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Constitutional Law - Mootness - Personal Stake - Class Actions Duquesne Law Review Volume 19 Number 4 Article 7 1981 Constitutional Law - Mootness - Personal Stake - Class Actions Thomas F. Smida Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons Recommended Citation Thomas F. Smida, Constitutional Law - Mootness - Personal Stake - Class Actions, 19 Duq. L. Rev. 779 (1981). Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol19/iss4/7 This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -MOOTNESS -PERSONAL STAKE-CLASS ACTIONS-The United States Supreme Court has held that an action brought on behalf of a class may be appealed upon expiration of the named plaintiffs substantive claim even though the class certification has been denied. United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980). Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,1 John M. Geraghty was convicted of con- spiracy to commit extortion through the use of his official position as a Chicago vice squad police officer,2 and of making false declarations to a jury.3 On January 25, 1974, Geraghty was sentenced to concurrent terms of four years imprisonment on the conspiracy count and one year imprisonment on the false declaration count.' On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions.5 Pursuant to a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Pro- cedure 35,8 Geraghty obtained a reduction of his sentence to thirty 7 months. In Janauary 1976, and again in June 1976, Geraghty applied for release on parole. The Board of Parole denied both parole applications,8 relying on the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act' and the 1. See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 390, 391 (1980). 2. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976). 3. See ic. § 1623. 4. 445 U.S. at 392. See 18 U.S.C. § 4208 (1976). 5. United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975). 6. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 provides: The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein for the reduction of sentence. The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the sentence is imposed, or within 120 days after receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon af- firmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within 120 days after entry of any order or judgment of the Supreme Court denying review of, or having the effect of upholding, a judgment of conviction. The court may also reduce a sentence upon revocation of probation as provided by law. 7. United States v. Braasch, No. 72 C.R. 979 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 9, 1975), appeal dis- missed and mandamus denied, 542 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1976). The motion was granted because, in the district court's view, application of the United States Parole Board's Parole Release Guidelines, 38 Fed. Reg. 31,942-39,145 (1973) (currently in force at 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1979)), would frustrate the sentencing judge's intent with regard to the length of time Geraghty would serve in prison. Id. 8. 445 U.S. at 392. 9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1976). Duquesne Law Review Vol. 19:779 guidelines promulgated thereunder by the Commission."0 The guidelines, as applied to Geraghty, did not permit release until service of his entire sentence minus good-time credits." On September 15, 1976, Geraghty brought a class action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to challenge the validity of the Parole Release Guidelines.12 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B), 1 Geraghty sought certification of a class of all federal prisoners who are or will become eligible for release on parole." Without deciding the certification motion, the court transferred the action to the United States District Court for the Mid- dle District of Pennsylvania, the district where Geraghty was in- carcerated.1 5 The District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania subse- quently denied Geraghty's request for class certification and granted summary judgment for the United States Parole Commission. 16 The district court held that rule 23 was not applicable to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the issues raised were not applicable to all the members of the class and not all members of the class had the same interests as Geraghty in declaring the Parole Commission act un- constitutional.1 7 Turning to the merits of Geraghty's claim, the district 10. 28 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1976). These guidelines, in accordance with statutory criteria, are to be used in making parole decisions. 18 U.S.C. § 4206(al requires the decision to be based upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the history and characteristics of the prisoner. See Conference Report, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 359. 11. 445 U.S. at 392. 12. Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, Civil No. 76-1729 (D.D.C., November 12, 1976). 13. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) provides in relevant part: An action may be maintained as a class action if... (1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not par- ties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests .... 14. 445 U.S. at 393. 15. Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, Civil No. 76-1729 (D.D.C., November 12, 1976). The District Court for the District of Columbia construed the action as a peti- tion for writ of habeas corpus, which must be brought in the district where the prisoner is incarcerated. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (1976). The court transferred the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406 which allows a district court in the interest of justice to transfer a case laying in the wrong venue to any district court in which it could have been brought. Id 16. Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 429 F. Supp. 737 (M.D. Pa. 1977). 17. Id. at 740-41. 1981 Recent Decisions court concluded that the Act and the guidelines were not unconstitu- tional.' 8 Geraghty, individually and on behalf of a class, appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.' 9 Thereafter, a prisoner named Becher who also had been denied release through ap- plication of the guidelines, moved to intervene to insure that the legal issues raised by Geraghty on behalf of the class would not escape ap- pellate review.20 The district court denied the petition to intervene, concluding that Geraghty's notice of appeal had divested the court of jurisdiction. Geraghty's and Becher's appeals were consolidated.2 ' On June 30, 1977, while appeal was pending, Geraghty was man- datorily released from prison.' The Parole Commission then sought dismissal of the appeal on the basis that Geraghty's claim was moot. The court of appeals reserved decision on the motion until considera- tion of the merits. In reversing the district court's decision, the appeals court held that Geraghty's release from prison would not have rendered the case moot if a class had been certified,' and, therefore, an erroneous denial of certification should not lead to an opposite result. 5 The court held that plaintiff is not required to prove that certification is necessary, but on- ly that there is compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.n The court of appeals also questioned the trial court's finding that class certification was inappropriate. According to the appellate court, the trial court failed to exercise its discretion to limit an overbroad class by the use of sub-classes.Y Concluding that the trial court erred by fail- ing to consider the possibility of creating sub-classes, the court of ap- peals reversed and remanded.5 18. Id at 741-44. The court found Geraghty's argument that the Act empowered the Parole Commission to make deferred sentencing decisions without proper due process safeguards and in violation of the ex post facto prohibition to be without merit because parole involves the implementation, not the modification, of a sentence. Id. 19. Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 445 U.S. 388 (1980). 20. 445 U.S. at 394. 21. Id. 22. Id. Geraghty was released after serving 22 months of his 30 month sentence, hav- ing earned good-time credits for the remaining 8 months. Id. See notes 6 and 7 and accom- panying text supra. 23. 445 U.S. at 394. 24. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). 25. 579 F.2d at 248-52. 26. Id. at 252. 27. Id. at 252-53. 28. Id. Duquesne Law Review Vol. 19:779 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether a trial court's denial of a motion for class certification may be reviewed on appeal after the named plaintiffs personal claim has ex- pired." In delivering the opinion of the court," Justice Blackmun first discussed the case or controversy limitation which article III of the Constitution places on the judiciary.3' The case or controversy require- ment limits the business of federal courts to issues framed in an adver- sarial context, and defines the role of the judiciary in order to main- tain the separation of powers2 2 The Court noted that the doctrine of mootness has two corresponding requirements: that an issue be live, and that a party have a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation." After finding a live controversy between the defendant and at least some of the class members," the Court turned to the second aspect of mootness, the personal stake of the parties in the litigation." Narrow- ing its analysis to the class action context,8 the Court discussed Sosna v.
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