiality: [tlhey are in search of the answer to a question that concems us, too... a question which is raised for men by t h e Christian revelation that is the foundation of the church (HT 27). 1 have to count al1 these people as members of the Christian church (HT 28). [Llike me, they were ultimately concerned with the Christian faith (HT 28). 3. courtesy: a historical figure must be read not as a "pretext", but as a "presupposition"(HT 22). As a pretext "the wise man of the pst" (HT 19) "has to play a role conesponding with my own point of view" (NT20); he is "used simply as a means to our ends... strengthening a position that has already been adopted (HT 22). As a presupposition "he is... allowed to have his own say" (HT20): "they have a claim on our courtesy, a daim that their own concerns should be heard..." (HT22): or "knowledge of history is honestly sought as a presupposition of one's own position" (HT 22). In theology, we have beyond question not only the right but even the duty to be clear about the degree and manner in which Our own particular approach was already present in an earlier time; we have to see how the peculiar theological concern of Our own histoncal context was already seen and developed at an earlier date, or how far it was overiooked and neglected- It is quite iegitimate for us to carry on a controversy, both positively and negatively, with the past in this way (HT 29). and 4. historical awareness: fw]e must take senously the difference between them and ourselves... They obviously speak quite a different language from us... Its content, tw, is different, in that the common vocabulary of the Christian church which we both share is stressed, evaluated, used, classified and interpreted in quite another way ...They translated and interpreted the same text in a particular way that is quite different from ours. ..were troubled in quite a different way from us ... Real historical knowledge of another period must consist in an awareness of its peculiarity and othemess, of its subsidiary themes... controversy originating in our own time must not be altowed to dominate the proceedings. We must always - under the presupposition of the unity of the church - investigate the particular context and concern of the past and understand this from its own relative centre and not from ours (HT28f). The Vitality of the Wd:Hegel's Poetical Last Will and Tesîament

Hegel's awareness of the inherent vitality of the gospel as the activity of the Spirit of the living God in the world, so that the task of the church is nghtly described as service of, as an attentive waiting upon, the tnith as that which has its own initiative and purpose, is discreetly suggested in the poem which Hegel wrote just a few months before his death, and which has ken descri bed as "a kind of last will and testament to his spintual heirs" ' The pemwas his response to the request. also in poetic forrn, of a student, Heinrich Stieglitz, '90 give again, like a Sorcerer, the magic word which his apprentices in their disarray had forgotten". As Butler rightly adds, "Hegel's rhymed response ..mas a charge to students to free themselves of apprenticeship in the mere letter. in spiritless and hence forgotten words of magic". But then Butler describes what he believes Hegel is prescribing instead, "faith in the further world-historical efficacy and destiny of his [Hegel's] thought, and readiness to surrender to that efficacy". So to read him entails identifying "the word", to which in the poem Hegel calls his readers. with his own thought: it is in other words Hegel's word. tt seems to me far more likely, more consistent with Hegel's own writings particularly of the 1stdecade of his life. that "the Word" should be capitalized. Within the poem i tself the speaker understands hi mself to be wai ting upon and driven by "the Word" which has its own initiative and purpose in and for the worid. What is called for is an appropriate. "reciproca[l1" response. Of course the original Gennan does oot settle this particular disagreement as al1 nouns are capitalized in that language. If the "w*' should not be capitalized, then, again in the li ght of the Hegelian texts of the 1ûîOTs,it is Hegel's word as a testimony to the divine Word which it is philosophy's vocation to serve. Here is the poem in its original context. Hegel to Stiegiitz ...the day after [Hegel's birthdayl August 27, 183 1 Such a greeting from my friend 1 welcome, But wi th this greeting now a cal1 for resolve has come, For a deed of words to conjure up - no less - The many - fnends included - enraged to madness. Yet what means "crime" to those accused by you, If not that each but wants to hear himself, to do the talking, too. Thus the Word that was to ward the evil off ' This and dl furthcr quotations in this panpph are from Clark Buder's cditorial commcnL Letfers 679f. 101 Becomes another means to increase the mischief, And if this Word, as it has long driven me, were at last to escape, Your cal1 would bind me to proceed with daring and not to wait, But to hope that to this Word other spirits would reciprocate, That ernpty grievances should not dissipate tbis Word Tbat these spirits may bear it to the people and put it to work! - From the little castie atop kuzberg Hegel'

Letfers W. 1 have capitalized the 'w' in "Word: Butler and Scilcr do not. 1 02 APPENDIX 3

Homan Theology or Cod's Very Own Theology: Barth and the Pare Fantasy of the Hegelian Solution

What amounts to Barth's rejection of my version of an Hegelian metaethics,3 as "a pure fantasy, really 'too beautiful to be tnie"' is eloquently set forth in the chapter called "Solitude" w hich opens the third section. "The Threat to Theology", in one of Barth's Iast books, Evangelical Thcoiogy: An Inrrnciuction.' Barth begins in tenns with which Hegel would have benaltogether in syrnpathy. The inevitable isolation of the theologian seems nor to correspond to the essence of theology . The work and word of God are the reconciliation of the world with Cod. as it was performed in Jesus Christ. The object of theology. therefore, is the most radical change of the situation of al1 humanity; i t is the revelation of this change which affects al1 men. Surely this will mean that theology's object must provide a prototype and pattern for al1 sciences. No wonder the attempt is made (and Barth has in mind, in particular, Paul Tillich) "to integrate theology with the rest of the sciences or with culture itself as represented by philosophy and, vice versu. to set culture, philosophy ,and other sciences in an indissoluble correlation with theology".

"What solutions! What prospects! 'Would that we were there!"' But we are not. Barth identifies the goal that according to this project is taken to be attainable here and now. as either the pcudîrk state before the fall, the perfected state which will only be inaugurated with the second coming of Jesus Christ. or the divine and urchetypzfpresumption of having attained to "God's very own theoiogy". Admittedly. were such a state attainable, such theology/philosophy would indeed "be the philosophy either because the light of God illuminates it. or because it is identical with this light". Such however is not the case. "Al1 that men may here and now know and undertake is humn theology ...theology typical not of God but of. ..men who are pilgnms". Human theology is undertaken by people who are at once still blinded and already enlightened with knowledge through the grace of God. Their pilgrim character. their king between the times, their ' Scc aba'c, çhrip. 5. and the section entitted "Responsivc Actualization".

Kari Barth. Evclngelicnl Th4ologv: An Innoduction, Lrans. Grover Foley . Grand Rapids. 1979. 1 1 1- 1S. Al l quomiions in this appcndi'c arc taiccn from thme pages. 1 O3 king no longer in paradise, not yet perfected, and never to be gods, means that they 'do not yet view the glory of the coming universal revelation". There is therefore only a mutuaily exclusive either/or that lies before the theologian: on the one hand, and to be rejected according to Barth, the theobgiuarchetyptz, or paradr'siaca, or and the theologian's problem and task "can only be the latter, not the former". Barth does acknowledge the very real looging and hopthat looks toward the perfected theology, "the vision of the unity of al1 sciences in God or of the unity of the origin and goal of their study". But --realismdemands the renunciation" of al1 attempts ta realize the syntheses More the time: "the theologian must still carefully avoid trying to produce from his own resources that perfection". Leaving aside Tillich's particular project, 1 want to ask Barth why it cannot be part of the theologian's legi timate task to approximate IO the unity of al1 sciences in God, to press toward the perfected theology, not from the theologian's own resources in so far as those are not the gifts of grace. the gospel. and the Spirit in the church, but as one who, baptized into Christ in the church. is in Barth's words "already enlightened with knowledge through the grace of God"? Without claiming more than partial insight into the compre hensive actualization of gospel reconciliation. is the endeavour itself so absolutely illegitimate? I have undertaken in my conclusion to this essaf to show what such an undertaking might look like. It assumes that the trinitarian character of God is paradiDrnatic. in Barth's words a prototype and pattern, for the logic of creatioo. Certaidy that is Hegel's contention. Barth emphaticall y rejects such an undertaking: theological knowledge, thought, and speech cannot become general truths. and general knowledge cannot became theological truth ...[ The people of God] will not try to integrate its knowledge of ...the work and word of God... as a suprernely novel event... with the different knowledge of its environment or, in reverse order. the different knowledge of its environment with its own knowledge ...meology] dare not try to break free of its solitude.

Ibid. APPENDIX 4

Hegel in the Churcir Dogrnatics

In Church Dogmatics(CD) Barth foMkes the Hegel of legitimate promise and challenge for almost exclusive preoccupation with Hegel as disappointment and temptation. Sigaificantly. whereas PT is rich in direct quotation of Hegel, in CD there are no such quotations. I shall look at ali of the important references to Hegei in CD categorizing

The Firsr Criricism In relation to the first cnticism, the reduction of God to human consciousness and thought. in a passage on the vesfigiarrinircuis (CD 1.1.337ff) Barth recalls Hegel's identification of the Trinity with the structure of human consciousness, which he says denves directiy or indirectly from Augustine's theory of the verigium minitais within the human sou1 which "was more... than a rnere vesrigium". Barth wams against taking Augustine's theory too seriously. Take it as a "helpful hint ...not ...as a proof' because "we need to know and believe tbe Trinity already if we are really to perceive its vesrigiu". Hegel, he says. sees the Tnnity as a representation of human consciousness which philosophical reason demythologizes or conceptualizes. H'hereas for Augustine the structure of human consciousness is supplementary to the Trinity. for Hegel exactly the reverse is the case. On several occasions (CD 1.2.320: 11. 1.270; 11. 1. 282). Barth cites Hegel as a classic example of atheistic moaism. We are reminded of Barth's account of Hegel in PT as kafasarka, comprehended entirely on one side of the biblical antithesis of sarx and Pneumu, of which Hegel was not even aware so that his Geist is entirely on the side of created reality .altogether other than the Holy Spirit of God. In the fint of the three passages. Hegel's "in and for itself of the absolute Spirit" is really atheism in disguise. He serves the same purpose as mysticism, pursuing the goal of that "formless and unrealized vacuum, where knowledge and object are... the same thing." "Atheism means a blabbing out of the secret" which Hegel and mysticism, among othen. strive to conceal. In the second passage God is "ourselves". Hegel's description of God "is not a description of God whose movement is infinitely more than our self-movement even when the latter is hypostatized." Barth refers to the absence of Gdas "self-motivated" and as "a particular idea". Such taik of God cannot be taken senousl y and is little more than mythical language for describing human "attainment of. ..self-consciousness". In the third passage Barth compares Hegel with Biedermann and even the "pious blasphemies" of Angelus Silesius. (The passage is an example of Barth at his most mischievous and amusing.) God is ^the self-determination ...of the absolute world-process." The "tendency" here, "to say the least", is toward "the identification of God and the world-process". The evil consequence of this is to "forsake ...and forget... the actuality of God's love as seen in his revelation", and to replace it with, and here the explicit cornparison is made with Hegel, a general and "not incontestable" concept of love- A brief but important mention of Hegel occurs in an extended discussion of Heidegger (CD III. 3.335), where Barth says that Heidegger agrees with Hegel that 'pure king and pure nothing are one and the same'. The older affrnnation: ex nihilo nihilfir must be arnended to read: ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fir marth refers to Sein und Zeit 3771. This too relates to the Hegelian synthesis that does away with al1 antitheses including, through an allegedly faulty doctrine of creation, the distinction between Creator and created. We saw tbot Barth's first criticism of Hegel included his illegitimately rendering sin and salvation humanly comprehensible, their necessity philosophically demonstrable. Barth returns to this in CD IV. 1.375f (cf. 374). He notes that Hegel's account of sin cornes in a section of bis lectures which he entitles "The Kingdom of the Son" (this is in the 1821 series of lectures). Whereas this might impiy that it is Christ who reveals what sin is, in fact for Hegel sin is known independently of our knowledge of Christ. Also, and this too Barth criticized in PT, "there is an unbroken contiouity behveen creation, sin and atonement." They are moments within the unfolding of the comprehensive reality of mind. As a final passage from CD relating to Barth's first criticism of Heget we corne to the first of the interesting pusirive exceptions (1. 1.244)." The passage is part of a reply to the Roman Catholic doctrine of the analogiaenti~~Over against it Barth sets the anafogiafidei identifying it with "the remarkable passages in Paul in which man's knowledge of God is inverted into manos

* Admittcdly in this passage Barth has "the Hegclian P. Marheineke" more in mind than Hcgcl himsclf. But it is u-orth rccalling the lettcr in which Hegel urges Msuheincke (and Daub) to dcvclop thcir thcologics as, in Hegel's own vicn.. a posi ti\ c altcrnati vc to thc theology of Schlciermacher (Lerturs 460). 1O6 being known by God". This inversion points to the radical discontinuity between al1 human knowing and the knowledge of Gd.They do not "correspond". No amount of human knowing, even Christian knowing, can successfully achieve God as its object. Instead God hirnself in his self-revelation creates the actuality and therefore the possibility of his king humanly known: the divine act of knowledge ... takes place on man rather than through man ...[ E]ven in the Christian this being known, the divine possi bi li ty, remains distinct fmm the human possibility of knowing. Having observed that support for this rnay be found in Augustine, Barth goes on, albeit grudgingly, to find this distinction drawn in Marheineke's Grundlehren d. ch. Dogm. ais Wissenschafr, pub1 ished in 1827. He prefaces the quotation as follows: "One must also be sufficiently impartial not to overlook that which fora11 the dubious elements can still be taken in honrrmpurtem in the words of the Hegelian, P. Marheineke." Then this direct quotation follows: In the human spirit God is not manifest through this but through himself, and hence manifest also to the buman spirit. This, as reason. is annulled in Him. The hardest thing that science requires of every devotee is that pure substance show itself as subject. that [man] with his spirit should subject himself to the divine spirit and be patient under it. His tme knowledge of the absolute is itself absolute.

With Barth's previous references to Paul's inversion of knowledge of God into king known by God (Galatians 480 it becomes clear that he understands Marheineke (and Hegel?) to mean by the absoluteness of tnie knowledge that it is God's knowing that creates human knowing of God, and not a continuation or achievernent or even consumrnation of natural human reason. It is the fruit of Srace, of revelation. Again, "'God is not manifest through the human spirit ... but through

Himself. '" Marheineke makes the contrast with the human spirit "as reason" explicit. For him as for Hegel all other expressions of the human spirit (eg. Schleiermacher's feeling), king secondary to reason, need not even be mentioned. It is surely striking that in this passage at any rate Barth refers only to Augustine and "the Hegelian, P. Marheineke" for support in the Christian tradition for his reply to the Roman Catholic anaiogiuentis. Before we leave Marheineke it is worth mentioaing andber passage (CD 1. 1.303) in which Barth acknowledges the "constitutive" place of the doctrine of the Trinity in Marheineke's "special dogmatirs", though he is not vety impressed by what he says about the Trioity "in itself and as such". He doesn't explain why he is unimpressed; though in a later passage (CD 1. 2.878f) he implies that the Trinity is a presupposition for Marheineke's dogmatics, "a fundamental principle" from which al1 of hÏs dogmatics is derived. This in contrast to Barth's own procedure which he says is without a fundamental principle; rather, his whole dogrnatic including the doctrine of the Trinity "is derived ... from ...the work and activity of God in His revelation". And again, "the doctrine of the Trinity, like al1 other doctrines, is preceded by the fact of revelation and as such" (CD 1. 2. 878f). This is Barth's criticism of Hegel in another guise. The integrity, the original and essentially constitutive character, of revelation is compromised by ultimacy king granted to a concept of God. Even if that concept is an orthodox dogma it will not do. God in himself, God in his revelation. is lost sietof and reduced to being identical with some conceptual content of human understanding. Barth descn bes it as "mere appearances or emanations... demi-gods or deified creatures". over against "the essence and the tmth of the living God" as he meets us "in his revelation" (CD 1. 2. 8180. But is this fair to Marheineke? Ought Barth to have bracketed Marheineke with Schweizer, Marthensen, Haring, and Rade as he does (CD 112.879)?Without king able to answer for the others it looks as though the Hegelian Marheineke is not so cavalier as to reduce God as self- revealed. to God as a human concept. He too. like Barth, though using different language, is careful to distinguish human consciousness and understanding. concepts and doctrines, from "the Absolute who is manifest ...through Himself' (Marheineke quoted by Barth, CD 1. 1. 244). Of course, the same question arises with regard to Barth's treatment of Hegel. Specifically, do Hegel and Barth understand the same thing in their use of the tenn, "concept" (begrim? Barth reads Hegel as a neo-platonist; there are other possible interpretations including the one I have ventured in this essay of Hegel as a Christian philosopher with much more in common with Anselm and Luther than the neoplatonists. 1 have discussed Hegel's understanding of concept as the trinitarian paradigm, in the body of this essay.'

The Second Crit icisrn With respect to Barth's second criticism of Hegei and his alleged compromise of revelation in Christ through the provision of another. higher level of knowledge of God by philosophical - CJ Michacl Instrood,A Hegel Dicfior~aq.58ff; n.b. Inwood's account of the conuast betwecn Hcgel's and Kant's accounts of BegriJ. 108 reason. there are several passages in the CD that repeat the charge hmdifferent perspectives. In the first instance (CD 1. 1.258f) it is again not Hegel but the Hegelian philosopher, Marheineke who is accused of cornpromising the Bible as "concrete and supreme criterion" through his account of the Spirit in the Church. Barth sees the same compromise at work in Roman Catholic and Protestant modemists. It results in the theologian, the dogmaticiaa, fiaaliy sitting in judgment on the Bible. In chree further passages, we find Hegel charged with swallowing up the distinctiveness of the Gospel in philosophy and rendering it available as a tool for the philosopher to use as and when he sees fit. He is said (CD 1. 1.323) to have secularized the revelation of God in Christ by considering it to be a constant and a given, rather than "always a new thing, something that God actually brings into being in specific circumstances". As such, Hegel can draw from Jesus "the Ida of religion", which is then at his disposal, able to be discerned and applied at will. In a sirnilar vein (CD 1.2.290) Hegel is likened to Kant, Wolff, and Feuerbach, all of whom are variations on the same sad servitude of Christianity to the more pmfound reality of religion or morality. The Christian religion is "only a prototype of the awareness of philosophy purified by the idea". So Barth can Say of Hegel that "existing religion with its dogrnatics and ethics is a structure which is taken over only to be broken up" (CD 1. 2.320). In an extended treatment of Nietzsche's attack on Christianity (CD III. 2. 240) Barth writes of Goethe's paganism that never expressed itself as explicit opposition to Christianity. As such it compares with Hegel, arnong others, who "if he could not make much of the Christianity of the New Testament, was restrained in [his] criticisms... trying to interpret it as positively as possible ...within the limits of [his] own understanding" . Finally with respect to his second criticism, Barth explains (CD IV. 2.82f) how it is that Hegel could so compromise the revelation of God in Christ and yet profess himself a good Lutheran and be accepted as such by his contemporaries. He says that 18th and 19th Century Lutheranism turned orthodox Christology on its head so that Jesus is but a hard shell which conceais the sweet kernel of the divinity of humanity as a whole and as such, a shell which we can confidently throw away once it has perforrned this service ...[ ThereforeIHegel ...could profess to be a good Luthetan ...[ and] Feuerbach usually liked to appeal to Luther for his theory of the identity of human and divine essence, and therefore of God's becoming man which is really the manifestation of man 109 becoming God. As an aside we may compare with this Barth's comments on Hegel in his Scbleierrnacher lectures of the mid- 1920's (The Theology of Schieiemacher (S)).As he enters upon his treatment of The Christian Fai~h,the first edition of which had been severely criticized, on the one hand as "speculative" replacing "Christian tnith with a knowledge of God that is attained upriori by transcendental critical abstraction", and on the other hand as lacking any "speculative basis at dl", Barth reminds us that Hegel was among the most virulent of the latter cntics. While Barth betrays a modicum of sympathy with Hegel's cnticism he identifies the one thing necessary that is lacking not only in Schleiermacher but in his critics on both sides including Hegel, narnely, that there might be an original w hich is not an apriori but revelation and therefore sornething very different from the fact of consciousness which Schleiermacher reads into John 1: 14 and in whose manifestation he finds the stuff of dogrnatics - this possibility lay outside both his own field of vision and that of his critics (S 188). Here again is the criticism of Hegel's failure to take revelation senously as "an original". Furthemore, in identifyiag Hegel's Geist with consciousness, as we have seen that he does, he might just as well have addressed the criticism, here focused on Schleiermacher, at Hegel, omitting only the reference to John 1: 14. The terminology is that of the Hegel essay in PT. The "fact of consciousness" is the "manifestation*' not of the stuff of dogrnatics but of God himself. But this blumng of the distinction between Schleiermacher and Hegel should make us pause. Barth is right about Schleiemacher, who himself wrote of his Christicut Faith that its true aim is "the presentation of the distinctively Christian consciousness", and that "the concept of God ... developed in it ... has simply ansen in reflection on this higher self-consciousness" (quoted

by Barth: S 188). But is the parallel assessrnent of Hegel fair? 1s Hegel's Geist Schleiermacher's " 'sirnply and honestly empirical' ...self-consciousness" (S 188) whether Christian or not? Perbaps it is in the Hegel of the first decade of the 1800's, even through to 1û20: but aot, as we have tned to show, after 1820. For Hegei, to look for Cod or for the dogmatic and speculative foundations of the knowledge of God through an analysis of human consciousness is as unprofitable and misguided as to remain within the limits of Kantian Understanding. Barth ought not therefore to have bracketed Hegel and Schleiermacher togetheras the object of an identical criticism. The mird Criricism There are only two significant references in CD to Hegel from the point of view of Barth's thi rd criticism of the philosophically demonstrable necessity of reconciliation and the corresponding annihilation of the actual dialectic of grace. In the first instance (CD 11. 1. 282) Hegel is said to have "forsaken" and 'Torgotten" the uniqueness of Gd's love in Christ in favour of a general concept of love. The particularity of Gd's reconciliation in Christ is absorbed and overwhelmed by a generic reconciliation which is always and everywhere. In the second passage (CD IV. 3.2.703-707) Hegel is cited as an example of a temptation w hich is to be avoided in understanding Christian reconciliation. Barth has identified two essential realities for understanding the reconciliation of God and the world, the providence of God and the confusion of humanity. Just here he pauses to analyze the Hegelian solution to the contradiction. promising that the explicit articulation of this illegitimate alternative will serve, by way of contrast, to set in a clearer light the true solution. The flaw at the heart of the Hegelian solution is that it is knowable and achievable apart from Jesus Christ. Jesus is at best a metaphor or mythic representation of this general synthesis. "Jesus Christ is not a concept which man can think out for himself. ..On the contrary Jesus Christ is a living human person." The tnie solution, which is in Jesus Christ. is "grace actually present and active... enveloped by the mystery of its royal freedom". Implied by the Hegelian solution is the philosopher's "superior point in the void" from which he can "look back and survey and explain al1 ...He thinks he can set himself above both God and himself." Of course, with the illegitimate solution, this too must be rejected. There is no such superior point of view. Still with reference to reconciliation a third passage deserves consideration as another of the interesting exceptions to Barth's nomally sharp criticism of Hegel in CD (III. 1. 388f, 404f). The praise is muted, But it is there. Barth is cautiously applauding the optimism of Leibniz and bis era as a "philosophical counterpart" to his own theological enquiry into ''The Yes of God the Creator" and "Creation as Justification" (388).He mentions Hegel as the last gasp of that optimism after Kant's reversal of it in his philosophy of radical evil. Barth cannot be critical of the Leibnizian and Hegelian optimisrn without first acknowledging that they "proclaim glad tidings, and thus display a formal affinity to the proclamation of the Gospel" (404).In that, they correspond to "the incomparable Mozart9*(404): That king the case "it would be out of place to bring [them J into downright discredit. Al1 this must be remembered before we frown and gnimble" (404). In other words, Barth is not prepared to wnte off Hegel's optimisrn; it is his discenunent of the Gospel of universal reconciliation. He is aware that in this respect Hegel stands in conflict with Kant. and in some sort of contin ui ty with Kant's predecessors irom Leibniz to Rousseau and Voltaire (405)!

"cgel \\.rote of Mozm (and Haydn) in icrms that correspond remarkabiy wiih Barth's o\vn Mozartian rcflecuons: "Thescrcnity of thc spirit rcrnains intact in ihc wor)is of thcsc masicrs; pin, of course, finds cxprcssion as wcll, but it 1s al n-ays rcsol\xd. The poiscd s>';mmctryncvcr rea~hesan e'ttrcmc; cveqzhing cohercs wiihin rhe bounds of rcstr-ant, so that jubilation nevcr degcncrates into wild ranung and evcn lamentation esudes the mosi blissful dm." (Gcorg Kncplcr, IVol/Qang An& Mo:rrrr. Cambridge 1994. 170f. Kncplcr pets ihc onginai Gcnnan quotation frorn Astfrrrik /8/7- /829.cd. G.Lukks, Berlin 1955.850.) 112 Ahlers, Rol f. The Communify of Freedom: Barrh and Presuppositionless Theologv. New York: Peter Lang, 1989. Bamett, Stuart. ed. Hegel Afier Demi&. New York: Routledge, 1998. Barth. Karl.EvmgeIical7heology:An Introduction. Trans. Grover Foley. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 1979. ------. Kirchliche Dogmafik.Zurich: Evangelischer Verlag Zollikon. 1932-68. Translated under the editorial oversight of G. W. Bromitey and T. F. Torrance as Church Dogmarics (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 19361969). ------. Die P rutestantische Theolog ie im 1 9. Jahrhundert .ihre Geschichre und Vorgeschichre. Zurich: Evangelischer Verlag Zollikon, 1947. Translated by Brian Cousins under the title Proresrant Thought :From Rousseau to Ritschl (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969). ------. The Theofogy of Schleiermacher. Ed. Dietrich Ritschl. Trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley . Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1982. Brito, Emilio. Diefi et L'Etre D 'Apres Thomas D 'Aquin et Hegel. Presses Universitaires de France. 1% 1. Burbidge, John W. Hegel on Logicund Religion: The Reusonubleness of Chrisfianiiy.Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. Busch, Eberhard. Kuri Barth: His Lijiefiorn Letfers ami Aufobiographical Texts. Trans. John Bowden. London: SCM Press Ltd.. 1976. Cayley, David. George Gruni in Conversation. Concord: Anansi, 1995. Chnstensen, Darrel E., ed. Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion: The Wofford S~vnposiurn.The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970. Col 1 ins. James.The Mird of Kierkegaard- Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953. Cooper, Bame. T3re End of History: An Essay on modern Hegelimism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984. Cri tes. Ste phen. In rhe Twilight of Christéindom: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard on Fairh and Histow. Chambersburg: American Academy of Religion. 1972. Croce, Benedetto. Whar is Living and Whai is Deud of the Philosophv of Hegel. Trans. Douglas Ainslie. New York: Russell & Russell, 1969. Descartes. René. Medirations on First Philosophv- Trms. Donald A Cress. Indianapolis: Hac kett hblishing Company, Inc., 1W9. Desmond. William. ed. Hegel ami His Crifics:Philosophy in the Afermarh of Hegel. Albany : State University of New York Press, 1989. Fackenhei m. Emi 1 L. The Religious Dimension in Hegel 's Thought. Bioornington: Indiana University Press, 1967. Gascoi pne , Robert. Religion. Raîionaliqv and Coltylu~nip:Sacred Md Secular in the Thought of Hegel ancl His Critics. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 1985. Greenspan. Louis and Nicholson. Graerne. eds. Fackenhrim: German Philosop@ ond Jewish Thought. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1992. Hams, Errol E. The Spirit of Hegel, New Jersey: Humanities Press International. Inc., 1993. Hams, H.S. Hegel: Phenornenolog-y and System. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. Inc.. 1995. He ge1. G. W.F. fntroducrion tu the Lecrures on the Hisrory of Philosophy. Trans. T.M. Knox and A .V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Ress, 1985. ------.Vorlrsungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie. Teil 4. Philosophie des Mitrelaiters und der Seueren air. Ed. Pierre Garniron and Walter Jaeschke. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag GmbH. 1986. Translated by R. F. Brown and J. M. Stewart with assistance of H.S.

Harri S. edi ted by Robert F. Brown. under the title Medieval und Modern Philosophy. Volnmc 3. Lectures on the History of Philosophy: The kctures of 1825 - 1826 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). ------.Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Religion. Ed. Walter Jaeschke. Ham burg: Felix Meiner Verlag GmbH. 1983- 1985. Translated by R.F. Brown etal., edited by Peter C. Hodgson. under the title Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion 3 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1484). .The kmrs. Trans. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984. Hodgson, Peter C., ed. G. W.F. Hegel: Theologian of fhe Spirit. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997. Jaeschke. Walter. Reason in Religion: The Fouhion of Hegel S Philosophv of Religion. Trans. J. Michael Stewart and Peter C. Hodgson. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. Kaufmann, Wai ter. Hegel:A Reinterpretation. Garden City: Doubleday, 1966. Kierkegaard. Soren. Concluding Unscientrjk Posrscript. Trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie. London: Oxford University Press, 1941. Kol b. David. The Critique of Pure Moderniîy: Hegel. Heidegger and Afler. Chicago: Universi ty of Chicago Pfess, 1986. Kol b, David, ed. New Perspectives on Hegel's Philosophy of Religion. Albany: State University of New York Press. 1992. Küng. Ham. The Incml~~~~ionof God: An Infroductionto Hegel's Theoiogical Thoughr us Prolegomena ro a Future Chrisrology. Trans. J.R. Stephenson. New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1987. Macken SJ, John. The Autonomv Theme in the Church Dogmatics: Km1 Barth cvtd His Critics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Maker. William. Philosophy without Founclcuionr Rethinking Hegel. Albany: State University of New York Press. 1994. Merkl i nger, Phi 1i p M. Philosophy. Theology, and Hegel 's Berlin Philosophy of Religion. 182 1 - I827. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993.

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