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January 27, 2017 Volume Xv, Issue 2

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January 27, 2017 Volume Xv, Issue 2 THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION JANUARY 27, 2017 VOLUME XV, ISSUE 2 p.1 p.3 p.5 p.7 Alexander Sehmer Ebi Spahiu Farhan Zahid Andrew McGregor BRIEFS Western Balkans Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al- Anarchy in Azawad: A Struggles With Return- Alami: A Pakistani Guide to Non-State ing Militants and Reli- Partner for Islamic Armed Groups in gious Identity State Northern Mali FRANCE: WHAT LIES IN STORE FOR RETURNING family was moved back home shortly after, Guiavarch MILITANTS? spent nearly seven months in jail in Turkey before being extradited to France, where he now faces terrorism Alexander Sehmer charges (RFI, January 21). French authorities have detained one of the county’s A former church choirboy raised by a single mother, most high-profile Islamists who, after reportedly growing Guiavarch is one of a number of fairly colorful French disillusioned with Islamic State (IS), left Syria, turning alleged jihadist recruiters. His peers include militants like himself over to Turkish authorities. Omar Diaby, a Senegalese immigrant living in Nice, who after moving to Syria faked his own death in order to Kevin Guiavarch was placed on the United Nations’ undergo surgery — afterward, he contacted the French sanctions list of individuals connected to IS and al-Qae- media to announce he was still alive (France 24, June 1, da in September 2014 and was the subject of an Inter- 2016). pol red notice. The 23-year-old moved to Syria in 2012, initially joining what was then the al-Nusra Front (now Of the foreign fighters who travel from Europe to Syria, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) before turning to IS. The French a high proportion comes from France. By the close of allege he recruited foreign fighters for the group online 2015, the French government estimated a total of about and believe that he was directly involved with the 1,800 fighters had traveled to Syria from France, com- group’s financing (France 24, November 1, 2016). pared to about 760 from the United Kingdom. Guiavarch has variously claimed to be reformed or to Since then, the trend has started to reduce. As well as have grown fearful of dying in Syria (Aranews, January security measures, heightened since the Paris attacks of 23). After contacting the French authorities, he turned 2015, the French government has employed various himself over to the Turkish police in June last year, along deradicalization strategies, including the use of short with his four wives and six children, three of which were interactive films available online that show individuals born in Syria (Le Monde, November 20, 2016). While his battling with the temptations of radicalization (RFI, No- 1 vember, 18, 2016). Such “soft” techniques should not LIBYA: HAFTAR’S STAR ON THE RISE be too easily dismissed, particularly in Europe, where the data suggests those tempted to join IS are often Alexander Sehmer tech-savvy young people with no real experience in the hardships of violent jihad. Libyan fighters loyal to General Khalifa Haftar have re- captured the Ganfouda district of Benghazi, in Libya’s Now in French custody, Guiavarch is doubtless being east, finally securing an Islamist stronghold that had re- debriefed by the authorities and should be able to pro- sisted the general’s forces for nearly two years (Libya vide some useful insight into IS’ structure and finances. Herald, 25 January). The move is a victory for Haftar’s The return of foreign fighters is often couched in terms Libyan National Army (LNA), but also strengthens con- of the potential security threat they pose to their home cerns about the general’s wider ambitions. state; but assuming Guiavarch’s reasons for returning are as he claims, he could perhaps prove a useful tool for Some believe he has set his sights on Tripoli, and those deradicalization efforts as well. fears are not without foundation. Already backed by Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, the anti-Islamist general has seen increasing support from Russia. Earlier in the month, Haftar toured a Russian aircraft carrier off the Libyan coast and spoke to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu by video link (Libya Observer, January 11). It was reported last year that the general had ap- proached Moscow via Libya’s ambassador to Saudi Ara- bia, Abdel al-Badri, requesting military support (Moscow Times, September 28, 2016). Some say Russia has since agreed to use Algeria to skirt a United Nations arms embargo on Libya (Middle East Eye, January 25). Alge- ria, however, has maintained a longstanding policy of non-interference (see Terrorism Monitor, December 1, 2016). And both Russia and Haftar have denied any con- travention of UN sanctions (New Arab, January 19). Western diplomats, officially at least, are less enamored of Haftar, who opposes Libya’s UN-backed government of national accord (GNA) in Tripoli. According to certain indications, however, this view is changing. Some think the new U.S. administration will want to back Haftar, al- though others suspect it will grow less interested in the Libyan conflict. Europe, on the other hand, can ill afford to disengage. With migrants continuing to travel through Libya, events there are of particular concern to Europe and have left many contemplating whether there might not be a ben- efit to having a strongman in place, with Haftar the ob- vious choice. Weary of this, the GNA has tried to play up its own suc- cesses in Libya and offered the prospect of reopening the oil sector to foreign investment (Libyan Express, 2 January 25). At a conference held in London this week, Ahmed Maetig, the deputy chairman of Libya’s Presi- Western Balkans Struggles dency Council, asserted that an area of the country With Returning Militants and spanning from Libya’s western border to Sirte — which government-allied forces recently liberated from Islamic Religious Identity State (IS) — is now “secure, with no obstacles or clashes whatsoever”(Libya Herald, January 26). Ebi Spahiu The implication is that such a claim cannot be made Coalition bombing campaigns against Islamic State (IS) about the east, where Haftar’s anti-Islamist campaign strongholds in both Syria and Iraq have degraded the continues. The LNA took a back seat during the libera- group’s military capabilities and reduced its territory. tion of Sirte, and has come under criticism from the However, as these losses continue, the group is expect- GNA-allied forces, which say he has allowed IS militants ed to increase its engagement with former combatants to flee Benghazi and regroup in Bani Walid (Libya Ob- who have returned to their home countries. The coun- server, January 7). tries in the Western Balkans are no exception in this re- gard. Haftar still has work to do then; but his star, at least for now, is on the rise. More than 1,000 citizens from the Western Balkans joined the group, mainly from majority-Muslim popula- tions, such as Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as minority Muslim communities residing in Ser- bia, Montenegro, Croatia and Macedonia (see Terrorism Monitor, June 24, 2016). As the conflicts in the Middle East have shifted, the numbers of foreign fighters join- ing IS from the Balkans is believed to have decreased since 2015 (Balkan Insight, August 11, 2016). Some at- tribute this decline to government policies aimed at countering violent extremism, while others consider it a result of stronger security measures (see Terrorism Moni- tor, June 24, 2016). Recent events in Albania and Kosovo, however, have poured cold water on just how effective either of these strategies has really been. Lavdrim Muhaxheri In November 2016, security forces in Albania and Koso- vo thwarted an attempted large-scale attack targeting the Israeli national soccer team during a World Cup qualifying match in Shkodër, northern Albania’s second largest city (Gazeta Express, November 9, 2016). Infor- mation about the attack reportedly came from online conversations between Lavdrim Muhaxheri, a Kosovar- Albanian militant, and a number of his followers, inter- cepted by Israeli intelligence. Muhaxheri, an important IS leader for many ethnic Alba- nians who have joined the group but remain based in Albania and Kosovo, first appeared on the jihadist scene 3 in 2014, when he posted pictures of himself on social individuals allegedly linked to the attack (Panorama, media beheading a man and called on Albanian Mus- November 13, 2016). The soccer match, meanwhile, was lims to join IS. Several (apparently false) reports surfaced rescheduled to take place in Elbasan, a town an hour of his death on the battlefield in Syria, but later images away from Albania’s capital. of him in different IS propaganda videos have raised questions about his exact whereabouts and his role with- Although government officials in Albania and Kosovo in IS ranks (see Militant Leadership Monitor, August 31, were quick to capitalize on the successful prevention of 2014). what appears to have been intended as a major attack, the operation also demonstrated the security agencies’ Over the past year, several local media reports have al- weaknesses. As events in Shkodër gained traction in the luded to his return to the region, including a recent re- local media, heightened security measures were put in port from L’esspresso, an Italian news agency, which place. In addition to the over 1,000 Albanian police suggested Muhaxheri had returned to his hometown, already on site, Israeli Special Forces were deployed to Kaçanik, along with 400 former IS fighters from Syria and Elbasan (Balkan Web, November 13, 2016). The move Iraq (L’esspresso, December 26, 2016). All of these re- was controversial, with Albanian commentators asking ports have been repeatedly denied by Kosovar authori- why their country, a NATO member state and a con- ties and by local experts, who say there is no credible tender to join the European Union, had handed almost evidence to support them (Gazeta Express, January 4).
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