The Henry A Strategic Briefing [email protected] Jackson Society http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org

Revaluing Our COIN Moving British counterinsurgency forward in the 21st century By Dane Vallejo Executive Summary

• Failure in Iraq and slow progress in Afghanistan have lead many to conclude that British COIN is outdated, that the nature of insurgency has undergone fundamental strategic shifts and that COIN in general is no longer efficient or viable. This paper challenges all three sentiments.

• Insurgency has undergone characteristic shifts yet there have been no fundamental changes to the nature of insurgency. There are aspects of modern insurgency which require new tactical and operational means of countering but the strategic context of insurgency remains constant.

• Accordingly, the ‘British way’ in COIN – cultivated through a rich history from Malaya to Northern Ireland - involves a number or principles and modes of practice which remain strategically relevant in the 21st century.

• The failure in Iraq and the troubles in Afghanistan were not due to an understanding of insurgency that is fundamentally wrong. Instead, basic strategic ineptitude at the highest level is to blame.

• This lack of strategy has forced shortcomings in British COIN to the fore. Most significantly that the British army is critically under-resourced. It simply does not have the manpower to put its own COIN principles into practice in the 21st century.

• The way forward for British COIN therefore relates to efficiency maximisation. Achieving efficiency will come through a combination of four broad actions; one – increase army efficiency and institutional memory; two – increase civilian efficiency and utility; three – increase the efficiency and robustness of multilateral operations; and four – cradle these three actions within the confines of sound strategy.

• Finally, it is imperative that these issues are addressed and that the importance of unconventional capabilities is reflected in the organisation of Britain’s forces. If Britain wishes to maintain its position as an expeditionary force with a global reach, that can protect its strategic interests at range as well as promote and harbour the virtues of democracy and liberty world wide, then its security apparatus must be organised accordingly.

[1] The difficulties experienced by the British in Helmand Province and in Iraq’s Multi National Division (South East) (MND-SE) have lead many to conclude that the ‘British way’ in COIN – cultivated through experience from Malaya to Northern Ireland - is outdated.2

British counterinsurgency (COIN) must mirror insurgency, has has traditionally been considered historian, Thomas Mockaitis once remained constant also. It continues the most effective means to the argued that the has as a specific blend of military and end of victory in war.5 Within this much to teach a world increasingly political action which serves as a long line of thought, any consideration challenged by the problem of term enabler for, and a short term of reconstruction or development internal war;1 then came along the provider of, security, governance and has typically come once conflict has wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. If development for the population of ceased. For example, the Marshall ever there was a way to spoil one’s the affected state. Combined, the Plan, implemented to help boost resumé, these two conflicts were security-governance-development the redevelopment of Europe at seemingly it. trinity creates the conditions for the end of WWII, did not start success by creating a comprehensive until 1947, some 22 months after The difficulties experienced by the track through which the hearts and the bombings of Hiroshima and British in Helmand Province and in minds of the population can be won. Nagasaki. Diametrically opposed Iraq’s Multi National Division (South to this paradigm is COIN in which East) (MND-SE) have lead many COIN is therefore distinct from reconstruction and development are to conclude that the ‘British way’ conventional warfare. The latter fundamental aspects of an effective in COIN – cultivated through approach and equal with - if experience from Malaya not of greater importance to Northern Ireland - is than - kinetic military outdated.2 Moreover, it has operations. Under these been argued that the nature circumstances, the centre of insurgency has changed of gravity shifts from enemy to such an extent that it has forces to the target population forced the strategic context since indiscriminate use of of COIN to change with it; military power is actually something British forces have counterproductive and supposedly failed to grasp.3 invariably loses hearts and Some have even gone as far to minds. Victory can only suggest that COIN is no longer come through equilibrium an efficient concept worthy of in the security-governance- pursuit.4 All three sentiments development trinity. are, by and large, mistaken. British failure in Iraq and the While the character of difficulties experienced in insurgency has inevitably Afghanistan are therefore changed over the course actually best explained by of the last century, its reference to a lack of strategy, nature has remained resources and political will and constant. Put simply, not an obsolete understanding despite operational and tactical is overwhelmingly dependant on of COIN. If the nature of COIN has alterations, insurgency remains an military power and has traditionally remained constant over the turn of unconventional pursuit of power, focused on enemy forces as its the century, then the British army conducted by irregular forces that centre of gravity. Owing in large is aware of what it needs to be seek to overthrow the existing form part to the influence of Jomini’s doing; it just has difficulty getting of authority. Accordingly, the nature theorising, the complete destruction it done in the 21st century. To of COIN, which by its very definition of an enemy nation and its army remedy the problem, a combination

[2] of heightened army efficiency; from the people - to separate the manipulation and coercion. Quite increased and better quality civilian fish from the sea – and win the simply, they are leaving the door input; and effective navigation of hearts and minds of the population open for insurgent victory and the multilateralism in COIN operations for themselves. Hence, the centre of counterinsurgent must therefore must be reached under the guidance gravity in COIN, where it is won and be amongst the population 24/7. of sound strategy in order for Britain lost, is not the opposing force but Accordingly, the strain on resources to move its COIN approach forward. instead, the population. is ever greater. Not only must lines And more to the point, it is critical of communication be maintained for Britain to do just that in an era Accordingly, COIN is inextricably to replenish FOBs, but inherently in which internal conflict in weak resource intensive, both in terms complex logistical support systems or failing states represents a major of material and human cost. In must also be maintained to replenish strategic challenge. order to win the population, the the soldier providing security on the counterinsurgent must provide street. There are no short-cuts in ‘Old’ insurgency three basic building blocks COIN. which interrelate as a dynamic Classically, insurgency has been trinity; security, development ‘New’ insurgency? popularly interpreted as a and governance. Yet, the latter protracted asymmetric struggle two simply cannot come without It has become popular to talk of for power in which the insurgent the overriding assurance of the ‘new’ insurgency as a distinction force compensates for its inferior former since security is a necessary from the classic ‘Maoist’ model military muscle by avoiding head- condition required for development outlined above. Within this on conventional battle argument, it is with the counterinsurgent. contested that Instead, the insurgent will For the counterinsurgent, victory globalisation has conceal his or herself in the played both a natural terrain and within rests upon the ability to separate supportive and the population of urban driving role in the centres; blurring the lines the insurgent from the people - emergence of an of distinction between altered brand of combatants and non- to separate the fish from the sea organised violence combatants. Conventional that has a unique fighting will occur – and win the hearts and minds strategic context.8 sporadically but only when suited to the insurgent and of the population for themselves. On the one hand, often in the latter stages globalisation has of the insurgency when the existing and governance to prosper and increased the political power is perceived as ripe mature. In order to beat an transnational flow of money, people for overthrow.6 Living amongst insurgency, security is therefore a and information and on the other, the population, an insurgent force central imperative and ensuring it has raised the expectations of extracts its strength from the people security for a population of millions individuals thereby fuelling their by obtaining shelter, sustenance, requires a significant number of desire to challenge existing political sponsorship and even new recruits. troops with a force-population ratio authorities that are seen to be It is for this very reason that Mao of 1:50 often seen as the benchmark unresponsive to their personal described the population as the sea figure. aspirations. In other words, in which the insurgent lives as a fish, it has both facilitated violent that is, the sea is required for its What is more, it is inadequate to entrepreneurs to be able to practice survival. deploy troops for the purpose of their craft and has also propelled undertaking short routine patrols others to commit acts of political As a consequence, the key to victory who will otherwise reside in fortified violence. for either side has traditionally forward operating bases (FOB). been viewed as the population of Security must be an omnipresent Resultantly, there have been four the target state. For the insurgent, condition; it must be felt in the day main developments in contemporary who seeks power, victory rests as well as throughout the night insurgency and small irregular wars. upon the tacit or explicit consent and during the run up to elections First, there has been an eruption of the people, or if failing that, at as well as on the everyday walk of network-centric organisations least their enforced compliance to school. If the counterinsurgent which avoid the need for a mass through intimidation.7 For the abandons the population at base making them more suited to counterinsurgent, victory rests upon night, for example, they leave the the urbanised areas increasingly the ability to separate the insurgent population vulnerable to insurgent prevalent as the setting for COIN.

[3] Traditional insurgent forces, such It has done so by facilitating better states. In turn, this has lead to as the Main Force Units of the communication as well as more greater interconnectedness with Viet Cong/People’s Liberation effective strategic terrorism and other entities such as criminal Armed Forces in Vietnam, were “propaganda of the deed” thereby organisations and to a culture where often subdivided into battalions, allowing modern insurgent forces survival, profitability or at best companies and so on, much like the to bypass the conventional military market domination is the ultimate hierarchical conventional forces that phase of insurgency. Examples of goal as opposed to the overhaul they were facing. However, loosely this shift are abundant within the of the state.10 This trend is most affiliated organisations, for example, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq where apparent in Afghanistan where al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) have replaced the internet, laptops, mobile phones opium produced in the country’s the former and now operate within and hand held video camera’s have southern provinces accounted for systems where no single node is all played transformative roles in roughly 80 percent of global supply necessarily vital for the network to the tactical behaviour of insurgent in 2008, some 7,700 metric tons. Of exist. Central direction these 7,700 metric tons, 98 may still come on certain percent came from the south- issues such as finance (as eastern regions affected (and has been the case with to an extent controlled) by the Taliban in Afghanistan the Taliban who maintain which remains rigid close links with Afghan drug and hierarchical when traffickers. Astonishingly, it comes to collecting the UN’s Office on Drugs and provisional and regional Crime (UNODC) estimates taxes and so on) but that the Taliban’s combined delegation to the local profits from ushr (a religious level is more common tax claimed on poppy when it comes to combat growth), tax on refined heroin operations. and morphine, and money and material supplies earned Second, with the erosion through armed protection for of state power has come drug traffickers total in the a substantial rise in new region of half a billion dollars forms of identity politics, annually.11 specifically ethnicity and religion as opposed At the operational and tactical to political ideology level, therefore, insurgency as sources of conflict. has evolved to some extent; Again, a comparison its character has changed. of the Vietnam War Logically, in overcoming and today’s irregular these new developments, conflicts provides a counterinsurgent forces helpful narrative in tracing movements. What is more, modern must develop new tactical and this shift. Where as the Vietnam media continues to play a pivotal perhaps even organisational means War was rooted in an ideological role in “propaganda of the deed”, which will be explored in greater communism-anti communism that is, acts of terrorism which draw depth below. cleavage, many of today’s irregular their strategic value from perception wars have been rooted in ethnic and media coverage as opposed to However, while such developments tensions, for example the Yugoslav are clearly important, nothing the actual physical damage caused. st Wars (where Serbs, Croats and Examples are plentiful with the most has changed in the 21 century to Bosniaks fought a series of bitter and recent, at the time of writing, found alter the strategic context of what bloody campaigns), or in religious in the AQI bombings of some 60 Iraqi has been described above as ‘old’ differences as was, in part, the case police recruits in Tikrit on 19 January insurgency. That is to say, there is no with the insurgency in Iraq (where 2010 and of 14 Iraqi police officers distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Shiite and Sunni militias were in Baquba on 20 January 2010 which where it matters most: the nature involved in violent attacks rooted in were reported across the globe.9 of insurgency. Insurgency remains, years of tension). at its essence, a quest for power in Fourth, there has been a marked which the population remains key. Third, the rapid development of decline in material support for Regardless of whether an insurgent mass communications has altered insurgent movements from nation is seeking the complete overthrow the tactical emphasis of insurgency. of an existing political system for the

[4] purpose of his or her own ascent to of politics by other means.12 The As a result, the means of countering political primacy, as was the case in process where by politics, the way in this phenomenon also remain Vietnam, or, whether an insurgent which power is distributed in society, fundamentally unaltered. The is merely seeking to perpetuate reaches a level of emotion that leads implication this holds for the future a state of violence for his or her to organized violence as a continued of British COIN is that no drastic own criminal economic gain, as has forum for resolution.13 Power can revisions of doctrine are necessary in arguably been the case with groups therefore refer to economic or order to see through improvements. of violent entrepreneurs in post- religious power as much as it can to To be sure, it is necessary to trace Saddam Iraq, power remains the political power. At its most simplistic the intricacies of the ‘British way’ in object and the people remain the level, insurgency remains the COIN so as to see how the ‘British centre of gravity. It is, as Clausewitz projection of ones will onto others. way’ remains a relevant force against famously suggested, a continuation contemporary insurgency.

The ‘British way’ in COIN

The ‘British way’ refers to a combination of principles and practice; although, as we will come to see, in regard to British exceptionality, the emphasis falls principally on the latter.

In terms of principles, British COIN is modelled on the following ideas: • Military operations must be subordinate to political direction.

• Civilian and military infrastructure must be integrated into a coherent campaign.

• Operations should be intelligence lead.

• Minimum force should be employed at all times.

• The insurgent must be separated from the people.

• Success will come through political settlement, not the destruction of enemy forces.

• ‘The people’ are the centre of gravity.

Those familiar with the theory of COIN will be aware that these principles are hardly groundbreaking. They are, in fact, in line with much of what is considered prudent practice. However, the substance of the ‘British way’ lies not in its content as much as it does in the way in which it had been consistently and uniquely applied throughout the 20th century:14 an achievement which is owing to the organisational culture of the British army.

[5] locally and were highly relevant to demonstrators were shot dead.19 At A brief history of the British specific theatres which proved to this point, there was no “coherent army’s organisational be particularly beneficial when one counterinsurgency strategy, no aptitude for COIN considers the topographical variation unified command, little civil-military of the campaigns British forces have co-operation, and no effective hearts The British army has persistently been involved in. From the urban and minds campaign.”20 However, demonstrated an aptitude for centres of Belfast, to the jungles of this situation was redeemed via low-intensity, irregular warfare due Malaya and to the critical role British shifts in policy, for example, the to a culture that can be deduced forces played in the deserts of Oman, introduction of direct rule on 24 by reference to several distinctive the British army was unrestricted March 1972 and the creation of features. by centralised doctrine which can the Northern Ireland Office which often prove to be irrelevant in eliminated the divided command First and foremost, the primacy of theatre sensitive COIN.17 To take structure.21 As a result, tighter the in British national an example, during the campaign civil-military cooperation allowed a defence has meant that the in Malaya between 1948 and 1960, broader-based political strategy to army has traditionally fulfilled an British forces created a unit called be successfully employed. Thus, in expeditionary role instead.15 It the “ferret force” which introduced part because of its expeditionary has been small, mobile and widely locally relevant innovations such as role and in part because of the varied in its experience since its role native trackers, smaller patrol groups influence of British scholars such as was gradually expanded to involve and the inclusion of interpreters and Basil Liddell Hart (who advocated policing far-flung corners of the natives into operations.18 Not only an indirect approach to war22), the British Empire. As a direct result did this ease the burden of limited British army has traditionally made of this experience, an institutional resourcing, but it also brought the political settlement the focus of its appreciation for the principle of population into the fold and ensured COIN as opposed to the destruction minimum force was bred given that operations were culturally and of enemy forces. that policing subjects of the British locally sensitive. empire and managing transitions to The exceptionality of commitment to independent states which the British Finally, British forces have also been this principle of placing politics at the government hoped to keep ‘on- decisively successful in recognising primacy of COIN is best highlighted 16 side,’ ultimately required a ‘don’t the primacy of politics in COIN and in contrast to the conventional shoot’ policy. working closely with civilian agencies approach of the American army in so as to integrate non kinetic COIN (prior to 2007 at least) which Related to this point has been an activities, such as those political and had been ineffective, inefficient institutional propensity for tactical economic, into its COIN efforts. In and at worst, counterproductive. flexibility. This development came Northern Ireland, early emphasis on Following the Vietnam War, the as much out of necessity as it did weapons seizures, the employment American army took on a process of out of design in that resources of internment, and interrogation learning which was codified within were typically focused toward in depth all served to alienate the formulation of the Weinberger the Royal Navy and the army was the Catholic population which doctrine and which effectively led therefore often forced to ‘make reached a climax with the Bloody the erection of barriers to avoid do’. Thus, tactics were developed Sunday incident when 13 Catholic fighting another COIN campaign.23 [6] Amongst other qualifications, the policy within these two conflicts is, etc.) using available military means, Weinberger doctrine spelt out in fact, a matter of picking the bones including the threat of force as well that US forces should be sent to out of the strategic direction from as its actual use. war only if vital national interests the highest level and making hard were at stake; if there was a clear nosed assessments regarding the Throughout the Iraq war and intention of winning; if there were current resourcing of our forces. during the majority of the war in clear political and military goals in Afghanistan, the British government mind and room for a swift exit once Explaining Defeat and critically lacked a clear political aim enemy forces had been defeated; Difficulty or an overall plan. In short, it lacked and if there was the support of the strategy. During his address to the US public. In short, it advocated big Given the historical exceptionality of nation in 2003, Tony Blair remarked wars and big victories; nothing in British COIN, it may seem paradoxical that the mission of British troops between and certainly no room for that there has been so much friction was “to remove Saddam Hussein the reconstruction efforts associated and failure in Helmand Province and from power, and disarm Iraq of its with effective COIN. in MND(SE). weapons of mass destruction.”25 This was the primary aim. However The British army’s aptitude for small At the most fundamental level, failure there was also talk of post Saddam wars and insurgencies has therefore in Iraq and long periods of confusion Iraq, specifically to “help Iraq move been internationally respected and quagmire in Afghanistan came towards democracy.”26 throughout the 20th century. What is about due to a simple lack of strategy. more, as we have seen, the strategic In fact, it is not unreasonable to The problem with this vague context of insurgency has remained conclude that the wrong strategy was aspiration is that this is all it was, constant over the same period. employed altogether. an aspiration. As indicated above Consequently, the body strategy is more than of theory and experience an articulation of ones outlined above remains At the most fundamental level, desired political goals. It a suitable grounding requires asking difficult on which to build failure in Iraq and long periods and incisive questions contemporary COIN regarding how one might strategy and doctrine. of confusion and quagmire in achieve these goals and Amongst others is therefore bound to factors it maintains Afghanistan came about due to a a degree of creativity. an appropriately simple lack of strategy. In fact, it The British government population-centric failed chronically emphasis; it recognises is not unreasonable to conclude throughout the Iraq the importance of war to address these governance and that the wrong strategy was questions adequately development in beyond the military conjunction with employed altogether. victory of removing the security and the role Hussein regime and in civilian agency must play Afghanistan, progress in this regard; and it promotes small Strategy is a concept which is at has been only a recent attainment scale intelligence lead operations as once very simple, yet all too often with the introduction of a new, opposed to reliance on conventional misunderstood, misapplied and comprehensive strategy. firepower. Put simply, the British ultimately bypassed. It is the critical army’s understanding of COIN is bridge that links military means and The confusion and misdirection sound. desired political ends. Formulating which stemmed from an absence of strategy therefore involves strategy ultimately led to the British Yet, the international respect for the fundamental questions; what are our army being tasked in Iraq to maintain ‘British way’ in COIN has waned since aims? How can we achieve them? security and provide basic services in the turn of the century. Put bluntly, What resources will we need to pool an environment lacking any form of this decline in international opinion in order to achieve these aims? As governance or security framework. has come about due to failure in Iraq a consequence, formulating strategy The Iraqi government and army and relative failure in Afghanistan involves more than identifying what were purposefully disbanded by (although there is now sufficient one hopes to achieve and, instead, the Coalition Provisional Authority reason for optimism in the case of involves the construction of plausible (CPA) meaning that British forces the latter). Given that the British ways to achieve these goals.24 were essentially operating in army’s understanding of COIN is Ultimately it is the art of creating schism of anarchy. Similarly, in sound, explaining the fate of British power (political, economic, religious Afghanistan, British forces were

[7] required to provide security and for limited resourcing. It is the taken which quite simply have some semblance of governance in contention of this article that this not worked from Sangin to Basra. a state where the newly installed issue constitutes the single greatest The result? Security could not government had little, if any, obstacle to be overcome in order be enforced and the subsequent influence outside of Kabul. move British COIN forward in the 21st necessary conditions of governance century. In MND(SE) and Helmand and development were found The situations in MND(SE) and Province, the army has struggled wanting also. southern Afghanistan are directly profoundly to spread its resources contrasted to the environmental adequately so as to protect an Contrastingly, when more boots have context of colonial COIN campaigns. adequate percentage of the been available, more success has Here, the role played by colonial population, for an adequate amount been enjoyed. Although beyond the administrations was invaluable, of time, with adequate civil services scope of this study, in Afghanistan not only because they were the to match. since the NATO troop surge at the recognised pillars of authority in turn of 2010, a previously desperate these colonies, but because they Unfortunately, a combination of situation has been subject to also provided precious assistance lukewarm political will (which was considerable turnaround due, quite in cultural, lingual and political ever cooling in unison with declining simply, to an increase in the number capacities and because they were a public support), blatant strategic of boots on the ground and more key foundation for effective ways of integration into local using them.29 A security apparatus. renewed strategy has allowed British The British army’s forces, operating approach to COIN under NATO, to place is therefore less the population as effective than it the centre of gravity was during the in its efforts as colonial/immediate opposed to chasing post-colonial era the Taliban across due to significant the country. This changes to the shift is beginning to environment in spur fruitful gains which insurgency is which echo the conducted.27 Where success enjoyed in the conditions of Iraq where the US governance that pulled something were present resembling victory in colonial from the gaping contingencies are jaws of defeat by present no more, deploying 5 extra the British army has struggled ineptitude at the highest level and brigades (over 20,000 new troops) accordingly.28 Filling the security a basic lack of means meant that and organising them around a new vacuum in this political void (as in further resourcing was less than strategy. The message is clear: COIN Iraq or Afghanistan) has become forthcoming for troops in Iraq. requires extensive resourcing. To a significant challenge for our The direct result on the ground in repeat a central adage, there are no army; a challenge that has been MND(SE) was to sacrifice the army’s shortcuts in COIN. compounded by a lack of strategic own principles (a trend that had direction from above. been identifiable in Afghanistan also The Way Forward until the troop surge of 2009/2010.) But a lack of strategy and a lack of For example, a lack of boots on the We have seen therefore that colonial security apparatus are not ground in Iraq instigated anomalies British principles are sound, yet the the only sources of hindrance to such as preference for air power and implementation of these principles st Britain’s forces in COIN. There is in preference for force protection to has proved problematic in the 21 fact one other significant shortfall compensate for an inadequate force century. What does this mean for in contemporary British COIN which density; both of which contradict the future of British COIN? has emerged in the political and much of what has proved successful What is certain is that COIN cannot, security void found in both Iraq and throughout the history of British under any circumstances, be Afghanistan and that is that Britain’s COIN. Inadequate resourcing, in disregarded as simply a resource army struggles to compensate other words, led to shortcuts being

[8] sapping effort. It plays, and will Afghanistan’s rugged mountainous prospect given that some estimates continue to play, a critical role regions to a population-centric place the wages of Taliban contract in helping developing countries program of redevelopment. In short, soldiers at $150 per month in a state free the shackles of violence and it continued to pursue counter- where police officers earn barely half suppression in pursuit of a better terrorism. at $80 per month and the average way of living. COIN is an enabler; annual income is below $50032) and employed effectively, it can ensure A huge offensive in the Tora many more were enticed by the security for the population in a Bora Mountains was followed by prospect of growing poppy for the conflict over the short to medium operation Anaconda in March narcotics trade. Thus, not only did term which then creates the 2002 which targeted the Shahi-Kot the prevailing counter-terrorism political breathing space required Valley and Arma mountains in the approach fail to achieve equilibrium for governance and development southwest’s Zormat region. Both in the security-governance- to mature. In the longer term, this operations eliminated several development trinity, but in some process comes full cycle as strong hundred al-Qaeda and Taliban cases, it actually increased the level governance and development help members, yet neither generated of insurgency. to ensure that domestic security anything constructive in terms forces can implement effective of development on the ground.30 COIN on the other hand, as we long term security. This, in turn, In fact, between 2001 and 2009, have seen, focuses exclusively helps to secure the interests around only $2 billion was pumped on the security-governance- of the intervening state (the into the south and south east regions development trinity. The intense counterinsurgent,) resourcing required to specifically stability in Once the Taliban had been ousted in do so can make COIN the affected region. an unfashionable policy the early stages of the war, the US- with voting publics at Thus, not only are home, but it is necessary there moral obligations led coalition failed to switch its focus if political goals are to be to consider in terms realised. of aiding developing from chasing al-Qaeda and Taliban countries, but there are Finally, internal conflict strategic factors too. operatives across Afghanistan’s in weak or failing states Replacing COIN with a rugged mountainous regions to is fast becoming the less expensive (both in norm. Since the Cold terms of material and a population-centric program of War drew to a close, human costs) counter- Western utilisation terrorism strategy would redevelopment. In short, it continued of military power be completely ineffective has largely involved in a situation where to pursue counter-terrorism. irregular warfare and the support of the state building; from population is required for success. of Afghanistan (those most affected the Balkans to Iraq and now in Counter-terrorism is fundamentally by the Taliban insurgency) compared Afghanistan, traditional displays different from COIN. It is far less to the $5.3 billion spent developing of mass kinetic land power have resource intensive and places a large the central zone in Kabul.31 The become more of an anomaly than emphasis on airpower and remote upshot of this policy was that the a regular feature of warfare. This strikes to break up terrorist activity, Afghan population, particularly in the trend is set to continue for two broad but it cannot produce results on the south, were left with unclean water, reasons. First of all, the potential ground in terms of governance and poor sanitation, a lack of electricity, for war between major states is particularly development. and little to compete for in terms of currently limited to a handful of employment. examples such as tensions between The approach taken by US and India and Pakistan and friction in British forces in Afghanistan between By failing to address the the Korean Peninsula, rendering 2001 and 2009 is a prime example aforementioned dire conditions, state on state warfare increasingly of how a counter-terrorism strategy coalition forces were not only unlikely. And secondly, the dual- is inadequate when applied in a ineffective and inefficient in their track fragmentary and integrating contingency that requires winning counter-terrorism approach, but in effects of globalisation have lead to hearts and minds. Once the Taliban fact counterproductive. With little the aforementioned alterations to had been ousted in the early stages hope of realising their expectations the character of war such as shifting of the war, the US-led coalition failed under the status quo, many Afghan identity politics, erosion of state to switch its focus from chasing al- males were compelled to join the power and an explosion of network- Qaeda and Taliban operatives across Taliban insurgency (an inviting centric structures which have made

[9] it easier for non-state actors to wage by the recent spending cuts At the strategic level, the first task war. In short, the art of war has announced by David Cameron whose will also involve closer adherence permeated below the level of state government has slashed 5,000 Navy to the British army’s own principles, monopoly. jobs, 5,000 RAF and 7,000 in the despite a lack of resources. The Army along with further cuts to temptation will always be present, Consequently, British security and military procurement. In times of when resources are scarce, to foreign development apparatus austerity such as these, throwing shift from body and resource must be organised to reflect this more money at the problem is not intensive counterinsurgency to truth. If we are to move British only unlikely, but imprudent and something closer resembling COIN forward in the 21st century, perhaps even unnecessary. counterterrorism which is more this is what must be done. How we of a cat and mouse game. Yet as do this is a topic of considerable Moving Britain’s COIN forward in the we have seen, the latter, focused debate, however, this author sees 21st century can actually be achieved, on firepower and enemy forces, six possible options; one - avoid in part, by adherence to options will consistently fail to achieve the intervention in states with weak or three, four, five and six as outlined same results as population-centric no government infrastructure; two above; ideally as a composition of all counterinsurgency. For this reason, - heavily increase defence spending four. it is critical that even when resources so as to reserve the ability to flood are found wanting, the British army insurgency environments with boots Increasing troop efficiency resists the attraction of entrenching on the ground; three – amend British itself in forward operating bases Within the third option, the army doctrine so as to make existing and of relying upon air power and must look to improve on its ability to forces more efficient; four – revise short patrols. The British army has fill security vacuums, to learn from civilian input into COIN to boost traditionally demonstrated a great failures in Iraq and to improve its own the overall effectiveness;five - only deal of resourcefulness and flexibility institutional memory. undertake COIN ops multilaterally and now is no time to bring this and improve coordination; and six – The first task will involve reaching trend to an end. only undertake COIN ops within the consensus on more effective ways confines of clear strategy. The second and third tasks are, to of countering new tactical and an extent, one and the same. The operational threats. More emphasis The first option is unacceptable, not British army ought to embark upon needs to be placed on cyber security only for moral reasons but equally the kind of learning curve that its for example; protecting domestic due to strategic considerations. American counterpart undertook systems and using expertise to Placing ones cards on the table, between 2006 and 2007 so as to monitor and break up communication so as to say in advance where is ensure that these lessons pass on between insurgents. Similarly, the and where is not a worthy subject to tomorrow’s army. The American way in which insurgent movements for intervention, is a dangerous process involved identifying obtain funding is another area which policy. Not only would it inhibit weaknesses, reaching consensus requires rethinking. In Afghanistan, Britain’s ability to act in regions on the best way of remedying for example, Haji Juma Khan - of strategic importance, but it these weaknesses and creating considered at one stage to be the would potentially deny individuals and diffusing doctrine (see FM third most significant member of the necessary assistance against mass 3-24, ‘U.S. Army & Marine Corps Taliban and his immense drug racket; violation of human rights or despotic Counterinsurgency Field Manual), one of its principle sources finance - governance. More worrying still, revising curricula in army colleges was briefly arrested in 2001 only to be it may even serve to encourage and adapting organisational released after US Military intelligence insurgency by providing reassurances structure accordingly.34 This process deemed his illegal trade insignificant that Britain will not intervene is a good example of how institutions to the war that they were fighting.33 should individuals take up arms learn and such a learning curve is In hindsight, this was a major error and challenge political authorities. necessary if the British army wishes as Khan’s funding maintained the If Britain wishes to maintain its to progress as an institution and Taliban’s efforts over the next seven position as an expeditionary force avoid the lessons of today dying out years until his eventual re-arrest in with a global reach, that can protect with our current troops. its strategic interests at range as 2008. Looking more closely at ways well as promote and harbour the to prevent criminal enterprise and Civilian input virtues of democracy, liberty and at ways to break the links between economics, then it must criminal organisations and insurgent The fourth option will involve more be provisionally willing to intervene groups is therefore required in an era input from MOD, DFID and FCO as where necessary. where conflict is perpetuated more well as better coordination between by funding sourced in crime than the three. What it must equal is an The second option is unlikely at best. state sponsorship. improvement in the economic, civic In fact, it has been directly countered and political aspects of British COIN. [10] The army cannot employ effective still and build robustness into its and food provisions needed for COIN alone. implementation and particularly development. Leading on from this cross-institutional coordination point, multilateral operations also We have seen that COIN is an experience, yet it is clear that pool together civilian manpower and enabler for governance and lessons are indeed being learned expertise. Linguists, economists, development and that effective and weaknesses recognised and governance experts and the like COIN requires integration of targeted through improvements in are needed in abundance in post different functions and agencies the appropriate areas. conflict situations to tie governance so as to achieve balance in the and development into the trinity security-governance-development Multilateral operations alongside security. trinity. Thus, the army, reduced in numbers, must be assisted in non- The fifth option will involve working Yet, it is imperative that coalitions kinetic activities such as digging closely with allies. If the British are formed carefully with strategy wells, laying roads and distributing government cannot support its in mind. Britain’s allies must share medicine. Such tasks are essential forces with adequate resources, with it a commitment to a unified in winning hearts and minds and then it must spread the cost vision of victory or else risk pulling achieving equilibrium in the security- with those who share the same in opposing directions. German governance-development trinity and aspirations. Invading Iraq in 2003 was forces in Afghanistan, for example, therefore, by extension, essential in problematic, in part, because of the were restricted in their commitment defeating insurgent movements. composition of the coalition which to that particular campaign due to an extensive list of In order to push Britain’s rules of engagement COIN forward, its In order to push Britain’s COIN prior to alterations in civilian development, 2009. Before opening security and government forward, its civilian development, fire, German soldiers agencies must therefore were obliged to express learn to work together security and government loudly, in English, and with the army to “United Nations — stop, compensate for the lack agencies must therefore learn or I will fire,” followed of boots on the ground, to work together and with the by a version in Pashtu leaving organisational and Dari.37 What is rivalry aside. army to compensate for the lack more, these forces were inhibited by stipulations To an extent, progress of boots on the ground, leaving which dictated that no has indeed been made patrols were permitted in this respect with organisational rivalry aside. without the presence the formation of The of an ambulance Stabilisation Unit (SU) chaperone. A cautious, which is a substantial step in the was disproportionately weighted that is to say non discriminatory right direction. This organisation, towards the US and Britain. Future approach in COIN should of course which involves input from all three COIN efforts must therefore be be advocated at all times. However, government agencies, aims to: genuine multilateral efforts in which overly restrictive rules of engagement co-ordinate and support cross- broad political coalitions are matched provide just one example of the government stabilisation planning by broad multilateral resourcing. potential for fractures to occur in and execution; ensure the rapid the unity of vision that is essential and integrated delivery of targeted The implications of doing so, in formulating effective multilateral expertise in a cross-government for British involvement in COIN, strategy. In short, a fragmented approach; and lead on stabilisation would be beneficial in numerous approach will only serve to confuse lesson-learning and assist with tangible ways. For one, it would and hinder any COIN effort. implementation.35 allow for greater force density which, as we have seen, is critical The most obvious way to protect Especially pleasing has been for providing security in insurgency against fragmentation and ensure the SU’s creation of the Civilian environments. It would also allow unity of vision in strategy is through Stabilisation Group (CSG) which for better equipment and funding; a body such as NATO which can serve involves over a thousand individuals both that of the technologically as a vessel for effective multilateral who mix expertise in stabilisation, advanced variety needed to combat COIN. NATO must, of course, governance, the rule of law, strategic phenomena such as cyber warfare maintain its ability to balance the communications, economic recovery, and strategic terrorism, as well as traditional threats posed by security sector reform and other that of the traditional variety such 36 and Russia, yet it should also look at critical areas . The SU should look as medicine, farming apparatus ways of developing so as to be better to increase the size of the CSG size [11] prepared for irregular contingencies strategy plays in linking all of the of any war, but particularly acute such as an insurgency. above. A highly efficient British army in an insurgency environment, the acting in coordination with domestic object of war should not be limited Strategy civilian agencies and the security to military victory as an end itself, apparatus of allied states would but should be the realisation of Leaving the concept of ensuring nevertheless struggle without the political goals drawn out in advance. sound strategy till last should not direction of sound strategy. Without strategy, there cannot be reflect any sense of secondary any such goals. Without strategy, importance. Rather, it should signify Never again should British troops be there cannot be victory. the overarching significance which deployed into a strategic void. True

Conclusion

The last twenty years have brought with them changes to the character of insurgency. Much has changed, yet the strategic context of the phenomenon has remained fundamentally unaltered. Accordingly, the British army is in a position where it has a rich wealth of experience and knowledge behind it as an institution to combat a problem which is fast becoming the most regular manifestation of war. Yet, despite this, the British army has struggled profoundly in its last two endeavours of this nature due in large to a complete lack of strategic guidance and an associated lack of resourcing. The time to despair and concede defeat is not yet upon us. By implementing the four policy suggestions outlined in this paper – heightened army efficiency, increased civilian input, better multilateral cooperation and the formulation of genuine strategy – British COIN can be refocused so as to allow it to live up to the reputation it has hard earned, once more.

By implementing the four policy suggestions outlined in this paper – heightened army efficiency, increased civilian input, better multilateral cooperation and the formulation of genuine strategy – British COIN can be refocused so as to allow it to live up to the reputation it has hard earned, once more.

The Henry Jackson Society is named after ‘In matters of national Democrat Senator, Henry M. Jackson. The security, the best politic Society is a registered charity for the understanding is no politics.’ and articulation of democratic geopolitics—a proactive — Henry M. Jackson and principled foreign policy which differentiates between constitutionally governed countries and autocratic regimes. ©2011 The Henry Jackson Society

[12] End notes

1 Mockaitis, T.R., British counterinsurgency in the post-imperial era (Manchester: University press, 1995), p.12 2 Mackinlay, J., ‘Is UK Doctrine Relevant to Global Insurgency?’, The RUSI Journal, 152:2, 2007, pp.34-39, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071840701349950 3 Metz, Rethinking Insurgency, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, June 2007, at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub790.pdf 4 Dobbins, J., ‘Your COIN is no good here’, Foreign Affairs, Oct 26th 2010, at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66949/james-dobbins/your-coin-is-no-good-here?page=show 5 Olson, E.T., ‘Some of the Best Weapons For Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot,’ The Letort Papers, U.S. Army War College, Oct 2010 (Carlisle: US Army War College, 2010) 6 For a comprehensive overview see Galula, D., Counterinsurgency Warfare – Theory and Practice (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006) 7 Galula, D., Counterinsurgency Warfare – Theory and Practice (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006) 8 Kaldor, New and Old Wars – Organised Violence in a Globalised Era (Stanford: University Press, 2006) 9 ‘Baquba ambulance suicide bomber targets Iraq police,’ BBC News, accessed at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12223573 10 Metz, S. Rethinking Insurgency, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, June 2007, at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub790.pdf 11 Peters, G.S., ‘The Taliban and the Opium Trade,’ in Giustozzi, A. Ed., Decoding The New Taliban – Insights from the Afghan Field (: Hurst & Co, 2009) 12 Clausewitz, C.V., On War M. Howard & P. Paret ed. (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1986) 13 Bassford, C., ‘John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz’, (1994), at http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Keegan/ (Accessed on 20/12/10) 14 Betz, D. & Cormack, A., ‘Iraq, Afghanistan and British Strategy’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Spring 2009, pp.319-336,at http://www.fpri.org/orbis/5302/BetzCormack. IraqAfghanistanBritishStrategy.pdf, (Accessed 21/12/10) 15 Mockaitis, T.M., British Counterinsurgency, 1919-1960(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990) 16 Nagl, J., Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife – Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University Press, 2005) 17 Nagl, J., Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife – Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University Press, 2005) 18 Nagl, J., Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife – Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University Press, 2005) 19 Mockaitis, T.R., British counterinsurgency in the post-imperial era (Manchester: University press, 1995), pp. 102-104 20 Mockaitis, T.R., British counterinsurgency in the post-imperial era (Manchester: University press, 1995), p. 106 21 Mockaitis, T.R., British counterinsurgency in the post-imperial era (Manchester: University press, 1995), pp. 106-107 22 Hart, B.L., Strategy 2nd ed. (London: Penguin, 1991) 23 Krepinevich, A. The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), p.274 24 Krepinevich, A. & Watts, B., ‘Regaining Strategic Competence,’ Strategy for the Long Haul Series, Washington DC: Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2009 at http:// www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA506833&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, (Accessed 21/12/10) 25 Blair, T., ‘Prime Minister’s Address to the Nation 20/03/03’, at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3327, (Accessed 20/12/10) 26 Blair, T., ‘Prime Minister’s Address to the Nation 20/03/03’, at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3327, (Accessed 20/12/10) 27 Chin, W., ‘Why Did it All Go Wrong? Reassessing British Counterinsurgency in Iraq’, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Winter 2008 at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA509 458&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (Accessed 19/12/10) 28 Mackinlay, J., ‘Is UK Doctrine Relevant to Global Insurgency?’, The RUSI Journal, 152:2, 2007, pp.34-39, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071840701349950 29 Grant, G., ‘Succeeding in Afghanistan’ The Henry Jackson Society, at http://henryjacksonsociety.org/cms/harriercollectionitems/Succeeding%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf (Accessed 18/12/10) 30 Grant, G., ‘Succeeding in Afghanistan’ The Henry Jackson Society, at http://henryjacksonsociety.org/cms/harriercollectionitems/Succeeding%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf (Accessed 18/12/10), p.10 31 Grant, G., ‘Succeeding in Afghanistan’ The Henry Jackson Society, at http://henryjacksonsociety.org/cms/harriercollectionitems/Succeeding%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf (Accessed 18/12/10), p.10 32 Peters, G.S., ‘The Taliban and the Opium Trade,’ in Giustozzi, A. Ed., Decoding The New Taliban – Insights from the Afghan Field (London: Hurst & Co, 2009), p.13 33 Peters, G.S., ‘The Taliban and the Opium Trade,’ in Giustozzi, A. Ed., Decoding The New Taliban – Insights from the Afghan Field (London: Hurst & Co, 2009), p.15 34 Nagl, J., Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife – Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University Press, 2005) 35 ‘About Us’ The Stabilisation Unit, at http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/index.php/about-us 36 ‘About Us’ The Stabilisation Unit, at http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/index.php/about-us 37 Boyes, B., ‘New rules let Germans in Afghanistan stop shouting and start shooting’, , July 29 2009, accessed at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/ article6730996.ece

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