THE STIKINE: TAHLTANS, ENVIRONMENTALISTS, AND B.C. HYDRO
by
ANDREA MADELAINE KATHERINE DEMCHUK
B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1981
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
Department of Political Science
We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard
THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
October 9, 1985
© Andrea Madelaine Katherine Demchuk, 1985
®0 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the The University of
British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my
Department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.
Department of Political Science
The University of British Columbia 2075 -Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5
Date: October 9, 1985 Abstract
The Stikine and Iskut Rivers in northwest British
Columbia form one of the last pristine wilderness river systems in North America. B.C. Hydro and Power Authority has, as part of its longterm development strategy, plans to dam the rivers some time early in the next century. These plans are opposed by the Tahltan Indians for whom the
Stikine-Iskut Basin is an ancestral home and by numerous environmental organizations. This thesis analyzes the
interaction of these opposition groups in light of the general literature on the Indian land claims and environmental movements. This is accomplished in four chapters.
The first chapter analyses Indian response to internal colonialism through both the maintenance of the native
economy and the land claims movement and examines the
history of the North American environmental movement in
terms of reformist and deep environmentalism. The two
movements are found to differ substantially over issues such
as land use control and resource development.
The second chapter traces Tahltan and environmentalist
attachments to the Stikine, outlines B.C. Hydro's plans and
describes how B.C. Hydro's planning activities would
themselves generate controversy.
The third chapter discusses and compares Tahltan and
environmentalist opposition to B.C. Hydro's plans. The
Tahltan opposition is expressed in two forms, both through
ii the persistence of the Tahltan economy, the adherents to which are not represented in a fully funded formal organization and the more predominant Association of United
Tahltans. The environmentalist opposition is falls mainly in the reformist stream of environmentalism. The predominant form of Tahltan opposition and the environmentalists are shown to have markedly different objectives.
The thesis concludes that the case of the Stikine indicates that there are many obstacles to alliances between the formally defined land claims movement and environmentalists. The most prominent of these obstacles is federal comprehensive claims policy which encourages resource-extractive development by providing for resource royalties in claim settlements. However, the findings from the Stikine also indicate there are numerous points of common interest between Indians committed to the native economy and environmentalists. Table of Contents
Abstract ii
Acknowledgements vi
I. LAND CLAIMS AND ENVIRONMENTALISM ..1
A. Introduction 1
B. The Indian Land Claims and Environmental Movements 2
1. Internal Colonialism ....3
2. Response to Internal Colonialism 7
3. The Sierra Club: Reformist Environmentalism .16
4. Environmental Groups as Interest Groups 26
C. Incompatability Between Two Movements 28
II. THE STIKINE: WILDERNESS AND HYDROELECTRIC PLANS ...34
A. A Pristine River Basin 35
1. Tahltan Ties to the Basin 36
2. Environmentalist Attachments 38
B. B.C. Hydro Development Policy and the Stikine ..39
1. Early Interest and Covert Activity 41
2. The Stikine-Iskut Proposal ..41
3. Provincial Impetus 43
4. Proposed Effects .45
5. Planning Activities 48
C. Summary 52
III. DIVIDED OPPOSITION 54
A. Two Oppositions 55
1. Tahltan Opposition Through the A.U.T 55
2. Environmentalist Opposition ....60
3. Opposition Interaction 65
iv B. The Energy Project Approval Process: Two
Critiques 69
1. The Mechanics of the Process 69
2. The A.U.T. Critique 74
3. The Environmentalist Critique 75
4. Incongruent Critiques ....80
IV. CONCLUSIONS • 83
BIBLIOGRAPHY 88
1. Secondary Sources 88 2. Government Publications and Public Documents 91
3. Interviews 93
4. Theses and Unpublished Papers 94
5. Environmentalist Newsletters 95
6. Newspapers • 96
7. Miscellaneous .97
v Acknowledgements
There are numerous people to whom I would like to express my heartfelt thanks: my committee, Don Blake, Phil Resnick and Michael M'Gonigle for being excrutiatingly patient; the U.B.C. Department of Political Science, for providing two teaching assistantships; the Hamber Foundation, for a bursary;
Anne Yandle of Special Collections, for providing the sanctuary of a carrell; all the people (acknowledged in the bibliography) who consented to interviews;
Jim McConnell for reading and re-reading previous drafts ad nauseam;
Simon Dalby for critical bibliographic hints; my parents, Harry and Christine Demchuk, for funding the production of this thesis; my husband Mike Wallace, for applying his skill with
Textform to the production of this thesis and for bearing with me when I was unbearable; my friend Kaye Brearley, for insisting that I could, should and would complete this thesis; and my paternal grandfather, John Demchuk, for teaching me that politics is something to be excited about.
vi Chapter I
LAND CLAIMS AND ENVIRONMENTALISM
A. INTRODUCTION
As wilderness becomes an ever-scarcer resource
throughout the world, undeveloped lands become a coveted
commodity. Canada is a nation whose economy exhibits a
marked reliance on hinterland resource development. While
much political science has been concerned with the impetus
behind federal and provincial development policies, there
has been little written about the two movements which most
frequently oppose hinterland resource development, the
native land claims and environmental movements. As a
consequence of the scarcity of work on these two movements,
there has been virtually no examination of their
interrelationship. This thesis will study the interaction
between member organizations of the Indian land claims and
environmental movements in their opposition to a major
resource development.
B.C. Hydro and Power Authority (henceforth, B.C. Hydro)
has, as part of its long-term development strategy, made
plans to construct dams on the Stikine and Iskut Rivers in
the remote northwestern region of B.C. If implemented, these
plans would destroy the Stikine-Iskut Basin's wilderness.
B. C. Hydro's plans have been and continue to be strongly
opposed by both native peoples and environmentalists. But
despite the unanimous opposition of both groups to the Hydro
1 2 proposals, they have not formed a cohesive alliance to strengthen their opposition.
The purpose of this thesis is to show that the
inability of the native groups and environmentalists to form an alliance reflects the partial disjunction of perceived
interests between the Canadian land claims and environmental movements. The thesis will consist of four chapters. The
remainder of this first chapter will describe the origins of the two movements. The second chapter will demonstrate that the St i'kine-I skut Basin is valued by both native peoples and environmentalists, and detail the ways in which the B.C.
Hydro proposals would transform the ecology, economy, and
traditional society of the region. The third chapter will compare and contrast the philosophies behind and the tactics
used by the two opposition groups. Finally, the fourth chapter will argue that while there are many obstacles to an
overarching alliance between member organizations, these do
not totally preclude the formation of alliances between
native peoples and environmentalists.
B. THE INDIAN LAND CLAIMS AND ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS
No single existing theory could explain the opposition
to B.C. Hydro's Stikine-Iskut proposal. This is true, not
because all theories have their inherent limitations, but
because the opposition to B.C. Hydro's proposal is not
monolithic; it consists of two types of groups, native and 3 environmentalist. The two types of opposition have separate histories, philosophies and objectives. They are the products of disparate traditions. This division of opposition parallels divisions in other contemporary movements to oppose massive resource developments in
Canada's hinterland. This thesis will argue that native opposition may be seen as a response to internal colonialism, while environmental opposition may be seen as a part of the North American conservationist movement.
1. INTERNAL COLONIALISM
Internal colonialism is the legacy of a process begun
in Canada by the English and French some hundreds of years ago. The objective of colonization is to bring the undeveloped lands of a territory under the political and economic control of a specified state. In this view, colonization is both an historical and contemporary phenomenon. Thus, Canada, with its enormous undeveloped hinterland, has yet to be fully colonized. Many of the political and economic manifestations -of contemporary
Canadian colonialism result directly from Canadian resource development policy. In order to demonstrate the relationship between resource development policy and internal colonization, this section will first, present a definition of internal colonialism offered by Paul Tennant, second,
show how contemporary colonization is a by-product of
northern resource development policies and third, examine 4
Peter Usher's characterization of northern resource development as the clash of two economies.
Paul Tennant summarizes the pertinent aspects of internal colonialism as it is discussed in the literature:
The essential empirical feature of internal colonialism is the continued subjugation of an indigenous people in a post-colonial independent nation state. Subjugation will in every case involve restriction of use of land and resources as well as varying degrees of administrative supervision, social discrimination, suppression of culture and denial of political and other rights and freedoms.... The moral claim of indigenous peoples differs from that of other subjugated groups in that it includes and rests upon the fundamental claim to land and use of resources which derives from prior and rightful occupancy. The fact of continued subjugation of indigenous people takes its significance from the perception that the subjugation has no greater moral justification in an independent state than in a colony.1
Internal colonialism, then, is a form of oppression which contradicts a moral claim whose strength has not and cannot be ameliorated through the passage of time. It is a continuing process during which the state both broadens and consolidates its control over a territory and its peoples.
The most recent phase of Canada's colonization, which began in the latter half of the century, has been characterized by an extension of resource exploitation to
Canada's north.2 It is a by-product of contempory resource
1 Paul Tennant, "Native Political Organization in British Columbia, 1910-1969:A Response to Internal Colonialism," B.C. Studies, 55 (1982): 3-4. Tennant's article contains an excellent review of the literature on the concept of internal colonialism preceding his adaption of the concept to the British Columbia land claims movement. 2 Donald Colborne and Norman Zlotnik, "Internal Canadian Imperialism and the Native Peoples," Imperia1ism, Nationalism, and Canada, John Saul and Craig Heron (eds.), (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1977), pp. 172-173. 5 development policy. The depletion of resources in southern
Canada, coupled with the backing of American monopoly capital, has made the exploitation of northern Canadian resources a more viable enterprise. The magnitude of these developments is unprecedented. Metropolitan interests encroach upon the hinterland:
Because the hinterland is an area that has been effectively a native area the phenomenon can be described as an extension or completion of colonialism, or as a process of internal colonialism.3
This phase of colonization has three parallels with earlier periods of internal expansion." First, the rationale for expansion is found outside of native communities. Second, the inequality of negotiating position between the native and non-native sector remains. Third, there is a high probability that government policy toward native groups will continue to result in their subjugation.
Of salience to the Stikine controversy is Peter Usher's characterization of the contemporary incursion of major resource extractive developments into Canada's hinterland as the clash of two economies, the native and the industrial.
Of importance is Usher's description of the native economy as a functioning institution rather than an historical artifact. Usher argues that the contemporary native economy, which like its pre-contact predecessor, functions mainly for
3 Douglas Sanders, Native People in Areas of Internal National Expansion:Indians and Inuit in Canada International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, Doc.14^ (Copenhagenrn.p., 1973), p. 4. • Ibid., p.23. 6 subsistence, has evolved to produce goods for exchange as opposed to trade in surplus. Usher asserts that despite the introduction of cash, the native economy has remained a central vehicle for the maintenance of native culture. For example, the fur trade has been compatible with traditional native land use and social systems. Trappers and fishermen still needed skills in the bush, women still needed to prepared clothing and meals, and the extended household remained the basic unit of production. Thus, Usher envisions the native economy as both retaining traditional practices and adding significant linkages with the external economy.
Usher posits that the recent industrialization of the north is a much more radical challenge to the native economy than the fur trade. In the era of the mega-project, the two economies are engaged in an ever fiercer competition for productive factors; that is, they are in constant conflict over land use, resources and allocation of public and private funds. As well, they have overlapping labour forces; because of this much initiative and creativity is drawn out of the native economy as native people, especially young men, are encouraged to join the industrial workforce. This incompatibility is said to weaken directly the native economy despite and because of growth in the industrial economy. Usher suggests that unrestricted northern industrialization will eventually eliminate the use of the north for subsistence. Usher sees this transition from one mode of production to another as the most critical episode 7 in the history of native society. An exodus from the native economy is seen as leading to the demise of traditional culture. Economic and, therefore, cultural control of the north moves from the hinterland to the metropolis:
As trade and movement increase between the two (including not only commodities but labour and capital) the more the domestic sector of the native economy is transformed by market forces and industrial imperatives, the more dependent native community and native society become and the less able they are to defend their own interests.5
2. RESPONSE TO INTERNAL COLONIALISM
A number of responses to internal colonialism have been
empirically observed among the indigenous peoples of new world societies.6 These have ranged from passive acceptance
to violent outbursts to demoralization to assimilation or
finally, to political adaptation. While a theory of internal
colonialism is useful in describing the plight of indigenous
peoples in new world societies, it has a very limited
ability to predict the responses of these peoples to their
predicaments. To account for this variegated response we
must introduce many idiosyncratic and contextual factors.
Within British Columbia response has generally followed two
patterns
Hugh Brody has argued that an important response of
British Columbia's Indians to internal colonialism, has been
5 Peter J. Usher, "Canada's North: Two Economies, Two Ways of Life," Transition, 11 (Fall 1981): 7-11. 6 Tennant, "Native Political Organization," p.89. 8
the maintenance, especially in the north, of the native economy.7 Indians maintaining the native economy have
resisted industrialization through traditional land use.
They have explicitly rejected the consumeristic values of contemporary Western culture. The native economy, is
however, constantly facing encroachment from resource
extractive industries. It is not represented by any formal
organizations at the local or provincial levels. In fact,
its largest unit of organization is most frequently the
extended family. The native economy functions largely
outside formal political structures.
Tennant argues that the Indians of British Columbia
have responded to internal colonialism with political
adaptation.8 In order to maintain their identity they have
managed to work within the immigrant majority's political
system. Since British Columbia joined Confederation a
constant theme of Indian political action has been a desire
for the recognition of aboriginal title to traditional
tribal lands. In order to understand the situation which
produced this response, this section will first show how
British Columbia's traditional Indian lands have
historically been the subject of strained federal-provincial
7 Hugh Brody, Maps and Dreams, (Vancouver: Douglas and Mclntyre, 1981) pp. 190-214. 8 Tennant, "Native Political Organization," p. 89; Paul Tennant, "Native Political Activity in British Columbia, 1969-1983", B.C. Studies, 57 (1983): 112-136; Canada, Dept. of Indian and Northern Affairs, A History of Native Land Claims Processes in Canada, 1867-1979 , by Richard Daniel. (Ottawa: Dept. of Supply and Services, 1980); passim. 9 relations, second, outline the latest federal strategy to resolve these claims, and third, show the precise nature of contemporary British Columbia Indian political adaptation.
Since Confederation, the Indians of British Columbia, or more precisely their lands, have been the subject of much federal-provincial contention.9 The Indians of British
Columbia, with the exception of a small number of tribes on southern Vancouver Island and in the northeast of the province, have never treated with the Crown.10 The Indians argue that because they have not surrendered their lands through treaty that their aboriginal rights have not been extinguished. By contrast, successive provincial governments have argued against the concept of aboriginal title. In the words of Attorney-General Brian Smith:
....if native title ever existed in British Columbia, it was extinguished by pre-confederation proclamations of the Governor and ordinances of the colonial legislature respecting the use and disposition of land.11 Any unsettled lands outside of reserves are held by the province to be Crown lands. Accordingly, the Province has acted upon the assumption that it alone has held the prerogative of the development of these unsettled lands and all their resources excluding the fishery. The federal government, with its responsibility for Indians as specified in the The British North America Act,has been caught between these two opposing opinions.12
9 Daniel, A History, pp. 27-56, 193-219. 10 This absence of treaties is relatively uncommon in the other provinces of Canada where treaties were usually made in advance of settlement. 1 1
Brian Smith, British Columbia Attorney-General, News
Release, Victoria, March 6, 1984. 12 The federal government could make treaties between itself and native groups on such issues as the fishery and self-government. Because the province has constitutional 10
For more than a century the federal government has employed a number of strategies, none of which has succeeded in settling any outstanding claims to the satisfaction of both the Indians and the Province of British Columbia. The current federal government strategy for the settlement of claims such as those of most British Columbia Indians was designed to accommodate the contemporary resource extraction in Canada's north and followed on the Nishga decision in the Supreme Court of Canada. Richard Daniel describes the outcome of Calder vs. the Attorney-General of British Columbia:
The Nishgas narrowly lost their case, but the judgement gave greater credence to aboriginal rights claims. Three of the seven judges ruled that the Nishgas held an aboriginal title to certain lands in the province and that the title had not been extinguished. Three others accepted the concept of aboriginal title but held that in this case it had been extinguished. The seventh and deciding opinion rejected the claim on the technical basis that the court action could not be brought with the authorization of the province. In essence, the judgements lent considerable support to the concept of aboriginal rights but were divided on what constituted ext inguishment.13
On August 8,1983, the Minister of Indian and
Northern Affairs announced a policy on comprehensive
claims which:
...indicated the Government's willingness to negotiate settlements with native groups in those areas of Canada where any native rights based on traditional use and occupancy had not been extinguished by treaty or superseded by law. While this native interest has never been definitively recognized or defined in Canadian law, it relates to traditional native usage and occupancy of land in these areas (the Yukon,
12(cont'd) authority oyer crown lands and all resources excluding the fishery, the federal government must solicit the province's cooperation for an effective claims settlement. 13 Daniel, A History, p. 222. 11
Northern Quebec, most of British Columbia and the Northwest Territories). The policy recognized that non-native occupancy of this land had not taken this interest into account, had not provided compensation for its gradual erosion, and had generally excluded native people from benefitting from developments that might have taken place as a result of non-native settlements....1"
The federal government has chosen negotiation
as the mechanism by which to achieve the settlement
of comprehensive claims. This process of negotiation
has two stages.15 In the first stage, native
organizations prepare and submit comprehensive
claims to the Office of Native Claims. The claim is
then analyzed by the Department of Justice for
historical accuracy and legal merit. During this
stage research is funded through grants from the
Department of Indians Affairs to the representative
Indian group. In the second stage, the basis for the
claim is accepted or rejected by the Department of
Indian Affairs. If the basis for the claim is
accepted, the native group may further prepare and
begin negotiating its claim. At this stage, all
research is funded through loans from the Department
of Indian Affairs against any future settlement. At
either stage only one organization may be funded to
research a particular claim and no individual may be
party to more than one claim.
14 Ibid.,intro., pp. ii-iii. 15 Canada, Dept. Indian and Northern Affairs, In All Fairness (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, -1981), pp. 13-14. There is no standard format for comprehensive
claims settlements. The settlements will vary along
eight dimensions.16 First, agreements will vary as
to the disposal of traditional lands. For example,
they may or may not include provisions for access by
non-natives or they may or may not provide for
participatory land management structures. Second,
they may or may not provide for wildlife management.
Third, they may allocate subsurface rights to
claimants or they may otherwise allocate them.
Fourth, they may provide for varying amounts of
monetary compensation for alienated rights. Fifth,
they provide for variegated structures to manage
claimant assets. Sixth, they may or may not include
provisions for exemption from taxation. Seventh,
they impinge differently on existing government
programs. Finally, they vary in eligibility
requirements. That is, benefits may not be limited
to status Indians, but are open to "...Canadian
citizens of native descent from the claimed
area."17 Thus, many points are open for
consideration. One provision which is not open for
negotiation is that all settlements are final.
Federal comprehensive claims policy, then, is
designed to both recognize aboriginal title and to
settle the question so that development may proceed
16 Ibid., pp. 23-25. 13
on traditional native lands in a legally unambiguous
fashion. The policy has encouraged native groups to
bring forth claims by providing funding in the forms
of grants and loans. To a degree, the design of the
negotiation process has shaped recent native
political activity in British Columbia.
Tennant has argued that the predominant mode of
contemporary Indian political organization in
British Columbia is unique in Canada.18 The basic
political unit is the tribal group, as opposed to
the band or province-wide organization. These tribal
groups frequently have both status and non-status
membership. Both of these tendencies have been
somewhat encouraged by federal comprehensive claims
policy. The tribe has become the focus for political
activity as the Office of Native Claims has accepted
14 claims for negotiation, 10 by tribal groups and 4
by individual bands.19 In addition, the Office is
considering a further 13 claims, of which all but
18 Tennant, "Native Indian Political Activity." pp. 135-126. Tennant also argues that these organizational tendencies contradict two longstanding federal policies. Which are the strict division of status and non-status Indians and the recognition of the band as the basic political unit. To a great extent however, these policies have now been superseded by the comprehensive claims policy. The band remains responsible for the routine administration of reserves but comprehensive claims policy allows Indian participation in the choice of organization to pursue their particular claims. As well, eligibility for comprehensive claim benefits is not limited to status groups. 19 Canada, Dept. Indian and Northern Affairs, "British Columbia Comprehensive Claims," Office of Native Claims Doc. no. 0015A(Vancouver:n.p.,Nov. 1984). 14
one are from tribal groups. These 27 claims have
each, to some extent, been fostered through the
provision of research funding. The unity of status
and non-status Indians has been encouraged by the
fact that eligibility for benefits from
comprehensive claims is not limited to status
Indians. Federal comprehensive claims policy has
allowed the Indians of British Columbia to pursue
claims as self-perceived cultural entities rather
than as bureaucratically imposed Bands made up of
legalistically defined Indians.
The Nishga Comprehensive Claim negotiations
have been at the forefront of British Columbia
comprehensive claims. No further British.Columbia
comprehensive claim negotiations will begin until
this settlement is achieved. The Nishga
negotiations, which have lasted eight years, have
not been concluded due mainly to the continuing
refusal of the provincial government both to
recognize the legitimacy of aboriginal rights and to
accept any responsibility for compensation for their
loss.20 The province observes but does not
participate in these negotiations. Thus, for British
Columbia's Indians, this latest policy on
comprehensive claims has encouraged political
activity but has not furthered the resolution of the
20 Dept. Indian Affairs, In. All Fairness, p. 30. 1 5 problem of internal colonialism.
The Indians of British Columbia are engaged in a struggle for their traditional lands. This struggle has taken two principal forms. In the first, traditional land use and the native economy are maintained. In the second land claims are sought with the framework of federal comprehensive claims policy. As the latter form is officially recognized and funded by the federal government, it has become more widely known and dominates the former. In addition, because the native economy is not represented in any formal organizations, most relations between Indians resident on traditional lands and outside bodies such as governments and interest groups are transacted through member organizations of the land claims movement. The land claims movement has not achieved its goals because of the refusal of the Province to recognize unextinguished aboriginal title. While the issue of title remains unresolved, the colonization of
British Columbia's hinterland is fostered through provincial development policies. Thus, as shall be shown in later chapters, opposition to uninvited development may be seen as a response to internal colonialism. 16
3. THE SIERRA CLUB: REFORMIST ENVIRONMENTALISM
While Canada's native peoples view a large part of
Canada's hinterland as their rightful heritage, there are non-natives, aside from developers, who would also claim an
interest in these same areas. Environmentalists would argue,
in the face of non-renewable resource extraction, that the
undeveloped nature of Canada's hinterland is. in itself a precious resource. As an ever-smaller area of Canada's
hinterland remains undeveloped, environmentalists call for
its preservation as a wilderness legacy.
There has been little academic analysis of the
environmental movement in Canada.21 The paucity of
literature would indicate, at first glance, that the
movement is virtually non-existent. However, this indication
is belied by frequent media reports of environmental
activism. In order to understand the tradition of
21 The task of writing a comprehensive overview of the Canadian movement could indeed prove daunting as the movement's membership is heterogenous and constantly evolving. The literature is thus limited to case studies and undetailed overviews: William Leiss ed., Ecology Versus Politics in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979) offers a collection of essays which describe the philosophies behind the movement but little analysis of its behaviour; D. A. Chant,"Pollution Probe: Fighting the Polluters With Their Own Weapons," in Pressure Group Behaviour In Canadian Politics A. Paul Pross ed., (Toronto:McGraw-Hill-Ryerson, 1975) pp.56-68 studies the case of one group but makes no general analysis of the movement; Timothy 0'Riordan,Environmentalism 2nd ed.,(London:Pion Limited, 1981) is brief in its specific reference to the Canadian movement; A. Paul Pross, "Pressure Groups: Talking Chameleons" in Canadian Politics in the 11 980's, Michael S. Whittington and Glen Williams eds., (Agincourt:Methuen, 1984), pp. 287-311 mentions the effectiveness of the wilderness lobby at the federal level in parks maintenance. 1 7 environmental activism in Canada, then, it is necessary to draw on two sorts of literature. The Canadian environmental movement may be seen both as a part of the North American environmental movement and as a type of interest group in the Canadian political system.
This section will examine a prominent member of the contemporary North American environmental movement, the
Sierra Club. The Club, as will be shown in later chapters, was the foster organization of the environmentalist opposition to the Stikine-Iskut proposals. Following this examination the next section will place the Canadian environmental movement in the constellation of interest groups in the Canadian and British Columbian policy
formulation process.
As will be shown in subsequently, the Sierra Club has been the organization within the North American environmental movement with the greatest philosophical and
tactical influence on the environmental opposition to the
Stikine-Iskut proposal. The issues which inspired the
formation and growth of the Sierra Club offer close
parallels to the issues which spawned the environmentalist
opposition to the Stikine-Iskut proposal. Both groups were
responses to impending threats of environmental degradation.
Both the Club and the Stikine-Iskut environmentalists fall
within what Bill Devall has termed the reformist stream of
North American environmentalism. As well, both fit Mary
Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky's characterization of the Sierra 18
Club as an institution concerned with organizational maintenance to the detriment of radical activism.
The Sierra Club was founded in 1892 by John Muir, the
noted conservationist and poet. The Club's initial goals
were to:
To explore, enjoy and render accessible the mountain regions of the Pacific Coast; to publish information concerning them; to enlist the support and cooperation of the people and government in preserving the forest and other natural features of the Sierra Nevada...22
In the years prior to the Club's formation, Muir had been
the most active member of the successful movement to have
Congress declare the Yosemite National Park. At the same
time other conservationists successfully lobbied for the
establishment of Sequoia and General Grant National Parks in
order to protect the southern Sierra's large trees. The
conservationists discovered however, that their efforts were
not over with the declaration of these parks. The parks were
still threatened by sheep-grazing and forest fires. Thus,
the Sierra Club was formed to ensure the preservation of
these areas. Wilderness was seen by Muir and the Club's
membership as being of value in and of itself. The means of
ensuring this preservation were public education and
lobbying influential public officials.
22 Terry Fleishman, "Major Evironmental Groups," EPA Journal, 4(1978): 14-17; Stephen R. Fox, John Muir and His Legacy, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1981); Douglas H. Strong, "The Sierra Club A History Part 1: Origins and Outings," Sierra, 62: 8 (Oct. 1977) : 14-17; Douglas H. Strong, 'The Sierra Club: A History, Part two-Conservation," Sierra, 62: 9 (Oct. 1977): 16-20. 19
For many years, the Club was purely a volunteer organization. Until the Second World War, the bulk of its activity centred on wilderness preservation in the Sierra
Nevada mountains. Its membership grew slowly but steadily due primarily to the attraction of club-sponsored outings.
After the War, the Club broadened its efforts outside of
California and consequently broadened its membership base.
From the late 1940's, the Club, led by a paid employee, executive director David Brower, fought its first large campaign outside the Sierra Nevada. The successful campaign
blocked the construction of Echo Park Dam in Dinosaur
National Monument on the Colorado border. The campaign
consisted of a number of tactics including raft trips down
the Yampa River to increase awareness of the beauty of the
area, publicity such as bulletins, films, articles, ads and
letters to the press, and cooperation with other
conservation groups such as the Wilderness Society. In
addition, Brower appeared before various congressional
committees exposing flaws in the dam plans, listing
alternative sites and arguing against the necessity of the
project. The Dinosaur Monument campaign set the
professionalized tone of future Club campaigns.
As of 1960 the Sierra Club had local chapters in nearly
all of the United States and in over 15 other countries
including Canada. The Club expanded its activities to
include such issues as "...sonic booms from airplanes, urban
sprawl, excessive use of pesticides, protection of coastal 20
areas, a national wilderness bill and a concern with the
overuse and misuse of recreation facilities."23 While it
remains a conservationist organization concerned with the
threats of dams and other wilderness endangering
developments, the Club's activities have broadened to such
an extent that it has become a part of the North American
environmental movement.
Though the Sierra Club has evolved from a purely
conservationist to an environmentalist group, its popular
image is still that of hiking and outdoors club. The bulk of
activities continue to be public education and political
lobbying. The majority of the contemporary membership are
passive rather than heavily involved in Club activities.
Most of the active minority participates in the Club's
activities at the local level while paid staff and the Club
executive generally represent the Club at national political
• functions and formulate national policy. Aside from
lobbying, the central functions of the Club's national
office are the publication of a Club magazine, Sierra and
the publication a of series of books on the environment. The
group presently has tax-deductible status in the United
State and Canada and receives a substantial amount of its
income from donations.
Bill Devall has developed a salient distinction between
two tendencies within the environmental movement. These are
the reformist and the deep ecological. The first stream, the
23 Fleishman, "Major Evironmental Groups," p. 15. 21 reformi st:
...is frequently seen as the attempt to work only within the confines of conventional political processes of industrialized nations to alleviate or mitigate some of the worst forms of air and water pollution destruction of indigenous wildlife, and some of the most short-sighted development schemes.2 *
By contrast, the second stream, the deep ecological:
...supports many of the reformist goals but is revolutionary, seeking a new metaphysics, epistemology, cosmology and environmental ethics of the person/planet.25
The fundamental difference between the two streams is their respective levels of satisfaction with what deep ecologists refer to as the dominant social paradigm. The reformist is content to work for incremental change within an anthropocentric social system. The deep ecologist seeks a radical reorientation of the the social system from anthropocentricism to biocentrism. That is, the deep ecologist envisions a society in which man does not seek to dominate nature but to live as a part of it.
Timothy O'Riordan offers two terms, technocentrism and ecocentrism which are congruent with the respective anthropocentric and biocentric tendencies of Devall's reformists and deep ecologists.26 O'Riordan further subdivides these two streams but it is possible to compare their general aspects. Technocentrists have a fundamental
24 Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered, (Layton, Utah: Peregrine Smith Books, 1985) p.2. 25 Bill Devall, "The Deep Ecology Movement," Natural Resources Journal, 2 (1980): 299. 26 O'Riordan,Environmentalism, p. 275. 22 belief in man's ability to progress. That is, they believe that given sufficient funding and resources that man's scientific and technical expertise can overcome most of the problems which he faces. They believe that expertise rather than public participation is the appropriate tool for solving society's problems. Some technocentrists, the accommodaters, would have a more qualified faith in man's ability to progress. Accommodaters believe that economic growth can continue assuming that there are suitable economic adjustments, there are improvements made to legal rights to a minimum level of environmental quality and that there is full compensation for those who experience adverse environmental or social effects of development. They would accept the need for public participation to complement expertise in political decision-making. They would argue for the provision of effective environmental management agencies at national and local levels. Like all technocentrists they have an overriding faith in man's ability to manage his way out of difficulties. By comparison, ecocentrists lack confidence in contemporary society. They believe that man should live as a part of nature rather than as a master of it. They do not give much credence to large-scale technology and the associated demands of elitest expertise, central state authority and anti-democratic institutions. They reject the notion of man's innate ability to progress because they feel it is grounded in materialism. They insist on the intrinsic importance of nature for the humanity of 23 man and presuppose that ecological laws should dictate morality. They contend that only within the small-scale community can democracy be truly achieved. Thus, the technocentric vision is completely compatible with society as it is now structured. It holds that man can manage his way out of any difficulty. By contrast, the ecocentric critique holds that many of man's difficulties are symptoms of a flawed social intellectual structure.
Devall further illustrates how the technocentric and anthropocentric faiths of reformists consistently frustrates
the achievement of their goals:
One scenario for the environmental movements is to continue with attempts at reforming some natural resource policies. For example, ecoactivists can appeal administrative actions to lease massive areas of public domain lands in the United States for mineral development, or oil and gas development. They can comment on draft Environmental Impact Reports; appeal to politicans to protect the scenic values of the nation; and call attention to the massive problems of toxic wastes, air and water pollution, and soil erosion. These political and educational activities call to the need for healthy ecosystems... However environmentalism in this scenario tends to be very technically oriented and only to short-term public policy issues of resource allocation. Attempts are made to reform only some of the worst land use practices without challenging, questioning or changing some of the basic assumptions of growth and development. Environmentalists who follow this scenario will easily be labelled as "just another special issues group". In order to play the game of politics they will be forced to compromise on every piece of legislation in which they are interested.27
Devall states that such reformist activity usually builds on
accomplishments such as land use or wilderness regulations.
He asserts that such work is valuable but can have
27 Devall, Deep Ecology, p. 2. 24 limitations. Many of these limitations stem from the fact that in arguing their case before public officals, reformists are forced to confine their arguments to the language of resource economists for fear of being termed
"...sentimental, irrational or unrealistic..." 28 Thus,
reformist accomplishments are necessarily compromises.
Although Devall places some prominent members of the
Sierra Club such as John Muir and David Brower within the deep ecological stream, he places the organization as a whole within the reformist stream. While the number of
issues with which the Sierra Club concerns itself has
increased in recent years, the Club's commitment to working within the mainstream of North American society has if anything solidified. The Club questions individual forms of
environmental degradation rather than the society which
intrinsically must produce them. The Sierra Club is the
prototypical reformist organization. While its central goal
is wilderness preservation, its activism is delimited by the
values of mainstream society.
Douglas and Wildavsky point to the contemporary
structure of the Sierra Club as the most deterministic
factor in its perception of environmental risk. They
describe the Club's structure as one in which a small elite
presides over an inert mass membership.29 They suggest that
this tendency toward hierarchy differentiates the Club from
28Ibid. 29 Aaron B. Wildavsky and Mary Douglas, Risk and Culture, (Berkeley: University of California Press, c. 1982), pp. 126-151. 25 other more grass-roots oriented organizations such as
Friends of the Earth. In the terminology of Douglas and
Wildavsky those forces which function in the mainstream of society are termed the centre and those farther away from the mainstream are the border. Organizations such as the
Sierra Club will tend to mimic the institutions whose aims they purport to oppose:
Little hierarchies speak and act like big hierarchies. Though they may be intended to protect nature from depredation theirs is not a true border voice. The more the public interest group is organized as a hierarchy, the more it believes there is time for reform. It seeks incremental changes and speaks frankly for its own perceived interests. The more like a hierarchy, the stronger its internal control and the less its fear of subversion. The more hierarchical the organization, the less it bears a message about catastrophe.30
Thus, critics of the Sierra Club have argued that the
Club's success in wilderness preservation has been limited by its choice of political tactics and organizational structure. Having established that the Club and the environmental movement are one of many types of interest groups active in the conventional political system, it is useful to turn now to the role of the environmental movement in the Canadian and British Columbian policy formulation process.
30Ibid., p. 126. 26
4. ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS AS INTEREST GROUPS
While members of reformist environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club may perceive themselves as working within the mainstream political system, in Canada at least, their location in the policy formulation process is peripheral in comparison with other, more established,
interests. This is not to argue that the environmental movement has not been without its successes but that
interests such as corporations figure more influentially.31
Environmentalists are not a part of Canada's notably elite dominated decision-making structure but rather, as O'Riordan would argue, adversaries fighting to hold their ground.32 In
British Columbia, Jeremy Wilson asserts, environmentalists have influenced the design of environmental regulatory
structures but that these gains have not obstructed resource development.3 3
O'Riordan has argued that the Canadian brand of
environmental activism "...lies somewhere between the two
polls of participatory activism found in the United States
31 Fred Thompson and W. T. Stanbury, The Political Economy of Interest Groups in the Legislative Process in Canada, Institute for Research on Public Policy Occasional Paper 9, (Montreal: n.p., May 1979) does not specifically discuss environmental groups but would class them as interests with little or no representation in the policy process; Pross, "Pressure Groups," p. 289 mentions the routine manner in which wilderness groups are consulted on federal parks issues but does not discuss the success of the environmental movement in general. 32 O'Riordan, Environmentalism, p. 231. 33 R. Jeremy Wilson, "Environmentalism and B.C. Natural Resources Policy: 1972-82," paper presented to the annual meetings of th Canadian Political Science Association, University of British Columbia, June 5, 1983. 27 and Britain, but tends toward the American model..."34 He describes grass-roots activism as an integral part of the
American political culture and suggests that it is no accident that environmental action groups were spawned in
the United States. By contrast, he characterizes Britain
"...as a nation where the invisible political power of
influence through social and political connection is far more telling than the more dramatic placard-waving antics of
politically ephemeral environmental groups.."35 He concludes
then that:
Environmental and political participation has been "imported" into Canada from its southern neighbor both ideologically and physically through the immigration of American activists. A number of dedicated Canadian and American lawyers have been largely responsible for the mounting pressures on the federal and provincial governments to adopt legislation that would legally sanction public involvement... 3 6
Wilson contends that the greatest part of the British
Columbian movement's success has been the way in which it
has influenced the design of provincial legislation and
guidelines for coal, mining, forestry practices and of
special relevance to this thesis, hydro-electric
development. He notes however, that rarely have such
measures caused hardship for resource-extractive
industries.37 As well, the regulatory structures have been
influenced by interests other than environmentalists and
hence do not completely ensure that British Columbia's
34 0'Riordan,Environmental ism,p. 231. 35Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Wilson, "Environmentalism and B.C.," pp. 1-2. 28
resources are developed in the public interest.
Thus, to a great extent, the Canadian environmental movement remains outside the policy formulation process.
More often than not members will oppose policy rather than
initiate it. When environmental reforms are made they are
almost never to the detriment of corporate interests.
C. INCOMPATABILITY BETWEEN TWO MOVEMENTS
As the development of natural resources in Canada's
hinterland may be simultaneously viewed both as the
colonization of aboriginal territory and environmental
degradation, it would be easy to assume the land claims
movement and environmentalists to be natural allies in the
face of a common enemy. As the preceding sections have
shown, however, the two movements have different motivations
and resources. Most basically, they have different primary
goals. Native people active in the land claims movement are
asserting their right to control their traditional lands.
Canada's environmentalists are seeking to protect
wilderness. Related to the difference between the goals of
the two movements is the disparity between their relative
levels of satisfaction with the prevailing system of social
and economic relations. Finally, the types of resources
which the two movements can bring to bear in furthering
their causes vary considerably. 29
In asserting their right .to control their traditional lands, Canada's native peoples are calling, by implication, for a right to choose whether or not to develop these lands and as a consequence to choose whether or not to benefit from development. They may in fact choose to manage their lands in accordance with traditional practices or they may choose to develop resources and acquire resulting economic rents. The latter may seem very appealing if sub-surface rights are granted in a comprehensive claims agreement. From this perspective, both resource development corporations and environmental activism may be seen as detracting from native rights in that they threaten to restrict native freedom to choose.
In seeking wilderness preservation, environmentalists are arguing for the right of mankind to unspoiled nature.
Unlike the land claims movement, they are not asserting the rights of a clearly definable body of people such as a tribe but rather a more amorphous community. While environmentalists may support the recognition of aboriginal title, they are also somewhat in contradiction, putting - forth the case that a wider cross-section of the Canadian population than Canada's native peoples is entitled to enjoy the legacy of wilderness and participate in its preservation.
As has been shown in the preceding sections, the federal comprehensive claims policy has shaped the precise goals of many organizations in the land claims movement. As 30 has also been shown, the agreements may contain varying provisions for land use designations such as parks, forestry or multiple use. Peter Burnet has pointed out that lands designated as "native lands" are not to be construed as being congruent with parks or wilderness preserves. Burnet
illustrates this difference between the two movements:
The identification of'native lands in a land-claims agreement is not necessarily the designation of specific land uses. It is the transfer of land-use control over a certain area to the indigenous aboriginal population. Because of their opposition to northern development proposals during the last decade, the aboriginal peoples often are assumed to be opposed to development on their lands. While it certainly is true that the preservation of wildlife to support traditional hunting and fishing is a major goal of aboriginal organizations, these groups have always asserted that they are not opposed to development. Their opposition to past proposals stems as much from their demand to share in the control of and proceeds from development, as it does from a desire to see the north maintained as a pristine wilderness.38
Burnet goes on to cite two cases where corporate
structures entrenched in comprehensive claims settlements
have led to conflicts between natives and environmentalists:
...The experience of the Alaskan and James Bay settlements supports this statement. The signing of these two agreements was followed by several entrepreneurial undertakings by the beneficiaries, sometimes on a very large scale. The North Slope Borough of Alaska has become very wealthy through property taxes from oil development and is heavily involved in oil development support facilities. In Canada, environmentalists often cooperate with native groups to argue against industrial developments, but, in Alaska, industry and natives have found themselves together trying to thwart attempts by conservationists to have land withdrawn
38 Peter Burnet, "Parks and Native Claims/Land and Resource Withdrawal" in The Public Disposition of Natural Resources, Nigel Bankes and J. Owen Saunders eds., (Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 1984) p. 123. 31
from development.39
Thus, as a practical matter, contemporary land claims settlements may have effects of realigning the native perceptions of self-interest. The ability to collect royalties may enhance the attractiveness of development.
Another major difference between the two movements is related to their different goals. They are unequally satisfied with the current system of social relations. While it is arguable that the land claims movement is not seeking to transform radically the prevailing system of economic relations, it is also evident from recent discussions of native self-government that the movement wishes to fundamentally alter the current configuration of Canadian governmental institutions. The reformist majority of environmentalists do not question the legitimacy of the prevailing system of social relations but rather would argue that it could be improved with adjustments. In fact, the removal of the authority of land use designation from the
Crown to native groups may be perceived by environmentalists as a threat to wilderness preservation. Deep ecologists certainly seek to alter the 'dominant social paradigm'.
However, they would probably differ with members of the land claims movement on the nature of the appropriate alternative society. Deep ecologists would return many of the central state's functions to local community control without regard to ethnicity.
39Ibid. 32
A final difference between the land claims and environmental movements is the varying levels and different types of resources available to them. As illustrated earlier, the land claims movement has a major legal resource in the concepts of aboriginal right and treaty obligations and a financial resource in funding from the Department of
Indian Affairs to pursue land claims. By comparison, environmentalists have a weaker set of resources at their disposal. There is no single concept of environmental right to parallel the concept of aboriginal right.
Environmentalists must fight their battles with the piecemeal legal resources of statutes, regulations and common law precedents. As well, no matter how unsatisfactory
its level of service, the Department of Indian Affairs is
far more administratively comprehensive than the confusing array of environmental agencies and funding programs at the
federal and provincial levels of government.
Environmentalists must often spend a great deal of energy on
fundraising activities. To attract donations they need charitable tax status and to maintain this status they must constrain their political action.
Thus, in their opposition to hinterland resource development the Indian land claims and environmental movements may be seen as coincident interests rather than a
unified force. The next chapters will describe an area, the
Stikine-Iskut Basin, claimed by an Indian tribe, the
Tahltans, and valued by environmentalists, which faced the 33 prospect of a major resource-extractive development. The
Stikine-Iskut controversy illustrates the practical differences in perspective among between the Indian land claims and environmental movements. Chapter II
THE STIKINE: WILDERNESS AND HYDROELECTRIC PLANS
As noted in the previous chapter, B.C. Hydro's plans for the Stikine-Iskut Basin have been the object of much controversy. Vehement opposition to the proposal has come from two directions. The Tahltan Indians, who have resided in the Basin for thousands of years, perceive the proposal as an attempt to colonize their territory. Environmentalists see the proposal as an imminent threat against a unique wilderness. Many of the fears inherent in both types of opposition were not to be allayed by the decision-making process which led to the proposal or by the manner in which
B.C. Hydro carried out its technical fieldwork. Despite the fact that both Tahltans and environmentalists were faced with the same adversary, their perceptions of the struggle would differ from the outset.
The three sections of this chapter will trace the development of this controversy. The first will outline the history leading to the current state of the Stikine and explain why the Basin is valued both by Tahltans and environmentalists. The second will describe B.C. Hydro's plans for the area, their origin in provincial economic development policy for the Northwest of British Columbia and their potential adverse effects on the region. The third will demonstrate how B.C. Hydro exacerbated its opposition by the way in which it proceeded with its planning activities.
34 35
A. A PRISTINE RIVER BASIN
The Stikine River rises on northwestern B.C.'s Stikine
Plateau. From its origin it flows about 500 kilometres southwest to the B.C.-Alaska border; from the border it flows a further 35 kilometers through the Alaska Panhandle to its Delta near Wrangell, Alaska. The Iskut River, the
Stikine's major tributary, flows from the south into the
Stikine at approximately 61 kilometers upstream of the
B. C.-Alaska border. The rivers pass through some of Canada's highest mountains and through two distinct climactic zones."0 Of particular note is the Grand Canyon of the
Stikine which has been called the most spectacular river canyon in North America. The canyon's walls range between
800 and 1200 feet in height and its channel can narrow to as little as fifty feet. The Rivers are most remarkable for the
fact that they have been left virtually free of human alteration.
The Stikine and Iskut have remained wild rivers because they are relatively inaccessible by comparison with other parts of B.C. Because the Stikine is hidden behind the
Alaska Panhandle its level of European settlement has
remained low and its non-renewable resources have been
largely ignored by B.C.'s industrial economy. This lack of
resource development contrasts greatly with the extensive
4,0 B.C. Hydro and Power Authority, Quick Facts About B.C. Hydro's Proposed Stikine ^ 1skut Hydroelectric Development (Vancouver: n.p., 1982); Canada, Dept. of Indian and Northern Affairs, The Future of the Stikine Basin by John Faustmann (Vancouver: n.p., 1982), p.1. 36 resource exploitation in the other parts of B.C. Aside from sporadic mining efforts the level of non-renewable resource development has been limited:
The history of European settlement on the Stikine is a story of big plans that never panned out: mineral deposits that proved too small or too inaccessible to mine, railroads begun but never completed, unfinished telegraph lines, and a Klondike gold rush trail that leads to nowhere."1
1. TAHLTAN TIES TO THE BASIN
The majority of residents in the Stikine Basin are
native Indians. There are two Indian Bands. The Tahltan
Band, centred in Telegraph Creek, has a membership of over
500 Tahltans, of whom roughly one-third live on the reserve.
The Iskut Band, located at Iskut, has a membership of about
350 Sekanis, of whom three quarters live on the reserve. The
Bands' memberships are related. Both speak Tahltan, an
Athapaskan language, and have similar nomadic hunting
practices."2 Because the Stikine-Iskut Basin has remained
wilderness, the Tahltans have retained many aspects of their
traditional economy, which in turn is an integral part of
their culture and aboriginal identity.
While definitely a post-contact people, the Tahltans
still rely on the Stikine-Iskut land base. Their economy has
many of the characteristics ascribed to the native economy
by Peter Usher. Anthropologist Sylvia Albright underlines
"1 Faustmann, The Future, p.5 "2 B.C Hydro and Power Authority, Social and Economic Impacts by Bentley LeBaron (Vancouver: n.p., 1982) p. 6. 37 the importance of the isolation of the Stikine-Iskut Basin to the maintenance of the Tahltan economy:
While the sequence of historic events on the Stikine River was similar to that occurring in other areas of British Columbia, the influence of direct European contact on traditional Tahltan culture was felt much later than in most areas. Throughout the historic period, Tahltans have maintained strong ties to their land and aspects of their traditional culture related to a subsistence economy"3.
An example of these ties is the harvesting of fish and wildlife for food. Albright relates that, in order to understand past Tahltan use of fish and wildlife, in addition to the examination of archeological evidence, the observation of present practices was instructive:
Research conducted at the Telegraph Creek area by the author has concentrated on observing and recording traditional activities which are still carried out by local Tahltans. Salmon is still a major economic resource of the Tahltan people. While other methods of preservation are now available, quantities of salmon are still dried in traditional style smokehouses for winter storage as they have been for hundreds and perhaps thousands of years. The hunting of wild game continues to provide a major portion of the native diet. The process and many of the tools used in tanning hides today for making mittens, moccassins and babiche, have remained unchanged since prehistoric times...""
Thus, the isolation of the Stikine-Iskut Basin from encroachment by the industrial economy has allowed the
Tahltan people to continue their traditional subsistence practices. By default the Tahltans have been allowed to exercise control over land use in the Stikine-Iskut Basin.
The Basin has remained a working part of their culture.
"3 Sylvia Albright, "An Ethnoarcheological Study of Tahltan Subsistence and Settlement Patterns" (M.A. Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1982), p.29. "" Ibid., p.43. 38
2. ENVIRONMENTALIST ATTACHMENTS
The Stikine's pristine environment has, in addition to allowing the continuation of traditional Tahltan practices,
inspired the awe of environmentalists. As early as the
1880's, John Muir, the noted conservationist and founder of the Sierra Club, visited and was impressed by the Stikine's
Great Glacier."5 A few non-natives have been so attracted to the Basin that they have homesteaded there. However, most non-natives who visit the region are attracted for its
outdoor recreation opportunities. Until the nineteen
seventies, most non-native recreation took the form of
big-game hunting. With the opening of Highway 34 and
Spatzizi Provincial Park, local businesses expanded to serve
tourists who wished to engage in rafting, fishing, hiking,
wildlife viewing and photography."6 Marty Loken, of the
Alaska Geographic, has summarized the environmentalist
attachment to the Stikine:
We have killed many of our great rivers—draining, diverting, rechanneling, damming, poisoning—but the Stikine remains, despite present threats, a living watershed, part of the last unmanipulated wilderness in British Columbia and South Eastern Alaska."7
"5 Marty Loken, "The Stikine River: Perhaps the Last Large Navigable Wilderness River in North America", Alaska Geographic, 6: 4, (1979): 7. "6 Rosamund Pojar, "Recreation", The Telkwa Foundation Newsletter, 3:l(Spring 1980): 6. "' Loken, "The Stikine River", p. 7. 39
B. B.C. HYDRO DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND THE STIKINE
In the fall of 1983, B.C. Hydro, faced with a mounting debt load and a power surplus, anounced, amongst other cuts, the postponement of the in-service date of the first
installation on the Stikine from the 1990's until well into the twenty-first century."8 While it may be tempting to
think of a twenty year postponement as a cancellation, it is
important to realise that B.C. Hydro continues to view the hydro-electric development of the Stikine as its prerogative."9 In late 1984, B.C. Hydro compiled an Interim
Assessment Report on the Stikine which was intended to
summarize all B.C. Hydro findings about the Stikine in the
event they would required for future project implementation.
Nowhere does this report indicate that the proposal has been
abandoned.50 It assumes that one day the province's level of
energy consumption will grow past available supply and that
construction of new hydro-electric installations will be
necessary.
In B.C. Hydro's longterm development itinerary,
construction on the Stikine is scheduled to begin some time
after the completion of Site C on the Peace River.51 In
"8 "B.C. Hydro Forsees Further Cuts in Capital Projects as Growth Slows", Globe and Mail, Sept.26, 1983, p. B-1. 49 B.C. Hydro and Power Authority, Stikine-Iskut Development Interim Assessment Report, Report no.H1693 (Vancouver:n.p., Dec. 1983). 50Ibid. 51 B.C. Hydro, Electric System Plans, (Vancouver: n.p., 1980) this report places Site C first, followed by Hat Creek and then the Stikine; however Hat Creek has since been totally removed from the itinerary; "Hat Creek Abandoned," Province(Vancouver), Aug. 22, 1982. 40
1983, after some 18 months of hearings, the B.C. Utilities
Commission rejected Site C as economically unviable and thus, Site C, along with other long term plans such as the
Stikine-Iskut, was postponed.52 However, in August of this year, Premier Bill Bennett announced at the opening of the
Revelstoke Dam, that B.C. was aggressively negotiating long term power exports to California, and that construction on
Site C could begin within a year.53 Although no agreement has yet been reached, Bennett has already seen the removal of one obstacle in that the Bonneville Power Administration , which owns the transmission lines necessary to transmit any
B.C. Hydro exports, has agree to consider granting B.C.
Hydro permission to use the lines.
Thus, the Stikine-Iskut proposal retains immediacy. Its implementation will be pushed ahead if Site C is developed earlier than was predicted a year ago. The Stikine-Iskut proposal has fostered controversy for a number of reasons.
First, its implementation would have an undeniably adverse effect on the ecology of the Stikine-Iskut Basin. Second, the power which would have been generated by the dams could not be justified by present or future or local or provincial energy requirements. Third, was the manner in which B.C.
Hydro proceeded with its planning activities. The opposition
52 "Site C dam go-ahead called foolish by SPEC," Sun (Vancouver), Sept. 11, 1985. 53 "New Hope for Dams," Sun(Vancouver), Aug. 29, 1985; "Bennett heads south on sales trip," Sun(Vancouver), Sept. 16, 1985; "Fast action sought on power pact," Sun(Vancouver), Sept. 17, 1985; "Bennett hails power breakthrough," Sun(Vancouver), Sept. 18, 1985. 41 would fault B.C. Hydro for its secrecy and lack of compliance with regulations.
1. EARLY INTEREST AND COVERT ACTIVITY
B.C. Hydro and the provincial government have had an
interest in developing the Stikine and Iskut rivers for some
time.5" A 1961 publication of the B.C. Lands Service gave
estimates of the hydroelectric potential of the two rivers.
By 1964 the B.C. Water Investigations Branch had identified
potential damsites and, later in that year, provincial
Orders-in-Counci1 held lands near the sites in reserve,
restricting mining activity. Finally, in the summer of 1971
Brinco Limited, the company which had built Newfoundland's
Churchill Falls project, was inadvertently discovered by
tourists to be engaged in survey work near the Stikine, some
six years before a formal proposal was made. Brinco at first
denied, but later admitted its activity. By the spring of
1972, further lands had been reserved for flooding.
2. THE STIKINE-ISKUT PROPOSAL
B.C. Hydro's first full proposal for the Stikine-Iskut
included a group of four projects: a) "Stikine Canyon", b)
"Tanzilla" on the Stikine, c) "Iskut Canyon", and d) "More
Creek".55 The Stikine Canyon project, which would have an
installed generating capacity of 915 Mw., would consist of a
dam 270 meters high creating a reservoir 103 km. long with
5" Faustmann, The Future, p.7. 55 B.C. Hydro and Power Authority, Quick Facts. 42 an area of 12,700 hectares. The Tanzilla project, to generate another 915 Mw., would construct a dam 193 m. high with a reservoir 25 km. long and flood 900 ha. The Iskut
Canyon project would generate 780 Mw. with a dam 158 m. high, and a reservoir 25 km. long flooding 3800 ha. Finally,
the More Creek project would generate a further 155 Mw. from
two dams: a 135 m. one with a 25 km., 4100 ha. reservoir; and, to divert Forrest Kerr Creek into the headwaters of
More Creek, a second 37 m. dam. The combined generating
capacity of the proposed dams on the Stikine-Iskut would be
approximately 2800 Mw., or about one third of B.C. Hydro's
generating capacity in 1982.
In addition to the dams the proposals included
transmission lines to deliver the power to the provincial
grid.56 At the time the proposal was postponed two possible
systems were under consideration. The first was for a
500,000 volt (500kV) line from the site to the city of
Terrace. The second would have seen the construction of a
765kV line from the site to Prince George. The construction
of the transmission lines alone would have involved
development unprecedented in northwest B.C.
Bearing in mind that the complete Stikine-Iskut
proposal would have provided power in excess of 2800Mw., it
is possible to conclude that electricity consumption in the
Basin, or for that matter in all of the northwest, would not
have warranted a development of this magnitude. As of 1980
56 B.C. Hydro and Power Authority, Progress Report on Feasibilty Studies, (Vancouver:n.p.~ 1980) pp. 2-9. 43
(the year in which B.C. Hydro first acknowledged its interest in developing the Basin), the entire generating capacity on the Stikine Plateau was 3.25 Mw. 57 At that time, peak demand for all Hydro customers in the northwest was only 308Mw. Thus, a development of the magnitude envisaged in the proposals would only be justified if the power were exported from the region or if a customer of unprecedented magnitude was attracted to the area.
3. PROVINCIAL IMPETUS
Provincial government reports suggest that both
scenarios would have been necessary for the proposal to be
economically feasible. A 1982 provincial Ministry of
Industry and Small Business Development report on
development prospects for northwest B.C. states that the
region's potential rests on the exploitation of yet
undeveloped mineral deposits.58 The report also notes that
this exploitation would be limited by a general lack of
infrastructure in the form of transportation, municipal
facilities, and low-cost power.59 However, the report goes
on to note that even full mineral development of the region
57 B.C. Hydro and Power Authority, Electricity in Northwestern British Columbia (Vancouver:n.p., 1981), p.7-8; All electricity on the Stikine Plateau is now provided by diesel generators. 58 British Columbia, Ministry of Industry and Small Business Development, The Northwest Region (Victoria: Queen's Printer, 1982) pp. 130-133. See also British Columbia, Ministry of Economic Development, The Northwest Report 77 (Victoria: Queen's Printer, 1977). 59 The proposals would certainly have remedied this lack. Aside from producing power, hydroelectric developments produce spinoffs in the form of roads and townsites. 44 would not require the entire potential of the Stikine-Iskut proposal, and that a decision to build would have to be based on provincial rather than regional needs. The report concludes by noting that regional power needs could be served by the More Creek development alone, the smallest component of the entire proposal, and that this option would be less likely to provoke environmental and native opposition.
A 1983 inter-ministerial report in response to the 1982
report identified 3 major mineral claims which it saw as viable before the end of the decade.60 One of these, Mount
Klappan, an anthracite coal mine owned by Gulf Canada
Resources, underwent extensive field testing in the summer
of 1984. Another development deemed viable, Stikine Copper,
would have required much of the power from More Creek. In
general, the report strongly suggested that while local
hydro or diesel generation would be the best option to
provide power for mineral development, this development by
itself would not justify proceeding with the entire
Stikine-Iskut proposal. Given that there was (and is) a
surplus in the provincial grid, the report was a tacit
admission that the full proposal would be inadvisable. It
also lends support to the view that the proposal was framed
with provincial rather than regional interests in mind.
60 British Columbia, Ministry of Industry and Small Business Development, Summary Report: Task Force on Northwest Economic Development Opportunities" (victoria:Queen's Printer, 1983), pp. 35-39. 45
4. PROPOSED EFFECTS
The proposed development would have drastically altered the ecology of the Stikine-Iskut Basin. The dams and their infrastructure alone, even leaving aside any further development they fostered, would have transformed the region from its current wilderness state.61 The dams would have reduced the fish and wildlife resource and detracted from the region's scenery. These effects, in turn, would have resulted in the destruction of the Tahltan subsistence economy, and the alteration of the way of life now enjoyed by many people in the region, and the loss of many opportunities for wilderness recreation.
The effects on fish and wildlife would have been marked. Although the effects on the fishery would be difficult to calculate precisely due to a lack of baseline data, both B.C. Hydro and opposition concur that the dams would have adverse effects in at least two ways.62 First, the dams would stabilize the seasonal flow regime and thereby reduce the salmon fry rearing habitat and sockeye spawning habitat. Second, short-term fluctuations in river discharge, resulting from hourly, daily and weekly changes
in power demand, would interrupt mainstem spawning by exposing reeds and stranding fish. The adverse effects on wildlife would have two principal causes. First, the
flooding of 17,000 ha. of habitat would displace moose, goats, bears and other mammals. Second, increased access due
61 Bentley LeBaron, Social and Economic, p. 150. 62 B.C. Hydro, Stikine-Iskut Interim, pp. 6-8. 46 to the corridors made by transmission lines would increase hunting pressures.
The scenic value of the region would have been severely diminished by project implementation.63 For example, the
Stikine's Grand Canyon, thought by many to be of
international significance, would be flooded. B.C. Hydro has
stated that it would not be cost-feasible to pre-log
reservoirs so snags will mar their beauty and render them
dangerous for boaters.6" As another example, one possible
route for the transmission line is along Highway 37, now a
designated wilderness highway.
The Tahltan subsistence economy, and therefore the
entire Tahltan way of life, would be destroyed by the
implementation of the B.C. Hydro proposal. As B.C. Hydro's
Interim Assessment pointed out:
Recent studies in other areas indicate that large-scale development has proven to have far more adverse effects on native people than those associated with either the fur trade or the gold rush.65
The report suggested that these effects result from the
rapid increase in the non-native population, the relative
permanence of development, the difference between value
systems and the alienation of wilderness.
A small number of non-natives have moved to the Stikine
in order to enjoy a way of life that is only possible in the
wilderness. These people generally make their living outside
63 Ibid., p. 80. 6" Pojar, "Recreation," p.6. 65 B.C. Hydro, The Stikine-Iskut Interim, pp.V:211-212. 47 the wage economy by a combination of homesteading, market gardening, fishing and tourism. Although they do not have the aboriginal right to the land base claimed by the
Tahltans, their lives would be as affected by the dams as would the Tahltans'. B.C. Hydro's report describes how development would clash with the ways of life led by the
Tahltans and homesteaders:
...the project would be beneficial for those people who are part of the wage economy and who perceive that hydro-electric development signifies progress. For those people who depend on the subsistence economy or who place high value on the wilderness, the project would require significant adjustments. The increased population and corresponding increase in competition for land and resources (eg. fish, wildlife and agricultural land) would increase conflict with the present lifestyles. Moreover, the issue of land claims and its relationship to the development remains critical. The issue has implications not only because of its .priority for local and regional native people but also because of the political and legal complexities it' represents.6 6
Tourism is a growing part of the economy in the
Stikine. Both Tahltan and non-native enterprises would be affected by B.C. Hydro's plans. Because it is not easily accessible from any major population centre, much of the
Stikine's attractiveness for tourists has been its unspoiled wilderness. B.C. Hydro has argued that while the
Stikine-Iskut development would radically alter the Stikine,
it would also make the region more accessible to tourists and thereby increase regional income from tourism and
recreation.67 Opposition groups would argue that much of the
66 Ibid., pp. V:3-4. 67Ibid., p. 8. 48
Stikine's present recreational value is a direct result of the region's inaccessibility and that any recreation opportunity resulting from the dams would be "...a miserable alternative to the present".68
Thus, the Stikine-Iskut dams would spell the end of the
Stikine-Iskut Basin as a wilderness. It would force the integration of Tahltans and homesteaders into the wage economy. No measure of mitigation which B.C. Hydro could offer would adequately offset this loss.
5. PLANNING ACTIVITIES
At the time of the project's postponement, B.C. Hydro had spent over $50 million on fieldwork.69 This large expenditure had itself a significant impact on the sparsely populated area. These preliminary activities of sampling and design work gave residents a foretaste of the effects of dam construction. Henry Tashoots of the Iskut Band spoke at the
1982 B.C. Utilities Commission Rate Hearings on the intrusive nature of Hydro's preliminary work in the
Stikine-Iskut Basin:
You see, the traditional trapping ways of our people express that the trapping in the winter was harvested more or less with care, as to the populations they are trapping. Now during the summer months the animals in the area have a chance to reestablish its traditional population. So that it was always regulated. Now if you start sticking--if you start putting helipads, helicopter pads or
68 Pojar, "Recreation," p. 6. 69 John Dawson and W. Graham Nicholls, B.C. Hydro Community Relations Officer, interview, Vancouver, Dec. 10, 1984. 49
landing areas in the surrounding area where there is a population of—let's say mink for instance--a fur-bearing animal called mink—Now, these are very shy animals—Now, what is going to happen is that they're just going to migrate to another area, an area more or less where they are not in tune with the environment. So what happens during the winter? They don't know where to find food and they dissipate rather quickly.70
B.C. Hydro and its planning activities would be criticised in three major ways, by both Tahltans and environmentalists.
First, as Henry Tashoots recounted, the planning activities were very disruptive. Second, the corporation was faulted for being secretive with its findings. Third, Hydro was consistently casual about complying with land use regulations.
B.C. Hydro's community relations department has itself admitted that it failed to meet its objective of public consultation:
...owing to inadequate staff resources and information availability, and to a lack of recognition by Hydro of the extent of communications and travel problems in the study area.... Hydro's initial reliance upon news releases and brief Information Bulletins in a region where newspapers and radio were virtually nonexistent were no substitute for early consistent personal contact with local residents. 71
In 1981 the corporation increased staff, arranged public meetings and disseminated more information but public resentment remained and useful interaction was inhibited. In
1982 the Northern Projects Journal was mailed to every
70 British Columbia Utilities Commission, I_n the Matter of the Utilities Commission Act and in the Matter of an Application by the B.C. Hydro and Power Author ity Proceeding no.48, Vancouver, June 1, 1982, pp. 94-97. 71 B.C. Hydro, Stikine-Iskut Interim, p. 11:22. 50 household in northern B.C., but apprehension persisted until project postponement:
While information availability and public dialogue improved significantly late in the study program, "consultation" in the sense of the project team receiving and seriously considering informal advice and comment from the public, never really began.72
The problems of access to information and non-compliance were both evident during B.C. Hydro's preliminary investigations in 1980 through 1982.73 At this
stage because B.C. Hydro had yet to make formal application
to build the dams, the corporation had to apply to the
Ministry of Lands to construct access roads and sewage
facilities on a site by site basis. Opposition groups found
a number of irregularities. First, permits from the Ministry
of Lands were inadequately monitored for compliance. For
example, a campsite at Site Z was occupied long before it
was permitted and long after the permit expired. Second,
applications for land tenure were often transacted and
granted verbally by B.C. Hydro and Lands officials. The
casual nature of these transactions denied the public access
to information about B.C. Hydro's activities. Third,
procedures for land tenure applications were constantly
being revised without notice so the public was never fully
aware of the regulations with which B.C. Hydro had to
comply. Fourth, when B.C. Hydro financed a third party such
72 Ibid.; In B.C. Hydro's corporate terminology, "public . consultation" is limited to such issues as compensation and impact mitigation and does not encompass justification of the project per se. 73 Tom Buri, "Prelude to Power", The Telkwa Foundation Newsletter, 6:1 (Spring 1983), pp. 9-11. 51 as a mining company to carry out exploration activities, the public had no access whatsoever to information about the activities. In addition to the above irregularities, opposition groups were frustrated by the fact that because
B.C. Hydro had not applied to construct the dams it was not
required and refused to publicly discuss whether or not the
project was justified. The Ministry of Lands had no
jurisdiction to investigate the costs of B.C. Hydro's
activities or whether activities such as drilling and road
access were actually planning as opposed to construction
activities. Opposition groups have argued that because
B.C. Hydro's activities were not subject to due process that
they could not be effectively scrutinized by the public. In
the next chapter environmentalist groups will be shown to
have had some success in urging the Ministry of Lands to be
more strict in its administration of regulations.
B.C. Hydro has suggested that no matter how much it had
spent on public relations or how well it had complied with
land use regulations, that the corporation's activities
would still have been greatly resented 7". Certainly the end
result of the planning was bitterly opposed by Tahltans and
environmentalists. Much criticism of B.C. Hydro's corporate
secrecy and failure to comply with regulations was
necessarily confused with criticism of the project's
justification. It is doubtful then that the legitimacy of
B.C. Hydro's activities in the Stikine would ever be
7* Dawson, interview. 52 acknowledged by the opposition.
C. SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the sparse industrial development of the Stikine and explained this in terms of the area's relative geographic isolation. The Stikine"s lack of development has in turn allowed the Tahltan people to lead their traditional way of life and has made the Basin particularly attractive to environmentalists. The Stikine's unique land base is threatened by B.C. Hydro's proposal to dam the Stikine and Iskut Rivers. It should come as no surprise that, given the strong sentiments in favour of keeping the Stikine in its natural state and given the magnitude of B.C. Hydro's proposal and indeed, B.C. Hydro's planning activities, that the proposal should have met with controversy from its initial announcement.
A great part of the controversy has been due to the
fact that B.C. Hydro's proposals were not the product of public consultation. The proposals were stimulated by provincial economic development policy, which in turn was based on cabinet and technocratic decision-making rather
than on open deliberation. This is not to argue that no
residents of the Stikine or members of the general provincial public would favour the dams but rather that the proposal was imposed upon rather than initiated by the local
or general provincial population. The proposal is not 53 compatible with many current uses of the Basin and as has been shown, there are strong sentiments in favour of keeping the Stikine and Iskut Rivers free of impoundments. This basic divergence of opinion has shaped the relationship between the Tahltans and environmentalists into an uneasy coexistence. Chapter III
DIVIDED OPPOSITION
The relationship between the Association of United
Tahltans (henceforth, the A.U.T.) and the Stikine-Iskut environmentalist opposition exhibits many of the conflicts which, as discussed in Chapter One, permeate the general
relationship between the land claims and environmental movements. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the
tactics and philosophical motivations of the A.U.T. and the
Stikine-Iskut environmentalist opposition and show how these
have in turn affected the relationship between the two
oppositions. In addition, the final section of this chapter
will reinforce the understanding of the division between the
two oppostions by examining and contrasting their attitudes
toward the regulatory process, which is central to
contemporary hydroelectric development in British Columbia.
Generally, the A.U.T. may be seen as a member of the British
Columbia Indian land claims movement, while the
environmentalist opposition may be seen as committed to
reformist solutions to the problem of wilderness depletion
through resource-extractive development.
54 55
A. TWO OPPOSITIONS
1. TAHLTAN OPPOSITION THROUGH THE A.U.T.
The Tahltans have been fighting for a recognition of their land claims since the turn of the century. The following passage indicates that they were aware of internal colonialism long before the phrase was coined:
DECLARATION OF THE TAHLTAN TRIBE, 1910 We, the undersigned members of the Tahltan tribe, speaking for ourselves, and our entire tribe, hereby make known to all whom it may concern, that we have heard of the Indian Rights movement among the Indian tribes of the Coast, and of the southern interior of B.C. Also, we have read the Declaration made by the chiefs of the southern interior tribes at Spences Bridge on the 16th July last, and we hereby declare our... intention to join with them in the fight for our mutual rights, and that we will assist in the furtherance of this object in every way we can, until such time as all these matters of moment to us are finally settled. We further declare as follows: Firstly—We claim the sovereign right of all the country of our tribe--this country of ours which we have held intact from the encroachments of other tribes, from time immemorial, at the cost of our own blood. We have done this because our lives depended on our country. To lose it meant we would lose our means of living, and therefore our lives. We are still, as heretofore, dependent for our living on our country, and we do not intend to give away the title to any part of same without adequate compensation. We deny the B.C. government has any title or right of ownership in our country. We have never treated with them, nor given them any such title. (We have only very lately learned the B.C. government makes this claim, and that it has for long considered as its property all the territories of the Indian tribes in B.C.) Secondly--We desire that a part of our country, consisting of one or more large areas (to be selected by us), be retained by us for our own use, said lands, and all thereon to be acknowledged by the government as our absolute property. The rest of our tribal land we are willing to relinquish to the B.C. government for adequate compensation. Thirdly—We wish it known that a small portion of our lands at the mouth of the Tahltan River, was 56
set apart a few years ago by Mr. Vowell as an Indian reservation. These few acres are the only reservation made for our tribe. We may state we never applied for the reservation of this piece of land, and we had no knowledge why the government set it apart for us, nor do we know exactly why. Fourthly—We desire that all questions regarding our lands, hunting, fishing,etc., and every matter concerning our welfare, be settled by treaty between us and the Dominion and B.C. governments. Fifthly--We are of the opinion it will be better for ourselves, also better for the governments and all concerned, if these treaties are made with us at a very early date, so all friction, and misunderstanding between us and the whites may be avoided, for we hear lately much talk of white settlement in this region, and the building of railways, etc., in the near future. Signed at Telegraph Creek, B.C., this eighteenth day of October, ninteen hundred and ten, by NANOK Chief of the Tahltans, NASTULTA alias Little Jackson, GEORGE ASSADZA, KENETL Alias Big Jackson, and eighty other members of the tribe.75
The contemporary Tahltan struggle for recognition of claims is a continuation of the struggle which is described in the 1910 Declaration. The contemporary period has some remarkable parallels with the earlier. In both cases the
Tahltans were part of provincial Indian movements, faced recalcitrant provincial governments, had yet to sign treaties, had not been compensated for losses of land, felt wronged by the small size of their reserves and wished for settlements in the face of massive developments. The most prominent similarity between the periods is the Tahltan assertion of ties to the land.
The contemporary period though, is not completely indentical with the past. Today, the Tahltan assertion of
75 Marty Loken, "The Stikine River: Perhaps the Last Large Navigable Wilderness River in North America,"Alaska Geographic, 6:4 (1979): 46. 57 ties to the land takes two partially overlapping but nonetheless distinct forms. In the past these ties were asserted mainly by the continuing traditional use of the
Stikine supplemented with sporadic political activity. Today traditional land use continues but political activity has become much more institutionalized than in the past.
B.C. Hydro's proposals aroused opposition throughout the Tahltan community. B.C. Hydro's preliminary work, which began before any official announcements, was in itself a disruptive factor. Tahltan opposition to the dams was based on a number of points.76 First and foremost was the fear that the dams would adversely affect the salmon fishery.
Second, was the apprehension that increased public access during the planning and construction of the dams would pressure wildlife. Third, was the resentment over decisions being made about the Basin by individuals who knew nothing
substantive about it. Fourth, was a mistrust of B.C. Hydro,
reinforced by its corporate secrecy.
As noted in the second chapter, the undeveloped nature
of the Stikine-Iskut Basin has allowed many Tahltans to continue in their traditional uses of the Stikine. As well,
some Tahltans have, as individuals, taken opportunities to
express their opposition to B.C. Hydro's proposal in forums
outside the claims negotiation process. Among these
responses has been (as previously cited) attendance at B.C.
76 Canada, Dept. of Indian and Northern Affairs, The Future of the Stikine Basin, by John Faustmann (Vancouver: n.p., 1982T7 p. 13. 58
Utilities Commission rate hearings, the submission of a
brief to the Pearse Commission on Fisheries and Oceans, and
participation in Lands Branch hearings on B.C. Hydro's
application for an access road. A major purpose of these
appearances has been to encourage public understanding of
the importance of wilderness to Tahltan livelihoods.77 This
response to internal colonialism has taken place largely
outside formal organizations.
The Tahltans claim some 50,000 square miles as opposed
to the 2,000 acres of land which are now reserved for
them.78 In keeping with the tendency, noted by Tennant, of
British Columbia Indian political activity to centre on the
tribe, the A.U.T., formed in 1975, represents both the
Tahltan and Iskut Bands in their land claim negotiations.
The A.U.T. borrows monies against future Tahltan claims from
the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs to research
land claim issues. In 1980, the federal government accepted
the Tahltan claim for negotiation. To date, these
negotiations have not commenced because, as mentioned in
Chapter One, the federal government is-awaiting the result
of some eight years of negotiations with the Nishgas and the
A.U.T. is still researching the Tahltan claim.79
77 "Tne rivers have always been theirs," Sun (Vancouver), Sept. 5, 1980. 78 Ibid. 79 Canada, Dept. of Indian and Northern Affairs, I_n All Fairness, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1982), p.30; George Asp, A.U.T. land claims representative, phone interview, Smithers, May 3, 1985. 59
While the background work on the Tahltan claim was well underway when B.C. Hydro first publicly acknowledged its interest in the Stikine-Iskut Basin, B.C.Hydro's proposal still served to highlight the urgent need for a settlement.
In addition to its land claims activities the A.U.T. has also tried to strengthen its case against the dams by conducting its own independent study of resource use in the
Basin. The Stikine Basin Resource Analysis was funded for two fiscal years by the Department of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development under a special program to study the effects of major resource developments on traditional native lands. This program was unusual because it allowed the study of lands outside of reserves.80 Although constrained by funding limitations, the Stikine Basin Resource Analysis was an effort to catalogue the resources on Tahltan aboriginal lands and to calculate the opportunity costs of proceeding with the construction of B.C. Hydro's proposals. The identification of these resources or "setting a baseline" was seen as a first step in controlling their development and use.81
The A.U.T. is a characteristically hierarchical organization. Its executive is elected by the membership at large. For the most part, between elections A.U.T. policy and external relations are developed and carried out by members of the executive and their consultants. The A.U.T.
80 Ada Tuck, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, phone interview, Vancouver, Sept. 24, 1984. 81 Asp, interview; according to Asp the A.U.T. received approximately $250,000 for this purpose. 60 office is located at Dease Lake which is some geographic distance from Tahltan reserves at Iskut and Telegraph Creek.
Members of the executive tend to spend most of their time on land claims activities and hence, at least during their terms, are prevented from participating in the traditional
Tahltan economy.
Thus, Tahltan opposition to B.C. Hydro's proposal may be seen as taking two forms. The first, the maintenance of the traditional Tahltan economy lacks the financial and professional resources of the second, the A.U.T. In fact,
Tahltans who make their living from the land do not have a
formal organization to promote their traditional practices.
Hence, the A.U.T. and to a lesser extent the Band Councils, are frequently delegated, if mainly by default, to represent
Tahltans in their relations with external bodies such as
governments, corporations and environmental groups. For this
reason, this thesis concentrates on relations between the
A.U.T. and environmentalists.
2. ENVIRONMENTALIST OPPOSITION
The two Canadian non-native opposition groups are the
Friends of the Stikine and Residents for a Free Flowing
Stikine. The groups originated at a workshop on B.C. Hydro's
Stikine-Iskut proposal in January of 1980.82 The workshop,
sponsored by the Sierra Club of British Columbia and held at
U.B.C, brought together native groups and non-natives from
82 Tom Buri, "Who Are We?" Friends of the Stikine Newsletter, 1 (Jan. 1981): 1. 61 north and south B.C. and Alaska. After considering the potential environmental and social effects of the dams, the workshop participants voiced their unanimous opposition to them. The participants also decided to establish committees in Vancouver and Telegraph Creek "...to develop public awareness of the Stikine and alternative policies for managing it in keeping with wilderness character and the aspirations of the native people".83 The committee at
Vancouver became Friends of the Stikine and the committee at
Telegraph Creek became Residents for a Free-Flowing
Stikine.8 •
The two groups have remained in fairly close communication. Most contact has been through the letters and the distribution of newsletters and by long-distance telephone calls. As well, members of the Residents have an ' open invitation to attend Friends meetings when they are visiting the Lower Mainland, and several have taken advantage of the invitation. In addition, two former members of the executive of Friends have moved to Northwest B.C. and one former member of Residents now lives in Vancouver and serves as liaison between the two groups. With a few exceptions then it is fruitful to discuss the two groups as a single entity.85
83Ibid. 8" May Murray, Secretary of Friends of the Stikine, phone interview, Vancouver, Mar. 24, 1984; Tannis Fischer, Board Member of Residents for a Free-Flowing Stikine, phone interview, Vancouver, May 23, 1985. 85 The only substantial difference between the two groups is the occupational composition of their memberships. Members of Friends are largely members of the professional urban 62
The two groups reflect their origins in the Sierra
Club. This is certainly no accident as Friends shared the
Sierra Club's charitable tax status number for four years until it obtained its own in the summer of 1984. Both
Friends and Residents have remained largely voluntary organizations that use reformist political tactics and at least tacitly, accept the dominant social paradigm.86
Although individual members in either organization might have deep ecological tendencies, the activities of both organizations themselves reflect a willingness to work within the mainstream political system. Neither group has engaged in, or officially sponsored, violent or non-violent direct action. To a great extent this choice of tactics has been prescribed by federal legislation which limits the amount of political activity in which a tax-deductible charity may engage and by the reliance of Residents, in particular, on small but essential federal government grants to keep its office open.87
In keeping with their initial mandate "to enhance public awareness" about the Stikine, most of Friends and
Residents public activities have been educational. These
85(cont'd) middle-class. Members of Residents are almost exclusively homesteaders in the Stikine. This difference has not, however, led to any substantial differences of philosophy or tactics. 86 The only major difference between the environmentalists' opposition and the Sierra Club is that all of the policy decisions of both Friends and Residents are made by volunteers. The two organizations are so small that they cannot support professional staffs and must rely on the participation of their memberships, albeit small active subsets of their memberships. 87 Fischer, interview. 63 activities have included the production by Friends of a semi-annual informational newsletter, the sale of a special
Stikine issue of Alaska Geographic, the circulation of a videotape on the Stikine controversy, the sale of a scenic poster and postcards and the sponsorship of a May 1985 workshop in Telegraph Creek on land use planning in the
Basin.88 In addition, the groups have kept in close communication with sympathetic groups such as the South East
Alaska Conservation Council and the Sierra Club.
The political activities of Friends and Residents have been linked with their educational activities. Both maintain mailing lists of sympathetic politicians and appropriate government officials at the federal and provincial levels and in Alaska. Wherever possible they have taken the opportunity to participate in public fora such as the Pearse
Commission and the Utilities Commission rate increase hearings.89 Much effort has been put toward reforming environmental regularity structures which have included at various times the Land Act, the Utilities Commission Act or the Forest Act.
88 "Skeena Broadcasters Make Stikine Film," Friends of the Stikine Newsletter, 4 (Dec. 1981); "Framed Stikine Posters,"Friends of the Stikine Newsletter, 9 (Oct. 1983); "Newsflash—Stikine Workshop Planned," Friends of the Stikine Newsletter, 11 (Mar. 1985): 4. 89 "The Stikine Dam—Hydro's Search for Gravel," Friends of the Stikine Newsletter, 4 (Dec. 1981): 3. "F. 0. S. Writes to Minister on Energy Certificate Approval Process," Friends of the Stikine Newsletter, 9 (Oct. 1983): 2-3; "Logging on the Lower Stikine,"Friends of the Stikine Newsletter, 10 (Apr. 1984): 1-4. 64
A 1980 and 1981 campaign by Friends and Residents offers an example of their efforts to reform environmental regulations. As noted in the previous chapter, much opposition to B.C. Hydro's proposal had been engendered by the manner in which B.C. Hydro's planning in the Stikine was regulated by the Ministry of Lands. An active letter writing campaign by both environmental groups successfully pressured the Minister of Lands to order that B.C. Hydro hold two public meetings, one at Dease Lake and the other at Terrace, on February 23 and 24, 1982 so that there could be an information exchange between B.C. Hydro and the public.90
Each meeting began with a B.C. Hydro presentation of about an hour and a half in duration. In both cases, this was followed by a public question period during which much animosity was expressed against the Ministry of Lands. Most of this animosity stemmed from the fact that the meeting was a discussion between B.C. Hydro and the public rather than an adjudicated regulatory hearing. Success in this case was, as is often the case in reformist environmental activism, mixed. B.C. Hydro was awarded its road access permit.
As current provincial environmental regulations have failed to halt major resource-extractive developments such as logging on the Lower Stikine and anthracite mining at
Mount Klappan, many environmentalists have come to the conclusion that these regulatory processes are both too limited and too diffuse to protect the wilderness of the
90 Tom Buri, "Prelude to Power," Telkwa Foundation Newsletter, 16:1 (Spring 1983): 9-11. 65
Stikine-Iskut Basin. In addition, they have come to the conclusion that the Comprehensive Claims process has proven to be ineffective in British Columbia and that by the time the Tahltan Comprehensive Claim is negotiated, it may be too late to protect the Stikine. Thus, there is a growing sentiment among environmentalists that the Stikine should be given some sort of park designation.91
Thus, both Friends and Residents have continued in the conservationist and reformist traditions of the Sierra Club.
Although they officially support the resolution of the
Tahltan Comprehensive claim, their primary objective is the preservation of the Stikine-Iskut Basin as a wilderness. The next section of this chapter will examine how this objective affects the relationship between the A.U.T. and environmentalists.
3. OPPOSITION INTERACTION
The relationship between the two types of opposition has never been administratively close and has recently grown distant. Both the A.U.T. and environmentalists felt threatened by the B.C. Hydro proposal but neither their reasons for being threatened nor their opposition activities were, as has been shown, identical. This separation can be exemplified by contrasting the interaction between the two oppositions at two public meetings at which both were officially represented, the January 1980 Sierra Club
91 Telegraph Creek Convention, News Release, Telegraph Creek, B.C.: May 22-23, 1985, photocopy with author. 66
Workshop at the University of British Columbia and the May
1985 Telegraph Creek convention.
The growing distance between the two oppositions has been the product of three principle factors. First,
B.C. Hydro announced the postponement of the Stikine-Iskut proposal in 1983. This postponement weakened both Tahltan and environmentalist perceptions of the threat to the
Stikine and as a consequence weakened their incentive to
work as a united opposition. Second, both the A.U.T. and
environmentalists have, since the January 1980 workshop,
reviewed and refined their positions on the desired future
of the Stikine. The A.U.T. has made the settlement of the
Tahltan comprehensive claim their primary objective. The
environmentalists have made the protection of the wilderness
of the Stikine-Iskut Basin their central goal. Third, the
two oppositions have different and perhaps incompatible
decision-making structures.
At the January 1980 workshop, that is the founding
workshop of Friends and Residents mentioned earlier, there
were Tahltans in attendance. All those who attended the
workshop were able to support the resolution condemning the
dam proposal, reaffirming the value of the Stikine as a
wilderness and urging the respect of the native claim. The
Tahltans in attendance were not specifically authorized by
the A.U.T. or their Band Councils to support the resolution.
Nevertheless their individual willingness to support it
indicated their eagerness to seek the support and 67 cooperation and to recognize the interest of groups such as the Sierra Club in the protection of the Stikine Basin. This willingness on the part of individual Tahltans was later reflected in joint submissions by Tahltans and Residents and friends to public hearings such as the Pearse Commission and the Utilities Commission Rate Hearings. The receding threat of the dams would raise the prominence of the Comprehensive
Claim process in the Tahltan community and necessarily that of the A.U.T. while decreasing the apparent necessity of working with environmentalists.
By contrast, with the January 1980 workshop, the May
1985 Telegraph Creek Convention would not foster unanimity.
The convention, sponsored by Friends and Residents, was attended by representatives of the A.U.T., and the South
East Alaska Conservation Council and federal and provincial government officials. Representatives of both Tahltan Bands had been invited but declined to attend in deference to representatives of the A.U.T. In response to their invitations, A.U.T. representatives stated that they would attend as observers and would not support any resolutions.
The A.U.T. submission indicated that the Tahltans did not recognize the legitimacy of the federal or provincial governments and would not actively support the creation of any park in the Stikine until the resolution of the Tahltan claim.92 The convention recommendation, supported only by
92 Hugh Taylor, Researcher for the A.U.T., "A Discussion of the Possible Options and Influences Concerning the Protection and Management of the Stikine River Watershed,"submission to the Telegraph Creek Convention, 68 the environmentalist delegates, included statements favouring the immediate creation of parks in the Stikine and a moratorium on resource-extractive development at the
Stikine headwaters pending the settlement of the Tahltan claim.93 The final recommendation from the meeting reveals the separation between the opposition. This recommendation called for the media in covering events on the Stikine to properly distinguish between Residents and the A.U.T. The convention was significant because it clearly displayed the conflicting goals of the oppositions.
A final factor in the disunity between the two oppositions has been their divergent decision-making structures. The A.U.T. relies on hired experts and a full-time executive for the formulation of policy. It does not welcome the grass-roots participation of Tahltans. In that it is financed by government rather that its membership, the A.U.T. has little need to solicit the opinions of its membership and might well be more influenced by federal comprehensive claims policy than its membership.
By contrast, Friend and Residents rely heavily on membership activism. They do not have the financial resources or large government grants to delegate policy-making to a permanent paid staff or full-time executive. In order to maintain their organizations they must be responsive to the wishes of
92(cont'd) Telegraph Creek, B.C., May 21-23, 1985, copy with author. 93 Telegraph Creek Convention, News Release; Lynn Thunderstorm, SUN(Vancouver), letter to the editor, Aug. 13, 1985, p. 5. 69 their memberships. Hence, the A.U.T. can be inherently less responsive to membership and flexible in formulating policy than can the environmentalists.
B. THE ENERGY PROJECT APPROVAL PROCESS: TWO CRITIQUES
1. THE MECHANICS OF THE PROCESS
In British Columbia, B.C. Hydro and the other utilities
obtain the legal authority to build major energy projects
such as the Stikine-Iskut, through procedures established in
the Utilities Commission Act. The Act, passed in August of
1980 created the Utilities Commission (henceforth the
B.C.U.C.). Of immediate relevance to this thesis is the
B.C.U.C.'s responsibility to bring under review applications
for permission to construct major energy projects.9"
The approval process is central to the Stikine
controversy because it is the framework within which B.C.
Hydro, government departments and opposition groups must
act. The approval process determines the rights and
resources available to both utility and opposition.
9" It should be noted that the approval process is project specific. That is, there is no comparable review of B.C. Hydro's overall system planning. The Utilities Commission Act does provide for review of rate increase applications by the B.C.U.C. but this review like the energy project approval process does not constitute a regular public review of B.C. Hydro's system planning and the assumptions on which this planning is based. Thus, an energy project is the subject of a great deal of internal corporate decision-making before it is subject to the approval process. 70
Ultimately the process should ensure that any energy development is truly in the public interest. Like other aspects of the Stikine-Iskut controversy, the approval process does not generate a unaminity of opinion or unity of action among opposition groups. The remainder of the chapter will describe the approval process and compare and contrast its Tahltan and environmentalist critiques.
The Ministry of Energy. Mines and Petroleum Resources
(henceforth the Ministry of Energy) has described the parts of the Utilities Commission Act dealing with major energy project approval in its Guide to the Energy Project Approval
Process. 9 5
During the "Pre-application Phase" the utility prepares
its application for the Minister of Energy. Prior to making the formal application the applicant is encouraged first to prepare a prospectus containing a general project description and schedule, project rationale and a description of proposed preliminary studies. This prospectus
95 British Columbia, Ministry of Energy Mines and Petroleum Resources, Guide to the Energy Project Approval Process, (Victoria: Queen's Printer, 1982), pp. 4-16. A major energy project as defined by the Act would include 1) transmission lines 500 KV or higher, 2) pipelines transporting 16 pjs energy per year, 3) transhipment or storage facilities capable of storing 3 pjs of energy, 4) hydro-electric or thermal electric plants generating 20 or more megawatts Thus, the Stikine-Iskut proposals would have come under purview of the Act in three ways. First, the proposal as an entirety would have exceeded the 20 or more megawatt requirements for electric generation. Second, any of the four projects of which the Stikine-Iskut Proposal was composed would individually have exceeded the 20MW minimum. Third, the Stikine-Iskut transmission line proposals would have exceeded the 500 KV minimum necessary for consideration under the Act. 71 will be reviewed by the Energy Project Coordinating
Committee which consists of the Head of the Project Analysis
Division at the Ministry of Energy, a B.C.U.C. staff member and the Head of the Assessment Branch of the Ministry of
Environment. After the review of the prospectus the applicant prepares a Preliminary Planning Report which consists of an identification and assessment of feasible alternatives, a preliminary procurement plan, terms of reference of proposed justification studies, a description of a public consultation program and a preliminary list of approvals, licences and permits required. This Preliminary
Planning Report is then further reviewed by appropriate governmental committees. Discussion at this stage is largely between applicant and government officials and documents may be kept confidential.
During the "Application Phase" which follows on the
"Pre-Application Phase" the applicant prepares the
Application. This document builds upon and is a refinement of the "Prospectus" and "Preliminary Planning Reports". The application must contain a description of the applicant, the project description including its purpose, a timetable and required infrastructure, environmental and socio-economic impact assessment, project justification, a list of ancillary applications and a description of the public consultation program and subsequent response. Finally, the application is reviewed by government agencies for compliance with regulations. Discussion at this stage is 72 still largely at the inter-agency level. While the applicant is required to initiate and report on a public consultation program, much information exchanged between the utility and government agencies may continue to be held confidential.
Once a formal application has been made to cabinet there are three choices as to its disposition. In the first case the Minister' of Energy with the concurrence of the
Minister of Environment may send the application to the
B.C.U.C. for review under Part 2 of the Act with terms to be specified by the Ministers. The B.C.U.C. will conduct a public hearing under its own procedures and report its findings and recommendations back to cabinet. The Cabinet will then decide whether or not to award the applicant an
Energy Project Certificate. In the event the Energy Project
Certificate is awarded, the applicant must comply with the specified terms and conditions and demonstrate this compliance to cabinet in order to receive an Energy
Operation Certificate. In the second case if the application is from a public utility the Minister of Energy may refer the application to the B.C.U.C. for a review and decision under Part 3 of the Utilities Commission Act which specifies that any public utility operating in B.C. must obtain a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity from the
B.C.U.C. in order to construct a major energy project. The
B.C.U.C. may, at its discretion, hold a hearing on the application. If the application is accepted by the B.C.U.C. the applicant must meet any terms and conditions specified 73 by the B.C.U.C. and any applicable statutory requirements.
In the third case the Minister of Energy with the concurrence of the Minister of the Environment may exempt
the application from some or all of the provisions of the
Utilities Commission Act and may permit the construction of
the energy project subject to specified terms and conditions. In sum, the disposition of the application
determines whether an application will be subject to public
scrutiny through a hearing before the B.C.U.C.
Two general critiques of the approval process may be
identified. The critiques are divided on the same lines as
the opposition to the Stikine proposal. The first, the
A.U.T. critique, is implicit rather than explicit. This
critique may be deduced from A.U.T. policy on other
regulatory processes. The second, the environmentalist,
follows from the general literature on public involvement in
energy planning and is openly articulated. After a
discussion of these critiques there will be a description of
the resources which the two types of opposition groups would
be able to bring to bear in opposition to a B.C. Hydro
application and how these resources in turn might be
reflected in the differing critiques of the approval
process. 74
2. THE A.U.T. CRITIQUE
An A.U.T. critique of the Approval Process may be deduced from the A.U.T. position on various other Federal and Provincial management options for the Stikine-Iskut
Basin. The critique would be two-sided. On the one hand the process would be seen as a provincial encroachment on
Tahltan rights to the Stikine-Iskut Basin which would
"...further prejudice and complicate their claim".96 The
A.U.T. would deny the legitimacy of the process:
The Tahltan cannot and do not recognize the assumed mandate of the Federal or Provincial government to plan or manage any aspect of life within their traditional territory. This position will be maintained until the Tahltan have achieved the desired aboriginal rights settlement.97
On the other hand, while the A.U.T. would vehemently deny
the right of the federal or provincial governments to
jurisdiction over the Stikine-Iskut Basin they would also
recognize "political realities" which would necessitate
their working in cooperation with the federal or provincial
governments.
The A.U.T. position on the approval process is a
response to yet another form of internal colonialism. The
regulatory framework for major energy projects can only be
applied to the Stikine-Iskut Basin on the assumption that
the province rather than the Tahltan people as represented
by the A.U.T., has a right to control the future of the
96Taylor, "A Discussion," p. 15. 97 Ibid.; In this connection one may recall that individual Tahltans have indeed appeared with environmentalist groups before the B.C.U.C. rate hearings. 75
Basin. The assumption, no matter how it is justified, that the right to manage the Basin lies outside the hands of the
Tahltans is perceived by the Tahltans to be as predatory as
B.C. Hydro's plans to dam the Stikine and Iskut Rivers.
While it has been pointed out that the A.U.T. would fight for the rights of Tahltans within an illegitimate framework generated by "political realities" they would also argue that their ultimate objective is a recognition of their claim to the Stikine-Iskut Basin:
The point that needs to be made firmly and often whether the Tahltan .are addressing bureaucrats, politicians, developers or conservationists; is that when they are referring to the Stikine Basin, they are dealing with the core of Tahltan territory and until a Land Claim Settlement is achieved, the Tahltan have to play a dominant role in any planning or management process created or ongoing.98
3. THE ENVIRONMENTALIST CRITIQUE
The environmentalist critique, as it has been labelled,
is a composite of the views held by Friends and Residents which was built in turn on the experience of interveners at
B.C. Hydro's Site C application and to some extent the land use permit process.99 Unlike the A.U.T. critique, the environmentalist critique grounded as it is in the reformist tradition, would not challenge the fundamental legitimacy of the approval process. Rather, the environmentalist would
98Ibid, introduction. 99 Indeed as Wilson argues (as cited in the first chapter) that the formulation of the process came about largely as a result of environmentalist pressure. 76 suggest measures to improve the approval process so as to put the intervenor on a more equal footing with the utility.
As has been mentioned in an earlier chapter, the environmentalists hold the official position that the ought not be developed until the settlement of the Tahltan Claim, but they also hold an even dearer principle that the Basin
should be maintained in its natural state and that the
Tahltan claim will be worthless in the interim if this natural state is not preserved. The environmentalists would
thus welcome the opportunity to participate formally in the
future of the Basin.
The Environmentalist critique of the approval process has centred on one or another aspects of the inequitable
relationship the process fosters between the utility and the
public interest intervenor. While public hearings may be
held under the provisions of the Utilities Commission Act, meaningful public participation in generation planning is
still quite limited. The regulatory process does little to
rectify the disparity of resources between utility and
public interest intervenor.100 The major criticisms of the
process are in four areas; first, of the lack of compulsory
funding of intervenors; second, of the fact that the
utility's actions are not open to public scrutiny prior to
the formal application; third, of the consideration of
project justification and mitigation in the same hearing;
100 Melody Hessing, "Production of the Public Voice: Public Participation in the Hearing Process as Contemporary Democracy," (PhD Thesis, U.B.C, 1984). 77 fourth, of the amount of cabinet discretion inherent in.
British Columbia's energy project approval process.
The environmentalist critique argues that the first and most crucial problem with the major energy project approval process is the lack of any statutory or regulatory obligation at either the Utility or the B.C.U.C. to fund public interest intervenors.10 1 Originally there had been a provision under Section 133 of the Utilities Commission Act
for the B.C.U.C. at its discretion to award costs to
intervenors. This funding could only have been awarded after a formal application from an energy project certificate made
by the utility. After the Site C hearing, even this discretionary provision was removed by Order-in-Council so
that public interest intervenors could only make submissions
with their own funds. Thus, the utility cannot be
effectively criticized in its presentation of complex
technical issues. A participant in the Site C hearings felt
very strongly about the issue:
A hearing without intervenor funding is a farce, and at least as dishonest and unfair as no hearing at all. Proponents of large energy projects are inevitably tax-payer subsidized while the taxpaying intervenors must "peddle pies for pennies" to cover their costs. Without funding public interest participation is restricted to trivial or self-interested interventions and the larger resource issues cannot be addressed. Intervenor funding is essential to a fair hearing process.102
101 "F.o.S. Writes," Friends, pp. 2-3; Adrienne Peacock,"Improving Energy Decisionmaking and Planning in British Columbia," submission to the Peoples Commission for Policy Alternatives, Vancouver, B.C., Dec. 15, 1984; Copy with author. 102Peacock, "Improving Energy," p. 5. 78
The second part of the environmentalist critique which was alluded to in the previous chapter notes that a utility's engineering and planning activities are not fully open to public scrutiny or regulation prior to the formal application for an energy project certificate. Since the
Stikine-Iskut proposals never went past the "Pre-Application
Phase" of the process, the public never had a chance to discuss the project as a comprehensive undertaking.103 This lack of public scrutiny or regulation presented two major difficulties for the interested public. First, while the amount spent by B.C. Hydro on preliminary studies on the
Stikine-Iskut had pronounced economic, environmental and social effects on the sparsely inhabited region, the affected public had almost no regulatory or legal means to redress any resultant grievances. Second, B.C. Hydro was under no obligation to release any of the results of its studies to interested parties. Therefore, Chot only did public intervenors lack funding to carry out their own studies, they also lacked access to the results of
B.C. Hydro's studies.
Linked to the notion that planning and engineering studies should be regulated from their earliest stages is the third criticism which is of the present practice of placing both the issues of project justification and of mitigation and compensation under discussion at the same
103Buri,"Prelude to Power," pp. 9-11; "F.O.S. Writes" Friends, pp. 2-3. 79' hearing.104 As has been noted $43 million was spent on the
Stikine-Iskut before the project was ever justified. The separate consideration of both types of issues has been seen as advantageous for the following reasons. First, both'types of issues are more efficiently discussed, if the discussion of one is not coloured with controversy over the other.
Second, if the underlying question of project justification is addressed and public participation is not left solely to matters of mitigation and compensation, public confidence in the approval process will be heightened. Third, real alternatives to project construction can only be properly examined with separate consideration of justification.
Finally, should a project be found to be not justified then the costs of preliminary studies would be saved. The methods by which this separate consideration could be achieved are either through a two-stage hearing process or through regular hearings into B.C. Hydro's system planning.
Finally, a fundamental environmentalist criticism of the approval process is the amount of ministerial discretion
it affords.105 First, the cabinet decides whether or not there will be a hearing on a particular application. In fact, the cabinet may decide to entirely exempt the application from the perusal of the B.C.U.C. Second, the ministers make the final determination of the terms of reference for hearings without public input. Third, there
104 Andrew Thompson et al, Energy Project Approval in British Columbia (Vancouver: Westwater, 1981), pp. 52-53. 10 5Peacock, "Improving Energy," p. 5. 80 are no qualification requirements for the panels presiding over public hearings; that is, the cabinet may appoint virtually anybody regardless of their level of appropriate expertise or acceptability to both applicant and public
interest intervenors. Fourth, the cabinet is under no obligation to release the B.C.U.C.'s report or to follow its recommendations. Thus, the cabinet is given unlimited discretion in complex technical matters and is under no obligation to even consider the arguments of public interest
intervenors.
4. INCONGRUENT CRITIQUES
As we have seen, the A.U.T. and Environmentalists would part on the premise that the approval process would have any
legitimate application to the management of the
Stikine-Iskut Basin. This division stems from two factors.
First, the two types of opposition have different visions of
the future of the Stikine. Second, the two types of
opposition have different rights and resources with which to make their case against the dams.
In the first case, it would not be inconsistent with
the environmentalist position to place the Stikine-Iskut
Basin under the regulation of a provincial body such as the
B.C.U.C. as long as this regulation left adequate room for
public participation. The protection of the Basin, by
whatever means, is of paramount concern to the
environmentalists. The A.U.T., somewhat paradoxically, 81 values its control over the management of the Basin more than the ecological protection of the Basin through
regulations outside the land claims process.
In the second case, the difference of critique might
stem not only from an ultimate disagreement on ends but also
from an unequal level of resources. The A.U.T. has two sorts
of resources which are unavailable to environmentalists.
First, the Tahltans as noted earlier have a strong potential
legal claim to the Stikine Basin based on aboriginal rights.
Second, as a consequence of this strong potential claim, the
A.U.T. has access to funds borrowed against a future claims
settlement and to special Indian Affairs funds to study the
impact of resource development. Thus, while the A.U.T., like
the environmentalists, could not obtain B.C.U.C. funds to
oppose a B.C. Hydro application, they have had other equally
useful types of funding at their disposal. In fact, were the
A.U.T. successful in its comprehensive claim, the claim
settlement itself might include an outright prohibition of,
or right of the A.U.T. to control the sort of development
which B.C. Hydro proposed. In contrast to the A.U.T., which
would have the desire and potential opportunity to
circumvent the approval process, the environmentalists would
see the approval process, if fairly conducted, as a means of
effectively opposing B.C. Hydro. In essence, the A.U.T.
cannot afford to accept the legitimacy of the approval
process while the environmentalists cannot afford to deny
it. 82
The current formulation of the approval process does little to ameliorate the discrepancy of efficacy between utility and opposition. The alternate critiques of the process would characterize it as either entirely appropriate or merely inadequate. The difference of opinion between the
A.U.T. and the environmentalists stems, as has been shown in earlier chapters, from a fundamental disagreement over which community should have the right to control the future of the
Stikine. As well, the difference of opinion might stem from the actual levels of influence the A.U.T. and environmentalists can bring to bear on the approval process.
In any case the levels of resources available in the approval process to either the A.U.T. or environmentalists would pale in comparison to B.C. Hydro's $50 million expenditure on preliminary studies. Chapter IV
CONCLUSIONS
The previous chapters have examined, first, the general interaction between the Indian land claims movement and environmental movements, and, second, a specific instance of this interaction. The two movements have been shown to have different goals and, as a consequence, their member organizations have also been shown to face difficulties in forming close alliances. The case examined in detail in this thesis, the opposition to B.C. Hydro's Stikine-Iskut proposals, exhibited many of these difficulties. The fundamental difference between the A.U.T. and environmentalists was over which community should have the right to control the Stikine Basin. On the one hand, the
A.U.T. argued that it was their sole right to control such use until the settlement of their comprehensive claim.
External land use designations such as parks were viewed as
infringements of their rights. On the other hand, the environmentalists were prepared to use whatever statutory or
regulatory means available (including park designation) to maintain the Stikine wilderness. These differences thwarted
the formation of an official alliance between the two oppositions in spite of cooperation between individual
Tahltans and environmentalists.
Throughout this thesis there has been a deliberate
distinction between the Indian land claims movement and the
totality of Indian response to internal colonialism. As
83 84 well, there has been a distinction made between A.U.T. policy and views held by individual Tahltans. While in
recent years the land claims issue has been the most prominent facet of Indian political activity in British
Columbia, (due in large part to the ready availability of
funding for that purpose), other issues such as the native
fishery have remained important. With this distinction in mind it should also be noted that because the Indian land
claims movement is so prominent, it will inevitably affect
other forms of Indian political activity.
Thus, while coalitions between member organizations of
the Indian land claims and environmental movements may face
the sort of obstacles so clearly present in the
Stikine-Iskut case, these should not be perceived as
insurmountable barriers to alliances between
environmentalists and Indians who are committed to the
native economy. The bases for this assertion are twofold.
First, there have recently been formed close alliances
between natives and environmentalists in opposition to the
threatened logging of Meares Island and the Stein River
Valley. Second, many Indians continue to pursue their
livelihood within the traditional native economy as it is
described by Peter Usher. The ^Imtjor reason why British
Columbia has not seen more examples of this sort of alliance
between environmentalists and Indians who perpetuate the
native economy lies with the nature of federal comprehensive
land claims policy. 85
As Usher has shown, the native economy is a significant
institution in the Canadian north. Indians who have made
their living in a subsistence economy and who wish to continue their traditional activities have a vital interest
in wilderness preservation. Large resource-extractive
developments inevitably have adverse effects on fish and
wildlife. As well, they attract labour and initiative away
from the native economy. Thus, it is logical that Indians
committed to the traditional economy should oppose such
forms of development. Their primary goal is the protection
of their land base, rather than the legal recognition of
traditional claims or the establishment of formal title.
Insofar as the land claims movement focusses on such legal
goals, and pursues them within the confines of federal land
claims policy, the movement does not support the native
economy.
As discussed in Chapter 1, there are two aspects of
federal land claims policy which would tend to make
development more attractive to claimants than wilderness
preservation. First, the policy allows for the possibility
that resource royalties will be part of the settlement.
Second, it requires that groups with claims accepted for
negotiation borrow money against future claim settlements.
The first provision encourages those groups involved in land
claims negotiations to commit their future to the industrial
rather than the traditional economy. The second policy
ensures that in practice settlements will contain a cash 86 component, either in compensation for alienated lands or resource development royalties. The comprehensive claims policy was designed to facilitate northern resource extractive development and contains no provision for the maintenance of the traditional native economy.
The Indians who desire to maintain a native economy may have to look outside the land claims movement to environmental groups for support. Like environmentalists, proponents of the native economy do not have the comparatively high level of resources available to the land claims movement. As demonstrated earlier, their livelihoods may in fact be endangered by development fostered by federal comprehensive claims policy. In that it is compatible with wilderness preservation, the native economy may be come a focal point for Indian and environmentalist cooperation. In fact, for practical reasons such as a shortage of cash, proponents of the native economy may have no choice but to cooperate with the environmentalists to effectively oppose environmental threats.
In the Stikine the Tahltan Comprehensive Claim is currently the centre of most Tahltan political activity.
However, there is also, as described by Albright and cited in Chapter 1, a thriving subsistence economy. As catalogued by Faustmann and cited in Chapter 3, the Tahltans' initial rejection of B.C. Hydro's initial plans was a reaction against the dams' possible adverse effects on fish and wildlife. Although it has become less vocal with the 87
receding threat of B.C. Hydro's plans, a significant segment of the Tahltan population has "voted with its feet" to maintain the native economy. The sentiments of these
Tahltans are not fully represented in the policies of the
A.U.T. They lack the organizational resources of their counterparts in the A.U.T. This lack of resources could
either completely discourage them from fighting for the
right to continue in their traditional ways or it could
encourage them to look for support from outside the A.U.T.
Because these Tahltans were active when the B.C. Hydro plans
posed an imminent threat it can be argued that their
sentiments will resurface in the event B.C. Hydro's plans
are re-activated.
In conclusion, there are very real differences between
the goals of the Indian land claims and environmental
movements. Indian society is not single-minded. The goals of
the land claims movement as they are delimited by federal
land claims policy are not unanimously subscribed to by all
Indians. Thus, while in the case of the Stikine alliances
between Indians and environmentalists never went beyond the
individual level, the will for cooperation has nevertheless
surfaced from time to time. Indians who make their living
from the land and environmentalists have a common respect
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Application by B.C. Hydro and Power Authority,
Proceeding no. 48. Vancouver, June 1, 1982.
Canada. Dept. of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. A
History of Native Land Claims and Processes in Canada, 93
1867-1979, by Richard Daniel. Ottawa: Dept. Supply and
Services, 1980.
"British Columbia Comprehensive Claims." Office of
Native Claims Doc. 0015A. Vancouver:n.p., Nov. 1984.
The Future of the Stikine Basin, by John Faustmann.
Vancouver: n.p., Mar. 1982.
> jr.
All Fairness. Ottawa:Dept. Supply and Services, 1981.
Fleishman."Major Environmental Groups." EPA Journal
4(1978):14-17.
3. INTERVIEWS
Anderson, Michael. Phone Interview. Nanaimo, Sept. 11, 1984.
Asp, George. A.U.T. Land Claims Representative. Phone
Interviews. Smithers, Apr. 16 and May 3, 1985.
Dawson, John and Nicholls, W. Graham. B.C. Hydro Community
Relations Officers. Interview. Vancouver, Dec. 10, 1984.
Fischer, Tannis. Board Member of Residents for a ,
Free-Flowing Stikine. Phone Interview. Vancouver, May
23, 1985.
Murray, May. Secretary of Friends of the Stikine. Phone 94
Interview. Vancouver, Mar. 24, 1984.
Tuck, Ada. Dept. Indian Affairs and Northern Development.
Phone Interviews. Vancouver, Sept. 13 and Sept. 24,
1 984.
Wilson, Jim. Former B.C. Hydro Executive. Interview. U.B.C,
May 2, 1985.
4. THESES AND UNPUBLISHED PAPERS
Albright, Sylvia. "An Ethnoarcheological Study of Tahltan
Subsistence and Settlement Patterns." M.A. Thesis, Simon
Fraser University, 1982.
Fraggalosch, A.C "The Institutional Barriers to Public
Participation In Electrical Energy Planning in B.C.:
Case Study of Cheekeye-Dunsmuir." M.A. Thesis,
University of Victoria, 1981.
Hawkes, David T. "An Analysis of the Demographic Data
Dealing With Unemployment and Residence Patterns in Two
Indian Communities of Telegraph Creek and Iskut, British
Columbia." B.A. Essay, University of British Columbia,
1966.
Hessing, Melody. "Production of the Public Voice: Public
Participation in the Hearing Process as Contemporary
Democracy." M.A. Thesis, University of British Columbia,
1985. 95
Taylor, Hugh. Researcher for the A.U.T. "A Discussion of the
Possible Options and Influences Concerning the
Protection and Management of the Stikine River
Watershed." Submission to the Telegraph Creek
Convention, Telegraph Creek, B.C., May 21-23, 1985.
Peacock, Adrienne. "Improving Energy Decision-making and
Planning." Submission to the Peoples' Commission for
Policy Alternatives, Vancouver, B.C., Dec. 15, 1984.
Photocopy with author.
Wilson, R. Jeremy. "Environmentalism and B.C. Natural
Resources Policy, 1972-1983." Paper presented to the
Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science
Association, U.B.C., June 5, 1983.
5. ENVIRONMENTALIST NEWSLETTERS
Buri, Tom. "Prelude to Power. "Telkwa Foundaiton Newsletter
6:1 (Spring 1983): 9-11.
. "Who Are We?" Friends of the Stikine Newsletter 1
(Jan. 1981): 1.
"F.O.S. Writes to Minister on Energy Certificate Approval
Process." Friends of the Stikine Newsletter 9(Oct.
1983): 2-3.
"Framed Stikine Posters." Friends of the Stikine Newsletter
9 (Oct. 1983). 96
"Logging on the Lower Stikine." Friends of the Stikine
Newsletter 1(D(Apr. 1984): 1-4.
"Newsflash--Stikine Workshop Planned." Friends of the
Stikine Newsletter 11 (Mar. 1985).
Pojar, Rosamund. "Recreation." Telkwa Foundation Newsletter
3:1 (Spring 1980): 6.
Skeena Broadcasters Make Stikine Film." Friends of the
Stikine Newsletter 4(Dec. 1981).
"The Stikine Dam—Hydro's Search for Gravel." Friends of the
Stikine Newsletter 4 (Dec. 1981): 3.
Strong, Douglas H. "The Sierra Club A History Part 1:
Origins and Outings." Sierra 62:8 (Oct.1977): 10-14.
Strong, Douglas H. "The Sierra Club: A History Part
two—Conservation." Sierra 62:9 (Nov.-Dec. 1977): 16-20.
6. NEWSPAPERS
"B.C. Hydro foresees further cuts in capital projects as
growth slows." Globe and Mail, Sept. 26, 1984, pp. B1-2.
"Bennett hails power breakthrough." Sun(Vancouver), Sept.
18, 1985.
"Bennett heads south on sales trips." Sun(Vancouver), Sept.
16, 1985. 97
Bohn, Glenn. "400 Scale Heights in Bid to Save Stein."
Sun(Vancouver), Sept. 3, 1985.
"Fast action sought on power pact." Sun(Vancouer), Sept. 17,
1985.
"New hope for dams." Sun(Vancouver), Aug. 29, 1985.
"Site C dam go-ahead call foolish by SPEC." Sun(Vancouver),
Sept. 11, 1985.
"The rivers have always been theirs." Sun(Vancouver), Sept.
5, 1980.
Thunderstorm, Lynn. Sun (Vancouver), letter to the editor,
Aug. 13, 1985, p. 5.
7. MISCELLANEOUS
Telegraph Creek Convention. News Release, Telegraph Creek,
B.C., May 22-23, 1985. Photocopy with author.