Past Due Remove the FDLR from Eastern Congo

www.enoughproject.org PAST DUE Remove the FDLR from Eastern Congo By Rebecca Feeley and Colin Thomas-Jensen ENOUGH Strategy Paper 22 June 2008 n 1994, at Rwanda’s moment of greatest need, When the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front, or the world turned its back. The Rwandan geno- RPF,2 took control of Rwanda and ended the geno- Icide and the subsequent flight of the genocid- cide in July 1994, the forces largely responsible for aires into the Democratic Republic of the Congo the orchestration and execution of the Rwandan spawned eastern Congo’s complex crisis—one that genocide escaped to eastern Congo. Although the has led to the deaths of 5.4 million Congolese and Congolese had battled issues of land ownership threatens the future of millions more. The world has and citizenship long before the events of 1994, the had 14 years to take action against the perpetra- arrival of these genocidaires—former Rwandan tors of the genocide and those who now terrorize Armed Forces, or ex-FAR and a Hutu extremist eastern Congo in their name, but the international militia called the Interahamwe—set into motion a response remains sorely inadequate. Absent an regional war in which ethnicity, citizenship, control international action plan to finally remove this of land, and lucrative natural resources pitted com- scourge, eastern Congo will continue to suffer. munities against one another. Renewed efforts to resolve the crisis in eastern The conflict has many layers. The FDLR are a source Congo have not gained momentum; the hu- of harassment, violence, destruction, and rape in manitarian and security situation remains dire eastern Congo. Their presence is the raison d’être and diplomatic progress is at risk of erosion unless for some Congolese rebel groups, including Lau- the international community locks these gains in rent Nkunda’s National Congress for the Defense through sustained high-level diplomacy, more ef- of People, or CNDP3, who purport to protect fective civilian protection, aggressive measures to their communities from the FDLR threat but are halt impunity for human rights abuses, and a long- also guilty of atrocities. The FDLR also potentially term approach to the country’s CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC greatest challenges: security and SUDAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC Zongo justice sector reform. Yaoundé Gbadolite Bondo PROVINCE OF THE CONGO Libenge ORIENTALE Faradje Businga National capital Gemena Aketi Watsa District capital Buta Isiro Bumba Mungbere City, town Imese Lisala Ituri UGANDA Major airport go Libreville i on The most urgent issue, however, u C Bunia International boundary g Basoko Banalia Bafwasende n Basankusu a Distristrict boundary b Beni u Yangambi O Kisangani is the destabilizing and threaten- Bolomba EQUATEUR Ekoli 0 100 200 300 km CONGO Butembo Boende Ubundu Mbandaka Peneluta ing presence, more than 14 years 0 100 200 mi NORTH Ikela Lubutu KIVU Lake Goma Victoria Inongo Punia Lake RWANDA after the slaughter of nearly Bolobo Kivu Lake KASAI Bukavu Kutu Mai-Ndombe ORIENTAL Kindu SOUTH Kilembwe KIVU 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Bandundu Kole Lodja Uvira Kibombo BURUNDI Ilebo Makobola KINSHASA Bena MANIEMA Hutus in Rwanda, of Rwandan Bulungu Mamba Kasongo Kenge Mweka Lusambo KINSHASA Kikwit BAS-CONGO L Mbanza- KASAI Lubao Kongolo a BomaMatadi OCCIDENTAL k Ngungu BANDUNDU e armed groups in eastern Congo. Mbuji-Mayi Kalemie Kananga Kabalo Kabinda TANZANIA ATLANTIC Tshikapa Mpala T These groups—namely the Forces a OCEAN Moba n Mwene-Ditu Manono g Kahemba a n Kabamba y i KATANGA k Democratiques de Liberation du Moliro a Kapanga Pweto Kamina Rwanda, or FDLR, and their many ANGOLA 1 ZAMBIA offshoots —have been responsible Dilolo Kolwezi Kasenga L a Likasi k e MALAWI Lubumbashi M for terrible atrocities in eastern a l Kipushi a w Congo, including widespread and Sakania i systematic sexual violence. 1 Unless otherwise specified, the term FDLR will be used in this paper as an umbrella term for the Rwandan armed groups in Congo, including the ex-FAR, Interahamwe, ALIR, FDLR, RUD-URUNANA, etc. 2 The RPF is the political party currently in power in Rwanda. 3 For more on Nkunda and CNDP, reference ENOUGH’s strategy paper “Averting the Nightmare Scenario in Eastern Congo” by John Prendergast and Colin Thomas- Jensen, available at: http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/09/eastern_congo.html 2 threaten Rwanda and is thus are a major impedi- Protection: The U.N. Peacekeeping Mission in Congo, ment to peace and security in the Great Lakes known as MONUC, must increase its presence in region more broadly. FDLR-controlled areas and expand FDLR defection “corridors” where defectors and their dependents As a foreign armed group, the FDLR were not are safe and can start the demilitarization process. involved in the January peace conference in MONUC must also begin to deny the FDLR and other Goma, the capital of North Kivu province. This armed groups access to the minerals and other natu- conference was intended to advance dialogue be- ral resources that fund their movements and expand tween the Congolese government and Congolese its special forces capabilities for possible offensive armed groups in North and South Kivu, including operations, in coordination with the Congolese Nkunda’s CNDP. The resulting cease-fire agreement army, against the FDLR. Furthermore, ENOUGH joins between the government and 22 Congolese armed Human Rights Watch and 61 other international and groups is just the first step of what will be a long Congolese human rights groups to call upon the in- and challenging process. ternational community to endorse and immediately fill the position of a special human rights advisor for To build momentum now for an inclusive peace eastern Congo. process that addresses the root causes of conflict in eastern Congo, the international community must Punishment: Because of the current atrocities the urgently pursue a “3Ps” strategy for neutralizing FDLR are committing in eastern Congo, the inter- the FDLR. In particular, the international commu- national community has a responsibility to disrupt nity must build on the November 2007 agreement the command and control of FDLR leadership over between the governments of the Democratic combatants on the ground. This leadership includes Republic of the Congo and Rwanda—the so-called exiles living in the United States and Europe. First, Nairobi Communiqué—and begin dismantling the U.N. Security Council should expand the list of these deadly rebel forces.4 individuals for targeted sanctions—the freezing of financial assets, limiting lines of communica- Peacemaking: The United States, European Union, tion, and imposing travel bans—and U.N. member and United Nations must work with the Congo- states must aggressively enforce those sanctions. lese and Rwandan governments to implement a Second, those countries where FDLR political lead- “carrots-and-sticks” approach to deal with the FDLR. ership live and work—specifically the United States, This includes increased support for demobilization, France, Germany, and Belgium—must investigate disarmament, repatriation, resettlement, and those individuals to determine how their political reintegration, or DDRRR. In addition, the interna- activities affect their resident status. To help end tional community must put sustained high-level impunity on the ground, the International Criminal diplomatic pressure on the Congolese government Court, or ICC, should focus its investigation on FDLR to sever its ties with the FDLR and on the Rwandan leadership in the Kivus. Additionally, the interna- government to demonstrate that the individual tional community should work with the Congolese FDLR combatants not wanted for genocide can government to establish a special court to try war safely return to Rwanda. crimes and crimes against humanity committed by all armed parties in eastern Congo since 1993. 4 Representatives of the governments of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda met last November in Nairobi, Kenya, to discuss the foreign armed groups in Congo. On November 9, 2007, both governments re leased a joint communiqué addressing the threat to the security of Rwanda, eastern Congo, and the stability of the Great Lakes Region as a whole. See the ENOUGH report, “Report Getting Serious about Ending Conflict and Sexual Violence in Congo,” by Rebecca Feeley and Colin Thomas-Jensen, available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/03/getting_serious.html, for a discussion of the pluses and minuses of the deal. 3 A HISTORY OF ACRONYMS: Ugandan sponsors routed Congolese President HOW THE FDLR BECAME THE FDLR Mobutu Sese Seko and took control of the country in only seven months. Some Rwandan Hutu fled When the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and Rwandan Hutu deeper inside Congo rather than return home, and authorities crossed into eastern Congo in 1994, more many, including civilians, were massacred by the than a million Hutu refugees who feared reprisal Rwandan army. killings by the Rwandan Patriotic Army, the armed wing of the RPF, accompanied them. The refugees The congenial relationship between the President settled in unsanitary camps, largely in North Kivu, Kabila and Rwanda did not last long. War broke and the humanitarian disaster quickly developed out again in August 1998 when Kabila attempted catastrophic proportions. However, these condi- to gain independence from his regional backers tions did not deter the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and and moved to purge Rwandan elements from his their leaders from their original agenda. Former government. Backed by Rwandan and Ugandan Rwandan authorities, who recognized themselves as troops, a newly-formed Congolese rebellion known a government in exile, began making preparations as the Rally for Congolese Democracy, or RCD, took to return to power in Rwanda; refugee camps in control of the Kivus and targeted Kabila’s economic eastern Congo were ideal grounds for new recruit- lifelines: the diamond towns of Mbuji-Mayi and the ment. Mugunga refugee camp (not far from Goma), minerals of Katanga.

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