No. 20 November 2014

China-India Economic Cooperation: Alternate Economic Corridors through India to China’s Western Region

Gautam Das*

Introduction and its global economic clout, China has The historical echoes are rather remarkable emerged as the dominant power all across and intriguing. As 21st century China reaches Central Asia. Xi Jinping thus enjoys a a position of its greatest power and prestige position in both China and Central Asia since the in the 8th Century comparable only to the Tang emperor C.E., a new military threat is emerging in the Taizong. In another parallel, in 747 C.E. a form of a new Islamic Caliphate in West Asia. Tang general, Xianzhi (Guo This new threat is the rise of the so-called Xianzhi/Kuo Tzu-i), a Korean in the service Islamic State under a proclaimed Caliph, of the Tang court, crossed the Baroghil Pass demanding the allegiance of all Muslims and entered what is now known as the - worldwide, which has begun military Baltistan area in the state of Jammu and operations to enforce its writ. The Islamic , establishing a Chinese protectorate State (IS), as it calls itself, is using a mix of over Gilgit. This marked the furthest Chinese seemingly organized tactical ground penetration so far, into this mountainous operations as well as threats of terrorist acts region lying between the Hindukush across the world. It has begun to find willing mountains and the Himalayas. Today, after recruits among the Islamic countries across many centuries again, there are Chinese the world, and even, as very recent events in government personnel in the Gilgit-Baltistan the U.K. and Canada have shown, among the area - construction workers and security radicalized new converts to Islam in the personnel - and it is reported that the region advanced Western countries. has been leased to China by Pakistan1 for 50 years. President Xi Jinping of China enjoys much greater personal power in China than his immediate predecessors, and the strength and capabilities of the armed forces of China *Adjunct Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies, today command respect both in the Asia- Delhi. The views expressed here are those of the Pacific region and the world. author and not necessarily of the Institute. For feedback mail: [email protected] 1 With its leading position in the Shanghai The area falls within the area of Jammu & Kashmir state occupied by in 1947-48, referred to in Cooperation Organization, its military power India as Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK). Contemporaneous with Chinese westward by rival sectarian Islamic militias in the expansion into Central Asia during the Tang Gilgit-Baltistan region, which is Shia- dynasty, Islam had been expanding across dominated. In its southern-most stretch West Asia and into Central Asia under the around Mansehra, the KKH also passes Arab . This led to a through territory dominated by an anti-Shia confrontation between the Arabs and their militant group, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, which allies, the recently Islamized Turkic tribes, has no respect for the Pakistani state. and the Chinese forces in central Asia. The fateful Battle of or Battle of Artlakh Under these circumstances, it does not seem (751 C.E.) between the united Arab-Turkic to be sound policy for China to be investing forces and the Tang army, took place near the in the proposed -Gwadar Economic present-day town of (formerly Aulie- Corridor. Billed as the China-Pakistan Ata and Talas), along the River Talas in Economic Corridor, it has been under active today’s , near the border with consideration since about 2006. It is intended Kyrgyzstan, at which the Chinese army under to link Xinjiang Province of China with the Gao Xianzhi (Kuo Tzu-i) was annihilated. Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea coast of General Gao Xianzhi’s defeat ended Chinese Pakistan, which is being developed by power across most of Central Asia for the Chinese companies. Both Xinjiang Province next many centuries. and Pakistan are under terrorist threat from local Islamic terrorist groups, and the Widening Span of Islamic Fundamentalism proposed economic corridor will run along Today Islamic fundamentalists are active in the KKH: through Xinjiang, and through the Xinjiang Province of China, in adjacent mountain territory in northern Pakistan and , Pakistan and , all Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The entire 1,300 attempting to overthrow the existing regimes km from Kashgar to Abbottabad will be a in order to replace them with states run under vulnerable stretch that will be difficult to Islamic Sharia law. The Uighur unrest in physically protect. The remaining distance of China may be ethno-political based, but about 700 km to the sea will also be difficult arguably, it is reinforced by Islamic separatist to protect, given that the Tehreek-e-Taliban feelings. Some of these fundamentalist Pakistan has formally declared war against terrorist organizations, such as the East the Pakistani state itself. Turkestan Islamist Movement (ETIM), also known as the East Turkestan Islamist Party, Security Concerns and the East Turkestan Liberation It is necessary at this early stage in the Organization (ETLO) or Hizb ut-Tahrir, are building of the Kashgar-Gwadar Economic avowedly pan-Islamic organizations, which Corridor for China to re-examine both its do not believe in the concept of the modern aims and objectives and its vulnerabilities, nation-state. They desire instead a universal especially in terms of security concerns. If Islamic state – exactly what the IS has the aim is indeed purely an economic one, declared itself to be. In Pakistan too, there are intended to bring and continue to provide groups within the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, long-term prosperity to the people of such as the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e- Pakistan and the people of the Chinese Mohammadi (TNSM) in the Swat Valley, province of Xinjiang, then its physical which espouse a world caliphate under security must be of paramount concern. The Islamic Sharia law. The TNSM has easy inherent vulnerabilities caused by steep access to the Karakoram Highway (KKH) mountainous terrain in a geologically young and can attempt to target a soft target with and unstable mountain region and extreme high publicity value. The KKH has already high altitude climatic conditions apart, the been targeted and disrupted in the recent past Islamic terrorist threat is now assuming Page | 2 greater salience. In Pakistan, the Government energy transportation point of view, China’s has declared war against Islamic militants Hequ region. and the Pakistan Army is presently in active operations against them: in effect there is an The suitable pipeline layout would be a main ongoing civil war in Pakistan. Until and pipeline from the northern Arabian Sea coast unless political stability and peace within to north-central India, with another branch Pakistan is restored and physical security of line leading out from it thereafter, while the all infrastructure is assured, the creation of main line continues into Nepal and thence such an economic corridor will be a great into the TAR. A second line pipeline from financial risk. the northern Bay of Bengal coast would travel northwards to supply energy to the If the primary Chinese aims are to secure eastern TAR, from where it would continue alternative energy supply routes from the to the Hequ Region, which is the area around Persian Gulf to western China and Xinjiang, the first big bend in the Yangtze River, and and to facilitate development and prosperity thus at and around the junction of the for the people of that province, then prudence Sichuan, Qinghai and Gansu provinces. dictates that the likely benefits to Pakistan from this project may need to be temporarily The main pipeline can be taken from the postponed. It would perhaps be wiser for Arabian Sea, western coast of India in China presently to assist the Government of Gujarat state. The requisite oil terminal could Pakistan in stabilising its internal security be either at Kandla or at a new oil terminal situation, rather than presenting the various facility-cum-port, which can quite anti-government Islamist militants with high conveniently be developed in the Gulf of publicity-value soft targets which are difficult Kutch (also spelt Kachch). In order to to protect. A revised plan for a China- maximize security, such a new pipeline could Pakistan Economic Corridor, without a very run alongside the existing 1,075 km long oil vulnerable oil pipeline, could easily be pipeline, which connects Salaya in Gujarat, worked out later when conditions along the via Koyali to Mathura in Uttar Pradesh state. proposed corridor are peaceful. Western Line An Alternate Proposal The two routes, which can be used onwards It is hereby suggested that alternate economic from Mathura to China, are a main pipeline corridors be developed through India instead (Western Pipeline Economic Corridor) to the of through Pakistan, which will provide near- TAR via Nepal, and a branch pipeline to total physical security and entail less Xinjiang via the state of Himachal Pradesh. expenditure. Such economic corridors will Broadly, the route via Nepal could travel in a provide all the benefits that China perceives direct line through the north Indian plains will become available to its Western Region, towards Raxaul-Birganj on the India-Nepal as are being sought from the Pakistan-China border in Bihar state, and thence northwards Economic Corridor. The desired objective of into the Kathmandu Valley. Thereafter, it an oil pipeline conveying oil from the Persian would run alongside or closely parallel to the Gulf to western China can actually be Kodari Highway into . This route achieved through India. Oil pipelines from would entail traversing the least possible India’s coast to China’s inland areas in its distance through difficult and mountain Western Region can help move energy safely terrain than the presently-proposed insecure and in a cost-effective manner to Xinjiang, route along the Karakoram Highway in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), and Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. even to that most isolated area of all from the

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The branch pipeline would run northwards modern pipeline security architecture and by from Mathura, parallel to the existing effective counter-intelligence systems of highway alignment, and thereafter from the West Bengal state and of the Indian central environs of Shimla, it could run parallel to government. the old Hindustan-Tibet Road. This would take it over Shipki La into western Tibet, Securing the pipelines and the proposed from where it can run beside the existing economic corridors highway system to Xinjiang. The route would Security of the pipeline and associated run about 400 km through Himalayan infrastructure can be provided by an effective mountain territory, much less than the and cost-effective combination of traditional approximately 800 km through such physical security methods, augmented by the mountains along the Karakoram Highway. most modern security technology. This This route too, like the one through Nepal, would include installed fibre-optic pressure would be free from real and present terrorist and temperature sensors for the pipeline threat, and could be more easily kept environment, and 24 x 365 visual observation, physically secure. multi-frequency coverage through a geo- stationary satellite-based observation system, Eastern Line backed-up by small short-range drone The suggested eastern pipeline (Eastern (unmanned aerial surveillance platform) Pipeline Economic Corridor) would be along systems. Thus three new physically secure the alignment Kolkata Port (Haldia and administratively convenient Economic Terminal)-Kishenganj-Kalimpong-Jelepla- Corridors within India could then be Yatung (Yadong) route, or Kolkata- developed along the alignment of these Kalimpong-Yatung (KKY) for short. North pipelines, the two interconnected western of Kalimpong it would follow the general ones, and the one eastern one. alignment of the ancient traditional trade route between Lhasa and the Indian plains. The suggested new China-India Economic However, in the TAR it will need to go up to corridors, if implemented, will most likely the east-west projected Chinese railway line propel the economic relationship between from Xigatse to Nyingqi, and thence onwards India and China to new and unprecedented towards the Hequ region. This particular highs. It will bring oil to the western region eastern pipeline would have minimal or low- of China and allow complementary economic threat vulnerability when compared to the development of both India and Nepal, as well Gwadar-Kashgar corridor through Pakistan as bring with it Chinese investment in and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. However, infrastructure in India. Such an economic that anticipated level of low-level corridor will have much less high-mountain vulnerability – only in a stretch close to the terrain to traverse and will be free from the Bangladesh border, if and when any Islamic constant threat of attack and disruption by fundamentalist political party comes to power Islamist terrorist militants. in that country - is easily catered for by

The ICS is an interdisciplinary research institution which has a leadership role in promoting Chinese and East Asian Studies in India. ICS Analysis aims to provide informed and balanced inputs in policy formulation based on extensive interactions among wide community of scholars, experts, diplomats and military personnel. Page | 4

No. 19 October 2014 : The Contingent Reserve Arrangement and The International Monetary System No. 18 October 2014 : Impasse Yet Again: ’s Failure to Acknowledge the Dalai Lama’s Increasing Moderation No. 17 August 2014 : Second Xinjiang Work Forum: Old Policies in New Language No. 16 August 2014 : Comparative Assessment of the SAARC and SCO Charters No. 15 July 2014 : South Korea-China Relations and the Northeast Asian Strategic Puzzle No. 14 March 2014 : Kunming Incident Reveals Political Chasm No. 13 February 2014 : India-South Korea Strategic Partnership: An Assessment No. 12 July 2013 : Emerging Trends in Chinese Investments in Bangladesh: Challenges and Opportunities No. 11 July 2013 : China and the Federalism Question in Nepal No. 10 June 2013 : The Recent Violence in Xinjiang and China’s Ethnic Policy No. 9 May 2013 : Rising and Shining: The Coming Boom in Indo-Japanese Economic Relations No. 8 April 2013 : China’s Military Power No. 7 March 2013 : Self-Immolations, the Tibet Question and the Way Forward No. 6 August 2012 : China and the Revival of the World Economy No. 5 May 2012 : The US-China “Strategic Distrust”: Perceptions from New Delhi No. 4 May 2012 : Chinese Reactions to India’s Agni-V Test Firing No. 3 April 2012 : Bo Xilai’s Exit: Some Interpretations No. 2 April 2012 : China, India and the Indian Ocean Region: Need to Move from Balance of Power to Cooperation No. 1 November 2011 : Postponement of the 15th Special Representative-level Talks: Possible Causes and Implications

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