Middle East Mission Review
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Peacekeeping_3.final.qxd 1/28/08 10:04 AM Page 64 3.13.5 Middle East Following the Israel-Hezbollah war in July in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was initially tasked and August 2006, and despite the creation of a with confirming the withdrawal of Israeli new political framework in the subregion with forces, restoring international peace and secu- UN Security Council Resolution 1701, the Mid- rity, and assisting the government of Lebanon dle East as a whole continued to slide deeper in ensuring the return of its effective authority into crisis in 2007. In Lebanon, a prolonged po- to the south of the country. In May 2000, litical crisis, repeated assassinations of promi- UNIFIL assisted in confirming Israel’s with- nent political figures, and several months of drawal of its forces in accordance with Reso- fighting between the Lebanese Armed Forces lution 425 behind a “Blue Line” identified by and an Al-Qaida-inspired Islamist faction the UN. (Fatah al-Islam) in a Palestinian refugee camp, Conditions remained unstable, however, combined with reports of illegal arms traffic as the Lebanese government was unable to across the Syrian-Lebanese border, contributed deploy forces in the south. In 2004, Security to creating a sense of instability and insecurity. Council Resolution 1559 reiterated the de- Violence among Palestinian factions in the oc- mand for an extension of the Lebanese gov- cupied Palestinian territory increased, which ernment’s authority throughout all of Leba- culminated in a week of clashes and the mili- non, also calling for a withdrawal of Syrian tary takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas in troops (accomplished in the spring of 2005) June. Against this background, and also com- and “the disbanding and disarmament of all bined with heightening tension over Iran’s nu- Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.” In the clear program, as well as fears of a Syrian-Is- context of the assassination of former Leba- raeli confrontation in the summer of 2007, nese prime minister Rafiq Hariri, the UN was international peace operations remained caught further mandated to conduct an investigation; up in the deepening regional turmoil. On the in May 2007, amid the continuing Lebanese other hand, in the later part of 2007, levels of political crisis, the Security Council decided violence in Iraq began to decline, though this to establish an international tribunal to try was not matched with a positive political those involved in the Hariri assassination. process. At the same time, the renewal of con- War erupted in the south of Lebanon in tacts between Israel and the moderate Palestin- July 2006 when Hezbollah launched an attack ian leadership in the West Bank and a victorious against an Israeli patrol and abducted two sol- end to the fighting between the Lebanese diers. A major military campaign ensued, end- Armed Forces and Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon ing after five weeks of intense bombing and gave some hope for stabilization and a renewal rocket fire targeting civilians on both sides of the peace process in the Middle East. with the adoption of Security Council Resolu- tion 1701. That resolution established a new and expanded mandate for UNIFIL, adding to UNIFIL: Background and Mandate its original responsibilities the tasks of moni- First established in 1978 by Security Council toring the cessation of hostilities, ensuring Resolutions 425 and 426, the UN Interim Force that no foreign forces would be present in 64 Peacekeeping_3.final.qxd 1/28/08 10:04 AM Page 65 MIDDLE EAST • 65 Lebanon without government consent, assist- ing the Lebanese Armed Forces in preserving an area free of armed personnel (other than UNIFIL and Lebanese government troops) be- tween the Blue Line and the Litani River, and fully implementing the Taif Accords, which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon. The resolution also added a num- ber of political tasks that the UN was charged with, including facilitating negotiations over the contested Sheb’a Farms and the release of the two abducted Israeli soldiers and Leban- ese prisoners in Israel. UNIFIL: Key Developments and Challenges In the year since the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, conditions in south Lebanon have been relatively stable, and the arrangements established with Secu- rity Council Resolution 1701 have largely held. Hezbollah has frequently reiterated its commitment to the resolution’s implementa- tion, and has focused on building political strength—though it has also replenished its military arsenal, albeit not within UNIFIL’s area of operation in south Lebanon. At the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) same time, a permanent cease-fire is yet to be achieved, and many of the key elements called for in Resolution 1701 remain to be • Authorization and 19 March 1978 (UNSC Res. 425/426) Start Date implemented. In addition, the prolonged po- • Force Commander Major-General Claudio Graziano (Italy) litical crisis in Lebanon, mounting tension • Budget $713.6 million (1 July 2007– and fears of renewed civil strife, and what 30 June 2008) may have been only a first manifestation of • Strength as of Troops: 13,264 an Al-Qaida-inspired Islamist challenge, have 31 October 2007 International Civilian Staff: 304 significantly impacted UNIFIL. The mission Local Civilian Staff: 583 was targeted by a roadside bomb attack in For detailed mission information see p. 263. June 2007, which killed six soldiers from a Spanish battalion. A second major incident highlighting the continued precarious security of the mission occurred on 16 July, when a UNIFIL’s troop complement grew through UNIFIL military police vehicle of the Tan- a phased deployment. In February 2007, Italian zanian contingent was attacked, though no general Claudio Graziano replaced Alain Pelle- casualties resulted. Another attempt to attack grini of France as force commander, and by UNIFIL peacekeepers was thwarted success- mid-2007 UNIFIL had enlarged to roughly fully by the Lebanese authorities in Tyre in 13,500 military personnel from thirty coun- October. tries, out of an authorized 15,000. This in- Peacekeeping_3.final.qxd 1/28/08 10:04 AM Page 66 66 • MISSION REVIEWS cluded 1,600 serving in its Maritime Task Line on the ground in order to prevent unin- Force. Troop contributors (eight of which were tended border violations by either side. represented on the Security Council in 2007, UNIFIL officials also worked hard to es- an unusually large number) generally remained tablish good relations with the civilian popula- committed to the mission’s mandate and con- tion in south Lebanon. In the first few months figuration, despite questions by some actors as after its expansion, UNIFIL patrols faced occa- to whether UNIFIL’s mandate would evolve sional stone-throwing by local youths, and there into an open-ended one, and as concerned the were reports of Hezbollah activists denying costs of, in particular, the Maritime Task Force. peacekeepers freedom of movement. These in- UNIFIL’s most notable characteristic re- cidents led to an increased engagement to foster mained the extensive European participation, a dialogue with the local authorities—as well as, relative exception for UN operations. One man- on occasion, the deliberate use of a firm posture ifestation, the Strategic Military Cell (a man- vis-à-vis efforts to deny freedom of movement. agement mechanism at headquarters created to As UNIFIL reached full troop strength and re- meet the insistence of European troop contrib- cruitment of civilian staff progressed, its politi- utors on a separate command structure), made cal and civil affairs office, civil affairs teams, important contributions to supporting planning civilian-military cooperation unit, public infor- needs, according to two Secretariat reviews— mation offices, and military community out- though those reviews also emphasized its “mis- reach unit all began working to improve rela- sion-specific” and “temporary” character, as tions with local communities and to implement well as the need to establish interoperability be- confidence-building measures. Emphasizing its tween it and existing Department of Peace- role as supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces keeping Operations (DPKO) structures, where enabled the mission to clarify its mandate and coordination difficulties had surfaced. dispel tension. This was consistent with a con- In the months after the war, much empha- sensus within the mission, albeit one not always sis was placed on consolidating the new status shared by every member of the Security Coun- quo into a more permanent arrangement and cil, that Hezbollah’s eventual disarmament on attaining greater stability in the area. By would take place only through a domestic polit- and large, the area remained quiet, and ical process. UNIFIL and national contingent UNIFIL established effective cooperation with quick-impact projects further helped to foster the newly deployed Lebanese Armed Forces. the support of local communities. That cooperation enabled the establishment of An equally important measure enhancing an arms-free zone in south Lebanon, as pro- UNIFIL’s security in its immediate environ- vided for in Resolution 1701, and without any ment has been the mission’s contribution to the visible presence of Hezbollah in UNIFIL’s clearing of landmines and of the estimated 1 area of operation. In February 2007, UNIFIL million unexploded cluster munitions used by successfully contained the situation when Is- Israel during the 2006 war. By June 2007, raeli troops crossed the technical fence along twenty-two UNIFIL teams were active along- the Blue Line and a skirmish with the side the Lebanese Armed Forces and seventy- Lebanese Armed Forces almost ensued. five UN-contracted clearance teams operating UNIFIL’s force commander also convened under the UN Mine Action Coordination Cen- regular meetings between Lebanese and Israeli tre, though their work was hampered by the fact military officials designed to lead to an Israeli that Israel continued to withhold targeting data, withdrawal from the northern part of Ghajar which would have facilitated the clearing effort.