Clientelism and Dominance: Evidence from Turkey

Clientelism and Dominance: Evidence from Turkey Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität zu Köln 2019 vorgelegt von DÜZGÜN ARSLANTAŞ, M.Sc. aus Tunceli (Türkei) Referent: Prof. Dr. André Kaiser Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Stephan Conermann Tag der Promotion: 09.09.2019 ii To labor, love and peace…. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In the completion of this dissertation, many people have undoubtedly played a role. First and foremost is my supervisor, Prof. André Kaiser. I would like to thank him for all the support he has given me during this challenging process. He always encouraged me with his positive and friendly attitude and made me extremely efficient in dealing with the thesis and life. I feel very lucky to have worked under his supervision and hope that we can find common ground to work together in the future as well. Similarly, I would like to thank my second supervisor, Prof. Stephan Conermann, for his constructive views and suggestions. My thanks also go to Prof. Christine Trampusch, who chaired the disputation. This thesis would certainly not be complete without unique institutional support. In this context, I am grateful to the IMPRS-SPCE at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies and to the Cologne Center for Comparative Politics (CCCP) for providing a unique working environment and amazing facilities. My special thanks go to our directors, Prof. Jens Beckert and Prof. Lucio Baccaro, and the faculty member Prof. Martin Höpner, who were always very supportive in the feedback sessions. In addition, I am grateful to our administrative and academic coordinators, Ursula and Gudrun, reception members Christiane and Enke, and all editorial team members. Similarly, I would like to thank my mentor, Jan, and Cyril (then Michael and Philip) at the CCCP, who supported me whenever I needed. I am also indebted to the staff at Columbia University, where I spent Fall 2018. I would also like to thank James, who proofread the dissertation. iv Conferences and colloquiums played a major role in the development of this project. In particular, the constructive feedback that I received at both the CCCP and Max Planck colloquiums greatly enhanced the concept, theory, method and argument of the dissertation. Similarly, I would like to thank my colleagues who read some parts of the thesis and returned with very constructive feedback at the APSA, EIP and GraPa conferences/meetings. The non-academic world equally contributed to the completion of this thesis. The first three people that I would like to mention are Erkan, Erol and İsmet. Erkan opened his home to me and always encouraged and guided me during my stay in Germany along with his family members Gülçin, Gürkan, Özkan and Lütfü. Similarly, in my heated and very constructive talks with Erol and his team members (Barış, Cemil, Fırat, Hüseyin, Memo, Murat, Ozan, Pınar, Yüksel and Zeynel) until the early hours of the new day, I matured the argumentation of the dissertation. I have never met with such good people and will never forget their friendship and support. İsmet, too, contributed greatly to advancing my arguments. I would also like to thank my friends Ali, Ayhan, Burak, Deniz, Gonca and Şükran and my uncles Ali, Düzgün and Resul, for their constant support. Last but not least, I would like to thank my family members. Şenol, my identical twin brother, played a critical role in developing the theoretical infrastructure of the thesis and the implementation of the fieldwork. I thank my mum (Fadime) and dad (Hüseyin), who are not afraid of sacrificing anything for their children. I would also like to thank my sisters, Bahar and Sevgi, my grandma, Fidan, and my brother- v in-law, Serbülent. Finally, I give a big hug to my nephew Ali (Mozik), who was born in 2017 and has become a source of joy and inspiration for our family. vi Table of Contents Tables, Figures, and Photos .....................................................................................x ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................ xii 1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION* ............................................................ 1 1.1. Comparative cases ............................................................................................ 6 1.2. Method and fieldwork ....................................................................................... 6 1.3. Contributions and output ................................................................................. 7 1.4. Plan .................................................................................................................... 8 2. CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK* ..................................... 9 2.1. The party and the party systems ...................................................................... 9 2.2. The dominant party and the predominant party system ............................... 15 2.3. Predominant party systems versus hegemonic party systems ....................... 19 2.4. Predominant party systems and political regimes ......................................... 20 3. CHAPTER THREE: THEORY ..................................................................... 24 3.1. Institutional theories ....................................................................................... 25 3.1.1. Gerrymandering .................................................................................................... 31 3.2. Social cleavage theory ..................................................................................... 34 3.3. Decision-theoretic model ................................................................................. 35 3.4. Performance legitimacy theory ....................................................................... 36 3.5. Resource theory............................................................................................... 37 3.5.1. Clientelism .............................................................................................................. 38 3.5.2. Clientelism in Turkish politics: The past ............................................................... 40 3.5.3. Clientelism under AKP governments .................................................................... 43 4. CHAPTER FOUR: PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE IN TURKEY .................... 49 4.1. Defining party system change ......................................................................... 49 4.2. 1923‒1950: One-party authoritarianism ........................................................ 55 vii 4.3. 1950‒60: From the predominant party system to the hegemonic party system 56 4.4. 1961‒1980: Polarized pluralism driven by left-right cleavage ....................... 58 4.5. 1983‒2002: Polarized pluralism driven by ethnic and religious cleavages .... 62 4.6. 2002‒2015: Predominant party system .......................................................... 66 5. CHAPTER FIVE: AKP ................................................................................. 73 5.1. The rise and fall of Islamist politics in Turkey ............................................... 73 5.2. AKP ................................................................................................................. 76 5.2.1. AKP’s flirtation with the global order: neoliberalism at the climax ..................... 77 5.2.2. AKP and political Islam: Cyclical moderation ...................................................... 85 5.3. Elections .......................................................................................................... 87 5.3.1. 2002–2007: The good old days ............................................................................... 87 5.3.2. 2007–2011: Consolidation of power ....................................................................... 90 5.3.3. 2011–2015: The “New Turkey” .............................................................................. 92 5.3.4. From June to November 2015: The fall and the rise of the AKP .......................... 94 6. CHAPTER SIX: FIELDWORK .................................................................... 97 6.1. Method ............................................................................................................ 97 6.2. Scope and significance .................................................................................... 99 6.3. Case selection: Bağcılar .................................................................................. 99 6.3.1. Parties and elections in Bağcılar .......................................................................... 104 6.4. From the ‘social democrats’ to the ‘Islamists’: Clientelism during the 1990s 105 6.5. The demand side: the poor ........................................................................... 108 6.6. The supply side: Patrons ............................................................................... 112 6.6.1. Party ..................................................................................................................... 113 6.6.2. Municipality ......................................................................................................... 116 6.6.3. Leader .................................................................................................................. 117 6.6.4. Religious groups, vaqfs and loyal businessmen .................................................... 120 viii 6.7. The content of clientelist exchange ..............................................................

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