Superior Judges' Commitment to Judicial Independence In

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Superior Judges' Commitment to Judicial Independence In SUPERIOR JUDGES’ COMMITMENT TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN PAKISTAN 1Amanullah Shah, 1Muhammad Iqbal Khan, 2Mobina Mahsood 1Law College, Gomal University, Dera Ismail Khan(KPK) Pakistan 2Lower Courts , Dera Ismail Khan(KPK) Pakistan ABSTRACT Independence of judiciary cannot depend solely on the structure of the government and the judiciary’s formal role within it. It also depends on the judges themselves. This paper aims at examining the judicial commitment to independence of judiciary in Pakistan. This study covers collective role as well as individual role of the judges of the superior courts in Pakistan from 1947 till the restoration of Judges in March 2009. It elaborates the importance of integrity and character of the individual judges for judicial independence. This paper critically studies the role of those judges who by their behaviour undermined the independence of the judiciary and severely damaged the confidence of the public in the judiciary of Pakistan. INTRODUCTION corruption and to make truly Independence of judiciary does not mean independent decisions. Prof. Dam has merely independence from outside rightly referred to the British influences but also from those within. A constitutional system, in support of his former justice of India, Mr. Verma, is of view that behavioral independence is the opinion that dangers to judiciary more important and more effective than from within have much larger and structural independence in the context of greater potential to harm than dangers independence of judiciary (Dam, 2006). from outside (Verma, 2000). Professor The British judiciary has not Dam differentiates between structural traditionally been structurally independence and behavioral independent is shown by the independence. The latter is more intermingling of judicial, executive and important than the former (Dam, 2006). legislative functions at the highest level. The former term as used here, refers to Until the Constitutional Reform Act the way in which government is 2005 was passed, the Law Lords who constitutionally structured. Does that formed the Highest Appellate Court in structure secure independence of the British Judiciary also sat in the judiciary? Behavioral independence House of Lords – the upper house of the resides in the judge as a person. Is the British Parliament. More amazing was judge independent? An independent the position of Lord Chancellor, who judge is not just dispassionate and free presided over the Law Lords as well as from bias, but willing to take difficult the House of Lords and was a member of position to resist political or any external the cabinet also at the same time. The pressure, to reject any temptation of Law Lords transferred to the newly Gomal University Journal of Research, 27(2). December, 2011 55 Shah et al., Superior Judges Commitment created Supreme Court in 2009 under the removed by the military government in Reform Act 2005. That is why it is said 1977. The whole process was accepted that the structural arrangement in Britain by the judiciary with very ease without made structural judicial independence any murmur on its part. The judges of unlikely, yet still the fact is that British superior courts had been asked four judiciary, particularly at the highest times (i.e. in 1977, 1981, 2000 and level, was known for its independence 2007) by the military dictators to take a (because of behavioral independence). new oath under Provisional Behavioral independence was acquired Constitutional Order (PCO). They have after a long struggle in which many never been able to act collectively and to British judges were willing to stand up resist as an institution, the executives to the British sovereign at great personal measures undermining the prestige as risk during the Tudor and Stuart periods, wells as independence of the judiciary. even before the Act of Settlement of Each time except in 1977, a good 1701, gave judges life tenure on good number of judges of the superior behavior (Dam, 2006). judiciary were arbitrarily removed by the military regime, simply not inviting Although the independence of the them to take new oath. Their only fault British judicial system was established was that they were not under the by behavioral independence rather than influence of the government and were structural independence, it does not apparently known as independent follow that a developing country like judges. There were also certain noble Pakistan can afford to neglect structural judges who individually refused to take independence. Structural independence new oath under PCO and preferred to and behavioral independence can sacrifice their prestigious service at the support each other and in a country altar of their conscience. seeking to overcome legalized abuse of the executive authority, it is mars to see The most shocking and painful episode judicial independence “fully secured” if was the oath taking of several judges of one does not foster both. the superior judiciary under PCO 2007, promulgated on November 3, 2007 by JUDICIARY AS AN INSTITUTION General Musharraf as Chief of Army The preceding history of Pakistan tells Staff. Anticipating something unusual, the fact that judges could not develop the several senior judges of the Supreme judiciary as an institution. They never Court including the Chief Justice responded collectively as an institution remained in the Supreme Court till late to a threat or direct interference in the afternoon on Saturday (November 3, independence of judiciary. For example 2007). As they came to know about the the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Justice declaration of Extra-Constitutional Yaqoob Ali Khan was arbitrarily Emergency and promulgation of PCO Gomal University Journal of Research, 27(2). December, 2011 56 Shah et al., Superior Judges Commitment 2007, they immediately assembled in a judges also switched over to the court room. In an unprecedented move, government’s side. At the end 5 seven judges of the Supreme Court Supreme Court judges and 40 High headed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Courts judges took oath under PCO Muhammad Choudhry overturned the 2007. A very good opportunity of PCO and restrained the Chief of Army collective stand as an institution has Staff, Corps Commanders, Staff Officers been missed by the judges who preferred and other civil and military officers from their personal perks and privileges over acting under PCO. The court directed the institutional interests. President Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz not to take any action Judges of the superior judiciary not only contrary to the independence of the failed to collectively resist the onslaught judiciary and asked the judges of the on the independence of judiciary but Supreme Court and the High Courts, they have been so docile and passive that including their Chief Justices, not to take they could not protest even at an oath under the PCO or follow any humiliation of their brother judges. For other extra-constitutional step. This example, during General Yahya Khan’s order of the court was distributed among martial law in 1969, as Sub-Martial Law the media men present at the time Administrator, General Abu Bakr (Dawn, The News, The Nation etc dated Usman Mitha issued a notice of November 4, 2007). The same was contempt of martial law to two justices communicated to all Chief Justices and of the West Pakistan High Court and judges of the Supreme Court and High both judges were asked to appear before Courts (The News, 4-11-2007). In spite the General. They were blamed in the of the clear order from the Supreme notice for staying an order of military Court, there were certain judges who court. According to Justice Nasim took new oath under PCO without any Hassan Shah – one of the two judges to hesitation and in complete violation of whom the notice was issued – almost all the Supreme Court’s direction. Though judges of the West Pakistan High Court this time majority of the judges resisted kept silent and was avoiding taking open the powerful establishment but their stand and supporting their colleagues stand was destroyed by some self- against General Mitha (Shah, 1997). centered judges. On November 3, 2007, Another shocking episode of judges’ 13 judges out of 17 Supreme Court disgrace happened in 1981, during judges including the Chief Justice of General Zia’s regime, where three Pakistan and 49 judges out of 77 judges judges of the Lahore High Court were of the High Courts refused to take oath returned from the Governor House under PCO. Justice Abdul Hamid because they were not to be given oath. Dogger was sworn in as Chief Justice of Other brother judges present including Pakistan. Within few days some other the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Gomal University Journal of Research, 27(2). December, 2011 57 Shah et al., Superior Judges Commitment Court did not take any stand for the declined to take oath under PCO? In a colleagues who were so blatantly society like Pakistan, even a dictator insulted and humiliated (Khan, 2001). would think a hundred times before sacking the entire judiciary. In the days On March 9 2007, the Chief Justice of of General Ayub Khan’s regime, where Pakistan, Justice Iftikhar Muhammad the Chief Justice of Lahore High Court Chaudhry was summoned by General (one of the noble exceptions) learnt that Musharraf to his army office, there he a writ issued by the High Court was not was pressured to quit. On the refusal of going to be honored by the government, the Chief Justice to do accordingly, he the Chief Justice threatened Ayub Khan was detained in the army office up to that the whole Court would resign in five hours. In the meanwhile another bloc. It is said that Chief Justice was judge of the Supreme Court, Justice carrying the letters of resignations of the Javid Iqbal, was appointed and sworn in judges in his pocket.
Recommended publications
  • PAKISTAN NEWS DIGEST a Selected Summary of News, Views and Trends from Pakistani Media
    February 2017 PAKISTAN NEWS DIGEST A Selected Summary of News, Views and Trends from Pakistani Media Prepared by Dr Ashish Shukla & Nazir Ahmed (Research Assistants, Pakistan Project, IDSA) PAKISTAN NEWS DIGEST FEBRUARY 2017 A Select Summary of News, Views and Trends from the Pakistani Media Prepared by Dr Ashish Shukla & Nazir Ahmed (Pak-Digest, IDSA) INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES AND ANALYSES 1-Development Enclave, Near USI Delhi Cantonment, New Delhi-110010 Pakistan News Digest, February (1-15) 2017 PAKISTAN NEWS DIGEST, FEBRUARY 2017 CONTENTS ....................................................................................................................................... 0 ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................................... 2 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS ............................................................................. 3 NATIONAL POLITICS ....................................................................................... 3 THE PANAMA PAPERS .................................................................................... 7 PROVINCIAL POLITICS .................................................................................... 8 EDITORIALS AND OPINION .......................................................................... 9 FOREIGN POLICY ............................................................................................ 11 EDITORIALS AND OPINION ........................................................................ 12 MILITARY AFFAIRS .............................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Israel-Pakistan Relations Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS)
    P. R. Kumaraswamy Beyond the Veil: Israel-Pakistan Relations Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS) The purpose of the Jaffee Center is, first, to conduct basic research that meets the highest academic standards on matters related to Israel's national security as well as Middle East regional and international secu- rity affairs. The Center also aims to contribute to the public debate and governmental deliberation of issues that are - or should be - at the top of Israel's national security agenda. The Jaffee Center seeks to address the strategic community in Israel and abroad, Israeli policymakers and opinion-makers and the general public. The Center relates to the concept of strategy in its broadest meaning, namely the complex of processes involved in the identification, mobili- zation and application of resources in peace and war, in order to solidify and strengthen national and international security. To Jasjit Singh with affection and gratitude P. R. Kumaraswamy Beyond the Veil: Israel-Pakistan Relations Memorandum no. 55, March 2000 Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 6 P. R. Kumaraswamy Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies Tel Aviv University Ramat Aviv, 69978 Tel Aviv, Israel Tel. 972 3 640-9926 Fax 972 3 642-2404 E-mail: [email protected] http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/ ISBN: 965-459-041-7 © 2000 All rights reserved Graphic Design: Michal Semo Printed by: Kedem Ltd., Tel Aviv Beyond the Veil: Israel-Pakistan Relations 7 Contents Introduction .......................................................................................9
    [Show full text]
  • Pakistan: Challenges to Nawaz Sharif Government
    scholar warrior Pakistan: Challenges to Nawaz Sharif Government ALOK BANSAL The elections held on the 11th of May, 2013 have ushered in Mian Nawaz Sharif as the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for an unprecedented third term. Although, the elections gave Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) a clear majority, the new government faces monumental challenges. Politically, the emergence of Imran Khan led Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) poses a major challenge to Nawaz Sharif in his traditional strong holds. Imran Khan, who has no love lost for Nawaz Sharif, ensured that his party emerged as the largest opposition party in terms of votes polled. PTI’s emergence as the largest political party in Taliban afflicted Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa (KP) and Imran Khan’s pro-Taliban proclivities have severely restricted Nawaz Sharif’s options of dealing with the menace of Talibanisation. In the run up to the elections, both Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan had spoken against US drone attacks and had supported negotiation with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). While this did win them some votes, it has become extremely difficult to deliver on their electoral promises. Although, handling the Taliban, and the inherent radicalization of society are the most significant issues requiring the government’s attention, the issues that needs utmost attention can be broadly divided into four aspects: sectarianism, economic crisis, ethno-nationalism, and Talibanisation. Sectarianism Sectarianism is the natural corollary of the divisive ‘Two Nation Theory’, which required an ‘object of hate’. After the liberation of Bangladesh, the number of 48 ä AUTUMN 2013 ä scholar warrior scholar warrior With the passage of minorities became so insignificant that new time, the sectarian demons had to be created within the fold of Islam and this aggravated the sectarian faultline.
    [Show full text]
  • Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non-Proliferation Regime
    Pakistan’s nuclear bomb: beyond the non-proliferation regime FARZANA SHAIKH* Among the many concerns raised in the wake of the devastating attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington DC on 11 September 2001 was Pakistan’s status as a nuclear power. Some feared that domestic opposition in Pakistan to its role as a ‘front-line’ state in the US cam- paign against ‘international terrorism’ would fuel a deadly coalition between Muslim extremist groups and pro-Islamic factions in the army, giving them access to nuclear weapons.1 Others were apprehensive that US dependence on Pakistan in the ‘war against terrorism’ would weaken the global nuclear non- proliferation regime by easing pressure on Pakistan to ‘cap’ its nuclear pro- gramme and freeze the development of nuclear weapons at existing levels. º Either way, there was a growing consensus that changes in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States would resurrect the debate on whether Pakistan could be trusted to act responsibly as a nuclear power given its long history of political instability. It was also reasonable to assume that Western concern about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability would heighten rather than diminish, and that greater efforts would be made to control Pakistan’s nuclear technology in order to prevent its falling into the hands of terrorist organiza- tions. For its part, Pakistan was expected to draw international attention to the military threat posed by India and resist any pressure to renounce the nuclear option. Bridging the gap between these diverging views is likely to be the main challenge facing arms control negotiators in the coming years.
    [Show full text]
  • The Removal of Nawaz Sharif and Changing Role of Punjab in Pakistani Politics
    December 2014 15 August 2017 The Removal of Nawaz Sharif and Changing Role of Punjab in Pakistani Politics Tridivesh Singh Maini FDI Associate Key Points The removal from office of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif could be the precedent for a change of approach towards the civil-military relationship on the part of the influential province of Punjab. The most populous province of Pakistan, Punjab has long dominated the Pakistani polity and military. Sharif’s party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), heads both the Punjab provincial government and the national government. If the PML-N decides to continue Sharif’s attempts at better relations with India, it will again place the government at odds with the army, which wants oversight of foreign policy issues pertaining to Afghanistan and India. If the PML-N is interested in improving links with India, it will need to take action against terrorist groups. Summary The most populous province of Pakistan, Punjab has long dominated the Pakistani polity and military. Initially, at least, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif – a Punjabi – enjoyed a close relationship with the army. That relationship soured, however, following his dismissal from office during his first term as Prime Minister in 1993. A key factor for the falling out between Sharif and the army was the former’s attempts to build a better relationship with India. Arguably, that enmity only increased during Sharif’s third, most recent, term in office. In the wake of Sharif’s disqualification on 28 July 2017, the influential, traditionally pro-army Punjab leadership is now instead backing Sharif’s party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), or PML-N.
    [Show full text]
  • Pakistan / Alan Wachtel
    ALAN WACHTEL © 2009 Rourke Publishing LLC All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system without permission in writing from the publisher. www.rourkepublishing.com PHOTO CREDITS: ARIF ALI/AFP/Getty Images: pp. 11, 35; Terry Ashe/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images: p. 26; Bernard Bisson/Sygma/Corbis: p. 25; Margaret Bourke-White/Times Life Pictures/Getty Images: p. 18; Getty Images: pp. 24, 37; ASIF HASSAN/AFP/Getty Images: p. 7; Aman Khan/istock: p. 19; Banaras Khan/AFP/Getty Images: p. 40; Danish Khan/istock: p. 14; Saeed Khan/AFP/Getty Images: pp. 28, 31; Library of Congress: pp. 13, 17; John Moore/Getty Images: p. 8; narvikk/istock: p. 29; Daniel Pearl Foundation: p. 34; AAMIR QURESHI/AFP/Getty Images: pp. 5, 39; Christian Simonpietri/Sygma/Corbis: p. 22; Ron Summers/istock: p. 21; Transport Security Administration: p. 32; U.S. Marine Corps: p. 33; Wojclech Zwierzynski/istock: p. 12. Cover picture shows supporters of opposition leader, Benazir Bhutto, during an anti-government protest in November 2007. (Mohsin Raza/Reuters/Corbis) Produced for Rourke Publishing by Discovery Books Editor: Gill Humphrey Designer: Keith Williams Map: Stefan Chabluk Photo researcher: Rachel Tisdale Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Wachtel, Alan, 1968- Pakistan / Alan Wachtel. p. cm. -- (Countries in crisis) ISBN 978-1-60472-352-6 1. Pakistan--Juvenile literature. I. Title. DS376.9.W33 2009 954.91--dc22 2008025141 Printed in the USA CONTENTS Chapter 1: Return of the Exiles 4 Chapter 2: Land and Early History 10 Chapter 3: Independent Pakistan 16 Chapter 4: The Bhuttos 24 Chapter 5: The Musharraf Years 30 Chapter 6: A Dangerous Place 36 Timeline 43 Pakistan Fact File 44 Glossary 46 Further Information 47 Index 48 3 CHAPTER ONE RETURN OF THE EXILES n the fall of 2007, Pakistan’s Pakistan’s Supreme Court Igovernment was getting ready opposed Musharraf’s wish to remain for elections.
    [Show full text]
  • 16 Ist Term Nawaz Sharif 6Nov 90 to 18July 93
    Ist term Federal Cabinet Under the Premiership of Mr. Mohammad Nawaz Sharif from 6. 11. 1990 to 18. 7. 1993. S.No. Portfolio Period Remarks The Prime Minister Mr. Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, 6. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93 1. Sahabzada Yaqub Khan Foreign Affairs 9. 11. 90 to 20. 3. 91 9. 11. 90 to 20. 3. 91 2. Mr. Sartaj Aziz Finance & Economic Affairs 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93 3. Chaudhry Shujat Hussain Interior 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93 Industries 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93 4. Malik Muhammad Naeem Khan Commerce 10. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93 10. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93 5. Lt. Gen (Retd) Abdul Majid Malik Food, Agri. & Cooperatives 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93 6. Mir. Hazar Khan Bijarani Railways 9. 11. 90 to 10. 9. 91 9. 11. 90 to 10. 4. 93 Defence Production Division 10. 9. 91. to 10. 4. 93 7. Mr. Muhammad Ijaz -ul-Haq Labour, Manpower & 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93 9. 11. 90 to 18. 7. 93 Overseas Pakistanis. 8. Maulana Muhammad Abdus Sattar Local Govt. & Rural Dev. 9. 11. 90 to 4. 3. 91 Khan Niazi Spl. Education & SW(Addl. 9. 11. 90 to 4. 3. 91 9. 11. 90 to 4. 3. 91 (Resigned) Charge) 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7. 93 (Re-appointed) Religious Affairs 10. 9. 91 to 18. 7.
    [Show full text]
  • National Security Council of Pakistan
    National Security Council of Pakistan BACKGROUND GUIDE CHAIR: Joe Reed Coy Sanchez-Sponsler Dear Honorable Delegates, I have enjoyed being a part of the Model United Nations team at Stanford, always intrigued in anything concerning politics and power dynamics and regularly deprived of it as a chemical engineering student. Less academically speaking, I pursue string and vocal music as a cellist and bass and spend as much time as I can in the making of useful and/or beautiful things. As your Chair this conference and on the behalf of the rest of the PacMUN community and staff, I would like to extend a warm welcome to PacMUN 2017. This year in particular, with a global joint-crisis format and intricate recent events to develop, we look forward to vibrant debate and conversation on the political world. Functioning as prominent contemporary political figures engaging in diplomacy and negotiations, you will have the opportunity to jointly craft the policy of the National Security Council of Pakistan, a highly influential institution welding the heavyweights of Pakistan’s military and civil government leadership. Introduction to Committee The National Security Council of Pakistan (NSC) has had a tumultuous history as an agency since its conception under General Yahya Khan in 1969. Originally a part of the office of the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator, in 1984 the NSC’s first legal mainstay, article 152A, was proposed as part of the Revival of the Constitution Order (RCO) to provide for military influence of the civil government. A large departure from the Pakistani military’s previously apolitical stance, General Zia-ul-Haq’s move drew criticism from major political factions, the NSC having been sharply curtailed in 1972 after Bhutto’s civilian rise to power in 1971.
    [Show full text]
  • Pakistan's Political Economy and Stock Market Returns
    Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal Volume 24, Issue 4, 2020 PAKISTAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY AND STOCK MARKET RETURNS Ahmed Muneeb Mehta, University of the Punjab Aamir Sohail, University of Sargodha Shafiq Ur Rehman, University of the Punjab Farah Naz Naqvi, University of the Punjab Shrafat Ali Sair, University of the Punjab ABSTRACT The objective of this research is to find out the effect of uncertain political events on the Pakistan Stock exchange (KMI 30& KSE 30) from 2012 to 2019. This study examines how uncertain political events affect Pakistan's stock market using mean adjusted return models and event study methods. The findings of the study show that the Islamic stock market is significant at 5 events and conventional market is significant at 6 events out of 21 events. Both markets responded events count have a minor difference. Islamic market is more intense in response to political events; its significance level is high in responses. The findings of the study show that both markets are inefficient for short timeframe, after nearly 15 days, they absorb the noisy data and begins normalizing. The research contributes to the literature by proving that KSE 30 is less effective than KMI 30, as conventional markets respond more to different uncertain political events than Islamic markets. This research study is expected to make a significant contribution, especially in the Pakistan capital market literature as in this study researchers incorporate multiple political events and its impact on different stock markets performance. Further research may examine differences in the response of the KSE and other Pakistani stock exchanges (such as Lahore and Islamabad) to Pakistani political events.
    [Show full text]
  • The Reincarnation of Nawaz Sharif: Pakistan's Deepening Democracy
    ISAS Brief No. 279 – 13 May 2013 469A Bukit Timah Road #07-01, Tower Block, Singapore 259770 Tel: 6516 6179 / 6516 4239 Fax: 6776 7505 / 6314 5447 Email: [email protected] Website: www.isas.nus.edu.sg The Reincarnation of Nawaz Sharif: Pakistan’s Deepening Democracy1 Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury2 Introduction Barring an act of God, Nawaz Sharif is poised to become Pakistan’s Prime Minister for the third time round. Each reincarnation implies changes, and so will this one. We are likely to see in him a seasoned politician, chastened by experience, matured over time and also hardened by adversity. His Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) [PML(N)] has won sufficient number of seats of the 272 elected to form government, albeit with the support of some eager independents. There are 70 more seats in the Lower House of the Parliament, reserved for women and minorities, which will be proportionately divided among the parties elected, which means PML(N) will walk away with the major share. He has already held out the olive branch to all others in the political landscape, including the ‘old-new kid on the block’ Imran Khan and his Tehreek-e-Insaf, who is second in the pecking order of winners. In doing so, Nawaz Sharif has displayed much wisdom and sagacity; for the party worst off in the polls, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) of Asif Ali Zardari, still has a 1 This Brief is the first in a planned series of ISAS papers focused on Pakistan and its historic opportunity at this time.
    [Show full text]
  • Eyeing the Generals
    Eyeing the Generals Parsing the Civilian-Military Struggle for Influence in Pakistan By Shuja Nawaz rime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif’s government took office in June 2013—with a sizable parliamentary majority—and amidst raised expecta- Ptions that his party, the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz party, or PML-N, for short, would be able to create a positive change on the political and economic scene. But the fractious polity of Pakistan has threatened his tenuous hold on power and thrust his party into a confrontation with the powerful military establishment, even as Sharif is under attack from his civilian political opponents. Nawaz 3.0, his third time in office, has started looking more like Nawaz 1.0. And rumors have begun cir- culating of an “Egypt on the Indus”—the possibility of a soft coup perhaps leading to the real thing. First, the political crisis. As Pakistan celebrated its sixty-seventh independence anniversary on August 14, at least two political forces converged on the capital Islamabad to press for change in the government. One challenge came from the rela- tively liberal Tehreek-e-Insaf of cricketeer-turned-politician Imran Khan; the other from the right-wing religious evangelist Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, a resident of Canada who brought his Minhaj-ul-Quran followers to bear on the teetering and confused government. Khan had accused the Sharif government of stealing last year’s elections, which left his party with just thirty-four seats in parliament. The irony of a democrat demanding an extra-constitutional change in the government was lost on Khan and his followers.
    [Show full text]
  • 5. the Nuclear Confrontation in South Asia
    5. The nuclear confrontation in South Asia M. V. RAMANA and ZIA MIAN I. Introduction The 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan dramatically worsened the secur- ity situation for over a billion people in the subcontinent.1 Since then the two countries have continued to engage in a slow but steady arms race involving qualitative and quantitative developments and a gradual consolidation of nuclear weapon infrastructure. Nuclear use doctrines are taking shape. There have also been two major military crises, both prominently featuring nuclear threats. Section II of this chapter presents an overview of Indian and Pakistani rela- tions since the 1998 nuclear tests. Section III discusses the crisis of 2002. Sec- tion IV describes the nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan and nuclear force developments are covered in section V. Section VI examines the role of nuclear weapons, and section VII presents the conclusions. II. Overview: 1998–2002 The Lahore Declaration Once the incendiary rhetoric characterizing the immediate aftermath of the nuclear tests had subsided, India and Pakistan appeared to take their first steps towards arms control and détente, partly in order to assuage domestic and international fears. As with the superpowers during the cold war, India and Pakistan sought to move the terms of the nuclear debate away from disarma- ment and towards managing the nuclear threat. The culmination of this pro- cess was the Lahore summit meeting in February 1999 between Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz
    [Show full text]