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Justice and Economic Theory University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1980 Justice and economic theory. Barry Stewart Clark University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Clark, Barry Stewart, "Justice and economic theory." (1980). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 3566. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/3566 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC THEORY A Dissertation Presented By BARRY STEWART CLARK Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY May, 1980 Department of Economics Barry Stewart Clark 1980 All Rights Reserved li JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC Il-iEORY A Dissertation Presented By BARRY STi:WAFT CLARK Robe?rt Paul’ Wolff, Member DEDICATION To Kristine, whose wholehearted love contributed greatly to the completion of this work. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I owe a general debt of gratitude to the Economics faculty of the University of Massacusetts—Amherst for fostering an intellectual environment conducive to the flourishing of critical social theory. I particularly thank Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Richard Wolff, Stephen Resnick, Richard Edwards, James Grotty, and Leonard Rapping. V ABSTRACT Justice and Economic Theory May, 1980 Barry Stewart Clark, B.A. , Ohio University M.S., University of Wisconsin, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts Directed by; Professor Herbert Gintis The purpose of this dissertation is to reexamine the works of past economic theorists in light of the perspective offered by John Rawls' A Theory of Justice . The fundamental task of liberal social theory is claimed to be the legitimation of a society based on private property and the maximum feasible range of individual liberties. This legitima- tion must be grounded in the consent of individuals, and yet, if contin- gency is to be avoided, an objective criterion of right must be formu- lated in order to determine that to which consent should be given. The objective criterion provides a basis for assessing the justice of society, but its viability depends on its ability to generate the consent of the individuals constituting a given society. Thus the major liberal theor- ists have sought to construct syntheses of rational and empirical criteria of right. In the work of Locke, natural law provides the objective criterion to which rational persons will consent. Since Locke expects individuals to consent only to that which serves their interests, the criterion of natural law dannot bind men to social rules and authority which harm them. vi Thus consent and natural law are consistent and mutually supportive only so long as the least advantaged rational person perceives his interests to be served through obligation to rules and authority. Locke's theory of justice is an embryonic version of Rawls' theory, and Locke's apparent justification of unlimited accumulation should be rejected as inconsistent with the whole of his theory of justice. Adam Smith initially developed a theory of justice based on mutual recognition and approval between persons. However, his fears that market- oriented behaviour would corrupt morality led him to an economic theory of value as a method for justifying the outcomes of market transactions. The labor theory of value provided the objective measure of value, but it also revealed the extraction of surplus. Thus Smith turned to a "labor-embodied" theory, attempting to retain labor as the measure of value while legitimizing property income. His dissatisfaction with his own theory of justice led Smith to the threshold of utilitarianism. John Stuart Mill found Bentham's utilitarianism to be an inadequate theory of justice since it provided no objective criterion of right capa- ble of generating consensus among opposing class interests. Mill intro- duced a dynamic element, making the maximization of utility over time the objective criterion of right. Through competition, superior preference structures would develop so long as a class—neutral government maintained the conditions essential to fair competition. John Rawls' recent reformulation of the theory of justice reveals vii the extent to which liberalism must transform if it is to remain internally consistent in the face of an interventionist government and monopoly power. Responding to the failure of neoclassical wel- fare economists to construct rational norms for liberal societies, Rawls develops the maximin principle as a solution to the indeter- minacy of the social welfare function. According to Rawls, this principle would be chosen by persons ignorant of their personal attributes and status and thus constitutes an objective criterion of right which is both appealing and compelling to rational persons. Yet Rawls has overlooked the prevalence of class divisions which would make both the choice of and the subsequent commitment to his principles of justice highly unlikely. viii TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION i CHAPTER I; John Locke and the Origins of the Liberal Theory of Justice p. 8 CHAPTER II; Between Natural Law and Utility; Adam Smith's Theoiry of Justice p. 42 CHAPTER III; John Stuart Mill's Theory of Justice p. 77 CHAPTER IV; John Rawls and the Demise of the Liberal Theory of Justice p. 128 BIBLIOGRAPHY p. 180 INTRODUCTION The appearance of John Rawls* A Theory of Justice in 1971 sparked a virtual renaissance of social philosophy. Yet Rawls' notoriety stems not so much from the ultimate persuasiveness of his arguments as from his willingness to make definitive statements about a topic which had been largely .removed from the realm of respectable intellectual dis- course. Specifically, Rawls believes that a single conception of jus- tice exists which can be rationally defended. Such boldness demands considerable substantiation>i'lanid /Rawls has risen to 'the task ifibh a 'book which, given the initial response, will be the most controversial work in political philosophy of the twentieth century. Ironically, the analytical rigor which has led modern philosophers away from the intense moral concerns of their predecessors is eagerly employed by Rawls to give weight to his deductions. Even as he re- kindles interest in the issues of justice, fairness, and goodness, he urges that "we should strive for a kind of moral geometry with all the rigor which this name connotes."^ Rawls* work is suffused with the for- mal precision of modern game theory, and much of the critical response to A Theory of Justice has been directed at the illogic of Rawls* de- ductions while largely ignoring the intrinsic merit or significance of his principles of justice. However, Rawls himself cautions that his work must not be judged solely on the basis of analytical rigor because ii2 his reasoning "is highly intuitive throughout." To fully appreciate Rawls* intentions and measure his success, his work must be situated within a series of efforts devoted to the con- 1 2 struction of a liberal theory of justice. The term 'liberal* is taken to refer to the advocacy of social arrangements which are based on the private ownership of property and the maximum feasible range of individ- ual liberties. A theory of justice is a formal attempt to demonstrate how rights and duties, which are a necessary component of all social arrangements, ought to be distributed among individuals. What distin- guishes a liberal theory of justice from ancient or medieval theories is that the stress on maximum individual liberty elevates the individual to a central role in assessing the justness of society. A liberal theory of justice must demonstrate that the exercise of individual liberties in the context of a private market economy will lead to a distribution of rights and duties which is sufficiently satisfactory to the participants to make them willing to continually affirm liberal institutions. Or, failing in this, the theory must recommend remedial solutions which are consistent with the institution of private property and the exercise of individual liberties. My intention in this work is to analyze the evolution of the liberal theory of justice by focusing on the ideas of three prominent theorists John Locke, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill. Then, having developed an appreciation of the logical requirements facing a liberal theory of jus- to eval- tice and the shortcomings of previous theories, I shall proceed difficulties uate the Rawlsian theory of justice. The methodological not a suit- underlying this task are enormous. Empiricism is certainly other hand, logi- able method' for evaluating theories of justice. On the 3 cal analysis, which may reveal internal inconsistencies in a theory, cannot judge the theory’s ultimate relevance in a given historical situation. Thus, I begin by rejecting what Mark Blaug refers to as the "polar opposites" of relativism and absolutism.^ The former views ideas as reflections of the contemporary social environment and usually searches for logical necessity in the evolution of social structures, while the latter focuses on internal coherence and logical necessity in the evolution of ideas. I reject both of these extremes as being partial or
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