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9 Caching Proxy Server webXaccelerator: Owner's Guide by Luis Soltero, Ph.D., MCS Revision 1.06 February 10, 2010 (v1.2.3.10-RELEASE) Copyright © 2010 Global Marine Networks, LLC Table of Contents 1 Quick Start..............................................................................................................................................5 2 Introduction.............................................................................................................................................8 3 Initial Installation and Configuration......................................................................................................9 3.1 Connections.....................................................................................................................................9 3.2 Power-up..........................................................................................................................................9 3.3 Power-down...................................................................................................................................10 3.4 Web Administrator........................................................................................................................10 3.5 LAN Setup.....................................................................................................................................10 3.6 WAN Setup....................................................................................................................................11 3.7 WAN2 (Backup WAN) Setup........................................................................................................13 3.8 WiFi Hotspot Setup.......................................................................................................................13 3.9 Backup/Restore System Configuration.........................................................................................14 3.10 Locking the Console....................................................................................................................15 4 Time......................................................................................................................................................15 4.1 NTP Client.....................................................................................................................................15 4.2 NTP Server....................................................................................................................................15 4.3 Configuring NTP time client on PCs.............................................................................................16 4.3.1 Enabling NTP Client on a Windows PC................................................................................16 4.3.2 Enabling NTP Client on a Mac..............................................................................................16 4.4 Internet Polling Interval.................................................................................................................16 5 Firewall Rules - Block Unwanted Traffic to/from the Internet.............................................................17 5.1 System vs. User Generated Firewall Rules...................................................................................19 6 VPN access through WAN....................................................................................................................19 6.1 Enabling PPTP..............................................................................................................................19 6.2 Windows 7 PPTP Client Setup......................................................................................................20 6.3 Mac OS X Client Setup.................................................................................................................21 7 Captive Portal........................................................................................................................................22 7.1 Limitations ...................................................................................................................................26 7.2 Setting up the Captive Portal.........................................................................................................26 7.3 Bypassing the Captive Portal........................................................................................................27 7.4 Setting up for the Buy Now links..................................................................................................27 7.5 Pincode Restrictions......................................................................................................................29 8 Assigning Static IP addresses to PCs on the LAN/WLAN...................................................................29 9 Caching Proxy Server...........................................................................................................................30 9.1 Limitations.....................................................................................................................................30 9.2 Customizing the Proxy Server.......................................................................................................31 9.2.1 General Settings.....................................................................................................................31 9.2.2 Bypassing Proxy for access to Satellite Terminals................................................................31 9.2.3 Custom Option.......................................................................................................................32 9.2.4 Caching Options....................................................................................................................32 9.2.5 Traffic Management...............................................................................................................33 9.3 XWeb Compression.......................................................................................................................33 9.3.1 Requirements.........................................................................................................................33 9.3.2 Limitations.............................................................................................................................33 9.3.3 Configuration.........................................................................................................................34 9.4 Transparent vs. Manual Proxy.......................................................................................................34 9.4.1 Configuring Client Browsers for Manual Proxy...................................................................35 9.4.2 Automatic Proxy Configuration............................................................................................36 9.4.3 Dynamically Disabling Web Compression............................................................................36 10 Controlling Access to the Web............................................................................................................37 10.1 Blacklists.....................................................................................................................................38 10.2 Dynamic Content Filtering..........................................................................................................39 10.3 Custom Destinations....................................................................................................................39 10.4 ACL.............................................................................................................................................40 10.5 Whitelists.....................................................................................................................................41 10.6 Don't forget to Apply..................................................................................................................41 11 Web Logging.......................................................................................................................................41 12 Disabling Skype and other p2p applications.......................................................................................43 13 Failover from primary to backup satellite link....................................................................................44 13.1 Scheme 1 - Client Based DNS Lookups.....................................................................................45 13.2 Scheme 2 - Static Routes to DNS Servers...................................................................................45 13.3 Configuring Failover Pool...........................................................................................................46 13.4 Policy Based Routing..................................................................................................................48 13.5 Failover and Firewall Rules........................................................................................................48 13.6 Failover and Captive Portal.........................................................................................................49 13.7 Failover and Proxy Web Services................................................................................................49 13.8 Manual Failover..........................................................................................................................50
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