Amicus Briefs in Cases, Like This One, That Raise Issues of Vital State Concern
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The Political Question Doctrine: Justiciability and the Separation of Powers
The Political Question Doctrine: Justiciability and the Separation of Powers Jared P. Cole Legislative Attorney December 23, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R43834 The Political Question Doctrine: Justiciability and the Separation of Powers Summary Article III of the Constitution restricts the jurisdiction of federal courts to deciding actual “Cases” and “Controversies.” The Supreme Court has articulated several “justiciability” doctrines emanating from Article III that restrict when federal courts will adjudicate disputes. One justiciability concept is the political question doctrine, according to which federal courts will not adjudicate certain controversies because their resolution is more proper within the political branches. Because of the potential implications for the separation of powers when courts decline to adjudicate certain issues, application of the political question doctrine has sparked controversy. Because there is no precise test for when a court should find a political question, however, understanding exactly when the doctrine applies can be difficult. The doctrine’s origins can be traced to Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison; but its modern application stems from Baker v. Carr, which provides six independent factors that can present political questions. These factors encompass both constitutional and prudential considerations, but the Court has not clearly explained how they are to be applied. Further, commentators have disagreed about the doctrine’s foundation: some see political questions as limited to constitutional grants of authority to a coordinate branch of government, while others see the doctrine as a tool for courts to avoid adjudicating an issue best resolved outside of the judicial branch. Supreme Court case law after Baker fails to resolve the matter. -
Is the Political Question Doctrine Jurisdictional Or Prudential? Ron Park
UC Irvine Law Review Volume 6 Article 9 Issue 2 The New Legal Realism at Ten Years 6-2016 Is the Political Question Doctrine Jurisdictional or Prudential? Ron Park Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr Recommended Citation Ron Park, Is the Political Question Doctrine Jurisdictional or Prudential?, 6 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 255 (2016). Available at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr/vol6/iss2/9 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UCI Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in UC Irvine Law Review by an authorized editor of UCI Law Scholarly Commons. Park FINAL [4.6.17] (Do Not Delete) 4/14/2017 5:44 PM Is the Political Question Doctrine Jurisdictional or Prudential? Ron Park* In Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., the family members of protestors killed or injured by bulldozers driven by the Israeli Defense Forces sued the manufacturer of the bulldozers in federal district court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the lawsuit after holding the issues nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit held that the political question doctrine was jurisdictional. As of this moment, only the Ninth Circuit has explicitly answered the question of whether the political question doctrine is jurisdictional or prudential. The Supreme Court has not answered that question and no other Circuit Court of Appeals has done so either. This Note attempts to answer that question by making the factors articulated in the Supreme Court’s key opinion on the political question doctrine, Baker v. -
IN the SUPREME COURT of the STATE of KANSAS Nos. 113,531
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS Nos. 113,531 113,532 STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. TONY R. ROAT, Appellant. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. A case is moot when a court determines it is clearly and convincingly shown that the actual controversy has ended, that the only judgment that could be entered would be ineffectual for any purpose, and that it would not have an impact on any of the parties' rights. 2. The mootness doctrine is based on and gives effect to prudential considerations, such as conservation of judicial resources. 3. The determination of whether a case is moot is subject to de novo review on appeal. 1 4. Before dismissing cases as moot, courts must exercise caution and explore with due consideration the wide variety of interests a party asserts. 5. The party asserting mootness generally bears the initial burden of establishing that a case is moot in the first instance. 6. In an appeal solely challenging a sentence, the party asserting mootness may establish a prima facie showing of mootness by demonstrating that the defendant has fully completed the terms and conditions of his or her sentence. 7. Upon a prima facie showing of mootness, the burden shifts to the party opposing the mootness challenge to show the existence of a substantial interest that would be impaired by dismissal or that an exception to the mootness doctrine applies. 8. The prospect of a later suit for damages may create a sufficient interest in a case pending before an appellate court to allow the case to survive a mootness challenge. -
Standing and Ripeness Revisited: the Supreme Court's "Hypothetical" Barriers
University of Tulsa College of Law TU Law Digital Commons Articles, Chapters in Books and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works 1992 Standing and Ripeness Revisited: The uprS eme Court's "Hypothetical" Barriers Marla Mansfield Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/fac_pub Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation 68 N. D. L. Rev. 1 (1992). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles, Chapters in Books and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. STANDING AND RIPENESS REVISITED: THE SUPREME COURT'S "HYPOTHETICAL" BARRIERS BY MARLA E. MANSFIELD* I. Introduction ............................................. 2 II. The Law of Standing and Ripeness ..................... 6 A. HISTORY OF STANDING LAW AND GENERAL C RITIQUES .......................................... 6 1. "Narrow" Standing: Private Rights Model ..... 7 2. "Broadened"Access ............................. 8 3. "Causation" Limiting Systemic Relief .......... 11 4. The Agency Era ................................. 15 B. HISTORY OF RIPENESS LAW AND GENERAL CRITIQUES .......................................... 19 III. The Cases in Detail: Lujan and Air Courier Conference .............................................. 23 A. LUJAN V. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION ........ 23 1. Factual and ProceduralBackground ............ 23 2. The "Injury in Fact" Decision ................... 25 3. The Nature of an "Action" and the "Ripeness" D ecision ......................................... 29 B. AIR COURIER CONFERENCE OF AMERICA V. POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO ........................ 33 1. Factualand ProceduralBackground ............ 33 2. The "Zone of Interest" Test ..................... 35 IV. Philosophical Pedigrees of the Decisions ............... 37 A. SEPARATION OF POWERS AS A DECISIONAL GUIDE 37 B. -
Notes Who's Standing in the District After Grayson V. At&T Corp.? the Applicability of the Case-Or- Controversy Requireme
CURRAN.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2013 1:18 PM NOTES WHO’S STANDING IN THE DISTRICT AFTER GRAYSON V. AT&T CORP.? THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CASE-OR- CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT IN D.C. COURTS * JOHN W. CURRAN TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ........................................................................................ 740 I. Background .............................................................................. 741 A. Congressional Power over D.C. ........................................ 741 B. Modern-Day D.C. Courts ................................................... 743 1. Congressional creation of Article I courts in the District .......................................................................... 743 2. Palmore and the constitutionality of Article I D.C. courts ............................................................................ 746 3. Congress can legislate over D.C. free from Article III constraints ............................................................... 746 C. Standing Requirements in Federal Court ........................ 748 D. D.C. Court Discussions of the Case-or-Controversy Requirement ...................................................................... 750 II. D.C. Courts Exist Unencumbered by the Case-or- Controversy Requirement ........................................................ 754 A. CPPA and Grayson History ................................................. 754 B. Grayson II Ducks the Question, Throwing Precedent Into Doubt ........................................................................ -
Advisory Opinions and the Influence of the Supreme Court Over American Policymaking
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT OVER AMERICAN POLICYMAKING The influence and prestige of the federal judiciary derive primarily from its exercise of judicial review. This power to strike down acts of the so-called political branches or of state governments as repugnant to the Constitution — like the federal judicial power more generally — is circumscribed by a number of self-imposed justiciability doctrines, among the oldest and most foundational of which is the bar on advi- sory opinions.1 In accord with that doctrine, the federal courts refuse to advise other government actors or private individuals on abstract legal questions; instead, they provide their views only in the course of deciding live cases or controversies.2 This means that the Supreme Court will not consider whether potential legislative or executive ac- tion violates the Constitution when such action is proposed or even when it is carried out, but only when it is challenged by an adversary party in a case meeting various doctrinal requirements. So, if a legisla- tive coalition wishes to enact a law that might plausibly be struck down — such as the 2010 healthcare legislation3 — it must form its own estimation of whether the proposal is constitutional4 but cannot know for certain how the Court will ultimately view the law. The bar on advisory opinions is typically justified by reference to the separation of powers and judicial restraint: when courts answer le- gal questions outside the legal dispute-resolution process, they reach beyond the judicial role and assume a quasi-legislative character. But ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 1 See Flast v. -
Hart and Wechsler's the Federal Courts and the Federal System By
Kentucky Law Journal Volume 62 | Issue 4 Article 5 1974 Hart and Wechsler's The edeF ral Courts and the Federal System by Paul M. Bator, Paul J. Mishkin, David L. Shapiro, and Herbert Weschler George W. Liebmann Frank, Bernstein, Conoway and Goldman Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. Recommended Citation Liebmann, George W. (1974) "Hart and Wechsler's The eF deral Courts and the Federal System by Paul M. Bator, Paul J. Mishkin, David L. Shapiro, and Herbert Weschler," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 62 : Iss. 4 , Article 5. Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol62/iss4/5 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Special Book Review HART AND WEcHLsr's, Tim FEDERAL CouRTs AND TEE FEDERAL SYsrEm (2d ed. .1973) by Paul M. Bator, Paul J. Mishkin, David L. Shapiro and HerbertWechsler. Mineola, New York: Foundation Press, Inc., 1973. Certainly it is the height of presumption to undertake a review of this new edition of a work which has come to be regarded by courts and practitioners, as well as by the academic fraternity, as the most penetrating delineation and description of problems of federal juns- diction and of the allocation of power between state and national courts. -
U.S. Supreme Court BAKER V. CARR, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
U.S. Supreme Court BAKER v. CARR, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) 369 U.S. 186 BAKER ET AL. v. CARR ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE. No. 6. Argued April 19-20, 1961. Set for reargument May 1, 1961. Reargued October 9, 1961. Decided March 26, 1962. Appellants are persons allegedly qualified to vote for members of the General Assembly of Tennessee representing the counties in which they reside. They brought suit in a Federal District Court in Tennessee under 42 U.S.C. 1983, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, to redress the alleged deprivation of their federal constitutional rights by legislation classifying voters with respect to representation in the General Assembly. They alleged that, by means of a 1901 statute of Tennessee arbitrarily and capriciously apportioning the seats in the General Assembly among the State's 95 counties, and a failure to reapportion them subsequently notwithstanding substantial growth and redistribution of the State's population, they suffer a "debasement of their votes" and were thereby denied the equal protection of the laws guaranteed them by the Fourteenth Amendment. They sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the 1901 statute is unconstitutional and an injunction restraining certain state officers from conducting any further elections under it. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that no claim was stated upon which relief could be granted. Held: 1. The District Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the federal constitutional claim asserted in the complaint. -
United States District Court 7 Eastern District of California 8
Case 1:14-cv-01067-SKO Document 108 Filed 03/29/17 Page 1 of 18 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 RONALD MOORE, Case No. 1:14-cv-01067-SKO 10 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ Plaintiff, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 11 AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS v. 12 (Doc. 90) 13 FATEMAH SANIEFAR, et al., 14 Defendants. _____________________________________/ 15 16 17 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively 18 Summary Adjudication (“Defendants’ Motion”). (Doc. 90.) For the reasons provided herein, the 19 Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion, (id.), and DISMISSES all of Plaintiff’s claims. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 This action involves allegations that features of a restaurant owned or operated by 22 Defendants (the “Building”) violate certain provisions under the Americans with Disabilities Act 23 (the “ADA”) and California state law. The Building is “located at 4030 N. Blackstone Ave., 24 Fresno, CA” and is owned by “the Bost Trust” to “this day.” (Doc. 89, Ex. 2 ¶ 1.) On April 14, 25 2014, the Building was occupied by a restaurant “known as ‘Zlfred’s.’” (Id. ¶ 2.) “On or about 26 February 1, 2015,” the Building “was leased to” an individual “who opened a new restaurant 27 named ‘Yem Kabob.’” (Id. ¶ 3.) 28 Case 1:14-cv-01067-SKO Document 108 Filed 03/29/17 Page 2 of 18 1 Plaintiff asserts that he “suffers from hydrocephalus . , degenerative disc disease, and 2 chronic pain syndrome.” (Doc. 89, Ex. 1 at 9.) Plaintiff further asserts that, “[a]s a result of his 3 medical conditions, [he] is substantially limited in his ability to walk” and, as such, qualifies as 4 disabled under the ADA. -
Opinion of the Court
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS 444444444444 NO. 14-0453 444444444444 COTI MATTHEWS, ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD, M.M., ET AL., PETITIONERS, v. KOUNTZE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, RESPONDENT 4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444 ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444 JUSTICE DEVINE delivered the opinion of the Court. JUSTICE WILLETT filed a concurring opinion. JUSTICE GUZMAN filed a concurring opinion. JUSTICE BOYD did not participate in the decision. The sole issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the defendant’s voluntary cessation of challenged conduct rendered the plaintiffs’ claims for prospective relief moot. The court of appeals held that it did. ___ S.W.3d ___, 2014 WL 1857797, at *4-8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014) (mem. op.). Because the challenged conduct might reasonably be expected to recur, we reverse and remand. Middle school and high school cheerleaders, through their parents, sued Kountze Independent School District after the District prohibited them from displaying banners containing religious signs or messages at school-sponsored events. The District responded by filing a plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity and lack of standing. The District later supplemented that plea to assert mootness in light of its subsequent adoption of Resolution and Order No. 3, which provides that the District is “not required to prohibit messages on school banners . that display fleeting expressions of community sentiment solely because the source or origin of such message is religious,” but “retains the right to restrict the content of school banners.” The trial court denied the District’s plea, and the District took an interlocutory appeal. -
Ripeness and the Constitution Gene R
University of North Carolina School of Law Carolina Law Scholarship Repository Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 1987 Ripeness and the Constitution Gene R. Nichol Jr. University of North Carolina School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications Part of the Law Commons Publication: University of Chicago Law Review This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Ripeness and the Constitution Gene R. Nichol, Jr.t In a decade and a half of decision making, the record of the Burger Court proved, in many ways, a surprising one. Neither the conservative monolith suggested by its early "Nixon Court" label, nor the enthusiastic heir of its predecessor's egalitarian agenda, the Court constructed a mixed legacy of activism and restraint.1 Al- though the Court's overriding approach to constitutional problems has proven difficult to characterize, recurrent themes are clearly ascertainable.' This article will touch on one particular, perhaps distinctive, legacy of the Burger Court: the constitutionalization of 4 the law of federal justiciability. For decades prior to the 1970s, principles of jus- ticiability-standing, mootness, ripeness, political questions, and t Cutler Professor of Constitutional Law and Director, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. I received particularly helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay from Martin Redish, Erwin Chemerinsky, and William Marshall. -
An Overview of Scientific Debate of Global Warming and Climate Change Akhtar S* Department of Geography, University of Karachi, Pakistan
Open Access Journal of Aquatic Sciences and Oceanography RESEARCH ARTICLE An Overview of Scientific Debate of Global Warming and Climate Change Akhtar S* Department of Geography, University of Karachi, Pakistan *Corresponding author: Akhtar S, Department of Geography, University of Karachi, Pakistan, Tel: 0333-3536896, E-mail: [email protected] Citation: Akhtar S (2019) An Overview of Scientific Debate of Global Warming and Climate Change. J Aqua Sci Oceanography 1: 201 Abstract Climate change is not the new phenomenon. The palaeo-climatic studies reveal that during the Pleistocene and Holocene periods several warm and cold periods occurred, resulted change of sea level and change in climatic processes like rise and fall of global average temperature and rainfall. The last medieval warm period was observed from 950 to 1350 AD, followed by the little Ice Age from 1400 to 1900 AD. Occurrence of these climatic changes and their impacts are considered due to natural processes that are geological and astronomical. In 1970s environmentalists and some climate scientists pointed that earth’s average temperature is rising linked with the anthropogenic causes of global warming and emission of carbon dioxide through fossil fuels. In late 1980s the problem was discussed in politics and media. To examine and monitor the global rise of temperature and its impacts due to the emission of carbon dioxide an organization of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was created in 1988 by United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). The IPCC released several reports based upon anthropogenic causes of climate change and their impacts. According to IPCC, 2007 report on climate change during the last 100 years the earth’s average temperature has increased up to 0.6 degree Celsius and if emission of greenhouse gases particularly carbon dioxide continues to rise, global temperature will rise up to 5.8 degrees Celsius by the end of 2100 AD.