MIAMI UNIVERSITY The Graduate School
Certificate for Approving the Dissertation
We hereby approve the Dissertation
of
Mark S. Keida
Candidate for the Degree:
Doctor of Philosophy
______Director John M. Rothgeb, Jr.
______Reader Walter Vanderbush
______Reader Sheila Croucher
______Graduate School Representative Stephen Norris ABSTRACT
GLOBALIZING SOLIDARITY: EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN U.S. LABOR UNION TRANSNATIONALISM
By Mark S. Keida
The purpose of this research is to explain differences in the transnational organizing strategies of U.S. trade unions. Of particular interest is the degree to which economic globalization (e.g., import competition, foreign direct investment, and multinationalization) influences the nature, scope, and priority U.S. labor unions assign to transnational organizing strategies. Toward this end, this research compares the transnational strategies of three U.S. labor unions — the United Steelworkers of America (USW), the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) — each of which represents a distinct sector of U.S. labor market (manufacturing, service, and professional) and experiences a different level and type of exposure to economic globalization (high, moderate, and low). Using an updated theory of labor transnationalism and primary source data, this study finds that transnational organizing strategies are highly correlated with exposure to economic globalization, particularly multinationalization in a union’s core industries. At the same time, in cases where exposure to economic globalization is low, transnational strategies are better explained through intra-organizational dynamics, such as leadership ideology, membership interests, and union size. In the main, this study suggests that in order to explain differences in transnational organizing strategies, one must consider both the level and type of exposure to economic globalization, as well as organizational dynamics in cases where exposure is minimal.
GLOBALIZING SOLIDARITY: EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN U.S. LABOR UNION TRANSNATIONALISM
A DISSERTATION
Submitted to the Faculty of
Miami University in partial
fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Political Science
by
Mark S. Keida
Miami University
Oxford, OH
2006
Dissertation Director: John M. Rothgeb, Jr.
©
Mark S. Keida
2006
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1: The Study of Labor Transnationalism...... 1 Introduction: On the Decline of the U.S. Labor Movement ...... 1 Literature Review: Organized Labor in the Global...... 6 Normative/Prescriptive Approaches: Labor Transnationalism, Good or Bad?...... 6 Empirical/Descriptive Approaches: Sites of Labor Internationalism...... 9 Analytic/Explanatory: Why Transnational Labor, Why Now?...... 11 Summary: On the Vices of “Cosmopolitan” Analysis...... 15 Theory: Situating American Labor Transnationalism...... 16 The Economic Globalization Approach to Labor Union Transnationalism ...... 17 Political Opportunities and Resource Mobilization as Determinants of Labor Union Transnationalism...... 22 Toward a Theory of Labor Union Transnationalism...... 26 Research Design and Methodology...... 27 Research Question ...... 27 Operationalized Variables...... 27 Hypotheses ...... 29 Cases ...... 30 Data Collection/Interviews...... 31 Chapter Outlines...... 34 Chapter 2: U.S. Labor Transnationalism in Historical Perspective ...... 35 Introduction...... 35 The Early Years of the U.S. Labor Movement: 1900-1955...... 36 The Cold War Years: 1945-1989 ...... 44 Situating International Affairs...... 44 Bilateral Activism: The AFL-CIO’s Foreign Institutes...... 46 Multilateralism: The ILO and ICFTU ...... 54 The Assault on Organized Labor...... 58 Whither Organized Labor? ...... 65 Chapter 3: The United Steelworkers’ of America (USW) ...... 70 Introduction...... 70
iii A Brief History of Steel Organizing and the USW...... 70 The USW Today: Key Sectors, Job Trends, and Globalization...... 75 The Domestic Arena: Toward Competitive Manufacturing ...... 78 What do they want? ...... 78 Free Trade ...... 79 Benefits: Heath Care and Social Security...... 81 Workers’ Rights...... 82 The Transnational Arena: Global Employers and Global Unions ...... 83 Global Union Councils/Networks ...... 84 The ICEM/Rio Tinto Global Union Council (1998) ...... 86 Goodyear/Bridgestone Global Councils (1999, 2000) ...... 87 IMF/Alcoa Global Company Council (2003) ...... 89 ExxonMobil & Sappi Global Councils (2003/2005)...... 91 Strategic Alliances...... 93 Analysis ...... 94 Chapter 4: The Service Employees International Union (SEIU)...... 97 Introduction...... 97 A Brief History of the SEIU ...... 98 The SEIU Today: Sectors, Jobs Picture, and Globalization ...... 103 The Domestic Arena: From Job Security to Life Security ...... 106 What Do They Want? ...... 106 Immigration Reform ...... 107 Wages and Working Conditions...... 109 The Transnational Arena: Raising Standards in the U.S. and Abroad ...... 112 Focus on Group 4 Securicor...... 113 Driving Up Standards/London Cleaners’ Campaigns ...... 115 The Clean Start Campaign ...... 117 Women’s Rights ...... 119 Direct Solidarity Actions ...... 120 Analysis ...... 121 The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) ...... 124
iv Introduction...... 124 A Brief History of the AFT...... 125 The AFT Today: Key Sectors, Job Trends, and Exposure to Globalization...... 128 The Domestic Arena: Keeping the Public Sphere Public (and Unionized)...... 132 What do they want? ...... 132 NCLB (No Child Left Behind)...... 132 Vouchers and Charter Schools ...... 134 Social Security/Retirement...... 136 The Transnational Arena: Making the World Safe for (U.S.) Democracy...... 138 The Africa AIDS Campaign...... 139 Education for Democracy/International (ED/I)...... 142 Bi-lateral Solidarity Programs...... 144 Resolutions...... 146 Analysis ...... 148 Chapter 6: Interviews and Hypotheses...... 151 Hypothesis 1 (H1): ...... 151 Hypothesis 2 (H2):...... 154 Hypothesis 3 (H3):...... 158 Hypothesis 4 (H4):...... 158 Chapter 7: Conclusion ...... 161 Appendix A...... 168 Graph 1: Manufacturing Employees in the U.S., 1960-2006...... 168 Graph 2: Production Employees in the U.S., 1970-2006...... 168 Graph 3: Education and Health Services Employees, 1960-2006...... 169 Graph 4: Government Employees in the U.S., 1960-2006...... 169 Figure 1: Rio Tinto’s Major Operations ...... 170 Figure 2: Alcoa’s Major Operations...... 171 Picture 1; Picture 2: USW members dumping Chinese imports, Seattle 1999...... 172 Statement 1: USW statement of solidarity...... 173 Appendix B: Interviews...... 174 References...... 216
v DEDICATION
To my Grandparents: Rocco and Marie Mascaro and Philip and Irene Keida
vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to acknowledge my parents, Paul and Susan, for their unwavering support throughout my long career as a student. I would also like to thank Lauren Schapker for her assistance in reading and editing multiple drafts of this work, and for her resolve to convince me that this dissertation was indeed possible (and perhaps worth reading). I would also like to acknowledge my brothers, Matthew and Michael, for constantly reminding me how exciting the world outside of academia can really be through their own fascinating pursuits. I would like to thank (and apologize to) my wonderful graduate school roommates, James Hockaday and Adam Conway, for suffering through a common living arrangement with me. I would also like to thank my friends, past and present, for inspiring me to prove myself through diligence and hard work. Finally, I wish to thank every professor who took an extra moment to assist me or impart their wisdom during my time at Miami University, most especially Dr. John Rothgeb, Jr., Dr. Karen Dawisha, Dr. Clyde Brown, Dr. Walter Vanderbush, Dr. Stephen Deets, Dr. Sheila Croucher, Dr. Ryan Barilleaux, Dr. John Forren, Dr. Adeed Dawisha, Dr. Dilchoda Berdieva, and Dr. George Ehrhardt. I am most grateful to all of you.
vii Chapter 1: The Study of Labor Transnationalism
1) Introduction: On the Decline of the U.S. Labor Movement The study of labor internationalism in the new millennium would seem to many a moot target of inquiry. Over the past two decades, scholarship on labor unions has reflected the near-unanimous proposition that the worldwide labor movement was either in severe decline or completely dead. Certainly a number of empirical trends pointed to such a conclusion, as most measures of union strength were clearly in decline. Economically, for example, real wages and job security have steadily decreased since the 1970’s, most notably in unionized industries (Silver, 2003: 1). This change corresponds to a notable decrease in union density (the percentage of the national or sectoral workforce that is unionized) in non-corporatist industrialized economies. In the United States, total union density stands at about 13 percent (7.9 percent in the private sector), down from its peak of 35 percent in 1954 (BLS, 2006o). 1 Likewise, strikes and other forms of overt labor militancy — what are perhaps the most vivid expressions of union strength — have all trended down in recent decades (Vanneman, 2002; Silver, 2003: 126). Indeed, on account of these trends most scholars by the early 1990’s had written off labor unions as a relevant social force. Bruce Nissen (2002: 1) explains that for many theorists, organized labor was perceived to be “unsuited to the modern environment: a dying and reactive force stuck in outmoded adversarial attitudes and relations.” Economic globalization, flexible production, and “fast capital” had, 2 in the view of Manuel Castells, rendered the labor movement “historically superseded” (Castells, 1997: 360). Charles Tilly echoed Castells, noting that “almost everywhere, organized labor is in retreat” (Tilly: 1995: 21). 3 For some, the problem was much worse. “[T]he distinctive social formation we term ‘working class’” Aristide Zolberg lamented, has all but disappeared
1 http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/actrav/publ/128/3.pdf (1-15-06) 2 The term “fast capital” or “loose capital” has come to dominate the globalization literature. It refers to the ease with which investment capital can be moved from banks in one country to banks in another. Over the past four decades, capital mobility has increased. 3 Cited in Munck, 8-9.
1 relations.” Economic globalization, flexible production, and “fast capital” had, 4 in the view of Manuel Castells, rendered the labor movement “historically superseded” (Castells, 1997: 360). Charles Tilly echoed Castells, noting that “almost everywhere, organized labor is in retreat” (Tilly: 1995: 21). 5 For some, the problem was much worse. “[T]he distinctive social formation we term ‘working class’” Aristide Zolberg lamented, has all but disappeared (Zolberg, 1995: 28). 6 For labor theorists, the problem of labor’s demise was fundamentally the problem of labor rights; if labor rights emerged with organized labor, they very well might disappear as organized labor disappears. The central argument underpinning these predictions is best summarized by Charles Tilly, who wrote simply that, “[g]lobalization threatens labors’ rights” (Tilly, 1995: 1). 7 Indeed, for most analyses of labor’s decline — as well as labor’s future potential — the globalization of the world economy is labor’s foil. This reasoning suggests that the exponential growth of international trade and “loose capital” has undermined the traditional bases of union strength: state power and embedded capital . Thus, for Charles Tilly, the internationalization of economic activity and the creation of supranational political bodies threatens labor rights because it undermines “state capacity to guarantee those rights,” which it had traditionally done (Tilly, 1995: 4; Munck: 2004: 9). Similarly, the mobility of capital and production has, according to Beverly Silver, created a single labor market in which multinational corporations “race to the bottom” in order to minimize labor and production costs. The ability to relocate money and production facilities — even the threat of doing so (Bronfenbrenner, et al., 1998: 5) — acts as a potent weapon against organized labor (Nissen, 2002: 4). Furthermore, states face tremendous pressure to repeal social welfare provisions lest they be “abandoned en masse by investors scouring the world for the highest possible returns” (Silver, 2003: 4).
4 The term “fast capital” or “loose capital” has come to dominate the globalization literature. It refers to the ease with which investment capital can be moved from banks in one country to banks in another. Over the past four decades, capital mobility has increased. 5 Cited in Munck, 8-9. 6 Cited in Silver, 1-2. 7 Cited in Munck, 2004: 8.
2 But we should be careful not to attribute labor’s troubles solely to globalization. 8 Craig Jenkins and Kevin Leicht (1997: 378-9) argue that transformations of the nature of production through process innovations, such as “just in time” 9 distribution and “flexible production,” 10 have transformed stable working-class relationships into “networks of temporary and cursory relationships” which undermine labor solidarity. Moreover, many scholars note the marked decline in organized labor’s political influence since its “golden heyday” from 1945 to 1970. With few exceptions (as in Belgium, Scandinavia, and Germany) the labor movement has come under sustained attack by political parties that no longer view them as ideal social partners (Gordon and Turner, 2000: 5). Organized labor today, they argue, must compete with a confluence of unfavorable forces — namely, relaxed labor laws, employer-led union suppression strategies, weak enforcement mechanisms, and weak party support (Gordon and Turner, 2000: 5). Nevertheless, just at the time when scholars and activists were administering labor’s “last rites,” trade unions and the broader labor movement were showing signs of revitalization. They were not, as many critics lamented, merely “silent witnesses” to globalization and workplace change. Commentators began noting the steady upsurge of labor activism. This activism was most often associated with the visible and often contentious series of protests against neoliberal globalization, the most prominent of which occurred in 1999 at the WTO’s Seattle ministerial meeting. In this much- publicized case, protestors representing national and international trade union organizations, as well as environmental, labor, women’s, and indigenous rights NGO’s, derailed the (then) newest round of trade liberalization talks. For many, the “Battle in
8 One major counterweight to the “race to the bottom” thesis is the fact that over the past decade total FDI flows between industrialized states have hovered between 55 and 78 percent (UNDP, 2005). This would suggest that although some working class communities are lost to production flight, others are created in their place. 9 Just-in-time (JIT) production processes, sometimes called lean production, focus on producing exactly the amount you require at exactly the time your customers require it, rather than having goods being pushed through production and supplying customers from stock. This minimizes lot size (product locked away in storage facilities), reducing cost and improving efficiency. Source: Business Link. http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/bdotg/action/detail?type=RESOURCES&itemId=1074405965 10 Flexible production systems are characterized by some of the following: 1) MNC’s play a central role; 2) high levels of networking and subcontracting among firms; 3) labor is based on principles of flexibility implying that work supply is closely adjusted to demand, for example, through greater use of part-time workers, workers who are readily hired and fired, or more multi-skilled workers; and 4) Unions are less powerful in general and worker benefits are closely related to skill as well as productivity. Source: Dr. Roger Hayter, Simon Frasier University. http://www.sfu.ca/~hayter/Temp.htm
3 Seattle” typified a much broader surge in expressions of labor solidarity — between, for example, dockworkers in Europe, janitors in the United States, textile manufacturers in the Americas, or fair trade advocates at global conferences — which underscored a renewed and revitalized labor movement. Although few were arguing that the so-called “global backlash” was undermining globalization entirely, new expressions of labor solidarity did suggest that assertions of labor’s demise were at least slightly premature. To be sure, the upswing in labor activism goes much deeper than the sporadic protests of globalization might suggest; structural changes are taking place within the trade union movement as well. The explosion of international trade and investment, the advent of “real time” communications technologies, and cross-border flows of people and products, have, in the words of James Mittelman (2000: 7), engendered a number of “emancipatory possibilities” for organizational change and social action. Indeed, unions in the United States, Europe, and other industrialized states (as well as movements across the developing world) have begun responding to their new environment with a mix of traditional and innovative strategies for renewal. For example, many prominent national unions and union confederations — such as the AFL-CIO and “Change to Win” in the U.S., the CAW in Canada, and the TUC in Great Britain — have made “organizing the unorganized” a top priority. Thus, unions are targeting immigrants, women, young workers, employees of small and medium-sized firms, and workers in the “informal” sector (ILO, 1998). But perhaps the most interesting development in the labor movement has been the dramatic rise in cross-border solidarity and international trade union cooperation. In fact, recent labor movement literature is replete with examples of transnational union activity across a range of spatial and organizational contexts. One well-documented form of activity is bilateral cooperation among union locals. Depending on the need, a union local may send money or advisors to an affiliated union in order to help organize new members or assist with contract negotiations (Hanagan, 2003: 491; Cook, 1997). There has also been a notable increase in the presence of national unions or confederations at the international level. These organizations, such as the AFL-CIO in the U.S., CAW in Canada, or TUC in Great Britain, have eschewed anti-communism as the overriding foreign policy objective in favor of promoting core labor standards, basic organizing, and
4 collective bargaining. At the highest level of transnational activity, national union confederations are increasing their work in the Global Union Federations (GUF), which organize federations along sectoral or industry lines, and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), which organizes all national Federations into one international body. The ICFTU, for example, has recently lobbied vigorously for the WTO to adopt a “social clause” into the language of multilateral trade agreements. In addition, union locals are also harnessing new communications technologies (notably the Internet) in order to create networks of affiliated organizers and NGO’s, bypassing official organizing structures. (Harrod and O’Brien, 2002: 5). These developments, though still modest in comparison to national strategies, have emboldened researchers and activists to treat labor transnationalism as a serious topic of inquiry. As noted above, a rich literature has emerged in recent years that describes the various origins and manifestations of transnational labor strategies, offers predictions about labor’s future course, and in a good many instances, levels normative claims about the desirability of a transnational labor solidarity. Yet there are still a number of questions that remain unresolved. Given that there are a number of different avenues through which labor organizations can exert pressure internationally, there are few attempts to explain differences in the nature, priority, and timing given to certain transnational strategies. As a result, few studies are geared to generalize beyond the specific case in question, a serious limitation to a broader understanding of transnational strategies. Furthermore, precious little research seriously interrogates the claim that “economic globalization” is the most appropriate explanatory device for the current wave of labor transnationalism. While economic indicators (such as FDI, trade flows, capital flight, and sectoral composition) tend to correlate with this renewed emphasis on transnationalism, few studies explore variations of transnationalism across cases. This project seeks to address these deficiencies by testing the economic globalization approach to labor transnationalism with three U.S. cases representing divergent sectors of the U.S. economy: manufacturing, service, and professional. In order to develop the parameters for this inquiry, the next section will review recent literature on labor transnationalism, highlighting the dominant approaches, methods, and topics, while also assessing its shortcomings and limitations.
5 2) Literature Review: Organized Labor in the Global Transnational union organizing has generated considerable interest in the academic and activist literature of late. And, like most other research streams, the literature on the labor movement overlaps academic disciplines (e.g., Sociology, Industrial Relations, Political Science), engages a different and sometimes contradictory research traditions (e.g., Marxist and Weberian), and treats a wide variety of manifestations of the labor movement (e.g., organizing, bureaucracy, politics, globalization, history, etc). Nevertheless, several dominant approaches have emerged, each of which will be taken in turn: normative/prescriptive; empirical/descriptive; analytic/explanatory a) Normative/Prescriptive Approaches: Labor Transnationalism, Good or Bad? The first major stream of scholarship on labor transnationalism is undoubtedly the most prevalent, and can be defined as scholarship that advances an explicit normative argument about the “goodness” or “desirability” of the international labor movement. In many cases, this literature is dominated by a discussion of the ways in which labor organizations and “Left” social movements are harnessing globalization to advance global justice (see Waterman, 1998, 2001, 2005; Lee, 1997; Moody, 1997; Munck, 2002), a development that these authors celebrate. For example, Kim Moody (1997: 4, 5) maintains that, “the old argument that a rising tide lifts all ships has never been convincing to those trapped in steerage. The rising tide must offer the opportunity to reduce and eliminate the old inequalities… (unionism) fights for all the oppressed and enhances its own power by doing so.” Others are more forthright. Peter Waterman (2005: 210) laments the development of “labour-devastating…globalized-networked- informatised capitalism” [sic] and declares “the necessity and possibility of a new kind of labour internationalism, capable not only of defence against neoliberal globalization, but also of an emancipatory challenge to capitalism as such.” Employing the similar necessitarian logic, Ronaldo Munck (2002: 160) simply states: “a complex (even disorganized) capitalism demands a complex internationalism.” In other words, only an international labor force can provide the appropriate countervailing power to provide the requisite balance between capital and labor. While others may have eschewed such
6 deterministic arguments, many maintain that labor internationalism should be on the reform agendas of national unions nevertheless. Beyond the contention that international labor solidarity is a structural inevitability, a number of authors have posited conditions thought to be propitious for transnational unionism, as well as identified developments that evidence this trend. Certainly, one of the least controversial arguments within this stream is the need for unions to shed their nationalist heritage and adopt a more international, cosmopolitan outlook to organizing and coordination. Thus, we have a number of authors hailing the decision by national unions (as in the AFL-CIO) to drop anti-communist and protectionist rhetoric from their organizational missions (Cowie, 1996: 27-28; Nissen, 2002: 5; DeMartino, 1999: 90). Drawing these conclusions from his analysis of the U.S. labor’s campaign against NAFTA, Jefferson Cowie (1997: 27-28) argues that protectionist rhetoric proves to be a “nationalistic diversion from constructing meaningful alternatives” to economic and political issues which all workers, irrespective of national origin, commonly share. Part-in-parcel of a more cosmopolitan approach, a growing number of authors , many of whom come from the sociological tradition, have advocated that unions also recruit more members from immigrant communities, women, and “informal” workers, as well as cultivate stronger relationships with social movements (see DeMartino, 1999; Nissen, 2003; Clawson, 1999, 2003; Levesque, 2002; Munck, 2002; Moody, 1997; Waterman, 2001). Social Movement Unionism (SMU), as this approach is commonly termed, moves beyond the “business-as-usual” bureaucratic trade-unionism to a “community-oriented strategy” that “breaks down the binary oppositions between workplace and community, economic and political struggles, and between formal sector workers and the working poor” (Munck, 2002: 68). In the main, this view of unionism sees traditional workplace unionism as inflexible and exclusionary, and thus insufficiently geared to deal issues that, in an increasingly globalized economy, similarly affect workers of all stripes. Debates over the desirability of the social movement approach correspond with attempts to posit conditions most likely to facilitate it. Thus, we have a growing list of prescriptions offered by scholar-activists based on evidence of successful organizing in
7 recent years. These preconditions can be viewed, in the metaphorical sense, as a “strategic toolkit” for reconstituting transnational union power (Levesque and Murray, 2002: 40). The communications revolution and the Internet, for example, have drawn considerable attention for their role in facilitating economic globalization, but also as potential “emancipatory possibilities” for labor revitalization (see Lee, 1997; Shostak, 2002; Mittelman, 2000; Fiorito et al., 2000). “The Web,” Peter Lewis (2002: 277) explains, “has a natural fit with the labor movement because it is driven by the same concept that has always sustained (it). It is a network builder.” Indeed, many unions are currently using listservs, websites, and blog s to expose nefarious business practices, mobilize consumer opinion, and coordinate cross-border action (see Broad, 2003; Prokosch and Raymond, 2002; Welton and Wolf, 2001). Coordination via the Internet becomes crucial, these authors argue, if unions are going to forge links with national and international unions and NGO’s, since these groups are not conveniently located on the same “shop floor.” At the same time, effective communication presupposes good information and knowledgeable members. As such, several authors emphasize the need for more vigorous educational campaigns, both within and between groups (Borgers, 1999: 120; Levesque and Murray, 2002: 47-52; Frundt, 2005: 29-30). By introducing educational curricula that emphasizes international awareness and “union success stories,” rank-and-file union members and labor leaders will become “convinced (of the) centrality of cross-border organizing” and devote greater attention to “solidarity funds,” outreach programs, and worker exchanges (Borgers, 1999: 109, 120). Still others maintain that cross-border organizing will be most successful when affiliated NGO’s are involved (Hale, 2004: 1-6), and when unions have autonomy from government monies with respect to international programs (a legacy of anti-communism) (Rodberg, 2001: 1-3). Finally, some authors debate the proper scope of organizing, arguing variously that the chances for success increase when local participation constitutes the primary locus of action (Frundt, 2005; Wood, 1997: 7-10), when regional institutions are utilized (Haworth and Hughes, 151- 153), or when multilateral institutions (WTO) and international organizations (ILO) become involved (Thorpe, 1999: 226-228). b) Empirical/Descriptive Approaches: Sites of Labor Internationalism
8 The empirical/descriptive approach to labor transnationalism can be defined as scholarship that describes a particular actor, event, or dimension of transnational activity while avoiding explicit normative determinations. 11 Perhaps explained by its popularity within activist circles, much of the empirical literature is anecdotal in nature, documenting specific transnational activities yet neglecting broader analytic comparisons and discussions. To be sure, of the few attempts to construct a general theory of labor transnationalism — such as Wills’ (2004: 85-104) “local-national-regional-international” approach, Frege and Kelly’s (2004: 20-25) “membership-institutions-politics-bargaining” model, or Johns’ (1998: 257-261) differentiation between forms of labor solidarity — most scholars simply prefer to sidestep these discussions altogether. More often, the empirical literature describes a theoretical possibility for transnational activity and then proceeds to document examples of that activity (see, for example, Shostak, 2002; Armbruster-Sandoval, 2005; Prokosch and Raymond, 2002). We are thus left to sift through a scattering of “internationalisms” that reflect different domestic politics, organizational models, economic sectors, and scopes of activity (national, regional, international, etc). In making sense of this patchwork, I find it easiest to distinguish transnational behavior along its horizontal and vertical dimensions. 12 In short, the horizontal dimension can be defined as cross-border networking among unions, workers, and NGO’s, while the vertical dimension refers to the centralization of labor union power in governance structures beyond the local or national union (e.g., the ICFTU or appropriate GUF). Cross-border networking has come to dominate the study of labor transnationalism in recent years, owing in large part to the growing number of “successes” in this area of labor cooperation. In this respect, unions attempt to reinforce cross-border labor power by strengthening horizontal ties with national unions, workers, and allied NGO’s. Henry Frundt (2002: 49-59) distinguishes four main ways in which the networking option can be exercised: 1) coalitional organizing — where informal transnational alliances develop among local unions, concerned citizens, unaffiliated
11 There is, of course, considerable overlap between the normative and descriptive literature. For one, the empirical literature is driving the optimism of the normative school. 12 Analytically, this is ‘blunt’ way to differentiate transnational activity, yet this basic taxonomy fulfills the basic purpose of summarizing trends in the literature.
9 workers, and relevant NGO’s; 2) federation-to-federation organizing — more formal coalitional alliances headed by national unions; 3) international campaign organizing — where organizing targets sympathetic “outsiders” who pressure governments and corporations for social change; and 4) clandestine targeting — where heavy local involvement is targeted for organization and/or bargaining drives. In his own work, Frundt (1999) examines how U.S. unions have made effective use of each networking method in Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America. He documents how influential U.S unions — such as the AFL-CIO, the Teamsters, UE (United Electrical Workers), and UNITE (Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile Employees) — have shunned protectionism in order to cultivate linkages with immigrant labor, unionize women in garment assembling plants in Caribbean Basin free zones, develop transnational consumer-awareness campaigns to expose corporate abuses, and recruit/train new labor organizers. Others have documented similar U.S. initiated networking activity in the auto industry (Babson, 2002), telecommunications (Borgers, 1999; Rechenbach and Cohen, 2002), and agriculture (Stillerman, 2003). Moreover, a number of scholars have examined similar organizing methods in Europe, Asia, and Africa. For example, Burgoon and Jacoby (2004) document how European unions in Germany, France, and Belgium are working with their regional counterparts in Italy and Spain to bolster national welfare policy and extend collective bargaining rights. The vertical dimension of labor activism has also generated considerable interest of late, not least because most labor scholars and activists believe that institutionalizing the global labor movement in transnational structures offers the best prospect for work and wage protections. In this sense, unions attempt to strengthen vertical labor power by replicating the structure of the national union at the international level — something they have been doing for some time now, with varying degrees of success. Academic interest in this area tends to focus on two institutional arrangements: the sectoral-level global union federations (GUF’s); and the peak-level International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The global union federations, on the one hand, are international associations comprised of national trade unions representing workers in specific industries, economic sectors, industry groups, occupations, and professions (Windmuller, 2000: 105). These associations — such as the International
10 Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Worker’s Union (ICEM), and the International Metalworkers’ Federation (IMF) — focus chiefly on maintaining trade union rights within their particular sectors, yet also specialize in labor education and training with new and LDC affiliates and program coordination with relevant multinational corporations (Harrod and O’Brien, 2002: 5). Scholarly interest in these organizations is particularly high with respect to the GUF’s, since they have consistently increased the size and scope of their activities since the 1970s — the same period in which national union density had declined in most industrialized states (Windmuller, 2000: 105-06). In contrast to the GUF’s, and at the highest level of international union coordination is the ICFTU. This body is comprised of 236 national union federations (not unions themselves) in 154 countries on six continents, and is thus considered to be the most representative confederation of labor organizations in the world (ICFTU, 2006). In the main, the ICFTU collaborates with IO’s, IGO’s, NGO’s, and GUF’s labor issues that affect the global workforce generally , such as bargaining rights and union recognition. With few exceptions, scholarly attention of the ICFTU relates to its tireless campaign to secure “social clause” protections in the trade language of the WTO (see, for example Chan and Ross, 2003; Scherrer, 1998; Wilkinson and Hughes, 2000; O’Brien, 2002), while a smaller chorus documents how the ICFTU actively participates in more ‘localized’ campaigns to ensure compliance with the International Labor Organization’s (ILO's) “core labor standards,” as reaffirmed by their 1998 declaration (see ILO, 2006). For example, the ICFTU openly and successfully challenged South Africa’s apartheid regime by publicizing labor rights’ abuses and coordinating trade embargos (Gordon, 2002: 92-94). The organization has also conducted solidarity campaigns for women in Central America and helped introduce the RUGMARK certification program (which combats child labor) in Europe, among many others (see ICFTU, 2006; Gordon: 2002: 94-97). c) Analytic/Explanatory: Why Transnational Labor, Why Now? This analytic/explanatory stream can be defined as literature that posits an explanation of the factors that have inhibited or spurred transnational labor activism, and/or constructs an analytic framework through which to understand broad patterns of
11 transnational labor behavior. Indeed, since the literature is overwhelmingly case-oriented and drawn from various institutional, economic, and political environments, it is has generated a litany of explanatory insights, many of which are related and reinforcing. In the main, several interrelated and overlapping camps have emerged. On the one hand, a number of scholars emphasize the organizational, economic, institutional, and political obstacles to organizing in order to explain what they view as comparative lack of labor transnationalism. In this sense, these scholars seek to explain why labor unions have not “caught up” to global economic and political integration. For instance, Levesque and Murray (2002: 43) contend that in the face of liberalized trade rules, greater capital mobility, technological change, and the subsequent modifications in the organization, pace, and condition of work, local unions have lost much of their organizational leverage vis-à-vis employers. Furthermore, the decentralization of national collective bargaining schemes places greater weight on individual unions to negotiate concessions “that are unlikely to be achieved in isolation” (Levesque and Murray, 43), while restrictive labor laws permit employers to actively oppose their employees’ decision to unionize (Clawson and Clawson, 1999: 100; Bronfenbrenner, 1994, 1998). Others maintain that cross-border activity is inherently ‘expensive,’ requiring money, member mobility, organizational resources, and information that labor movements usually lack (Burgoon and Jacoby, 852; Anner, 2002; Boswell and Stevis, 1997). Meanwhile, some maintain that globalization has actually strengthened national- level labor responses at the expense of transnational organizing. For instance, Mine Elder (2002: 168) contends that national unions have targeted the state as the most “feasible” site for struggle since they were “the first to suffer” and were better organized at the national level (see also Herod, 1997: 407-410) Compounding the problem, Elder and other NIDL theorists suggest, is that globalization has only “reinforced the discrepancy between core and periphery” at the international level, polarizing and undermining labor solidarity across borders (Elder, 2002: 168; see also Hoogvelt, 1997). In other words, calls for solidarity in the face of rising global inequality appear more ‘protectionist’ than ‘solidaristic’ to unions in developing states.
12 Nevertheless, there is clear evidence that national unions are crossing borders, prompting many labor scholars to contrive explanations for emerging patterns of transnationalism. For instance, some make history and culture the dominant points of departure. The end of the Cold War, for one, eliminated the impetus for unions in the industrialized democracies to maintain an anti-communist foreign policy — a notorious feature of the AFL-CIO, for example — thus reducing tensions between and among communist, socialist, social-democratic, and liberal/business unions (Gordon and Turner, 23; Stillerman, 2003: 583). The process also applies to totalitarian labor unions, which constituted the bulk of the socialist-leaning World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and were also instruments of Cold War politics (Lee, 1997: 10). Other scholars have explained transnationalism through the lens of international institutions and communications technology, noting especially their growing importance over the past several decades. For example, organizations such as the ILO, UN, and ICFTU have enabled global union representation and acted as central players in support of core labor standards (Costello, 2005: 2). Moreover, the emergence of the WTO, IMF, and World Bank, while accelerating some of the threats that national unions face, has provided labor groups new sites through which to petition for workers’ rights protections. Furthermore, considerable scholarly attention has been devoted to the organizing possibilities facilitated by new communications technologies, notably the Internet and satellite communications, which have been seized by labor groups and NGOs (noted above) (see Lee, 1997, Shostak, 2002, Waterman, 2001, Fiorito et al., 2000). A second stream of literature alternatively looks at domestic political opportunities and resource mobilization to explain labor transnationalism. These explanations typically follow the logic of Logue’s (1980: 20-21) rationalist observation the transnational action and domestic labor conditions are inversely related: “the greater the degree of trade union control over its national environment, the less likely it is to undertake international activity to achieve its members’ goals” (Logue, 1980: 21-22). From this, a number of scholars have used the domestic political context as their analytic departure. For instance, Cornfield & McCammon (2003: 3), suggest that labor organizations are institutional actors that engage in purposive action, although this action is constrained and facilitated — that is, “socially embedded” — by the “web of labor
13 organizations’ relationships with workers, employers, and the state.” Indeed, if we take the inverse of Logue’s argument, then transnational organizing becomes rational when members’ goals cannot be achieved by national action (Logue, 1980: 20-21). This is precisely what many argue is the condition of labor today: demographic changes (immigration, internal migration, female employment, etc), restrictive legal systems that permit employers to deny their members’ efforts to organize, capital/production mobility, flexible production techniques, and anti-union employer offensives (consultants, vote packing, permanent replacement workers, etc) have all contributed to the closing of domestic opportunities for action, compelling unions to seek cross-border alliances (see Clawson & Clawson, 1999; Bronfenbrenner, 1998; Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1997). From a related perspective, several scholars draw insights from the literature on social movements (see Tarrow, 1998; McAdam, 2001) and resource mobilization theory (see McCarthy and Zald, 1977). The former posits the structural conditions that facilitate the emergence of “political opportunity structures,” or moments when social movements are most likely to contend for power. For example, Frundt (2005: 2) showed how the International Textile, Garment, and Leather Workers Federation (ITGLWF) used assessments of local leadership skills, the nature of production in the targeted company, and the structure of union bureaucracies at the national and international level in determining the opportunities for successful transnational campaigns. As a complement to structural theory, resource mobilization theory explains why different results may emerge from similar structural conditions. This perspective, highlighted by Keck and Sikkink’s “boomerang model,” emphasizes more informal networking between unions and allied NGOs, other local union organizations, and interest groups with a cross- national presence (see Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Undoubtedly the most common explanation of labor transnationalism, however, centers on the vast economic changes precipitated by increasing global trade and investment — a phenomenon commonly termed economic globalization . In the main, the argument holds that transnational activity is a “direct function of rising investment and trade interdependence,” which together have tilted the balance of power in favor of multinational employers and emboldened workers to develop cross-national links that “match the international profile of firms” (Burgoon and Jacoby, 853). The forms of
14 globalization are may vary, yet each contributes to the same outcome: transnational responses. For example, the increasing number of international employers and firms shifted economic power from Europe and North America to Pacific Asia, Central America, and other low-wage economies in the developing world (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 198), often pitting one group of workers against another (i.e., the ‘whipsaw’ tactic) At the same time, however, these movements have given rise to “new structural relationships among unions” and bolstered the incentives for transnational cooperation as a means to counter ‘footloose’ multinationals (Gordon and Turner, 24). In a related vein, a number of scholars employ a political opportunity framework to explain how transnational labor forces are targeting governance structures created to administer neoliberal restructuring, such as the WTO, IMF, World Bank, and NAFTA. The efforts of the ILO and IFCTU on the issue of a ‘social clause’ in international trade are a case-in-point. As Robert O’Brien (2002: 222) reminds us, since “economic liberalization requires a transnational regulatory structure to facilitate and mediate competition” between states and firms, labor groups now have the opportunity (however limited) to “insert a social clause into the liberalization mix.” The same logic applies to regional agreements as well. Joel Stillerman (2003) suggests that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for example, compelled cross-border labor cooperation by forcing the established sectors of labor to confront (and in many cases abandon) their counterproductive protectionist strategies. More importantly, NAFTA provided labor a new institutional opportunity for such cooperation through the NAALC labor side-accord (North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation). d) Summary: On the Vices of “Cosmopolitan” Analysis Although the literature yields a number of insights into the nature, priority, and timing of labor internationalism, there remain basic areas of empirical and theoretical underdevelopment. In the former, the literature’s seemingly habitual preference for the single case study constitutes one of its most glaring empirical shortcomings. In rare instances, cross-national comparisons are conducted along a specific axis of labor internationalism (say, rhetorical support for ILO conventions: see Griffin, Nyland, and O’Rourke, 2002; or cross-border solidarity in maquila zones: see Armbruster-Sandoval). The result is a patchwork of ‘internationalisms’ that, while providing excellent insight
15 into innovative forms of labor solidarity, have trouble explaining important variations in labor responses to industrial restructuring between economic sectors. Specifically, we hear that cross-border activities are increasing, yet the literature tells us very little about the frequency and intensity of these activities across various economic sectors within the U.S. economy (e.g., autos versus textiles). At the same time, since most case studies analyze the event , as opposed to the union itself, we have little understanding of the priority that unions assign to different types of cross-border activities. 13 Considering that unions employ multi-pronged organizational strategies (domestic and otherwise) and can choose from a number of competing international approaches (if at all) — ranging from educational awareness, strike support, and hosting of foreign unionists to transnational collective bargaining and ICFTU petitions for a social clause ― the literature is surprisingly quiet about union priorities and what explains them. In sum, the literature pays insufficient attention to variations in the nature and scope of transnational strategies employed by U.S. labor unions in response to, and in the case of the AFT, despite economic globalization — a contention substantiated by the absence of any systematic study of U.S. labor transnationalism. This project seeks to fill this void by stipulating the forms labor responses can take while offering a theoretical model through which to explain variations in these responses.
3) Theory: Situating American Labor Transnationalism In order to assess and explain variations in transnational U.S. labor union responses in the contemporary period, it becomes incumbent to make use of the relevant explanatory insights listed in Chapter 1 in conjunction with those gleaned from the broader literature on globalization, interest groups, and American politics. To be sure, the literature reviewed yields an analytic model — economic globalization — that goes far in explaining the transnational impulse, and could be used alone to explain broad differences in the cases surveyed here. Yet for focused, qualitative comparison it becomes necessary to acknowledge and situate labor unions in their varying domestic, international, and organizational contexts.
13 I credit Burgoon and Jacoby with raising the question of priority. I argue that this problem stems from a focus on events over unions themselves.
16 In the following section, the basic contours of each approach will be discussed, highlighting the aspects of each that will inform the study of U.S. unions. In addition, I will posit several theoretical refinements. a) The Economic Globalization Approach to Labor Union Transnationalism The economic approach to labor transnationalism seeks to explain correlations between the frequency of transnational union activities and levels of “sectoral exposure” to international trade and investment and international job competition. In this vein, a number of scholars have noted a positive correlation between the degree of industry exposure to the forces of economic globalization and the degree and intensity of transnational labor union activities. The conventional explanation of this trend maintains that unions are strategic rational actors who care firstly about protecting their constituent’s jobs, wages, and workplace rights, and that globalization produces a number of incentives for unions to engage in transnational activities for this purpose. In other words, unions “go global” as a means to protect themselves. Ultimately, the economic argument suggests that the purpose of international solidarity is to control the conditions of work at home by controlling the conditions of work abroad . There are two interrelated forces that help explain why unions might behave in this way. The first relates to import competition, which has risen dramatically in the U.S. over the past several decades. In the main, increasing foreign trade and investment tends to create “downward pressures” on wages, jobs, and labor rights in the domestic economy, especially when these movements directly compete with domestically produced goods (Frege and Kelly, 2004: 42). In order to compete with foreign rivals who produce goods at a fraction of the cost, domestic producers seek ways to reduce the cost of production inputs — namely labor , which constitutes the single greatest expenditure for firms. Indeed, a voluminous literature has emerged documenting the ways in which firms “informalize” production through flexible work schedules and trim costs by slashing wages, health care benefits, and pensions. The second interrelated force compelling U.S. unions to seek greater transnational links relates to domestic FDI outflows and the resultant internationalization of the domestic jobs market. The reduction in national trade and capital barriers has provided domestic multinationals (MNC’s) with greater opportunities to reduce production costs
17 (either as a result of import competition or shareholder demands for greater profit margins) by simply moving production operations, and thus domestic jobs, overseas. FDI outflows are targeted in developing countries, such as China, Mexico, Indonesia, and Nigeria, which enjoy a “comparative advantage” in cheap labor, relaxed environmental regulations, and low corporate taxes. The result, in the words of William Greider, is a “global jobs auction…a peripatetic global jobs competition” in which U.S. workers are displaced by their counterparts abroad (Greider, in Lechner and Boli, 2000: 148). The experiences of the U.S. manufacturing sector since 1970 underscore these global processes particularly well. U.S. unions and corporations in industries that have been exposed to significant foreign competition (e.g., textile and garment, automotive, steel, and recently telecommunications, among others) have labored to keep pace with cheaper and more efficient rivals. In the automotive sector, once considered the backbone of the U.S. industrial economy, for example, the “Big Three” U.S. automakers (Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler) and their domestic suppliers (e.g., Delphi, Dana, Tower Automotive) have responded to Japanese and European import competition by relocating many remaining production facilities to abroad, cutting domestic jobs and production, and renegotiating the terms of union contracts (e.g., health care, wages, vacation time) for the remaining U.S. workers. Other industries have likewise suffered. As a result, since 1970 the U.S. manufacturing sector as a whole has lost over 3.5 million workers, or about 25 percent of the workforce (Appendix A, Graph 2). Not surprisingly, union density in the manufacturing sector has plummeted as well: the Autoworkers union has lost half of its membership, or 650,000 workers; the Steelworkers union has lost 60 percent, or 600,000; the Carpenters union has lost 45 percent, or 322,000; and the Garment and Textile workers union have lost over a million workers (Zieger and Gall, 2002: 243-44). It is under these conditions that we might expect unions to conform to the expectation generated by the conventional economic hypothesis. Thus, for example, we should find that when a company moves production facilities and investment capital abroad to take advantage of lower labor costs, domestic unions will pursue international policies that increase the cost of labor abroad (e.g., helping enforce the ILO’s core labor standards, assisting foreign union development, etc.) in order to reduce or eliminate the economic incentive for future capital flight. Similarly, increasing trade competition
18 between national sectors (for instance, between two textile manufacturers) creates incentives for domestic unions to develop stronger cross-border ties in order to raise production standards of foreign exporters, thereby reducing import levels and preserving jobs and wages. We might also find in this case an emphasis on global framework agreements (GFA's), which commit global employers to the ILO’s core labor standards where their business is conducted. Indeed, much of the literature cited documents expressions of cross-border activity that fit well with this explanation. U.S. unions have begun to champion workplace rights abroad through transnational links with foreign unions and NGO’s in order to raise the cost of foreign imports and thus reduce import competition domestically. Cross-border organizing between Mexican and U.S. textile unions in maquila zones (where wages and working conditions are comparatively low), or workers’ rights petitions signed by the AFL-CIO on behalf of workers in China, South and Central America, and Southeast Asia directly correspond with increased trade and investment (see Armbruster-Sandoval, 2005: 12-14). However, there are several features of globalization that are generally overlooked in the literature on labor union transnationalism. First, the transnationalism literature fails to distinguish types of globalization, namely those global processes that create job insecurity from those that do not, and the how the difference between the two may influence transnational approaches. First, multinationalization differentially affects industrial sectors. In the case of service unions, multinationalization in the property services and hospitality industries has not occasioned massive rounds of layoffs, while multinationalization in the manufacturing sector has corresponded with the loss of millions of union jobs. In short, service jobs are cannot be shipped overseas, while manufacturing jobs can (in most cases). Second, this difference matters for transnational strategies. Most notably, labor union transnationalism in the manufacturing sector, especially that which criticizes “free trade” or emphasizes worker/environmental standards, has been criticized by some unions in the developing world as “protectionism in disguise” (See Anner, 2001: 18-19). Unions in the service sector, however, are not susceptible to this charge because “protectionism” does not facilitate job retention in this
19 sector. As a result, service sector unions may enjoy a comparatively high level of credibility when pursuing transnational solidarity initiatives. This is not to suggest that protectionism no longer exists. Indeed, a second overlooked feature of globalization relates to the tendency for economic dislocations to spur decidedly less solidaristic and more overtly nationalist or protectionist repertoires. 14 In this sense, labor unions may also respond to the pressures of globalization by looking inward — toward themselves and to their national governments — in order to directly regulate the traffic of capital, jobs, and goods that threaten their position domestically. Unions may, to take the most common example, seek cross-border ties when faced with import competition, or they may petition their government for import restrictions, or they may do both. For instance, the AFL-CIO’s historic indifference to organizing immigrant laborers, and more recently its pressure to get the U.S. government to reduce imports of foreign steel by erecting tariff barriers, highlights two of the most potent domestic levers at a union’s disposal: nationalistic organizational strategy and direct government regulation and intervention in economy. It is thus critical to any analysis of the nature and prospects of labor transnationalism to consider what unions are also doing domestically, since these efforts can impact the ways in which a union is perceived by its global partners. The literature likewise neglects differences variations labor union responses to globalization. In this sense, evidence from recent labor union campaigns suggests that the economic hypothesis alone is not a sufficient predictor of labor union transnational responses. For example, since the 1970s unions in the steel (USW) and textile (UNITE- HERE) sectors have lost over half of their membership as a consequence of globalization and industrial restructuring, yet the Steelworkers’ transnational work has focused on creating industry working groups and Global Framework Agreements (GFA’s) in collaboration with the GUF’s, while UNITE-HERE’s cross-border efforts center on public awareness campaigns conducted through allied NGO’s, foreign unions, and community groups. Domestic priorities are likewise different. Although both unions
14 I use parentheses here because the conventional economic argument presupposes that unions are rational economic actors firstly concerned with constituents' job and wage protection. As such, both solidaristic and nationalist strategies are protectionist, in that they are a means to protect constituent jobs. The differences emerge with strategy.
20 actively use electoral politics to pressure the federal government to for industry protection — the Steelworkers successfully lobbied the Bush administration for steel tariffs in 2002 and UNITE-HERE has long supported protections against sweatshop imports — the Steelworkers’ spend over 50% of union funds on political action and member servicing, while UNITE-HERE spends over 50% of union funds on organizing (see USW, 2006a; UNITE-HERE, 2006a). Ultimately, it becomes important to consider additional factors that may explain these subtle variations, such as leadership orientation and the nature of the workforce. Finally, some unions pursue transnational strategies in the absence of exposure to economic globalization. Professional unions such as the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and National Education Association (NEA) do not represent workers in industries that have suffered trade-related job losses or multinationalization, yet each is currently involved in transnational solidarity projects. Although the technological and cultural dimensions of globalization may account for increases in transnational efforts over the past several decades, the economic argument does not. As a result, professional unions represent a “counterfactual” case against which analyses of the impact of economic globalization on labor union transnationalism can be made. In other words, the inclusion of a labor union fully insulated from the effects of economic globalization allows one to isolate the independent effects of economic globalization on labor union transnationalism, and may additionally permit speculations about the structural prospects for certain types of transnational initiatives. Ultimately, the availability of both transnational and domestic levers, as well as the presence of transnationalism among “insulated” labor unions, underscores the necessity of refining the economic globalization hypothesis. At the same time, using the economic globalization hypothesis alone requires one to “hold constant” other factors material to labor transnationalism, such as the structure of political opportunities at the national and international levels, the incentives and resources embedded in both, and in the attitudes of rank-and-file members and union leadership. In short, it is important to acknowledge how these additional factors mediate labor union transnationalism, both as a means to choose the most appropriate cases to test the economic globalization hypothesis and to better situate labor union responses for qualitative analysis.
21 b) Political Opportunities and Resource Mobilization as Determinants of Labor Union Transnationalism A theory of political opportunity and resource mobilization attempts to situate labor unions in their political and organizational environment in order to add analytic richness to the transnational narrative. Over the past several decades scholars of social movements and interest groups have developed a rich literature mapping the dynamics of social protest and group mobilization on the national stage. Although diverse in analytic scope and application, this literature universally recognizes the importance of political institutions and organizational resources in patterning the behavior of groups, which makes it particularly appropriate for this study. Political Opportunity Theory (or political opportunity structure, POS) considers the structure of the political process — that is, structural factors exogenous to the group — in shaping the incentives for group action and the likelihood of group success. Although there has been considerable debate within the field about the theoretical clarity and specificity of political opportunity, Sidney Tarrow (1998: 85) provides the most succinct and generally accepted formulation of the concept: “(the) consistent, but not necessarily formal or permanent, dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for collective action by affecting peoples' expectations for success or failure.” Building on Tarrow’s formulation, Doug McAdam (1996: 26-29) delineates “a highly consensual list of dimensions” of political opportunity at the national level: 1) the degree to which the political system is “open” or “closed” to challenge; 2) the stability or instability of elite political alignments; 3) the presence or absence of elite allies; and 4) the repressive capacity of the state or relevant political entity (see also Tilly 1995; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996; Jenkins, Jacobs, and Agnone, 2003; Kay, 2005). In other words, access to state institutions becomes the decisive element shaping the incentives and expectations of group behavior. Yet, Tarrow stresses that, “structural changes that are not experienced can hardly be expected to affect people's behavior, except indirectly” (Tarrow, 1994: 85). This point underscores the importance of also considering the subjective perceptions of groups when considering openings or closings of political opportunity structures.
22 Nevertheless, theorists employing the concept of political opportunity have been criticized for relying too heavily on exogenous structural factors in their analyses of group behavior, thus overlooking the impact of intra-organizational dynamics. Resource Mobilization Theory (RM) complements theories of political opportunity by explicitly considering the impact of organizational resources on the emergence and persistence of group strategies. RM theory is primarily concerned with those components endogenous to the group that pattern the subjective (the perception of political opportunity) and objective (political and economic resources) orientation of group behavior. Specifically, the perception of political opportunities — that the consideration that political action is not only possible but is likely to succeed — is mediated by the “availability, aggregation, and deployment” of political and economic resources (Snow, Soule, and Cress, 2005: 1188). Again, while there is some debate over exactly what should be considered an organizational resource, most analyses using resource mobilization theory include the following core components: time, numbers, money, expertise, third party advocates, leadership, and ideology (see McCarthy and Zald, 1977; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1988; Cigler and Loomis, 2002; Snow, Soule, and Cress, 2005). On the one hand, these resources constitute the objective organizational components of a group that can be mobilized for political action. On the other hand, and equally important, these resources condition the perception of changes in the structure of political opportunities; tangible and effective political opportunities only emerge when a group has the resources to exploit them. Taken together, these two overlapping concepts may be synthesized into a broader empirical framework that views labor unions as strategic actors conditioned by the prevailing political environment (domestic and transnational) and the available resources for action. Yet since both concepts are typically associated with the study of domestic social movements, it becomes essential to specify how each might be adapted to the study of labor union transnationalism. This task involves specifying two basic empirical orientations: 1) domestic and transnational opportunity structures; and 2) organizational resources. Drawing on McAdam’s dimensions of the political process, it becomes possible to construct empirical measures of POS at the national and transnational levels that are
23 appropriate for U.S. labor union politics. At the national level, access to institutionalized power — state institutions and the people who run them — becomes a decisive element shaping labor union responses. This access is conditioned by three interrelated factors, each of which contributes to an overall measure of political opportunity: political competition, elite allies, and repression. 15 First , many scholars have suggested a positive relationship between political opportunity and electoral competition, noting how interest group mobilization is higher in “marginal” electoral districts (i.e., less than %10 margin of victory in the previous election) vis-à-vis “lopsided” districts because groups on both sides perceive victory to be “within their grasp” and thus worth the effort (Jacobson, 2003). Second , political opportunities increase when groups secure commitments from influential political allies, notably federal government officials, allied interest groups, and NGO’s. Within the labor union literature, the strength of labor union ties to the Democratic Party, a traditional ally of organized labor, is considered particularly important (Sousa, 1992: 9-12; Snow, Soule, and Cress: 1196). Third , recent scholarship on anti-union tactics suggests a negative relationship between government and corporate intolerance to labor unions and political opportunity. In this sense, the ability to form a union is viewed as a critical element of labor power. At the transnational level, few scholars have actually theorized political opportunity structures because of the presumption that political actors target institutionalized power capable of making and enforcing policy, “which is rare in transnational contexts” (Kay, 2005: 721). In other words, two of the three dimensions of political opportunity noted above (competition and repression) are irrelevant at the transnational level. Yet an emerging literature argues that the emergence of multilateral economic institutions (e.g., the IMF, World Bank, WTO), regional trade agreements (e.g., NAFTA, CAFTA, MERCOSUR), international organizations (e.g., UN, ICFTU, ILO, GUF’s), and NGO’s (e.g., Amnesty International, Social Accountability International) has “opened new opportunities for transnational alliance formation and collective action”
15 I have collapsed “system openness” and “political alignments” into more specific “political competition” variable that assesses the variation in effective political openings across electoral districts. I have done this because systemic constraints are constant across the cases in this study (i.e., the US system is “open”) yet there are nuances in this variable in one important respect: electoral competition. These nuances ovary with changes in political alignments, specifically the level of competition within a district.
24 that targets these venues (Stillerman, 2003: 581; see also Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Waterman, 1998; Kay, 2005). As such, it may be possible to specify two emerging dimensions of transnational political opportunity: transnational structures and transnational allies. The first dimension highlights the importance of transnational structures in creating new avenues for labor union mobilization and validating transnational rights, norms, and standards (however weak) (Kay, 723). The second dimension underscores the positive relationship between influential allies and political openings, as noted above. Complementing this multilayered formulation of POS is RM theory, which provides a lens through which to assess how the nature and availability of organizational resources conditions group perceptions of political opportunity and the likelihood that certain strategies will be pursued. In this vein, the interest group literature identifies several resources that are regarded as critically important for labor unions: union size and density, political allies, and leadership. First , scholars note the positive relationship between labor union size and governmental policymaking since an increase or decrease in membership directly impacts their access to the most important political resource — dues money (Scruggs and Lange, 2002; see also Berry, 1997; Iverson, 1998; Garrett, 1998). In addition, union density is positively correlated with access to political power because an increase or decrease in union density directly affects the ability of union leaders to deliver votes for political candidates (see Dubovsky & McCartin, 209). The second dimension is directly related to union density, and underscores the importance of labor unions’ access to influential political allies (e.g., members of Congress, federal administrators, and leaders of political parties) who can channel labor union demands into concrete national policy. Finally, the quality (effective, ineffective) and orientation (Left, Conservative) of leadership has long been associated with group strength. For Hyman (2001: 132), union leadership influences how groups perceive opportunities and threats, which shapes their current choices and produces “path dependencies” for future union strategies. In this vein, Anner (2003: 611) suggests that the most important distinction is between “Left- oriented” and “conservative” groups: the former tend to adhere to a “class-based ideology that in theory would leave them open to international labor alliances,” while the latter seem more disposed to nationalist strategies.
25 c) Toward a Theory of Labor Union Transnationalism Ultimately, both POS and RM theories can be synthesized and situated within the economic theory posited above to produce an empirically-verifiable argument about labor union transnationalism. The reformulated economic argument makes three basic claims, all things equal: 1) that dislocations from economic globalization and industrial restructuring provide a strong incentive for action (both national and transnational), yet such dislocations are not a necessary condition for labor union transnationalism; and 2) that exposure to economic globalization is directly and positively correlated with the priority of transnational solidarity projects; and 3) that the type of exposure to economic globalization (or lack thereof) influences the type of domestic and transnational projects that unions pursue. Yet all things are not equal, especially in the case of “small-N” qualitative studies. As such, I have attempted to delineate those additional factors that may influence labor union transnationalism for the purpose of minimizing their effects through appropriate case selection. Specifically, the political opportunity/resource mobilization argument suggests that the structure of political opportunities and the availability of union resources mediate strategic incentives and available policy choices. Unions should pursue local and national strategies where the incentives for action and prospects for success are perceived to be greater at those levels than at the transnational level, and vice versa .16 At the domestic level, these factors include union size and density, labor relations regime, allies, political competition, and union resources. At the transnational level, these factors include transnational allies and NGOs, multilateral institutions and international organizations. In this respect, the presence of the ICFTU, the global union federations, and international labor NGO’s provides local unions with allies beyond the state and increases the likelihood that transnational strategies can be pursued. In sum, the preceding review of literature and theory facilitates three broad aims: testing theory, refining theory, and explaining outcomes. Toward this end, the following sections will use this theory to choose the appropriate cases, questions, variables, and hypotheses that will guide this research.
16 This argument follows Schattschneider (1960) and Logue’s (1980) observations that groups will expand the scope of conflict when they lose (or perceive that they will lose) at the most local venue of political contestation (i.e., from local, state, and national to regional and international).
26 4) Research Design and Methodology a) Research Question The primary research questions driving this project are: 1) why do U.S. unions pursue the transnational labor strategies that they do (given that they have a choice not to do so); 2) how do these strategies differ across cases; and 3) how can we explain variations in the nature, priority, and timing U.S. unions assign to transnational labor strategies? These questions are informed by gaps in the empirical and theoretical literature. In the main, they seek comparisons across sectors in order to interpret differences in the nature (strike support, petitions, collective bargaining, etc.), scope (national, international, bi-lateral, multi-lateral, etc.) and priority (high, low) of union transnational strategies. These questions will thus address concerns derived from the prevalence of single case analysis, notably the lack of cross-sectoral comparison of U.S. unions. Moreover, these questions provide a test, however small, of the economic globalization theory driving this analysis. b) Operationalized Variables i) Dependent Variable (1) (Trans)National Strategy : This variable considers horizontal and vertical transnational strategies, as well as the priority labor unions place on them vis-à-vis national strategies. Horizontal strategies include coalitional organizing, federation-to-federation organizing, clandestine targeting, and international campaign organizing. 17 Vertical strategies relate to union involvement in national confederations (e.g. the AFL-CIO or the “Change to Win” coalition), the international secretariats (GUF’s), the ICFTU, and the ILO. Both will be measured by primary and secondary qualitative sources, (historical analysis, interviews, newspaper accounts) and archival data.
17 In sum: 1) coalitional organizing — where informal transnational alliances develop among local unions, concerned citizens, unaffiliated workers, and relevant NGO’s; 2) federation-to-federation organizing — more formal coalitional alliances headed by national unions; 3) international campaign organizing — where organizing targets sympathetic “outsiders” who pressure governments and corporations for social change; and 4) clandestine targeting — where heavy local involvement is targeted for organization and/or bargaining drives.
27 ii) Independent Variables (1) Economic Globalization (EG) (a) Imports by sector : this variable looks at the domestic competition from foreign imports by sector. For example, in the case of the United Auto Workers (UAW), this variable would measure the number of automobiles, OEM parts, and other manufacturing-related goods are imported into the U.S. Measurement will involve lists of imports and their levels by sector, and interviews to substantiate the “threat” posed by specific imports. (b) FDI outflows by sector : this variable looks at the net loss of jobs to foreign markets per sector. For example, in the case of the UNITE- HERE (textiles), this variable would be measured by the net number of jobs lost per year (over the past 15 years) due to production flight, in all companies with workers represented by the union. (c) Multinational Ownership (Multinationalization) : This variable will look at the percent and origin of foreign or multinational ownership of firms with workers represented by the particular union. iii) Control Variables (1) Political Opportunity Structure (POS) (a) Political Competition : This variable will assess the degree of electoral competition in districts (state and national) where unions have a significant presence (density). (b) Allies : Related to the first variable, this factor considers individuals or groups allied with labor unions. This includes, but is not limited to: federal officials, representatives, political parties, NGO’s, labor unions, labor federations, and prominent activists. (c) Repression : This variable assesses several angles of corporate and governmental intolerance to unions: anti-union campaigns during organizing drives; and NLRB decisions; workers’ rights, as measured by the ILO’s “core labor standards”.
28 (d) Transnational Structures : This variable examines the legal structure and purpose of various transnational structures and considers the incentives each provide labor unions and their allies at the transnational level. These include: multilateral economic institutions (e.g., the IMF, World Bank, WTO), regional trade agreements (e.g., NAFTA, CAFTA, MERCOSUR), international organizations (e.g., UN, ICFTU, ILO, GUF’s), and NGO’s (e.g., Amnesty International). (e) Transnational Allies : See (ii). These allies, however, support labor union activities at the transnational level. (2) Resource Mobilization (RM) (a) Union Size and Density : This variable measures the total number and percentage of unionized workers in each industry. By extension, this variable considers discretionary economic resources derived through dues, grants, and donations. (b) Allies : see 1(b) above. (c) Leadership : this variable considers the quality (effective, ineffective) and orientation (Left, conservative) of labor unions’ leadership. Does the union have a long history or currently advocate industrial militancy or does it practice accommodation and partnership with industrial leaders? c) Hypotheses i) Hypothesis 1 (H1): Import competition, FDI, and job losses — full exposure to economic globalization — will inspire transnational projects designed firstly to protect jobs and wages of union members. Conversely, the absence of exposure to economic globalization will result in transnational projects that do not seek protect members’ jobs and wages ii) Hypothesis 2 (H2): Multinationalization in a union’s core industries will inspire transnational strategies that seek to link unions representing members in a common multinational corporation (MNC). As a corollary, where there is significant import competition in a union’s core industries, transnational
29 responses will be skewed toward areas where jobs tend to migrate or where import competition originates. iii) Hypothesis 3 (H3): Import competition and foreign direct investment (FDI) are positively correlated with “protectionist” trade policy advocacy on the part of labor unions. iv) Hypothesis 4 (H4): Both forms of globalization are positively correlated with labor union transnationalism. In contrast, the absence of exposure to economic globalization, labor unions will place a low priority on transnational solidarity projects vis-à-vis unions with exposure to economic globalization. d) Cases This study employs a “most similar system” design. As such, the cases are chosen as to maximize variation among the main independent variable (exposure to globalization) while minimize variation among the independent control variables (political opportunity/resource mobilization). In the main, the idea is to find cases that are similar in all key respects but one — economic globalization — in order to “control” the effects of these additional independent variables. This translates into finding labor unions that are similar along the political opportunity/resource mobilization variable, while experiencing different levels of exposure to globalization. As stated, this will allow one to test the independent effects of economic globalization on labor union transnational strategies. In practice, however, no two labor unions are precisely the same along any one variable, so the objective of case selection is to identify those cases that are most similar along these measures. Toward this end, this study will look at three U.S. labor unions: the United Steelworkers’ of America (USW); the Service Employees International Union (SEIU); and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT). Most importantly, each case falls on a different point along the continuum of exposure to economic globalization: USW (high); SEIU (moderate); and AFT (low). Furthermore, these unions are relatively similar on a number of key control variables, such as union size and density, national political system, organizational ideology, political competition, and the presence of global federations that represent workers in their own sectors.
30 • USW (United Steelworkers’ of America) The USW is the largest industrial union in the U.S., representing roughly 1.2 million active and retired workers in the predominantly manufacturing industries, notably metals, mining, and rubber. In recent years, the union has also added a chemical, transportation, and healthcare workers. Overall, the USW has been highly exposed to the pressures of economic globalization. As noted above, since the early 1970s the union lost over half of its membership as a result of import competition, with the steel and aluminium industries suffering the greatest losses. Furthermore, the USW has experienced considerable multinationalization in a number of key industries, notably steel, aluminium, copper, rubber, paper, and industrial chemicals. • SEIU (Service Employees’ International Union) The SEIU is the second largest union in the U.S., representing over 1.8 million private and public workers in the service sector , such as health care, property services, and public services. Overall, the SEIU has been moderately exposed to the pressures of economic globalization, but this varies across industries. Unlike the USW, the SEIU has not been exposed to the pressures of import competition and FDI outflows in any industry, yet in both the property and healthcare services divisions the union has experienced considerable multinationalization of ownership. In contrast, the SEIU’s public services division has experienced minimal exposure to either type of globalization. Taken as a percentage, roughly 20% of members work in jobs that are not exposed to any form of economic globalization, while the other half have been exposed to multinationalization and little, if any import competition of FDI-related job losses. • AFT (American Federation of Teachers) The AFT is the seventh largest labor union in the U.S., representing both private and public sector workers in the professional and service sectors, notably teachers; paraprofessionals and school-related personnel, higher education faculty and staff, and more recently nurses and other healthcare professionals and local, state, and federal employees. Overall, the union has experienced minimal exposure to the pressures of economic globalization.
31 e) Data Collection This project will rely on a number of primary and secondary sources, notably interviews of union leadership, archival data, union documents and media statements, and where appropriate, secondary sources. The most important primary sources include union and government archives, union and campaign websites, interviews with union leaders, professional papers/reports published by labor unions, the GUF’s, the ICFTU and ILO, NGOs and community groups, and the U.S. Department of Labor. Interviews will consist of questions about transnational strategies and priorities, union experiences with globalization and global actors, and the successes/failures/prospects related to specific transnational campaigns. Where necessary, this project also will use secondary source books and journal articles to fill any gaps in primary source materials. f) Interview Parameters This study will rely on interviews with labor leaders in order to “triangulate” information gleaned from other primary and secondary source material. Interviews will consist of closed- and open-ended questions detailed below. In some instances, questions will be rephrased or omitted in consideration of the expertise and organizational position of the interviewee. 18 • Economic Set (Imports, Job Loss, and MNC’s) o Has your union experienced any significant job loss or job “informalization” in recent years? If so, to what do you attribute these changes? o Does your union face any significant import competition? If so, in which industry sectors is it concentrated? o Who are your main national and multinational (MNC) employers? Could you discuss the main similarities and differences between the two, with respect to: workers’ rights, job security, collective bargaining, organizing strategy? • Global Set (Globalization, Global Campaigns, Free Trade)
18 In this sense, some questions are not appropriate or applicable to some interviewees, and will thus be omitted.
32 o What are the top challenges and priorities of your union in the international/transnational realm? o How do you define “globalization” and how does this definition affect your approach to global affairs? o What is your union’s position on the “free trade” debate? How would you structure free trade agreements? o Which global actor(s) or institution(s) do you consider the strongest allies of your union? Conversely, which of these do you consider the weakest allies or greatest threats to your union? Examples: foreign labor unions, international NGO’s, the ILO, UN, GUF’s, WTO, IMF, World Bank, ETUC, TUAC). o Could you discuss your most successful global campaigns? What were your objectives and how did you pursue them? How well did you meet your objectives? To what do you attribute your successes? o Could you discuss your least successful campaigns? What were your objectives and how did you pursue them? How well did you meet your objectives? To what do you attribute any failures? o Would you care to share information on campaigns that you are developing? How have previous successes and/or failures influenced the content of your current approach? o Where you do you see your union globally in 5 years? 10 years? 50 years? • National/U.S. Set (Density, ’06 Elections, CTW, Local Politics) o What are the top challenges and priorities of your union domestically? Does your union have a preference of the federal government over state/local government? o Where is your union most heavily concentrated? By geographical location? By industry sector?
33 Do you feel that density gives you an advantage or disadvantage in electoral politics? o Who do you consider the greatest allies of the union domestically? (e.g., elected officials/parties, NGO’s, social activists)? o How your union’s members measure up to the ILO’s “core labor standards,” most notably the freedom to organize and the freedom from discrimination in the workplace? How much of a problem is union-busting for your union? How supportive is the NLRB? o Would you mind discussing your union’s approach to labor relations? In other words, does your union take a position on the “adversarialism versus accommodation” debate? Is this debate even valid today? g) Chapter Outlines • Two: This chapter will provide a basic overview of the U.S. labor movement, noting broadly economic change within the U.S. economy, the history of labor law, the labor-party nexus, and issues relating to union density and decline. The bulk of this chapter will be devoted to the history of U.S. labor transnationalism, its forms, objectives, and key actors. • Three, Four, and Five: The purpose of these chapters is to perform in-depth, structured case studies of the three unions listed above. Each case will be subdivided into five parts. Part I will provide a brief historical overview of the union. Part II will detail how each case interacts with the main independent variable and control variables. Part III will document the key national policy priorities of the union, making particular note of the linkages between these policy “fights” and economic globalization. Part IV will survey the union’s main transnational objectives, partners, and campaigns. Part V will analyze and assess the main hypotheses against the record of labor union transnationalism noted earlier in the chapter. • Six: This chapter will assess the four main hypotheses and summarize the interviews of labor leaders. • Seven: The final chapter will conclude with a discussion of key findings and shortcomings of this study, and propose avenues for future research.
34 Chapter 2: U.S. Labor Transnationalism in Historical Perspective
1) Introduction The international dimension of labor union strategy has increasingly been the focus in a number of international relations, industrial relations, and comparative politics books and articles over the past few years. Scholars have noted how U.S. labor unions, among other unions around the globe, are building coalitions and alliances across borders to address a host of political, economic, and organizational concerns. In addition, the content of labor unions’ transnational strategies appear to have evolved, from overt expressions of economic nationalism characteristic of the Cold War years to more forceful calls for international labor solidarity since the mid-1990’s. How can we explain these shifts? Certainly the most dominant explanation of this newest wave of labor internationalism is that the forces of globalization — neoliberal economic restructuring, the creation of supranational political bodies, increased information flows and the communications revolution, and mass migration — have eroded the national bases of union strength and reduced political opportunities at the national level. At the same time, these forces have facilitated the emergence of new, globalized identities among disparate labor groups. In this sense, labor group petitions for the inclusion of a social clause in free-trade agreements, labor union coordination through global union federations and the ICFTU, and other forms of grassroots, cross-border organizing between labor organizations are viewed as expressions of emerging global responses to increasingly global problems. Yet, while the forces of globalization certainly shape labor union responses, they do not fully account for the peculiarities of the U.S. experience. In this sense, U.S. unions were “going global” long before the ascendancy of neoliberal orthodoxy and the proliferation of multinational corporations — albeit in different ways. Furthermore, industrial restructuring has not guaranteed that a union will pursue a transnational response; in the face of global competition some labor unions continue to focus their efforts on economic nationalism and protectionist domestic policy. In order to account for these anomalies, therefore, it becomes important to situate econometric explanations of union behavior within the specific economic, political, and
35 social experiences U.S. unions throughout the 20 th century. This chapter seeks to fill this gap. Part II will provide a brief survey of early instances of U.S. labor transnationalism, with an emphasis the conditions that facilitated the emergence of organized labor as a political and economic force, culminating with the creation of the most influential U.S. labor organization, the AFL-CIO. Part III will detail the transnational dimension of AFL- CIO policy during the Cold War, with particular emphasis on the goals and methods driving these policies, and relationships with foreign partners. Part IV will highlight the decline of organized labor, noting the economic, political, and demographic contours of this decline. Finally, Part V will briefly survey recent attempts to revitalize the U.S. labor movement domestically and internationally. The transnational dimension of contemporary union activity will be analyzed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
2) The Early Years of the U.S. Labor Movement: 1900-1955 American labor unions have been active in the international realm for over a century. In the late 19 th century, socialist trade unionists sponsored exchanges with their counterparts abroad, most notably Canada, Britain, France, and Russia. Similarly, the largest progressive socialist federations in the U.S., the Knights of Labor (K of L) and the International Workers of the World (IWW, or “Wobblies”), regularly sponsored trade unionists from Chile, New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa in the early part of the 20 th century with the hope of exporting socialist trade unionism abroad (van der Linden, 145). In the 1920’s, the more conservative American Federation of Labor (AFL) worked with successive U.S. administrations to create the Pan-American Federation of Labor (PAFL), a labor fund dedicated to steering fledgling union movements in Mexico, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba into adopting the AFL’s capitalist-friendly “business as usual” 19 labor relations model (Buhle, 1999, 85). Likewise, government-sponsored internationalist organizations, such as the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy
19 Samuel Gompers, the first president of the AFL, is often credited with introducing “business as usual,” also known as “business unionism” in the U.S. labor movement. This model would come to dominate labor relations in the 20 th century, and is based on the acceptance of capitalism as the preferred economic system (or at least, accept it as given), employer-employee bargaining without government interference, and the satisfaction of immediate worker demands over long term, solidaristic, internationalist, or “idealistic” goals. The idea of the union was that it be a business in its own right.
36 (AALD), emerged to challenge communism and anarchism in the United States’ “back door” (Buhle, 78). For the most part, however, these early foreign ventures were only marginally successful in achieving their varied aims, in part because American labor unions were fledgling themselves, preoccupied with consolidating their own power at home and unable to sustain their organizing efforts abroad. Of course, this would change after the New Deal and WWII, two events that thrust American unions into national, and very quickly international , prominence. It is during this time, from roughly 1945 to 1970, that the labor movement began exerting significant influence within the international trade union movement. Bolstered by their domestic political clout, which increased markedly after the New Deal, the AFL and CIO (AFL-CIO after 1955) developed a sophisticated international affairs arm through which business unionism and anti-communism could be promoted abroad. * * * As the American labor movement entered the 1950’s, it was at the peak of its organizational, political, and economic clout. Roughly one-third of the total non- agricultural workforce was represented by a union, thousands of pro-labor state, local, and federal officials occupied public office, and the peak labor federations (the AFL and CIO) were awash in dues, money that they did not hesitate to spend on a host of domestic and international initiatives. This was the era of “Big Labor.” Of course, these developments stood in sharp relief to the situation of labor just two decades earlier, when unionization stood at less than ten percent and commentators were proclaiming the “end of labor” as they had known it. A number of forces conspired to make labor strong in the 1950’s, the most important of which was President Franklin Roosevelt’s “New Deal.” Prior to 1932, labor unions enjoyed very few legal protections. Between 1932 and 1938, however, a string of legislation was passed that provided the foundation for the dramatic upsurge in organizing. The first of these was the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, which stripped the authority of federal courts to issue injunctions in nonviolent labor disputes, and prohibited “yellow dog” contracts, or employment contracts which stipulated that a worker refrain from joining a union. Immediately thereafter, Congress passed the
37 National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (or NIRA), which was legislation designed to promote fair competition between firms, regulate wages and prices, provide jobs for the unemployed, and most importantly, encouraged workers to join unions for the purpose of collective bargaining (Nicholson). Although the NIRA was overturned in 1935, the key labor provision encouraging unionization (i.e., Section 7a) was reinserted into what became the third, and clearly most distinguished piece of New Deal labor legislation: the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (or Wagner Act). The Wagner Act explicitly granted all industrial workers the right to join workplace unions for the purpose of collective bargaining, banned company unions from bargaining in place of private unions, and outlawed the use of intimidation tactics on the part of employers (Dubofsky & McCartin, 142). Furthermore, the Wagner Act created the National Labor Relations Board, a federal agency charged with task of certifying union elections and investigating “unfair labor practices” as outlined in the NLRA. 20 Finally, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which guaranteed a federal minimum wage for most industrial workers, required employers to provide “time and a half” for overtime work, and abolished most forms of child employment. The federal government’s radical departure from its classically liberal approach to labor relations (i.e., nonintervention in business-labor relations) occasioned a dramatic surge in labor organizing. Between 1935 and 1956 union membership increased by over 400 percent, from 3.7 million workers in 1935 (the year that the Wagner Act went into effect) to 17.5 million workers in 1956. Over the same period, moreover, union density quadrupled, from 6.7 percent to its historic peak of 25.2 percent in 1956 (Jarley, in Fairbrother and Griffin, 2002: 209). These gains were most spectacular in mass-production industries, such automotives, steel, coal, electrical, and petro-chemicals, which had been until the late 1930’s the most union-resistant sectors of the economy (Dubofsky & McCartin, 143). Bolstered by the Wagner Act, a flurry of union activity was initiated by industrial unions
20 Certification elections are used to determine whether a union has the right to collective bargaining with a certain employer. Typically, workers in a particular plant will vote on whether and with whom to organize; if the majority of the votes cast request union representation, and a particular union receives a majority of those votes, that union has the sole right to bargain with the employer. The NLRA requires the employers bargain “in good faith” with the winning union.
38 affiliated with the newly-created Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), most notably the United Auto Workers (UAW), the United Steel Workers (USW), the United Mine Workers (UMW), the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), and the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union (ACTWU). 21 These unions initiated a series of “sit-down” strikes (the “GM-Flint Strike” of 1936-37 among the most celebrated) which brought most of the country’s largest employers to the bargaining table for the first time, among them GM, Ford, and U.S. Steel. The result of these negotiations were historic contracts guaranteeing an eight-hour workday, structured wage increases, a pension, and a measure of job security for several decades to follow (Nicholson, 218). The 1940’s through the 1960’s witnessed the consolidation of organized labors’ economic and political clout. Economically, the “business as usual” model of decentralized collective bargaining, in which employers negotiated with unions to determine work rules, became the industrial norm. WWII had erased unemployment and strengthened the hand of labor, while the rise of mass consumption ensured that there would be a market for goods in industries that were predominantly unionized (e.g., autos, consumer durables). Although a wave of strike activity after WWII prompted a backlash in the business community, most employers accepted the legitimacy of business unionism and sought accommodation and labor peace by acceding to basic union demands (e.g., job control, wage increases, etc.) (Jarley, 201). In other words, unions were accepted more-or-less as coequal partners in defining the terms of work on the shop floor. The ascendancy of “Big Labor” had political ramifications as well. With membership soaring but their New Deal gains under increasing scrutiny after WWII, as reflected in repeated efforts by national legislators to rescind the Wagner Act and the narrow election of pro-labor presidential candidate Harry Truman in 1948, the labor movement redoubled its political efforts at the state and federal level. On the electoral front, for example, the CIO and AFL created the CIO Political Action Committee (PAC)
21 The Congress of Industrial Organizations, or CIO, was established in 1935 by an influential contingent of AFL affiliates, most notably the United Mine Workers, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, and the United Textile Workers, each of whom had become disenchanted with the AFL’s reluctance to organize the mass industries along industrial lines (i.e., industrial unionism). Unable to sway the AFL’s leadership to adopt both modes of organizing, John Lewis of the Mine Workers established CIO as a federation of industrial unions within the organizational framework of the AFL, yet severed ties in 1938 to create a completely autonomous labor organization. In essence, the CIO argued that craft unionism ignored far too many unskilled and semi-skilled workers in the large industries, such as steel, autos, energy, and apparel.
39 and Labor League for Political Education (LLPE), respectively, in order funnel money from their affiliates toward voter registration initiatives, political propaganda, rallies, door-to-door canvassing, radio and ad space, and other forms of electoral outreach (Ziegler & Gall, 159-160). After the AFL-CIO merger in 1955, these competing organizations were collapsed into the Committee on Political Education (COPE) (Galenson, 1996: 99). As a legislative complement, the two federations developed sophisticated research, information, and lobbying arms in order to enhance their public profile with legislators at the state and national capitals (Zieger and Hall, 165). The logic behind these organizations was simple: with over fifteen million union members it would be possible to get pro-labor candidates (mostly Democrats) into public office and lobby them for legislation that ensures viability of New Deal labor protections. Indeed, from the 1940’s to the 1960’s, the labor vote consistently helped over two-thirds of congressional candidates win office and was critical to the electoral fortunes of each Democratic candidate for president, especially Harry Truman and John Kennedy (Galenson, 105).22 Electoral influence was particularly strong in the heavily unionized industrial centers of the North and Midwest, such as Michigan, New York, Ohio, Minnesota, and Washington, where both Democrats and Republicans competed to win the labor vote. Organized labor was so influential in Michigan, for instance, that many considered the CIO and the Democratic Party “virtually indistinguishable” (Dubofsky & McCartin, 209). Yet the emergence of “Big Labor” as a political force the 1940’s and 1950’s did not go uncontested. Indeed, just at the time when the labor movement was at the height of its power, anti-labor forces in Congress and corporate America were deployed a legal and ideological broadside against two key pillars of organized labor’s strength: its leaders and its legal rights. Using the emergent “red scare” as an ideological pretext, the anti-labor chorus sought to “tame” the labor movement by subverting the Wagner Act and purging the leading unions of all but their most anti-communist, pro-government, and pro- business elements. In short, the Cold War facilitated an anti-labor backlash that, by the
22 Of course, it is very difficult to definitively gauge the influence of labor unions’ political action on candidate election and legislative behavior. Certainly, the labor vote was important in a number of races, and legislators, especially in the heavily unionized states, were likely to consider the labor vote a high priority.
40 end of the 1950’s, was so successful that it had resulted in the expulsion of all communist elements from the main labor federations and severely curtailed the labor protections afforded by the Wagner Act. Both of these experiences, moreover, would heavily influence the labor movement’s international policies during this period. The “red scare” that descended on American politics in the immediate post-war years hit the labor movement especially hard, especially the affiliates of the CIO (and to a smaller extent, the AFL) which had a long history supporting leftist causes and having admitted communists within its ranks. As the Cold War heated up in the late 1940’s, critics of the labor movement, especially those who viewed the Wagner Act and the associated growth of union influence with contempt, called on each federation to purge its ranks of communist sympathizers. For some critics, the “red scare” provided vehicle through which national security could be tied to domestic radicalism, and by extension, the leadership of the large unions (Nicholson, 255); for others, communism was a genuine threat to the democratic order. Either way, the increasingly ideologically and combative posture of business and government conservatives led the CIO to challenge and ultimately expel members and affiliates who were openly members of the Communist Party (i.e., “reds”), or even sympathetic to communist ideology and the Soviet Union (i.e., “pinkos”). By the early 1950’s, the CIO had expelled over twenty percent of its membership that had refused to repudiate communism or the Soviet Union, including its most influential affiliates, such as the United Electrical Workers Union (UE), the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU), the National Maritime Union (NMU), and the Transport Workers Union (TWU), and the Mine Mill, and Smelter Workers (Mine, Mill) (Dubofsky & McCartin, 210; Zieger and Gall, 170). As for the CIO members who had lost their union, the federation established replacement unions in the hopes of retaining the bulk of the expelled union membership. The purge of communist unionists had several important domestic and international ramifications. Foremost among these was the effective elimination of left and centrist ideology within the dominant federations, resulting in an overrepresentation of labor conservatives who were the most vocal supporters of Cold War anti-communist policies of Truman and his successors (Nicholson, 255-56). Old guard reformers who had
41 advocated conciliation towards the Soviet Union, civil rights, gender equity, national health care, and other “progressive” causes, such as John C. Lewis of the Mine Workers and Albert Fitzgerald of the Electrical Workers, were publicly condemned for being in league with the enemy. In contrast, ardent anti-communists who, either out of opportunism or genuine belief extolled the virtues of American-style capitalism and democracy, quickly rose to the highest ranks of power—individuals such as George Meany of the AFL and Walter Reuther of the Auto Workers (and later president of the CIO). For this new cadre of labor leaders, the key to labor’s strength at home was not radicalism, but accommodation with the both the captains of business and government. Indeed, as the Cold War heated up in the 1950’s and 1960’s, evidence of labor’s commitment to peaceful accommodation would manifest in its vigorous pursuit of anti-communism and business unionism abroad. Efforts to placate a public apprehensive about the gathering “red menace” did not foreclose a new round of challenges to the decidedly pro-labor Wagner Act, however. Although the rights to organize, strike, and bargain had become established labor prerogatives by the end of WWII, these rights were only grudgingly accepted by many in the business community and in government as a means to ensure labor peace, and thus continued prosperity in the domestic economy. In fact, as early as 1937, when the constitutionality of the Wagner Act was affirmed by the Supreme Court, disaffected conservative forces within government and business flirted with legislation that would rescind key provisions of the Wagner Act, or at least alter the legislation to make it more business-friendly. While these efforts met with little success during President Roosevelt’s tenure, and in fact were shelved during WWII in order to maintain the war economy, two events, the massive wave of industrial strikes that precipitated between 1945 and 1947, as well as the onset of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, provided anti-labor forces with a propitious moment with which to resurrect their counteroffensive. The effectiveness of the anti-labor counteroffensive is most clearly reflected in the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley) and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin). The first revision, hastily written during the peak of industrial striking, was intended to curtail future strikes and
42 strengthen the hand of employers generally. Indeed, Taft-Hartley addressed these concerns and more; it gave employers and the government the authority to charge unions with “unfair labor practices,” a power that was exclusively reserved to unions in the Wagner Act; employers were given the right of “free speech,” which legalized to their ability to conduct anti-union campaigns; mass picketing and secondary boycotts on the part of unions were prohibited; union finances were required to be open for public accounting; the closed shop was made illegal, meaning that employers were able to hire non-union workers; and perhaps the most controversial of all, union officers were forced to sign anti-communist affidavits (Nicholson, 251; Ziegler and Hall, 2002: 152-159). The subsequent Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 reaffirmed and clarified the LMRA, explicitly barring ex-communists from union leadership positions, mandating secret union elections and open financial reporting to curb union corruption, and placing more sever penalties on secondary or “sympathy” boycotts. Big Labor protested these changes, proposing a repeal of the provision in Taft-Hartley which prohibited “closed-shop” and “union-shop” management arrangements, but Congress flatly rejected it. 23 In short, the two Wagner Act revisions substantially altered labor-relations regime established under the New Deal by severely restricting the autonomy of unions (e.g., secondary boycotts, political independence) while reestablishing the rights of business to disrupt the formation of unions on their shop floors (e.g., employer free speech). Although the “core” provisions of the Wagner Act remained — the basic rights to organize and collective bargaining, enforced by the federal government — they were henceforth subjected to a litany of stringent government regulations. * * *
23 There are three types of union-management relationships. The Wagner Act guarantees #1, while Section 14B of Taft-Hartley prohibits #2 and #3. National “Right to Work” laws are based on this reading of Taft- Hartley, explaining why labor unions have generally worked to repeal this portion of the law. Right to Work laws allow workers to “opt out” of paying union dues, thus creating a “free rider” problem for unions. See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action , 1964. 1. Open Shop: A union has the legal right to organize workers, but no worker may be compelled to join it. 2. Closed Shop: every employee must belong to a union, and management may not employ any worker who is not a union member. 3. Union Shop: management may hire non-union workers, but these workers must join a union within a specified period of time to retain their job.
43 By the mid-1950’s, the labor movement was on its heels, reeling from years of communist purges and legal assaults. Searching for a way to recapture the vigor that the labor movement had lost over the decade prior, Walter Reuther of the CIO and George Meany of the AFL negotiated a tactical merger of the two erstwhile rival federations in 1955. While the AFL-CIO merger was largely a “marriage of convenience rather than love”— both viewed the other as a prerequisite for a strong movement, yet there remained significant differences between the two federations over politics, economics, and the nature of organizing — they did share one element that would become critical to understanding the trajectory of national and international labor politics after 1955: the only people who remained in leadership positions were staunch anti-communists who were highly supportive of American business and government at home and abroad.
3) The Cold War Years: 1945-1989 a. Situating International Affairs From 1945 to the early 1980’s, that the U.S. labor movement began exerting significant influence within the international trade union movement. With few exceptions, however, the contours of U.S. labor internationalism during this period were fashioned by the AFL-CIO. As noted above, by the time of the merger between the two rival federations in 1955, the AFL-CIO had become thoroughly enmeshed and vocally supportive of the anti-communist, capitalist, and expansionist consensus of the day, and had become the most influential voice of American labor domestically. This influence carried over into the international realm in the form of vigorous anti-communism initiatives abroad, promoting business unionism, and supporting expansionist foreign policy ventures of the U.S. government. In the main, AFL-CIO directed its international trade union activities through the four main international arms its Department of International Affairs: the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD); the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI); the African-American Labor Center (AALC); and the Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI). To a lesser extent, the AFL-CIO coordinated international labor activities through the two main international labor organizations, the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU),
44 and the twelve sector-level international trade secretariats (ITS), such as the International Metalworkers Federation and the International Textile, Garment, and Leather Workers’ Federation (ITGLWU). In the main, most of the AFL-CIO’s international initiatives were coordinated through their own international bodies, principally because they could exercise more control over them than the multilateral institutions, of which they only enjoyed partial control and were often at odds with other delegations (usually over anti- communism). Nevertheless, during the Cold War, the AFL-CIO would pursue hundreds of initiatives designed to assist their labor allies abroad. For over three decades, these international bodies were used in service of the AFL-CIO’s overarching foreign political and economic agenda, an agenda that was almost exclusively composed of two elements: anti-communism and business unionism. As noted above, the purge of communists and communist sympathizers from the CIO (and to a lesser extent, the AFL) in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s left a leadership vacuum that was quickly filled by staunch anti-communists— for example, George Meany, Walter Reuther, and Jay Lovestone — who made anti-communism one of the chief policy objectives in both domestic and international trade union ventures. There was, in the words of historian Philip Nicholson, “no dictator, no matter how corrupt and no matter how cruelly repressive to his own labor force, (who) was unacceptable or unworthy of their endorsement in the great struggle with the Soviet Union” (Nicholson, 256). At the same time, there was no leftist government, no matter how democratically legitimate, progressive, or friendly to the working class that would be permitted to exist (ibid). In short, from the merger of the AFL-CIO in 1955 through the early 1980’s, (when anti-communism would decrease in importance), relationships with foreign trade union movements would be driven first by anticommunist ideological considerations and only second by international solidarity generally. The second element motivating the AFL-CIO’s international trade union activities was its firm belief in business unionism, described by the AFL’s early founder Samuel Gompers as “trade unionism pure and simple,” which it sought to export to the developing world through what it termed “free unions.” The business union has long roots in the American trade union movement, and is based on the firm acceptance of capitalism (often rejected by leftist unions at the time) and decentralized negotiations
45 between workers and their employers over the conditions of work, such as wages, hours, conditions, and benefits (see Buhle, 17-19). In this way, the business union orientation rejects the class-based reading of economic relations, and sees unions and employers as potential allies (albeit unequal) in economic development. Tactically, this model is designed to satisfy the immediate demands of workers. This orientation, moreover, is consistent with the anti-communist posture of the AFL-CIO. The AFL-CIO’s commitment to business unionism fed into its relations with trade unions abroad. Taken together, the AFL-CIO’s dual commitment to anti-communism and business unionism influenced the way it approached its relations with trade unions abroad. The AFL-CIO promoted what it called “free” or “authentic” unions abroad. As described by the Federation, “Authentic trade unions are not tools of the state, of political parties, or of employers. They are voluntary associations created by workers for mutual support, to give voice to their needs and to advance their interests—as workers define them” (cited in Sims, 1992: 4). In the context of the Cold War, however, “free” unions were those whose behavior was consistent with the philosophical orientation of the AFL- CIO and the U.S. government — that is, anti-communism, capitalist expansion, business unionism, and American hegemony. Indeed, from its creation in 1955, the AFL-CIO demonstrated through its international arms a steadfast commitment to building an international trade union movement on these principles, while vigorously working to undermine challenges to their vision by rival trade unions or international organization. b. Bilateral Activism: The AFL-CIO’s Foreign Institutes Nowhere was the AFL-CIO’s commitment to the aforementioned principles more apparent than in operations conducted through its four international institutes: the AIFLD; the AALC; the AAFLI; and the FTUI. The institutes, created by the AFL-CIO in conjunction with the U.S. State Department and the CIA between 1962 and 1977, and functioning as late as 1997 (when they were reorganized into the “Solidarity Center,” discussed below), were assigned the task of providing training, information, and money to anticommunist unions in developing countries, particularly those in which the United States had an abiding economic or political interest (e.g., Central and South America, Europe, and to a lesser extent Africa and Southeast Asia) (Galenson, 127). The institutes were nominally funded by the Federation, although they received considerable funding
46 through the U.S. government’s Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), in addition to undisclosed corporate donations (see Sims, 1992: 22-24). The ultimate aim of the institutes, as one commentator put it, was to train and assist “pro-American and pro-business” labor leaders to supplant the tide of left-led, and presumably anti-capitalist unions abroad (Buhle, 151). The AIFLD The first and clearly most controversial of the AFL-CIO’s four institutes was the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AFILD), created in 1962 in to give the Federation a foothold in the affairs of labor movements in the Western Hemisphere, particularly Latin America and the Caribbean. The AIFLD was the Federation’s complement to the Inter-American Regional Labor Organization (ORIT), the ICFTU’s Latin American institute best known for participating in the overthrow of left-leaning Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 (Scipes, 2005: 24). As explained by a congressional subcommittee staff report in 1968, the AIFLD was formed “primarily in response to the threat of Castroite infiltration and eventual control of major labor movements within Latin America” (cited in Sims, 55). Building on ORIT’s legacy, the stated purpose of the AIFLD was to promote U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere by providing assistance free trade unionists in Latin America generally, with targeted emphasis placed on countries perceived to be the most susceptible to the development of communist trade unions or left-led governing regimes. In the thirty three years of its existence, the record of the AIFLD generated the most controversy among the four institutes. Supporters point to the fact that between 1962 and 1993 the program trained more than 750,000 Latin American trade unionists in virtually every country in the region, educating them on the tactics of organizing, recruitment, leadership, and advocacy (Galenson, 127). Using both government and private funds, AIFLD programs also included technical assistance to free trade unions, support for social service projects, assistance developing pro-U.S. labor publications, and perhaps most importantly, the development of political efficacy through political education programs, voter registration/“get-out-the-vote” drives, media campaigns, election observation, trade union rights monitoring assistance, and trade unionist visitor exchanges between the U.S. and the home country (Sims, 56-57). In addition, AIFLD
47 monies were used for much-needed social projects, such as housing developments, worker co-ops, micro-credit banks, medical clinics, and union halls (Berger, 1967: 83). For example, in Uruguay alone during the 1960’s and 1970’s the AIFLD and CIA together invested roughly $8 million in housing projects, salaries for unionists, and field training (Buhle, 154). Of course, such assistance targeted those unions and unionists who shared the political and economic outlook of the AFL-CIO. Yet AIFLD activities drew far more criticism than praise in the thirty three years of its existence. Of particular concern was the AIFLD’s involvement in CIA-sponsored interventions against leftist governments throughout the region in the 1960’s, 1970’s, and 1980’s. The first allegations of such misdeeds surfaced within twelve months of the organization’s existence when it sponsored and funded a strike in British Guiana of conservative unionists against the supporters of leftist president Cheddi Jagan (Buhle, 152-53). In the same year, AIFLD operatives were involved in the Dominican Republic, supplying rightist elements with funding, strategic assistance, and favorable publicity in anticipation of the election of leftist President Juan Bosch, who was eventually ousted just seven months after taking office in 1963. When a pro-Bosch uprising took hold in 1965, the AIFLD “ardently supported” an invasion of U.S. Marines to restore order (ibid). Similar tactics were also used in ventures against Brazil’s Joao Goulart in 1964 and Chile’s Salvador Allende in the early 1970’s. In the case of Chile, perhaps the most notorious instance of U.S. Cold War interventionism in Latin America, the AIFLD developed a multi-pronged strategy to foment a worker-led, yet pro-business uprising against the popularly elected Socialist leader. Led by the AIFLD’s chief operative in Santiago, Robert O’Neil, the plan included various unsuccessful schemes to infiltrate the country’s largest labor union, the communist-led 1-million-member Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT), with the hope of capturing the loyalties of workers in the strategic sectors (e.g., copper, oil, banking, and oil) (Shorrock, 2003: 16-18). When these efforts failed, AIFLD operatives pitched their support behind right-wing movements, the most successful of which, led by General Augusto Pinochet, resulted in a military coup in 1973 (ibid). Beyond these well-publicized cases, the AIFLD has also been implicated in schemes to fund right-wing movements in El Salvador and Nicaragua in the 1980’s.
48 The AALC The African-America Labor Center (AALC) was the second institute established by the AFL-CIO, created in 1964 by longtime AFL anticommunist activist Irving Brown to assist labor movements in Africa, particularly those emerging from anti-colonialist movements. The AALC conducted operations in as many as 31 countries at the height of its operations in the 1970’s and 1980’s, often coordinating activities with leading regional labor organizations, most notably the pan-African Organization of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU), the Southern African Trade Union coordinating Council (SATUUC), the Organization of Trade Unions of West Africa (OTUWA), the Organization of Central African Workers (OTAC), and the African arm of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU-AFRO). Much like its sister organization the AIFLD, the AALC was established to help shore up U.S. influence in the region generally, while promoting de-radicalized anticommunist unions, “bread and butter” business unionism, and “harmonious” relationships between business and workers (i.e., labor peace) through intensive educational training and financial assistance (Sims, 57). From a Cold War perspective, this task became critically important through the 1960’s and 1970’s when the activist nationalist and socialist movements that spearheaded the decolonization process assumed the reins of political power across much of the continent. In short, the desire to further U.S. labor and corporate interests, as well as the need to undercut the Soviet Union’s attempts to gain a foothold in the region, impelled the AFL-CIO to take an active role through the AALC in order to “offset the influence of the militantly anti-apartheid left and its Christian liberal allies” (Buhle, 227). Yet much like the its sister organization the AIFLD, the AALC’s work was the subject of pointed criticism, the main charge being that the organization undercut legitimate grassroots labor organizations through its dogged support of pro-business, anti- communist leaders and “front” labor unions with little working-class credentials — among others, CIA-sponsored National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) leader Holden Roberto, Unita head Jonas Savimbi of Angola, Kenya Federation of Labor (KFL) leader Tom Mboya, and Kwazulu homeland Chief Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi (Cox, 1971: 555).
49 In the latter case, that of apartheid-era South Africa and Chief Buthelezi, the AALC’s work has come under considerable scrutiny. Concerned about the rising influence of the African National Congress (ANC) and its jailed activist Nelson Mandela, perceived by the Reagan administration, the CIA, and the AFL-CIO to be too left-leaning and militantly anti-apartheid, the AALC sought to create a conservative labor counterweight under the auspices of Chief Buthelezi, the apartheid government’s appointed ruler of Kwazulu homeland and South Africa’s most notorious black opponent of economic sanctions (Buhle, 227). Through Buthelezi, the AALC created the business- friendly Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA) in Natal in order to undermine the ANC-dominated Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the largest and most vehemently anti-apartheid labor federation of black workers in South Africa (Scipes, 1997: 1-2). Although Buthelezi failed to discredit the ANC, Mandela, or the COSATU, he was nevertheless awarded the AFL-CIO’s George Meany Human Rights Award in 1982 as allegations of his own involvement in human rights abuses surfaced (Buhle, 228). The AAFLI The Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI) was created by the AFL-CIO in 1968 to operate first as the Federation’s labor conduit in Vietnam during the conflict in Southeast Asia, but was quickly expanded to include dozens of countries in the Pacific Rim, East Asia, and the Middle East. The institute was created with the same funding source (USAID) and with the same overall objectives as the AIFLD and AALC — that is, to promote “free and effective” pro-American, anti-communist trade unions through “urgently needed technical assistance,” as well as to encourage trade unions to endorse the business union model with its focus on collegial relations between workers, employers, and the state (quoted in Shorrock and Selvaggio, 1986: 170). Moreover, in creating the institute the AFL-CIO hoped to create a direct link to trade union organizations in the region, while bypassing the multilateral ICFTU which was perceived by them to be particularly hostile to U.S. military and labor interests, especially with respect to Vietnam. Similar to the AIFLD and AALC, the AAFLI’s operations over thirty years inspired far more criticism than praise. On the one hand, supporters cheered the
50 institute’s steadfast opposition to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) trade union organization, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), an organization long accused perpetrating human rights abuses against its workers. Throughout the 1990’s, the instituted insisted (unsuccessfully) that U.S. lawmakers block China’s request to join the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) until it addressed its human rights record. Others commended the AAFLI’s support of trade union movements in a region with a demonstrable history of state-led labor union repression, most notably in the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and South Korea (Galenson, 129). Critics of the AAFLI charged a number of misdeeds, the most notable of which was the institute’s refusal to work with independent labor federations or labor unions with ties to opposition parties, while at the same time developing close relationships with government-led trade unions in countries with a history of labor repression and corruption (Shorrock and Selvaggio, 170). In this vein, the unions that the AAFLI did support were notoriously corrupt, able to evade government repression principally because they were led co-opted pro-government labor leaders who colluded with political leaders to ensure labor peace. In South Korea between 1961 and 1978, for example, the AAFLI worked closely with President Park Chung Hee and the Korean CIA (KCIA), both of whom were known for their ruthless suppression of trade union activity independent of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), the only legal trade union federation in the country. Despite the AFL-CIO’s policy against working with government-controlled unions, especially unions that were reputed to be hostile to the workers that it represented (as in the case of the FKTU), it nevertheless directed the AAFLI to finance and train FKTU leaders (Shorrock, 2003: 18-19). Similarly, in the 1980’s and early 1990’s the AAFLI funneled millions of dollars to the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUC), the corporatist labor federation founded in 1975 by partisans of President Ferdinand Marcos as an alternative to the independent and decidedly anti-Marcos Kilusang Mayo Union (KMU, or May Day Movement) (Scipes, 1997: 2). With the help of the AAFLI, the TUC assisted the Marcos regime in infiltrating KMU and arresting key leaders of the opposition movement. Although Marcos was eventually overthrown in 1986, the AAFLI continued to fund the TUC in exchange for its support of business deregulation (which benefited U.S.
51 businesses extensively) and the use of Filipino naval bases by the U.S. military (Buhle, 228). Both of these cases, as well as others in Fiji, Thailand, and Malaysia, sullied the image of the AAFLI. The FTUI The last of four institutes created by the AFL-CIO was the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI), established in 1977 to serve as the European arm of the Federation and a clearinghouse for National Endowment for Democracy (NED) grants to the other three institutes (Carothers, 1994: 126-127). The institute succeeded the post-war Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC), the AFL-CIO’s key European conduit during the immediate post-war years which had become moribund by the early 1970’s. The purpose of resurrecting the FTUI was to give the AFL-CIO an effective mechanism to respond to “unfavorable” developments in Europe during the 1970’s, most notably the fall of military governments in Portugal and Spain and the emergence of socialist parties and leftist trade unions in their place (Sims, 54). These developments impelled the AFL-CIO, at the behest of President Lane Kirkland, to revitalize its European arm in order to curb the influence of leftist unions and communist parties in these emerging democracies. The mission of the FTUI, however, was somewhat different than the other three international institutes of the AFL-CIO. The FTUI’s initial purpose, much like the other regional institutes, was to combat anti-communism and promote U.S. interests in a particular region — in this case, Europe. Facing a budget crunch in the early 1980’s, however, AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland solicited funds from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a quasi-autonomous endowment created by the Congress in 1983 in order to provide grants to non-governmental agencies working to build democratic institutions abroad, in order to keep the FTUI solvent. The NED became a willing partner of the FTUI. Beginning in 1983, the NED provided over fifty percent of its grants to the FTUI for the purpose of promoting “democratic development in a manner consistent with the broad concerns of United States national interests” (cited in IRC, 2006: 1). For its part, the FTUI became the chief conduit for the NED’s institutional development projects overseas, using some of the grant money for its own projects in Europe, particularly Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, while funneling millions more to the AFL-CIO’s other regional institutes in Latin America (AIFLD), Africa
52 (AALC), and Asia (AAFLI) (Galenson, 129). Moreover, the FTUI softened its anti- communist rhetoric, replacing it with a more “pro-democratic rationale” consistent with the basic philosophy of the NED (Carothers, 1994: 127). Indeed, the projects funded by the FTUI during the 1980’s and early 1990’s clearly reflect a mix of the AFL-CIO’s traditional anticommunist politics with the NED’s emphasis on building democratic institutions abroad. In Poland for example, the FTUI worked closely with the Solidarnosc (Solidarity), the independent pro-democracy workers movement led by Lech Walesa. FTUI funds were used to create the Polish Workers’ Aid Social Fund for unemployed Solidarity members, to purchase communications equipment and disseminate information to workers in Poland and in the West about workers’ abuses, and most importantly, to help Solidarity organize a truly independent union in communist Poland (Shevis, 1981: 31-33; IRC, 2). At the same time, FTUI assistance served U.S. foreign policy interests quite well; communist elements within the Polish government and trade union movement were thoroughly discredited, while pro-democratic, pro-free market labor leaders were elevated to the highest ranks. The story was the same for other FTUI projects, both in Europe and around the world through the AFL-CIO’s other regional institutes. In France, the FTUI funded two center-right groups with strong anti-communist credentials, L’Union Nationale Inter- Universitaire (UNI) and the Force Ouvriere (F.O.) in the hopes of curbing the influence of the left-wing Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT), France’s largest labor union (Schapiro and Levy, 1985: 11). The FTUI did the same for right-wing unions in Portugal and Spain throughout the 1980’s (IRC, 2). In Latin America, the FTUI worked with the AIFLD on projects in Panama, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Chile, Brazil and Colombia, among others. In Panama, for example, FTUI funds were directed towards the Panamanian Confederation of Workers (CTRP) in support of the military-backed Nicolas Barletta in national elections (IRC, 2). The FTUI also funded projects in Southeast Asia and Africa through the AAFLI and AALC, respectively. In the Philippines, for example, FTUI grants were used in support of the TUC (noted above), while in South Africa FTUI grants were used to support Chief Buthelezi (also noted above). 24
24 For more FTUI activities, see Rightweb: http://rightweb.irc-online.org/groupwatch/ftui.php
53 c. Multilateralism: The ILO and ICFTU Beyond the foreign institutes, the AFL-CIO cultivated working relationships with several international labor organizations throughout the Cold War, most notably with the International Labor Organization (ILO), the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and the International Trade Secretariats (ITS) of the ICFTU. Although the Federation preferred working through its own foreign institutes, principally because it could exercise greater control over their operations, it typically found common cause with the main multilateral labor organizations in promoting anti-communism and “bread and butter” unionism to developing unions abroad — the raison d’etre of the AFL-CIO’s international work. As part of this collaboration, the Federation provided a number of services, among which were drafting universal conventions on working conditions and human rights, developing educational training for upstart unions, coordinating cross- border exchanges between unions, and providing financial assistance to support anti- communist unions. Nevertheless, at various points during the Cold War conflict over the content and direction of multilateral policy led the Federation to sever ties with both the ICFTU and the ILO. As a result, the Federation tended to rely much more heavily on its foreign institutes and to a lesser extent its multilateral allies. The ILO The International Labor Organization was established in 1919 as an agency of the League of Nations, and still exists today as the specialized labor arm of the United Nations. In creating the ILO, the Allied powers sought to address concerns that unregulated capitalism was contributing to the rise of radical working-class movements in Europe and the United States that, if left unchecked, could escalate into Bolshevik- style revolutions (Wilkinson, 2002: 204). Towards this end, the ILO formulates international labor standards covering a wide range of labor-related issues, such as the freedom of association, the right to organize, collective bargaining, the abolition of slave and prison labor, social security, workplace discrimination, child labor, and basic workplace rights (ILO; Douglas, Ferguson, and Klett, 2004: 274-75). In contrast to other state-centric international organizations (e.g., WTO), the ILO establishes a tripartite executive structure, incorporating an equal ratio of business, labor union, and government
54 representatives in order to achieve greater consensus and legitimacy in the formulation of its standards, formally known as conventions and recommendations (Wilkinson, 205). Lacking enforcement mechanisms and being a voluntary organization, however, the ILO must rely on moral suasion and the commitments of its member states — both of which have hampered its effectiveness throughout its history. The ILO and the American labor movement have a long history, one that dates back to the initial founding of the organization in 1919. Samuel Gompers, the AFL’s founder and longtime president, served as head of the postwar Labor Commission of the Versailles Conference and helped draft the ILO’s first constitution. At Gompers’ behest, the ILO constitution enshrined the same tripartite negotiating structure that characterized business relations in the United States — that is, business unionism. In this sense, the presumption behind tripartism is that business, labor, and government are not ‘natural’ enemies, but potential allies who should work together to formulate working conditions. It should come as no surprise, then, that although the ILO welcomed all states irrespective of economic constitution (e.g., communism, capitalism, corporatism, etc), the Soviet Union was perpetually hostile to the arrangement (yet a member nevertheless). The influence of Samuel Gompers notwithstanding, until the end of the Cold War the relationship between the ILO and the captains of American government, labor, and business was ambivalent at best, downright hostile at worst. Although the U.S. delegation regularly affirmed the significance of the ILO as “an instrument in the ideological contest” and “and instrument for U.S. objectives for building democratic institutions as well as a platform for U.S. labor and management,” the absence of unilateral control on the part of the U.S. delegation led to several instances of open conflict between the U.S. and ILO leadership, and in one case (1978) the complete disaffiliation of the U.S. from the ILO (cited in Melanson, 1979: 49-50). Several instances underscore these troubles. For example, the United States refused to join the organization in 1919 over of concerns that radical European unions wielded too much power, and only joined in 1934 when it was assured greater decisionmaking authority. Similarly, the U.S. delegation boycotted the ILO’s annual conference in 1966 after the U.S. backed candidate for ILO chairmanship, Dr. G.M.J. Veldkamp of the Netherlands, was defeated by one vote by Poland’s Leon Chajn, a noted
55 communist (Windmuller, 1967: 206-07). Just four years later, the U.S. delegation, led by staunch anti-communists David Morse, Rudy Faupl, Walter Reuther, George Meany, and David Dubinsky, to petition U.S. House of Representatives to cut all government appropriations to the ILO (which it did) when the Soviet Union was granted an assistant directorship (the #2 position in the ILO) against their strong objections (Galenson, 125- 26). American employers and labor leaders objected that the business and labor representatives Soviet Union were not independent actors of the Kremlin, but puppets of the state, and thus in violation of the most fundamental tenet of tripartism: independence (ibid, 125). Their petition was ignored. The final straw came in 1975, when the ILO granted the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) observer status at the annual conference. After the AFL-CIO’s formal resolution condemning the move was ignored by the ILO leadership, the Federation successfully petitioned President Jimmy Carter to terminate U.S. membership, which it did in 1978. Although the U.S. rejoined the organization two years later, tensions between the U.S. delegation and ILO leadership remained until the 1990’s. The ICFTU The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the largest and most representative confederation of trade unions in the world today, was founded in 1949 by the United States and Great Britain as a counterweight to the communist- dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) (Gumbrell-McCormick: 2004: 180). Commonly termed “the Confederation,” the ICFTU was created to provide union federations around the world to provide a system of mutual support at the international, regional, and national levels, and to promote democratic trade unionism, core labor standards, non-discrimination of workers, and the elimination of forced labor around the world (Windmuller, 2000: 81). Organizationally, the ICFTU maintains a membership of 236 national union federations from 154 countries (ICFTU), holds advisory seats in both the ILO and the UN, and maintains three quasi-autonomous regional organizations in the developing world: the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT) in Latin America, the African Regional Organization (AFRO) in Africa, and the Asian and Pacific Regional Organization (APRO) in Southeast Asia (ICFTU). In addition, the ICFTU
56 coordinates actions with the twelve Global Union Federations (GUF’s) on issues that affect a particular sector of the global economy. For the most part, U.S. experience with the ICFTU during the Cold War mirrored that of the ILO. 25 While in the early years of the Cold War the AFL-CIO viewed the ICFTU as a major bulwark against international communism and an ideal “multilateral pulpit” from which to address the ILO, the UN, and the International Trade Secretariats, (not to mention the communist-led WFTU), the relationship turned sour not long after the organization began work in 1949. The major issue of contention was over the ICFTU’s commitment to anti-communism, which was called into question almost immediately by AFL-CIO stalwarts Irving Brown and Jay Lovestone and was consistently reiterated throughout the Vietnam War. Among the arguments lodged against the ICFTU were that it was “producing insufficient anti-communist literature” for its affiliates, that it did not take a forceful stand on the popular U.S. anti-communist missions abroad, most notably the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and that the leadership of longstanding ICFTU General Secretary Jacobus Oldenbroek was “lethargic and lacking imagination” (cited in Carew et al., 2000: 237). As a related matter, AFL-CIO leadership was concerned that too many left-leaning unions were being admitted, such as the Italian federation UIL and other social democratic unions in Europe with communist pasts, which was diluting the strength of the anti-communist bloc. Finally, and perhaps most troubling for the American delegation was the opposition of European unions to the U.S. war in Vietnam, as well as the AFL-CIO’s staunch endorsement of it, which the AFL-CIO viewed as conclusive evidence of the ICFTU’s “soft” stance towards anti-communism (Sims, 62). In the end, the AFL and later the AFL-CIO voiced their displeasure much like they did with the ILO; they boycotted the ICFTU’s annual meetings in 1952, 1953, and 1968, and disaffiliated altogether in 1969 (Carew et al., 236-242; 323-328). Although two of the largest affiliates of the Federation, the United Mine Workers (UWMA) and the United Auto Workers (UAW), continued to participate in the ICFTU during the period of formal disaffiliation, the Federation maintained a hard line well into the 1980’s (ibid, 328-332).
25 The main exception being that the AFL-CIO (with CIA assistance) was able to exercise significant control over ORIT, the ICFTU’s Latin American regional organization.
57 * * * In the main, from the end of WWII to the early 1980’s, the AFL-CIO acted as the principal driver of international affairs for the American labor movement. 26 While there were limited exceptions — the UAW split from the Federation in the 1970’s and pursued links with Mexican and Canadian unions, while smaller independents such as the United Electrical Workers (UE) did the same throughout the period — the Federation acted as a hegemonic influence on the nature and direction of American labor activities abroad. These activities, funded largely by the U.S. government through the CIA, the NED, and the AIFLD, championed business unionism and anti-communism abroad, while minimizing international solidarity and other progressive causes.
4) The Assault on Organized Labor Corresponding to the AFL-CIO’s muscular labor imperialism between WWII and the early 1980’s was a highly favorable domestic context, one that facilitated a steady increase in the political and economic influence of organized labor. The underpinnings of the American labor movement during this period were several-fold. First, union density hovered between 25 and 35 percent, ensuring a certain level of influence “on the shop floor” and in electoral politics. Second, the tremendous expansion of economic production ensured that companies were able to meet the rising expectations of American workers, especially those negotiating through labor unions. Third, as part of the “New Deal” coalition American workers were afforded the legal right to organize into unions and collectively bargain with their employers. Fourth, “radical” elements within the labor movement were purged and replaced by anti-communist leaders who shared the foreign policy outlook of the U.S. government and large employers, for which the AFL-CIO was rewarded with lucrative government grants and private donations. Fifth, the United States had an industrial economy, which is conducive to union formation. Finally, labor unions were generally tolerated by employers as a means to ensure “labor peace” (also termed the “business-labor accord”), thus avoiding costly strikes and shut-downs (Nissen, 2003: 139).
26 From 1945-1954, the AFL dominated international affairs, and to a lesser extent the CIO.
58 Yet all was not well within the ‘house of labor’ at the moment when it was pursuing anti-communism most aggressively abroad. Beginning in the early 1970’s, the factors that contributed to the emergence of a politically and economically influential labor movement began to erode, leading to a collapse in the size of the most labor unions. Private-sector union density plummeted single digits by the early 1990’s, down from %35 in 1955. Over the same period, the total number of unionized workers dropped by 4 million, despite an overall increase of 37 million jobs nationwide (Baldwin, 2003: 1). In the manufacturing sector, job losses were particularly severe. For example, the United Auto Workers (UAW), the largest union of autoworkers in the U.S., lost just under half (650,000 members) of its membership between 1970 and 1995 (Zieger and Hall, 243-44). Similar losses were felt in the steel industry, as the United Steelworkers (USWA) lost over a million to just over 400,000 by 1995 (ibid). This helps explain why, as so many commentators have opined, that the American labor movement had become “historically superseded” during this period. Explaining the decline of unions has become somewhat of a “cottage industry” over the past several decades, with a several economic, political, and organizational perspectives taking center stage. Economically, for example, American labor unions faced perhaps the greatest challenge of replacing millions of high-wage union jobs that were lost in the heavily-unionized industries of the Midwest and Northeast after 1970, losses that gutted the membership of many large unions. Some jobs were lost outright as U.S. corporations closed plants in the face of increasing foreign competition. The “Big Three” U.S. automakers (Ford, Chrysler, and GM), to take the most notable example, shed thousands of jobs during the decade in order to compete with cheaper and more fuel-efficient rivals, Japan-based Honda and Toyota. The U.S. steel, textile, and garment industries fared little better, losing millions of workers as a consequence of foreign competition. Other jobs, furthermore, were sent to the low-wage U.S. South, where unionization rates were far lower as workers exhibited little desire to join them and employers demonstrated overt hostility to bargain with them (Lichtenstein, 2002: 105). At the same time, a far more troubling trend for organized labor was emerging: many of the lost jobs left the country altogether as a consequence of increasing international trade and investment (i.e., economic globalization), a process that placed
59 American workers in direct competition with their counterparts overseas. Although global trade and investment were not new to the period, they increased at a feverish pace after 1970, as evidenced by the five-fold increase in global trade during the 1970’s and 1980’s (Lichtenstein, 213). Facilitated by the liberalization of financial flows and trade rules under the aegis of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as improvements in global communications and trade infrastructure, U.S.-based multinational corporations (MNC’s) increasingly closed domestic plants and relocated them overseas in order to capitalize on more relaxed environmental and labor regulations and cheaper labor costs. In the 1990’s, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) accelerated this process. Particularly vulnerable to such movements were the heavily-unionized industrial manufacturing centers in the Midwest and Northeast, areas that specialized in such goods as automobiles, steel, appliances, machinery, and other high-value durables. In the 1980’s and 1990’s, the outsourcing profile of non-durable manufacturing products, such as textiles and garments, likewise increased. Accentuating the problem of job losses in the unionized sectors have been two other trends over the past several decades. One trend saw the numbers of non-union professional and service-sector jobs increase as a percentage of the total working class (i.e., the “service-sector boom”). These sectors, such as the service (e.g. nurses and professors), financial (e.g. accountants and financial planners), retail (e.g. store clerks), and high-tech (e.g., computer programmers and software engineers), lack some of the key conditions that facilitate union membership: for the professional class, higher pay and benefits leads to a perception that collective bargaining is unnecessary; and for the low- wage retail class, high rates of job turnover give employers an incentive not to bargain in the first place. A second trend saw a dramatic increase in the number of immigrants and women entering the workforce, many of whom worked in the same non-industrial sectors that unions find so difficult to organize. Specifically, the number of U.S. workers who were foreign-born doubled between 1970 and 1990, while the share of female workers as a percentage of the total labor force jumped from 29.6 to 44.6 percent over the same period (Dubofsky and McCartin, 261).
60 Compounding the loss of jobs since the 1970’s, furthermore, has been a souring of relations between employers and organized labor which has made stopgap organizing efforts much more arduous. One of the effects of economic globalization was to tip the balance of power decidedly in favor of employers, as the increasing mobility of jobs and capital overseas gave employers a powerful bargaining chip with which to discourage or ignore the demands of labor. Employers increasingly exercised this leverage through various legal and illegal union-busting tactics designed to ensure “union free” workplaces (Clawson & Clawson, 1999: 102). One popular yet illegal tactic used in over half of union certification elections is to threaten plant closure if workers pursue unionization (Bronfenbrenner, 1998). In addition, employers have increasingly made use of professional “labor consultants” for the purpose of organizing systematic anti-union campaigns on the company floor. Since 1970, these campaigns have been used in over 75 percent of certification elections, and have featured at least one of the following tactics: 1) “captive audience” meetings, in which employees are required to listen to anti-union presentations or videos during work hours; 2) discharging workers for union activity and/or delaying reinstatement for workers who have been found to be illegally fired; 3) giving workers illegal wage increases and imposing unilateral changes in benefits; 4) conducting one-on-one supervisor meetings with employees, in which the employee must defend his/her views about unionization; 5) offering bribes and other forms of monetary coercion; and 6) assisted anti-union committees (Clawson & Clawson, 102-103; Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1998: 19-36). What is more, Comstock and Fox (1994: 90- 109) found that the most aggressive anti-union tactics are used in those workplaces most in need of a union, namely those firms where job satisfaction, wages, benefits, and workplace conditions are comparatively poor. Yet the troubles for organized labor were not solely economic in origin. A second approach looks at the political marginalization of organized labor faced as key labor allies began to turn away from the AFL-CIO, while labor critics became emboldened to challenge the legal foundations of union power. Ironically, just at the time when the ascendancy of the Democratic Party in both houses of Congress and the presidency in the mid-1970’s would have suggested favorable political circumstances for organized labor,
61 labor unions faced instead some of their toughest political challenges. In short, the “neo- liberal” consensus was beginning to take shape. For most scholars, the proximate cause labor’s political troubles was the economic crisis that beset the country during the 1970’s, when inflation and recession (i.e., “stagflation”) combined to depress real wages for most Americans and halt aggregate economic growth. President Carter, himself endorsed by the AFL-CIO because of his modest (though not enthusiastic) support of labor issues, soon came to view labor unions’ wage demands as a central component of the inflationary “wage-price spiral” (Dubofsky & McCartin, 259). President Carter’s determination to curb inflation led to frequent policy conflicts with organized labor. For example, with the assistance of top airline administrator Alfred Kahn and Senators Edward Kennedy and Howard Cannon, President Carter passed a series of sweeping deregulation laws in the trucking, railroad, and airline industries which dramatically altered the system of labor-relations in the transport sector, opening employment to non-union employees and cutting unionization rates there by a third (Lichtenstein, 236). In addition, the president’s appointment of Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board drew heavy criticism because his fiscally conservative policies immediately generated short-term interest rate hikes and unemployment (Zieger and Gall, 248). President Carter’s likewise irritated the Federation over his rapprochement with Communist China and the left-leaning Sandinista government in Nicaragua. As a result, large segments of the labor movement defected from President Carter in the 1980 presidential campaign and endorsed other candidates, namely Democratic Senator Kennedy but also Republican hopeful Ronald Reagan. Accentuating the political impasse between organized labor and the Democratic Party during the 1970’s was a resurgence of the business community in national politics. Overshadowed by the explosion of progressive citizen activism that consumed Washington (and the U.S.) in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s (e.g., civil rights, women’s rights, environmental rights, labor rights, anti-Vietnam, and anti-nuclear, among others) the business community rallied with their own political action program that saw lobbying and campaign donations soon dwarf those of organized labor. At the time of President Nixon’s reelection in 1972, for example, business political action committees’ (PAC’s) contributions to federal candidates roughly matched those of organized labor, with
62 business donating $8 million to labor’s $8.5 million (Dubofsky & McCartin, 260). In the 1982 mid-term election, by contrast, business donations totaled 84.9 million while organized labor was only able to muster $35 million (ibid). Marked by the creation of such groups as the Construction Users Anti-Inflation Roundtable (CUAIR) and the Business Roundtable, both of which comprised of the country’s largest corporations, the business community consistently pressured the federal government for a series of pro- business policies. The most notable victories included the deregulation of the transport sector (noted above), increases in corporate tax relief and federal interest rates, reductions in capital gains and maximum income tax rates, the easing of national labor codes and standards under the National Labor Relations and Fair Labor Standards Acts, and federal budget cuts for social programs, (Nicholson, 295-98; Jarley, 220). The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and George H.W. Bush in 1988 only exacerbated organized labor’s political troubles. This twelve-year period, in the words of Robert Zieger (248), “represented the apogee of modern conservatism’s success in building a formidable threat to the primacy of the New Deal’s heritage in American politics.” Reagan, himself the former head of the Screen Actor’s Guild and once a liberal Democrat, had become a staunchly anti-union and pro-business by the time he entered national politics, presiding over a period of “neoliberal consensus” in which the labor unions and the Keynesian interventionist state were viewed as the principal impediments to economic progress. Indeed, President Reagan used his tremendous electoral mandate, ironically bolstered by millions of union votes in 1980 and 1984, to push for a host of measures unfavorable to organized labor. For example, the president packed the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) with extreme anti-union board members, such as department head John Van de Water, a prominent “union-busting” consultant, as well as members of the conservative Heritage Foundation, Business Roundtable, and National Right-to-Work Committee (Nicholson, 303). The pro-business cast of the Board meant that labor union petitions for redress of unfair business practices were largely ignored. Furthermore, in keeping with his “government that acts least acts best” philosophy, the president slashed discretionary spending on union-friendly social programs while lowering taxes for the rich, much to the ire of many labor leaders. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the
63 president ordered the firing and permanent replacement of 11,500 striking members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO), ironically one of the most vociferous supporters of the president during his 1980 campaign. Reagan’s action was widely interpreted as an implicit license for employers to break their own strikes by hiring “permanent replacement” workers — the union-busting procedure upheld by the Supreme Court in 1938 yet seldom used — as evidenced by both the increase in the use of the tactic as well as the marked decrease in the number of strikes after 1981 (Dubofsky & McCartin, 260-61). The Democratic takeover of Congress in 1986 and the election of Arkansas Democrat Bill Clinton in 1992 fueled optimism among labor activists that the two decades of union decline had perhaps subsided. Indeed, on numerous occasions throughout the 1990’s President Clinton demonstrated his willingness to bring organized labor into the liberal fold by introducing a host of progressive bills widely supported by most labor leaders. One of the president’s first initiatives was to replace anti-labor Reagan-era bureaucrats in the NLRB with pro-labor appointees, most notably eminent labor law scholar William Gould. Following the oft-maligned attempt to develop a system of national health care, Clinton introduced legislation to curtail the use of permanent replacement workers by employers and helped amend the Hatch Act of 1938, which had prohibited the political activity of federal workers (Zieger & Gall, 251). The president also pursued worker-friendly programs in the areas of child care, portable health care benefits, environmental and workplace protections, the national minimum wage, and the 1991 amendments to the 1964 Civil Rights Act which strengthened federal protections against workplace discrimination (ibid, 249; EEOC.gov). Furthermore, the president (and organized labor) scored perhaps the greatest victory of the decade with the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, which gave workers the legal right to take an unpaid leave from work for up to twelve weeks, or at the discretion of the employee to care for family members in need without penalty (Nicholson, 317). Yet the 1990’s introduced a number of unfavorable political trends as well. One of these was the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994 (which continues through this writing in 2006), which presaged an era of more business-friendly initiatives in Congress. For example, the Republican’s passed (and Clinton signed) the Personal Responsibility
64 and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (or the Welfare Reform Law of 1996) which placed much more stringent requirements on the provision of social welfare (see Blank, 1996). Another, perhaps more significant setback was the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), passed in 1993 against the strong objections of both congressional Democrats and the AFL-CIO that the agreement would simply accelerate the trend of job outsourcing in the beleaguered manufacturing sector — elegantly termed the “giant sucking sound” of American jobs by Ross Perot — and that it did not adequately safeguard workers’ rights or the environment (Dark, 1999: 170-72). Indeed, the critics were at least partially correct: since NAFTA has gone into effect, the U.S. manufacturing sector has lost over three million jobs, over 500,000 of which have been certified by the federal government as NAFTA-related job losses (Public Citizen, 2004). 27 Finally, the election of George W. Bush in 2000, against one of the largest union turnouts for a Democratic candidate (Al Gore) in U.S. history, completed a “Republican sweep” at the federal level. The president has never met with AFL-CIO leader John Sweeney. Taken together, the past several decades have witnessed the erosion of the political, economic, and demographic foundations that facilitated the development of a strong labor movement between the 1930’s and 1970’s. Indeed, recent years have not been kind to organized labor. Most notably, between 1973 and 2004 the percentage of the total U.S. unionized workforce has dropped from 29 to 12 percent. Private-sector unionization has actually fared much worse, down from 27 to 8 percent over the same period. The lone bright spot has been the public sector, where unionization rates have steadily hovered around 37 percent since 1973 (LRA, 2006).
5) Whither Organized Labor? Missing in the account of labor’s decline is any reference to the ways in which unions themselves responded (or failed to respond) to the challenges of declining density, demographic change, employer hostility, and flagging support within the Democratic Party. Indeed, commentators long assailed leaders within the labor movement for their
27 However, roughly three million jobs have been created in the service-sector over the same period, albeit at lower average wages (Nicholson, 316).
65 unwillingness to accept the changing economic and political realities of the day or to entertain even modest departures from the bureaucratic status-quo. Although this generalization ignores reforms pursued by small independent unions during the time, it certainly resonates with the experience of the AFL-CIO under longtime AFL-CIO president George Meany (1955-1979). Meany was openly hostile to developing relationships with progressive social movements within the “new Left,” or to organizing the growing workforce of women, minorities, and immigrants. Asked in 1972 why AFL-CIO membership was declining as a percentage of the total workforce, Meany responded, “I don’t know, I don’t care.” When pressed on the matter, Meany continued: “Why should we worry about organizing groups of people who do not appear to want to be organized? Frankly, I used to worry about the membership, about the size of membership. . . . I just stopped worrying about it because to me it doesn't make any difference. . . .The organized fellow is the fellow that counts. This is just human nature” (cited in Buhle, 196; Yates, 2006: no pagination). The ascension of Lane Kirkland to the presidency of the AFL-CIO in 1979 provided the Federation with an opportunity to reassess the stagnant policies of the Meany-era. Although Kirkland could hardly be considered a serious reformer — he was the hand-picked successor of Meany and reputed to be the “near-perfect embodiment of the Cold War labor bureaucracy” — he was convinced, unlike his predecessor, that the Federation needed to respond to Ronald Reagan and his corporate sponsors who were determined to cripple organized labor (Lichtenstein, 247; Zieger and Gall, 248). Towards this end, Kirkland sought to bolster the Federation’s political clout by dramatically increasing campaign donations to reliably pro-labor candidates, redoubling lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill, developing pragmatic alliances with progressive social groups (e.g., environmentalists and feminists), and sponsoring several mass demonstrations in Washington, D.C., such as “Solidarity Day” in 1981. Organizationally, Kirkland worked to bring key defected affiliates back into the Federation, namely the Autoworkers, Mineworkers, and Teamsters, while promoting “amalgamated unionization” — merging unions with similar jurisdictions in the same geographical area — in order to make more efficient use of financial resources (Lichtenstein, 249). Furthermore, Kirkland mended relations with both the ILO and ICFTU, directing the Federation’s petition for
66 readmission into both organizations in the early 1980’s in the hopes of addressing MNC’s and overseas job losses. Yet Kirkland’s initiatives were unable to stem the decline of union power. During his tenure, total union density declined from 25 to 15 percent, while private-sector density fell even further, from 22 to 10 percent (LRA, 2006). Over the same period, work stoppages plummeted from 3,111 in the peak year of 1977 to just 385 in 1995, a clear indication that workers were choosing concession bargaining over striking in order to protect their jobs from permanent replacements (Brecher and Costello, 1998: 25). What is more, the Democrats, whom organized labor had helped retake Congress and the presidency, voted in 1993 for the North American Free Trade Movement, which was widely condemned within the labor movement for threatening the jobs of millions of American workers. As a result, Kirkland was roundly criticized insurgent factions within the Federation, and he was ousted in 1995 by self-styled reformer and Service Employees International Union (SEIU) president John Sweeney. Sweeney’s progressive “New Voices” slate, which has remained in power through 2006, has attempted to reinvigorate the mainstream labor movement on several fronts. Organizationally, the Federation has renewed its emphasis organizing by symbolically and substantively reaching out to immigrants, women, minorities, and left-wing intellectuals, all of whom were marginalized by the organization in the decades prior. Notably, John Sweeney tapped Linda Chavez-Thompson as AFL-CIO executive vice-president, the first woman or person of color ever to hold an executive position in the organization, and elevated other social reformers to leadership positions formerly held by old-guard labor conservatives. In addition, the Federation renewed its emphasis on “organizing the unorganized,” long neglected by Kirkland and his predecessor George Meany. For example, the Federation developed its “Union Summer” and “Union Cities” programs to help train young organizers and activists and coordinate local organizing campaigns. It has also supported the wave of local “living wage” campaigns in cities around the country, linking the labor movement with a host of community, religious, environmental, and women’s rights groups.
67 Politically, however, the Federation has been far less imaginative. Under Sweeney, the organization has continued to pump millions of dollars into the coffers of the Democratic Party, and spent millions more lobbying Capitol Hill — much to the chagrin of some AFL-CIO unions, notably the SEIU and UNITE, who have become disillusioned with the Democrats and maintain that the labor movement would be better served through aggressive organizing. These “new voices” perhaps have a point: since the election of Sweeney’s “New Voices” slate in 1996 the Federation and its affiliates have spent close to a billion dollars on political action, yet Big Labor’s strength has continued to wane. The persistence of import competition in the manufacturing sector, anti-labor appointments to the National Labor Relations Board under the Bush administration, and increases in the use of union-busting consultants during organizing drives have all conspired to depress private sector union density from 10.2 to 7.9 percent over this period (LRA, 2006). It is for this reason that at the annual AFL-CIO national convention in 2005 a group of seven prominent affiliates — SEIU, UNITE-HERE, IBT, LIUNA, UFW, UBC, and UFCW — disaffiliated from the AFL-CIO and formed a rival labor federation, the “Change to Win” coalition (CTW). 28 This coalition, led by Anna Burger of the SEIU and comprised of roughly 1/3 of the AFL-CIO’s membership, has pledged to spend over 50% of union dues on organizing and far less than the Federation on political action (see Chapter 4 for fuller discussion of CTW). Finally, and perhaps more relevant to the subsequent chapters in this study, there has been qualitative shift in the nature of international affairs, both for the Federation and for its recently-disaffiliated unions. Although the labor movement may disagree about how best to spend dues-money at the domestic level, there has been an emerging consensus among labor officials that American unions need to more actively promote global solidarity with their trade union counterparts abroad. Two developments in the 1990s — the passage of NAFTA in 1994 and the creation of the WTO in 1995 — compelled the Federation to dismantle the structures of “labor imperialism” in order to
28 Change to Win is: Change to Win unions include: SEIU; United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW); the Teamsters; United Farm Workers (UFW); Laborers International Union of North America (LIUNA); Union of Needletrades, Industrial, Textile Workers, Hotel Employees, and Restaurant Employees (UNITE-HERE), and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (UBC). See http://www.changetowin.org/about-us/who-we-are.html
68 concentrate on a more pressing threat: neoliberalism. 29 Toward this end, John Sweeney demoted Kirkland-era anti-communists and reorganized the four foreign institutes (FTUI, AALC, AIFLD, and AAFLI) into one international body, the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS, or Solidarity Center). Since it opened in 1997, the Solidarity Center has served as the Federation’s conduit for a host of transnational solidarity projects designed around the ILO’s core labor standards — freedom of association and collective bargaining, non-discrimination, and the prohibition of forced and child labor. In recent years, the Solidarity Center has been most active working to eliminate sweatshop labor and workers’ rights violations in export processing zones (EPZ’s), but it also funds programs that address the rights of migrant workers, HIV/AIDS, and trade union development in the developing world. But the Solidarity Center is not the only U.S. labor organization promoting global solidarity. Indeed, over the past decade the unions themselves have been developing their own specialized cross-border relationships with counterpart unions abroad while regularizing their involvement with the sector-level Global Union Federations (GUF’s). Manufacturing unions, such as the United Autoworkers’ (UAW), the United Steelworkers’ (USW), and UNITE-HERE (garments, textiles, and services), have been collaborating with their sectoral counterparts on the development global industry councils and working groups. Unions in services and technology, such as the Service Workers (SEIU) and Communications’ Workers (CWA), have likewise worked to create regularized channels with foreign unions to facilitate information exchange about industry developments and joint solidarity actions. Even professional unions, such as the American Federation of Teachers’ (AFT), are reaching out to foreign unions and the GUF’s on cross-national HIV/AIDS and trade union development programs. In the following three chapters, three of these U.S. labor unions (USW, SEIU, and AFT) will be surveyed in greater detail.
29 In the AFL-CIO’s perspective, orthodox neoliberalism is a threat to the labor unions in the U.S. and abroad because it reduces the ability of states to protect labor and the environment.
69 The United Steelworkers’ of America (USW) The USW is 1.2 million working and retired members throughout the United States and Canada, working together to improve our jobs; to build a better future for our families; and to promote fairness, justice and equality both on the job and in our societies. —USW Mission Statement
1) Introduction The United Steelworkers’ of America (USW) is the largest manufacturing union in the U.S., representing roughly 1.2 million active and retired members in steel, rubber, plastics, and chemicals, among others. The USW is also one of the most embattled labor unions in the U.S., as import competition and multinationalization in its core industries have depleted membership roles by half since 1970. As part of its revitalization strategy, the USW continues to pressure the U.S. government for trade protection and other policies designed to make their core industries more international competitive. At the same time, the USW is aggressively pursuing a host of transnational partnerships that are designed to reduce the incentives for multinational corporations to eliminate jobs unionized by the union. The remainder of this chapter will be divided into four parts. Part II briefly details the history of steel organizing and the USW, noting major periods of development and important organizational issues, most notably the impact of globalization. Part III surveys the USW’s domestic priorities and levers through which it is addressing globalization in its core industries. Part IV explores how the USW’s transnational strategies complement these domestic initiatives. Finally, Part V analyzes these developments with reference of the independent variables and hypotheses posited in Chapter 1.
2) A Brief History of Steel Organizing and the USW The first instance of steel organizing dates to 1889 with the creation of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers (AAISTW) at the Carnegie Company Mill in Homestead, Pennsylvania. The union was short-lived, broken just three years later after a strike over wage cuts was met by 300 company “watchmen” and the Pennsylvania state militia (USW, 2006r). In the ensuing violence, seven union members
70 and three militiamen were killed, and the Carnegie Company vowed never again to recognize the AAISTW (Ibid.). The company, which would later became a subsidiary of U.S. Steel, honored its anti-union promise by crushing the union after it was reconstituted during a 14-month strike in 1909. Recognizing the opportunity in a burgeoning industry, the AFL attempted to organize the entire steel industry (and its 365,000 workers) in 1919, but once again imported strikebreakers, company “thugs”, and several state militias quashed the union’s cause (Ibid.). No serious effort to organize the industry would commence for another two decades. A change in the political climate during the early 1930’s presaged the most serious and successful organizing drives in the industry. Although U.S. Steel and other industry leaders still remained hostile to the notion of independent unions (company unions had long supplanted them on the shop floor), the newly-formed CIO, bolstered by FDR’s pro-labor New Deal legislation and a string of victories for Democratic governors in Midwestern steel strongholds, created the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) in 1936 and launched a massive organizing drive against U.S. Steel immediately thereafter. Under the leadership of Phillip Murray, the SWOC created 154 locals and organized 125,000 workers at by the end of 1936, and another 175,000 by June of 1937 (USW, 2006r; Zieger and Gall, 90-91). These extraordinary gains gave the young union leverage to negotiate the first steel contract in forty-five years, in which the SWOC achieved sole bargaining and grievance rights, a 10% wage increase, a forty-hour workweek, and perhaps most importantly, a day-to-day presence on the shop floor (Nicholson, 219; Zieger and Gall, 90). Although roughly 40% of the industry remained non-union at the end of the decade, at a quarter-million members the SWOC had become a formidable union in just a few short years. The middle decades of the century (1940-1970) were likewise good years for United Steelworkers’ of America (the name officially changed in 1942). Organizationally, the union continued to expand its ranks. In 1941, the union achieved bargaining rights at a majority of mills operated by the “Little Steel” companies — Bethlehem Steel, Republic Steel, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, and Inland Steel — companies who together represented the remaining 40% of the steel industry and had been hitherto successful in quashing a number of wildcat strikes organized by the SWOC
71 between 1937 and 1941 (see USW, 2006r). In addition, the USW presided over the merger of the Aluminum Workers of America (AWA) in 1944, which boosted membership by 46,000 to an all-time high of 700,000 by the end of WWII. The union continued to expand its membership base in the following years, reaching a million members in the early 1950s and maintaining these numbers into the early 1970s (see Galenson, 140). The USW’s growth has political ramifications as well. Having purged itself so- called “radical” elements in the late 1940’s and fully embracing the anti-communist consensus of the day, the USW began to leverage its size within the AFL-CIO to get pro- labor Democrats into public office. Through the AFL-CIO’s Committees on Political Education (COPE's), the union mobilized millions of voters in Midwestern steel communities in the late-1950s and 1960s, helping secure a Democratic majority in Congress after 1954 despite President Eisenhower’s landslide victories in 1952 and 1956. USW support was likewise critical to the narrow election of John Kennedy in 1960, and the subsequent election of his successor Lyndon Johnson in 1964. The USW’s political activism extended to state politics as well, helping secure Democratic majorities in “Big Steel” states that were hitherto dominated by Republicans, such as Ohio, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Illinois. With a critical mass of liberal Democrats in state and national offices, the USW lobbied heavily in favor of job creation and training programs, a more progressive tax-code, social security protection, the “Great Society” anti-poverty programs, increased government spending in times of recession, and in later years civil rights and the Vietnam War. The Steelworkers’ fortunes changed dramatically in the latter decades of the 20 th century, however, during which time the union lost over 50% of its steelworker and metalworker membership and struggled to remain solvent. In the main, the union had become particularly vulnerable deepening economic globalization and industrial restructuring in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Rising steel and automobile imports from East and Southeast Asia, for example, forced a number of smaller steel manufacturers to close domestic plants and permanently dismiss thousands of USW workers. The worst period was between 1978 and 1986, when USW lost roughly 470,000 members to industry cutbacks, most of which were among the five “Big Steel” industry leaders: USX,
72 National, Inland, Bethlehem, and LTV (Reutter, 1992; Galenson, 148). In other cases, beleaguered steel and metals producers were merged with a growing cohort multinational corporations (MNC’s), who then took advantage of new communications and transportation technologies, as well as cheaper labor and environmental costs, to relocate (or threaten to relocate) facilities overseas. Finally, automation and computerization raised productivity by reducing the number of “man hours” required to produce a ton of steel (90% since 1970) and other manufactured goods, thus reducing the need to retain workers (BLS, 2006). In the end, with the balance of power tipping decidedly in favor of corporations— they no longer needed some workers and could credibly threaten to move other jobs abroad — the USW was forced to accept scores of job and wage concessions as a precondition in any new contract negotiations. Having enjoyed considerable political success during the 1950s and 1960s, the USW turned to the Democratic Party for help. It is during this period that the union became a vocal critic of “free trade” and actively lobbied Washington for “fair trade” protection. Although the union achieved limited protection from subsidies and illegal dumping — it negotiated a series of “voluntary export restraint” (VER) agreements on steel imports from Japan beginning in 1969 and obtained steel tariffs against the European Union in 2002 — it was largely unsuccessful in reversing the general liberalizing trend of U.S. trade policy (McClenahan, 188-89). Notably, the union failed to rally congressional support for the Burke-Hartke Foreign Trade and Investment Act of 1973, which sought to protect union jobs in the automotive and steel industries by using quotas to “freeze” steel imports at mid-1960s levels (Robinson, in Harrod and O’Brien, 119). The USW was likewise unsuccessful in blocking efforts to reduce non-tariff trade barriers during negotiations of the Tokyo (1979) and Uruguay (1986) Rounds of GATT, the Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) in 1987, and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 (Ibid.). 30 Finally, the USW has been unable to convince Washington to include binding and enforceable labor and environmental
30 A tariff is a tax on imported goods levied to depress imports by inflating the price of imported goods. A non-tariff trade barrier is a non-tax mechanism to depress imports, and can take the form of subsidies on domestic goods, antidumping measures, countervailing duties, content requirements, and import bans, among others.
73 protections into free trade agreements, as in the case of NAFTA or at the current round of WTO negotiations at Doha (i.e., the Doha Round). 31 In light of these difficulties, the USW sought to offset membership losses in steel and metals manufacturing industries through strategic mergers with smaller, but equally struggling manufacturing unions. Between 1967 and 2004 the USW merged with ten unions, helping boost membership by roughly 800,000. These mergers included: 30,000 members of the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers (1967); 20,000 members from the United Stone and Allied Product Workers (1971); 172,000 members from District 50, United Mine Workers (1972); 35,000 workers from the Upholsterers International Union of North America (1985); 90,000 members from the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, and Plastic Workers and 40,000 members of the Aluminum, Brick, and Glass Workers Union (1995); 5,000 members of the Canadian Division of the Transportation Communications International Union (2000); 12,000 glassworkers from the American Flint Glass Workers Union (2003); 55,000 members of the Industrial, Wood, and Allied Workers of Canada (2004). In 2005 the USW concluded its second- largest merger in history, adding 250,000 members of the Paper, Allied Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Workers International Union (PACE) (USW, 2006s; USW, 2005, January 11; Green, 2006). In the end, the Steelworkers’ strategic mergers made it one of the largest and most diverse unions in the United States. 32 But there is a cost associated this approach, what critics have derisively termed “non-organizing growth.” As I will discuss in the next section, since the USW pegged its future on mergers in industries with limited or negative growth potential (i.e., manufacturing industries), it is struggling to keep pace with its counterparts in other economic sectors (e.g., the SEIU and AFT). In addition, the following section will detail how the USW measures against the independent and control variables delineated in Chapter 1, which will help situate the organization’s domestic and transnational strategies later in the chapter.
31 NAFTA does include “side accords” (see Chapter 1) covering labor and environmental standards, but the USW argues that these provisions are weak and ineffective. 32 Perhaps most interesting about these mergers is that they displaced steelworkers from majority status within the union. Currently, steelworkers comprise roughly 1/3 of union membership. Furthermore, the merger compelled the union to change its name to reflect its growing diversity. Officially, the USW is called the “United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union,” the United Steelworkers’ of America for short.
74 3) The USW Today: Key Sectors, Job Trends, and Globalization The United Steelworkers’ of America is a private-sector manufacturing and general workers’ union that claims to represent 850,000 active and 350,000 retired members in the United States and Canada, which makes it the largest industrial union and one of the ten largest unions in the U.S. overall. 33 Once comprised entirely of workers in U.S. steel mills, mergers with aluminium, rubber, mining, chemical, and paper unions, in addition to recent organizing in public services and state/local government have made the USW one of the most organizationally diverse in the U.S. The USW has over 1,600 local affiliates across the United States, although membership is heavily concentrated in the Midwest and Northeast, particularly Ohio, Michigan, and Pennsylvania (see USW, 2006u). In the main, the USW’s key industries have been heavily affected by the pressures of import competition and multinationalization, both of which have contributed to a steady decline in membership over the past three decades — a decline that would have been much more severe without the union’s strategic mergers. The USW is comprised of three major industrial divisions: metals and mining; manufacturing; and chemical, petroleum, and paper products. Although steel workers no longer constitute a majority within the union, the USW’s Metals and Mining division (steel, aluminum, copper, and titanium) remains one of its largest with over 100,000 workers in steel and thousands more in aluminum, copper, and titanium (USW, 2006v). 34 The most common jobs in this industry are in smelting and refining, ore mining, and metal fabrication (USW, 2006w). As a result of several mergers in the 1970s and 1980s, the USW is also one of the largest manufacturing unions in the U.S. The union’s Tire, Rubber, and Plastics division represents about 70,000 workers specializing in the manufacture of automotive tires and inner tubes, miscellaneous automotive parts, glass and glass products, cans and containers, and wire fabric (see USW, 2006x; 2006w). Most recently, the 2005 merger with PACE made the USW the largest paper, chemicals, and energy union in the U.S. The union now represents roughly 130,000 workers in sawmills,
33 USW-Canada lists 280,000 active and retired members in mining, manufacturing, steel, rubber, electronics, chemicals, and auto parts. See USW-Canada: http://www.usw.ca/program/content/966.php 34 The USW claims to represent over 100,000 steelworkers, but membership data on aluminum and titanium are scarce. The union does provides membership information for individual worksites and companies, which suggests that the union represents about 20,000 workers in aluminum, copper, titanium combined.
75 power plants, and oil platforms and refineries (see USW, 2006y). Beyond these core industries, the USW also has a small presence in healthcare, public services, and non- profit organizations, among others. 35 Nevertheless, the USW faces an uncertain future. Although the union reclaimed most of the membership that it lost in the 1970s and 1980s, it did so not by organizing new workers or industries “insulated” from globalization but by merging with manufacturing unions that were likewise suffering from it (e.g., paper, chemicals, glass, and mining). Overall employment in the U.S. manufacturing sector currently stands at 14 million, but this represents a loss of roughly 5.5 million jobs since the historic high of 19.6 million in 1979, and 3.7 million from the 10-year high of 17.7 million in 1998 (BLS, 2006b; see Appendix A, Graph 1; Graph 2). 36 Over 400,000 of these jobs were steel and tire manufacturing positions that were unionized by the USW. Furthermore, over the next decade (2004-2014) the BLS predicts that the manufacturing sector will continue to shrink by 5.4% because continued international competition, modernization and automation in production processes, and industry consolidation (BLS, 2006c). In the USW’s core industries, the situation is actually worse: steel manufacturing is predicted to decline by 13.4%; chemical and paper manufacturing is predicted to decline by 14.4%; and mining and mineral extraction is predicted to decline by 8.8% (BLS, 2006; BLS, 2006d; BLS, 2006e). Finally, the USW’s core industries have some of the lowest unionization rates (i.e., union density) in the U.S., with general manufacturing at 13% and mining at 8%. 37 The USW is particularly concerned with rising bankruptcies and mergers with multinational corporations in its core industries, a trend to which it attributes much of its declining job prospects. Indeed, compared to the other unions surveyed here the USW is clearly the most exposed to this facet of economic globalization. In the main, the union faces two key problems: 1) when a firm declares bankruptcy, it often cites high labor costs as a key problem and pressures the union to make job, wage, and/or benefit
35 The USW’s organizing in these areas has generated considerable ire from the SEIU and AFT, both of whom specialize in these industries and accuse the USW of “poaching” members and diluting the “core” strengths of their respective unions. 36 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, manufacturing employment peaked at 19.627 million in September, 1979. As of January, 2006 employment stands at 14.110 million. 37 It is important to note that actual USW density is lower in each case because the union does not represent all unionized workers in these industries.
76 concessions (i.e., “concession bargaining”); and 2) citing these same reasons, the multinational firms that purchase bankrupt firms threaten to idle plants and move production overseas if further concessions are not made. This is no small problem. In the steel industry, for example, 45 firms together representing about 3/4 of the union’s steelworker membership (or 87,400 members) declared bankruptcy between 1997 and 2004 (see USW, 2005). All told, 50,000 steel jobs were eliminated after 17 firms were liquidated and the rest were “streamlined” by their leading multinational buyers, notably International Steel Group (ISG), KES Holdings, and U.S. Steel (Ibid; USW, 2003). The USW faces similar problems in its other core industries, where multinational corporations have been increasing market-share and streamlining operations in aluminum (Alcoa, Alcan), mining (Rio Tinto, Grupo Mexico), rubber (Goodyear, Bridgestone/Firestone, Michelin) paper (Sappi), chemical manufacturing (Dupont), and energy (ExxonMobil, British Petroleum). In dealing with the changes attendant to industrial restructuring and continued international competition, the USW is pursuing several interrelated strategies. At the industry level, the union is fighting job losses and cutbacks through a rearguard, concessionary bargaining strategy. This mainly involves pressuring corporations to hire fewer contractors and supervisors, increase investment in modern technologies and job training, keep existing wages and benefits, and (when absolutely necessary) use voluntary retirement buyouts to eliminate jobs (see, for example, USW, 2003a). The union is also targeting the federal government to help their industries become more internationally competitive. In this sense, since companies often site healthcare and retirement “legacy costs” as the key impediments to growth (and thus a reason to eliminate jobs), the union is lobbying Congress to provide universal health coverage and protect social security. Furthermore, the union encourages the use of tariffs to protect domestic industries from what it considers illegal dumping and subsidies. Lastly, and perhaps most relevant to this study, the USW has initiated a series of transnational partnerships and global networks with foreign labor unions, Global Union Federations, and international NGOs. In most cases, these partnerships link the Steelworkers’ with foreign unions representing workers in the same industry or multinational corporation. The USW is also working through the
77 U.S. Government and its transnational partners to ensure the MNC’s and foreign governments respect the ILO’s core labor standards. In the end, while the USW resembles other unions in that it is chiefly concerned with the size of its membership and the quality of its members’ work, the levers by which the union pursues these objectives differ considerably from other unions surveyed here. This is because the USW primarily represents workers in manufacturing industries that are highly sensitive to both forms of economic globalization, namely import competition and multinationalization. In the following two sections, I will detail the USW’s main organizational priorities and its chief domestic and transnational levers for achieving them. This will be followed by a final section synthesizing these findings and assessing them against the hypotheses posited in Chapter 1.
4) The Domestic Arena: Toward Competitive Manufacturing What do they want? Deciphering the goals of the United Steelworkers is not a difficult task. In early 2005 the union developed its first centralized information portal devoted exclusively to its key organizational issues. “Rapid Response”, as the portal is termed, is the USW’s “nonpartisan” grassroots education, communication, and political action program targeting rank-and-file members and influential policymakers (USW, 2006d). In practice, Rapid Response (RR) serves as an information clearinghouse for the USW. Its main purpose is to provide information and analysis about the union’s official positions concerning pending local, state, and congressional legislation affecting the labor movement generally, and USW workers in particular. This information is then linked to RR “Action Calls”, which detail specific means through which rank-and-file members can try to influence the political process. Common methods include letter-writing campaigns and targeted protest actions against corporations and policymakers, campaign contributions to candidates (%98 Democrats), and fundraising for the USW and its local unions. The USW currently lists four key issues on its RR website: Trade, Health Care/Social Security, and Workers’ Rights.
78 Free Trade As noted above, the Steelworkers’ have been some of the most forceful critics of US “free trade” agreements over the past two decades. Images of USW members tossing Chinese steel “I-Beams” and Huffy bicycles into the Puget Sound during the 1999 WTO protests in Seattle provide a stark visual representation of their opposition to global outsourcing and import surpluses in the manufacturing sector (see Appendix A, Picture 1, 2). In the early 1990s, the USW protested the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and continues to use that agreement as a pretext for its current opposition to free trade agreements. The USW argues that NAFTA has been responsible for roughly 1.7 million of the 2.4 million manufacturing jobs lost in the US since 1994, many of which were USW jobs (USW, 2006e; see also USW, 2006t; see also AMTAC). These losses, the union maintains, have displaced American workers from predominantly high-wage manufacturing positions and forced them into lower paying service-sector jobs (where they have been absorbed by rival unions, such as the SEIU). At the same time real wages have fallen and poverty has increased in Mexico, while the US trade deficit with Canada and Mexico has increased twelve-fold to over $100 billion dollars (USW, 2005f). Against the shadow of NAFTA, two trade-related issues have come to overwhelmingly dominate the USW’s agenda: CAFTA/FTAA and Chinese imports. In the former, the Steelworkers’ is actively opposed to both the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 38 and the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) 39 , both of which would effectively extend NAFTA to Central and South America, respectively. In the latter, the USW is opposed to the US government’s insistence on “normalized” (or MFN) trade relations with China (PRC) under the WTO. 40 In both cases, the union contends the US government’s version of “free trade” should be opposed because, among other concerns, it fails to provide meaningful protections for workers’ rights abroad, exacerbates the loss of “good paying middle-class jobs” by lowering
38 CAFTA involves these countries and has been passed, except DR. 39 FTAA involves these countries and has not been passed. 40 Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, also known as Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PTNR), is a term derived from the World Trade Organization (WTO) that denotes normal bilateral trade relations. In practice, this means that the country on which MFN is granted will be treated no worse than any other trade partners with respect to tariff barriers. Since 2001, China has been a member of the WTO, and thus enjoys MFN status with all member countries including the US.
79 foreign direct investment (FDI) barriers on US companies, and contributes to rising income inequality in the US and abroad (USW, 2005e). Challenging the US government’s trade policies involves two interlocking strategies: energizing the rank-and-file to pressure government officials and submitting formal petitions and legislation. First, the USW publishes a list of all federally elected officials and their likely position on pending trade legislation, and encourages members to write letters in support of the union’s line (see AFL-CIO, 2006a; and USW, 2006f). Part-in-parcel of letter-writing, the USW directs members to contribute and vote for particular candidates deemed to be “union friendly”— that is, those who vote the union line — while contributing millions in union funds through the USW’s Political Action Committee (USWPAC) (see USW, 2005d). Since 2000, the union has contributed over 4 million dollars to federal races, or roughly $1.82 per member (Center for Responsive Politics, 2006)). Second, the union coordinates political protest actions that link rank-and- file members with NGOs, community groups, and religious organizations. For example, the union is actively involved with the United Students against Sweatshops (USAS) in building student-labor coalitions against sweatshop practices in China, East Asia, and Central/South America, and most recently in its campaign against the fierce union- busting efforts of Coca-Cola in Colombia (see USAS, 2006; and USW, 2005d). In addition, the Steelworkers’ is working through the AFL-CIO and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to file petitions in support of workers’ rights abroad. Most recently, the union filed two “301” petitions 41 with the USTR urging the Bush Administration to impose trade sanctions on China for its “unreasonable trade practices.” The USW argues that China’s “persistent violation of workers’ rights” (jailing independent unionists, long hours and low pay, child labor, dangerous working conditions, etc.) “artificially reduces labor costs, causing an illegitimate increase in exports to the United States…thereby displacing jobs in the United States” (see USW, 2006h). Similarly, the union is supporting the “Decent Working Conditions and Fair Competition Act” (HR 5635 and S 3485), introduced by Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-ND) and
41 301 Petitions refer to Section 301 of the US Trade Act, which gives the President the authority impose and monitor sanctions against countries that engage in “unreasonable trade practices.”
80 Rep. Sherrod Brown (D-OH) in June of 2006, which prohibits the import, export, or sale of “sweatshop” goods in the United States (GovTrack, 2006; USW, 2006m). Benefits: Heath Care and Social Security For those jobs that do remain in the US, the Steelworkers’ is actively lobbying Congress and the President to secure the two key benefits for active and retired workers: health care and social security. Regarding health care, the USW maintains that the current HMO-based system “is a disaster,” leaving millions uninsured or underinsured (many of whom are working families with children) while the cost of healthcare is making it increasingly difficult for people to remain insured (USW, 2006i). 42 At the same time, the USW adamantly opposes the Bush Administration’s proposal to create individualized Health Saving’s Accounts (HSA's), arguing that the President’s plan principally benefits the pharmaceutical industry and accounting firms at the expense of working people (USW, 2005b). Alternatively, the Steelworkers’ is actively lobbying for the “Healthcare Bill of Rights”— the “United States National Health Insurance Act” (HR676) — a single payer system of national healthcare that provides all American citizens with coverage through Medicare without premiums, deductibles, or co-pays and guaranteed prescription drug benefit (USW, 2006l). Social security is also on the Steelworkers’ agenda, although the failure of the President’s privatization plan in 2005 has taken some of the urgency out of the union’s efforts to protect it. Nevertheless, the USW insists that Social Security is a critical benefit, especially in a time of shrinking pensions and corporate bankruptcies in major USW industries. As such, the union opposes the government’s plan to privatize Social Security through “private accounts,” arguing that the current program will remain solvent in its current form until 2052 (citing CBO estimates) (USW, 2005c). Moreover, the union questions the prudence of placing retirement savings “at the mercy of the stock market,” noting that a retiree would have lost roughly 1/3 of his/her investment over the last six years under the President’s plan (USW, 2006j). Instead, the Steelworkers’ suggest that
42 According to the union: 41 million Americans are uninsured, 82 percent of whom come from working families; 65 million Americans lack prescription drug coverage; 9.2 million children are uninsured; medical prices are rising at three times the rate of inflation annually; and health care premiums have increased 12.7 percent since 2001 (USW15).
81 Congress repeal the President Bush’s recent tax cuts to pay for any shortfalls in the current funding scheme (Ibid.). Workers’ Rights Finally, the USW is working to ensure that all workers enjoy the freedom to join a union, a right spelled out in the Wagner Act that has come under increasing attack by employers since the 1980s. In this vein, the Steelworkers’ oppose employers’ use of “heavy handed and oftentimes illegal” tactics to disrupt organizing campaigns, such as firing workers for union activity, hiring anti-union consultants to disrupt union meetings, posting anti-union propaganda, and refusing to bargain with a legitimately-elected union — so-called “union busting” (see chapter 2 for a detailed analysis of the practice) (USW, 2006k). At the same time, the union suggests that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the federal law prescribing penalties for violations of national labor law, is too weak to sufficiently protect the interests of workers (see USW, 2006n; American Rights at Work, 2006). The NLRA’s penalties are so weak, the AFL-CIO contends, “that employers treat them as a minor cost of doing business” (AFL-CIO, 2006b). In addressing their desire to reinforce the Wagner Act, the USW is pursuing two main strategies. First, the Steelworkers’ is endorsing national legislation to stiffen penalties for union-busting behavior while making it easier for workers obtain union representation. The bipartisan “Employee Free Choice Act” (HR1696 and S842) 43 increases the amount of back pay for illegally fired employees, provides for civil fines against employers who “willfully and repeatedly” violate employees’ rights, and provides for “card check” certification in lieu of formal NLRB elections — that is, workers may unionize by signing a card designating the union as its sole bargaining representative (GovTrack, 2005). Second, the USW it is coordinating protests involving prospective union members, rank-and-file, and allied community groups during local organizing drives. For example, the union recently conducted actions against Alcoa in Pennsylvania, AK Steel in Ohio, Goodyear in Oklahoma, Kent State University in Ohio, Delphi in Ohio, and Healthy Start in Pennsylvania, among others.
43 The bill was introduced to both houses of Congress on April 19, 2005 by Sens. Edward Kennedy (D- Mass.) and Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) and Reps. George Miller (D-CA) and Peter King (R-N.Y.).
82 5) The Transnational Arena: Global Employers and Global Unions At the same time, the USW has not been content to rely solely on political and organizing strategies at the domestic level. As International President Leo Gerard explained at Cornell University’s 2006 “Global Companies and Global Unions” conference, “More and more of our employers have become global corporations. We can’t kid ourselves. To continue maintaining our high standard of living, we can’t solely bargain contracts locally. We have to deal with multinationals on a global basis” (USW, 2006, February 9). As such, President Gerard has renewed the call for “global solidarity” while initiating a series of transnational projects designed to complement the union’s domestic agenda. In the main, these initiatives range from basic rhetorical support for jailed unionists to sophisticated cross-border alliances under the aegis of the Global Union Federations (GUF’s). The USW is working with a number of transnational actors. The most important are two GUF’s through which it is affiliated: The ICEM, established in a 1995 merger between the Miners’ International Federation (MIF) and International Federation of Chemical, Energy, and General Workers’ Unions (ICEF), which represents over 20 million workers (379 trade unions in 123 countries) in the Energy, Mining, Chemicals, Paper, Gems, and Environmental Services industries; and the IMF, established in 1893 by European metalworkers’ unions, which represents 25 million workers (over 200 unions in 100 countries) in the metals, automotive, mechanical, aerospace, and shipbuilding industries (IMF, 2006). The main objective of both global federations is to negotiate and monitor global framework agreements (GFA’s) with multinational corporations, facilitate cross-border solidarity projects among its affiliate unions, and represent workers and promote workers’ rights at two arms of the United Nations: the International Labor Organization (ILO) and World Health Organization (WHO) (ICEM, 2005; see also IMF, 2003). In addition, the union has signed a number of strategic alliances with unions that represent workers in a common multinational employer. The USW currently has strategic agreements with SNTMMSRM in Mexico, IG Metall in Germany, the AWU and CFMEU in Australia, Amicus in the United Kingdom, and CNM-CUT in Brazil (discussed below).
83 In the following section, I will detail the Steelworkers’ main transnational initiatives and partners. In most cases these partnerships center on promoting the ILO’s “core labor standards” and developing global unions around common multinational employers (MNC’s), which in the end is intended to strengthen the USW’s (and others’) domestic bargaining position (thus saving jobs and protecting wages and benefits) by making it harder for multinational employers to “race to the bottom” on wages and working conditions. Global Union Councils/Networks Over the past decade the USW’s most aggressive transnational work has been conducted through two of the Global Union Federations (GUF’s) with which it is affiliated: the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine, and General Workers’ Union (ICEM), the International Metalworkers Federation (IMF). 44 Through both Federations the USW has spearheaded the creation of “Global Union Councils” — or worldwide union networks hosted by the Global Union Federations that link trade unionists employed by a common multinational corporation (MNC). In short, these Councils help affiliated unions formalize global protest activities, coordinate bargaining strategies, and wage contract campaigns against MNC’s operating in their home country. The USW is actively involved in six of these Councils: the Rio Tinto Global Council (1998), which is the by far the largest and oldest, followed by the Goodyear Network (1999), the Bridgestone Network (2000), the ExxonMobil Network (2003), the Alcoa Global Council (2003), and the Sappi Network (2005). Global Union Councils emerged in the late 1990s as a coordinated trade union response to the “multinationalization” of production in major national industries generally — and to the corporate practices of the world’s leading multinational corporations (MNC’s). In the industrialized world, for example, labor unions were reeling from the loss of jobs that resulted from the consolidation of fledgling national enterprises into global MNC’s and the corresponding movement of production to regions with comparatively cheap operational costs (e.g., labor, environmental, regulatory, social, etc.) At the same time, unions in the developing world (where much of the production was
44 In 2005, the USW joined the International Union of Food, Agriculture and Restaurant Workers (IUF) as well.
84 shifted through the 1980s and 1990s) often complained about the mistreatment of workers and the environment, the lack of social development, unsafe working conditions, the use of child and slave labor, and trade union repression. And in both cases, MNC’s were using the credible threat of plant closures and job losses as a means to exact concessions from workers and labor unions during contract disputes — if a union even made it to that stage with an employer. In the end, the USW became involved in the push for global councils in those cases where a major multinational was following this pattern of behavior. Companies such as Rio Tinto, Alcoa, Rio Tinto, Grupo Mexico, Australian BHP, Teck Cominco Goodyear and Bridgestone/Firestone, Sappi, and ExxonMobil were first on the union’s list. The overarching purpose of Global Union Councils is to encourage MNC’s to enter into “global framework agreements” (GFA’s) 45 — that is, arrangements between the Council and the MNC that underscore the MNC’s formal commitment to abide by corporate, labor, and environmental “best practices” as spelled out in the ILO’s “Fundamental Rights of Work” and the OECD’s (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) “Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises” (ICEM, 2000). These standards cover workers’ freedom of association and collective bargaining (unionization), the abolition of forced labor, equal pay and freedom from workplace discrimination, the elimination of child labor, reciprocity 46 , and reasonable notice of intended closures and collective layoffs (see ILO, 1998; and OECD, 2000). The USW’s Global Union Councils engage their affiliates in several key ways. First, they fund research on the global operations of MNC’s and organize annual delegate meetings for the purpose of disseminated this research among their affiliate unions. These conferences also provide delegates an opportunity to strategize new campaigns and articulate positions on the progress of Council initiatives. Second, the Council coordinates targeted campaigns with member unions, community groups, and allied NGO’s. These actions range from small-scale “statements of solidarity” posted on the
45 The IMF uses the term “International Framework Agreement,” but the content is the same: respect for the ILO “core labor standards” and the OECD’s “Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.” See IMF 46 Reciprocity in this context maintains that MNE’s should conduct business in a manner consistent with the host country. Specifically, MNE’s should “observe standards of employment and industrial relations not less favorable than those observed by comparable employers in the host country.” See: http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/global/ilo/guide/oecd.htm
85 GUF website (see Appendix A, Statement 1) to organizing/bargaining support, rank-and- file training, and direct protests against offending MNC’s. Finally, the Networks presents findings on workers’ rights violations to international organizations that deal with labor issues (e.g., UN, ILO, WHO, ICFTU, etc.). In the end, USW District 12 Director Terry Bonds explains, the Global Councils combat the “race to the bottom” by providing “a system that enables us to strategically use our collective knowledge about all the inhumane, anti-worker and environmentally devastating actions (MNC’s) are taking across the globe. We will become the whistleblowers of the world, and the companies will be forced to deal with the consequences” (USW, 2006; 2006). In the following sections each of the USW’s councils will be briefly introduced, with reference to their composition, the USW’s interest in them, and major successes and failures of these initiatives. The ICEM/Rio Tinto Global Union Council (1998) Established in 1998, The Rio Tinto Global Union Network links workers from unions in 18 countries where the Rio Tinto Corporation — the world’s largest copper and general mining company and the employer of over 51,000 people directly worldwide — has extensive operations. 47 The Network emerged out of series complaints about the conduct of Rio Tinto and its subsidiaries. In Zimbabwe, Brazil, and Scandinavia, for example, the mineworkers’ unions there charged that Rio Tinto was “reducing health care benefits,” “illegally discharging workers,” using “whipsaw” tactics to pit workers against each other “in a race to the bottom,” and closing plants with little concern for the surrounding community (USW, 2006a) In the United States, where the USW represents thousands of copper and mining workers at Rio Tinto’s main US subsidiary, Kennecott Utah Copper (KUC), USW District 12 Director Terry Bonds argued that Rio Tinto had violated US labor law and “basic human decency” by “reneging” on contracts and repeatedly laying off workers (USW, 2003, July 15; see CFMEU, 2006). In short, these unions maintained that Rio Tinto was not abiding by the codes of social responsibility that it had pledged to uphold (see ICEM, 2006).
47 These countries include: Australia, Brazil, Great Britain, Canada, Chile, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, South Africa, the United States, Sweden, Turkey and Zimbabwe.
86 In addressing these varied concerns, the Network has focused on Rio Tinto’s blanket refusal to recognize and bargain with trade unions, especially in Australia (where the company is listed). In the absence of union representation, the ICEM Council argues, Rio Tinto is able to subcontract work at lower wages and hire workers on a temporary basis (the so-called “informalization” of work), employ child laborers in several refining plants, increase the shift length and working hours of its workers without consultation or negotiation, and rely on government or military repression to “secure its operations” and retard the efforts of union delegates and activists (ICEM, 2000). As such, the Network demands that the company abide by the ILO’s “core labor standards” and the OECD’s “Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises” (see above). What is more, the Network insists that Rio Tinto avail itself to “an agreed independent monitoring and compliance mechanism” in which the ICEM council unions played an active part (ICEM, 2000). In the eight years since the Rio Tinto network has been operational, moderate successes have been achieved. On the one hand, the Network has been unable establish a global framework agreement (GFA) with Rio Tinto and its subsidiaries — its main objective. Nevertheless, the Network has been successful in negotiating agreement with Rio Tinto on several international monitoring and compliance mechanisms aimed at “responsible mining practices and sustainable development” (see Responsible Gold, 2006). These include, among others, Oxfam International’s “Mine Certification Evaluation Project” (MCEP), the International Council on Mining and Metals’ (ICMM) “Sustainable Development Charter” (SDC), and the International Standards Organization’s (ISO) “International Standard on Social Responsibility” (ISSR) (Ibid.). In addition, the USW reports that the Network has been instrumental in achieving “a fair settlement” with Kennecott Utah Copper, including wage increases and improvements in health care benefits for retirees and actively employed members (USW, 2006). Similarly, the ICEM credits the Network with recent successes in Norway (wage increase, July 2006), Namibia (wage increase, January 2006), Australia (job reinstatement and union recognition, 2000-2004), and Zimbabwe (wage increase, 2004) (see ICEM, 2006). Goodyear/Bridgestone Global Councils (1999, 2000) Soon after the Rio Tinto Network was founded, the Steelworkers’ resolved to create other councils in other core industries, such as steel and rubber. The consequence
87 of these efforts was two ICEM Global Councils in the rubber industry. The first, the Goodyear Global Network (1999), links unions from sixteen countries on five continents, all of whom represent most of the 95,000 workers in the world’s second largest tire company (ICEM, 1999, March 11). The second, the Bridgestone Global Network (2000), brings together unions from nine countries on four continents for the “mutual defense and advancement” of over 100,000 workers in the world’s largest rubber and tire company. In the main, both councils emerged amid complaints that the two global multinationals were engaging in widespread union-busting tactics, using “whipsaw” tactics against workers, employ some workers in conditions of “virtual slavery” (see Global Rubber, 2006). USW President (at the time) George Becker announced: “Creating global networks and demonstrating world solidarity is the best way to combat the international race to the bottom on wages in this industry or other” (ICEM, 2000, August 4). The Steelworkers’ interest in forming global councils in the rubber industry stems from their dramatic loss of membership in tire manufacturing industries over the past three decades. Since the late 1960s, when every major tire plant in the US was organized, the number of unorganized plants has grown steadily to roughly 40% of the total industry, while thousands of additional jobs have been moved overseas (ICEM, 2002, October 28). And while the Steelworkers’ still represent about 2/3 of the remaining workers in the industry — over 70,000 in the US and Canada — they maintain that Goodyear, Bridgestone, and Continental are committed to reducing this number even further (ICEM, 2002, October 28). The USW contends that the major tire manufacturers have become “quite adept” at weakening the union’s bargaining position by creating non- union “parallel production lines” to replace unionized plants, and then using the non- union plants as leverage to threaten unionized workers with additional job, wage, and benefit cuts (see, for example, USW, 2006p; Global Rubber, 2002). At the same time, the USW maintains, these companies have developed and deployed sophisticated union- busting “consulting” groups to disrupt USW organizing drives in Oklahoma, Ontario, Illinois, North Carolina, and California, among others (Global Rubber, 2002). Finally, the Steelworkers’ contest Goodyear’s and Bridgestone’s decision to reduce or eliminate “guaranteed” defined-benefit healthcare plans with defined-contribution plans, a move that the union believes undermines the retirement security of its members (USW, 2006q).
88 Since 1999 both Councils have initiated solidarity projects and engaged in cross- border actions in support of affiliates’ collective bargaining rights, wages, and workplace safety. The Bridgestone Network, for example, declared that “the unions representing Bridgestone workers throughout the world ‘will call on their members to engage in solidarity activities in support of USWA members’” (ICEM, 2000, August 4). Indeed, the Network followed through with its promise, marching 75 delegates from nine unions to a Firestone center in St. Louis to demonstrate in support of the 8,000 USW workers who were negotiating a new three-year contract with the company (Ibid.). The USW’s VP of Rubber/Plastics suggested that this was helpful in re-establishing pattern bargaining in the US tire industry. 48 For participating unions overseas, these networks have likewise helped in some ways. In Thailand and Malaysia, for example, the Goodyear Network was successful in pressuring the company to reinstate 9 illegally dismissed union leaders in Thailand and Malaysia (8 from Malaysia, 1 from Thailand) (ICEM, 2006, August 20: 26) Similarly, the Bridgestone Network sent letters of solidarity in support of 58 Argentinean workers illegally dismissed, and ultimately reinstated, during a one-year lockout over wage negotiations (Ibid.). The Networks have also taken actions in support of workers in Australia, Turkey, Canada, Poland, South Africa, New Zealand, and Liberia (see ICEM, 2006a; 2006b). Finally, USW created the “Goodyear Network’s Health, Safety, and Environment” email list-serve, so that affiliates could discuss issues of concern (e.g. workers’ rights, job safety, organizing strategies and tactics, etc.) on a regular basis (ICEM, 2006b). IMF/Alcoa Global Company Council (2003) Established in 2003, the Alcoa Council links unions from 17 countries where the Alcoa Aluminum Corporation — the world’s largest aluminum producer— has extensive
48 For unions, pattern agreements generally the most preferred method of negotiation for union contracts (although they less preferred by most employers). Once the standard of U.S. labor relations, pattern agreements are contracts that apply to all companies in a particular industry. Traditionally, a union would negotiate a contract with the largest employer, say GM, and then use that contract as a benchmark for further negotiations with smaller companies. Pattern bargaining is largely non-existent today, although many unions are working to recreate the practice. The SEIU is perhaps the vanguard in this respect with its Justice for Janitors campaign.
89 operations (see Appendix A, Figure 2) (IMF, 2003, October 14). 49 According to the resolution introduced by the Steelworkers’ at Council’s opening meeting, the Council was created to address “the growing dangers ‘posed by a small group of global aluminium corporations with little regard for social democratic norms and traditions and a willingness to adopt authoritarian modes of production’” (IMF, 2006, April 25). This declaration stemmed from a litany of trade union complaints that centered on Alcoa’s use of “whipsaw” tactics against workers and its plan to move thousands of manufacturing jobs to China. The Steelworkers’ interest in forming the Alcoa Council stems from its complaint that the company, which employs over 20,000 workers in 25 states, regularly violates national labor laws. Most recently, the Steelworkers’ filed a class-action lawsuit in early 2006 challenging Alcoa’s decision to prematurely terminate a benefits contract and charge health insurance premiums to roughly 3000 retirees at 15 consolidated Alcoa and Reynolds Aluminium plants (IMF, 2006, April 25). Less than a year earlier, the Steelworkers’ suspended an organizing drive at an Alcoa smelting facility in Mt. Holly, South Carolina because of what they described as several major violations of the NLRA. According to the union, Alcoa violated a signed “neutrality agreement” 50 by forming a “Union Free Environment” consulting group that dispatched consultants to Alcoa’s facilities in order to disrupt the USW’s organizing drive (IMF, 2004, April 29). The consultants allegedly conducted “surveillance” of the USW and threatened to close the Mt. Holly facility, fire workers, withhold pay and benefits, and “retaliate” against individual workers who participated in union activities (Ibid.). Although the Council has yet to reach agreement on a GFA, it is taking steps to raise the international profile of Alcoa’s purported abuses to make such a moment more likely. Toward this end, the Council has created an Alcoa Working Group website, in which information about Alcoa and its subsidiaries can be posted and accessed by all members of the Council. This site includes information relating to globalization within the Aluminium industry, Alcoa’s global corporate practices, the status of trade union
49 These countries include: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Japan, Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. The USW represents over 15,000 Alcoa workers (USW, 2006o). 50 A neutrality agreement is a pledge from an employer to not to disrupt organizing drives with union- busting tactics.
90 rights at Alcoa’s facilities, and provides IMF responses to company and industry developments (IMF, 2006). Paralleling the site, the IMF publishes Metal World , a quarterly in-house magazine that profiles developments in major industries and MNC’s. In addition, the Council has developed a corporate solidarity campaign in order to facilitate solidarity projects among its affiliates. To date, these projects have included strike support, rank-and-file training, statements of solidarity, and bi-yearly Council meetings among affiliates. The USW, for example, has worked with the Australian Workers’ Union (AWU) and the Mexican NGO Comite Fronterizo De Obreros (Protecting the Rights of Maquiladora Workers) in support of organizing drives at Alcoa’s Macoelmex facility in Piedras Negras, Mexico (see CFO, 2005; Metal World, 2005). As USW President Leo Gerard insists, “If violations by any company result in a union losing its right to representation or having that right undermined, then unions across the globe are going to challenge that company’s oppressive approach to labor relations” (IMF6). ExxonMobil & Sappi Global Councils (2003/2005) The two most recent Global Councils of which the USW is a member target the leading MNC’s in the energy and industrial paper sectors. The first, the ExxonMobil Global Council (2003), links workers from unions in 11 countries that are home to the world’s largest energy company (ICEM, 2003, August 30). The second, the Sappi Global Council (2005), brings together workers from unions in six countries where the world’s largest producer of coated magazine papers has operations (ICEM, 2005, April 1). In both cases, the Global Councils were developed in order to assist affiliates with collective bargaining amid complaints about worker discrimination, union busting, and poor working conditions. The USW’s interest in both councils relates to its 2004 merger with the leading paper and chemical union in the United States: the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International Union (PACE). That merger added 240,000 workers to the USW’s ranks, and well as PACE’s outstanding concerns with ExxonMobil and Sappi. In the case of ExxonMobil, PACE accused the company of employing “harsh union busting tactics in failed attempts to defeat PACE affiliations” and of failing to adhere to the National Oil Bargaining Agreement’s provisions respecting job security and union
91 successorship. 51 Additionally, the union accused ExxonMobil of violating the ILO’s core labor standards in its operations elsewhere, most notably Canada (union busting), Nigeria (informalization), US Native-American Reservations (discrimination and union busting), and Australia (working conditions) (PACE, 2006, July 17). Regarding Sappi, PACE was encountering similar problems. It chiding the South Africa-based company for proposing to “drastically cut” workers’ income, healthcare benefits, and retiree benefits for 80% of its US workforce (ICEM, 2004, March 1). The union also criticized the company’s demands for “labor market flexibility” in its South African operations (Ibid.). Although the two PACE/USW Councils are the ICEM’s two most recent, each has engaged in modest yet noteworthy solidarity work. For example, the ExxonMobil launched a solidarity website — ExxonMobil-Solidarity — to serve as the main information portal for Network affiliates. The most thorough website among the six Councils documented here, ExxonMobil-Solidarity has posts articles related to “global warming” and corporate profits in the oil industry, discloses ExxonMobil’s SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) documents, details the company’s purported abuses in the US and abroad, and posts links to affiliated citizen groups and NGO’s. In addition, the Network delivered a resolution to ExxonMobil’s 2003 shareholder meeting demanding compliance with the ILO’s core labor standards. This resolution was underwritten by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, First Nations Development Institute, the AFL-CIO, and other “socially responsible” organizations (PACE, n.d.). The resolution was withdrawn after the company’s Board of Directors admitted that it was not in compliance with the ILO’s principles and agreed to work towards such a goal (Ibid.; see also ExxonMobil, 2005). The Sappi Council, for its part, coordinated a solidarity protest with the Steelworkers’ and South Africa’s Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood & Allied Workers’ Union (CEPPWAWU) at Sappi’s US Headquarters in Boston in May, 2006 (ICEM, 2006, May 15). The solidarity action was designed to support Sappi workers in contract negotiations that had been stalled for over a year in three of Sappi’s four US
51 The NOB agreement set a “floor” on wages, working conditions, and union contracts between oil companies. It was intended to reduce competition in these areas; that is, take wages, conditions, and contracts “out of the market.” Successorship clauses ensure that a company honors jobs and union contracts when a plant is sold. Job security clauses guarantee protect employees from involuntary firings during the term of the union contract. Source: ExxonMobil-Solidarity.org
92 plants (Ibid.). CEPPWAWU also hosted a USW delegation in South Africa to discuss workers’ concerns and to take a tour of Sappi facilities in the country (USW, 2006, March 6). Strategic Alliances The USW has also negotiated a series of strategic alliances with foreign metals and manufacturing unions that represent workers employed in a common multinational corporation. These strategic alliances follow a similar logic to the global union councils in that they are designed to increase the USW’s (and others’) domestic bargaining position vis-à-vis multinational employers by making it harder for MNC’s to “race to the bottom” on wages and working conditions. This is accomplished principally through coordinated bargaining and organizing, strike support, and regular information sharing about industry and company developments. The key difference between these alliances and global councils/networks, however, is that the former tend to be bi-lateral and are not formally affiliated with a GUF. At current, the USW is has formal alliances with trade unions in Mexico, Brazil, Australia, and Europe. In Mexico, the USW is working with the National Union of Mining, Steel, and Allied Workers (SNTMMSRM) to coordinate strategies and support strikes related to the MNC Grupo Mexico, the Mexico-based mining company that operates in the U.S. through its main subsidiary, Asarco. In 2004, for example, SNTMMSRM President Napoleon Gomez Urrutia visited steelworkers at Asarco’s mines in New Mexico and Texas to support the USW’s strike over an expired contract (USW, 2004). Later that same year, the USW returned the favor by sending a delegation to Mexico to support striking SNTMMSRM workers at the Nacozari mine while simultaneously conducting solidarity demonstrations in major U.S. cities (Ibid.). More recently, the USW has initiated a cross-border campaign to protest the Mexican government’s removal of Gomez Urrutia from his union post following his accusations that the government and Grupo Mexico were responsible for a gas explosion that claimed the lives of 65 miners at Pasta de Conchos (USW, 2006aa; AFL-CIO, March 2006). According to the government, Gomez Urrutia was removed because he was a corrupt leader who had stolen millions from his members, but the USW counters that the real motivation for his ouster was his militancy and willingness to stand up for workers’ rights (Sherman, 2006). In this vein,
93 the USW declared the government’s actions were “a shameful act of naked aggression against the human rights of workers” and amounted to “political persecution” (Ibid; 2006, March 17). In the meantime, the USW is giving the embattled union boss asylum in Arizona while it continues to press the Mexican government for his reinstatement through solidarity letters and small protests in several U.S. cities (see USW, 2006aa; USW, 2006, March 3). The USW also maintains strategic alliances with unions in Europe, Brazil, Australia, and he United Kingdom. In Europe, the USW is working with several partners, notably the German Metalworkers’ Union (IG Metall), the Dutch Industrial Union (FNV Bondgenoten), the Belgian Textile Union (ACV), and the European Works Council, to coordinate solidarity actions against the Netherlands-based Gamma Holding, Inc, which operates National Wire Fabric in Arkansas. The USW is seeking support for NWF workers who are on strike over safety, benefit, and seniority provisions in their new contract (USW, 2005a). In Brazil, the union is working with the National Confederation of Metalworkers’ (CNM/CUT) on negotiations with Gerdau Ameristeel, a Brazilian multinational that the USW claims has illegally fired workers and forced managers to accept a concessionary, “sub-standard collective agreement” at their Texas subsidiary (USW, 2005, June 2). The USW is also working with the largest manufacturing union in the U.K., Amicus, to pressure shared multinational employers in core industries (e.g., steel, shipbuilding, energy, and chemicals) to sign global framework agreements, as well as to coordinate bargaining strategies and organizing support (see Amicus, 2006). Finally in Australia, the union is working with the Australian Workers Union (AWU) and the Construction, Forestry, Mining, and Energy Union (CFMEU) to develop joint strategies regarding mining and forestry multinationals, such as Sappi and Rio Tinto (USW, 2006, March 1).
6) Analysis In assessing the USW’s key domestic and transnational priorities, it may be worth considering what the union is , and what it is not . Whether the USW chooses to acknowledge as much, it is an organization that is principally concerned with the jobs, wages, and working conditions of its dues-paying members. Although the USW may take
94 an interest in the lives and working conditions of non-members in the U.S. and abroad, it does so strategically and with the recognition (or hope) that these efforts will serve the interests of its own members first, and ideally non-members as well. In this sense, the union cannot be expected to elevate others’ interest above its own members (or prospective members) because it relies on money to operate, and thus must ensure a steady stream of revenue by protecting their ability to pay. I believe that this constraint — the need for dues money — is worth reiterating because it helps make sense of their domestic and transnational priorities noted above. Other considerations help as well. As I argued in Chapter 1, the nature and extent of exposure to economic globalization informs the strategic choices of labor unions as they attempt to preserve the jobs and wages of their members. Most importantly, the USW has been highly exposed to both effects of economic globalization (job loss and multinationalization). I argue that both factors have influenced the union’s domestic and transnational strategies in ways that differ from the other unions surveyed here. Regarding the jobs losses, the USW must constantly deal with the threat (explicit or implied) that manufacturing jobs will either be eliminated or relocated overseas — in both cases, the USW will lose dues-paying members as a result. In dealing with this issue, the USW has consistently asserted its opposition to “free trade,” but the arguments and tactics underlying this position have evolved considerably with time. From the 1973 (Burke-Hartke) until 1999 (Seattle WTO), the union’s position was avowedly “protectionist,” in that it stressed “our jobs,” “U.S. jobs,” “buy American,” and “save U.S. steel.” The logic behind this position was clear: use protective tariffs to shield domestic industries from competition, thus limiting the need to fire workers. Yet two interrelated problems emerged with this strategy: 1) it did not work (see above), and the USW was forced to consider a new plan; and 2) it alienated unions overseas, which actually interfered with that new plan. The new plan, as evidenced by the current set of political campaigns, has been to supplant overtly protectionist trade policies, such as tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers, with federal policies designed to make U.S. firms more competitive and global networks of unions to ensure that corporations are not tempted into a “race to the bottom.” In both cases, the idea is to reduce the structural incentives for corporations to eliminate jobs
95 unionized by the USW. At some level, the USW is simply repackaging its protectionism: whereas the union previously sought to reduce the flow of goods produced in countries with lower labor and environmental costs, the union is now working reduce the flow of goods by raising labor and environmental costs in exporting countries. As noted above, however, since this global strategy is more dependent on the willingness of foreign unions cooperate with the USW, the union has been careful to downplay its continued insistence on tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. This helps explain why, for example, the USW makes sure to reference the plight of foreign workers whenever it files petitions for trade protection with the U.S. Trade Representative or presses for the use of protective tariffs. The second portion of this new plan has been to develop transnational partnerships around common multinational corporations. On this level, the USW is clearly outpacing other U.S. unions, particularly the SEIU and AFT. Much of the union’s emphasis on global union councils is derived from the recognition that as a manufacturing in an increasingly globalized economy, it is particularly vulnerable to FDI flows and must develop strategies to reduce job flows overseas. To date, the union has created six global councils and over a half-dozen strategic partnerships for this purpose. In this way, by focusing on collective bargaining, strike support, and information exchanges between partner unions, these councils are attempting to eliminate the influence of the geography of labor in the global economy. In other words, these councils and networks are working to eliminate geography as a tool through which MNC’s reduce labor and environmental costs — and thus replicate the structure of national industrial relations at the transnational level. 52
52 The recurring theme in these global partnerships is global unionism. Implicitly, the idea behind global l unions is to recreate national industrial relations, in which a national company negotiated with a national union, at the transnational level. In other words, global unions seek to “level the playing field.” See: Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation
96 The Service Employees International Union (SEIU) We are the Service Employees International Union, an organization of more than 1.8 million members united by the belief in the dignity and worth of workers and the services they provide and dedicated to improving the lives of workers and their families and creating a more just and humane society. --SEIU Mission Statement
1) Introduction The Service Employees International Union (SEIU) is the largest service-sector union in the U.S., representing roughly 1.8 million active and retired members in healthcare systems, property services, and the public sector. The SEIU is also the fastest- growing union in the United States. In recent years, the SEIU has become increasingly exposed to multinationalization in two of its three core industries, although unlike the USW the SEIU has little experience with trade-related job losses. As such, the union eschews involvement in the “free trade” debate, choosing instead to focus on policies related to the service-sector workforce generally, such as immigration and retirement security. At the same time, multinationalization in its core industries has led the SEIU to develop several transnational partnerships with foreign unions that represent workers employed by common multinational corporations. In this way, the SEIU resembles the USW in that its transnational partnerships seek to bolster the union’s domestic bargaining position vis-à-vis its multinational employers. The remainder of this chapter will be divided into four parts. Part II briefly details the history of service organizing and the SEIU, noting major periods of development and important organizational issues, such as the impact of globalization. Part III details the SEIU’s key sectors, jobs picture, and exposure to globalization. Part IV surveys the SEIU’s main domestic priorities and levers through which it is addressing them. Part V explores how the SEIU’s transnational strategies complement these domestic initiatives. Finally, Part VI analyzes these developments with reference of the independent variables and hypotheses posited in Chapter 1.
97 2) A Brief History of the SEIU The Service Employees International Union (SEIU) enjoys a rich history, one that dates back to the struggles of immigrant janitors in the small service unions of Chicago at the turn of the 20 th century. The largest of these building-service unions, the Chicago Flat Janitor’s Union (CFJU), was founded in 1902 by a small group of janitors, elevator operators, and window washers seeking better wages, working conditions, and living conditions (Hunt, 2004). 53 Defunct by 1905, the union was revived in 1912 by prominent local organizer William F. Quesse, and later chartered by Samuel Gompers’ AFL in 1921 as the Building Service Employees International Union (BSEIU), with the former CFJU becoming the BSEIU’s first union local, BSEIU Local 1. 54 Focusing its organizing efforts on janitors and other building-service workers in large Midwestern cities, the BSEIU enjoyed modest success in its first two decades, growing from just 200 members in 1912 (when it was the CFJU) to 70,000 members by the end of the 1930’s (Reuther, 2006; Hunt, 2004). In the decades following the Great Depression, the BSEIU flourished in size, organizational diversity, and political reach. Under International (i.e., national) President William McFetridge (1940-1960), an early member of Chicago Flat Janitors Local 1 and the nephew of SEIU founder William F. Quesse, the union added thousands of members from service professions outside of buildings, such as airports, greenhouses, atomic plants, hospitals, bowling alleys, nurseries, cemeteries, sports stadia, and para-professions within public schools (e.g., bus drivers, maintenance workers, groundskeepers), among others. These organizing drives, although hampered by Taft-Hartley and the employer backlash of the late 1940s and 1950s, helped boost membership almost 400 percent during McFetridge’s tenure, from 70,000 in 1940 to 275,000 by 1960. At the same time, President McFetridge launched a sweeping modernization program — creating departments for research and legislative affairs, hiring labor attorneys, and developing procedures for record-keeping, among others — that enhanced the union’s bargaining
53 Janitors typically lived in the dilapidated basements of the apartment complexes in which they worked. 54 In 1968, the name that would finally be shortened to the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), a name that union retains today.
98 power with employers and political leverage in Chicago and Washington (Reuther, 2006). When President McFetridge finally retired in 1960, he left behind a healthy union. Under the leadership of David Sullivan in the 1960s and 1970s, the SEIU continued to flourish. A former elevator-operator from New York City, Sullivan was a charismatic leader who bolstered the union’s political clout by moving its headquarters from Chicago to Washington, D.C. and dedicating the organization to legislative affairs and member servicing. 55 The union lobbied vigorously on behalf of President Kennedy’s 1962 Executive Order 10988, which amended the Wagner Act to permit collective bargaining among government employees and clarified the rights of public employees to unionize. Sullivan used the legislation to expand the union’s organizing efforts to hospitals (nurses, technicians), nursing homes, mental health facilities, and state and local government (social workers, emergency personnel, engineers, and others). Between 1960 and 1971, the union added 125,000 members in these new areas. The SEIU also became heavily involved national politics, working through the AFL-CIO’s Committee on Political Education (COPE) to finance the candidacies of pro-labor (mostly Democratic) candidates (see Chapter 2), and developing an in-house Civil Rights Department to assist its minority members and Johnson administration on the implementation of the “Great Society” programs. 56 Finally, the union expanded its ranks from 275,000 to 430,000 during Sullivan’s presidency (Reuther, 2006a). 57 Yet the SEIU, much like most unions during this period, began to stagnate in the 1970’s. But unlike their private and quasi-public sector counterparts, globalization was less a factor than the union’s overriding emphasis on political action and member servicing, both of which detracted from new member organizing. Although the union added several thousand members during the decade, these gains were largely the result
55 Servicing refers to the “selective benefits” that unions confer to members as a condition of their membership. Typical benefits include: credit cards and bank loans, healthcare, pensions, strike funds, and college loans. A union’s ability to provide selective benefits is the main way in which Olson’s collective action problem is addressed. David Sullivan’s pension and college scholarship plans, instituted during his tenure, are two examples of such benefits. 56 Notably, Sullivan chaired the Office of Economic Opportunity’s Labor Advisory committee in the War on Poverty program. 57 In 1968, the BSEIU dropped “building” from the name to become the SEIU, a move that reflected changes in the composition of the organization’s membership over the previous three decades. Some argue that the union dropped the name in order to move beyond its roots as a janitorial union, which had generated some ridicule over the years from rival unions. See Galenson, 153.
99 three “mega-mergers” — 100,000 members of the California State Employees Association; 50,000 members of the National Association of Government Employees; and 52,000 members of New York local 1199 — as opposed to the localized, grassroots organizing that had characterized the union’s earlier (pre-Sullivan) growth agenda (Galenson, 154). The election of John Sweeney as International President in 1981 would represent a sea change for the SEIU, and usher a new era for the U.S. labor movement as well. Sweeney, whose success with the SEIU would later propel him to the Presidency of the AFL-CIO in 1995 (a post that he still holds today), had become disenchanted with Sullivan’s “inside the beltway” politics, arguing that unions needed to rediscover the elements that made them strong in the first place: organizing and (where necessary) disobedience. Toward this end, Sweeney raised dues and dedicated over 25% of SEIU’s budget to organizing, up from the typical 5% for private-sector unions at the time, in order to pay for hundreds of full-time organizers and grassroots campaigns (Lichtenstein, 256). Sweeney also broke from the traditional model of workplace organizing by mobilizing entire communities — as opposed to specific workplaces — around the cause of social justice. The SEIU’s well-publicized “Justice for Janitors” and “Service Workers Rising” campaigns, for example, involved workers, religious and community groups, prominent local leaders, and progressive NGO’s for community pickets and rallies (see Friedman, 2002; SEIU, 2006i; SEIU, 2006h). In the end, the tactics paid off: during Sweeney’s 14-year tenure, the SEIU averaged 4% annual membership growth and organized roughly 400,000 new janitors, security guards, healthcare workers, and local government personnel (Galenson, 154; Lichtenstein, 256). At over 1 million members by 1993, the SEIU had also become the largest labor union in the AFL-CIO. When Sweeney was chosen to lead the AFL-CIO in 1995, the SEIU unsurprisingly elevated its national organizing director, Andrew Stern, to its top post (1995-current). Perhaps the union’s most ambitious (and controversial) president, Stern has been committed to making the SEIU the vanguard of the post-industrial U.S. labor movement through aggressive organizing and targeted political action. In terms of organizing, Stern has pressed even harder than John Sweeney to organize new members, directing the SEIU to devote more than 50% of all funds to organizing (20% for locals),
100 or roughly $180 million annually between the two (locals and national) (Bernstein, 2004). Stern has also refined the SEIU’s “social movement” organizing approach by introducing the concept of simultaneous industry organizing . Under this scheme, the union seeks to organize an entire market at once — say, all janitors in Houston, not just all janitors at one company — by targeting the largest 4 or 5 employers and promising that a union contract will not go into effect until a majority of employers sign it. By creating a citywide wage “floor”, Stern reasons, employers are no longer forced to slash wages in order to remain competitive in local markets (see Bai, 2005; SEIU, 2006, November 30; see also Bernstein, 2004). Taken together, Stern’s reforms have helped the union add 900,000 new members, from 1.1 million in 1996 to 1.8 million in 2006, the largest 10- year increase in SEIU history (SEIU, 2006j). 58 These gains, most of which were achieved in the low-wage service sector, have also made the SEIU the largest union of immigrants, women, and “people of color” in the United States. Over the past several years, the SEIU’s success has emboldened Stern to propose significant changes to the broader labor movement as well. After the defeat of John Kerry in the 2004 presidential race, a candidate heavily favored by the AFL-CIO, Stern unsuccessfully urged the Federation’s leadership (most notably, his former boss John Sweeney) to reconsider what was, in his opinion, a failed model. Arguing that the labor movement was spending too much time and money on member servicing and legislative politics and too little on organizing new members, Stern and the SEIU spearheaded the creation of a rival labor federation in 2005 — the “Change to Win” coalition (CTW) — that would devote over 75% of its annual budget to “organizing the unorganized.” Six prominent unions, together representing 35% of the AFL-CIO and roughly $16 million in annual dues, immediately joined the new federation and elected the SEIU’s Anna Burger as the first woman leader of a U.S. labor federation. 59 60 61 To date, the CTW has
58 The SEIU also lost 200,000 union members during this period. 59 Change to Win unions include: SEIU; United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW); the Teamsters; United Farm Workers (UFW); Laborers International Union of North America (LIUNA); Union of Needletrades, Industrial, Textile Workers, Hotel Employees, and Restaurant Employees (UNITE-HERE), and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (UBC). See http://www.changetowin.org/about-us/who-we-are.html 60 Five unions officially disaffiliated from the AFL-CIO. These include: SEIU, LIUNA, Teamsters, UFCW, and UNITE-HERE. Two members retain membership in both federations: UFW and UBC. 61 This figure is based on CTW’s current budget. See also 60 Minutes interview with Stern.
101 launched seven nationwide organizing campaigns that target low-wage workers in predominantly service-related industries, such as retail (“Wake Up Wal-Mart”), food preparation (“Justice at Smithfield”), transportation (“Driving Up Standards”), retail laundry (“Uniform Justice”), building services (“Make Work Pay”), and hotels (“Hotel Workers Rising”), among others (see CTW, 2006). Yet Stern’s penchant for labor reform is not limited to the U.S. alone. At the SEIU’s most recent national convention in 2004, Stern outlined the organization’s key priorities for the next decade, among which included global organizing for the first time in union history (see SEIU, 2006k). In a 2005 op-ed published in the Los Angeles Times, Andy Stern explained his determination to make global unionism a top priority for the SEIU: “We live in a world in which companies, not countries, are making the global economic rules. No one is going to reverse globalization. But a global economy needs policies that benefit working people, not just giant corporations. Workers in global companies need global unions to negotiate agreements across borders that help raise living standards for workers, instead of continuing the race to the bottom” (Stern, 2005).
Toward this end, the SEIU created its Department of Global Organizing Partnerships in 2004 to facilitate the union’s transnational work. Although less than two years old, the department has already developed several major transnational projects, each of which seeks to build solidarity among unions and workers connected through the same multinational employer. These initiatives will be explored in greater detail in section 5. In the meantime, the next section will detail how the SEIU measures against the independent and control variables delineated in Chapter 1, particularly the union’s key industrial sectors, job prospects, and most importantly for this study, experiences with globalization. As noted above, these measures will help situate the organization’s key domestic and transnational initiatives later in the chapter.
102 3) The SEIU Today: Sectors, Jobs Picture, and Globalization The Service Employees International Union is a quasi-private sector union that claims to represent over 1.8 million active and 50,000 retired workers in the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. 62 Approximately 1.2 million SEIU members work in the private sector, in areas such as healthcare and property services, while the remaining members work in the public sector, notably state and local government and education. The union has over 300 local affiliates (locals) in 25 states across the U.S., although the union is commonly referred as a “bookend” union, with the bulk of its membership in California and New York. Most notably, the SEIU the largest union of immigrants, women, people of color, healthcare workers, and property service workers, and is the second largest union in the United States overall (SEIU, 2006l; SEIU, 2006m). 63 The SEIU is a service-sector union representing workers in three main industrial divisions: healthcare, property services and public services. The SEIU’s Healthcare Division, the union’s largest and fastest-growing industrial division, comprises roughly 50% of total active membership (900,000) and represents workers in hospitals and nursing homes, such as RN’s, LPN’s, technicians, and home caregivers, among others (SEIU, 2006o). 64 Public Services, the SEIU’s second-largest industrial sector, comprises roughly 30% of total membership (850,000) and represents workers in state and local government, K-12 education, and child care facilities, most notably social workers, teachers, emergency personnel, early childhood educators, and bus drivers (SEIU, 2006n). Finally, the SEIU still represents a large contingent of janitors and other property-service workers — the traditional backbone of the organization for roughly 100 years. The SEIU’s Property Services division comprises roughly 20% of total membership (250,000) and represents service workers in commercial office buildings, co- ops, apartment buildings, theaters, stadiums, and airports (SEIU, 2006p). 65
62 The term “quasi” is used to denote significant membership (at least 25%) in both the private and public sectors. The use of “private” denotes that a majority of members work in the private sector. 63 The National Education Association is the largest union in the U.S., with over 2.6 million members. For a list of the largest unions in the U.S., see: http://www.laborresearch.org/charts.php?id=25 64 Healthcare is technically split into two divisions: hospital systems and long-term nursing care. 65 The disparity in numbers is due to overlap between public workers and the other industry divisions. Public healthcare workers, for example, are members of both divisions. See: http://seiu.org/public/faqs/what_is.cfm
103 Unlike its private sector counterparts, the SEIU has managed phenomenal growth over the past four decades, averaging roughly 33,000 new members per year over this period in both low and medium-wage occupations. 66 Part of the explanation for this growth relates to the SEIU’s focus on organizing low and medium-wage industries in the service sector, a sector that has grown considerably in recent decades yet has been overlooked by other AFL-CIO unions. For example, the U.S. Education and Health Services sector, which includes public and private-sector nurses, technicians, long-term health and child care providers, para-professionals, and mental health personnel, added over 14 million jobs and averaged 11.4 percent annual growth between 1960 and 2006 (BLS, 2006f; Appendix A, Graph 3). 67 By itself, the health services sector provides roughly 13.5 million jobs and is projected to be one of the fastest growing sectors of the U.S. economy, growing by 19 percent or 3.6 million jobs over the next decade (2004- 2014) (BLS, 2006g). 68 Similarly, the Professional and Business Services sector, which includes private security guards and janitors, has grown considerably in recent years and is projected to grow by 31 percent or 4.5 million jobs over the same period. The privatization of homeland security operations since 9/11 is expected to add nearly 400,000 jobs alone by 2010, almost doubling the current number of 1.1 million (SEIU, 2006o; see also O’Sullivan, 2006). 69 Finally, state and local government, a small yet growing sector of the SEIU, has averaged 3.5 percent growth since 1960 and is projected to grow by roughly 1 percent over the next decade (BLS, 2006i). 70 In the end, while critics may charge the SEIU organizes the “low hanging fruit” of the U.S. workforce, it has nevertheless increased membership by organizing high-growth industries. 71
66 This figure is calculated from the 1960 job value of 275,000 and a 2006 job value of 1.8 million. Both numbers are furnished by the SEIU. 67 BLS data was used to calculate the average job growth rate between January, 1960 and January, 2006. For reference, the 1960 job value was 2.849 million and the 2006 value was 17.428 million. Note: The BLS does not disaggregate job growth numbers for healthcare and education, so a proportion of this number reflects job growth in both sectors. The SEIU is the largest healthcare union in the U.S., although it does represent several thousand education workers as well. 68 According to the May, 2006 BLS wage report, the average wage for the SEIU’s healthcare members (nurses, technicians, therapists, etc) was $56,750. See: http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics2_61.htm 69 For the BLS’s full jobs forecast, see: http://www.bls.gov/oco/oco2003.htm 70 According to the BLS’s May 2006 wage report, wages in government occupations average $44,250, just slightly lower than education and health services. See: http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics2_92.htm 71 This criticism is often leveled against unions with public sector membership, since employers are considered “less hostile” to unions than in the private sector. For one example, see: http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2002518943_labor25.html
104 A second explanation for the SEIU’s membership growth in recent years relates to the union’s exposure to the forces of economic globalization, namely trade-related job losses and multinationalization. By focusing on the service sector the SEIU has managed to organize jobs in industries that are difficult to move overseas, such as healthcare and property services, and thus has been able to retain a significant portion of its membership while other unions, notably the USW, have struggled. However, it is important to note that with the passage of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) under the framework of the WTO in 1995, these core industries are increasingly susceptible to migration flows (i.e., import competition in labor). 72 This is especially true of property services, where the vast majority of workers are immigrants, and increasingly in healthcare, where a shortage of registered nurses has created a demand for skilled foreign workers. Nevertheless, on balance the SEIU very much resembles the AFT with regard to job security. This picture changes with respect to multinationalization, however, as GATS has facilitated the movement of multinational employers into some of the SEIU’s core industries. This is particularly evident in the security industry, where the SEIU represents roughly 50,000 workers employed by the main U.S. subsidiaries of several global corporations, such as Securitas (the Swedish MNC that purchased Pinkerton/Burns in 1998), Group 4 Securicor (the Danish-English conglomerate that purchased the Wackenhut Corporation in 2002), Guardsmark, Vance International Security Services, and Initial Security. The two largest global security firms, Securitas and Group 4 Securicor, collectively employ over 175,000 workers in the United States and reported $7.5 and $2.8 billion in revenues in 2002, respectively (SEIU, 2006p; 2006q). Beyond security, there are also developing pockets of multinationalization in public services, particularly in school-related “para” professions. For example, the union organizes hundreds school-bus drivers employed by FirstStudent and Durham Student Services, the main U.S. subsidiaries of the U.K. school services multinationals FirstGroup and
72 GATS identifies four modes of trade in services: 1) cross-border supply, such as telecommunications provided by a foreign firm; 2) consumption abroad; 3) commercial presence, where a foreign service provider operates in another location; and 4) presence of a natural person, where the supplier is a foreign worker. The final mode covers migrant laborers, and is thus particularly relevant to the SEIU.
105 National Express, respectively. The union also represents thousands of food-service workers employed by the France-based multinational, Sodexho Corporation. Taken together, the SEIU’s penchant for organizing high-growth industries and its limited exposure to economic globalization leaves it better positioned than the USW as it looks to grow in the next decade. Nevertheless, the union remains vulnerable in a number of respects. In the following section, I will discuss these key organizational problems and the union’s domestic and transnational responses to them. Of particular note is how the absence of trade-related job loss has allowed the SEIU to focus on “bread and butter” economic issues, such as wages, working conditions, and benefits. At the transnational level, however, the union follows a similar pattern by linking campaigns to multinational corporations that employ union members in the U.S.
4) The Domestic Arena: From Job Security to Life Security What Do They Want? At base, the SEIU is interested in two things common to all institutionalized labor unions: enlarging the size of its membership and improving the wages and working conditions of its members. The SEIU is different from other private sector unions, however, in two key respects. First, the SEIU is a service-sector union operating primarily in the healthcare and property security industries, and thus represents workers in jobs that cannot be shipped overseas. The SEIU enjoys a high level of bargaining leverage comparative to other unions as a result. Second, the SEIU represents a very different type of worker. In two of the union’s three major sectors, immigrants, foreign- born citizens, women, and minorities constitute the majority of the workforce, as well as the union’s overall membership. Moreover, service-sector jobs are among the lowest paying on average of all the unions surveyed here. As a result, the SEIU’s organizational priorities, as well as the strategies and policy levers that employs vary considerably from their private sector counterparts. In the main, the SEIU is principally interested in four issues at the domestic level: immigration reform, healthcare, the right to bargain collectively, and “fair” wages. In the following section, I will document the SEIU’s domestic levers for achieving these goals, followed by a section discussing the union’s complementary transnational levers.
106 Immigration Reform On account of the SEIU’s tremendous immigrant and foreign-born constituency, the issue of immigration reform has become the organization’s highest priority. The union is decidedly pro-immigrant, as evidenced by the prominent placement on its official website of “Immigrant Workers: Making Valuable Contributions to Our Communities and Our Economy,” a fact-sheet documenting the contributions of “hard- working, tax-paying immigrants” (see SEIU.org). Moreover, the union is openly critical of the current immigration system, arguing that it treats undocumented workers as “second-class citizens” by providing “few orderly, legal channels to work” and pushing immigrants and their families “into treacherous pathways to this country and then into the underground economy” (SEIU2006, January 19; SEIU, 2006). In appealing to the broader public, the SEIU also contends that the system “denies 12 million hardworking, taxpaying immigrants in the U.S. a way to earn citizenship, making it easier for employers to exploit (them). This drives down pay and benefits for all workers in America” (SEIU, 2006b). Alternatively, the SEIU proposes an immigration system that ensures the safety of all immigrant workers, provides incentives for undocumented workers to seek legal citizenship, protects families, and strengthens the border. In dealing with the issue, the SEIU has pursued several tracts. First and foremost, the union has become actively involved in the current national debate over immigration reform, a debate that has become polarized between two congressional bills: the House of Representatives’ “Border Protection, Anti-Terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act” (HR 4437) 73 (or “Sensenbrenner-King”), and the Senate’s “Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act” (S 1033) 74 (or “McCain-Kennedy”). On the one hand, the union has come out forcefully against the former, Sensenbrenner-King, declaring it an “unrealistic, punitive bill” that “simply militarizes our borders…criminalizes hardworking immigrants,” and punishes “those who help them” (SEIU, 2006, May 15a; SEIU, 2006, May 15). Specifically, the union objects to two provisions in the House bill
73 The House passed the bill in December, 2005. It was overwhelmingly rejected in the Senate. Passed in the House but tabled in the Senate, Sensenbrenner-King is a “border enforcement” bill that would tighten border security, make illegally entry a felony crime, mandate deportation for all detained illegal immigrants, criminalize “alien smuggling,” and create a mandatory “employment eligibility verification system” requiring all employers to verify the legal status (via Social Security numbers) of their immigrant workforce (GovTrack, 2005a; see also HouseJudiciary, 2005, December 16). 74 See: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-1033
107 that would effectively render the United States’ 11 million undocumented immigrants “aggravated felons” while making “any relative, employer, coworker, clergyman, lawyer, or friend” who assists them an “alien smuggler,” and thus guilty of a felony as well (SEIU, 2006a; SEIU, 2006). 75 On the other hand, the union is offering its qualified support for McCain-Kennedy, a bill that they consider “a step in the right direction” by offering legal channels and meaningful protections for workers entering the country, providing incentives for undocumented immigrants to “come out of the shadows,” and maintaining tough border security. (SEIU 2006, May 15a; SEIU, 2006c). Nevertheless, the union contends that the Senate bill “requires significant improvements” because it is “too complicated to implement,” overburdens state and local law enforcement officials, and still encourages several million undocumented workers to remain “in the shadows” (SEIU 2006, May 15a). Unsatisfied with the current crop of proposals, the SEIU is seeking to influence the national debate. For example, it is mobilizing the rank-and-file to vote in state and national elections, launching comprehensive election website that automatically registers members to vote, provides information on key races and ballot initiatives, and details the legislative record of individual legislators (noting especially whether the legislator voted for or against the union on key bills) (see SEIU, 2006d). Since thousands of SEIU members are not U.S. citizens, however, the union also provides links to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service as part of a longer-term strategy to boost union voting. (SEIU, 2006b). In addition, the union is looking to increase voter turnout in “battleground” states with large populations of immigrant workers (who they view are sympathetic to their vision of immigration reform), particularly Florida, Arizona, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. Together with the People for the American Way and ACORN, the SEIU is spearheading the voter education and registration project Mi Familia Vota (My Family Votes), a project that claims to have successfully registered
75 The effect of these provisions, the union maintains, is to make the problem of undocumented workers worse by pushing undocumented workers deeper into the “shadows” out of fear that they would be permanently barred from ever obtaining legal immigration status, or that their children would be separated from them (SEIU2). Furthermore, the bill punishes so-called “good Samaritans” who provide undocumented workers with healthcare, legal assistance, or food and shelter (Ibid.). Finally, by turning state and local police forces into border agents the bill would undermine the “community policing” function of law enforcement officials.
108 72,000 new voters for the 2004 elections and aims to register over 100,000 in 2006 (People for the American Way, 2006). Finally, although the SEIU is decreasing campaign funding to focus on organizing, its size has allowed it to spend roughly $3.3 million on federal campaigns in the 2004 and 2006 campaign cycles combined (Center for Responsive Politics, 2006a). Complementing the electoral strategy, the SEIU is pursuing grassroots activism and coalition-building through two national pro-immigration alliances. The first is the Coalition for Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CCIR), a public-policy organization devoted to “progressive” immigration reform (see New American Opportunity Campaign, 2006). Through the CCIR’s New American Opportunity Campaign (NAOC), the SEIU coordinates pro-immigration social activism between allied labor, religious, and community organizations. Most recently, the union participated in two “National Day of Action” campaigns (April 10 and May 1, 2006), events that featured a pro-immigration rally on Capitol Hill, as well as rallies, candlelight vigils, and petition drives nationwide in support of what the union terms “real comprehensive immigration reform” (SEIU, 2006, April 19). The second is the “We Are America” alliance (WAA), a “newly- forming” nationwide coalition of likeminded pro-immigration organizations, such as the Center for Community Change (CCC), the National Day Laborers Organizing Network (NDLON), the National Association of Latin and Caribbean Communities (NALACC) (see Center for Community Change, 2006). The WAA alliance educates grassroots organizers about immigration legislation and basic organizing through “teach-ins” that it conducts nationwide. In addition, the alliance mirrors the CCIR in mobilizing immigrants and their supporters in rallies nationwide, offering voter registration and candidate information, and promoting solidarity marches at state capitols and Washington, DC. Wages and Working Conditions Raising the minimum wage is another key priority of the SEIU, due in large part to the low-wage nature of service-sector employment. In the main, the union contends that the current national minimum wage of $5.15/hr, a rate that was last increased by the Clinton Administration in 1996, is fully inadequate to keep low-wage earners out of poverty. Citing statistics from several leading “progressive” policy institutes (e.g., Economic Policy Institute, Center For American Progress, and the Center on Budget and
109 Policy Priorities), the union argues that the value of the national minimum wage “has fallen so low that it now takes a minimum wage earner a day and a half’s pay just to fill up their gas tank to get to work for the week. That’s more than a week’s less pay for…necessary expenses each month” (SEIU, 2006, July 17). As such, the union is urging Congress to “stand up for hardworking Americans struggling to make ends meet” by passing the Fair Minimum Wage Act (HR 2429, S 44 to S 256), 76 a bill that would increase the federal minimum wage $7.25 over two years (SEIU, 2006e). Congress has voted down both bills, but may reconsider each after the November, 2006 elections. Yet the SEIU is not waiting for Congress to pass federal legislation. The union is also pursuing grassroots strategies at the state and local level, where 18 states have a minimum wage higher than the national rate (with 15 more considering ballot initiatives this November) and 140 cities have passed so-called “Living Wage” ordinances (see Acorn, 2006). Recognizing the opportunity to directly influence the wage debate through localized policy fights, the SEIU is working with Acorn 77 (the leading anti- poverty/living-wage organization in the U.S.) and other allied community, religious, and labor organizations on living-wage campaigns across the country in areas with high rates of SEIU membership. In Chicago, the SEIU’s birthplace and headquarters for fifty years, the union was instrumental in persuading the Chicago City Council to approve a living- wage ordinance requiring “big box” retailers in the city to pay at least $10/hr wage and $3/hr in fringe benefits, with annual adjustments for inflation (Talbott, 2006). Dovetailing with the SEIU’s Justice for Janitors’ campaign (see § 1), the union has also developed its own grassroots anti-poverty alliance — the Alliance for Quality Services (A4QS) — in collaboration with UNITE-HERE, the largest textile and hotel workers’ union in the U.S. The campaign is designed to combat domestic outsourcing, or the trend for domestic organizations (e.g., schools, colleges, hospitals, and corporate offices) to outsource critical support services as a means to trim operating costs (i.e., privatization) (see A4QS, 2006a). In the main, the SEIU contends that domestic outsourcing erodes the quality of services and undercuts the wages and benefits of service workers, notably those organized by the union (see A4QS, 2006a). Through the A4QS
76 See Thomas: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:SP00044 : and http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi- bin/bdquery/z?d109:h.r.02429 77 ACORN: the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now
110 campaign website, the SEIU and UNITE-HERE are seeking to raise public awareness by documenting the working conditions and business practices at key worksites. In addition, the campaign works in concert with allied community groups, such as the United States Students Association, the United Students against Sweatshops, the Student Labor Action Project, and the Service Worker Solidarity Campaign, on targeted protest actions designed to raise awareness and pressure organizations to hold their subcontractors into account (see A4QS, 2006). Currently, the A4QS campaign is focusing on America’s top colleges and universities, such as Harvard, Swarthmore, Villanova, Miami (FL), and Georgetown, places where the SEIU represents thousands of low-wage workers (SEIU, 2005, October 26). Through public rallies letters to campus administrators, the union is urging college and university administrators to implement wage and benefit increases for campus service staff, and demand that the companies through which they subcontract service work do the same. These companies, such as the Cincinnati-based Cintas Corporation (work uniforms), Lackmann Culinary Services (cafeteria food), Allied Barton (private security), and Unnico (janitorial services) are variously accused by the SEIU of labor rights violations, including workplace discrimination, forced overtime, and health and safety lapses — in addition to low wages (see A4QS, 2006a; see also UniformJustice, 2006). The SEIU’s most recent campaign success came in June, 2006, when it successfully organized 450 poverty-wage workers who had been on strike for 9 weeks at the University of Miami. The campaign featured rallies attended by Senator John Edwards (D-NC), civil rights leader Charlie Steele, Jr., Teamsters President Jimmy Hoffa, and the Southern Christian Leadership Council, as well as a 17-day hunger-strike and fast involving UM janitors, students, and SEIU Vice-president Eliseo Medina, among others (see SEIU, 2006, May 2; June 15; UNI, 2006, April 4; April 4b). In sum, the SEIU’s domestic agenda centers on promoting the rights of its workers both at the workplace and in national politics. Beyond immigration reform, wages, and working conditions, the union is also a strong advocate of universal national healthcare and stronger protections for collective bargaining. In the following section, I explore the ways in which the union is using transnational partnerships to bolster these domestic initiatives.
111 5) The Transnational Arena: Raising Standards in the U.S. and Abroad At the SEIU’s national convention in 2004, President Andy Stern indicated the main priorities that would guide the union for the following four years. Among the usual priorities listed by Stern were “industry strength,” “political strength,” and “local strength” — and for the first time “global strength.” Recognizing the growth of multinational corporations in the union’s core industries, the SEIU created its Department of Global Organizing Partnerships to facilitate joint solidarity actions with unions representing workers employed by a common multinational corporation, such as Sodexho, Group 4 Securicor, FirstGroup, and Securitas, among others. Although the union is relatively new to transnational organizing and commits fewer resources than the USW, they have already initiated several promising transnational programs. In the main, these programs seek to raise standards and wages in the U.S. by linking the SEIU with partner unions based in the home country of a common multinational corporation. In this way, the SEIU hopes to leverage the bargaining power of foreign unions in their own negotiations with a common multinational employer. In pursuing its transnational partnerships, the SEIU works with a number of allies. The strongest relationships are with foreign unions themselves, particularly the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU) in the U.K. and the Swedish Transport Workers Union (STWU) in Sweden. As noted above, two of the SEIU’s largest multinational employers are based in the U.K. (FirstGroup) and Sweden (Securitas). Similar to the USW, the SEIU is also affiliated with two Global Union Federations: Union Network International (UNI) and Public Services International (PSI). To date, the union has worked almost exclusively through UNI, the global union for private service workers created in 2002 that currently represents over 15 million unionists from 900 trade unions across the globe (see UNI, 2006a). In short, UNI helps facilitate communications between members unions and helps monitor global framework agreements between unions and multinational employers. Less developed are the SEIU’s relationships with international NGO’s and grassroots community organizations.
112 Focus on Group 4 Securicor The SEIU’s largest current global campaign concerns the world’s leading private security provider, Group 4 Securicor, the U.K. based multinational which has operations in over 100 countries on 6 continents. Created in 2004 through UNI, the “G4S” campaign links unions and activists in countries where the MNC has been accused of anti-labor practices, such as the United States (SEIU), Indonesia (the Association of Indonesian Trade Unions, or ASPEK), Uganda (the Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union, or AGWTU), Great Britain (TGWU), as well as Kenya and India. 78 The G4S global campaign was created in response to a series of accusations that Group 4 Securicor and its subsidiaries regularly violated the ILO’s core labor standards. In Indonesia, for example, the ICFTU (2006) and US State Department (2006) reported that the company had harassed ASPEK officials and “unilaterally dismissed” 203 union workers for “unpleasant acts” against Group 4 — that is, a strike over wages and working conditions involving more than 600 workers at the company’s facilities in Jakarta and Surabaya. Moreover, G4S refused to comply with two court orders handed down by the Indonesian High Court for State Administrative Affairs and the Indonesian Supreme Court to reinstate the workers with up to six months’ salary (Ibid.; see also LabourStart, 2006; Focus, 2006; UNI, 2006, July 14). Elsewhere, the company has been accused of refusing to recognize and bargain with legitimately-elected unions (Uganda and Kenya), of flouting national regulations covering minimum wages and working conditions (Uganda), and of failing to pay government-mandated overtime (India) (see Focus, 2006a; 2006b; 2006c). The SEIU’s interest in Group 4 Securicor relates to its involvement with the company’s main US subsidiary, Wackenhut Corporation, which is the employer of roughly 50,000 SEIU members and country’s second largest private security provider behind Securitas Corporation (LHMU, 2003). The SEIU has charged the company with race and sex discrimination, inappropriate hiring and inadequate training of critical security personnel, unsafe working conditions, and other “unfair labor practices” (Focus, 2006d; see also Focus, 2006e). For example, the union alleges that the company has demoted, fired, or otherwise punished workers on account of their gender and race,
78 There is no partner union, although the campaign focuses on reported abuses in these countries.
113 allegations for which the US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought 12 discrimination lawsuits between 2004 and 2006 (Focus, 2006e: 7-8). The SEIU also claims that Wackenhut forces employees to work “excessive overtime,” such as 12-hour shifts for six and seven days straight at eight of the company’s nuclear reactor sites (Eye, 2006; see also Eye, 2002). Finally, the union maintains that Wackenhut is “putting our homeland security at risk” by hiring security workers with criminal records and failing to properly train officers according to US Department of Energy (DOE) guidelines (Eye, 2006a). Since the inception in 2004, the main thrust of the campaign has been to raise global awareness of Group 4 Securicor’s corporate practices with the aim of generating sufficient public pressure on the company to alter its behavior. Toward this end, the SEIU and its UNI partners have launched several websites. The largest, “Focus on Group 4 Securicor,” is hosted by the SEIU and provides press releases, newsletters, multimedia, letters of support (solidarity letters), and contact information regarding G4S labor disputes on a global level (see Focus, 2006g; UNI, 2006, June 19; June 22). Focusing heavily on G4S’s anti-labor record, this information targets group members specifically, but also devotes sections to G4S investors as well. A second site, “Eye on Wackenhut”, principally targets the US audience by providing detailed information on Wackenhut’s corporate practices at US Army Bases, Nuclear Facilities, and Homeland Security sites (see Eye, 2006). Rather than focusing on Wackenhut’s anti-labor record, however, this site targets the company’s homeland security profile (with the implication that the company is endangering US security interests). Complementing these sites, Union Network International (UNI) and LabourStart.org both link to press releases, solidarity statements, and related documents concerning the G4S campaign (see UNI Property Services, 2006; LabourStart, 2006). Although it is difficult to determine causation in these cases, the G4S union affiliates have scored several major successes. The most celebrated occurred in July, 2006 and involves the reinstatement with severance of roughly 500 Indonesian workers at two G4S sites after 15-month long strike. In that case, the G4S campaign pressured G4S Chief Executive Nick Buckles and Indonesia Director Chris Wright by sending over 1800 letters of protest and attending the company’s annual shareholder meeting with
114 representatives from the SEIU, ASPEK, AGWTU, as well as former US Congressmen David Bonior and the NGO American Rights at Work (see UNI, 2006, June 28; July 7). In the U.S., however, the SEIU reports that the campaign has not yet succeeded in pressuring Wackenhut to address its accusations of anti-unionism and discrimination, although it remains optimistic since the campaign still evolving. 79 Driving Up Standards/London Cleaners’ Campaigns As noted above, one of the SEIU’s strongest partnerships is with the U.K.-based Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU). The union is currently collaborating with the TGWU on two transatlantic campaigns, the largest of which is the “Driving up Standards” campaign. Launched in September, 2004 along with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), the largest transportation union in the US, the Driving up Standards campaign links the SEIU and the TGWU in a strategic alliance targeting National Express and FirstGroup, two British MNC’s operating in the transportation services industry in the UK and the US. In the United States, the companies operate under the names Durham Student Services and FirstStudent, respectively. In short, the campaign promotes joint solidarity actions between the three unions, such as protests at company facilities, letters of solidarity, and rank-and-file hosting. The DUS campaign was developed in response to allegations that FirstGroup and National Express, the world’s second and third largest transportation companies, employ union-busting tactics, pay substandard wages and benefits, and generally fail to provide quality services to their customers (SEIU, 2006f). In the United States, the main charges have centered on the company’s anti-unionism and wage/benefits packages for school bus-drivers. The SEIU and Teamsters’ maintain that both companies are “engaged in a race to the bottom” by lowering standards and “running aggressive anti-union campaigns at their US operations” (DUS, 2006; IBT, 2006, May 23; July 21; see also Maher, 2006). The SEIU, for example, alleges that the company has sent letters “denigrating unions and encouraging workers to refuse to sign a union card” during organizing drives and offers a healthcare plan that 95 percent of its workers claim is “unaffordable, or poor and in need of improvement” (Ibid.; see also Urquhart, 2005). The Teamsters’ mirror the SEIU’s
79 Interview with Director of Global Organizing Partnerships, Deborah Schneider, August, 18 2006; Interview with Program Director for the G4S campaign, Bill Ragen, September, 27 2006.
115 charges, contending that FirstStudent workers have been “deprived of wages, provided with inadequate health insurance and been horrified by the blatant safety violations that are ignored by the company” (IBT, 2006, June 1). In the United Kingdom, however, the main charges leveled against the companies have centered on the quality of transportation services and the “double standards” employed against their US workforces. On the one hand, TGWU General Secretary Tony Woodley explains, “Drivers and passengers alike are getting a raw deal...as the passenger transport industry becomes increasingly dominated by global giants who put big profits before customers every time” (TGWU, 2004). On the other hand, he suggests, “UK workers take their legal right to sick pay, maternity leave and holidays for granted, whilst US workers may have none of those protections without a union” (Ibid.). Ultimately, and where the interests of the three unions converge, is a joint concern that unless labor unions challenge the corporate practices of their multinational employers, corporations will become emboldened to “export” their practices elsewhere (DUS, 2006). As part of the DUS campaign, the three unions have engaged in several types of solidarity actions designed to pressure FirstGroup and National Express into addressing their purported abuses. First, the unions have created a website, DrivingUpStandards.org, which provides information about the objectives of the campaign, links to press releases and news stories concerning recent campaign activities, and offers statements of support for striking unionists (DUS, 2006; IBT, 2001). Second, and more concretely, the alliance has coordinated several protests in the UK. In both 2005 and 2006 the Teamsters and SEIU traveled to the UK to protest with the TGWU at FirstGroup’s Aberdeen, Scotland headquarters and the company’s regional offices in London (SEIU, 2006f). Both unions also joined the TGWU in addressing the company’s annual shareholder’s meeting and its board of directors about workers’ rights abuses, labor relations, and service quality in the US and the UK (IBT, 2006, July 21; DUS, 2006a; Urquhart, 2006; Northedge, 2006). 80 At the July, 2006 meeting, the TGWU submitted a resolution to shareholders suggesting that company endorse a human rights policy that ensures compliance with the ILO’s “core labor standards” in order to “minimize the risks poor labour relations could pose to
80 115 TGWU members are FirstGroup shareholders, and thus have the right to address the Annual General Meeting (AGM, or annual shareholder’s meeting) (see Manifest, 2006)
116 shareholder value” (Manifest, 2006). The resolution also demanded that FirstGroup avail itself to independent monitoring and verification of its human rights policy (Ibid.). Unfortunately for the unions, the FirstGroup shareholders overwhelmingly rejected the proposal (Bain, 2006; Urquhart, 2006). The SEIU is also coordinating with the TGWU on another, more limited campaign for janitor workers in the UK. The “Justice for Cleaners” Campaign was created by the TGWU in 2005 in order to organize roughly 3,000 janitors in London working for Metronet and Tube Lines, two of the city’s main subway operators, as well as others working in London’s financial district (TGWU, 2006; 2006, August 3). The TGWU is seeking collective bargaining rights and a “living wage” for the workers. The union argues that while these companies make millions in profits, they force their cleaners to work excessive hours, pay them a poverty wage, and refuse to offer paid holidays, sick leave, or pensions (TGWU, 2006). In response, the union has coordinated demonstrations and pickets between workers and union organizers at worksites and company offices around the city, most notably the Houses of Parliament (see TGWU, 2006; UNI, 2005; 2006, May 8) As T&G lead organizer Paul Davies explains, “the pickets are sending a clear message to the tube companies that cleaners expect them to act” (TGWU. 2006). The SEIU, for its part, is supporting the TGWU’s campaign with letters of support and rank-and-file visits, including several appearances at demonstrations by its President, Andy Stern (see 60 Minutes, CBS News, 2006). The Clean Start Campaign Outside of Europe, the SEIU has begun coordinating solidarity actions with unions in Australia and New Zealand. Most recently, the SEIU has teamed with Liquor, Hospitality, and Miscellaneous Union (LHMU) in Australia and the Service and Food Workers (SFWU) in New Zealand on the “Clean Start” Campaign. Launched on April 20, 2006 by the LHMU and SFWU and with the support of UNI and the UK’s TGWU, the “Clean Start” Campaign aims secure a collective bargaining rights and a “living wage” for low-waged, predominantly female immigrant workers in the industrial cleaning industry in 10 cities across Australia and New Zealand, many of whom work for the French multinational Serco-Sodexho (UNI, 2006, May 18). The SEIU, which has experience organizing workers in the industrial cleaning industry and also represents
117 workers at the Sodexho, joined the campaign to share its expertise and facilitate more regularized communication between service unions (see LHMU, 2006a) The Clean Start Campaign was created in response to the increasing multinationalization and “informalization” of the industrial cleaning industry in the US, Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. According to the campaign, over the past ten years workers in the industry have seen a precipitous decline in real wages as an increasing number of multinational employers compete against each other on the price of labor (UNI, 2006, March 12; 2006b; see also LabourStart, 2006a). In Australia, working conditions are particularly bad: the average annual income for cleaners is $14,360, almost $1,000 below poverty line and $42,000 less than the national average for full-time workers generally; between 60 and 70 percent of cleaning workers are employed on a part-time basis, often working three jobs with 2-4 hour shifts in order to reach 40 hours per week; and workers are often exposed to a range of occupational health and safety risks, such as chemical exposure, electrical hazards from faulty machinery, and heavy lifting (LHMU, 2006: 18-19). Workers in the U.K. and New Zealand labor under very similar conditions. In the United States, the lives of janitors and industrial cleaning workers vary little from their counterparts abroad. In this sense, the jobs are overwhelmingly staffed by immigrant labor, provide little or no benefits, and typically offer wages at or near the federal minimum wage. The industry likewise exhibits high rates of job turnover, with workers frequently working two or three jobs at a time to make a 40-hour week. As President Andy Stern explained in a solidarity letter to campaign members in Australia and New Zealand: “Many cleaners in the U.S. are immigrants. Many of you are immigrants. Cleaners in the U.S. take pride in their work. You take pride in your work. Many cleaners in the U.S. work for multinational companies. Many of you work for multinational cleaning companies. Many of the buildings U.S. janitors clean are owned by the rich and superrich. Many of the buildings you clean are owned by the same multinational property companies that own buildings in the U.S. The victory you’ll achieve will set the table for others here in the U.S. and around the world” (LHMU, 2006a).
118
Still less than six-months old at the time of this writing, the campaign is focusing on raising awareness of working conditions through nationwide protests in Australia and New Zealand, as well as letters of solidarity from unions affiliated with the campaign (see UNI, 2006, June 7). In the longer term, the campaign looking to develop pattern agreements with major employers for uniform wage and benefit packages for industry workers country-wide. In this respect, the SEIU is providing information about its much- publicized Justice for Janitors organizing campaigns, particularly its most recent campaign in Houston in which the union managed to persuade the city’s four largest contractors — ABM, OneSource, GCA, and Sanitors — to accept a citywide pattern agreement for Houston janitors (see SEIU, 2006r; 2005, November 20; see also Greenstone, 2006). Indeed, some of the SEIU’s tactics — broad community involvement, particularly among churches and local leaders, as well as aggressive public relations — are being employed in the campaign (see LHMU, 2006; 2006c; SFWU, 2006; UNI, 2006, April 19). Women’s Rights In recent years the SEIU has also taken an active stance in promoting women’s rights, specifically the ILO’s demand that workers enjoy the freedom from workplace discrimination on the basis of gender, race, or disability. The SEIU’s interest in promoting women’s right springs from several sources. First, women constitute 56% of the SEIU’s membership, or 1,008,000 members, many of whom work in the lowest-wage occupations and for multinational corporations with global reach. Second, as the union notes on its “Thinking—and Acting—Globally on Behalf of Women Workers” site, the top 20 occupations for women in the US are in lower-wage occupations, while roughly 70 percent of those living in poverty around the globe are women (SEIU, 2006g; see also UNIFEM, 2006). Pay inequity, sex and health discrimination, physical abuse, and unsafe working conditions are persistent features of working life for women. At the same time, however, women who are members of a union in the US earn roughly 34 percent more than women who are not, earning an average of almost $200 more per week, and also tend to enjoy greater workplace protections and benefits (SEIU, 2006g; see also BLS, 2004: 11).
119 Through the AFL-CIO’s Solidarity Center and the global union federation UNI, the SEIU has promoted solidarity projects themed around International Women’s Day, the international holiday highlighting women’s victories and ongoing struggles for justice and equality around the globe (see UNI, 2006, September 2; Solidarity Center, 2005; NWHP). Recent projects have included seminars on self-esteem, sexual harassment, and collective bargaining rights in Brazil and Ecuador, programs promoting entrepreneurship and micro-credit in India, and anti-discrimination rallies in Nepal, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States (Solidarity Center, 2005). In addition, the union is supporting the Chinese Working Women Network (CWWN), a Chinese NGO that focuses on “developing feminist awareness of workers’ empowerment” through training programs on labor law, occupational health and safety, and feminist rights (SEIU, 2006g; see also CWWN, 2006). As SEIU Secretary-Treasurer Anna Burger recently explained: “The vicious cycle of globalization, which pits one group of workers against another, can be stopped if we commit ourselves to bringing working women together to raise the floor for all” (SEIU, 2006g). Direct Solidarity Actions Finally, the SEIU occasionally contributes to solidarity campaigns spearheaded by other unions — campaigns that have little direct bearing on SEIU members but are of general interest to the union nevertheless. For example, in 2004 the union passed a resolution supporting “The Campaign to Stop Killer Coke,” a joint solidarity effort between the Steelworkers’ (USW) and International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) designed to promote workers’ rights in Colombia (see KillerCoke, 2006). In the resolution, the SEIU committed to supporting Colombian labor unions in several ways: 1) demand that the US government hold the Colombian government in account for military repression against union leaders; 2) provide humanitarian assistance to trade unions; and 3) honor a world-wide boycott of all Coca-Cola products (KillerCoke, 2006a). More recently, the union donated $25,000 to a strike fund for 300 members of the Cambodian Tourism and Service Workers Federation (CTSWF) who were protesting their dismissal from Phnom Penh’s five-star “Cambodiana Hotel” (Solidarity Center, 2006a; IUF, 2004). The strike fund was part of a larger global campaign coordinated through GUF International Union of Food, Agriculture, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers’
120 Associations (IUF). Finally, the SEIU coordinated with ASPEK on the Indonesian tsunami relief effort, and donated additional funds to the Solidarity Center’s relief fund for Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Thailand (Solidarity Center, 2006b; 2006c; 2006c).
6) Analysis As noted in the chapter on the Steelworkers’, the SEIU is a nationally-based organization that requires dues money to operate, and is thus principally concerned with the wages and working condition of its own members. At the same time, as I argued in Chapter 1, the nature and extent of exposure to economic globalization goes far in explaining variations of labor union transnationalism, and also may help explain some labor unions’ domestic priorities as well. In this sense, it is important to reiterate the SEIU has been moderately exposed to the forces of economic globalization. On the one hand, the SEIU has not experienced any significant trade-related job losses, making it very much unlike the USW. On the other hand, the SEIU has witnessed the steady growth of multinational corporations in some of its core industries, and thus resembles the USW in this respect. Ultimately, these two interactions have profoundly influenced the way in which the union pursues its growth agenda. At the domestic level, the absence of trade-related job losses has allowed the union to focus on issues not related to the “free-trade” debate, an issue that is generally associated with the U.S. labor movement. While the SEIU concurs with the USW (and other “fair trade” proponents) that trade agreements should include more robust protections for labor and environmental rights, the union stands to gain very little by engaging the government at this level since trade-in-goods only marginally affects the job prospects of service-sector workers. Yet job security does not necessarily translate into job prosperity, which helps explain why the SEIU is focusing its domestic agenda on number of “bread and butter” issues, such as a “living wage,” universal healthcare, and social security. Indeed, for many SEIU members, particularly those who working in the property services industry, wages and benefits are among the lowest among U.S. professions. Furthermore, the union’s emphasis on immigration reform and voting rights reflects changes in the composition of its membership after years of aggressive organizing campaigns in industries with high concentrations of women, minorities, and
121 immigrants — three constituencies traditionally ignored by most AFL-CIO unions into the 1980s. Whereas AFL-CIO President George Meany once extolled the virtues of the white, male trade unionist in 1960s and 1970s, John Sweeney and later Andrew Stern recognized an opportunity in moving beyond the status quo . Thus, progressive immigration reform and secure voting rights serves the SEIU’s goal of empowering its current (and prospective) membership. Untainted by the chauvinism of trade discourse, the SEIU has managed a limited but growing number of transnational partnerships. Yet while the union may be well- positioned to sincerely claim the mantle of “true” international labor solidarity, it is very strategic in the application of its goodwill. As SEIU Director of Global Organizing Partnerships recently explained, “pure solidarity” is not a sufficient motivator to bring disparate labor unions together for collective action; rather, collective action is principally facilitated by shared, cross-border experiences with global corporations. 81 In this way, the SEIU suggests that transnational campaigns work best when each participant has a vested, material interest in the partnership. Certainly, the union’s main transnational projects appear to evidence this belief. For example, the campaign against Group 4 Securicor, the European private security multinational that operates in the U.S. through Wackenhut Security, links the SEIU with the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU) in the U.K., as well as other trade unions with members employed through G4S and its subsidiaries. A similar dynamic exists with the Driving up Standards and Clean Start campaigns as well. Thus, the key difference between the SEIU and other unions experiencing multinationalization in its core industries is the scope and intensity with which it pursues transnational partnerships. Although both the USW and SEIU are each focusing their partnerships on unions that represent workers employed by a common MNC, the SEIU’s recent entry into the transnational fold reflects the union’s recent exposure to this facet of globalization. What is more, these partnerships are comparatively underdeveloped; GUF involvement is minimal, campaigns typically involve only a few unions, and few tangible successes have yet been achieved. The manufacturing unions, dogged by trade-related job
81 Interview with Debbie Schneider, August 18, 2006.
122 losses and decreased bargaining leverage with multinational corporations, enjoy one advantage in that they began cultivating global partnerships more than a decade ago. In the next case, however, a very different picture of transnational organizing will emerge. In the case of the AFT, a union that has experienced minimal exposure to the forces of economic globalization, its transnational campaigns are driven by a very different set of organizational objectives.
123 The American Federation of Teachers (AFT)
“The mission of the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, is to improve the lives of our members and their families, to give voice to their legitimate professional, economic and social aspirations, to strengthen the institutions in which we work, to improve the quality of the services we provide, to bring together all members to assist and support one another and to promote democracy, human rights and freedom in our union, in our nation and throughout the world.” —AFT mission statement
1) Introduction The American Federation of Teachers’ (AFT) is the second-largest professional union in the U.S., representing roughly 1.3 million active and retired members in public education, higher education, and public services. Unlike the USW and SEIU, the AFT has been relatively insulated from the pressures of economic globalization. As such, the union avoids many of the domestic policy fights of its labor counterparts, focusing instead on state and national education policy and retirement security. The AFT also pursues different types of transnational projects, trading global union networks for non- strategic campaigns that advance democracy in post-authoritarian states, raise awareness about HIV/AIDS in Africa, and promote the rights of children in developing economies (see AFT 2006ag). The remainder of this chapter will be divided into five parts. Part II briefly details the history of the AFT and organizing in the professional sector. Part III surveys the AFT’s key sectors, jobs picture, and exposure to globalization. Part IV explores the AFT’s main domestic priorities and levers through which it is addressing them. Part V surveys how the AFT’s transnational strategies complement these domestic initiatives, noting particularly the influence of ideology and professionalism on these projects. Finally, Part VI analyzes these developments with reference of the independent variables and hypotheses posited in Chapter 1.
124 2) A Brief History of the AFT The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) was founded on April 15, 1916 by handful of teacher-unionists from three small teachers’ associations in Chicago. From these modest beginnings, the AFT experienced considerable, albeit uneven growth in its first few decades. The union added 170 locals and roughly 10,000 members within its first four years, yet by the end of the 1920’s a series of setbacks — backlash from disgruntled school boards in many districts and a nationwide anti-socialist movement, highlighted by intimidation, loyalty-oaths, and “yellow dog” contracts — reduced the organization’s roles by half, to about 5,000. 82 The Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s further weakened organizing efforts. The AFT’s fortunes changed considerably following promulgation of the Wagner and Norris-LaGuardia Acts in 1932, and the union experienced a quick surge in membership, from 7,000 at the beginning of the decade to 32,000 by 1939. In the early 1940’s, however, unionization efforts were again undermined by a resurgence of anti-communism and employer backlash. In 1941, the charters of three locals were revoked on allegations of communist infiltration, resulting in the summary loss of roughly one-third of the AFT’s national membership, while the pall of McCarthyism discouraged new membership into the 1950’s. Nevertheless, in those first five decades the AFT’s legacy had become firmly established (AFT, 2006aj; Reuther, 2006c). As the union matured in the middle and late decades of the 20 th century, internal struggles increasingly came to dominate the union’s agenda. One of these issues was desegregation and civil rights, both of which the union had supported since its founding in 1916 when it became one of the few AFT unions to extend membership to African- American locals (AFT, 2006al). After WWII, the union became involved in the civil rights movement, filing an amicus brief in support of the plaintiff’s in the Supreme Court’s 1954 Brown v. Board of Education case. Within three years, the AFT desegregated its own ranks by expelling all unions that would not admit African- Americans. The union lost 7,000 members as a result. Nevertheless, these losses were
82 Yellow Dog contracts make employment contingent on employees’ pledge not to join a union during the term of their employment. These contracts were used, of course, to limit the influence of unions in the workplace. Yellow Dog contracts were outlawed in 1932 by the Norris-LaGuardia Act (see Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion of FDR’s pro-labor New Deal legislation).
125 offset during the 1960’s when the AFT organized thousands of desegregated Southern locals on the heels of its involvement with voter-registration drives and freedom schools in the South. Towards the end of the decade, the union collaborated with likeminded unions and civil rights organizations to secure passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, the Fair Housing Act, and the Voting Rights Act — three pillars of the 1960’s civil rights legislation. In the decades that followed, the AFT’s commitment to civil rights would also lead them to support the ANC in South Africa, as well as other issues affecting workers and unions in Africa generally (AFT, 2006aj; Reuther; AFT, 2006al). The period between 1960 and 1990 were good years for the AFT, in stark contrast to their private sector counterparts in the manufacturing sector. These decades were characterized by tremendous growth in both diversity and organizational clout, both of which were aided by President Kennedy’s decision to grant collective bargaining rights to public workers in 1961 (see Troy, 2000). 83 During these decades, union militancy peaked as the AFT successfully waged over 300 teachers’ strikes to win collective-bargaining rights, which swelled the union’s ranks from 60,000 in 1960 to 600,000 by the early 1990’s. Part of this expansion was the result of the AFT’s effort to organize workers outside of primary and secondary education. The union added 300,000 paraprofessionals and school-related workers after 1969, 70,000 healthcare workers after amendments to the National Labor Relations Act in 1974, and over 100,000 state and local government employees after 1985. In each case, the AFT formed a division to facilitate contract negotiations, public policy outreach, and member servicing specific to each industrial sector (AFT, 2006aj; Reuther, 2006c; AFT, 2006al). Nevertheless, through these decades primary education teachers remained the backbone of the organization, and the AFT predictably devoted considerable resources to issues affecting this core group — most notably, in the area of education reform. In 1983, the Department of Education-appointed National Commission on Excellence in Education (NCEE) published “A Nation at Risk”, a report highly critical of the public
83 Executive Order 10988, signed January 17 th , 1962, granted federal employees the right to freely join a union or any other employee organization. The Wagner Act included a provision excluding many public employees, and this order was considered critical to labor unions considering the growth of employment in this sector. Indeed, the AFT and SEIU seized this law for their subsequent growth agenda.
126 education system (and by implication, AFT members) (AFT, 2006ak). In response, then- president Albert Shanker embraced the report and urged the AFT to “take charge of their profession” by overseeing the development of a series of programs designed to reform public education (e.g., strengthening curriculum standards, increased funding for inner- city schools, smaller class sizes, a focus on civic education and democracy, and so forth) (Ibid.). In response, the AFT began its Education Research and Dissemination (ER&D) program to facilitate the implementation of research on pedagogy and curriculum development in the classroom (see AFT, 2006ae). In 1989, the AFT expanded ER&D through the Redesigning Schools to Raise Achievement (RSRA) project, an initiative designed to help states, school districts, and teachers improve student achievement through technical assistance and labor-management training, criteria for identifying low- performing schools, and information on pilot improvement programs that show promise (see AFT, 2006af). In the 1990’s, the organization developed additional projects to monitor programs and standards for disadvantaged children, English language learners (i.e., ESL), and early-childhood students (i.e., pre-kindergarten). Most recently, the AFT has helped its members interpret the requirements of the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, and regularly publishes reports detailing suggestions on reforms to the law (see below). The 1980’s and 1990’s also witnessed the expansion of the AFT’s transnational activism, as the union moved beyond the rhetoric of anti-communism into material development projects. 84 According to The AFT was a leading figure in a coalition of AFL-CIO unions assisting the Polish trade-union movement Solidarnosc (Solidarity) in challenging communist authorities in the mid-1980s. The union likewise provided assistance to teachers’ unions in Chile, which were instrumental in ousting Augusto Pinochet in 1988, and later lent support to the anti-Apartheid movement in South Africa, pressing for release of Nelson Mandela and monitoring the subsequent free elections in
84 The AFT has a long, albeit intermittent transnational history. The union was involved in PAFL in the 1920s before it became defunct. Later, under President Albert Shanker, the union became a forceful critic of communism, and lobbied vigorously for the release of anti-communist political prisoners in the Soviet/Eastern Europe bloc, South America, and East Asia. As the head of the AFL-CIO’s department of international affairs, Shanker personally lobbied for the ultimate release of Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky. Shanker See: http://www.shankerinstitute.org/AT/teacher3.html
127 1994. The union also developed ties with fledgling teachers’ unions in Eastern Europe (Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Ukraine) throughout this period. Through its Education International (ED/I) program, expanded considerably in the region after the fall of communism 1989 (and still operational today), the AFT funded teacher training workshops, curriculum development, democratic leadership training, and publications on democracy and education. These initial transnational projects, especially those in Eastern Europe and Africa, established the AFT as a leading U.S. union at the transnational level, and have led in recent years to more sophisticated transnational projects, most notably the AFT Africa/AIDS campaign and ED/I “train the teacher” programs (see below) (AFT, 2006aj). As the AFT approached the 21 st century, it continued to expand its education reform and transnational initiatives while broadening its membership to include adjunct and part-time college faculty, graduate students, psychologists, forensic scientists, and environmental engineers, and others in the public and private sectors. In the following section, I will detail the AFT’s current organizational, political, and economic profile, noting particularly the union’s relationship to key independent variables.
3) The AFT Today: Key Sectors, Job Trends, and Exposure to Globalization The American Federation of Teachers is a public-sector union that claims to represent 1.3 million active members and 170,000 retirees in the United States. Roughly 1.2 million AFT members work in the public sector, most notably K-12 education and state and local government, while the remaining 1 million members work in private sector industries, such as healthcare and post-secondary education. The union has more than 3,000 affiliates in 43 states, although the bulk of its membership works in urban areas and the Northeast, particularly New York and New Jersey. 85 Overall, the union has experienced steady growth in membership since 1960, and has been minimally exposed to the pressures of globalization. The AFT is a diverse union, with members in five different industrial divisions: teachers; paraprofessionals and school-related personnel (PSRP); local, state, and federal
85 The National Education Association, the largest teachers’ union in the U.S., operates in predominantly rural districts in the Midwest and West. Neither union has high membership in the South.
128 employees; higher education faculty and staff; and healthcare professionals (AFT, 2006am). 86 Teachers have traditionally constituted the vast majority of AFT members, although in recent decades the percentage of teachers has shrunk in proportion to other sectors as the union has diversified its ranks. The AFT’s Teachers’ Division concentrates on K-12 public education facilities and teachers. The AFT’s PSRP division, created in the early 1930’s, represents roughly 300,000 teaching “support” titles, such as custodians, bus drivers, and special education assistants. The AFT’s government-employees division primarily represents state and local government employees, such as social workers and corrections officers. More recently, the AFT has organized post-secondary personnel, such as adjunct/part-time faculty and tenured faculty and public and private institutions, and currently counts 150,000 among its ranks. Finally, the AFT represents roughly 70,000 healthcare personnel, such as RN’s, LPN’s, technicians, and therapists (see AFT, 2006am). 87 Since 1960, the AFT’s membership has grown by an average of 28,000 new workers per year, helping it become one of the 10 largest unions (public or private-sector) in the United States. 88 Moreover, the industries in which the AFT has experienced the greatest union growth over the past few decades are overwhelmingly “professional” and well-paid. 89 For example, the Education and Health Services sector, which includes K-12 educators and support personnel, college faculty, and private healthcare workers (i.e., three of the AFT’s four represented sectors), added over 14 million jobs between 1960 and 2006, corresponding to an average yearly national job-growth rate of 11.4 percent (BLS, 2006j; Appendix A, Graph 3). 9091 Over this same period, the Government sector
86 Data on teachers and local, state, and federal employees are scarce. Together, these two divisions represent 780,000 workers. 87 The AFT does not disaggregate membership data for teachers or government employees, due in large part to overlap between the professions (i.e., teachers are mostly public employees, but not all public employees are teachers). Together, there are roughly 680,000 members in these professions combined. In both cases, however, these jobs are largely insulated from the forces of globalization, and thus may be considered together for the purposes of this study. 88 This is based on a job value in 1960 of 60,000 and a value of 1.3 million in 2006. 89 For the purposes o f this study, the term “professional” denotes professions requiring a bachelor’s degree or higher. This may explain why the AFT’s motto is: “A Union of Professionals.” 90 BLS data was used to calculate the average job growth rate between January, 1960 and January, 2006. For reference, the 1960 job value was 2.849 million and the 2006 value was 17.428 million. 91 According to the May 2005 BLS employment survey, these jobs paid quite well: the average national salary for the country’s 1,469,900 elementary and secondary school-teachers was $47,040; the average national salary for the country’s 7,207,330 post-secondary teachers was $45,060; and the average national
129 (local, state, and federal), which includes administrators, social workers, and emergency personnel (the AFT’s fourth and final represented sector), added 13 million jobs and averaged a steady 3.5 percent job-growth rate per year (BLS, 2006l; Graph 4). 9293 In each of these cases, finally, the BLS projects that total employment will increase through 2014: education by 2.9%; healthcare by 2.7%; federal government by 0.2%; and state and local government by 1.1% (BLS, 2006n). Although uncommon among the U.S. labor movement as a whole, where union density has steadily dropped since 1973, the AFT’s experience is not uncommon in the public sector, where union density has vacillated between 24.3 and 40.2 percent since 1962, and has stabilized at roughly 36 percent since 1984 (LRA, 2006a). In the main, the AFT (much like its public-sector counterparts AFSCME, AGFA, and NEA) has thrived in recent decades by organizing workers in jobs that are difficult or impossible to move overseas, or that face little if any competition from overseas or private domestic providers. In other words, the AFT has maintained comparatively high union density by organizing professions that are insulated from the pressures of globalization (competition and job loss) and multinationalization, and also have growth potential. For the AFT, this translates into enhanced bargaining power since employers are unable to threaten plant closure and job relocation for union militancy, very much unlike the situation faced by the Steelworkers’. Nevertheless, the AFT continues to face numerous challenges through 2006. In the education sector, the AFT is fighting several interrelated public education reforms at the state and national level, most notably school vouchers, charter schools, and the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001. In short, the union considers these proposals vehicles through which social and economic conservatives are attempting to privatize public education, reduce the power of teachers’ unions, and erode the separation of church-and-state. In higher education, the AFT is resisting what it calls the “exploitation of part-time and adjunct faculty,” as colleges and universities deal with growing budget
salary for the country’s 2,368,070 healthcare workers (nurses, technicians, therapists, etc) was $56,750. See: http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics2_61.htm 92 BLS data was used to calculate the average job growth rate between January, 1960 and January, 2006. For reference, the 1960 job value was 8.313 million and the 2006 value was 21.724 million. 93 These jobs likewise pay well: wages in public administration occupations average $44,250, just slightly lower than education and health services. See: http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics2_92.htm
130 shortfalls by informalizing faculty employment. In the AFT’s local, state, and federal government division, the union is working to ensure that its members retain sufficient healthcare and pension benefits while governments consider alternative funding schemes, such as private healthcare accounts and defined-contribution (DC) pension plans. Finally, although the AFT enjoys structural advantages that help buoy its membership and density, it nevertheless deals with the union-busting tactics more commonly associated with its private-sector counterparts surveyed here. In dealing with these issues, the AFT has initiated a host of domestic and transnational strategies. At the domestic level, the union is particularly active in lobbying the federal government against NCLB, school vouchers, and the partial-privatization of retirement security, among others. Beyond elections, the AFT works to raise public awareness of issues in public education, government, and healthcare through media outreach (commercials and advertisements), protests and rallies, and policy research. Finally, at the transnational level the AFT is particularly active in the fight against HIV/Aids in Africa and in promoting “democratic” trade-unionism and child education abroad. In the following two sections, I will explore in greater detail the AFT’s main domestic and transnational initiatives. Of particular note is how both domestic and transnational strategies vary from the SEIU, and especially the USW, in that there is much less emphasis on trade-related issues and global networks and more on issues of professional concern, such as national education standards, child labor, HIV/AIDS, and advancing democracy abroad. In short, the absence of trade-related job losses and multinationalization in its core industries has allowed the union to look beyond the basic “bread and butter” issues of union survival. 94
94 I differentiate professional and personal concerns. Admittedly, it is often difficult to differentiate the two, but I use the term professional to indicate that these issues extend beyond “bread and butter” issues of jobs, wages, and workplace safety.
131 4) The Domestic Arena: Keeping the Public Sphere Public (and Unionized) What do they want? Mirroring their private and public sector counterparts, the AFT is principally interested in protecting the jobs and working conditions of their members. As noted above, however, since the union represents workers who are comparatively well-paid and protected from the vagaries of the global market, their priorities are quite different from counterparts. This point is evidenced most clearly in the AFT’s legislative action website, “Unionvoice.org”, which details the key public policy issues affecting the union. In the main, the AFT is largely concerned with issues related to the teaching profession, such as NCLB, IDEA, charter schools, and vouchers. On account of the union’s growing healthcare and government sector, the union has also taken an active interest in retirement security and workers’ rights. NCLB (No Child Left Behind) Considering the nature of the AFT’s membership — education professionals — it is little wonder that that union has taken an active interest in federal education programs, namely the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001.95 In this regard, the union has become a vocal critic of the law, asserting that the principles and goals of the law — high standards for all children, achievement benchmarks and testing, well-qualified teachers and paraprofessionals, and support for failing schools — cannot be met without fundamental changes to the law and the requisite funding for those changes (AFT, 2006m). The AFT’s criticisms of the NCLB Act center on four portions of the law: AYP, school improvement, staff quality, and funding. First and foremost, the union criticizes the current use of Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) formulas — the legal mechanism by which states measure academic progress — on the grounds that the formulas fail to measure actual progress (i.e., the formulas do not measure progress longitudinally ) and create a disproportionate emphasis on reading and math at the cost of physical education and the arts, among other concerns (see AFT, 2006n; Letsgetitright, 2006; see also AFT, 2006o). Second, the union maintains that the law is ultimately punitive, mandating school
95 Signed into law on January 8, 2002. For a summary and full text of the bill, see: http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/esea02/index.html . See also: http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/esea02/107-110.pdf
132 vouchers for schools that fail to meet AYP goals instead of targeting resources (i.e., intervention) toward those students and programs that need assistance (Letsgetitright, 2006). Third, the union argues that the law does not provide adequate funding and support to attract qualified teachers in failing school districts, notably those in inner-city and rural locales (Ibid; see also AFT, 2006p). Finally, the union maintains that Congress and the president have underfunded the program since its inception, failing to allocate billions of dollars authorized yearly that could go toward research and school investments (infrastructure, textbooks, teachers, etc) (AFT, 2006q; see also Letsgetitright, 2006). 96 In response, the AFT has embarked on a multi-pronged legislative action and public awareness campaign to reform the NCLB Act. In the former, the union is supporting two national legislative proposals: the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Improvement Act of 2004 (reintroduced in 2006), and the Keep Our Promise to America’s Children and Teachers (PACT) Act of 2004 (see AFT, 2005a). According to the AFT, the NCLB Improvement Act mandates increased funding for schools with students with disabilities and ESL, and provides renovation grants for schools districts that lose federal funds through the school choice provisions of the NCLB (AFT, 2004b; see also Young, 2006, NEA, 2004). 97 Similarly, the PACT ACT directs the federal government to spend the roughly $26 billion shortfall authorized by the NCLB Act and increase appropriations for the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), both of which would provide additional resources for special education programs (AFT, 2004b; see also GovTrack, 2005b). The AFT has likewise deployed a comprehensive public awareness campaign designed to generate support for a NCLB reform movement. Firstly, the union as launched “Let’s Get It Right” (Letsgetitright, 2006itright.org) and “Unionvoice.org”, a central website documenting basic information about the NCLB and the union’s proposals for reform, and a blog for public discussions about both, respectively (see Letsgetitright, 2006; Unionvoice, 2005). For more detailed information on the NCLB, as
96 For a summary of the AFT’s criticisms and suggestions for change, see: http://www.aft.org/topics/nclb/downloads/NCLBRecommend060606.pdf 97 Under the NCLB, schools that fail to meet AYP standards for two consecutive years are deemed “in need of improvement,” a designation that mandates school vouchers for parents of that school district which are partially paid by the school district. See Dept. of Education: http://www.ed.gov/admins/comm/choice/choice03/choiceoptions03.pdf
133 well as union resolutions, internal and external research on NCLB implementation, and legislative action alerts, the AFT maintains an information database on their public website, AFT.org (see AFT, 2006r). In addition, the AFT has produced radio and print ads highlighting the union’s criticism of AYP formulas (e.g., “AYP and other provisions of the No Child Left Behind law are seriously flawed”) and directs audiences to the AFT site for further information (AFT, 2006s). Finally, the union maintains a “legislative action center” encouraging members to send two petitions to their congressional representatives in support the PACT and NCLB Improvement Acts (see AFT, 2006t). Vouchers and Charter Schools Complementing the AFT’s position on No Child Left Behind, particularly the Act’s provision mandating vouchers and charter schools for districts that consistently fall behind AYP standards, the union has become an active opponent of federal and state legislation concerning school vouchers, and in some cases charter schools as well. In the main, the union concerned that both “reform movements” have been seized by conservatives who are using them to incrementally privatize education, and thus undermine the public education system — and, as some suggest, the collective bargaining rights of its members as well. In the case of school vouchers, the AFT’s position is unequivocal: “The AFT supports parents’ right to send their children to private or religious schools but opposes the use of public funds to do so” (AFT, 2006u). According to the union, school voucher programs of every stripe — from private school vouchers, low-income vouchers, and tuition tax credits and deductions to charitable tuition tax credits and education savings accounts — divert public funds from publicly-accountable educational systems to private, and in many cases religious schools accountable “only to their boards and clients” (Ibid..; see also AFT, 2006w). Making matters worse, the union contends, when controlling for socioeconomic status, race, and disability public schools students typically outperform their private school counterparts — a conclusion based on research conducted by the AFT-supported public education journal, Phi Beta Kappan (see NCSPE.org, 2004; AFT, 2006v). Finally, the AFT maintains that voucher programs are “constitutionally suspect”
134 because redirect public funds into the coffers of religious institutions (AFT, 2006w). 98 Alternatively, the AFT suggests that schools should use voucher funds for, among other things, research-based instructional programs, professional development, reduced class size, and underfunded special education programs (see AFT, 2000). 99 The AFT’s concerns over vouchers are mirrored in the debate over charter schools as well. Interestingly, though, the AFT has traditionally been one of the strongest proponents of charter schools, but has recently articulated serious misgivings about them. In 1988, AFT President Albert Shanker proposed charter schools as a means for public school systems to test particular innovations in education. In short, Shanker supported a program in which public districts would create a charter school for a period of several years, regularly monitoring progress towards the goals specified in the initial charter, and ultimately incorporating any successes derived from the experiment. In this way, charter schools would be the created by and accountable to local districts and parents. Implemented properly, the AFT maintained, charter schools would increase parental choice, encourage innovation, and increase student achievement (AFT, 2006x). That was 1988. Since then, the AFT maintains, state and national legislation pushed by conservative policymakers has created charters schools of “a very different kind” (Ibid.). Operating in 37 states and accommodating over 500,000 students, charter schools today have transformed the “original notion of teachers as innovators…into a rhetoric of reform by choice and competition — with improved student achievement taking a back seat to parental and student satisfaction”, the AFT asserts (Ibid..). Citing evidence from the progressive Economic Policy Institute and the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), the AFT has become troubled by the lack of innovation, effectiveness, and community oversight in an increasing number of for-profit “cookie cutter” charter schools (AFT, 2000; AFT, 2005; U.S. Department of Education, 2003). What is more, in most charter schools the percentage of socio-economically disadvantaged students is lower than regular public schools, yet average performance and
98 For the leading arguments in support of school vouchers, see: http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-269.html ; http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cb_20.htm ; http://www.schoolchoices.org/roo/vouchers.htm . 99 Although it is beyond the scope of this study, the AFT provides a voluminous literature on public school improvement. The union has launched the Redesigning Schools to Raise Achievement (RSRA) initiative, a program designed to provide districts with tools to determine how to best identify and remediate low- performing schools. For further information, see: http://www.aft.org/topics/school- improvement/components.htm
135 student achievement is “no higher” than that of public schools (AFT, 2005). Finally, and perhaps more importantly for the AFT, charter schools have lower unionization rates than public schools: 18 states allow collective bargaining between unions and employers in most cases; nine states outlaw collective bargaining outright; and six states allow teachers to retain union membership if they move to charter status (AFT, 2000). Until these trends are addressed, the AFT affirms its “principled opposition” to the continued expansion of such initiatives (Ibid.). Social Security/Retirement Finally, and in a similar vein to its private sector counterparts USW and SEIU, the AFT has recently become involved in the national debate over retirement security, namely social security and pensions. In the main, the union actively opposes state and national proposals to further privatize social security, and is no more supportive of the trend to replace defined-benefit pension plans (DB) with defined-contribution (DC) plans. Regarding social security, an issue that has displaced by other concerns (at least temporarily) as mid-term elections near, AFT President Edward J. McElroy nevertheless declares President Bush’s proposal to create private investment accounts “the most significant fight of the beginning of the 21 st century” (Kuehn, 2005). For McElroy and the AFT, this fight entails a “clear choice” between a government that “stands for individuals” and a government that “shifts the risk of financing retirement to the backs of its citizens” (Ibid.). In supporting the former position, the AFT challenges several arguments advanced by proponents of private accounts. First, the union asserts that social security is “not headed for disaster” (as the president suggests), but in rather good health: although payouts will exceed collections by 2018, the U.S. Treasury will still be able to pay full benefits through 2042 and 73 percent of committed benefits through 2075 (AFT, 2006y). 100 Second, the AFT predicts that privatizing social security will be “unnecessarily destabilizing”, adding greater uncertainty of the stock market, reducing benefits by 40 percent, and adding at least $2 trillion to the current federal budget deficit (Kuehn, 2005; AFT, 2006y; AFT, 2005, February 2). Less “draconian” measures might
100 Social security conclusions are derived from data produced by several economic policy institutes, notably the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities; The Century Foundation; General Accounting Office; Economic Policy Institute; Center for Retirement Research; and Boston College.
136 include, in the AFT’s view, collecting social security taxes on income exceeding $90,000 (the current cap) or allowing the Social Security Administration to invest a portion FICA taxes into higher-risk stocks (Kuehn, 2005). The AFT is likewise concerned about a series of proposals at the state level to replace DB pension plans with “risky” DC plans, a move that would affect roughly half of the AFT’s public-sector membership, or roughly 600,000 workers (AFT, 2006z). DB plans require employers (in this case, state and local governments) to pay retirement benefits based on an employee’s length of service and final average salary; by contrast, DC plans require employers to contribute to individual investment accounts at a set rate during the period of employment (see AFT, 2006aa; AFT, 2006ab; see also AARP, 2006). Although the AFT admits several benefits of switching to DC plans — namely, shorter “vesting periods” and easier transferability of pensions to a new job — it is concerned that the complete replacement of DB with DC plans will, on balance, cost state and local governments more in the short-term, provide less-secure retirement benefits, and erode the quality of the pubic workforce (AFT, 2006ac). Specifically, the union suggests that state and local governments will not be able to attract quality workers without the “proven” incentive of defined benefits (AFT, 2006ad). At the same time, the AFT doubts that workers will manage their investments better than the professional investors currently managing state and local pensions (AFT, 2006ac). Ultimately, the AFT’s dim predictions are centered on the belief that privatization will add uncertainty and risk to retirement planning, both of which will end up benefiting portfolio managers at the expense of workers generally. In both cases, the chief vehicles through which the AFT is seeking to influence the debate is through rank-and-file education and direct political action. First, the union devotes two sections of its website to social security and pensions, including analysis, statements, links to outside sources, and “expert testimonials” consistent with the organization’s official position (see AFT, 2006z) Additionally, the site directs visitors to several “political action” alerts, in which members can sign letters to their representatives in support of the AFT line (see Unionvoice, 2005; Unionvoice, 2005a). In order to ensure that its members’ voices are heard, the union is also a prolific campaign contributor. The AFT has donated over $22 million to federal campaigns since 1990 (99% to Democrats),
137 or roughly $2.07 per member per election cycle (Center for Responsive Politics, 2006b). Since 1998, notably, the union has increased these numbers by fifty percent, giving over 10 million ($3.05 per member) combined in the 2000, 2002, and 2004 campaigns, and currently ranks third in spending among all unions for the 2006 cycle (Ibid.). In each case, the AFT has outspent the USW and SEIU in the amount that it gives per member (both spend roughly $1.5 per member).
5) The Transnational Arena: Making the World Safe for (U.S.) Democracy The American Federation of Teachers’ (AFT) involvement at the transnational level differs considerably from their private sector, globalized counterparts the USW and SEIU. In this sense, the AFT’s is not affiliated with any global councils or networks, does not actively pursue global framework agreements, and rarely sends workers to protest corporate offices. Instead, the AFT’s global work centers on issues of professional concern for its members, but that are not necessarily critical for the preservation of jobs — the AFT’s commitment to public health in Africa and the rights of child laborers, for example, is at best tangentially related to the immediate economic interest of AFT members. The union also active in promoting “free and independent” trade unions abroad, both as a standalone issue and as part of a larger project to buttress democratization efforts in formerly communist and authoritarian states (see AFT, 2006a). More recently, the AFT has initiated a multi-year project to fight against HIV/AIDS — a disease that it claims “poses as great a threat to the security and stability of the world as did previous threats, such as fascism and communism” (AFT, 2006; AFT, 2006a). Finally, the union has become active in highlighting abuses of child laborers and trade unions generally through the ILO and other projects. In pursuing its transnational initiatives, the AFT has partnered with the AFL- CIO’s American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS, or Solidarity Center), as well as the two global union federations to which it is affiliated: Education International (EI), and Public Services International (PSI). The former, EI, is the world’s largest global union federation and the largest global organization of educators, representing 29 million teachers and education workers in 166 countries (see EI, 2006). Established in 2002, EI focuses on securing “quality public education” for students,
138 securing the “industrial rights” of teachers and education personnel, promoting social justice and non-discrimination, and developing “solidarity and cooperation” among union affiliates (Ibid.). The latter, PSI, is the world’s largest global union of public sector workers, representing over 20 million workers in 600 national unions in 160 countries (see PSI, 2006). Also established in 2002, PSI concentrates on the development of water, energy, and health services to underdeveloped countries, while promoting gender equality, worker rights, and trade union “capacity building, equity, and diversity” (Ibid.). Where appropriate, the AFT also works with the ILO, the ICFTU, and allied NGO’s and community groups, such as Civitas International, the National Democratic Institute, and local teachers’ organizations (see AFT, 2006b). In the following section, I will explore the AFT’s main transnational initiatives in greater detail, noting particularly the purpose, scope, and strategic interest (if any) of these projects for the union and its members. The Africa AIDS Campaign The AFT-Africa AIDS Campaign was created in 2001 as a multi-year, multi- country project that works in collaboration with participating African teachers’ unions to develop and implement education, prevention, and healthcare programs for teachers and their families affected by HIV/AIDS (AFT, 2006c). The campaign hopes to “break the silence” surrounding HIV/AIDS by providing technical assistance and funding to teachers’ unions in Africa that are working to identify the “cultural, professional, and behavioral changes that are required to halt the spread of HIV” and to develop training materials and effective peer-education and awareness programs to do so (Ibid.). A project of the AFT’s Educational Foundation (AFTEF), the union’s non-profit arm created in 1985 to promote improvements in education in the U.S. and abroad, the Africa AIDS campaign works in collaboration with Education International (EI), and is funded by AFT, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Better World Campaign, as well as donations from AFT local unions (AFT, 2006). The AFT’s interest in developing the Africa HIV/AIDS Campaign stems its own 20-year involvement with local AFT affiliates on workplace awareness and prevention programs in the U.S., experiences that helped the union identify prevention programs and
139 behavioral changes that could successfully curtail infection rates. Every constituency of the AFT, the union maintains, “has direct experience with workplace HIV/AIDS education that can be of help to our counterparts in Africa” (Ibid.). In South Africa, for example, the disease kills roughly 1,000 teachers a year and has left almost 500,000 children. “In talking with our colleagues in Africa, we realized the best thing we can do to help teachers and education is to find ways to counter AIDS among teachers. We see AIDS as an education crisis” (David Dorn, cited in Blair, 2001). Similarly, AFT President Edward J. McElroy asserted that “the spread of HIV/AIDS is not an African problem, or an American problem. It is a challenge to the entire human race” (Zapata, 2005). Since its inception in 2001, the AFT has launched three major programs through its AIDS Campaign. The campaign began with 19-month pilot program in Zimbabwe, in which the AFT developed the “train the teachers” program in collaboration with the Zimbabwe Teachers Association (ZIMTA), the national union to which all of the country’s 53,000 teachers belong (see AFT, 2006d; AFT, 2006; Blair, 2001). With a $135,000 grant from the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs and roughly $100,000 donated by AFT affiliates through a U.S. fundraising effort, the AFT created eight regional “train the teacher” workshops designed to provide teachers with the skills and information so that they can serve as peer-educators at professional teacher education workshops at the local level. Complementing these workshops, the AFT has helped pay for specialized HIV/AIDS curriculum-development “tool kits” for school-based teacher study circles. These study circles, the union contends, help teachers “speak frankly” about HIV/AIDS and thus “break the silence” surrounding the disease. To date, the program has involved over 5,000 teachers in the union. In addition, the AFT procures development grants from the CDC, one of which was recently used to publish a special HIV/AIDS edition of ZIMTA’s quarterly union magazine (see AFT, 2006d). Based on the success of the Zimbabwe pilot program, the AFT has expanded its AIDS campaign to other African states, most notably Kenya (2002) and South Africa (2005) (AFT, 2006e). In Kenya, the union is working with the Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT) on developing peer-education and counseling services, and has trained
140 roughly 100 “master teachers” in 14 national districts through 2006 (The Nation, 2005; East African Standard, 2003). 101 In South Africa, where thousands of teachers die yearly from AIDS-related complications and 12.7 percent of educators are HIV-positive the AFT is working with the four leading South African teachers’ unions — the South African Democratic Teachers’ Union, the National Professional Teachers’ Union of South Africa, the National Teachers’ Union, and the South African Teachers’ Union — on a two-year pilot program that focuses on eliminating the stigma associated with official misinformation about the disease, 102 as well as peer education and counseling programs that highlight the importance of HIV testing, STD prevention, and healthy living (AFT, 2006d; see also Zapata, 2005; BuaNews, 2006). With a $1.9 million grant from PEPFAR, the project is enlisting the help of 7,500 union school representatives to conduct AIDS training workshops in the three provinces with the highest incidence of infection: Kwa-Zulu Natal, Mpumalanga, and Eastern Cape (AFT, 2006d). In addition, PEPFAR has allocated an extra $1.7 million for anti-retroviral treatment for teachers with HIV/AIDS to be administered by private doctors associated with the South Africa Medical Association, 2,300 teachers with HIV/AIDS (Zapata, 2005). As the AFT’s vice- president Marilyn Stewart declared, “if the epidemic is to be curbed, we have to make sure that people get the information and life skills needed to protect themselves” (Ibid..). Complementing the AFT’s projects in sub-Saharan Africa, the union maintains several programs in the United States designed to raise the profile of HIV/AIDS among local AFT affiliates and rank-and-file members. For example, the union has launched a fundraising campaign involving 75 locals that has raised more than $175,000 for the AIDS project. 103 The union also provides members a web-based resource guide that includes AIDS statistics, national speeches and congressional testimony, “think tank” reports, and PowerPoint presentations for use in U.S. classrooms (see AFT, 2006f). Education for Democracy/International (ED/I)
101 Kenya is divided into 40 districts. 102 President Thabo Mbeki argued in 2003 that “personally, I don’t know anybody who has died of AIDS.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3143850.stm . This statement was widely interpreted as an official denial that AIDS was serious public health threat. President Mbeki has since moderated his position, noting on the ANC’s website that AIDS is “one of the greatest challenges our society has faced.” See: http://www.anc.org.za/ ; http://www.anc.org.za/elections/2004/briefings/hiv-aids.html 103 Interview with Gregory King, AFT Director of Special Projects (AFT/AIDS Campaign) for President Edward McElroy, September 28, 2006.
141 The AFT is also active in promoting US-style democracy through civic education programs in “emerging” democracies. The union’s interest in promoting democracy through educational emerged in the mid-1980’s with the creation of the “Education for Democracy” project, a national (US) initiative based on the idea that “the health of any democracy depends on its young people being aware of the value of free institutions” (AFT, 2006h). In 1987 the AFT drafted a statement of principles entitled “Education for Democracy” and provided model curricula and teaching materials so that AFT teachers and schools in the U.S. could “purposefully impart to their students the learning necessary for an informed, reasoned allegiance to the ideas of a free society” and provided model curricula and teaching materials (Ibid.). After the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989, the AFT extended the ED program through its “Education for Democracy/International (ED/I) project, which is still in operation today. According to the union, the impetus for creating the an international education arm was a series of requests for assistance from teachers’ unions in Eastern Europe after 1989, particularly the teachers’ union within Solidarnosc (Solidarity) in Poland, as well as requests from other developing states emerging from authoritarian rule in the 1990s. David Dorn, the AFT’s Director of International Affairs, reiterated that the union’s activities in this regard are always requested, never imposed. 104 In any event, the purpose of the ED/I project is to provide teachers unions and schools in democratizing states assistance in promoting civic education, generally. With assistance from the AFL-CIO’s Solidarity Center and the Education International, the union provides teacher training and curriculum development seminars that stress leadership skills and democratic processes, and publications on democracy and education. In addition, the AFT’s ED/I project works closely with Civitas International, a leading global NGO that promotes civic education and “aims to strengthen effective education for informed and responsible citizenship in new and established democracies around the world” (see Civitas, 2006). Civitas specializes in hosting international conferences promoting teacher training workshops and provides multi-lingual lesson plans, “provocative lectures” on civic education and civil society, and articles about conference
104 Interview with David Dorn, October 1, 2006. (I will provide an exact quote when I transcribe the interview).
142 discussions (see Civitas, 2006a). To date, the AFT has participated in three of seven Civitas conferences: Civitas@Prague, Civitas Panamericano, and Civitas@Africa. To date, the AFT has participated in projects with teachers and schools in 26 countries. 105 In Nicaragua, for example, the AFT is currently working collaboration with the Nicaraguan Ministry of Education, with funding from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the two key funding sources of the AFL-CIO’s transnational work. Similar to the union’s work on HIV/AIDS in Africa, the Nicaraguan program employs the “train the teacher” model, in which “master educators” are provided leadership training, revamped educational curricula and materials, and strategic “tool kits” for use at local level seminars. To date, 20 master teachers have been trained though the program, who are now “successfully conducting” in-service training programs on “education for democracy” to their social studies counterparts at the local level (AFT, 2006h). The AFT’s most recent education project involves the former Yugoslavia, particularly Kosovo, Albania, and Macedonia. Citing the need to promote union development and democratization in a region with persistent ethnic conflict and stagnating economies, the AFL is working with AFL-CIO’s Solidarity Center, Education International, regional governments, and independent teachers’ unions on a series of projects centering on inter-ethnic cooperation, democracy education, leadership development, and strategic planning (see Solidarity Center, 2006). Teachers and teachers’ unions, the AFT maintains, have an important role to play in building the future through their work in the classroom through labor solidarity (AFT, 2006i). Since 1999, EI has been operating a multi-ethnic school involving roughly 20 teachers and 300 students outside the Kosavar capital of Pristina (EI, 2005). Following EI’s lead, AFT President Edward McElroy led a U.S. delegation to Pristina in April 2005, in which leaders from the two leading teachers’ unions in the region — the ethnic Albanian Independent Union of Teachers, Science, and Cultural Workers (SBASHK) and the Serbian Teachers’ Union (SOK) — met for an informal “unity dinner” designed to “facilitate inter-ethnic
105 These include: Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Burma, Croatia, Czech Republic, Eritrea, Hungary, Ethiopia, Hong Kong, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Lithuania, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
143 cooperation” (AFT, 2006i; see also EI, 2005). The delegation also met with Kosavar President Ibrahim Rugova (who passed in 2006), urging his government to respect the rights of “democratic unions” by upholding the 2004 collective bargaining agreement with SBASHK and SOK (Solidairty1). In Macedonia, furthermore, the delegation met with leaders of the Education Union of Science and Cultural Workers (SONK) to discuss inter-ethnic cooperation and democratic reforms within national unions (Solidarity Center1). Bi-lateral Solidarity Programs In addition to the AFT’s AIDS and democracy promotion transnational work, the union is also involved in a number of bi-lateral projects with teachers’ unions abroad. These projects may complement the union’s larger thematic projects, as in the case of their work with healthcare workers’ unions and HIV/AIDS, or they may stand alone as individualized solidarity actions. Over the past two years, the AFT’s has become involved in a host union-to-union projects around the globe, notably Africa (Botswana and South Africa), Burma, Cambodia, China, Colombia, and Georgia (AFT, 2006g). In Africa, the AFT is seeking ways to bolster its AIDS education programs already underway in Zimbabwe, Kenya, and South Africa. In Botswana, where life expectancy averages 39 years and one-third of the population suffers from HIV/AIDS, the AFT has been working with the Nurses’ Association of Botswana (NAB) to build an independent nurses’ union. The AFT sent two representatives from its Healthcare Division to conduct a workshop on union organizing, in which the NAB’s executive council and local leaders were presented with information on how to become a legally- recognized collective bargaining union for their members. In addition, the AFT discussed HIV/AIDS and the possibility of funding through the AFT-AIDS program for orphans of the disease. Similarly in South Africa, the AFT’s Healthcare delegation met with nurses’ unions to discuss funding through the AFT-AIDS program. In Burma, the AFT has been working to strengthen the exiled Kawthoolei Education Workers Union (KEWU), a union of roughly 2000 teachers exiled to Thailand in 1998 by the Burmese military (SPDC) in an ethnic conflict that has displaced over 2 million ethnic Karen, Karenni, Mon, and Shan (AFT, 2006g; see also CIA Factbook, 2006). Since 1998, the AFT has provided training and monetary assistance to KEWU and
144 other emerging workers’ unions representing teachers, healthcare, and agricultural workers in Thai refugee camps and Burmese villages. Using monies from the AFT’s Solidarity Fund and the AFL-CIO’s Solidarity Center, the AFT conducts training seminars in Thailand that focus on organizing, democracy, trade union and human rights, and leadership (Ibid.). From here, the union reports, KEWU trainers travel “through the jungle, in the mountains, and by boat” to villages in Burma to teach lessons on organizing and human rights (Ibid.). In Cambodia, where prominent trade union leaders Chea Vichea and Ros Sovannareth were recently assassinated (by the ruling Cambodian People’s Party, according to the AFT), and where Rong Chun, the president of the Cambodian Independent Teachers’ Association (CITA) has been targeted for reprisals by the CPP, the AFT has been working to strengthen teacher’s unions and highlight trade union rights in the country. Most notably, the AFT hosted two leaders of CITA for a three-week exchange with AFT members in the U.S. During the three week tour, the union reports, CITA members observed an AFT organizing campaign, participated in a state AFT training program, and visited the AFT’s national headquarters in Washington DC, as well as two locals, in which they spoke about Cambodian labor issues and the current crisis surrounding trade union rights. In China, the AFT has been funding the China Labour Bulletin (CLB), a Hong Kong-based labor rights organization created in 1994 by prominent Chinese labor rights activist Han Dongfang (China Labour Bulletin, 2006). Among other projects, the organization broadcasts a bi-weekly radio program to “hundreds of thousands of listeners” on mainland China through Radio Free Asia (AFT, 2006i). In addition, the CLB publishes various reports detailing workers’ rights abuses and labor standards in the PRC (a prominent target is Wal-Mart), imprisoned workers and trade union leaders, and health and safety in the workplace (see CLB). The CLB also maintains a legal office, using it to raise international awareness about workers’ rights, assist lawyers with labor rights’ cases, and provide a “meeting space” for workers from different industries to meet and share experiences from their workplaces.
145 In Colombia, where union density hovers at 6 percent and trade unionists regularly face intimidation, imprisonment, and in some cases assassination, 106 the AFT is working with the Solidarity Center and a teachers’ union Federacion Colombiana de Educadores (FECODE) on a campaign to provide support and mutual understanding between U.S. and Colombian human and labor rights, and raise awareness about U.S. policy toward Colombia and its human rights record in the U.S.. Among recent projects, the AFT participated in a fact-finding trip and training workshop in Bogotá (the capital) and hosted six FECODE unionists for a three-month training and solidarity visit in the United States. Finally, in Ukraine and Georgia, the AFT has recently assisted the development of independent teachers’ unions through training seminars and leadership workshops. In Ukraine, an AFT delegation led by AFT vice-president Kathleen Donahue met with leaders of the Free Trade Union of Education and Science of Ukraine (VPONU), a union active in the 2004 “Orange Revolution”, to discuss trade union developments in the country (Donahue, 2006). In Georgia, furthermore, the AFT has committed funding to the Free Trade Union of Teachers of Georgia-Solidaroba (FTUTG), a union active in the 2003 “Rose Revolution”, to conduct 15 “democratic union leadership” training programs in a dozen cities throughout the country, most notably the capital, Tbilisi (AFT, 2006i). Resolutions In a similar vein to the other unions surveyed here, the AFT regularly passes executive resolutions supporting or condemning events around the world that impact human and trade union rights, education systems, and/or the welfare of children generally. Since 2000, the union has passed 21 resolutions on a wide range of issues, from trade union rights in China and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to U.S. policy in Iraq and human rights for women in Afghanistan, to name a few. In 2006, for example, the union passed resolutions supporting trade union rights in China, Fair Trade agriculture,
106 According to the U.S. State Department and the International Labor Organization, Colombia has a “deplorable record for union activism” and should stop the “intolerable situation of impunity…that contributed to the climate of violence affecting all sectors of the society and the destruction of the trade union movement.” The ILO noted the murders of 34 trade union activists in 2005 and 2004, and the murders of an additional 26 teachers affiliated with trade unions. See U.S. State Department 2005 Human Rights Report, Section 6(a): http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61721.htm
146 striking teachers’ unions in Mexico, and condemning genocide in Darfur, Sudan, and U.S. policy in Iraq (see AFT, 2006k). The AFT’s most recent resolution concerns trade union and human rights in China. The AFT has teamed with the AFL-CIO in condemning the CCP (and by extension, the complicity of the All China Confederation of Trade Unions, the lone government-financed trade union) for its “violation of fundamental human rights,” including its “continued use of kangaroo trials, jailing, torture, the death penalty, and labor ‘reeducation’ camps to repress Chinese citizens,” notably independent political and democratic labor activists (AFT, 2006j). For the AFT and the AFL-CIO, the repression of workers’ rights in China has produced an “unfair cost disadvantage” for American companies, which has led to a massive U.S. trade deficit and the loss of roughly 727,000 jobs since 2001. Repression has also had a “detrimental impact” on Chinese workers as well, the union states. Therefore, the AFT has resolved to continue monitoring human rights abuses, press for the U.S. government to consider human rights when creating trade and investment agreements, and to provide “moral and material assistance when possible” to Chinese organizations working to promote human and trade union rights in China (such as the China Labour Bulletin) (AFT, 2006j). Over the past six years, however, no issue has garnered more attention in the AFT’s resolutions on the “War on Terror” and the “War in Iraq”, which together account for roughly one-third of recent resolutions (6 of 21). The union is particularly critical of current U.S. policy regarding both. In 2001, just shortly after 9/11, the AFT passed a resolution supporting “the use of a side range of powers at the country’s disposal to eradicate” terrorism and the President’s “resolve…to hunt down those responsible for the horror of 9/11”, yet by 2003 the union had become openly critical of the administration’s “deeply partisan” domestic agenda and general failure to “make a compelling and coherent” case for preemptive war in Iraq (AFT, 2001; AFT, 2003). Although the AFT warned that unilateral action and a failure to adequately fund the reconstruction effort would not be preferable, it nevertheless declared its intention to fully support a new Iraqi government firmly rooted in the rule of law, economic rehabilitation, free and open education, tolerance for religious and ethnic diversity, and the right of freedom of association for labor unions, irrespective of initial provocation (AFT, 2003). In 2004, the
147 AFT reinforced its earlier concerns with two resolutions, one deriding the administration’s treatment of prisoner-detainees at Abu Ghraib prison, and another asserting a series of “political missteps and strategic mistakes” in the war, such as “misleading” the American public about the case for war and failing to “win the peace” with a robust reconstruction plan (AFT, 2004; AFT, 2004a). The union finally pulled its support for the war in a 2006 resolution demanding the withdrawal of all troops from Iraq in a “rapid and timely manner” (AFT, 2006l).
6) Analysis The AFT is unique in this study because it has been minimally exposed to the forces of economic globalization. Assuming that the AFT behaves in a manner consistent with other financially constrained entities, we should expect the union’s domestic and transnational initiatives to target the areas of greatest organizational need. In the case of labor unions generally, this translates into actions that seek to protect or improve the jobs and working conditions of its dues-paying members. Unlike the USW and SEIU, however, the AFT does not suffer the effects (good and bad) of import competition, FDI outflows, or multinationalization in its core industries. Instead, the AFT enjoys a host of structural advantages over its counterparts — insulated jobs, comparatively high wages, public employers, and politically efficacious membership — all of which give it considerable leverage in negotiations with employers and in national policy debates. Indeed, these advantages are evident at both the domestic and transnational level. In the domestic arena, the AFT has been able to overlook many of the issues championed by the USW and SEIU, such as trade protection, an increased federal minimum wage, immigration reform, voting rights, and universal national healthcare. Of course, as is the case with most unions the AFT professes support for its “brothers and sisters” struggling with these issues, but lacking a vested interest themselves this support is limited to the rhetorical; few AFT dollars are actually spent on them. As a union that chiefly represents well-paid educators and teaching support staff, the AFT is instead waging its fiercest policy fights over issues of professional concern to its members, namely state and federal education policy. In this respect, the AFT is particularly critical of No Child Left Behind, charter schools, and school vouchers because each “reform”
148 movement has undermined the quality and prestige of the public education system (in their view). Of course, the union is also concerned that the privatization of public education will reduce its ability to retain members, but it downplays this consideration because it has couched its position in terms of child welfare (not member welfare). 107 The AFT’s relative advantages are perhaps even more evident at the transnational level. Indeed, there is a striking difference between the nature of the AFT’s transnational campaigns vis-à-vis the USW and SEIU, both of whom focus mainly on promoting the ILO’s core labor standards and developing links between unions representing workers employed by a common multinational corporation. The AFT, in the absence of exposure to both trade-related competition and multinationalization in its core industries, lacks the material incentive to coordinate global campaigns along these lines. This should come as no surprise. Instead, and much like its domestic agenda the AFT’s transnationalism centers on issues of professional concern to its members, such as HIV/AIDS awareness, preventing the exploitation of children by employers and governments, and promoting the rights of teachers to form unions abroad. For example, the union’s longstanding Education for Democracy/International program, which assists teachers’ unions in post-authoritarian states develop lesson plans that stress the importance of democracy and civic participation, was developed out of the AFT’s own domestic-level democracy program, Education for Democracy. Similarly, the AFT’s HIV/AIDS program was inspired by domestic programs first implemented in U.S. schools by union members. Differences also emerge with respect to the scope and priority of the AFT’s transnational programs. In the main, the union’s global partnerships are almost exclusively nonreciprocal , in that the AFT provides assistance to foreign unions but rarely solicits it for its own domestic policy fights. Any benefits received from global partnerships are diffuse and tangential, suggests David Dorn, Director of International Affairs for the AFT. 108 Lacking the strategic incentives enjoyed by USW and SEIU
107 In fact, opponents of the AFT regularly criticize the union on these grounds, arguing that the union actually cares more about union jobs that the quality of public education per se . 108 Interview with David Dorn, September 28 , 2006. Dorn suggests that strengthening trade unions abroad helps the U.S. labor movement generally because it undercuts the pretext to bust unions in the U.S. In this vein, Dorn suggests that union-busting in the U.S. accelerated only after employers and the Reagan
149 members, it is little surprise that “few AFT members actually understand” or get personally involved in transnational campaigns, Dorn explains. At the same time, the lack of strategic incentives also explains why transnational partnerships are such a low priority for the AFT as compared to the USW and SEIU. According to one source in the Department of International Affairs, most programs actually require sizeable USAID and NED grants because the union devotes less than 1% of its annual budget to transnational projects. 109 To be sure, neither the USW nor SEIU appear to have such funding shortages for transnational programs.
administration witnessed it being done in Europe. He admits, however, that this is a weak incentive for AFT members to commit time and money to transnational organizing. 109 It should be noted, though, that USAID and NED grants are not tailored to the transnational work of the USW or SEIU. But the general point is well-taken, namely that such funding shortages do not appear to afflict the IA departments of the USW or SEIU.
150 Chapter 6: Interviews and Hypotheses
In order to more succinctly assess the differences between the three cases surveyed in chapters 3, 4, and 5, it may be helpful to how each interacts with the main explanatory hypotheses posited in chapter 1. Toward this end, this chapter will consider each hypothesis against the key findings from the case studies and interviews of labor union leaders.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Import competition, FDI, and job losses — full exposure to economic globalization — will inspire transnational projects designed firstly to protect jobs and wages of union members. Conversely, the absence of exposure to economic globalization will result in transnational projects that do not seek protect members’ jobs and wages Evidence from the case studies strongly supports this hypothesis. Indeed, for the United Steelworkers’ of America (USW) and Service Employees International Union (SEIU), the rhetoric used to justify the main transnational projects suggests as much. For example, when asked to name two reasons why the SEIU is organizing globally, Debbie Schneider (SEIU Director of IA) insisted that there was actually only one: Really trying to figure out how we raise standards in industries where our members work, is our job at the union. And what we have learned is that as globalization permeates the service sector and its just no longer a manufacturing phenomenon, and that in order to really figure out how to raise standards for workers around the county we need to figure out how to raise standards for workers all around the world. Because the companies work very smoothly across borders and the unions are very national. And we’ve got to figure out how to deal with these companies locally so that we can raise standards everywhere. So, that’s our job. And I don’t know if there is a second one. In a similar, yet decidedly more veiled manner former USW president George Becker explained that, creating global networks and demonstrating world solidarity is the best way to combat the international race to the bottom on wages in this industry or
151 other .110 References to the “race to the bottom” are a recurring theme in the USW’s press releases, a phenomenon it argues is fueled by corporations that search out the cheapest labor and fewest standards in order to produce their goods. As we know, these finished products are often bound for the U.S. market. In this process, workers abroad are exploited, while workers here find themselves unable to compete on this anything-but- level playing field. 111 By contrast, the AFT, lacking exposure to multinationalization and trade-related job competition, has pursued a set of transnational initiatives that have very little with domestic jobs protection. This difference is most clearly evidenced in statements by David Dorn (AFT Director of IA) and Greg King (Director of HIV/AIDS Campaign). According to David Dorn, “ At the broadest level, the key objective of the American Federation of Teachers working in international affairs is democracy. There was always a sense of, and has been very closely linked to democracy, is free trade unionism. The idea of democracy is important because it’s without democracy you can’t have free trade unionism, and its initial human rights and trade union rights and stuff like that and we’ve reiterated that and made a point of mentioning that and there’s a mission statement of the AFT.” This helps explains why Education for Democracy/International, a program that seeks to bolster trade-union rights in post-authoritarian states, is the AFT’s most important transnational initiative. Yet there remains the question of why the AFT would pursue transnational projects at all , considering that the literature emphasizes globalization as a key determinant of labor transnationalism. When pressed on this point, Dorn added an additional set of reasons, the most compelling of which is that political developments abroad are used to justify labor union repression in the United States. Dorn explains: Why public service? We don’t have a multinational employer. And there were kind of three basic reasons for the whole influence, or at least we would present it this way, one is economic set of a reason for getting involved in international affairs which has just grown with globalization. The second reason is one, that’s just purely a belief in workers
110 George Becker made this point at the opening discussions of the ICEM Goodyear global union network. See: http://www.icem.org/?id=109&doc=757 111 This quote was taken from the USW’s recent statement in support of the “Decent Working Conditions and Fair Competition Act” (S. 3485 and H.R. 5635), which would impose a ban on the import of sweatshop goods into the U.S. See: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/3103.php
152 deserve to be supported in the same way that if you give money to some workers that are going to strike across town, the labor movement just kind of had the idea that you should give money to workers on strike in Italy or in various places around the world or causes, earthquakes, natural disasters…And the third issue is politics, especially the concept that what happens overseas most likely is sooner or later going to happen here and what happens to labor here politically is sooner or later going to happen overseas. And I can give one example if we go back to Ronald Reagan when Ronald Reagan fired all of the air traffic controllers, remember that?...It was one example of how the political realm here had affected other places…It went along with this idea that especially if you don’t have trade union rights in a public service area, if they don’t have any organized rights for public service employees in Europe that affects how people look at it here. Gregory King reiterated Dorn’s point, noting that, “ I think our members understand that the success of a member here in the United States isn’t dependent just on what happens in their community, it also depends on what happens in their state, and in the country at large, and in the world at large. Labor has always understood that you need allies and that you need to look beyond the closest border to understand what is happening. And certainly in education we are well aware of it; changes and challenges that we face here in the United States are being replicated all over the world 112 and it makes sense to have working partnerships with unions all over the world so that we can support their work. Interestingly, the AFT and SEIU have different positions on generalized solidarity actions — that is, the idea that unions should support all unions abroad in the spirit of international labor solidarity. While David Dorn emphasized “ a belief in workers (abroad) deserve to be supported in the same way that if you give money to some workers that are going to strike across town,” Debbie Schneider was decidedly more strategic, noting that “ We just don’t want to go to conferences to schmooze and network and even just get information. We really see these global entities (MNC’s and GUF’s) as opportunities to work together. To create a global labor movement, and that’s got to go beyond communication, information exchange, and solidarity. That is just not strong
112 See interview with David Dorn for further discussion on how education is increasingly becoming privatized in the United States and abroad. David Dorn considers this a strong link between U.S. unions and their counterparts abroad.
153 enough for what our members are encountering. In this sense, although general solidarity actions are important — to be sure, the SEIU regularly passes resolutions and sends statements of solidarity — such projects are minimized because they are not related to the overarching goal of raising wages and standards in the U.S. The AFT does not share this handicap. In addition, the SEIU does not have discretionary funds for generalized solidarity projects; its transnational projects are funded by union dues. In contrast, most of the AFT’s funds for international affairs come from NED or USAID, two organizations that have an interest in funding general solidarity projects. 113 Taken together, a survey of the cases strongly supports the link between globalization and transnational initiatives that are designed to protect domestic jobs and wages. In other words, where exposure to globalization is high, such initiatives are principally justified in terms of protecting and promoting members’ jobs and/or wages. This justification is lacking, or at least tangential to transnationalism in insulated unions.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Multinationalization in a union’s core industries will inspire transnational strategies that seek to link unions representing members in a common multinational corporation (MNC). As a corollary, where there is significant import competition in a union’s core industries, transnational responses will be skewed toward areas where jobs tend to migrate or where import competition originates. Evidence from the cases generally supports both parts of this hypothesis. With respect to multinationalization, there are considerable differences between the main transnational strategies employed by the USW and SEIU, two unions with significant multinational penetration in core industries, and the AFT, a union with no exposure to multinationalization. In short, the exposed unions have responded to multinationalization with cross-border projects that link unions around a common multinational employer while simultaneously pressing for the incorporation of the ILO’s core labor standards into the corporate agreements, while the AFT eschews both in favor of non-reciprocal solidarity programs.
113 Funding also helps explain why the Solidarity Center promotes general solidarity projects, such as HIV/AIDS, women’s rights, Tsunami relief, and sex trafficking.
154 For the USW and SEIU, the main purpose of organizing along multinational lines is to generate bargaining leverage for organizing and collective bargaining at the domestic level. The SEIU has three major transnational campaigns—Group 4 Securicor, Driving up Standards, and Clean Start — each of which As Bill Ragen, Director of the SEIU’s G4S Campaign recently explained about cross-border organizing around a MNC: I think that it provides the opportunity for the strength of numbers. In the case of Group 4 (Securicor), they have 400,000 employees around the world and if you really want to move the company in a serious way you need to engage it in several countries, otherwise you are just playing on a very small part of the field. So, it provides an opportunity to bring enough people together to get the company to mend its ways. At the same time, he continues: our employers are increasingly global companies, (and) we need to be able to operate globally to be effective. And not just acts of solidarity; someone from another country asks us for help on a specific issue regarding a strike, and we do what we can but that’s fine, but it doesn’t really go very far; it tends to be reactive. What we need is a common agenda with unions that represent service workers all around the world. Our employers certainly have a common global agenda. Debbie Schneider reiterated Ragen’s comments, noting specifically how MNC organizing can benefit US workers: And to say that it is in our interest, the US workers’ interest, for the Indonesian’s to win against this company, and we have all mutual interests in helping take these companies on, for them just to respect the basic worker rights. If you can get there, then you can then figure out how to raise standards. And I say that we have the advantage in the Service Sector that, because you asked the question earlier about protectionism, (job loss), and so on, is that we don’t have to feel like if the wages go that we, that we have an interest in the wages going up or down anywhere else because we are competing directly with our brothers and sisters in other countries. Because you can’t really offshore security, or cleaning, or the lunch lady. And so, I think that we have an interest in all the boats coming up at once, and in getting the rights to be real, and getting the big global players…if you can get the multinationals to figure out how to raise standards, it could bring the whole thing up. The USW has also formed a number of global councils and strategic partnerships with unions whose members are employed by a common multinational corporation. The
155 global councils and networks, for example, link unions around the global that represent chemical workers at Sappi, rubber workers at Bridgestone/Firestone and Goodyear, mining workers at Rio Tinto, oil and gas workers at ExxonMobil, and aluminum workers at Alcoa, respectively. The USW’s strategic partnerships operate in the same way, linking unions that represent workers at Grupo Mexico, Gamma Holdings, and Gerdau Ameristeel. As one high-level USW official bluntly explained, “ If bankers, governments and transnationals have cross-border alliances, workers and their unions urgently need to do the same, especially since globalization should benefit workers first, not just the elite. USW District 12 Director Terry Bonds, who coordinates the Rio Tinto and Alcoa global councils explained further: the Global Councils combat the “race to the bottom” by providing “a system that enables us to strategically use our collective knowledge about all the inhumane, anti-worker and environmentally devastating actions (MNC’s) are taking across the globe. We will become the whistleblowers of the world, and the companies will be forced to deal with the consequences” There remains an important difference between the USW and SEIU, however, which relates to the corollary hypothesis. Unlike the SEIU and AFT, the USW has experienced considerable trade-related job loss and FDI outflows in its core industries. 114 Further to the arguments posited in Chapter 1 and 3 that suggest that financial constraints force labor unions to be very selective in the “application” of their solidarity, it is not coincidental that the USW’s transnational projects invariably target the main sources or import competition, most notably China and Mexico. Beyond the global union councils and networks of which it is a part, this union’s interest in promoting the ILO’s core labor standards is, in practice , limited to workers and unions from the major trading partners of the United States. 115 At the policy level, the union has supported several “301” petitions with the USTR demanding that the U.S. government sanction China for violating workers’ rights, which according to the union, artificially reduces labor costs, causing an illegitimate increase in exports to the United States and the rest of the world,
114 Interview with Debbie Schneider: Has the union experienced in any of the sectors — health care, public services, or property services — any significant job loss or import competition? Not significant. We’re a union of public employees, healthcare workers, and property service workers. I would say of those areas the only one that has had any of that might be in hospitals, in our medical records or diagnostic work that can be digitized. But I would say that those are really small numbers. 115 This is not to suggest that the union does not care about workers in other states. Rather, Chinese and Mexican workers are “first among equals.”
156 thereby displacing jobs in the U.S. and other countries. In effect, the suppression of labor costs acts as an illegal export subsidy .116 The USW is also urging the U.S. government to incorporate (and make binding) the ILO’s core labor standards in any future trade agreements. As noted previously, the purpose of incorporating these standards is to reduce the likelihood for jobs to leave the U.S. while making imports of steel products more expensive. In addition, it is worth considering the counterfactual cases offered by those sectors in the SEIU that have not experienced significant multinationalization: healthcare and public services. 117 In both cases, the SEIU has not initiated significant transnational projects even though the union faces a number of organizational challenges in these sectors (see Chapter 4). Indeed, although the union is a member of two global union federations (UNI and PSI), it clearly prefers to coordinate its transnational projects through UNI (the union for service workers). When asked why the union appears to favor one GUF over the other, Debbie Schneider implied that the absence of common multinational employers in PSI (which links public sector unions) makes collective action particularly difficult: We have had the longest, deepest relationship with UNI, from when John Sweeney was still president of SEIU, long way back. And it is because of the three industries of SEIU, property services is the most globalized. And we have the most connections with unions in other countries around employers. And so it’s just natural. And so it’s not that we like them better particularly, it's just because that is the division in our union that was earliest and deepest impacted by globalization. … I would say that we haven’t figured out how to put a growth program together globally with PSI because we don’t share employers in the same way (that is what I was going to ask). You know, I wouldn’t say it’s PSI’s fault, it’s just we haven’t found a natural thing that puts a growth agenda in public sector, you know these outsource public services is one angle on that, and we are hoping to do some work in the America’s around PSI around that, but we haven’t found the route with PSI.
116 Quoted in the USTR petition, see: http://www.aflcio.org/issues/jobseconomy/globaleconomy/upload/china_qa.pdf 117 All three major USW sectors have experienced multinationalization, although its smaller and insulated industries (healthcare and public services) exhibit the same pattern of indifference toward transnational organizing.
157 In sum, from the cases surveyed here there exists a strong correlation between multinationalization and transnational organizing that centers on unions that share experiences with major multinational corporations. At the same time, import competition and FDI outflows in core industries is strongly correlated with solidarity actions that target workers and unions in the largest trading partners of the U.S.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Import competition and foreign direct investment (FDI) are positively correlated with “protectionist” trade policy advocacy on the part of labor unions. This hypothesis that is only important insofar as the (chauvinist) protectionism of some U.S. labor unions is generalized to the U.S. labor movement as a whole. 118 Indeed, evidence from the cases is wholly consistent with this hypothesis, which underscores the need to revise the conventional wisdom regarding labor unions and the “free trade” debate. The SEIU, for example, forcefully advocates for the expansion of citizenship rights for immigrant laborers while actively recruiting them into the union’s ranks. At the same time, both the SEIU and AFT avoid listing “free trade” as a major public policy issue or mention it during my recent interviews with them. The USW, by contrast, is perhaps the most vocal labor critic of neoliberalism and actively lobbies for various forms of tariff and non-tariff industry protection (as discussed in Chapter 3). The union’s recent decision to award Lou Dobbs its “Courage in Journalism” award for “encouraging the public debate about fair trade, job losses, responsible immigration policy, and outsourcing” symbolically evidences this point. 119
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Both forms of globalization are positively correlated with labor union transnationalism. In contrast, the absence of exposure to economic globalization, labor unions will place a low priority on transnational solidarity projects vis-à-vis unions with exposure to economic globalization. Evidence from the cases does not definitively confirm this hypothesis — although it does not refute it either. This difficulty stems from the absence of comparable data that
118 This not the case within labor circles, but I believe that it is the prevailing sentiment among academia generally (not to mention the general public). 119 See: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/2023.php
158 speak to a union’s relative interest in transnational organizing. The most important statistic — spending per member on transnational projects — was readily provided by the AFT (1 percent) but withheld by the USW and SEIU. The SEIU offered a proxy measure — the number of people working for the IA director — and noted that 14 people worked in this capacity, although these numbers are not readily available for the AFT and USW. 120 Barring that availability of precise and comparable data, I propose an alternative proxy measure to assess the priority that labor unions place on transnational organizing: rank-and-file involvement in transnational campaigns . In the main, since all three labor unions are “democratic” unions (in the sense that local affiliates roughly control the national agenda of the union), the union should only pursue transnational initiatives when its members genuinely want them, and thus the level of rank-and-file involvement in transnational campaigns would, by definition, indicate the importance that they place on such initiatives. In other words, if a transnational organizing is truly important to a union, its members will participate in such activities and the union will commit resources commensurate with member interest (because the union is its members). 121 As such, we should expect the highest levels of rank-and-file involvement in the most exposed unions, because it is in these unions that transnational organizing becomes critically important for jobs and wages. In short, this is indeed what we find with the unions surveyed here. The difference between the SEIU and AFT is particularly striking. For the SEIU, rank-and-file involvement (rallies, protests, fundraisers, and hosting) in transnational campaigns is a ready feature at both the domestic and transnational level. In response to a question about the SEIU’s emphasis on member participation, Debbie Schneider underscored its importance: Sure, for any of these campaigns to work, you have to have your members doing it. So our bus campaign is led by a committee that is called ITOC (international transportation organizing committee) and it has rank-and-file members who work for FirstStudent in the UK and rank-and-file workers who work for FirstStudent in the US, and they are the core and, you know it’s expensive to do. Securitas would never have happened if there weren’t workers exchanging with
120 I am awaiting responses from both unions on this question. 121 Granted, this assumes that labor unions are internally democratic, which is not entirely clear.
159 eachother. So I think that like any domestic campaign, if it’s not based on your membership it’s not going to work, because when you talk about what’s genuine, I can talk till I’m blue in the face but I’m not the one who is experiencing these things, so I think it’s absolutely necessary and we are in better shape than we were 20 years ago on that because of email, webcasts, and there’s ways to get those exchanges to happen that we worked pretty hard on besides flying people around. Its’ getting hard to fly people around to the UK . Later in the interview, Ms. Schneider reiterate the union’s position, making a special note of how SEIU members “totally get” the need to organize globally: I remember at the time thinking that members would think that this (the new global organizing department) is just about “hotshotting” around and globe, labor tourism, and this and that, but they totally get it. These are members who work in low wage jobs, the only reason they pay us their hard earned money is for us to think big about how to protect their work and raise their standards. And they totally get this. They work for these corporations that are so big and so out there that that is what they pay their 20 or 30 dollars a month for us to worry about. In the case of the AFT, however, rank-and-file involvement is relatively non- existent, with the most notable instance of member participation being the HIV/AIDS fundraiser that netted $10 contributions from roughly 15% of the union’s membership. Most interestingly, David Dorn plainly admitted that AFT members were largely unaware of international affairs. In response to a question asking whether teachers understood the connection between international affairs and their local workplace, Dorn simply stated: No, maybe we don’t do enough education on that… So part of the problem is that we don’t have enough info, the thing is we try to do something in the United States, we have you know 1.2 million members of that 60% are teachers and we sometimes put an article in the paper, but it’s the nature of reporting in the US…They read about it in the paper, but you don’t get as much general publicity about things here. We try to make are members aware that we do international work, you know especially on AIDS Africa we try to do a campaign for two reasons. One is so they understand what it is we’re doing, it’s a feel-good thing to know that we’re helping some other people. And the other thing we do is we raise money for members to help out with the campaign.
160 Chapter 7: Conclusion Scholars of labor unions and globalization have long questioned whether the U.S. labor movement in particular, as well as the global labor movement generally, is capable of enduring into the 21 st century as the national bases of union strength are being transformed by the forces of globalization. The literature is replete with examples of manufacturing unions in industrialized state coping with rising import competition and job losses that have resulted from deepening integration of global trade and financial markets since the early 1970’s. A far smaller literature, however, has documented how other economic sectors are experiencing these global pressures, and what unions in these sectors are doing about it. Thus, at the broadest level this dissertation seeks to better understand how different types of labor unions are adjusting to the pressures of economic globalization. More immediately, this dissertation seeks to assess the argument suggesting a correspondence between the globalization of capital and governance and the globalization of workers and national labor movements. In this sense, some argue, a global labor movement is the natural consequence of globalization in capital and governance because the incentives for organizing shift from the national to the international level. Indeed, evidence of global organizing in those industries where globalization has had the deepest impact and where new institutions of governance have emerged (i.e., the global union federations) highlights some of these “emancipatory possibilities,” in the words of James Mittleman. What is more, even where labor unions have little direct interest in organizing globally, there is evidence that the globalization of culture and information provides new opportunities to assist those beyond national borders. Toward this end, this dissertation employs a comparative design that assesses three different types of labor unions: The USW, a manufacturing union that has been exposed to significant globalization in recent decades; the SEIU, a service workers’ union that has been exposed to moderate globalization in recent years; and the AFT, a professional union that has not been exposed to the pressures of economic globalization. Several considerations guide this selection: First, few studies explicitly tested whether the economic globalization was actually the driving force behind the new wave of labor transnationalism, or how different aspects of globalization may influence these
161 transnational strategies. Since previous studies typically assessed differences between like-sector unions from different states (notably textile, garment, automobile, and other manufacturing unions), scholars could not generalized past this labor segment to other prominent economic sectors of the labor movement, such as services, technology, professional, and the public sector. Second, this particular configuration of U.S. unions — each is a U.S. union with membership over 1 million members, and each is a member of at least two global union federations — allows one to control for a host of independent variables identified in the literature as significantly influential for the prospects for labor union transnationalism. These include: political system, union size and density, union finances, domestic and transnational political allies, and access to international institutions. Taken together, this design is structured in a way that allows one to test the independent effects of economic globalization on labor union transnational responses. Controlling for these relevant independent variables, this study assesses four explanatory hypotheses through the case studies in chapters 3, 4, and 5, as well as the interviews with directors and program coordinators of global organizing projects. In the main, these cases confirm that economic globalization is significant predictor of labor union transnationalism. In the case of both the USW and SEIU, evidence from the interviews and main campaigns suggests that labor officials focused their greatest organizational resources developing cross-border alliances in those industries most affected by the pressures of economic globalization. The global union councils, transnational workers’ rights campaigns, and strategic partnerships of both unions invariably target those industries that have significant presence of multinational corporations. Moreover, there were frequent references to “the race to the bottom,” “global outsourcing,” “multinational corporations,” and “core labor standards” in discussions with labor leaders in these unions, which underscored the centrality of globalization as a driving force for these projects. At the same time, however, the case of the AFT (as well as those insulated sectors of the SEIU) demonstrates clearly that globalization is not a necessary condition for labor union transnationalism either. The AFT’s projects were non-reciprocal and focused very little on the day-to-day, “bread and butter” concerns of its members. The HIV/AIDS campaign and Education for Democracy/International programs, while generous
162 expressions of cross-border solidarity in their own right, are virtually unrelated to members’ core workplace interests at the local level. In other words, these programs will not help AFT members win contract disputes. As a result, the AFT exhibits very low levels of rank-and-file participation in transnational projects vis-à-vis the SEIU and USW, both of which have made it a priority to involve members in every project. So, if economic globalization is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for labor union transnationalism, what do we make of the overwhelming evidence that suggests otherwise? For starters, evidence from this study certainly points to economic globalization as a strong driver of labor transnationalism, but economic globalization is not substitute for historical/institutional analysis — an analytic panacea — which underscores the primacy of state institutions in mediating the strategic policy choices of U.S. labor unions. In other words, employing the economic globalization hypothesis alone (and without reference to history or domestic institutions) presumes one of two conditions, both of which are analytically suspect: 1) that labor transnationalism is an end in and of itself, and not necessarily a means to achieve self-interested, domestically- oriented ends (i.e., higher wages for members); or 2) that the firm and/or domestic political system fail to provide policy levers through which organizational demands can be met without resorting to transnational organizing. Both assumptions, I argue, are demonstrably suspect on account of evidence from the cases surveyed here, particularly the USW, which had been exposed to import competition — one of three key components of economic globalization — for two decades before it finally began initiating serious transnational initiatives in the late 1990’s. What explains their delay? Per Schattschneider and Logue (see Chapter 1), both of whom argue that interest groups “expand the scope of conflict” successively from the firm to the national to the international level only when they have “lost” at the first level, the USW initially dealt with import competition through direct negotiations with their employers and the state. In the former, the union worked closely with U.S. Steel and Bethlehem Steel (and other lower-tier employers) in the 1980’s and 1990’s on a series of concessionary contracts designed to ensure the long-term survival of the U.S. steel, in which the union “traded” concessions for a greater stake in industry decisionmaking (see Bruno, 2005). In the latter, the union successfully pressed the federal government for a
163 series tariff and non-tariff measures — voluntary export restraints (VER’s), countervailing duties, and safeguard tariffs — designed to insulate the U.S. steel industry from foreign competition. 122 It was only in the late 1990s that the USW seriously considered transnational organizing, when a confluence of forces — NAFTA, the Asian financial crisis, the penetration of major foreign MNC’s (Gerdau in 1999 and Mittal Steel in 2003), and the WTO’s decision against President Bush’s 2002 steel tariff — called into question the utility of firm- or state-based remedies while simultaneously opening more direct avenues (e.g., a common multinational employer) for worker-to-worker cross- national solidarity. The timing of the USW’s recent alliance with unions representing workers employed by Gerdau Ameristeel, to take one example, can thus not be fully understood without reference to these historical and institutional dynamics. In the same way, the SEIU’s comparatively swift efforts to organize transnationally can also be explained through a historical/institutional lens. In short, the SEIU wasted little time organizing globally when faced with multinationalization in its core industries precisely because such strategies were a firm-level response. For the SEIU, the local is the global by virtue of the fact that some of the union’s main employers are based outside of the United States; efforts to address organizational problems (at the firm-level first) necessarily implicate a multinational owner, and by extension the foreign union(s) that represent workers in that MNC’s “home” country. In 1999, for example, less than a year after the Swedish property-services MNC Securitas purchased U.S.-based Pinkerton/Burns, the SEIU developed a partnership with Swedish Transport Workers Union (STWU) in order to address the company’s purported workers’ rights violations. The SEIU’s more recent campaigns, such as DUS and CleanStart, follow a similar pattern. At the same time, and perhaps of equal interest, I argue that the SEIU has failed to “globalize’ their most highly-publicized domestic campaign — Uniform Justice, a campaign to organize Cintas workers — precisely because there are fewer structural incentives for cross-border union collaboration in the case of Cintas, a U.S. company with limited multinational links. 123
122 It is hard to overstate the success of these initiatives. Over the past three decades, more than half of all U.S. tariffs and non-tariff trade actions have involved the steel products. 123 Cintas operates in the U.S. and Canada.
164 These nuances, in what is otherwise a compelling argument for the centrality of the economic globalization hypothesis in explaining the nature and priority that unions assign to transnational organizing, compel an equally nuanced reformulation of the Schattschneider-Logue argument. These arguments, both posited before the full onset of economic and political globalization, generally fail to consider how globalization has altered the institutional geography of the employer-employee relationship. While the basic argument still holds — unions will pursue firm-level responses before national and international strategies — the effect of multinationalization is to transform firm-level responses into near-immediate transnational responses principally because employers are no longer solely located in the United States. In short, where the parent company is based overseas, a firm-level response might simultaneously be an international response. 124 In a related vein, the cases surveyed here likewise underscore the ways in which economic globalization has reconfigured social relationships, particularly those between U.S. workers and their counterparts abroad. In short, economic globalization has altered the social consequences of the pursuit of self-interest by providing new structural incentives for cross-border cooperation. To be sure, U.S. labor unions are still principally concerned with the welfare of their domestic constituency, but the pursuit of this end involves decidedly different methods. Whereas the AFL-CIO’s foreign policy was once guided by the twin aims of anti-communism and business unionism — two positions that arguably led the union to support highly undemocratic and anti-union governments abroad — the onset of significant import competition and multinationalization in key unionized sectors has compelled the Federation to recalibrate its global program around the promotion of core labor standards. In short, this change is driven by a recognition that the absence of labor standards abroad has fueled a “race to the bottom” on wages and working conditions around the globe and diminished the capacity of U.S. unions to retain well-paying union jobs. As such, I argue that the Federation and its affiliates are vigorously promoting the ILO’s core labor standards in their global partnerships as a means to ensure the well-being of their dues-paying members.
124 Of course, a union may choose to deal solely with the U.S.-based subsidiary, but I did not find evidence of this in the cases surveyed here.
165 This is not to say that such motives are necessarily problematic for the future of the global labor movement. On the contrary, economic globalization may be forging a common ideological and policy framework on which future cross-border collaboration can fruitfully take shape. Ideologically, I argue that the CLS movement is considerably less divisive than the socialism-capitalism debate, which consumed the international labor movement between 1950 and 1990. Although there exist arguments against the implementation of core labor standards, particularly with regard to “sweatshop” development in export-processing zones (EPZ’s), universal protections against non- discrimination and forced labor, as well as protections for the right to organize and bargain collectively are issues on which most unions find common cause. At the policy level, the CLS movement also provides additional avenues for collaboration between the international labor movement and other “progressive” non-governmental organizations, such as those within the environmental-, women’s-, indigenous-, and human rights movements. Indeed, this is already happening. To take one notable example, in the late 1990’s several AFL-CIO unions spearheaded the “Blue-Green Alliance” between organized labor and the environmental movement (e.g., the USW is has a formal alliance with the Sierra Club) principally out of concerns that foreign governments’ abuse of the environment constituted an unfair trade advantage that was hurting U.S. jobs. Other “unfair” trade advantages, such as discrimination against women in EPZ’s or the abuse of migrant workers in situations of temporary employment, have likewise facilitated new linkages between hitherto disparate groups. The most obvious counterweight to such optimism, of course, is that global organizing has yet to successfully achieve its twin goals of creating enforceable global labor standards and uniting national unions into a truly global labor movement. Although this aspect of the global labor movement is not explicitly assessed in this dissertation, it is worth noting that in my discussions with labor union officials at the SEIU, AFT, and Solidarity Center, most expressed skepticism that either goal would be achieved anytime soon. In terms of minimum global labor standards, the common refrain is that for all the talk about globalized governance structures, the nation-state still retains the monopoly on coercive power, and thus questions about the enforceability of labor standards ultimately rests with state leaders. At current, the U.S. labor movement has not yet convinced
166 leaders in their own country, let alone across borders, that global labor standards should be enforced with the same vigor as standards for capital, intellectual property, or tradable goods. At the same time, there is some skepticism about the utility of the global union federations — the chief international structures for national trade unions — as centers for global organizing. Interestingly, while no labor leader cited cultural, linguistic, or historical differences as significant impediments to a global labor movement, many did cite the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms within the GUF’s as a key obstacle to future growth. In the meantime, these trade unions and other allies both within and beyond the labor movement will continue to search for ways to build collective strength in the absence of official government sanction. At the very least, the cases surveyed here demonstrate that the globalization of national economies has produced a strong material interest for labor unions to cooperate across borders — but more could, and perhaps should be done if the international labor movement hopes to prove the emancipatory force that it purports to be. 125 For example, labor unions might consider formally merging with unions across national borders — a rarely exercised option — which may reduce the salience of nationalist/chauvinist rhetoric in times of organizational crisis. The international labor movement (and the U.S. labor movement in particular) might also consider disclosing its activities during the Cold War, which may assuage critics (and potential labor allies) who remain suspicious of the motives undergirding the new global trade union agenda. Finally, the international labor movement might benefit from redoubling its efforts to organize the roughly 85% of the global wage-earning workforce that is currently unorganized — a cohort that is increasingly comprised of women and migrant laborers — as well as the burgeoning informal workforce. These unrefined suggestions, among a great many others, only serve to remind scholars and activists of the continued need to assess and reassess the structures and methods through which organized labor seeks to broaden itself in light of rapidly changing social, political, and economic environs.
125 Consider the mission statements of the unions cited in this study, or that of the largest international trade union body, the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC): “The Confederation is inspired by the profound conviction that organisation in democratic and independent trade unions and collective bargaining are crucial to achieving the well-being of working people and their families and to security, social progress and sustainable development for all.” See: http://www.ituc-csi.org/spip.php?rubrique2
167 Appendix A
Graph 1: Manufacturing Employees in the U.S., 1960-2006. *Seasonally-adjusted, all employees, thousands.
Graph 2: Production Employees in the U.S., 1970-2006. *Not seasonally-adjusted, all production workers, thousands.
168 Graph 3: Education and Health Services Employees, 1960-2006. *Not seasonally-adjusted, all employees, thousands.
Graph 4: Government Employees (Local, State, and Federal) in the U.S., 1960-2006. *Not seasonally-adjusted, all employees, thousands
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (Graphs 1-4)
169 Figure 1: Rio Tinto’s Major Operations:
Source: http://graduates.riotinto.com/Region/AU/BU/EX/default.asp
170 Figure 2: Alcoa’s Major Operations:
Source: http://www.alcoa.com/global/en/about_alcoa/map/globalmap.asp?continent=Global_Flag s
171 Picture 1; Picture 2: USW members dumping Chinese imports into the Puget Sound, Seattle 1999.
Source: http://www.internationalist.org/seattledcint8.html
Source: www.inthesetimes.com/issue/24/03/moberg2403.html
172 Statement 1: USW statement of solidarity
For Immediate Release June 3, 2005
TORONTO — Trade union leaders from Canada, Brazil, and Chile, representing steelworkers employed at Gerdau (NYSE:GNA, GNA:TO) steelmaking operations in all three countries, met to discuss common concerns, issues and strategies on June 2 at the United Steelworkers Hall in Oshawa. The following statement was issued.
Gerdau Ameristeel’s anti-union agenda: Joint Union Statement of Solidarity
The United Steelworkers in Canada, USW Locals 5442 (Selkirk Manitoba), 6571 (Whitby Ontario), and 8918 (Cambridge Ontario), together with Constramet (Confederation of Chilean Metalworkers, representing Gerdau employees in Chile) and the CNM-CUT (National Confederation of Metalworkers representing Gerdau employees in Brazil) are united in our opposition to Gerdau’s anti-union philosophy and Gerdau’s attacks on workers’ living standards and protections.
Gerdau’s lack of interest in building a healthy, constructive relationship with its employees and their unions, has been evident for many years. Recent actions by Gerdau in Beaumont Texas and in Colombia confirm that Gerdau continues to try to implement an anti-union agenda.
Gerdau’s lock-out of employees at Beaumont, Texas is a cynical management attempt to force members of USW Local 8586 into a concessionary, sub-standard collective agreement. Management’s “best & final offer” strips overtime protection from employees, reduces vacations and cuts vacation pay, gives management new rights to unilaterally combine, change or eliminate jobs, imposes a new job classification system, allows supervisors to do bargaining unit work with no penalty, reduces group insurance benefits, and introduces a kind of two tiered wage system.
Management’s offer is an affront to dedicated and hard working Texas Steelworkers and their families, and it is an attack on all of our members employed at Gerdau - those in Texas and around the world. It is an unnecessary attack on all our Unions.We will support USW Local 8586 in their fight to obtain a non-concessionary collective agreement that reflects the needs of employees, their families and communities.
We call on Gerdau to immediately end its unfair lockout of USW Local 8586, put the membership back to work, and negotiate a fair agreement.
In Colombia Gerdau has recently reached agreement to acquire steelmaking and service facilities in Tuta, Cali, Boyaca, Muna, and Bogota. Any attempt by Gerdau to implement its anti-union philosophy in the Colombian facilities is misguided and unacceptable. In a country wracked by violence, and in particular anti-union violence, Gerdau’s failure to take immediate and decisive action to protect trade union leaders is simply inexcusable. Various trade union leaders have had death threats for their union activity. At least one trade union leader has been forced into exile.
The CNM-CUT has requested that Gerdau take a strong position on protecting workers and providing monetary support for those in exile. We strongly support that request.
Together we call upon Gerdau Ameristeel, and its parent company Gerdau, to honour the following basic principles:
Treat all workers employed in Gerdau operations around the world, and their unions, with dignity and respect. For example, affirm and implement the right of workers to union shop steward representation inside the workplace. Protect trade union leaders from anti-union violence. Engage with unions in good faith in collective bargaining processes which lead to collective agreements which reflect the needs and aspirations of employees, and recognize the true value employees contribute to Gerdau’s operations.
United we stand.
Fernando Lopes – Secretary General, CNM-CUT (Brazil) Miguel Soto – President, Constramet (Chile) Ken Neumann – National Director for Canada, United Steelworkers Wayne Fraser – Director District 6, United Steelworkers Steve Hunt – Director District 3, United Steelworkers Tony Sproule – President USW Local 5442 Denis Kavanagh – President USW Local 6571 Mike Mesich – President USW Local 8918
Source: http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_2005_June_3/ai_n13794746
173 Appendix B: Interviews
Interview: Debbie Schneider, SEIU This interview was conducted in person by Mark Keida on August 18, 2006. The interview was taped with the consent of the interviewee Deborah Schneider and transcribed at a later date. Procedural Questions 1. Name: Ms. Deborah Schneider 2. Place of Employment: Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 3. Title: Director of Global Organizing Partnerships, SEIU 4. Brief description of connection to AFT’s transnational programs: Ms. Schneider is the director of the SEIU’s global organizing department, and manages the organization’s entire transnational campaign profile. Interview Questions 1) Let me introduce my work: I am researching the influence of globalization on labor unions, and I am looking specifically at the relationships of U.S. labor unions with global union federations, foreign labor unions, and NGO’s abroad. The purpose here it two-fold: 1) I want to get verification that I am getting the right information and understand what the SEIU is doing; and 2) to get your perceptions on issues such as globalization, MNC’s, global unions, etc., and to try to understand where the SEIU is coming from. First, I have some quick “nuts and bolts” questions that I’ve asked all unions. 2) Has the union experienced in any of the sectors — health care, public services, or property services — any significant job loss or import competition? Not significant. We’re a union of public employees, healthcare workers, and property service workers. I would say of those areas the only one that has had any of that might be in hospitals, in our medical records or diagnostic work that can be digitized. But I would say that those are really small numbers. 3) Regarding multinational employers, I have noticed with some of your global work, certainly in the case of property services that there are several large multinational employers. There seems to be a link between that and your global
174 work. In the case of hospital services or public services do you have any major multinationals employing SEIU members? The big outsourcers of public services and healthcare work that outsource catering, food service, laundry, and sometimes janitorial work. And they do it equally from hospitals, nursing homes, higher education, school districts. We call them “multiservice” corporations who, since they are privatizes or outsourcers of services. So Sodexho is one of those, a big French company. Compass which is a big British company. And Aramark which is a US company but is multinational. So for our public sector and healthcare workers, right now it’s those outsourced services that we have multinationals in. And then there are little things here and there, so our bus driver campaign which is, it’s not like it is a central part of our union, but we represented school bus drivers because we represent school workers in school districts. And it used to be the school bus drivers worked for the school districts. We represented the Oxford, Ohio school district you had the secretaries, and you had the janitors, and you had the bus drivers, and the lunch ladies, and they all worked for the school district. But bit by bit they contract all of that out. So the lunch ladies now work for a French company, and the cleaners work for a Danish company, and the bus drivers work for a British company. And that’s how we ended up in a pretty big campaign with FirstStudent. So I think that more and more you will see this happen, that anything that can be contracted out from the public sector, and the healthcare sector they will try to figure out how to do that. Some of them will be national companies and some will be multinationals. 4) If you had to encapsulate the two top challenges or priorities for the SEIU and your department, what would those be? Really trying to figure out how we raise standards in industries where our members work, is our job at the union. And what we have learned is that as globalization permeates the service sector and its just no longer a manufacturing phenomenon, and that in order to really figure out how to raise standards for workers around the county we need to figure out how to raise standards for workers all around the world. Because the companies work very smoothly across borders and the unions are very national. And we’ve got to figure out how to deal with these companies locally so that we can raise
175 standards everywhere. So, that’s our job. And I don’t know if there is a second one. 5) Following up on raising standards, depending on the union there are different ways that you could approach it. Some could approach the issue through protectionism, or they could work with unions specifically, through individual partnerships, or they could work through the global union federations, etc. There a lot of different global actors out there, the ILO, the UN, the regional labor bodies, what or who would you consider your top allies or actors that you would be most likely to work with? I think it would be the global union federations because they act to bring together unions sectorally, to figure out, we think that more and more they are going to play the role of really figuring out how to deal with these global employers and coordinate our work together. But then also with partner unions there are employers in important regions. So for example, we work very closely with the Transport and General Workers Union in the UK because they are the main union of the bus company, FirstStudent. And so sometimes it’s bilateral, but with unions that share employers because they are so key with that employer at times it may be multilateral because there may be four countries that are really important for a given employer. And then if we could get the four unions that really deal with that employer together. Or it could be more universal, which would then be through the GUF’s. 6) Conversely then, what or who would you consider. How about the ILO? What is your relationship do you have? None 7) Or NGO’s? As partners to what you do bi or multilaterally? NGO’s are important partners in what we do. We work with them very closely on the kinds of social justice issues in the U.S. and we would extend that clearly to the global work that we are doing. So I think NGO’s are important partners and allies. The big government agencies, whether it’s the ILO or the UN, are something that we haven’t spent any time on. I’m not really convinced that it’s worth our time. It’s partly why we pay into the global union federations, because we sort of feel like that’s their bailiwick. We haven’t really found them (ILO) helpful. We actually tried to file a complaint on freedom of association on Wackenhut, the global
176 security company, and the ILO just really doesn’t buy that the violations that exist in the United States rise to the level (comparatively, they are thinking that). I’m not really involved in it at all. It doesn’t seem like an efficient avenue to do this work with employers. 8) Is it more an issue of their perceptions of that American or U.S. unions make vis- à-vis unions abroad, or is it that they might lack the real teeth to enforce the conventions that they have? I don’t know much about it. (That’s fine. That tells me a lot). I could speculate, but. 9) Do you mind discussing a few of the campaigns? Sure. That I know. 10) The campaigns for which I have found information are Focus on Group 4 Securicor, Driving Up Standards, the Clean Start Campaign, some work on International Women’s Day, there was at least some mention of that on your website, it was small (yeah), a little work on the Tsunami Relief Effort with the Solidarity Center, the London Tube Cleaners, those were the. I had some outstanding questions with regard to these. Before I get to these, I am curious what you think has been your most successful global campaign to date has been, if you could name one. And if you can’t identify a success, maybe one that was not so successful or what you are most proud of? One of your earliest global campaigns, we sort of fell into this, it’s not like we set out to do global work, but where security officers in Minnesota who worked for Securitas, which is a Swedish company, and their American subsidiary acted like an American company: it was anti-union, intimidations, threats, just acted like every typical American company. Very anti-union and straight out about it. And so our researchers asked how do you have leverage against a company that is being bad to make them stop being bad, this is sort of what we do for a living, to get people the space to form an organization for their own benefit. Because we think if people actually have the space to make that decision, they can make a decision to form a union, and when people are being battered, then that decision is not a free decision, and they won’t do it. People can’t possibly take those risks. So, they found out that this company is headquartered in Sweden, they studied a little more about it, we knew that at the time it wasn’t UNI but was called FIAT, it was a
177 predecessor of UNI, we knew some people from Sweden there, it turns out that the main union in Sweden that deals with that company is a transport union, the Swedish Transport Workers Union, who are incredible trade unionists. And who helped us win neutrality from Securitas over a long period of time. It was an employer that worked very, very well with its union in Sweden and Europe, and the basically said what many of these European companies will say is “look, we have to deal with the environment in which they live, and the American subsidiary has to respect the local culture, which is like brutally anti-union. And in the end the Swedish Transport Workers said, “that’s not good enough. It’s not acceptable.” But it took a lot of time in getting to know eachother and I think that people from other countries whether it’s Europe or the developing world have a very hard time believing that there’s oppression in our country, that there’s poverty in our country. (Hurricane) Katrina actually changed the world’s thinking about this, and it was important, we brought workers who worked for Securitas in Sweden over to meet the workers who work for Securitas in Minnesota, and (they) got to go see where they lived, what their homes were like, and their work that they lived in great poverty, they were making minimum wage, and you can’t essentially survive on it. They heard their stories about what their employer actually did to these workers who were trying to exercise their legal right under US law, and they were totally appalled. They just could just, like, not believe it. And so there had to be a bunch of that back-and-forth, but in the end they were willing to use their considerable relationship and leverage with this company out of pure solidarity, they had nothing to gain, in fact they had something to lose, because they had a very good relationship with this company and we were beating the company up. And they had to stand shoulder to shoulder with us as we attacked this company which is not in the European “social dialogue” model, and our European partners are not very comfortable with how aggressive we have to be back to employers who are very aggressive to workers and, we had a lot of that to work out with our allies in other countries, but in the end Securitas signed a neutrality agreement. They actually signed a Global Framework Agreement (yes, I saw that) that is really impressive. Not radical. It’s
178 only really impressive in comparison to its counterparts. So I would say that was our most successful campaign, and I can’t be proud of it at all because it completely preceded this department, and my work here. But I think was an incredible example of solidarity. What we’re trying to move to instead, because I think that the Swedish Transport workers are unusual (sure, 78 percent unionization rates), and we can’t expect other unions to use up their good will, and relationship, and leverage that they have with employers in their home countries out of pure solidarity. It’s just a lot to ask. And it’s rare to get. You know, people will write letters, people will do stuff, but to actually use your own relationship and your own leverage is a lot to ask. So, I think what we’re trying to think about is creating partnerships where it is absolutely of mutual interest, so that our helping the union in Indonesia that has Group 4 Securicor as its multinational employer, very bad there, broke the law over and over again, big horrible strike, their Wackenhut (subsidiary) in our country is extremely anti- union, breaks the law, and in Uganda, in Israel, in South Africa, in Uruguay, there are just law-breakers everywhere. And to say that “it is in our interest, the US workers’ interest, for the Indonesian’s to win against this company, and we have all mutual interests in helping take these companies on, for them just to respect the basic worker rights. If you can get there, then you can then figure out how to raise standards. And I say that we have the advantage in the Service Sector that, because you asked the question earlier about protectionism, (job loss), and so on, is that we don’t have to feel like if the wages go that we, that we have an interest in the wages going up or down anywhere else because we are competing directly with our brothers and sisters in other countries. Because you can’t really offshore security, or cleaning, or the lunch lady. And so, I think that we have an interest in all the boats coming up at once, and in getting the rights to be real, and getting the big global players. In all of these industries the multinationals are only a small percentage of the industry, but they are the strongest and most stable part, and they may be the best employers in the industry. The “moms and pops”, local employers in the service sector may be the real “bottom feeders”, and if you can get the multinationals to figure out how to
179 raise standards, it could bring the whole thing up. And poverty in America is different that poverty in India, but we could bring the whole thing up together. That’s really how we think about this, so that solidarity is not just an excellent thing, it’s the precept of the labor movement, but I don’t think that it is enough to deal with the context that our members work in. 11) Speaking of solidarity, do you think that compared to the Steelworkers or Autoworkers, do you feel that: 1) that your jobs can’t really be outsourced; and 2) that your union has a majority women membership, lots of immigrant and foreign-born members, do you feel that you have more authenticity or legitimacy when you go across borders and work with others, to say that this isn’t so much (protectionism) ? We are not trying to protect our jobs; we actually really care about… I don’t think we have any more legitimacy or authenticity than our brothers in the heavy metals, in manufacturing unions. So, I’ll say that again. Because they have enormous authenticity. Their stories are heartbreaking, what happens to whole towns and communities and families, and when they go tell their stories they are very authentic. So, in a way we don’t have to worry about the protectionism argument that they have to worry about (that’s what I was getting at). Yeah, they have to worry about it and it’s hard for them, we don’t because of the nature of our work. Because we’re women, because we’re foreign-born, I don’t know that that gives us more legitimacy. I don’t really think so. 12) Regarding the Global Framework Agreements? Yes 13) Corporate codes of conduct are one way that corporations try to assuage critics, do you put much stock in the framework agreements, that they will be honored? The mostly haven’t been, and there is so little teeth, and a lot of what’s in them is that “we will follow the ILO conventions”, so for me to hear a big grocery store chain say that “we won’t enslave workers” “we won’t have child labor”, the commitments that they make in these framework agreements seem very low bar. And the enforceability is none. So, but, I think that there should be global framework agreements that have real teeth, and that’s what we are starting to do with Securitas, with really workers’ right to organize, I haven’t seen any yet but there’s no reason that you can’t put stuff in GFA’s about “living wage” and make
180 them something that really have teeth, but in order to do that the unions who deal with those employers around the world have to come together in some different structures to really decide that they really want to do that. And my prediction is that the global union federations ought to morph into the ability to bring people together to bargain global framework agreements that have teeth with the major global industries in their major industries and sectors. Which for the most part they really don’t do and it doesn’t do us any good to have codes of conduct in GFA’s that have nothing in them and they aren’t enforceable, and that these guys can wear as a “badge of honor”. I don’t think we should give them out that cheap. 14) What do you consider teeth? What do you mean by that? I think you have to have some enforceability, and I think there has to be something about standards for workers and serious language about rights to organize that go beyond just saying that people should have a right of association. I think that there are ways you can, we do it all of the time in the United States, that we be much more specific, whether it’s access, or meeting times, or you know, there are lots of different ways you can make real that people are going to get the message that its okay to form a union. So, that’s what I predict for the future. 15) And enforceability? I think you have to figure out how to do that besides going to the ILO. And there could be arbitration. Like any other kind of contract. 16) I was thinking, at the end of the day, this would be state level, where you would have enforceability of GFA’s? You mean national? 17) Yes, national or international? I don’t know. But I think that this is where the global union federations are really going to have. If they don’t change to move in that direction I think that they will become less relevant to people. And I think they are going to have to struggle with a lot of those kinds of questions. 18) Beyond the unions in Uganda and Indonesia, how do you work, who do you work with in Kenya and India, because I noticed there were a few issues with G4S there as well? I should tell you who to talk to for that. 19) Then with the campaign, with regard to the key strategy, what I have found is that chiefly, not in terms of objectives but strategies, you have the UNI and
181 LabourStart, they post information about abuses, objectives, and statements of solidarity, and there’s also G4S website and the Eye on Wackenhut website, those are designed to do public awareness, clearly, and to bring people together, beyond that, what are the main strategies to get, to be effective in that. I really don’t think it’s that different from our domestic campaigns, in a lot of ways, except that we always have to have partners, you know, in order to take on very powerful forces, you have to figure out how you have leverage to get them to the point where they are essentially willing to accept workers having an organization. So, you have to find people who share that desire. We do work with shareholders, I don’t know if you followed the shareholder resolution work that we did both in eh bus driver campaign and G4S, to get into any more detail on those two specific campaigns I think you would be better to talk to their campaign directors...Each of us works very differently. But for us our campaigns are run out of divisions. So, our property services division runs that campaign (G4S), our public divisions runs the bus campaign, and that’s with the Teamsters, so that’s sort of complicated, and my department noses into some of it, we help coordinate some of it, but we are really trying to figure out how to do partnerships around union growth with partner unions in other countries, and also trying to figure out structures to make this work happen and to encourage more organizing work among partners of ours around the world. And so I’m not really a “hands on” on Kenya, or Uganda, or India, or the details of the Bus Campaign… 20) At the most general level, looking at the G4S campaign, at the broadest level, how successful has it been here? Have they been of any help at all with Wackenhut? Oh, not yet. I bet a lot of these campaigns are like others in the labor movement where they go on a long time because you have an incredibly intransigent opponent, and one day its over. And whether they get somebody new in to run the American division or if they get somebody new in Britain, whether a combination of all the things that we’ve done make them throw up their hands, we are not going away, but these are very long and hard campaign, and for the most part I would say that you do one thing, then another thing, then another thing, then you, we are building a strong partnership for workers around the world, and at some
182 point this employer will decide that it wants to deal with that. But on the way, you never get any encouragement. In my experience. And the one thing that the SEIU is good at is we don’t need that encouragement along the way because we are determined that at the end of the day this is the employer that we are going to work with. And that we’re going to, that the workers in that company are going to build an organization, so. 21) Certainly with the success of, just a few weeks ago with the ASPEK workers in Indonesia, (that’s great) these are encouraging things? Yeah. But it may be that they gave recognition to 15,000 workers in Britain, they fixed the problem in South Africa, and maybe they are willing to fix the problem everywhere but here. And eventually they fix the problem here. 22) Back to the GUF’s. I’ve noticed from my research that most of your work has been with UNI, and you are also a member of the IUF, ITF, and PSI. Am I researching poorly or is UNI really your top partner? We have had the longest, deepest relationship with UNI, from when John Sweeney was still president of SEIU, long way back. And it is because of the three industries of SEIU, property services is the most globalized. And we have the most connections with unions in other countries around employers. And so it’s just natural. And so it’s not that we like them better particularly, it's just because that is the division in our union that was earliest and deepest impacted by globalization. The IUF we have had a really great working relationship around the Sodexho, Compass, and Aramark campaigns which we are doing together with UNITE-HERE, we formed a new union for those workers, it’s a national union, it’s a joint project of SEIU and UNITE-HERE called “Service Workers United”, and the IUF was hugely instrumental in helping that campaign, and we are interested in helping take that campaign global through the IUF. So, while we’re much less affiliated with them in terms of numbers and years, they are a great GUF and we do important work with them. The ITF we are a teeny affiliate to, and that is really around the school bus drivers. The Teamsters is really the main player in the ITF. And then PSI should be our biggest place, because out of our 1.8 million members, about 1.6 million of them fit under the PSI because that is where healthcare workers, the
183 whole rest of the world healthcare workers are pubic sector workers, so they are in the public sector federation. We really haven’t been able to figure out how to move a growth agenda through the PSI, and if you’ve read anything about SEIU you’ll notice our number 1, number 2, and number 3 thing is to (raise numbers). The huge decline in union density in the US is mirrored all over the world. I understand Malta may be the exception, but everybody else is losing union density at an alarming pace. And so we really don’t do any work in our union that is not intended to turn those numbers around, and that includes our work with global union federations and I would say that we haven’t figured out how to put a growth program together globally with PSI because we don’t share employers in the same way (that is what I was going to ask). You know, I wouldn’t say it’s PSI’s fault, it’s just we haven’t found a natural thing that puts a growth agenda in public sector, you know these outsource public services is one angle on that, and we are hoping to do some work in the America’s around PSI around that, but we haven’t found the route with PSI. 23) So you would agree then that you’ll need some type of hook beyond just pure solidarity to get people to work together? That is SEIU’s opinion. We just don’t want to go to conferences to schmooze and network and even just get information. We really see these global entities as opportunities to work together. To create a global labor movement, and that’s got to go beyond communication, information exchange, and solidarity. That is just not strong enough for what our members are encountering. 24) On that, how do you encourage rank-and-file involvement with the campaigns, and how much emphasis has been on that. Because it seems that the perception is that when you have leaders and officers going to meetings with eachother that is not really global unionism, it’s not really global solidarity at work. Sure, for any of these campaigns to work, you have to have your members doing it. So our bus campaign is led by a committee that is called ITOC (international transportation organizing committee) and it has rank-and-file members who work for FirstStudent in the UK and rank-and-file workers who work for FirstStudent in the US, and they are the core and, you know it’s expensive to do. Securitas would
184 never have happened if there weren’t workers exchanging with eachother. So I think that like any domestic campaign, if it’s not based on your membership it’s not going to work, because when you talk about what’s genuine, I can talk till I’m blue in the face but I’m not the one who is experiencing these things, so I think it’s absolutely necessary and we are in better shape than we were 20 years ago on that because of email, webcasts, and there’s ways to get those exchanges to happen that we worked pretty hard on besides flying people around. Its’ getting hard to fly people around to the UK …. 25) What is your relationship with the Solidarity Center? Do you consider them…They are our friends. 26) You are still working (together)? It is a touchy question. They are our friends, and they are our close friends and, I guess that is what I would say. We do different kinds of work, and I believe, you’d have to ask them officially, but I believe there position is that if there are workers in a struggle they will support it. That they don’t need to be in a union, it doesn’t need to be an AFL union, and so I think we have been able to continue to do work with them based on that premise. But it’s touchy. 27) Last question, if you could either give a number or just you perception. In terms of priority that the SEIU gives to global partnerships, global organizing, things like that, on a list of top things, is it number 1, number 5, number 2? So, this department got created in the aftermath of our 2004 convention. SEIU takes its conventions really seriously, and it usually takes every four years and it’s at least two years of work, of really trying to figure out what a convention program should be, we’ve got lots of committees, we’ve got hearings, we have this and that, because we believe that it is the time that you bring your rank-and-file leadership together to decide on the direction of the union for the next period of time, that the officers are then responsible to carry out, and therefore our staff is. So, at the 2004 convention they had adopted a program which was called “7 Strengths”… (discussion about where to find a copy of the program) … and the “7 Strengths” is what we believe, it is what the convention adopted as the
185 program of the union for the next four years. But global strength was one of the seven, and it had never been anywhere. I mean, at conventions we always had resolutions about supporting Coca-Cola workers in Colombia, there’s a million international solidarity things that would come up at the convention but it was really the first year that we said that global dimension of our members lives matters, and so the seven strengths, I don’t remember them all but there was community strength, which says unless we build our communities and our alliances in the community then we can’t change members’ lives, industry strength, which was really focusing on the industry players, national strength, which said that, I noticed one of your questions was “where are your members”, we are very much a “bookend” union, most of our members are in the California and New York, Chicago, and that unless we really become a national union we’re not going to, so all of these things take a lot of work with our members. I had a different job at the time, I was the chief of staff of the Midwest, and we went around and did lots of different pre-convention hearings with members and to convince members in California and New York that they should send their local dues money to the South and Southwest because if we can’t bring up standards in the South and Southwest that they’re at risk in California and New York, where there are very good wages and benefits, is a lift. But we really do not shy away from having those discussions with our members, and global strength was one of them, which I remember at the time thinking that members would think that this is just about “hotshotting” around and global, labor tourism, and this and that, they totally get it. These are members who work in low wage jobs, the only reason they pay us their hard earned money is for us to think big about how to protect their work and raise their standards. And they totally get this. They work for these corporations that are so big and so out there that that is what they pay their 20 or 30 dollars a month for us to worry about. So global strength was one of seven, and I would be reluctant to say, “oh it’s the 4 th most important” because the whole basis of it, when we get an analysis of our, actually I saw a video of it, this big campaign we had in Miami for the janitors down there, have you seen that (oh yeah), so the thing shows how they used all seven of the strengths to win for these
186 workers. And exactly how each one of them played an integral part in winning. And that’s how I think we really think about this, one’s not more important than the others, all seven are essential. This is probably the newest of them, and we’re trying to figure out how to do it, and I think that the work that we are doing internationally is a little different than what unions have traditionally done, are actually quite different, the fact that we have organizers working in Hamburg with Verdi on organizing security officers, or in London on the tube campaign, or in Sydney on their Clean Start Campaign, I don’t know if there’s much precedent for that, and I think we’re humbled in a way because we’re just trying things that seem sensible to us. And I wouldn’t say that we declare that we know the answer (a lot of this is so new, these campaigns). It’s all new.
187 Interview: Bill Ragen, SEIU This interview was conducted by Mark Keida over the telephone on September 27, 2006. The interview was taped with the consent of the SEIU and the interviewee William Ragen and transcribed at a later date. Procedural Questions 1. Name: Mr. William Ragen 2. Place of Employment: Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 3. Title: Program Coordinator for Security Officer Organizing 4. Brief description of connection to SEIU’s transnational programs: Bill Ragen has worked extensively on issues related to security officer organizing at the domestic and transnational levels. He currently works on the Group 4 Securicor campaign, which seeks to organize workers employed by G4S and its subsidiaries around the globe, and recently led a delegation of SEIU members to the company’s Scotland headquarters to submit a shareholder resolution demanding compliance with ILO core labor standards. He consented to a 15 minute interview. Interview Questions 1) What is driving SEIU’s involvement in the Focus on Group 4 Securicor campaign, and what do you reasonably hope to achieve? Well, we organize janitors in mainly commercial office buildings in a couple dozen cities starting in the late 1980s, and during that we were approached by security officers who said, “we would like a union also, we want good pay and don’t have health coverage, et cetera,” and we started off as a janitors union but we thought about and realized that we’re really a property services union and represent workers who keep buildings running and security officers should be in our union as well. And with these workers there are people working who have similar issues of other low-wage service workers, so we thought it would make sense to organize them from an industrial perspective, in terms of organizing the non-union workers in our bailiwick. Additionally, in most cities the janitors tend to be recent Latino immigrants and security officers tend to be African-American and we thought this would be a good way to build a political coalition as well of communities that are often seen as being in competition with each other for employment, to bring
188 together common issues and to move a progressive political agenda in the cities where we represent folks. 2) And so your involvement with UNI, is that a function of globalization within the industry and a feeling that you may be able to unite in the same ways. Yeah, UNI comes in with the fact that our employers are increasingly global companies, that we need to be able to operate globally to be effective. And not just acts of solidarity; someone from another country asks us for help on a specific issue regarding a strike, and we do what we can but that’s fine, but it doesn’t really go very far; it tends to be reactive. What we need is a common agenda with unions that represent service workers all around the world. Our employers certainly have a common global agenda. 3) Regarding UNI, how have they been able to facilitate a common union agenda? They know property service unions in many different countries around the world, and their familiar with the issues that those workers face in other countries, and they are able to bring people together in the same room so we can compare notes about these companies and figure out how we should work together. The challenge with UNI is to go from a playing a coordinating and informing role to a tighter organization that is moving a common agenda in a global corporate campaign, instead of just exchanging information. 4) When you talk about a “common agenda,” would that fall under the heading of a global framework agreement, or something like that? Yes, trying to get global framework agreements, but ones with teeth in them, and ones that have set the bar high enough to be meaningful. 5) I was talking to Debbie Schneider (Director of Global Organizing Partnerships for SEIU) about this question of “teeth,” this has been a big question in what I do, how do put teeth into some of these agreements? How do you envision that becoming a reality? That’s the question. Right now the agreements we have are few, most of the agreements that are out there are pretty minimal, they are based on the ILO (core labor) standards, don’t use slave labor, and don’t use child labor, its pretty basic stuff. So not to deemphasize that, but to something that facilitates organizing and makes these agreements meaningful, is number one. But
189 two is how to enforce it, and so far these are pretty voluntary agreements, there aren’t many multinational corporations that I know that are about to sign something that is legally binding all around the world, I don’t think they are ready to take that step and we’re not able to get them to do it. So far its been somewhat on the voluntary side, although that being said the companies that sign, where it was their idea have been somewhat cajoled into it by unions, but there’s only so far they’re willing to go to make the commitments they’re willing to make. That’s the challenge, to make sure that these things get signed in Geneva but implemented around the world. I think some of that is, the more important part is really to have activity all around the world wherever these companies are to have healthy local activity that is organizing, or what have you, that is implementing these agreements. If you don’t have that, the enforcement mechanism doesn’t make any difference. 6) In terms of implementing, what do you mean by that? These companies will sign a global framework agreement, and it’s up to the unions to take advantage of it. So, if they are not out there signing people up, it’s just a piece of paper. 7) What role do you see for NGO’s or other community organizations towards these objectives? I noticed that you have a couple of websites that emphasize this (the Group 4 Securicor campaign Eye on Wackenhut campaign). Do you consider this a key way that you may get enforcement? Even before you have an agreement this looks like a key way that you are trying to get one? I think work with NGO’s is important, they can be very good allies. For example, the Indonesian human rights association Tapol, in London has been involved in supporting the strike by Securicor workers in Indonesia, and that is a natural outgrowth to their human rights work that they have done in Indonesia, and that has been a great help to the Securicor workers in Jakarta. We were able through UNI to find out about this strike and get involved with these workers and bring them to London, and then Tapol was able to play a role as well by bringing attention to this by bringing it up to the company, and they were a part of the constellation of forces that brought to bear on the corporation that got them to settle the dispute.
190 8) Then you are familiar with the G4S shareholder meeting from a few months back? Yeah, I went there. 9) Any thoughts, what might make the shareholders come around to the resolution (to force the company to abide by the ILO’s core labor standards) that you submitted? Or any general comments on your experiences there? It is pretty clear that the appeal to reason or to good corporate citizenship has failed, and I can only say that clearly there has to be some sort of crisis for the company, and until there is they’re not going to deal with this problem. They will just do the absolute minimum they need to. They will put out the worst fires. They did resolve the Indonesian situation, but there is still a question in my mind that without this global campaign these workers would have just been starved out. But through all the attention, from not only our work with UNI but through organizations like Tapol and Labourstart, they (G4S) had to solve that. This is the model of what we need to do, so we need to have more of it in more countries. 10) Final question, and it is in two parts: broadly, when you are thinking about global organizing and global partnerships, what makes SEIU or global organizing in general strong, what might be the greatest asset, what makes you most confident? And conversely, where could more work be done in the global arena in terms of linking unions; what is the greatest weakness of organizing abroad? I think that it provides the opportunity for the strength of numbers. In the case of Group 4 (Securicor), they have 400,000 employees around the world and if you really want to move the company in a serious way you need to engage it in several countries, otherwise you are just playing on a very small part of the field. So, it provides an opportunity to bring enough people together to get the company to mend its ways. The challenge is to do the work necessary to make that happen, and to deal with the different languages, different cultures, and different labor relations systems that exist in different countries so that people are working together more or less in a common fashion for a common purpose? 11) Is there any feeling that the concerns of U.S. workers are underappreciated, or that there is a feeling among foreign unions that the concerns of U.S. workers are not as serious or important as workers’ rights abroad? Does this impede global
191 organizing for the SEIU? This is an issue, that people don’t, people outside the United States don’t believe that poverty exists in the United States, they don’t really get it that people don’t have health insurance, particularly when you talk to folks in Europe, you know, people view health insurance as the normal social infrastructure, just like you would have a post office or roads or something. People just don’t absorb what it means. So it is hard to get folks to understand that if you are a low-wage worker and what it means not to be able to take your kid to the doctor when he gets sick, and so forth. It takes a fair amount of education, and I think we’ve brought a number of people to the United States to show them how people live, what they have to do when they can’t go to the doctor, etc.
192 Interview: Gregory King, AFT This interview was conducted by Mark Keida over the telephone on September 28, 2006. The interview was taped with the consent of the AFT and the interviewee Gregory King and transcribed at a later date. Procedural Questions 1. Name: Mr. Gregory King 2. Place of Employment: American Federation of Teachers 3. Title: Director of Special Projects, Office of President Edward J. McElroy. 4. Brief description of connection to AFT’s transnational programs: Mr. King was referred by the AFT per my request to discuss the AFT Africa-AIDS campaign. Mr. King coordinates domestic fundraising efforts for the campaign, and also serves as the chief spokesperson for the organization on the Africa-AIDS program and International Affairs. Interview Questions 1) Let me introduce my work: I am researching the influence of globalization on labor unions, and I am looking specifically at the relationships of U.S. labor unions with global union federations, foreign labor unions, and NGO’s abroad. 2) Regarding the AIDS campaign, could you take me through the genesis of the program? In my work when you think of international affairs you think of global framework agreements and global councils, there are not many unions working on HIV/AIDS. What inspired the union to pursue this as an issue? We belong to an international association of democratic teacher unions called Education International (EI), and at a meeting of Education International one of our staff members was asked by a representative of Zimbabwe teachers’ association (ZIMTA) if there was some way that the AFT could help deal with the AIDS crisis that their members had been through. There was an estimate in late 2002 that as many as a third of teachers in Zimbabwe were HIV positive. So, we gave it some consideration and decided that yes, we would help, and we began a partnership with ZIMTA and began to try to raise resources in the United States to assist ZIMTA in…The AFT decided to start a project called the AFT Africa-AIDS campaign in which we produced a commemorative pin, which we distributed to
193 our members for a $10 contribution and all of that money was directed toward the effort to assist in Zimbabwe. Now after we began our pilot project in Zimbabwe of teachers being trained as AIDS counselors, and serve as an accurate source of information on HIV/AIDS, we adapted the program to basically become a kind of peer-education, peer-counseling, and peer-consultation program, where teachers were trained over a series of 12 sessions to deal with various aspects of the HIV/AIDS issues, and it proved to be a great success. It was developed by ZIMTA with our assistance, but developed in a way that would deal with the issues that they felt were the most pressing. And we called it “breaking the silence” there was an effort created to make it possible through a series of group sessions to break down barriers and stigmas that were even attached to the discussion of HIV/AIDS. The program became so popular that the it was extended to several other African countries, to teachers’ unions in South Africa and Kenya, the South African Teachers Union (SATU) and Kenyan Union of Teachers, asked us if we could help them develop similar programs in their own countries. So we expanded the program to those countries as well. 3) About members, clearly there is a financial link between what your members do and this program, but has there been any direct involvement, beyond fundraising? The objective of our domestic campaign was to raise awareness among American teachers so that we would have a base of political support in districts around the country, so that we could go to the (Bush) administration and ask for significantly more funding for a program similar to this. We have received over $5 million in a PEPFAR grant from the U.S. government for these programs in Kenya, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. So, the objective was to engage our members and make them more aware of the crises in Africa. I think that was successful with the leadership of our locals around the country. 4) Considering other transnational allies, such as NGOs, the ILO, or other unions, how have they been able to facilitate the campaign, if at all? We do work with other NGO’s and other funders in South Africa, for instance. We have a partnership that includes Education International, that includes the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center; we receive support from other U.S. departments, such as
194 USAID and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). So, we have always looked for other partners, and I know other teachers’ unions from other countries are working with our partners in Africa on programs similar to this. 5) Have you made any progress providing retro-viral medication or other types of post-sickness solutions? Or is the focus principally on education and peer counseling? In fact, over the past year and a half we have expanded our program to South Africa and we’ve developed a pilot program where we are attempting to provide retro-virals to teachers through a new partner, the South African Medical Association, which is the union of doctors, so there is a real effort to expand beyond counseling and prevention programs, but also to get treatment to people who are in need of it. And we are anticipating going into Kenya as well, if we can get the funding for it. In Zimbabwe, we are restricted to a certain extent because of the U.S. government’s restriction on functional assistance there at the moment. 6) Broadly, what would you consider the greatest organizational or political assets when conducting global projects with unions across borders? We are a union that is proud of our involvement in international affairs. We have been active internationally since the earliest days of our union, which was founded in the nineteen-teens, and it is fair to say that we have the largest commitment to international projects than any other union in the United States; we have a whole international affairs department, and we work with Education International on global projects all the time. 7) You helped develop Education International, is that correct? Yes we did, and Al Shaker and Sandra Feldman, both of our late presidents, were both very active, and our current president Ed McElroy is a vice-president of Education International . But our efforts are not just focused on AIDS; we are involved with civic education, democracy education, and efforts to eradicate child labor, and efforts to promote human labor rights in countries around the world. We had taken a part in the effort to end Apartheid in South Africa and communism in Central America, and poverty in Latin America. We are engaged in a whole range of issues today, as well as in the past.
195 8) Trying to work internationally today, what would you consider your greatest challenge? There is always a great challenge in getting the resources to implement your programs effectively. We want to make sure that every child in the world has access to quality education, and we’ve worked with the global campaign for education on an action week every year to raise these issues. But, it may have to come from governments because the unions can only do so much, and we need to create a stronger commitment on the part of the U.S. government to providing resources to projects all over the world. 9) A recurring theme in some of my other discussions is this issue of American workers and American unions working aboard, that in some cases these projects may be viewed as an imposition of sorts, or that there is a certain legacy of trade union imperialism. Is this a concern and does it ever get in the way? We rely on our partners to give us guidance; we are not into going into a country and telling them how to do things. We have gone to countries where there are democratic unions that have invited us in, and we provide them with assistance. We don’t direct their programs or run them; we see what we can do to assist them in their efforts. That is a policy that we have followed throughout our history and it has worked well so far. 10) Hypothetically, I am an AFT member and I ask, “How do these international projects help me at my job, or how do they improve my situation domestically?” How would you respond to this? I think our members understand that the success of a member here in the United States isn’t dependent just on what happens in their community, it also depends on what happens in their state, and in the country at large, and in the world at large. Labor has always understood that you need allies and that you need to look beyond the closest border to understand what is happening. And certainly in education we are well aware of it; changes and challenges that we face here in the United States are being replicated all over the world 126 and it makes sense to have working partnerships with unions all over the world so that we can support their work. We also get intelligence from them to
126 See interview with David Dorn for further discussion on how education is increasingly becoming privatized in the United States and abroad. David Dorn considers this a strong link between U.S. unions and their counterparts abroad.
196 assist us in the work we are doing here at home. And I think that our members understand that and support it. We are a democratic union, and our positions on international affairs and projects is directed by the delegates at our convention, which is held every two years, and they pass resolutions encouraging us to do the work that we are doing. We do not do this independent of our members; our members elect the delegates who make the decisions regarding where we focus our energies.
197 Interview: David Dorn, AFT This interview was conducted in person by Mark Keida on October 5, 2006. The interview was taped with the consent of the AFT and the interviewee David Dorn and transcribed at a later date. Procedural Questions 1. Name: Mr. David Dorn 2. Place of Employment: American Federation of Teachers (AFT) 3. Title: Director of the Department of International Affairs, AFT. 4. Brief description of connection to SEIU’s transnational programs: David Dorn is the director of the AFT’s international affairs department, and manages the organization’s entire transnational campaign profile. Mr. Dorn is the highest- ranking member of the AFT in charge of transnational organizing. Interview Questions 1) Broadly, to what do you attribute the AFT’s emphasis on international affairs? What would you consider the union’s orienting premise or purpose? What at the broadest level are your key objectives? At the broadest level, the key objective of the American Federation of Teachers working in international affairs is democracy. There was always a sense of, and has been very closely linked to democracy, is free trade unionism. The idea of democracy is important because it’s without democracy you can’t have free trade unionism, and its initial human rights and trade union rights and stuff like that and we’ve reiterated that and made a point of mentioning that and there’s a mission statement of the AFT. And the last item on the mission statement is the support for democracy nationally and internationally. It’s a very short mission statement and actually I could show you, it’s on the wall of the conference room in the back if you want to take a look at it on your way out. The mission statement was adopted a few years ago, but the theme of democracy goes back to the origins of the union and John Dewey. John Dewey was one of the founders of the AFT and was known internationally as an educator and administrator and when they created the AFT the slogan was “education for democracy, democracy and education,” so it was always associated with democracy. The support for international work in labor
198 movement as a whole you know really goes back to Gompers and even before that. And the AFT was an AFL union, it was a craft union which is an interesting aspect for other reasons. The craft unions and the CIO unions, you know the AFT was somewhat different in structure and history and when the CIO was developed they had a different orientation, well I mean a different political background too. But the AFT always since the 30s and 40s there are examples of the AFT participating in international affairs and working with European groups or doing some pre-WWII activities to support people getting out from underneath Nazism and the beginning of the war and then after the war the founding of the International Federation of Free Teachers Union was created as one of the principle organizations. So I mean the question of our support for international affairs goes way back, why, because in the biography of Al Shanker there’s a quote. There’s this, he did a film for us on international affairs and he said well, first people get together on the local level, and workers in a factory get together and they decide well we can’t do everything we want to do just on a factory level so they get all the workers together in the city and then they start to get the workers at the state level together and then they form a national union and pretty soon, he said, they see that there are issues on an international level that intervene and that they have to be concerned and that they have to organize internationally. And, in the teachers organization, I was I started out working in the labor movement as a labor educator for a while and I specialized in teaching international affairs to unions. And you would go 20 years ago, 23 years ago and you go around to a union say to the textile workers union or the garment workers union, it was easy to tell workers even at the shop steward level why the union was involved in international affairs, because it was competition. Same with the automobile workers, international competition, multinational corporations and you know the international affairs directors of those unions were on Capitol Hill as much as anything looking at tariffs and quotas and so forth and so on. Why public service? We don’t have a multinational employer. And there were kind of three basic reasons for the whole influence, or at least we would present it this way, one is economic set of a reason for getting involved in international affairs
199 which has just grown with globalization. The second reason is one, that’s just purely a belief in workers deserve to be supported in the same way that if you give money to some workers that are going to strike across town, the labor movement just kind of had the idea that you should give money to workers on strike in Italy or in various places around the world or causes, earthquakes, natural disasters. I, when I worked on and wrote my speeches about international involvement in labor, and labor’s international involvement, we had some interesting statistics about the percentage of blood for the Red Cross that comes from labor employees and their families. The percentage of the United Way money that comes from organized labor. There was a department in the AFL-CIO that was specifically for liasoning for things like United Way campaigns and so forth because there was a natural inclination of labor to give more. In other words workers would give 40% when they were really only 13 20% of the work force or the general contributors, would give 40%. Now those statistics go back 40 years, where then there was just more of a concern about workers and labor unions would focus that concern. So that was the second reason, there was a focus on international solidarity that developed overtime. And the third issue is politics, especially the concept that what happens overseas most likely is sooner or later going to happen here and what happens to labor here politically is sooner or later going to happen overseas. And I can give one example if we go back to Ronald Reagan when Ronald Reagan fired all of the air traffic controllers, remember that? Al Shanker met with a bunch teachers, leaders from Asia and I thought they were going to sit down and talk about educational policy and things like that. The first question was “how did he get away with firing all these workers? They’re public employees. These guys are saying, the rational he used, the excuses he used to be able to fire these workers here opened up the door for our dictators and even democratically elected leaders to do the same thing here. And if it can be done in the US which is a big democracy, surely we can do it here.” And they said this is why. It was one example of how the political realm here had affected other places. And vice versa, I mean if you go and fight WWII, and you have and you go on national causes like that, during WWII the government tried to pass anti-
200 strike bills, and they would say we’re at war, we can’t afford a strike in steel. And interesting enough, the CIO when there was a Nazi-Hitler pact, the CIO was leading the cause for no intervention in Europe. When Hitler invaded Russia that changed, and almost overnight the CIO changed and said, no we have to go in right away and they were willing to sign a no strike agreement for the duration of the war. Because they thought it was so important. And George Meany who was president of the AFL at the time said no, we’re not going to strike, we’re patriotic but we’re not going to give up this right we have. It went along with this idea that especially if you don’t have trade union rights in a public service area, if they don’t have any organized rights for public service employees in Europe that affects how people look at it here. Now in the teachers area what’s happened is that it’s become a more internationalization of ideas about education so that we don’t have multinational employers but we do have trends in education crossing international boundaries. And if you look at the, there’s one example, at the OECD level, each year there’s a meeting of ministers of education at the OECD and they talk about educational trends and so forth. And there people change ideas, you know, so privatization and other ideas in education, decentralization, and other things like that are advanced through international organizations and they affect what people come back here and say that we should do. There was a period in the 80s when everyone was talking about, “oh well just do what the Japanese did in education and we’d have successful education” and that’s when Japan was riding high in the world and look at China where now you have international tests called TIMSS, I can’t remember the acronym its like the Test of International Math Science and I don’t know something yeah and it’s a big international test where you compare countries and TIMSS deals with math and science. There’s another international comparison done at the OECD level called PISA. So you know, where at, up unto a point, we don’t have international employers, however there’s another sort of thing that’s happening there’s an internationalization of employers in private schools and least its following this rise of private providers of education in the non-classroom, non-teaching part of education, that’s educational systems, testing, management systems, things like
201 that there is an enormous, billions and billions of dollars industry, and companies, international companies, go and sell educational systems to other countries. They go into especially into African countries and say we’ll set up your entire education system you just pay us a million dollars or whatever. It’s an enormous business and there’s a guy, a former guy at the World Bank, did a pretty good presentation to us once on this issue. And so that’s that. And then you have things like the Edison schools, are you familiar with that? Edison Schools was a company that was set up by the former editor of Esquire magazine, and they decided they were going to start putting in private school systems into American schools. They would set them up and run them at cost or lower level then it would cost to run existing public school systems and they would do a better job because they were presenting a better product. They were successful and they still exist in some cities, I don’t know if they were making money, but they put schools in Baltimore and in Miami. They were private schools, not charter schools. And as the movement got more steam they sold the idea to charter schools. But yeah I don’t know if the Edison schools, if they shaped themselves like private schools. If you want to you can talk to some other educational issues people and they can give you more information, but they were just private schools that would sell their system. You pay us X amount of dollars and we'll open and run X amount of schools and we’ll commit ourselves and get you better results that public schools at no extra cost as a money making venture, and they were going into and making trades on the stock exchange but they quickly started going international and tried to sell these schools in other places, so we go back about 5 or 6 years now and we get a call from one of the British unions saying the Edison school people are coming around and they want to talk to us. And the General Secretary of the National Association of School Masters Union Women and Teachers said that he got the information we put out because we put out information and explanations for why we thought charter schools were wrong and so when the guy from the Edison program came and the guy in Britain had all of our literature on his desk and he said the guy was coming in to sell us this concept, but we had all of your literature about what it was about and so forth
202 and we were prepared in advance for why we objected to them and so that’s an example of where this internationalization has some influence. But what you don’t have yet are the employers in the same way. There are issues that are important to teachers like how the classroom is run that are influenced by internationalization and international companies. I don’t know if that’s what you were getting at. 2) Do you get the feeling that the teachers get this connection? Do they understand why the AFT is involved at the global level? No, maybe we don’t do enough education on that. PISA for example, for a variety of reasons PISA, if you go to a teacher especially in Northern Europe and you say PISA they know exactly what you mean; they know it's this test. The German results from the 2000 PISA tests almost brought down Schroeder’s reelection. I mean since then he lost the other election to Merkel, but in 2000 this was a big issue in the national election because Germans were fairly down farther on the list. In the United States I don’t think it had, we have such a decentralized education system and we have very little reporting. When I was at the OECD office and the guy was saying that when the 2003 was released he said well I keep copies of the newsprint articles about PISA in my office, and he pointed to a cabinet top and he said look at the section for the US, 1 box. And he said look at the section for Germany and there were 5 or 6 boxes full of articles that had been written about PISA. So part of the problem is that we don’t have enough info, the thing is we try to do something in the United States, we have you know 1.2 million members of that 60% are teachers and we sometimes put an article in the paper, but it’s the nature of reporting in the US. In Europe it’s more important because you have Germany looks at what France does and France looks at what Finland does, and Finland is the highest performing country on the PISA report. So it’s much more pervasive. They read about it in the paper, but you don’t get as much general publicity about things here. We try to make are members aware that we do international work, you know especially on AIDS Africa we try to do a campaign for two reasons. One is so they understand what it is we’re doing, it’s a feel-good thing to know that we’re helping some other people. And the other thing we do is we raise
203 money for members to help out with the campaign. And something like PISA and some of these issues, it’s a lot harder to get it across and they don’t get it from other sources 3) Can I ask about your program, Education for Democracy? It’s unique and looks like it’s a two-pronged approach. First, you are trying to strengthening trade unions for democracy, as a type of civil society bulwark that will help strengthen democratization generally; and second, the program seeks to influence the content of what teachers teach, through modeling curricula and leadership training. Is this correct? Would you characterize this as kind of a two-pronged approach, or is the focus more on the development trade unions per se ? Well, we are always in the business of providing assistance to trade unions and teachers unions when they needed assistance, which in my over 20 years of service been sending in computer specialists to Chile to help them set up a national computer network, we sent a guy from our accounting department once to Nigeria to help them set up a more usable set of bookkeeping methods. So we do some real nuts and bolts things. We sent people to Hungary after the end of the Cold War to help the independent teachers union develop an actual organizing plan because they weren’t used to really developing strategies or organizing and so forth so we did that. So we’ve always done that and that’s part of our assistance for brother and sister unions. And it’s always done as long as there’s some kind of request. We don’t just send out troops to places to get involved in things without first being requested. Toward the end of the Cold War the AFT was very involved in supported Solidarnosc in Poland. And an interesting story at the end of the martial law in Poland, the president of the teacher’s section came over to the US. The AFT said what do you need, we can help you out, we can give you a grant to get the teacher’s union on its feet. We fully expected that he would say he needed an office and computers and things like that, but he said what we need are copies of the universal declaration on human rights be made available for every teacher in the classroom. And so we gave assistance so that the teacher’s union could print in Polish the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights to distribute to all of the classroom teachers. In the process of doing that, we had been working
204 domestically on a project called “Education for Democracy,” and it was a critique of how democracy was taught in the US. It wasn’t being taught very well, and our critique got a lot of attention. The idea came from an American political philosopher named Sydney Hook who gave a speech and when Al Shanker heard this speech he started really thinking about how we teach democracy. He said we should influence how democracy is taught in the US and then he got all of the signatures to sign on as supporters of the concept. Basically the concept is that we should actively teach democracy and it was reaction to the school of thought you get a lot in high schools and universities that’s, “we like democracy, but China and Russia each had their systems too that they liked.” It was a very non value-laden, it was done in a way where you weren’t trying to be critical of some other system. Al and these others said, "no that’s wrong." We have our system and teachers should be able to teach why we think that our system is better than the other systems. What is it about democracy that makes it better, is number 1 and number 2 is that democracy was not taught in a vibrant way. In fact it was Gore Vidal who said, “nothing spoils a good history class like a dose of civics education” or something like that. You know civics education was always taught to be there as X number people in Congress and about the state legislature and its pretty dry stuff. And Al argued that we aren’t talking about the struggle for democracy. It didn’t adequately talk about the struggle for women’s rights or the struggle for emancipation. At first democracy was all white men, then you had emancipation, then you had women’s rights and the civil rights movement later and then you also had international wars that threatened democracy and these stories weren’t told in a vibrant way where students understood why the founders supported this system instead of any other. What are some criticisms of the other systems? Why we thought communism or dictatorships were bad systems? And at the time this to some liberal educators sounded a bit like propaganda, but Al made the argument that you can teach other systems, its not that you can’t teach other systems. You can teach the tenets of communism, how is it practiced. What are the tenets of fascism how is it practiced? What are the tenets of other systems? And it also wasn’t saying that American democracy is better than other
205 democracy. He said you know you can teach this without making it propaganda. But you can teach it with facts; you can teach it with history. That argument is put forth in this essay. So as this came out in the late 80s and the AFT did a campaign to try and influence the textbooks and what went into the curriculum about teaching about democracy. As Eastern Europe started to change, there was a call on us to help teachers’ organizations and other NGO organizations, to work with them in terms of education for democracy. They were asking us for help, intellectuals and those running NGOs were asking the AFT for assistance in how to develop education for democracy in their system. They were basically saying “you think you’ve got problems teaching democracy, we were under communism for the past 50 years.” That’s what the Poles were saying and others were saying. So we started working on programs. We had a 3 year program that turned into a 5 year program in Nicaragua and we worked with them to help them develop their own program. After the first year it was a 99% Nicaraguan program. They had a committee and ran the program, and they really revised the way democracy was taught in the whole school system as a result. They even brought in former Sandinistas to become a part of the committee that oversaw the project. So for a number of years we did this program in Russia with the civic educators in Russia on teaching techniques and so on, and we still have a program going on in Russia. I worked with a small group in Mongolia of all places. We worked where people kind of wanted us to work, but then two things happened. One, we felt like we were getting more and more away from our core mission of helping teachers, working with civic educators and NGOs. Sometimes a teachers union was involved sometimes they weren’t. Like in Uzbekistan we worked with an NGO there, but there was no teachers union involved. Second, there was the rise of the democracy industry. At the end of the Cold War, more and more groups became involved with working with democracy and building democracy. And so in Mongolia today there are 3 or 4 more groups working on democracy there with Mongolian teachers and NGOs. So we don’t…But it was very nice, when one of them who was elected to parliament got around she said you know, this is the AFT, this is who got us started on this track. Part of the
206 democracy industry was started because there was a movement toward democracy worldwide that attracted people partly because the US government was putting in money. And so some NGOs shaped there program to follow where the money was going frankly. That’s why I say there was kind of a cottage industry in democracy programs. So around the end of the last century, the late 1990s we looked at our program and decided we kind of wanted to move the emphasis back more towards working with unions and helping unions become more democratic actors in society. So that’s what we do now. And then after 9/11 Sandra Feldman our former president instructed that she wanted us to see what we could do with teachers’ organizations in the Middle East. So we have our program in Russia, and we have our AIDS program, and we now have a two- year program in Lebanon that has now been suspended because of the war. We were working in Iraq, I went to Iraq twice but we stopped going in because we didn’t have the money for protection; we went to meet with Iraq teachers union that was formed three months after the invasion. We actually ran a national seminar on education for democracy with the acting minister of education and so forth, but we also got a grant from the NED to build up the national teachers union of Iraq. But because of all the violence we moved the program to Oman, but then we couldn’t have it there either because of the increased cost of going to Oman because you were not able to get there by road anymore. We had 3 people go to Kurdistan, to Kirkuk, and we had some of the Iraqis from the south came up. The Kurds have had their own teachers’ organization for 10 years. We started to work with Palestinians until the election and that’s kind of put that on hold because of Hamas taking over the government. So we’re working in Yemen too. And we’re also doing some work with Burma, with some of the Burmese teachers living in camps along the border. So we do some education for democracy programs but we’re also doing some work with trying to educate them about what a democratic teachers' union means, and it’s just like a niche program there. Cambodia, there’s a new teachers organization formed that we’re trying to get started there along with the Solidarity Center. So this is kind of what we’re doing now. There’s still a focus on democracy in education and teachers unions, but the
207 focus should be more on working on the main mission being with teachers themselves. 4) So in the AIDS campaign, funds are principally being diverted through teachers unions? Or are you involving other organizations as well? We had in the late 1990s, Sandy was still president Ed McElroy was secretary of treasury, he looked over our programs and said we had very little going in Africa. He said I want you to develop and Africa program and I started saying what can we do to help to get grants for African teachers’ organizations. Where to start? We had always been very strong in the anti-apartheid movement, strong as an outsider working with the teachers’ organization. The South African Democratic Teachers Union started before apartheid was ended and we supported it from the beginning and we worked in South Africa and with others here and there over the years, but looking at Africa, I was trying to figure out what we could do that might help and who should we talk to about it and this whole issue of AIDS came up. Teachers have a fairly high infection rate, higher then the general population in some cases although those figures are hard to come by. And a human life is a human life, but sometimes we’re educating two times the numbers of teachers that they need because half of the teachers are going to die from AIDS. And so we said let’s start a program of peer group education because teachers weren’t talking to other teachers about it. And we did this in the US, we would have a peer group AIDS education program in the AFT and teachers would learn about it from other teachers. And we started out working in Zimbabwe; we had been in contact with them and had gotten a small grant to work with the teachers union there to develop the concept of the program. We were using what’s called a worker circles. The Scandinavians have this thing for education where they would develop workers circles on the site which were groups that would get together on a regular basis and there would be someone there who would run the workers circle, and they through their international development work over the years taught this concept in Zimbabwe and South Africa and Kenya. And these were the places that also had the best infrastructure to reach out to all of the unions in that area. So it’s not an accident that we’re working with Zimbabwe South Africa and
208 Kenya because they had the best network to reach out to the countries. And the idea was, the biggest problem that these organizations had was, but we couldn’t go in and run the standard leadership training seminar, because they kept being hit by this same AIDS issue and at the same time we wanted to have teachers helping teachers because that’s one of the best things that a union can do, and you never get any education for kids if teachers don’t talk to their students about AIDS. You can introduce all the stuff you want to kids, but the stuff will just go on their desks and it won’t be used. So we kind of came to the conclusion about what’s the best thing we can do. The best thing was to help African teachers unions develop an AIDS education program through peer group education. So in a sense it is a union program. The by-product of this that we’ve seen in unions is that they develop or fine tune other skills, organizational skills. Because it takes a lot of work to put together this kind of program. So if you can do something like this, you can take your education work and apply it to organization work. You develop a leadership capacity and administrative capacity so you know how to administer and plan a campaign. All those things come into play, so if you do it in an AIDS campaign, you can also do it in an organizing campaign. Get some skills. The second thing is does is to modernize thinking about unions. In many parts of the world, the US included, there was a class approach taken in thinking about unions. The union’s relationship with school administrators or the ministry of education was always an adversarial one. The only time they came in contact was when the teachers wanted money or just they wanted more in general and the school administrators or ministry of education didn’t. So, it was always a conflictual relationship. But modern teachers’ organizations in the US, Europe, and other parts of the world realize that you have to be players in education. You have to be sophisticated enough even in negotiations or a pre-strike or strike situation that on the other hand you can cooperate with administrators on educational issues. That happens all the time in the US where you have an educational reform program but at the same time you might be in a pre-strike situation because the city’s not giving enough money to the teachers. But that’s a sophistication that just doesn’t come naturally. In Latin America for example,
209 the relationship is very conflictual. You only come in contact with the government if you have a conflict. So this AIDS program in Africa forces you to develop sophistication to work with ministries of education and government. And that’s a skill and concept that’s important for the unions. And sometimes they do better than the ministries and stuff and the relationships are conflictual, but sometimes they’ll do better than the ministry of health. So it kind of works both ways that we get to understand that in modern society, teachers unions can you know become more sophisticated and be positive players in education on one hand, but on the other hand they don’t give up their roles as teachers unions. Does that make any sense? So it’s another skill that this program gives, so it’s an AIDS program but it also provides the union on a development side. So it’s not divorced from union development. And also, we’ve had a hard time selling it. AIDS is such a controversial issues with all the myths about it and everything else, that selling it to the donors…. The donors go out and say that we should use teachers, but if they say “ok we’ll go out and get the ministry of education to start a program for teachers” all the international research in the United States and other places shows that its not as effective because managers come down and say “here’s a new program, you have to do this, you have to teach AIDS you have to do this and do that” So there’s a natural reluctance. But if a teacher gets this from his own representative, saying this is a program the union is working on, it gets access to teachers from a different way that you wouldn’t get from just a top down thing. And its not just about AIDS, but its about generally any kind of educational reform or ideas, things like that, if its any kind of top down, its less effective than one that the teachers are involved in the process. There are some examples of that. The World Bank ran an education reform program in the Dominican Republic some years ago and they asked us to get teachers union organizer from New York City who was of Puerto Rican background to go down and work with the education reform program to be kind of liaison with the teachers. And then when it came time to evaluate the program they had this teacher go down and help with the evaluation because having a teachers union come in is better than just having a World Bank official come in. I was invited, I went down on a
210 mission to Argentina 6 years ago now, and I was invited with a team to go negotiate the terms of an education reform program. The Bank asked me to go along because they said they wanted me to demonstrate that they were in favor of teachers unions being more effective. And it was fun because they let me be the bad cop in this case. The Minister of Education and everyone was in there and I said you know “I want transparency; I want the teachers involvement and so forth and so on.” In this case the teachers backed out of the deal. We got some agreement from the government for some cooperation and transparency but the teachers, in this life and death fight with the former president of the country Menen and also internally within the union, you know they said, “if we cooperate with a program by the World Bank and we also go to Congress within a few weeks there’s a whole bunch of leftists who will accuse us of being collaborators with the bad guys and it will hurt our chances of being elected so we’re not going to do it.” So I thought I was bringing them a great plum, they could go to their members and say “look we’ve become actors in shaping educational reform.” And they said no. Because the bank wanted me to come back and develop a reform program on the state level, and so when the states develop their plans, we want you to go in as a team with the teachers. And the other thing I pushed for real hard was transparency, so that the state would get a chunk of money for educational reform from the World Bank, then states would submit plans for education reform at the state level. They would be reviewed, and they would be getting money from the national government and the World Bank money. And I said, well when the states have a program for reform press should be allowed to see what the program is when it’s submitted and when the money comes back. You should see the budgets and you should have meetings with the teachers unions. Now the federal government also hated the main national teachers unions, so they compromised and said, “well we’ll have meetings of parents and teachers” and the teachers unions would be involved in that, so it was a bit of a compromise. And I said well what about the open meetings with the press, because transparency is a big thing so that you don’t have the corruption, and the
211 teachers unions said no. But the Bank was being pretty progressive I thought in asking me to go in. 5) I wanted to ask one more general question, since you keep touching on a lot of these things, but when you mentioned states and the lack of transparency, when you consider the bulk of would you do, what’s the greatest impediment to organizing or working globally? What impedes global solidarity, in other words? Funding. I mean finding funding is probably the biggest problem because you know, we compete with other NGOs and the AFT puts some money into the program itself, and the union can just sustain, although we probably put more money in than any other union. The core budget for this department is probably about 1% of the whole budget, the annual budget. We also pay dues to the international teachers’ organization, Education International which is another budget item. So when members say Oh we’re spending too much on international affairs, we say, well one percent, is that too much. But to run programs and ongoing programs we have to raise outside money. 6) And I’ve seen a lot of USAID money? Well USAID money comes in for certain things, like years ago in Nicaragua. But there are problems with aid money because we’re not a large operation. Most aid organizations don’t want to give money in small amounts. I mean a small amount to them is a million dollars. They want to give a 5 million dollar plus grant because that’s the only way they can manage. They can’t manage 500 different small grant programs to NGOs, we want 50 grants. We can manage 50 grants, but we can’t manage 500. So aid has been struggling, even the director under Clinton was saying he was trying to see about how to get subgrants to work so grants like the AFT could get a subgrant under a bigger grant but its not been very successful. National Endowment for Democracy is another source of funding. The Solidarity Center is another source of funding, but you’ll probably hear gossip that we’re back now in a big fight with them. But NED gives money to the Solidarity Center. The Solidarity Center is a core grantee of NED. You know what core grantees are? And when NED was set up, most of the core grant money went to labor because the democratic and republican parties didn’t have the capacity. But now they’ve
212 developed the capacity and labor movement has really lost some of its capacity and luster and the split didn’t help. So if we’re good AFL-CIO members, the idea is that any money that we get from NED, we can’t get NED money directly for labor work because all of the labor money from NED goes directly to the Solidarity Center and then the Solidarity Center is supposed to work with individual unions and that broke down when Sweeney was elected, first because Sweeney came from a different ideological background and we supported Tom Donahue and not Sweeney. And for years we got virtually no money from NED and now we’re getting a little money. The other problem is when funds come back to NED they have problems with aid money and things like that because they say “we have to protect our staff” and things like that and so we get money cut. So it’s not an easy relationship right now. Aid is hard. We get some State Department money. State Dept puts out RFPs from time to time and we’ll put in proposals sometimes. Request for proposals. And these are smaller amounts of money for NGOs, well I know they used to be up to $200,000, now I think they’re a little more now. And that’s how we went to Zimbabwe; we got a grant for about $137,000 for work in Zimbabwe. So, we struggle along to try to raise money where we can. 7) Regarding Education International and PSI (Public Services International). I know that in the 80s you helped create the merger organization, so certainly there’s some early involvement there. How would you characterize your relationships with these global federations? How do they help your work, and is this where the future of international affairs lies, working through these global federations? No. 8) Because they seem to be very important to some of the other unions that I’ve talked to. Yeah, well I think they can be more important to some of the other unions. See the Education International; it does good work in human rights, trade union rights, and those issues. It has the capacity to bring cases to the ILO for violations of trade union rights. It can reach a lot of people with issues. There was the case of a really bad violation of trade union rights in Ethiopia and they can do that. We think it can do more. It can give us more information on
213 education stuff. There’s a thing called TUAC, the Trade Union Action Committee, of the OECD and TUAC has a standing committee on education. So when ministers of education meet, the standing committee brings together educators. For example Al Shanker and other leaders have spoken, ministers of education, through that vehicle when they’ve met. I just came back from Paris three weeks ago because there was a meeting there on the PISA process. So the OECD researchers came in and gave a talk about the PISA project what’s the next research coming out and then we had a meeting of how the teachers directly or indirectly influence the process. But it is a growing question of what does it deliver back to the AFT in terms of what benefits do we get, and that’s something that we’re raising. The NEA belongs to it too. But what do you get back from it directly? We’re going through a process to try and reevaluate and see what we get back. We were members by tradition. We think that the EI does work that helps countries and human rights work. The EI is trying to do a better job at coordinating international aid. Because a whole number of countries do international aid to teachers, the Scandinavians especially, but it’s all government money. The Brits do some, not as much; the French do some, not as much for most of the Francophone companies. And the Canadians, they have what’s called Canadian aid money and they get money every year for programs. So the EI is trying to coordinate this more and more so that you don’t have people going in with the same project overlapping and then you don’t have some projects that should be funded falling through. But individual countries are never going to give up. They develop these programs, countries start to feel maternal, like these [programs] are our babies. They don’t mean it maliciously, it’s just not PC to say. So they develop this relationship, it happens with causes. Even here, we’ve been working with the Burma project for years, and it takes a lot of effort, but really is that the best thing we can do with the resources we have? So there’s a lot of people attached to it, they go to the Burmese border and you become attached to the people there, there’s a very strong pull. So going back to Education International, I don’t know. So the NEA continues to pay there dues. The NEA does not develop a separate real program. They do occasionally do some
214 overseas work, but they have in their bylaws a prohibition against using government money. It does back to the 60s and revelations about the government using covert money to fund programs and so forth. And they passed a rule back then that stayed in place about not taking government money even for domestic work. Now to get around it for domestic work, they set up a separate foundation. We have a thing called the AFT Educational Foundation it’s a 501C3. And it’s done not for political reasons, it’s that the AFT is not a 501(C)3. It just puts a wall between the general funds and then when we get money into that body it's its own stand alone organization. 9) Are you ever approached by your domestic colleagues asking if you might be able to reach out to any international partners for assistance on domestic programs? Not on a regular basis. On a specialized basis, like we might get a call from a local for example. And education is so much a state issue now rather than a local issue. And someone might come in and say here’s a program that works in this country overseas, or here’s what they do there and so I’m asked to give more information about it and find out what’s going on to see how they can deal with it as a local issue. And that happens maybe once every year or six months or something. I’ll get some request from some local or an individual member has a cause. Like there’s a big teachers strike going on in Oaxaca Mexico and its been going on for several months, and there’s been a net work of some left Americans who’ve adopted this issue, sending me emails like “what’s the AFT doing in helping the Oaxacan teachers?” But sometimes we’ll get that kind of thing, and we send back what we’ve been doing.
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———. (2005, October 26). Students, workers uniting to end low wage jobs on campuses [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://seiu.org/property/security/news/campus_jobs.cfm
———. (2005, November 30). Nearly 5,000 Houston janitors form union with SEIU; join janitors across the country to achieve the American dream [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.seiu.org/media/pressreleases.cfm?pr_id=1271
———. (2006, January 19). Statement from SEIU President Andy Stern calling for comprehensive immigration reform [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.seiu.org/media/pressreleases.cfm?pr_id=1281
———. (2006, April 19). Statement by SEIU Executive Vice President Eliseo Medina on the May 1 st national day of action for immigration reform [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.seiu.org/media/pressreleases.cfm?pr_id=1305
238
———. (2006, May 2). Statement by SEIU Executive Vice President Eliseo Medina ends 10-day fast as janitors at University of Miami win two-month struggle for right to a voice at work [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.seiu.org/media/pressreleases.cfm?pr_id=1307
———. (2006, May 15). Statement by SEIU Executive Vice President Eliseo Medina on President Bush’s address to the nation on immigration [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.seiu.org/media/pressreleases.cfm?pr_id=1310
———. (2006, May 15a). Statement by SEIU Executive Vice President Eliseo Medina on passage of the Senate immigration bill [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.seiu.org/media/pressreleases.cfm?pr_id=1311
———. (2006, June 15). Janitors’ victory at UM sparks new organizing by Florida service workers to lift themselves out of poverty [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.seiu.org/media/pressreleases.cfm?pr_id=1316
———. (2006, July 17). Statement by SEIU Secretary-Treasurer Anna Burger urging clean vote on minimum wage legislation in Congress [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://seiu.org/media/pressreleases.cfm?pr_id=1328
———. (2006). Sensenbrenner bill won’t secure our borders or provide an earned path to citizenship [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.seiu.org/issues/imm_sensenbrenner.cfm
———. (2006a). The Sensenbrenner-King bill’s greatest misses [Electronic File]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.immigrationforum.org/documents/PolicyWire/Legislation/SenseKing Glance.pdf
———. (2006b). Immigration reform: support immigration reform that improves pay and benefits for all workers [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.seiu.org/issues/issue_immigration.cfm
———. (2006c). SEIU statement on the bipartisan comprehensive immigration reform bill [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.seiu.org/issues/2005_secure_america_act.cfm
———. (2006d). Election 2006: candidates and information [Database]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: https://ssl.capwiz.com/seiuorg/e4/ ?
———. (2006e). Good jobs that can support a family [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.seiu.org/issues/raise_minwage.cfm
239
———. (2006f). School bus workers form global alliance [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.seiu.org/public/education/bus_campaign/index.cfm
———. (2006g). Thinking—and acting—globally on behalf of women workers [Resolution]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://seiu.org/about/global_partnerships/intl_women_s_day.cfm
———. (2006h). About Justice for Janitors [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.seiu.org/property/janitors/about/
———. (2006i). Justice for Janitors [Directory]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.seiu.org/property/janitors/
———. (2006j). SEIU history [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.seiu.org/about/seiu_history/index.cfm
———. (2006k). Uniting our strength to win big: the seven strengths [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.seiu.org/about/2004_report/unitingourstrength.cfm
———. (2006l). SEIU fast facts: core industries [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.seiu.org/about/fast_facts/index.cfm
———. (2006m). Where is SEIU located across the country? [Directory]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.seiu.org/faqs/faq_whereisseiu.cfm
———. (2006n). SEIU mental health industry [Directory]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://seiu.org/public/mh/
———. (2006o). What is hospital systems? [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://seiu.org/health/faqs/what_is.cfm
———. (2006p). What is property services? [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://seiu.org/property/faqs/what_is.cfm
———. (2006q). About the property services industry, by the numbers [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.seiu.org/property/security/about_industry/index.cfm
———. (2006r). More than 5,300 Houston janitors choose to form union with SEIU [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.seiu.org/property/janitors/campaigns/houston_victory_pg2.cfm
240 Sherman, J.L. (2006, September 10). Labor turmoil following disaster draws in USW. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette [Electronic Version]: Retrieved October 17, 2006, from: http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06253/720267-357.stm
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Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU). (2004, September 15). Transatlantic campaign highlights falling bus standards : Retrieved October 17, 2006, from: http://www.tgwu.org.uk/Templates/News.asp?NodeID=91104&PrintFriendly=Tr ue
———. (2006). Justice for cleaners; fighting for a fair wage and respect in the marketplace [Background]: Retrieved October 17, 2006, from: http://www.tgwu.org.uk/Templates/Campaign.asp?Action=Display&NodeID=924 73&int1stParentNodeID=42437&int2ndParentNodeID=42467
———. (2006, August 3). Tube cleaners' pickets to protest over pay : Retrieved October 17, 2006, from: http://www.tgwu.org.uk/Templates/News.asp?NodeID=92711&int1stParentNode ID=42438&int2ndParentNodeID=42438&Action=Display
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242 US State Dept: U.S. Department of State. (2006). Indonesia: country reports on human rights practices, 2005 : Retrieved October 18, 2006, from: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61609.htm
———. (2006, March 8). 2005 Human Rights Report, Colombia, Section 6(a) : Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61721.htm
U.S. House of Representatives, House Judiciary Committee. (2005, December 16). Sensenbrenner, King hail House passage of border security, immigration bill [Electronic File]: Retrieved October 18, 2006, from: http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/immhousepass121605.pdf
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———. (2005a). Stop the privatization of social security [Petition]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.unionvoice.org/campaign/socsec022205
———. Union Network International (UNI) (2005, November 30). Call to end cleaners’ dispute by Christmas [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.union- network.org/UNIindep.nsf/0/e433be6749bf9d10c12570c9003c458c?OpenDocum ent
———. (2006, March 12). SFWU clean start campaign launch, Thursday 20 April 2006 [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.union- network.org/unipropertyn.nsf/1c9ca52cb1bb2145c1257176005421af/f39bdf8117c b6ec6c12571a7004deb2a?OpenDocument
———. (2006, March 30). UNI signs global agreement with Securitas [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.union- network.org/unipropertyn.nsf/56555494277eec9fc125701a002ef900/56745616cac f858bc12571a7004deb20?OpenDocument
———. (2006, April 4). National SEIU leaders join hunger strike as chorus grows calling on Shalala to intervene [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.union- network.org/uniindep.nsf/4e36123c6ddb05b7c12568f000341550/aeeb8c3f01ba35 24c125715c002b0877?OpenDocument
———. (2006, April 4b). Janitors hunger strike at Miami University hits 17 days [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.union-
243 network.org/uniindep.nsf/4e36123c6ddb05b7c12568f000341550/86b682f6eacb8b 82c1257157002e7787?OpenDocument
———. (2006, April 19). Clean start campaign: invisible workforce stands up against Workchoice laws [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.union- network.org/UNIPropertyN.nsf/$webDocuments/B3F5F8D939577F5BC12571A7 004DEB2F?Opendocument
———. (2006, May 8). Cleaners demonstration at Deutsche Bank, London [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.union- network.org/unipropertyN.nsf/1c9ca52cb1bb2145c1257176005421af/6788ff21e8 a92f51c12571a7004deb39?OpenDocument
———. (2006, May 18). AMP buildings need a clean start [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.union- network.org/UNIPropertyN.nsf/$webDocuments/4E0D0A342272865DC12571A7 004DEB3A?Opendocument
———. (2006, June 7). Big corporations should get a heart, treat cleaners decently: MP tells Parliament [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.union- network.org/UNIPropertyN.nsf/$webDocuments/D60DF110EF0A4831C12571A 7004DEB3F?Opendocument
———. (2006, June 19). Securicor Indonesia workers defy intimidation, continue sit-in into second week. International support grows [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.union- network.org/unipropertyn.nsf/7f9bc1ab9d900747c1257044004ba821/53cf0ead92 9403f7c12571a7004deb44?OpenDocument
———. (2006, June 22). UNI meets with Indonesian ambassador to show support for striking G4S workers [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.union- network.org/unipropertyn.nsf/7f9bc1ab9d900747c1257044004ba821/fbfda7fdbe8 ae6b2c12571a7004deb45?OpenDocument
———. (2006, June 28). Group 4 Securicor under fire for human rights abuses [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.union- network.org/unipropertyn.nsf/7f9bc1ab9d900747c1257044004ba821/571c1b4d14 c51c47c12571a7004deb4a?OpenDocument
———. (2006, July 7). Indonesian update: Group 4 Securicor promises to implement Indonesian Supreme Court decision; Securicor Indonesia still fails to act [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.union-
244 network.org/unipropertyn.nsf/1c9ca52cb1bb2145c1257176005421af/ce9a7cb00e 6454ecc12571a7004deb4d?OpenDocument
———. (2006, July 14). Securicor Indonesia continues to deny justice to fired workers [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.union- network.org/unipropertyn.nsf/7f9bc1ab9d900747c1257044004ba821/2177eadc29 827bb4c12571ab004714f9?OpenDocument
———. (2006, September 2). UNI global union women’s network [Directory]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.union- network.org/UNIsite/Groups/Women/Women.html
———. (2006). Welcome to UNI property services global union [Directory]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.union- network.org/unipropertyn.nsf/Index?OpenPage
———. (2006a). About UNI: press pack : Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.union- network.org/UNIsite/About_Us/Presentation_of_UNI/What_is_UNI.html
———. (2006b). Stories about cleaners and security guards in Australia [Directory]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.union- network.org/UNIPropertyN.nsf/$webDocuments/EBD330B0D742D76FC12571A 7004DEB4B?Opendocument
Union of Needletrades, Industrial, Textile, Hotel, and Restaurant Employees’ Union (UNITE-HERE). (2006). About us [Background]. Retrieved October 17, 2006, from: http://www.unitehere.org/about/
United Steelworkers’ of America (USW). (2003, July 15). USWA-led coalition files legal actions v. Rio Tinto’s Kennecott Utah Corp. for ‘retaliation’ [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://betacms.uswa.org/uswa/program/content/760.php
———. (2003). Summary: proposed agreement between International Steel Group, Inc. and the United Steelworkers’ of America [Electronic File]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/adminlinks/docs//USWA_ISG_Summary.pdf
———. (2003a). Summary: proposed agreement between U.S. Steel and the United Steelworkers’ of America on behalf of National Steel employees [Electronic File]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/adminlinks/docs//USW%20NAT%20Summary .pdf
245 ———. (2004). Steelworkers’ deepen ties with Mexico’s metals unions [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/3175.php
———. (2005, January 11). Steelworkers’, PACE vote to merge [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.uswa.org/uswa/program/content/1823.php
———. (2005, June 2). Steelworkers’ leaders from Canada, Brazil, Chile condemn Gerdau attacks on workers’ standards, protections [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/2109.php
———. (2005). Steel companies filing for bankruptcy, 1997-2004 [Electronic File]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: https://www.usw.org/usw/program/adminlinks/docs//Bankruptcies%202004%206 -11-04.pdf
———. (2005a). National Wire Fabric workers go to Europe to try to end nine-month strike in Arkansas [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/2918.php
———. (2005b). Health savings accounts won’t work for workers [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.uswa.org/uswa/program/content/2750.php
———. (2005c). Bush social security plan means deep cuts in benefits [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/2084.php
———. (2005d). CAFTA passes both House and Senate [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/2255.php
———. (2005e). CAFTA is not good for workers [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/2243.php
———. (2005f). Reject flawed CAFTA, union leaders tell Congress [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/2052.php
———. (2006, February 9). USW joins conference to outline global strategies for trade unions [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/2723.php
———. (2006, March 1). Steelworkers’ installation of officers celebrates unprecedented growth and member influence [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/2792.php
246
———. (2006, March 3). USW condemns Fox government’s suppression of Mexican Miners’ Union as naked aggression [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/2796.php
———. (2006, March 6). Unions from two continents speak out at Sappi meeting: USW and CEPPWAWU question direction of global paper company [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/3189.php
———. (2006, March 17). Steelworkers demand that Vicente Fox’s government restore democratically elected Mexican mineworker union leader Napoleon Gomez to office [Press Release]: Retrieved October 22, 2006 from: http://www.uswa.org/uswa/program/content/2818.php
———. (2006). Coordinated Bargaining [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/483.php
———. (2006a). Global union group commits to bring Rio Tinto to justice; eight nations pledge solidarity [Resolution]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.uswa.org/uswa/program/content/3178.php
———. (2006b). Global copper industry at a glance [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/231.php?lan=en
———. (2006c). USW global initiative in copper and metals [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/385.php
———. (2006d). What is rapid response? [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/2170.php
———. (2006e). NAFTA’s decade of job losses [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/839.php
———. (2006f). Research how your officials vote [Database]: Retrieved August 5, 2006, from: http://www.capwiz.com/uswa/issues/votes/
———. (2006g). Fighting for sweat-free labor conditions and workers’ rights [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/overview_sub.php?modules2_ID=337 &modules_ID=337
———. (2006h). Section 301 petition against the Chinese government: questions and answers [Electronic File]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/adminlinks/docs/A_QA_5- 1_markups_not_shown.pdf
247
———. (2006i). U.S. healthcare bill of rights for all Americans [Resolution]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: https://www2.usw.org/billofrights/
———. (2006j). Issue brief: social security [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/2269.php?lan=en
———. (2006k). The employee free choice act [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/2840.php?lan=en
———. (2006l). The need for universal healthcare [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/2434.php
———. (2006m). Groundbreaking anti-sweatshop legislation introduced [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/3103.php?lan=en sweatshops
———. (2006n). Report suggests employers’ tactics thwart workers’ attempts to organize [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/2616.php
———. (2006o). About our Union, the USW, Alcoa Corporation [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/472.php
———. (2006p). Labor board charges Continental Tire with unlawfully relocating charlotte production: charges confirm USW complaints that company purposefully short-circuited bargaining process [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/3106.php
———. (2006q). Protecting retiree health care and winning job security top bargaining goals for USW’s rubber division: 2006 contract bargaining includes master talks at Goodyear, Bridgestone/Firestone and BFGoodrich/Michelin [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/2817.php
———. (2006r). USW early history [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/217.php
———. (2006s). USW mergers [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/543.php
———. (2006t). NAFTA spectacularly fails its advocates’ promises [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.uswa.org/uswa/program/content/2755.php
248 ———. (2006u). USW regions, district directors and co-directors : Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/overview_sub.php?modules2_ID=208 &modules_ID=208
———. (2006v). Basic steel: overview of the global steel industry [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.uswa.org/usw/program/content/266.php
———. (2006w). USW diversity [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/544.php
———. (2006x). Major issues in manufacturing [Directory]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/overview_sub.php?modules2_ID=15& modules_ID=431
———. (2006y). PACE: history of a great union [Background]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/3184.php
———. (2006z). Global solidarity: building global alliances [Directory]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://usw.org/usw/program/content/overview_sub.php?modules2_ID=549&mod ules_ID=549
———. (2006aa). Steelworkers’ demand justice for Mexico’s miners [Press Release]: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from: http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/3192.php
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