since9July2020 are theresignation of The maindemandsofthe citizens protesting in “captured state” protests –theBulgarian The source ofthe claring enthusiasmforeverything European. ropean slogansandwiththegovernment de- European values are violated underpro-Eu- in which challenge ofdealingwithasituation domestic scene.TheEUfacesthepeculiar favour and“European”on the legitimisation with theEU institutions'sgarian authorities ropean integration process provides the Bul- in theEu- participation The tacticofuncritical the elites, focusedon“capturing the state”. Hungary, forexample) asthepragmatism of carry outananti-liberal revolution(like in not so much the government’s ambitions to is deficit rule-of-law Bulgaria’s of cause The Spasimir Domaradzki Commentary gain favourwithBrussels Bulgaria: how tocapture astateand a multi-party system, and media pluralism – are rules ofademocratic state –suchaselections, opóźniona czyspecyficzna? 1 cessed 12October2020. no. 1,https://doi.org/10.22182/pnb.1812020.4, ac безбедности [Politikanacionalnebezbednosti] 2020, garia’s Securityafter30Years”, Политиканационалне J. Wojnicki, Warszawa 2019,p.75;S. Domaradzki, “Bul- tycznych międzyPolskąaBułgarią munist party. mafia groups thathavetheirroots in theformercom- and oligarchical informal by ruled is try Democracy in Bulgaria is a façade. Thecoun- tirely new paradigm. ing theprevious transformation modelforanen- step onthepathtomoral renewal andabandon tions, attaining these goals would be just the first According to the organisers ofthedemonstra- elections. Yet their expectations are far greater. cutor IvanGeshev, aswellnew parliamentary Prime MinisterBoyko Borisov andChiefProse- J. Wojnicki, Transformacja systemowawBułgarii– 1 Thetraditional institutions and 100 lat relacji dyploma , in:100latrelacji , edsM.Czernicka, - - -

1 Stefan Batory Foundation and weapons to the former Yugoslavia). drugs humans, of trafficking the in participating dividuals and institutions with government links inalisation of publiclifeandpolitics (including in- of thestructures ofthestate. This ledto the crim- control gained firms) security as legalised (often of thetransformation, organised crime groups tries than that in Central Europe. In the first years formation modelobservedinpost-Soviet coun- nomic andpolitical changes closertothetrans- conducted a top-down, controlled process of eco- mation. At the time, the communist authorities transfor- Bulgarian the of years first the to back of the The beginnings “” stretch of a“captured state”. resources. Bulgariatodayisatextbook example government are systematically taking control of economic sphere, oligarchs associated with the these groups to pursue their own interests. In the in practice nothingmore thananinstrumentfor States before hecameto power. role inorganised crimewaswellknown totheUnited owned asecurityfirmand,according toWikiLeaks,his 2 minimal. ruption. Public trust in the justice system is thus criminals andeliminate cor- capable ofpunishing in- therefore and resign) to prosecutor chief the to thegovernment (hencetheprotestors’ calls for subordinate office prosecutor’s a byweakened is state is the independent judiciary, although this The onlyobstacletothecomplete control ofthe hundred countries in media freedom rankings. Bulgaria regularly features among thesecond of speechare bestillustrated by thefactthat of theoligarchical elite.Violationsoffreedom the bidding do to willing loyalists by filled thus for exerting pressure andcontrol onsociety, and Public positionsinBulgariaare treated asatool on II,whobecameprimeministerin2001. reached its apogee with the return ofTsar Sime- groups mafia on based system the of solidation The current primeminister,Boyko Borisov, also 2 Thecon- further centralisation andpoliticalcontrol. strengtheningthey judicial independence, ledto the EU’s expectations. Forexample, rather than practice, the “reforms” had the opposite effect to a chronicle ofBulgaria’s sidestepsofreforms. In lar reports produced as part of the CVM became Commission’s recommendations. Yet theregu- the Bulgariangovernment wouldimplementthe area. The mechanism optimistically foresaw that overseemonitor and the reform process inthis to continue to was intention The (CVM). anism Mech- Verification and Cooperation a time, first and ’s accessionby introducing, forthe and widespread corruption,marked Bulgaria tice system, the existence of organised crime sion, aware ofthefragility of theBulgarianjus- meet all the standards. TheEuropean Commis- the integration process, even ifitdidnotquite ia’s membership wouldbethe latest success of power ofEuropeanisation, decidedthatBulgar- the At same time,theEU, convincedofitsirrepressible motivation. additional an borders) ern Kosovothe desire and tostabilisetheEU’s east- with thegeopolitical factor (includingthewarin the juxtapositionof“favourable” circumstances, Ultimately, EUaccessionwasmadepossibleby rule oflaw, demandedby theEU. tion of the reforms, particularly concerning the country. Thiswasprevented by the implementa- an elite striving tofully control andcolonise the in achaotictransformationgoverned and by was thedomesticsituation in astate immersed reason main The enlargement. fifth the during the backmarkers intherace forEUmembership Bulgaria (along with Romania) found itself among diction stillfunctionstoday. the economyandstatemachinery. Thiscontra- fia-oligarchical circles to take complete control of integration withtheEUandaspiration ofma- sion remains betweenthedeclared objectives of bygovernments. subsequent Butaconstantten- continued doctrine state official the became ter) late 1990s (whenIvanKostov wasprimeminis- the in solidified orientation pro-European The The EU’s mafiastate

2 Stefan Batory Foundation process goingoninthecountry. defend therule of law. It is just a side effect ofthe not consciouslyclashwiththeEU’s aspiration to The Bulgarianrule-of-law problem therefore does mal leaderssteeringthe“state capture” process. leaders, butpurely the pragmatism oftheinfor- “illiberal revolution” following the vision of party is in HungaryorPoland–adetermination for an aversion to the ruleoflawinBulgariais not –asit It is important to note that the reason for the to theeuro for twodecades,meaningthatthe interesting sincetheBulgarianlev haspegged ERM II exchange rate mechanism is particularly spite years of trying. Bulgaria’s recent entry to the ing theSchengenarea oradoptingtheeuro – de- the next stages oftheintegration process –join- a memberoftheEU, it has notmoved forward to made even more curious by how, while formally ofBulgaria’sThe phenomenon EUmembershipis a bastionofEuropeanness andstability. and advancingnationalism, Borisov stood outas ton. Againstthebackground ofthecorruptleft ning himfavourinbothBrusselsandWashing - Europeanness andtransatlantic orientation, win- dictability. Hewasalsoaguarantor ofBulgaria's migration andBrexit, Borisov guaranteed pre- of problems. Atatime of crisisoftheeconomy, sense thatBulgariawasceasingtobeasource cles, tookcontrol ofthestate and gavetheEU fell swoop,heeludedthethreats from thesecir- one In warfare. mafia ended also he machinery, man ChancellorAngelaMerkel. Using the state European politicians uncritically supporting Ger- of ranks the joined and corruption, fight to ised seized uponthepro-European narrative, prom- manager andwontheparliamentaryelection. He proficient a as himself presented Borisov, Boyko a assigned toit.On to stripBulgariaofthefunds such anextent that theCommission decided prime minister, EU funds were being abusedto A yearafteraccession,with Sergei Stanishev as Bulgarian transformation European-mafia faceof Boyko Borisov –the wave of public indignation, the mayor of , of mayor the indignation, public of wave 3 will waver and a stability financial Bulgaria’s , the adopting in a“captured state” hasledtofearsthat,after board is all there is to prop upeconomic stability in the euro charter zone. Thefactthat a country’s membership for required discipline financial the its ownof managing monetarypolicyinfavourof with theadvantages country longagodispensed when it comestovitalissueslikewhen thepossibility of integration is therefore unsurprising. In addition, mas over thefurtherdevelopment of European garian authorities’ passivity concerning dilem- unfavourable terms ofthe new directive. The Bul- Bulgarian government uncritically accepts the important issueforallnew EUmembers,the Even regarding the rights ofposted workers, an inant trends intheEuropean integration process. the tacticofleastresistance towards thedom - situation, the Bulgarian government has adopted Aware of the fragility of their domestic rule-of-law chical elitesisallowed tojoin. mafia-oligar- by controlled is system justice the jor riskfortheirown securityifa stateinwhich Germany andFinland,they are aware ofthema- Netherlands, the by Led countries. certain from the lack of membership is the result of resistance of the European Commission and EU politicians, of themigrationthe recommendations crisisand undertaken to protect the borders inthecontext Minister Borisov’s ardent wishesandtheefforts limits of Bulgaria’s membership.DespitePrime question oftheSchengenarea markstheinvisible currency is regulated by the accessiontreaty, the Yet whereas Bulgaria’s adoption ofthe common for thecommoncurrency. ics of the Bulgarian case and its consequences specif- the on reflect to than process integration seem keener to proclaim the rapid success of the funds. Aswith enlargement, EU leaders again for draining money fromand EU thebudget zone couldpotentially create new opportunities tralisation of power mean that joining the euro the cen- judiciary and The lackofanindependent 12 October 2020. core.ac.uk/download/pdf/78377746.pdf, accessed , 2006,p.206,https:// Area garia’s AccessiontotheEuro T. Kondarev, PoliticalandEconomicAspectsof Bul sense of impunity will emerge. - 3

3 Stefan Batory Foundation frustration withtheEU – betweenhopeand The protests inBulgaria tant problems ofintegration”. tion will leave the country among the “less impor- the majority, believing thata“constructive” posi- an government opportunistically goes alongwith Poland andHungary, forexample –theBulgari- tying EU fundsto the ruleoflaw–in the caseof cessed 12October2020. org/global/2019/10/14/democraticsatisfaction/ Democratic Satisfaction, the FallofCommunism ber 2020; vey/getSurveyDetail/surveyKy/2253, accessed12 Octo commfrontoffice/publicopinionmobile/index.cfm/Sur- First Results,Fieldwork,June2019 4 trust EUpoliticiansmore thantheirown ones a blindeye to corruption. Bulgarianscontinueto many forlegitimising Borisov’s ruleandturning other they are unhappy with Brussels and Ger- to theireconomicandpolitical woes, whileonthe On the one hand, they view the EU as a remedy opinion. in public trends broader reflecting EU, The protesters have anambivalent attitude to the and Hungary, thelackofareaction from the to thealmostritual plenary debatesonPoland strongly at the European Parliament.Compared The protests in Bulgaria are yet to resonate Bundestag. protesting outsideMerkel’s chancellery andthe ny putpressure ontheirgovernment havebeen gela Merkel.that Germa- Bulgariansdemanding well as his close relationship with Chancellor An- election of its president, , as passivity is alsoexplained by Borisov’s role inthe “captured state”. TheEuropean Commission’s ties, whichtheprotestors seeasasymbolofthe for Borisov and Delyan Peevski and their par- and Renew Europe have pledged their support signals, atbest.BoththeEuropean People’s Party mestic elites. Yet Brussels is sending ambiguous and to expect pressure tobeexerted onthedo- Standard Eurobarometer 91,Public OpinionintheEU, Eurobarometer Standard European Public Opinion Three Decades After Public OpinionThree European , 14October2019,R.Wike etal., https://www.pewresearch. , https://ec.europa.eu/ , ac- - 4

the EU. ing frustrated anddisappointed,notleastwith term inMarch 2021. The protestors are leftfeel- to getthroughto theendofparliamentary current setupare playingforthetime they need subject of constitutional change, Borisov and his observing thedraining ofthestate.Byraising the from thepartofsociety alienated andpassively movement. This is fundamentally a cry of despair shows that they are a widespread grassroots The diversity for theprotestsand masssupport ment’s policies). to tone down the articles criticising the govern- to, voted against it (having previously attempted jority, as the EPP, which Borisov’s party belongs of affairs.Itwasadoptedby arelatively small ma- law will not have a significant impact on this state 2020 criticising the deterioration of the rule of street. The Parliament's resolution on 8 October litical status quothatbrought themoutontothe European politicians as tacit support forthepo- passivity and sluggishnessof EU institutions and country. Atthesametime,protestors seethe treatment ofthequestionrulelawin person pointto the politicised and opportunistic evasive statementsby theCommissionspokes- Parliament totheevents inBulgariaandthe it asatoolforachieving the aim of“ever closer vide arguments torule-of-law scepticswhosee tutions do not adopt a firm position, they will pro- groups intheEuropean Parliament.Iftheseinsti- to political affiliation and relations informal by important role playedintheintegration process The EUinstitutions' indolencedemonstrates the post-accession CVM. expectations of reform andtheinvocation of the since the 1990s, forming regardless oftheEU's that isthepolaroppositeofEUvalueshasbeen rapid erosion of therulelaw. InBulgaria,asystem the by justified been has institutions EU fromvehement criticism ofPolandandHungary EU toacrossroads intheintegration process. The The caseoftherulelawinBulgariahasled Conclusions

4 Stefan Batory Foundation union”, rather than a genuine desire to defend efforts – even when the prime minister himself the rule of law and democracy as the foundations does not agree with them, as with the selection of the integration process. of Laura Kövesi as European public prosecu- tor – Borisov’s government is assured of the EU's The Bulgarian example shows that an EU mem- passive neutrality. Opposition to rule-of-law pro- ber can use security and stabilisation concerns cedures would consign Bulgaria to the margins as a cloak for transforming into an authoritarian of the decision-making process and be an addi- state. To do this, the Bulgarian elites exploited tional blow to Borisov, for whom EU support is the opportunity provided by the main wave of a source of important political legitimisation. integration, along with informal contacts and in- fluence (when filling the main EU posts, for exam- From Poland’s perspective, the Bulgarian exam- ple). This undermines the EU's normative power. ple shows that the problem of the rule of law goes beyond the framework of ideological con- Regardless of the protests going on in Bulgaria, frontation over the future of European integra- we should not expect changes in Sofia’s attitude tion and also concerns countries that uncritically to the rule of law. By formally supporting the EU’s support the federalisation of the EU.

October 2020

Spasimir Domaradzki – political scientist, assistant professor at the Department of European Union Law and Institutions at the University of Warsaw. Fellow at Visegrad Insight in 2019–2020. Member of Team Europe. His articles have been published in Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, Polityka and Res Publika Nowa.

Stefan Batory Foundation Publication is licensed under Sapieżyńska 10a the Creative Commons 00-215 Warsaw tel. (48-22) 536 02 00 fax (48-22) 536 02 20 [email protected] Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 www.batory.org.pl Poland Unported Licence (cc BY-SA 3.0) ISBN 978-83-66543-45-4 Warsaw 2020