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This microfiche was produced from documents received for inclusion in the NCJRS data base. Since NCJRS cannot exercise control over the physical condition of the documents submitted, r:, the individual frame quality will vary. The resolution chart on th~s frame may be used to evaluate the document quality. THE R-EPORT' OF!!!}E GOVERNOR'S PANEL

. ' 1.0 i TO INVESTIGATE 1I111~ THE RECENT INCIDENT AT GR"ATERFORD STATE 111111.25 11111 "1.4 111111.6

J) CORRECTIONAL ~STITUTION :!

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Microfilming procedures used to create this fiche comply with the standards set forth in 41CFR 101-11.504. i \ 1 j Points of view or opinions stated in this document are ~, those of the author(s) and do not represent the official ) position or policies of the U. S. Department of Justice.

(I I August 1982 't :f , l' National Institute of Justice Commonwealth of Pennsylvania I United States Department of Justice t,:1 , J Washington, D. C. 20531 , ~1 ) \\ 1 I •,I

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TIlE REPORT . OF THE " GOVERNOR'S PANEL TO INVESTIGATE i THE RECENT HOSTAGE INCIDENT AT GRATERFORD STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

1 " Judge Anthony J. Scirica Chairman

Malcolm L. Lazin, Esquire Ralph F, Scalera, Esquire, Member Member '

Ian H. Lennox F.;.~/esentative Warren H. Spencer Member l'Vu!mber . ,

Reverend ThomasJ. Ritter Senator T. Milton Street Member Member

U.S. Department <:It Justice National Institute of Justice This document has been reproduced exactly as received from the pers?n or organization originating It. Points of view or opinions stated In thiS document are those of the authors and do not necessarily George F. Grod~ represent the official position or pOlicies of the National Institute of Justice. Executive Director,

Permission to reproduce this copyrighted material has been granted by " ; Pe~nsYlvania Commission on Richard H. Glanton Cr1me and Delinquency Special Counsel to the National Crlminai Justice Reference Service (NCJRS).

Further reproduction outside of the NCJRS system requires permis­ sion of the copyright owner.

August 1982 ,.

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,): TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION Page The Incident

INTRODUCTION ...... iii During the early evening of Wednesday, October investigate the hostage incident at Graterford. The 28, 1981, a group of inmates at the State Panel was charged not only to assess the incident but SECTION 1- A CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS SURROUNDING THE Correctional Institution at Graterford attempted to also to "review the conditions in the correctional ESCAPE ATTEMPT/HOSTAGE TAKING INCIDENT ...... 1 escape from the Institution by climbing over the system at Graterford and advise what, if any, further 's 30 foot wall. They carried with them an legislative or a::fmin is1:rative actions might be SECTION 11- FINDINGS OF THE PANEL...... • ...... 18 extensive amount of escape materials which they appropriate to help ensure the safety of the inmates, stored within the prison and moved through the correctional employees, visitors and the public in SECTION 111- GRATERFORD EXAMINED: SELECTED ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 26 Institution's dining and kitchen areas to the intended general," and further to "ensure that any lessons to escape point in the prison yard. They were armed be learned to prevent similar situations from Introduction . . . . . 26 with two shotguns, two handguns and an extensive recurring are identified." amount of ammunition. The escape attempt failed. 1. Institutional Security 30 Four of the inmates who were part of the escape Scope of the Review effort then retreated to the kitchen area of the prison 2. Good Time. 33 and took hostage six members of the prison staff who The Panel has undertaken a detailed review of had previously been captured and locked in a storage the hostage-taking incident itself, how it developed 3. Desecration of Religious Articles. 33 room, ,and thirty-two inmates who were in the and how the authorities responded. The Panel has kitchen area. The crisis continued for five days, from examined the level of preparedness of the 4. Media Relations 36 early Wednesday evening until the following Monday Commonwealth to respond effectively to prison crises evening, when it ended with the surrender of the requiring prompt, effective intervention. The Panel 5. Staff Resources ·NCJ·RS' . 37 hostage-takers and with all released unharmed. has examined the conditions of confinement that existed at Graterford prior to, during and subsequent 6. Inmate Classification " . 40 to the incident within the historical context of the The hostage-taking incident at Graterford came prison and with reference to national advisory 7. Mental Health Se:vices. 42 to a negotiated conclusion without violence. No lives standards. were lost. No blood was shed. Damage to the 8. Medical Services . AGQUISI·TIONS 46 institution was minor. The deaths that had occurred The Panel cooperated in its review with the at Attica in New York State' in 1971, at Huntsville Pennsylvania State Police, who had responsibility to 9. Prison Industries 50 in Texas in 1974, and at the New Mexico State investigate all related to the escape attempt Penitentiary in 1980 and the destruction that had and hostage incident, including the illegal entry of 10. Education . 54 befallen four State institutions in Michigan earlier in weapons into the institution. There have been 1981 did not take place in Pennsylvania. numerous reports on how the £uns got in, many of 11. Inmate Accounts. 55 Nonetheless, it could have been otherwise. The lives which are plausible and are still under investigation of many people, including Bureau ,of Correction staff by the State Police. The most frequent reports 12. Inmate Grievances 55 and inmate hostages, had been put in immediate related to entry on various delivery trucks, including danger. The lives of State Police and outside observers bread trucks which Joseph Bowen himself unloaded. 13. Food Services 57 and mediators who came to assist in the resolution Other reports related to packages entering through of the incident had also been endangered. The the mail room and weapons "dropped" during the APPENDICES inmates' possession of guns and ammunition and their night on the and then carried in by control of hostages turned the ordinary power inmate farmers. There were also reports that the A. Sketches of State Correctional Institution at Graterford. 60 structure of the prison upside-down. As one of the guns entered through the aid of visitors or corrupt hostage-takers repeatedly stated during the incident, staff."~inally, there were reports that the guns were B. Selected Photographs . .. . 62 "I've got the power now." At any time during the brought ,\ in by other inmates not involved in this incident a carnage could have occurred. The eSCape attempt, but which were taken from them by C. Glossary of Names Associated with the Graterford Hostage Incident. 64 circumstances that enabled the potentially destructive the captors. incident to develop and the reasons for its safe D. Employee Hostages . 66 resolution needed examination. The Panel has identified security deficiencies through which these or other guns could enter the E. Hostage Takers and Other Involved Inmates 6i' prison. It is important to note that Graterford Appointment of the Panel administrators have taken significant measures since F. Material Found Near the Wall at the Point of the Attempted Escape 613 the incident to limit the entry of contraband. After resolution of the crisis, Governor Although entry of contraband can never be 100% G. State Costs Associated with the Hostage Incident 70 "thorn burgh appointed a seven-member Panel to controlled, it i~ the Panel's judgement that it would H. Agreement with Insurgent Inmates. . 71 I. Bills of Information Filed Against the Defendants j'4

J. Bibliography ~75

iii ii be more difficult to penetrate institutional security I n addition to the formal intierviews, Panel The Panel incurred costs for travel, lodging and might help to ensure better correctional operations today than it was during the period preceding the representatives spoke with numero(/; staff \and meals for meetings, but the Members served without at Graterford. It is clear, however, that the nature incident. Still, deficiencies exist and the Panel inmates present in prison shops, the infirmary, the play. Consultant fees were incurrf;ld as part of an of corrections today is complex and merits recommends improvements in this area. kitchen and elsewhere during our manv,itll'ips to the investigation of reported damag, . following the continuous attention, especially in light of the prison. {'If { s!~akedown and as part of the rwiflw of medical overcrowding at Graterford and other state ),:1 Process of Review 'i"I, Si~rvices. In all, the Panel's efforts cost $7,100 plus and the resulting stress. The issues examined are The Panel reviewed files and ril~inuals at contributed staff and mailing services;'iaIJ of which institutional security, "good time," the desecration In conducting its review, the Panel and staff Graterford, the Bureau of Correction H€\ildquarters, were paid by th.e Commission on -Grime and of religious articles, media relations, staff resources, made three: separate full-day trips as a group and over the Attorney General's Office, MontgomC,ry County Delinquency. 'i':~ inmate classification, mental health services, medical thirty additional individual trips to Graterford. In Courthouse and elsewhere. Panel members and staff services, prison industries, prisoner education, inmate addition the Panel met nine times to set direction, received dozens of letters and other correspondence Organization of the Reporl, accounts, inmate grievances, and food services. analyze findings and prepare this Report. Panel from individuals concerned about the incident or I representatives have been at Graterford to conduct about prison conditions. Telephone calls, several The Report concludes with several appendices interviews and observe prison operations in both the from anonymous sources, were received and the The Panel sought to chron icle the important that should be of help in understanding the incident, daytime and the evening hours. Panel representatives information considered. events that led up to the hostage incident and the including 'sketches of the institution, selected have also visited the state correctional facilities at incident itself. The chronicle of events is cOiltained photographs, a glossary of names, the negotiated Camp Hill, Huntingdon and Dallas and the Federal Many reports were reviewed by the Panel to in Section I of this Report, entitled: II A Chronology agreement and charges brought against the captors. Prison at Lewisburg to examine procedures used in examine correctional issues in Pennsylvania and of Significant Events Surrounding the Escape these facilities and to interview inmates, including elsewhere. Spedal attention was given to reports Attempt/Hostage-Taking Incident at the Graterford captors and hostages, who were present at Graterford following prison distu rbances or hostage incidents in State Correctional Institution. II Acknowledgements during the hostage-taking incident, but were other states, especially a 1974 incident in Huntsville, subsequently transferred elsewhere. Texas which paralleled the hostage-taking incident at The chronicle begins with what is known about The Panel wishes to acknowledge the special Graterford in many ways, but in which two hostages the planning and preparations for the escape attempt assistance of Nicholas Lippincott, Chief Counsel to The Panel conducted two days of public and two inmates were killed after a ten-day stand-off and ends with the return to normal conditions. the Judiciary Committee of the Pennsylvania House hearings on the hostage-taking incident and received ended without a negotiated solution. A bibliography Although the chronology ends in January 1982, it is of Representatives, and Mary Woolley, Executive public testimony from Bureau of Correction which includes the principal source material used is important to note that the incident is not over for Director of the same Committee; and Zahir Ra and Commissioner Ronald Marks and Deputy appended to this Report. many of the principal figu res involved. The State Steven Williams, staff assistants to Senator Street. Commissioner. Erskind DeRamus; Graterford Super­ Police investigation of the incident led to arraignment intendent -Julius" -Cuyler, Major Donald Vaughn The information contained· in the chronology of the four individuals alleged to be the main escape I n order to assess the medical and food services and prison psychiatrist Dr. Gulderen Bora; State came from eyewitness accounts and records planners and hostage-takers. The charges levied at Grat&rford, the Bureau of Correction cooperated Police Deputy Commissioner Cyril Laffey, former maintained during the incident. Where the Panel include kidnapping, attempted escape, weapons with other agency representatives who updated State Police Captain ,John McKenna, who served as received conflicting' information, it made judgements violations and conspiracy. information developed for the House Subcommittee State Police Liaison at Graterford, and State Police on the basis of the credibility of the different sources on and Corrections, in November 1980. The Lieutenant John Flannery, who is Commander of the and plausibility of the information. The incident continues to affect the staff Panel's review of medical services was assisted by Ms. State Police Station at Limeric;{; representatives of hostages. As of the beginning of August 1982, all Christine Reese, Assistant Director of Educational the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Northeast Region, All staff services to the Panel were directed by six staff hostages were sti II on medical leave. Some Activities for the Pennsylvania Medical Society, who including Regional Director Stephen Grzegorek, Chief George F. Grode, who also serves as Executive have shown, evidence of coming to terms with the coordinated the activities of the medical review team. Psychologist Dr. Homer Keeney, Allenwood Prison Director of the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime incident that should enable them to return to work The review team consisted of Mr. Angus Love, staff' Superintendent Robert Martin, and Equal and Delinquency. Five members of the Commission's in the correctional system in the future. Others still attorney for Montgomery County Legal Aid Service; Employment Opportunity Assistant Elliott Caggins; professional staff were assigned to work with the relive the experience daily and nightly, showing signs Ms. Mary Woolley and Mr. Kenneth Adami, staff of outside mediator Chuck Stone; and Jeffrey Bowen, Panel on various aspects of this review. James O. of extreme agitation and requiring medication to the House of Representatives; Mr. Joseph Hopko and brother of the ringleader of the captors. Thomas, Jr. was assigned full-time to the Panel's sleep. Most of the inmate hostages appear to have Ms. Barbara Airasian, staff of the Pennsylvania inquiry and served as principal staff assistant. Martin put the incident behind them; however, a few are Department of Health; and Dr. Herbert Tindall, a The Panel conducted over 200 hours of V. Walsh, David L. McCorkle, Roy A. Willoughby and stili receiving medication and psychiatric treatment. consultant physician. The review of food services interviews with representatives of the following: Balinger R. Brown were assigned part-time. Each was assisted by Mr. Gary German, Chief of the Governor's Office staff; Bureau of Correction staff member made significant contributions. All five In Section II, the Panel sets forth twelve findings Department of Environmental Resources' Division officials; Graterford administrators, correctional staff members had extensive prior experience working based on its review of the hostage-taking incident and of Food Protection. officers and civilian staff; State Police officials and with correctional issues, programs and agencies in of correctional services at Graterford. The findings line personnel; Federal Bureau of Prison officials; Pennsylvania. Thelma Elliott, Linda Kinsey, Lynn include judgements on how the hostage incident w,as Mr. William Anderson, a polygraph expert, National Institute of Corrections and other Hereda, Madeline Intrieri, Bonnie Fox, Shirley managed, highlight factors that contributed to Its as,sisted in the Panel's review of damage in correctional consultants; Montgomery County Numeroff and Diane Zeigler, all of the Pennsylvania occurrence and recommend improvements in Graterford's chapel, following the shakedown. District Attorneys' Office; Montgomery County Legal Commissiorl on Crime and Delinquency provided correctional operations in the Commonwealth and at Services lawyers; staff hostages; inmate. hostages; quality support in arranging logistics and in producing Graterford. The Panel wishes to acknowledge the assistance organized inmate groups; inmates randomly selected; drafts of this document. of several federal officials, including Rudolph the hostage-takers; citizen involvement groups and Section I \I entitled "Selected Issues and Giuliani, Associate U.S. Attorney General and state and local union officials of the American Richard H. Glanton, Executive Deputy General Recommendation's," sets forth observations and Norman Carlson, Director of the Federal Bureau of Federation of State, County and Municipal Counsel to the Governor, served as Special Counsel recommendations on numerous issues examined by Prisons, and the four Bureau of Prisons staff who

{ ::.. Employees. to the Panel. the Panel as part of its charge to suggest actions that assisted on the scene at Graterford during the

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• ,~ - --::1' --~------~ r incident, testified before the Graterford Panel and The Panel wishes to acknowledge the many SECTION I provided valuable information on correctional inmates at Graterford, both former hostages and operations: Stephen Grzegorek, Dr. Homer Keeney, others, with whom we spoke and who helped us A CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Robert Martin and Elliott Caggins. understand the incident and life at Graterford. SURROUNDING THE ESCAPE ATTEMPT/HOSTAGE TAKING INCIDENT AT THE GRATERFORD STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION Allen Breed, Director of the National Institute Officials and staff of the Bureau of Correction of Corrections, provided advice and assistance to the and the State Correctional Institution at Graterford OCTOBER 28, 1981 TO NOVEMBER 2, 1981 Panel at the start of our work and on several deserve special acknowledgement. The Panel was occasions mid-stream. His experience and advice given full cooperation and full access to staff, inmates were most helpful, especially in areas of institutional and records under supervision of correctional This summary of Significant events provides a review of written memoranda and reports prepared security and emergency preparedness. officials. Corrections Commissioner Ronald Marks comprehensive outline of the. escape attempt, by the Bureau of Correction and State Police and and Graterford Superintendent Julius Cuyler both hostage-taking incident and related matters as the review of news accounts of the incident. Certain Commissioner Daniel Dunn and staff of thp evidenced a keen interest in the Panel's work, took understood by the Governor's Panel to Investigate the information obtained by the Panel is not included Pennsylvania State Police provided excellent steps to correct many deficiencies identified and Recent Hostage Incident at Graterford State in this report so as not to jeopardize ongoing cooperation. They detailed events during the made it possible for the Panel to complete its review Correctional Institution. Information was obtained investigations olr emergency preparedness planning. incident and shared relevant information during the in a timely fashion. through extensive interviews, public hearings" the course of the Panel's review. Finally, the Panel wishes to acknowledge the EVENTS PRIOR TO OCTOBER 28. 1981 Attorney General LeRoy Zimmerman gave Panel assistance and information provided by the staff staff access to records and personnel of the Attorney hostages during the incident at Graterford who Planning and Preparation for the Escape Attempt General's Office which were essential to research of helped the Panel understand the facts and the affects court orders and consent decrees affecting of the incident. Preparation for the escape from Graterford Because of 'thl;i large amount of contraband correctional administration in Pennsylvania. Prison began long before the October 28, 1981 included in the ei~CalPe (273 different itf~ms qf attempt By some accounts, the escape effort was contraband were di.scovered) and the large number in the planning and preparation stage for three years. in the escape party; ke(lping the escape effort secret During this time, members of the escape party were was a constant source of concern. The inmates recruited, contraband including keys, ropes, weapons planned to escape through the kitchen area and over and ammunition was acquired and stored, and prison the wall between towers 6 and 7 during dusk hours routine was watched closely. Eventually, in late October or early November. The inmates approximately eight inmates formed the escape party. planned to move escape materials from the cell block By observing the collection of contraband, rope area to the kitchen area Where other contraband was making and other activities, an additional unknown already stored. Using their weapons, the inmates number of inmates became aware of the preparations planned to take control of the kitchen area, locking for an escape. the guards and kitchen stewards in various small food storage rooms. Once assembled and organized in .the Four of the inmates who prepared the escape kitchen, they would proceed to the loading dock and eventually became .the hostage takers after the escape take possession of a delivery truck customarily failed. The leader of the group was Joseph Bowen, parked by the dock just after the evening mea/. They 35, a three-time convicted murderer serving two life would drive the truck to the base of the wall between sentences; Leroy Newsome, 27, convicted of first towers 6 and 7, stand on top of the truck and affix degree murder and serving a life sentence; Calvin a rope to the top of the wall with pieces of Williams, 31, convicted of first degree murder and institutional piping which formed a two-pronged serving a life sentence; and Lawrence Ellison, 26, hook. The inmates would climb the rope which had convicted of robbery and burglary and serving a steps of regularly spaced blocks of wood tied to it sentence of 18 to 50 years. The other initial and which they believed was strong enough to hold participants are not named here as they remain the several climbers simultaneously. Once atop the wall, subject of criminal investigations. they would fix a second rope, which would be used for climbing down the outside. All of this would Because the escape plan required entry into the be done in a matter of minutes under the cover of prison of guns, including two shotguns, sophisticated dusk, but before the closest guard tower (tower 6) climbing apparatus and other unusual contraband, was manned at 7:00 p.m. Once on the outside, the some of the escape planners had to maneuver escapees would either meet up with an escape vehicle, themselves into work assignments and activities where or would disappear into the surrounding woods and they could obtain and store this contraband and try to make good their escape, using the weapons where they could observe security procedures, as needed. staffing patterns and personal habits of guards and other staff. They also had to establish plausible bases Several of the necessary elements to the plan for each of them to have access to the kitchen area fell neatly into place; others didn't. The inmates did from which the escape would be launched. obtain necessary escape materials, including:

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one caliber 22, Harrington & Richardson EVENTS OF OcrOBER 28. 1981 harm to the captured staff, the inmates compelled because they believed tower 6 was unmanned until model 929, 9-shot revolver. Ward to accompany them to D block and open the 7:00 p.m. and that dusk and shadcws WOUld. hide one caliber 38, Howard Arms Company, The Escape Attempt block door. Two of the inmc.tes entered D block their movements from tower 7 and more distant 5-shot revolver. and returned pushing a laundrv cart which contained towers. What they hadn't taken into account was one 20 gauge Eastern Arms double barrel, At approximately 5:00 p.m. on October 28, various escape materials LJl'lder a layer of clothes. The that because Daylight Savings Time had ended three cut-off shotgun. 1981, inmates assigned to work in the kitchen area cart was taken to the kitchen area and Officer Ward days earlier, tower 6 was manned at 6:00 p.m. The one 12 gauge, Crescent Firearms, Victor, who were to take part in the escape were joined was locked up in the bread storage 100m. inmates also overestimated the cover of dusk and single barrel, cut-off shotgun. by other inmates who skirted security checks by although they crossed the yard quickly, they were one piece of tan rope 32 feet in length. various ruses. Between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m., From approximately 5:00 p.m. to 6:15 p.m., observed first by one and ultimately by each of three one piece of white ror.e 28 feet in length the escape planners took control of the kitchen area during the capture of staff and assemblage of escape guards -- Officer Robert Molden in tower 6, Officer containing 29 - 211x2' blocks of wood. by neutralizing three guards and three kitchen gear, 30-40' inmates were working il) the kitchen, Paul Sites in tower 7 and Officer Edward Howard stewards. They did this one person at a time, by moving back and forth between the kitchen and the in tower 8. The inmates also assembled and prepared to isolating the individual, showing him a concealed gun dining rooms. Some of them noticed the gradual carry with them many items of high energy food and and instructing him to calmly and quietly follow disappearance of staff, others did not, as the kitchen As they crossed the yard, Officer Molden heard survival gear in case they were required to hole up them. The staff were informed that the armed area consists of approximately 35 different rooms them talking loudly, seemingly unconcerned about in the woods for a long period. They also burdened inmates wanted to escape rather than harm anyone and storage areas and the staff customarily move being overheard. VIIhen they reached the wall, they themselves with excessive clothing, playing cards, and if they cooperated, no one would get hurt. Each about. Some of the inmates working in the kitchen had trouble attaching the hook some thirty feet toiletries, pornographic pictures and other items that staff person and a few inmate hostages was led to speculated that the unusual absence of staff was part overhead. Their plan called for raising the hook, cou Id not have helped their effo~t. the rear of the kitchen area and locked into a small of a possible escape. In general, the inmates who made of piping, up the wall by adding pieces of bread storage room. In two instances, armed inmates . were not involved in the escape just did their jobs electrical conduit to the pole and r,aising the hook One factor that didn't fall into place was timing. were unable to isolate the staff person without as usual, although some took precautions by crawling higher as each new section of conduit was added. On October 28, 1981, the inmates were sti II days drawing special attention to themselves, so they into cupboards or giant iron kettles to protect Once the hook was at the top of the wall, it was away from being fully ready for their escape. removed a previously captured staff person from the themselves in case shooting occurred. At least one rotated to catch on. A 28-foot rope with 211 x 2" Nonetheless, there were rumors about an impending bread room and used him to bring the individual into inmate Drake Hall, not previously involved in the blocks attached at one-foot intervals as steps was escape among a wide group of inmates and their trap under threat that if any alarm was sounded, effort' actively cooperated with those planning to both tied and taped to the hook. Catching the hook correctional officers hE~ard general information about the remaining staff would all be killed. As each staff escap~ and assisted in the preparations. on the wall proved more difficult than anticipated, a possible escape plan or riot. One week earlier, person was captured, he was stripped of institutional but after a few tries, it connected, albeit not securely. correctional officers ha·j confiscated escape materials keys. One correctional officer had a walkie-talkie By 6: 15 p.m., the escape plan was moving on Joseph Bowen and behind him two other inmates and a complete set Clf institutional keys from inmate which was also taken by the captors. I n some a reasonable schedule and approximately nine stepped from the ladder and began to climb the rope. Paul Stanley, who was placed in administrative instances, personal items were taken. inmates* were ready to go to the wall. This included With three inmates on the rope, the climbihg custody while aWeliting transfer to another the original group of escape planners and at least .one apparatus failed to hold. Although the rope itself institution. Each of the staff members, except one, other who became a participant during preparations held, the hook came free and the three inmates fell surrendered peacefully to the captors. Correctional in the kitchen. One significant hitch had developed, to the ground, the rope and hook coming with them. Rumors were frequent, though unvalidated and Officer John Bozek argued and resisted and had to however, and presented a problem. The delivery At this point, the inmates first noticed or first not specific. Many inmates and some staff were be physically restrained by inmates and calmed down truck a common sight in the yard and needed to acknowledged Officers Molden and Sites yelling at aware of speculation that an escape was in by a steward who had already been captured. The conc~al movement to the wall, wasn't at the loading them to leave the wall. An inmate turned, raised his preparation. There are conflicting reports on how captured staff were out of contact with their dock where it was supposed to be. During delivery arm and Officer Molden saw a muzzle flash. Officer high escape rumors reached in the Graterford chain supervisors and other staff for up to one and one-half of meals. it had run out of gas. This information Molden fired a warning shot. Three inmates retreated of command. There is no evidence that knowledge hours without their absence being detected. had bee~ communicated to the inmates while they from the wall and headed toward the E block dining of these rumors came to the attention of were still locking up the staff around 5:30 p.m. They room area. A few other inmates retreated toward Superintendent Cuyler, his deputies or other ranking The three correctional officers taken hostage decided they had gone too far to wait for another the kitchen, while Joseph Bowen and two other officers. Tension was high among the inmates and were Lieutenant Lorenzo Alleyne and Corrections day and decided to walk to the wall and use a 4 inmates made another effort to attach the hook to several assaults occurred early in the week of October Officers John Bozek and Gregory Ward. Lieutenant foot platform ladder to start their climb. the wall and climb over. As guards were running 28, 1981. Some Graterford staff asked for a total Alleyne was a shift supervisor responsible for across the yard toward them and the hook still wasn't lock-up of the institution and a thorough search of patrolling large areas of the institution and overseeing Thus between 6: 15 and 6:30 p.m., nine inmates securely attached, Bowen and the remaining inmates all prison areas for weapons and contraband. The security in the late afternoon of October 28, 1981. set off fr~m the kitchen loading dock carrying several left the wall and retreated toward the kitchen area. correctional officers' union representative advised He was on tour in the kitchen area when taken heavy boxes of climbing gear, a ladder and escape Superintendent Cuyler that a riot could occur. hostage. Officers Bozek and Ward were assigned to materials, and headed across an open yard Had the inmates completed their climb up the Superintendent Cuyler viewed this as an control the gate separating the kitchen area from the approximately 530 feet to a point between towers wall, they would have found a detachment of three overstatement of tensions in the institution. He cell block dining rooms and supervise security in the 6 and 7. It was dusk and the inmates hoped they correctional officers armed with a shotgun, a pistol decided that there was insufficient specific kitchen area itself. The three civilian kitchen wouldn't be seen. They were reportedly not and batons waiting outside the wall at the point of justification to close down the institution for the stewards who were assigned on duty in the kitchen concerned about being spotted by tower guards escape. These officers had been sent to the scene four to six days needed for a thorough search. were Food Service Supervisor Eric Mohn and Food Service Instructors James Holiday and Wesley The escapists, aware that rumors of the escape Lowery, Jr. *The exact number of inmates who participated in the escap.e a~tempt ~as nev~r be;n. establ!shed as were out, fearful that someone might expose their eyewitnesses had to contend ~ith diminished visib!lity ~~d confusion In countlnQ and I.dentlfymg the Inmates. plan or that a possible shut-down and search wou Id Prior to locking Officer Ward into the bread Through investigation, nine Inmates have been Iden~lfled as. ~t the wall. It IS bell.eved that a tenth ~and occu r and their contraband wou Id be confiscated, storage room, the inmates needed to visit D cell block possibly an eleventh inmate were near the wall or In a positIOn to rush the wall .If the. escape a~pe~red decided to try their escape immediately; that is on where additional contraband was stored. By to be working. The inmates who were clearly i,:,volved have chosen not to clanfy thiS matter In light October 28, 1981. threatening Officer Ward with a gun and threatening of the criminal investigation and pending prosecutions. 3

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as part ,of perimeter .security after the control center or while they scaled the VI~n in ronfomlance with . open the front gate; that it is controllecjby a buzz~r institution. Other State ,Police ,began arriving w/as notified 'by Officer Howard (Tower 8) that there Bureau of Correction policy that deadly force not system. in the bullet-proof control room and. the ther.eafter. At this· time, lock-up of the (/ wali movement of inmates from the kitchen toward be used unless a life is threatened" orunJess an escape control room staff are trained not to let inmates out approximately 2,000 inn;~~es at Graterford was the watt Officer Shes (Tower 7) stationed the armed can not be sto;:wed by use of lesser force. The tower regardless of hostag~s.or anya9tion~ .against the nearly. complete. Almost all, Grat~rfo.rd ,officer:s:at the point of the escape attempt. guards stated that they would not have shot at the hostages. At this pomt, the captors deCided to stay administrative staff were present ,and aSSisted In tne inmates until the inmates reached the top of the wall. in the kitchen are~ and build bard cades to protect lock-up. A head count of inmate~ was underway to ., J~e three tower guards observed the inmates in Also, unti I the attempt failed, the tower guards did themselves in, the, event of an assau It. The inmate identify which inmates were missin~ from their cells . djfferent c5tages of the escape. Officer Molden saw not know that the inmates had guns. By the time kitchen workers were thEm put to, work building them first around 6:25 p.m. when the inmates started they knew of the presence. of guns,guards on-foot barricades an~ securing the area. The staff hostages The head count could not be completed at this to cross the yard. Officer Molden thought he saw had arrived and the tower guards were concerned that were locked back into the bread room amidst threats time as small groups of inmates were still being a correctional officer in the group but in the growing shooting into the growing darkness would endanger to their lives if they tried anything "funny." returned to their cells from distant locations and eary.ness he couldn't clearly count or identify the the guards or inmates not involved in the escape Lieutenant Alleyne was tQld' that if there was any becc-use there was no functioni'1g loudspeaker or indiysduaJs.l though some wore wh ite kitchen worker effort. lack of cooperation he would be killed first. OfficI. ~ .other system to communicate clear instru~tions to uniforms and others had on regular brown Bozek was threatened and told that it ;'~/as his everyone. Also, groups of officers were dispatched institutional uniforms. Officer Molden first tried It is not known whether or not the inmates had resistance earlier that had slowed the escape plan and to investigate rumors that inmates were seen on the caUing the control center, then the main gate to plans to hook up with an escape vehicle if they got was responsible for its failure, and thus hiS death was institution roof, out in the yard and el!:ewhere. No report the incident, but both telephone lines were over the wall. Certainly, the gear they had with them deserved. Loaded weapons were waved at the inmates were found. busy, When the inmates reached the wall, he yelled would indicate they were prepared to live in the hostages. a warning to the inmates to stay away from the wall. woods. In addition to these small groups of inmates They' either didn't hear him or acted as though they State OffiCials Respond to the Incident absent from their cells, a larger group of sixteen didn't hear him, and began mounting their hook and The Hostage Taking Incident Develops inmates was discovered in E block dining room. This climbing. . While the escape attempt was in progress, is the dining room toward which the first group of A first group of approximately three inmates Captain Bullman. called Deputy Superintendent inmates seen running from the wall were heat', J. While the inmates were crossing the yard, they left the wall carrying a walkie-talkie and were seen Lawrence Reid at his home to report the events. Mr. Staff were dispatched to determine who these were also seen by Officers Sites and Howard. Officer heading toward the entrance to E block dining room. Reid was the Duty Officer on October 28, 1981. Mr. inmates were and why they were In the E block HowardcaJled the control center and notified the The wal kie-talkie was later found outside of E block Reid called Superintendent Cuyler at home at 6:50 dining room. Staff was told that these !n.~ates had day captain, Captain Walter Bullman, that there was dining room. These inmates returned undetected into p.m. and informed him of what he k!1ew. The been engaged in after supper clean-up activities at the a possible escape in progress between towers 6 and the general inmate population and did not become information Clivler received wa~J confUSing because beginnina of the hosta9.e situation and lock-down, 7. The detachment armed with fireat"ms was sent part of the hostage situation. the incident was changing from an escape attempt, and had "been "stranded' in the E block dining room. outside the wall by veh icle to intercept the escapists to an armed escape attempt, to a failed escape They were searched and returned to, t~eir .c~lIs jf they got over the wall. In addition, a group of The remaining inmates retum~\p to the kitchen attempt, to a hostage situation, to a ~arricaded without any records. being made as to their Identities. four officers armed only with batons was dispatched area. They were followed by some\of the unarmed hostage situation within minutes. Supermtendent on foot through the recreation yard to the outer correctional officers who had been di~atched by the Cuyler ordered that the entire institution be Shortly after 9:00 p.m., tentative lists were prison yard where the inmates were reported. control center. The officers reachecf,'the loading immediately secured to isolate the problem area and prepared identifying thirty-six inmates who were Another two officers with batons were sent toward dock, peered through windows into the kitchen and called State Police Lieutenant Flannery, Commarrler unaccounted for. At this point, it was assumed that the same point via a different route. saw armed and unarmed inmates. The armed inmates of the local Limerick Station, at home to advise him all were in the kitchen area. Superintendent Cuyler returned to the staff locked in the bread storage of the situatiOn and to request assistance. directed Graterford treatment staff to j'eview the The tower guards were unable to determine the room, announced that the escape had failed and that Superintendent Cuyler then immediately reporte~ to recQrds of these thirty-six inmates and to work up number of inmates at the wall, with estimates ranging they were now hostages. Lieutenant Alleyne and the institution to take control. At the safTle time, profiles on the basis of their perceived dangerousness. from nine to fifteen. Estimates on how high the Correctional Officer Ward were then taken into the Mr. Reid notified Deputy S~ ~erintendent Robert Graterford's Treatment Director Thomas Stachelek oversaw this process and gave the Superintendent a inmates climbed also varied, but it is reasonably clear kitchen at gunpoint. Aware that correctional officers Mauger, Administrative 1·,SiSi;~I~ilnt Stephen Lucas~, from guards and inmates that the lead inmate, had arrived by the loading dock, Joseph Bowen told and Majors of the Guard ~I(;!'r I,d ,vaughn and R. H. list that identified the twelve most likely participants. I· It included all four hostage-takers. Bowen, got over halfway up the wall, possibly within Officer Ward to tell the officers to back off and leave ~pa!d.. All set out fr~ ;n,'111 ,191r homes for the ten feet of the top. The armed guards outside the the area, as the inmates had hostages and guns, mstltutlon. /i I! i r) wall heard the hook scrape the wall and slip off the including shotguns, and would use them if the At approximately 8:00 p.m., Joseph Bowen and inmates fall to the ground, and the exchange of shots. officers didn't comply. While Officer Ward was Superintendent CUy1tJr at the Leroy Ellison were recognized as two ~rmed inma~e~ arriU~d i~n~itut!on who appeared briefly in a COrridor sh,outln!:/ The unarmed guard force inside arrived after the first communicating this information to the guards. first, at 7:00 p.m., and eslablished the admmls,tra~lon exchange of shots and after some of the inmates had Bowen emerged on the dock with a gun at the head conference roorTt,as the c(;mmand post. By thiS time, obscenities waving their weapons and challenging the .already feft the wall. As the guards approached the of Lieutenant Alleyne and discharged a shot in the the inmates in the kitchqun were building barricades officers in their sight to "come on in." Steward Mohn was standing with them and they appeared to be remaining inmates, the inmates turned and fired a direction of the officers. The officers retreated and and the reports were,,)jl1ore clear. Supe~int~nd~nt handgun in the direction of these officers. By now at approximately 6:45 p.m. were directed to return Cuyler directed the rapId lock-up of the mstltut!on threatening him. These brief generalized taunts and expressions of readiness for armed c~mbat o~curred .. all of the inmates had left the wall and were eithe~ to the control center for new assignments. and at 7: 12 p.m. notified Bureau ~f C<;>rrectlOn back in the institution or enroute back across the periodically throughout the evening against a Commissioner Ronald J. Marks. At thiS pOint, only backdrop of the sounds of barricades under yard. I nside the kitchen area, the armed inmates Joseph Bowen was positively identified as being one considered their options. They told Lieutenant of the captors, although it was ass~med that all of construction. In total, three shots were apparently fired in the Alleyne that they had hostages, weapons and a the inmates at the wall might be Involved. yard, one by Officer Molden in tower 6 and two complete set of keys and would use the hostages to From time to time during these early hours of pistol shots by the inmates. The tower guards did g<;> through the prison and out the front g,chr', At approximately 7:20 p.m., Lt. John Flannery the incident, there was telephone contact between staff and Lieutenant Alleyne. Around 7:30 p.m. and not shoot at the inmates as they approached the wall Lieutenant Alleyne told them that the keys woul(m:,~< I and one other State Trooper arrived at the

4 5 \

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again around .8:00 p.m., Graterford's Sergeant John Governor's Office was notified, the correctional and Taylor spoke by phone to Lt. Alleyne; who indicated police agencies were coordinating their efforts, clear that he was "O.K." a"d no one had been hurt. chains of command within each service were Around 8:45 p.m., Lieutenant A"eyne called out and established, an adequate armed force was on the CHAIN OF COMMAND said the captors wanted an outside telephone line to scene, properly deployed and increasing in numbers call their families. This request was refused until the and equipment by the hour, hospitals and medical inmates freed the hostages or began negotiations to personnel were notified and in a state of preparation set them free. Between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., for emergencies, ambulances were at the institution, Lieutenant Alleyne placed two calls requesting ten medical personnel were at the scene, C block medication for hostages with diabetes and other dining room was converted to an emergency hospital, medical problems. alternate arrangements for feeding the locked-in inmates were in progress, and work shift changes for After the lock-up, correctional officers were all Graterford personnel were being communicated to available to guard the access points to the kitchi:! them at their homes. area. Administrative Assistant Stephen Lucash 8;-,d I Governor Dick Thornburgh J two correctional officers armed with handguns, took The chain of command was established as position in the service corridor outside the kitchen. shown on the next page. Lieutenant Robert Dietz and two correctional officers, also armed with handguns, took position at Tension Builds in the Kitchen the loading dock. The captors had keys and weapons and had they decided to try to take over larger During the late evening of October 28;. activity --.------~Paul W. Critchlow Jay C. Waldman I sections of the prison, they were expected to exit inside the kitchen was frantic. The captors had a great Press Secretary _____ ------General Counsel many doors and windows to secure. They w~re from either point. These six staff members held these and Director of positions for one and one-half hours. concerned about an assault and about sniper~, Accusations flew, placing blame for the failure of the I Communications I State' Police continued arriving so that by 10:00 escape attempt. Tempers and emotions were at I Richard H. Glanton p.m. forty-two armed troopers were present, under feverish pitches. Inmate hostages were ordered to I I Executive Deputy the command of ,Captain John McKenna, smear wind'ows with mixtures of catsup and flour so I I r ·General Counsel commanding officer of Troop K, the troop within that guards would not be able to see in the next I I I which the Limerick Station was assigned. Armed morning. Barricades were built using metal racks, Ronald J. Marks Daniel F. Dunn teams of State Troopers were assigned to relieve and, tables, pots, kettles and other items. Mazes of pots Kenneth Robinson State Police Commissioner Correcti on Press Commissioner of ------in some instances, team up with \:.:1e armed and and pans were made across the floors to impede correctiOnj L..------1r------· unarmed correctional oHicers. Captain McKenna movement of an assault force. Secretary maintained frequent telephone contact with State t Police Commissioner Daniel F. Dunn in Harrisburg. The staff hostages spent most of the evening Captain John McKenna Julius T. Cuyler locked in the bread box, although Lt. Alleyne was State Police Liaison . Commissioner Marks called the Governor's occaSionally brought out to make telephone contact. Superintendent State Correctional Institution at Graterford Office and informed the Governor's Deputy Counsel The staff hostages were extremely pessimistic about Robert Ross and Governor Thornburgh of events at their eventual fate. They saw the level of agitation at Graterford Graterford. The Governor then selected a Governor's of the captors who checked on them and saw the I Office management team and established a chain of two handguns, two shotguns, and extensive Other State Pol ice Personnel command and communication to work with the State ammunition in the hands of Joseph Bowen, Lawrence at Graterford Police and the Bureau of Correction. The team Ellison, Leroy Newsome and Calvin Williams. They consisted of the Governor, his General Counsel Jay heard the movements of police and correctional C. Waldman, his Executive Deputy General Counsel officers and the sounds of crashing pots and pans Major Donald Vaughn, Robert Mauger Major of the Guard Richard H. Glanton and his Press Secretary and that were indistinguishable from the sounds of . D~puty Superintendent Chief Mediator Director of Communications, Paul W. Critchlow. gunfire through the wa'ls of their 15 foot by 25 foot for Operations Richard Glanton was designated to be the principal by 13 foot windowless, cool storage room. On Lawrence Rp.id contact person. several occasions, Joseph Bowen confronted the staff Deputy Superintendent Captain William Winder, Lt. Ronald Lucas hostages, sometimes telling them "to be cool" as he for Treatment While Commissioner Marks was briefing the just wanted "to settle the thing so that none of his Relief Mediators Governor's Office, a group of eight correctional men got hurt or had to spend the rest of their lives officers led by Major Vaughn set up a forward in the hOle," and other times stating that if an assault command post in the kitchen corridor and bake shop began, he would kill the staff hostages immediate!)'. Note: In addition to the State officials involved in ~he chain .of command depi~ted abo~€, ~xperts in adjacent to the area held by the captors. Battery beginning with Lt. Alleyne. Every time the door to hostage-negotiation from the Federal Bureau Of. Prrson~ adVised Glanton .durlng the. l!lcldent and powered spotlights were set up to illuminate the area. the bread storage room was unlocked, the hostages hostage-negotiation experts from the New York City P~hce Depart.ment. adVised Commissioner Marks.

At this point, everything outside of the areas had to confront absolute uncertainty as to who was Glanton and Marks shared with each other the observation and adVice given by these experts. (\ controlled by the armed inmates was in place. The coming in, and for what purpose.

7 6

» • The staff hostages believed that an assault would phone. The conversations varied. Some dealt with . . The inmate hostages were still busily adding to In HarrisbUrg, Governor Thornburgh convened occur soon and developed a plan to hold the door medical needs of inmates and staff hostages. Others barricades and began building the principal barricade a meeting around 9:00 a.m. to review the situation, to the bread storage room closed. They would consisted of challenging outbursts by Bowen. There in the corridor just in front of the bread box. They clarify roles and plan future actions. Present were remove their belts, tie them around the door knob '. was no, ,progress in identifying demands. Major did not finish this barricade until Friday. When Jay Waldman, Richard Glanton, Robert Ross, Paul and pu II the belts creati ng a counter force 'against" . Vaugfin told Bowen that medical records were being complete, it extended from the floor to the ceiling Critchlow, Commissioner Dunn, Commissioner Marks those tryir to open the door. By this plan, they checked and medicine would be provided to those and was about three feet thick at the base and two and Dr. Raphael Belford, Chief of Psychological hoped they could keep the captors out until the in need. On the basis of these and prior feet thick at the top with a three foot square hole Services for the Bureau of Correction. The meeting assault force could retake the area. conversations, it became clear that in addition to in the middle that could be used as a shooting focused on three principal questions: a) what was Bowen at least Ellison, Newsome and Williams were porthole or could be used to pick off an assau It force the range of possible things that could reasonably be Eventually, the staff hostages heard sounds that active as principal captors. Prison staff presumed that one at a time as they clambered through it. The expected to happen, from worst-case to best-case they thought were an exchange of gunfire between there were other principal captors as well. barricade was made of cases of canned goods, sacks scenarios, b) what were the timeframes for probable their captors and what they thought were machine of vegetables and other items. key decisions and c) what were the levels of training guns. It was probably a table being dragged across During this period, the Graterford admini­ and competence of the State Police and Bureau of the flnor. Believing the assault was underway, they stration decided to deprive the inmates of Communications and Activities Correction personnel on the scene? The Governor secured the door. The captors soon discovered the some conventences as a'means of creating discomfort Continue Throughout the Day directed that, at all times, two objectives be kept in door wouldn't open and several of them tried forcing and hopefully qringing a quicker resolution. They mind: a) resolving the incident as quickly as possible it, threatening to kill Lt. Alleyne when they finally turned off the water and gas service for the kitchen With the coming of daylight, communications and without bloodshed, and b) insuring that no did so. The door would not open. Finally, the area and cut power to refrigeration units. with the inmates increased. Bowen, other inmates, precedents were set which would encourage the captors promised that if the hostages yielded, they ,Steward Hofiday' and Officer Ward either called or tutu re taking of hostages. would not kill them. The hostages, worn out and Around 3:30 a.m., a kitchen door opened, a gun appeared at the doorway to ask for heat, blankets, aware there had been no assault and that eventually barrel pointed down the corridor, and a loud blast cigarettes, more medication and a radio. Since the On the basis of information exchanged during the door would be taken off its hinges by the captors, occ4rred. The reason for this was at first unclear. captors were unwilling to give up anything for these the meeting, they decided to pursue a strategy of gave up. They were threatened again but not hurt. .Approximately one-half hour later, I..-t. Alleyne called supplies, the authorities only provided medication . talking with the captors for as long as the hostages out to the control center to say that the captorS Several Graterford staff members, including a teacher were unharmed. At the same time, they agreed that As midn ight approached, Major Vaughn wanted the authorities to remember that the captors of Bowen's, a prison psychiatrist and the chief of an assault team must be prepared to rush if an assault established more frequent telephone contact with 'had shotguns and ammunition. Shortly after this call, medical services spoke with inmates with whom they became necessary. The Comm issioners of the police Joseph Bowen. Prison officials had earlier thought ~ kitchen' door opened again, a hand and shotgun felt they had rapport, including Bowen. Dr. Gulderen and corrections agencies assured the Governor that Bowen was the ringleader of the captors, and phcihe muzzle, appeared, and it shot blindly down the Bora, consulting psychiatrist at the prison, urged the they had total confidence in the preparedness and conversations that evening co,nfirmed that Bowen was corridor. No one was injured. captors to release the diabetic hostages because of ability of their commanders on the scene. The their spokesman. It was also clear that Bowen was the severe consequences if they went into shock. The Governor decided that outside experts shou Id not be willing to communicate through Major Vaughn, albeit , Later in the night, authorities left medication captors refused but did agree upon a schedule of brought in to assist at this time, but that since intermittently and; at 'this point,. 'not meaningfully, needed' by inmates and guards by one of the doors regular urine samples and medication deliveries. An Pennsylvania had not had a correctional hostage in terms of identifying demands, negotiation points where ~n; inmate hostage picked it up for the captors. inmate nurse, William Fultz, volunteered to pick up situation in almost twenty years, consultation should or paths to resolve the situation. urine samples and make deliveries which he did for occur with outside experts with more recent By dawn, there were approximately 100 State several days. The basic situation, however, didn't experience in such incidents. In light of the Major Vaughn' described to the' Panel these Police in and around theJ'rison armed with shotguns, change. Captain William Winder and Lieutenant Governor's knowledge of capabilities within the conversations with Bowen. Joseph Bowen informed revolvers, tea'r gas,' bu lIetproof vests and gas masks. Ronald Lucas spelled Major Vaughn as the principal Federal Bureau of Prisons, due to his previous tenure Major Vaughn that it was Bowen's "show and that State' Police 'and correctional officers were organized spokesman. as Assistant United States Attorney General,. he he was running this' and that he would make the into four assault squads with each squad under the authorized Waldman to contact the U.S. Justice decisions and that he would get back to me. He leadership of a State Police representative. The squad In some of the telephone conversations, Bowen Department to request advisory assistance and ask would go away and stay a half-hour, an hour at leaders were Captain McKenna, Major Roy Titler, Lt. expressed a desire for a higher ranking mediator. that Federal experts be asked to stand by for more certain intervals, and he'would come back and scream Flannery and Lt. Edgar Richards. ' Each squad hac! Captain McKenna and Deputy Superintendent Reid direct involvement if that were to be requested. and holler again and tell me that this was his show four senior State Policemen armed with shotguns and were offered for this role but were unacceptable to and that he was making the decisions and he would the balance was armedvilith handguns and batons., Bowen. In one conversation, Bowen asked to speak Finally, the Governor clarified the chain of let me know, that he would get back to me in anotlJer' The assault plans called for satura'~ion of the area to Commissioner Marks. In another, he asked to command and communication and designated hour, and then he would go and stay another hour 'with tear gas' prior to an attack. There were speak to his mother. In many conversations, Bowen Richard Glanton to serve as the coordinator among and come back - I was tiot trying to be pushy conflicting reports' on' whether the correctional was asked to identify what negotiating points he the various parties. The chain had to remain flexible because I didn't know the particular situation, what officers were to participate as full members of the could offer to resolve the situation. He offered none. as events might develop at a pace which would condition the hostages were in, who the hostages assault force or be used only ·as spotters. require Glanton to have direct, immediate contact were and who else was involved. We were still in the Throughout the day, Graterford staff had been with the Governor or with other involved individuals. process of trying to determine who was back there The staff hostages spent the night in the bread trying to locate and contact family members of Following the meeting with the Governor, Waldman as far as the staff and as far as inmates go." storage area, referred to as the "bread box." They hostages and captors to inform them what had been called Rudolph Giuliani, Associate Attorney General were extremely cold and several appeared to be ill. happening. They also hoped, to .. ob~ain ~he of the United States, to request the assistance of EVENTS OF THURSDAY" OCTOBER 29,1981 During Thursday, they were allowed out into one cooperation of the hostage-takers families In talking Federal experts. Mr. Giuliani and his deputy, Jeffrey corner of the kitchen area where they were guarded to the inmates and urging them to surrender. By Harris, in turn contacted Norman A. Carlson, The First Night Passes by an armed inmate. When developments seemed the early evening, Bowen's brother and a sister and Dir~ctor of the Federal, Bureau of Prisons, and unusual or threatening to the captors, the staff . the mothers of two in mates believed to be captors dirb~ted him to identify appropriate Federal experts During the early morning hours of October 29, hostages were returned to the bread box. came to Graterford. The family members had brief in hostage negotiation and emergency management Major Vaughn spoke to Bowen several times by conversations with the inmates, but there were no and make them available to assist Pennsylvania. significant changes. Director Carlson assembled a team headed by the

8 9 ~------~------~~- ---

Bureau of Prisons' Northeast Regional Director, only one phone for their use. When media and energy managing. the inmate hostages. The staff At approximately 11 :00 a.m., Major Vaughn hostages now spent most of their time in a corner Stephen Grzegorek. Glanton and Grzegorek then representatives used that phone to call in to the heard a shot from the kitchen area. It sounded like of the kitchen area under armed guard rather than established contact. kitchen and speak directly to the inmates, the phone a shotgun blast. He called into the kitchen and was unplugged. At that point, news briefings were back in the bread room. Although Graterford demanded to know what happened. Bowen informed Glanton advised Grzegorek of the nature of the sporadic and information was sparse. Staff coming officials provided medication, it was often delayed him that a gun had been dropped on the floor and incident and status of developments at Graterford. on duty and going off duty passed through the press in delivery and retrieval. Two of the staff hostages accidentally discharged. Major Vaughn insisted that Grzegorek stated that from what he heard, it sounded area and passed on rumors and speculation to and two of the inmate hostages were diabetic and each staff hostage be brought to the door so that Ii ke everything was being done "by the book." reporters who had been given little factual suffering from the irregular medication schedule, lack he could see them and talk to them. Bowen Glanton asked if Grzegorek would keep his schedule information. An institutional spokesman announced of food and sleep, as well as the cold. The hostages, complied. The hostages were brought to the door sufficiently clear to come to Graterford if that that Joseph Bowen was the ringleader and the press inmates and staff alike, who were back in the kitchen one at a time and they assured Major Vaughn they became necessary. Grzegorek said that he and the reported stories of Bowen's violent past. The didn't know if and when an assault would come. were fine, although their stress was evident. As they other members of the Federal team had already relationship between the press and the Graterford They were angry that blankets and cigarettes ,weren't stood at the door, a shotgun was pointed at them cleared their schedules to respond to such a request. officials was tense and remained so for several ?ays. provided. They felt abandoned. Almost all of the from beside the door. staff hostages at this point were convinced that they At the Bureau of Correction, Commissioner Tension was more dramatic in the kitchen area. were going to die in t~e kitchen area. Many of the In fact, the weapon was discharged accidentally. Marks had established a "Crisis Team" consisting of By mid-afternoon, the captors stopped talking to the inmate hostages believed they were going to die. The captors often carried their weapons with the key Bureau officials representing legal, psychological, corrections staff with whom they had prior Some discussed plans to overpower the captors or safety catches off. On this occasion, Bowen and engineering and other areas of expertise within the relationships. Bowen and the other inmates reported escape. Williams were walking in the corridor and the weapon agency to participate in planning courses of action, that they had no reason to continue these accidentally discharged, just missing Williams. both in regard to the hostage-takers, as well as in conversations. Around 1 :45 p.m., the door opened Around 4:00 a.m., one inmate hostage made a obtaining food and supplies from other State prisons a.nd three staff hostages appeared .in the doorway, telephone call out of the kitchen area and said he Deputy Commissioner DeRamus arrived at that could be transferred to Graterford. Food for tied together. Shotguns were pointed at them. After was going to try to escape out a boarded-up kitchen Graterford around 1 :40 p.m. and met with the the institutional population was a special concern as eleven minutes, the door closed and they were gone. window. One-half hour later, this inmate climbed out captors. Bowen asked Lt. Alleyne to come to the the captors held the institution's food supply and Prison authorities assumed that the purpose of this of the window and was escortd to an office for door to verify that the Deputy Commissioner was food preparation area. Bureau of Correction officials action was intimidation. interrogation. actually in Bowen's presence. When Bowen was also sought outside consultation and reviewed events satisfied, he asked DeRamus to step out partly in with Lieutenant Robert Louden of the New York Around 8:30 p.m. Thursday evening, while State Officials now receivt;.-d the first clear account of front of him. They talked briefly and Bowen then City Police Department Crisis Intervention Team and Police and Graterford personnel were in the corridor the botched escape attempt, the hostage-taking itself determined that he wanted someone else and retired New York Police Department Detective Dr. outside of the kitchen, the door opened and a face and, most importantly, the dynamics inside the negotiations broke down until the following day. In Harvey Schlossberg. These two individuals had appeared briefly in the doorway. It appeared to be kitchen. The inmate reported that he believed that particular, Bowen said he would talk the next day conducted a hostage-negotiation training course for Bowen. This had been happening on and off for the captors were not likely to hurt the hostages if about bringing in an "independent negotiator." He the Bureau of Correction and State Police less than hours without incident or communication. On this they were given time to work things out, but that then dramatized this point a while later by bringing two weeks prior to the incident. The New York occasion, a muzzle appeared and the police and if the captors were put in immediate danger, anything Officer Ward to the door, holding a gun to his head, officials advised that it sounded like the corrections corrections officials tried to move behind barriers and could happen. Information from the inmate, engaging in a long, obscene tirade in which he worked himself into a tremendous rage and insisted that only personnel were doing all that could be done and that tables. Major Vaughn was reportedly slow to moV(~ together with facts already known, enabled officials the captors had to come up with acceptable trades. and was grabbed by an unidentified State Trooper to categorize 'I:he people in the kitchen as captNs an outside "go-between" can avoid a slaughter. The captors could have something only by giving and pulled, toppling over a bench or chair. Two (4), staff hostages (6) and inmate hostages (31). Deputy Commissioner DeRamus and Major Vaughn other things up, most importantly giving up the staff shotgun blasts tore down the corridor. A pellet or Until this time, authorities believed that there were conferred on this matter and DeRamus told Vaughn hostages. They cautioned against providing the wadding from one of them hit State Police Officer more than four captors. that he had been authorized by Commissioner Marks inmates with a radio since they feared that if Bowen Oskar Stabs in the leg. His leg was bruised and he to offer State Senator T. Milton Street as a mediator if that would help end the standoff. Major Vaughn heard broadcasts recounting his violent history and was given medical attention. No one was seriously An Interest in Negotiations Grows portraying him as a double-lifer with nothing to lose, injured. suggested to Bowen that Senator Street had offered he would not want to lose face by giving up Staff and inmate hostages began making his services as a mediator and they would try to bring peacefully. Richard Glanton and Commissioner EVENTS OF FRIDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1981 telephone calls out of the kitchen. Primarily, they him in. Bowen agreed to the use of Senator Street. Marks shared the information and advice they had requested blankets, water and cigarettes. The staff Commissioner Marks wanted to accept Senator each received from th~ Federal and New York City A First Inmate Escapes hostages urged the administration to cooperate with advisors. the hostage-take,'s. Captor Calvin Williams called out Street's offer because he was perceived to be a During the night, the inmates in the kitchen and apologized for the shotgun blasts of the night credible figure in the inmate community and because A particularly difficult matter that came up were cold, hungry and uncomfortable. They had before. He reiterated the captors' concern for their he had recently helped resolve a hunger strike staged during the early morning hours and throughout the ample raw food but couldn't prepare it. They had own safety. . by female inmates at the State Correctional day at Graterford was responding to the logistical and ice from the freezers melting for water. They broke Institution at Muncy. At this time the use of Senator informational needs ot. the news media. The up wooden furniture to burn in iron kettles both to Around 5:30 a.m., the kitchen door opened and Street had not been discussed with the Governor's institution and the Bureau of Correction's press try to cook some of the food and to keep warm. Officer Ward appeared standing in the doorway with Office nor with the Federal or New York City secretary in Harrisburg handled over a hundred phone Everyone was on edge. At least one fight had broken a rope tied around his waist. He stated that the hostage-negotiation advisors. calls from the press. A makeshift area to out among the inmate hostages. Another inmate captors wanted someone from the Bureau of accommodate the press was set up in the visitors' hostage had gone out of control, threatening others Correction's administration in Harrisburg to be at During the balance of the day, the Governor's waiting area at the institution. The press members with a knife and had to be subdued by one of the Graterford to negotiate between 6:00a.m. and 12:00 Office, Bureau of Correction and State Police present promptly overflowed the area. There was hostage-takers. The four captors had to spend time noon. This information was passed on to Commissioner considered the issue of negotiators. Commissioner Marks and Deputy Commissioner of The Governor's Office consulted with the Federal Corrections Erskind DeRamus was flown by State Bureau of Prisons' experts in hostage negotiation and Police helicopter to Graterford. Commissioner Marks talked to the New York City

10 11

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Police hostage negotiators. All consultants advised Institutional Operations 'I Just before 6:00 a.m., Richard Glanton met a lengthy discussion and several threats, other inmates 1 with the Federal Bureau of Prisons' advisory team joined in the argument. Eventually, the inmate against the use of any politician. Eventually, a J decision was reached not to bring in outsiders yet, While the focus of attention was on the activities in the Bureau of Prisons' Philadelphia Regional dropped the knife without harming anyone. and to consider Senator Street as one of several .in. the kitchen area, other prison staff at Graterford Office. Present were Glanton and Stephen possible outside mediators. had to contend with over 2,000 inmates who were Grzegorek, Bureau of Prisons' Northeast Regional At approximately 11: 15 a.m., an inmate hostage locked in their cells. The Bureau's summary of the j Director, Dr. Homer Keeney, Chief Psychologist at complained to Bowen that he had placed all ofthem During the evening, a girlfriend of Calvin events notes that by the morning of the 30th, making the Petersbu rg Federal Correctional Institution, in jeopardy. Bowen announced to the inmate Williams came to the institution and spoke with him meals for the general population in the small staff Robert Martin, Bureau of Prisons' Regional hostages that he hadn't been keeping them hostage over the phone. Joseph Bowen's mother and his kitchen had become a difficult and almost.impossible Correctional Administrator for Security and Robert at all; he was merely trying to look after their safety older brother, .Jeffrey, spoke to Bowen. All of them chore, as this kitchen is designed to serve only Verderyan, Warden of the Petersburg Institution. and that, if they wanted, they were free to leave at urged the captors to end the incident peacefully so 200-300 people. As a result, they requested National Following a two hour briefing on all of the details any time. Following some discussion and an attempt that no one, especially the captors themselves, would Guard field kitchens and 15 units were delivered to of the incident, the status of negotiations and the to clarify the situation, one inmate left the kitchen be killed or injured. Toward the end of the evening, the institution. Hot meals for the population of the backgrounds of key participants, the Federal advisors. area at approximately 11 :26 a.m. and, about noon, Major Vaughn gave cigarettes to the captors and institution were prepared expeditiously and were travelled to Graterford, arriving there at 9: 15 a.m. 24 other inmates left through the kitchen window hostages. delivered as quickly as possible to inmates in their All but Verderyan remained at Graterford until the and a door leading out of the bake shop. Prior to cell blocks. Inmates in the institution were allowed conclusion of the incident. Upon Mr. Verderyan's leaving, many of them thanked Bowen and the other Also that evening, a confrontation occurred out of their cells in groups of five so that they cou Id return on Sunday to duties at Petersburg, Elliott captors. At 3:40 p.m., another inmate walked out between a reporter and the. Graterford admini­ take showers and change their clothing. Comm issary Caggins, Equal Employment Opportunity of the front door of the kitchen and approximately stration. At this time, a radio reporter brought a items were also made available to each of the cell Administrator for the Northeast Region came to one hour later, the last inmate to leave the kitchen telephone into the area being used by the press. He blocks so that diet supplements could be purchased. assist the Federal team. area on Saturday came out the same way. One of plugged it into the live telephone jack from which the inmates who left the kitchen in this group has the Bureau had pulled its phone and called into the Generally, the inmates locked in their Mr. Kenneth Robinson, Press Officer for the subsequently been identified as part of the escape kitchen, spoke to one of the inmates and recorded cells cooperated during the incident. One inmate Bureau of Correction, arrived at 6:00 a.m. and held effort. Seven inmates and six staff hostages remained the conversation. Bureau of Correction officials did start a fire in his cell either in support of the his first briefing at 7:00 a.m. He scheduled regular in the kitchen from that point until the crisis ended. detected this action and deactivated the telephone captors or in protest of the lock-in. On Wednesday press briefings every two hours. Press and line. The authorities banned this reporter from the night many inmates called out to leave the lights on correctional officials agreed that communication with The seven remaining inmates included the four premises and notified the management of his radio as they were fearful in the dark with armed police the media improved significantly following Mr. captors and three others who voluntarify stayed station. Relations between the media and Graterford and armed inmates within the walls of the institution. Robinson's appearance on the scene. behind. The three additional inmates were Drake officials remained tense. In Harrisburg, the Many inmates told the Panel that this was the most Hall, Frank St. Clair and Otis Graham. Hall and St. Governor's Press Secretary and Director of Communi­ frightening event of their lives. Everyone knew of Between 9:30 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., Joseph Clair reported that they stayed to help keep things cations, Paul Critchlow, decided to send Bureau of the slaughter of inmates by other inmates that Bowen's mother told Bowen that Federal Bureau of "cool" and to insure safety of the hostages. Correction press secretary Kenneth Robinson from occurred in New Mexico. There was fear of the Prisons' personnel were present to insure his safety Interviews with the hostages confirmed that they had Harrisburg to Graterford to. conduct future press institution being set on fire and the inmates being if he gave up. Mrs. Bowen also told him that indeed helped them throughout the ordeal. Graham's activities. Robinson was directed to conduct regular, c~u.ght and suffocating inside. The inmates had arran~ements to have Senator Street come today motivation and role have never been clarified. periodic briefings for the press. .Assistant radios and televisions and followed developments hadn t worked out. Bowen accepted this without Gubernatorial Press .. Secretary Kirk Wilson was closely. As the days dragged on and as the anger. The Situation Worsens assigned to assist in the handling of media inquiries inconvenience to the whole inmate population grew, at the Bureau of Correction's administrative office so did their anger, and they frequently voiced tt--"lats Major Vaughn and others expressed great After the first wave of 24 inmates came out· of in Harrisburg. The press officers began to carefully as to actions they would take against the cc..Aors apprehension that Bowen's reaction to this news the kitchen, the situation worsened. The four coordinate the public dissemination of information when the incident \,\/as over. would be violent, that he would consider it a inmates who later came out on Saturday and the partly because of a concern that the captors might betrayal. I nmate and staff hostages who were present three who. stayed with the captors and the staff find a radio in the kitchen area or gain access to EVENTS OF SATURDAY, OCTOBER 31,1981 report that" this did not happen. Accord ing to them, hostages related that the captors seemed to go ~edia r~ports,. and that inaccurate or inappropriate Bowen never expected Senator Street or any other through wide mood swings during this period. Information might adversely affect negotiations. The Inmate Hostages Leave the Kitchen outside mediator to be admitted into the prison and Alternately aggressive and despondent, Bowen ranted that Bowen and the other captors believed it was a and raved, taunted the authorities to attack, but also The events recorded on this date marked a stalling tactic to buy time until snipers could find became silent for stretches. The hostage-takers talked During the evening, the Governor decided to ask turning point in the incident. Joseph Bowen and angles to shoot them down or until some other about "dying as men rather than surrendering like the Federal Bureau of Prisons to assist on-site at the other captors were not only concerned about strategy using force could be put into place. dogs. II At about 1: 10 p.m., Bowen reportedly took Graterford. Shortly after midnight, Richard Glanton their safety.and ultimate release, but were pressured all of the weapons and all of the hostages back into called Federal Bureau of Prisons' Regional Director by the anxieties of the 31 inmate hostages in the Pressures continued to mount in the kitchen a storage room and just sat there with them. Inmates Grzegorek and asked that the Federal Bureau bring kitchen area. Several of the inmates had histories area as an altercation broke out between two inmate still in the kitchen telephoned out that Bowen felt experts in crisis response and hostage negotiation to of mental illness and primitive living conditions ho.stages. They had been argu ing over the theft of he had II something to prove" and is II ready to die. II the prison to advise on proper actions as an impasse exacerbated their problems. a watch. As a result, one inmate who had been He later emerged and spoke to his mother on the appeared to have developed. The role of the Federal receiving treatment for emotional disorders became phone. He told her that he wasn't going anywhere. officials was described as to offer advice and At approximately 4:37 a.m., a second inmate agitated and, in the words of an observer, "started He now insisted that the correctional officers had assistance and to provide an additional direct line of hostage escaped through a window in the kitchen freaking out. II Joseph Bowen was called to the area reneged on not bringihg in Senator Street and he communication and information from the scene to area. This inmate provided some information about and confronted the inmate, who had armed himself would only talk to Senator Street. Major Vaughn told Glanton. Mr. Grzegorek agreed and a briefing the problems in the kitchen area and verified the with a knife and another kitchen object. Following Bowen that if he released the staff hostages, Senator between Glanton and the Federal team was scheduled information provided by the first hostage escapee. for 6:00 a.m. the following morning.

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Street would be brought in. This information was decision to propose Chuck Stone as the outside their professionalism and preparedness to be of such immediate personal danger. Nonetheless, he agreed never reported to the Governor's Office. mediator. a high level that little advice . was needed. to go forward. Before negotiations began, however, Periodically, Grzegorek advised Richard Glanton in the captors brought Steward Mohn and Lt. Alleyne Around 5:00 p.m., one of the inmates who At around 9:30 p.m., following an hour when the Governor's Office of the observations of the to a closed doorway. They were tied together with volunteered to remain called Major Vaughn and said the kitchen area was silent and no one was answering Federal officials. This gave the Governor's Officean cord around their necks and a shotgun was pointed that guards had telephoned into the kitchen the phone there, a shot rang out. Three minutes additional direct line of communication and at them. These two hostages were kept out of sight threatening the captors, who now seemed more later, Officer Ward called out to Major Vaughn to additional on-site reports of all aspects of the in this doorway until negotiations with Stone had determined than ever to fight. Superintendent Cuyler tell him that everything was O.K. Major Vaughn incident. begun and then were shown to Stone apparently to then cut off phone service to the kitchen, except asked that all of the hostages be brought to the door demonstrate the captors~ seriousness of intent. from the forward control post. This was the second and shown that they were all right. Vaughn said EVENTS OF SUNDA Y, NO VEMBER 1, 1981 instance of a breakdown in discipline by the guard th at if the hostages were fine, he wou Id send a Major Vaughn walked Stone and Jeff Bowen force. Earlier there had been reports that blanket for each of the people in the kitchen. The Negotiations Begin down the corridor. They carried folding chairs and correctional officers had surreptitiously brought hostages were all shown and stated that they were sat with their backs against the corridor wall opposite personal weapons into the institution. One fine. Bowen requested twelve blankets, one for each During the night, Bowen had several exchanges a side door that Bowen spoke out of. Vaughn correctional officer was discovered by Lieutenant of his men and one for each of the other nine people, with Lieutenant Lucas.' The most significant introduced Stone to Bowen then backed away. Dietz to have brought in a personal weapon and this excepting himself. Major Vaughn sent thirteen exchange occurred around 1 :00 a.m. when Bowen Bowen did most of the talking. He vented his was taken from the officer and put into the blankets as an expression of gratitude that the brought Officer Ward to the door with a gun to his complaints against society and the prison system. institutional arsenal. hostages were not being harmed. head. Bowen believed that the boxes that had Bowen worked himself into a rage, waving a shotgun contained the blankets had something hidden in them in the corridor. He cited numerous cases of what The Federal advisors reported that the scene Those present in the kitchen area report that and he wanted them moved. He was extremely he considered unfair, inhumane racist treatment at looked bleak at this time. The captors had still not the shot was fired by Calvin Williams. They heard agitated. Lieutenant Lucas moved the boxes. Graterford. presented any negotiating points. Inmate hostages footsteps on the kitchen roof and the captors who left the kitchen related that Bowen seemed to assumed it was a trooper trying to get a vantage point At around 8:00 a.m., approximately 110 hours Toward the end of Bowen's harangue, Calvin have become resigned to dying an j was waiting for as a sniper. Williams shot a pistol at the spot where after the incident began, Bowen informed Lieutenant Williams slid a clipboard with twelve" negotiations" the State Police assault. The Federal advisors feared footsteps were heard and the shot was followed by Lucas that the captors had drawn up their demands listed on it over to Jeff Bowen and Chuck Stone. that Bowen was seeking a dramatic form of suicide. the sound of footsteps running away frG.n the area. and when the mediator arrived, they would give them Stone reviewed the twelve points orally with the to him. The Governor's Office, after consultation captors to clarify them. Lt. Alleyne stated that he Major Vaughn provided cigarettes to the captors Around 10:30 p.m., Major Vaughn told Bowen with Commissioner Marks and Chuck Stone, clarified felt dizzy. Bowen announced that negotiations were as a means of keeping things calm. that Chuck Stone was proposed as the mediator. that Stone's role would be to: (1) receive the over for the day and the hostage-ta kers locked Bowen asked for a few minutes to confer with his demands; (2) serve as an intermediary and clarifier themselves back into the kitchen area. A Mediator is Selected men. Inmate St. Clair called out in a few minutes of the demands; and (3) assure that he would monitor and said that the captors knew of Stone and that the physical security of the hostage-takers. He would Chuck Stone briefed Major Vaughn, Following discussion in the Governor's Office on he would be acceptable. Major Vaughn said he would not have the authority to make commitments on Superintendent Cuyler and the Federal officials. He the topic of selecting an appropriate outside tell his superior to make arrangements for Stone to specific points in the demands. A State Police car briefed Commissioner Marks via telephone. He felt mediator, Waldman, Glanton and Critchlow be present on Sunday. Vaughn told Bowen that it was dispatched to pick up Mr. Stone and he arrived that the first session had provided Bowen an submitted a list containing the names of several would be necessary for Bowen to clarify his demands at the institution around 2:00 p.m. At 2:48 p.m., opportunity to "get a lot of things off his chest" possible mediators to Governor Thornburgh. They if the mediator were to help resolve the situation. he arrived at the forward control post. and that the provision of twelve negotiating points gave the highest recommendation to Philadelphia was a significant step. He pointed out that' the Daily News columnist Chuck Stone. Stone seemed Throughout the day, the Federal advisors Major Vaughn called Bowen to finalize inmates wanted to know in advance what to be an individual who would be acceptable to all provided valuable assistance. Regional Director arrangements for the negotiations. Bowen raised or disciplinary actions awaited them if parties. Regarded as "his own man," he had been Grzegorek moved about the prison, encouraged the procedural problems that caused delays. Jeffrey they surrendered, and that they would not be critical of the state correctional system on many staff that they were doing a fine job and established Bowen spoke with his brother on the phone and physically assau Ited. occasions and yet was seen by the corrections a good rapport with Mrs. Bowen and Jeff Bowen, urged him to cooperate and meet with Chuck Stone administrators as fair. In 1972 Stone had helped who had not fully trusted the state corrections and himself. Bowen asked for both Chuck Stone and That evening Stone met with Richard Glanton sett.le a work stoppage by 100 inmates at another personnel. Doctor Keeney drew upon his past Jeffrey Bowen to mediate and to enter the kitchen. at Glanton's home to clarify his understanding of the State prison. Most importantly, since 1978, thirteen experience as a hostage negotiator and trainer of Vaughn stated that the negotiations could not occur points. He also emphasized to Glanton the extent fugitives from justice had surrendered to Stone, all Federa~ Bureau of Prisons' staff in hostage where the outside mediator would be out of his sight. of concern the captors had for their physical safety. apparently seeking a guarantee that they would not negotiatbn and advised Major Vaughn and the other Eventually they agreed that the negotiations would That night Glanton, in consultation with the Bureau be harmed by police at the surrender. Governor backup ,'liigotiators. Grzegorek and Dr. Keeney also occur down the kitchen corridor that had become of Correction, State Police and Federal advisors, went Thornburgh felt that Stone's well-known record of noted that Major Vaughn's attention was often known as "shotgun alley." Stone informed the Panel over the twelve points, considered the ram ifications, assu ring the physical safety of those who retu rned diverted from negotiations as he was exercising that up to this moment, it had never been clear to conferred with Jay Waldman and began drafting themselves in to authorities could be a key to a command authority over some of the staff activities him how the negotiations would be conducted and responses for the Governor's consideration. peaceful resolution to the incident and authorized his outside of the kitchen area and had to respond to whether he would be alone or with State officials. staff to contact Stone. Richard Glanton called Stone complaints from the guards' union on several Stone realized from his conversations with Glanton Back in the kitchen area the staff hostages at his home and requested his participation. Stone occasions. The Federal officials suggested that that there would be an element of personal risk, became optimistic for the first time that the situation agreed to assist and Glanton said he would confirm Vaughn should be relieved of all duties except those however, he had not realized that he would be on might end peacefully. the assignment the next morning if Stone was relating directly to the negotiations and this was his own, away from governmental authorities and in acceptable to the captors. Glanton called done. Martin met with the Pennsylvania State Police Commissioner Marks and relayed the Governor's and was available to advise them, although he found

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State officials were also optimistic at this time. two hostages tied together. This time it was Officers The S u"ender Occurs GRATERFORD IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE INaDENr For the most part, the demands seemed to be items Bozek and Ward. Stone and Jeff Bowen explained that could be agreed to. The text of the twelve that the demands had been agreed to and began to Seventeen shots were fired down "shotgun The Shakedown and Return to Normalcy agreements is included in Appendix H to this report. explain the responses. Joseph Bowen stated that alley" from four weapons at 5:40 p.m. The guns were Basically, the captors sought freedom from physical there were new problems and offered seven new then carried by staff hostages to Major Vaughn. The The routine at Graterford did ·not begin to harm, no more than a 6-month confinement in demands, including a request that all seven inmates inmates followed staff hostages out of the kitchen normalize until mid-November. During the six-day maximum security segregation without further still in .t~e kitchen be transferred to a Federa/prison. area. The incident was over. period after the captors surrendered, the authorities misconduct, no responsibility to pay for damage done In addition, Bowen stated that the two correctional conducted a thorough shakedown of the prison. The to the institution during the incident, no oifficers had some things to say. The officers Final Activities search for contraband and weapons was extraordinary restrictions on visiting privileges, and e)(pressed their disappointment that the corrections comprehensive and as might be expected, created the issuance of a radio for 24 hours after the release officials hadn't cared about them and hadn't provided State Police Major Roy Titler wal ked each of great tension between staff and inmates. Many of the hostages. They also asked that no criminal blankets or other supplies promptly. They stated the inmates to a debriefing area where they were inmates charged that personal possessions were charges be filed against any inmate not involved in that the captors had treated them decently and had stripped and searched. The searches occurred in the broken or confiscated. By the end of this period, the escape attempt or the hostage-taking. not harmed them. The shotgun was still pointed at presence of the State Police and Federal officials to inmates had been housed in their individual cells them. insure the guarant-ees of physical safety. Each inmate without adequate exercise or activity for over 11 EVENTS OF MONDAY, NO VEMBER 2, 1981 was given a clean set of clothing and was taken under days. After one and one half hours, the mediators guard to the prison infirmary where he was given a Additional Demands Presented and Negotiated returned to the command post to confer On the seven physical examination. They were then taken by State Following extensive discussions with union new demands. Most of them had to do with Police and Federal officials to a waiting van and at officials representing guards and other workers at No contact occurred between the inmates and pnotection and treatment in the 8: 15 p.m. I were transferred to the Federal Bureau Graterford, the inmate population was unlocked on staff during the night. Between the hours of 6:00 sy!>tem and were not problematic. Federal Bureau of Prisons institution at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. the evening of November 9, 1981. Contraband a.m. and 8:00 a.m. on Monday morning, correctional of Prisons Regional Director Grzegorek conferred discovered during the institution-wide shakedown on staff handled routine matters. This included the with Bureau of Prisons Director Carlson on accepting Graterford psychiatric and psychological staff November 2 to 8 included various zipguns, ammuni­ exchange of urine specimens from the diabetic thE~ seven inmates into the Federal system and on met the hostages upon their release and took them tion, knives, inmate manufactured keys, drugs and hostages, the transfer of water requested by the thE! specific negotiation points. With Director for interviews, physical examinations and debriefing. cash. inmates and discussion about the health and welfare Carlson's authorization, Grzegorek agreed to thJ They spoke and met with their families. At of thoStJ still in the kitchen area. Officers were inmate transfers and to the seven points. The approximately 8:30 p.m., the staff hostages left for Following the shakedown it was discovered that advised that a couple of the staff hostages were additional points were communicated to home with their families. damage had been done to cabinets in the Jewish and "really suffering back here. II Commissioner Marks, Richard Glanton and Jay Catholic areas of the Chapel. Of particular concern, Waldman. After Governor Thornburgh was informed, At about 6:30 p.m., Chuck Stone reported to the damage in the Synagogue included the tearing The lights in the kitchen remained on all night he directed that they be consented to and this was the press corps that the crisis was over and gave them of the sacred Torah. The Panel's investigation of this f~r the first. t!me, indicating that the captors now communicated to Deputy Commissioner DeRamus some of the details. He then went to the aspect of the shakedown is presented in Section III d Id ~ot anticipate an attack, or sniper fire. By and Superintendent Cuyler, who co-signed the administrative offices to participate in a conference of this Report. morning the hostage-takers conversation and agreement. call with the Governor's Office and Commissioner demeanor were less tense. Marks who expressed their gratitude. A formal press By mid-November most institutional operations During the final round of negotiations, several briefing was convened with Chuck Stone at 7:20 returned to normal, although residual tension Having worked throughout the night responding of the inmates asked to speak with relatives and p.m., and questions from the news med ia were remained. By January 1982, the institutional climate to each of the twelve demands, by 9:30 a.m. Richard friends and some of tho.se requests were granted. answered. A final press briefing was given by was calm. Glanton and Commissioner Marks had developed Final discussions began at approximately 4:45 p.m. Kenneth Robinson at 10:45 p.m. draft responses and submitted them to Jay Waldman Chuck Stone and Jeffrey Bowen presented Joseph for revision and approval. By 10:20 a.m., Governor Bowen with papers that outlined the settlement, Thornburgh reviewed and approved the final details signed by appropriate State and Federal authorities. of th~ responses and they were typed at Graterford JOS4~ph Bowen discussed the document with them and and signed by Deputy Commissioner DeRamus and said that some things looked good and others didn't. Superintendent Cuyler. One-half hour later, Chuck Stone tried to clarify specific points and reinforce Stone and Jeff Bowen returned to meet with Joseph his personal tie with Joseph Bowen and the other Bowen. captors. Stone had talked to the mother of one of the inmates and passed on a message from her noting Stone was optimistic that a settlement could be that she loved her son and wanted him to leave the r~ached. His only concern was that he had given prison that evening. Stone provided other personal his word the day before that the twelve points would details about the conversation. Finally, after a brief be kept !n confide~ce. Somehow a local newspaper conversation with Joseph Bowen and a short had obtained a version close to the actual points and argument between Joseph and Jeffrey Bowen over published them.· Stone was concerned that Bowen JOSE!ph's delay, Chuck Stone and Jeff Bowen left the might learn of the leaks and lose confidence in him. kitchen corridor. They informed correctional officers Fortunately, Bowen knew nothing of this. and State Police that Bowen was' gOing to fire his weapons down the corridor, after which inmates and When Stone and Jeff Bowen returned to the staff hostages would leave the kitchen area. corridor, the captors again met the mediators with

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SECTION II arsenal and Pennsylvan ia State Police had arrived, the Excellent advice and support on the scene were FINDINGS OF captors had begun building barricades using hostage provided by the Federal Bureau of Prison THE GOVERNOR'S PANEL TO INVESTIGATE inmates as laborers. Within hours, the captors erected representatives, Stephen Grzegorek, Homer Kenney, THE RECENT HOSTAGE INCIDENT formidable barricades and an assault, even with the Robert Martin and Elliott Caggins, Associate United AT GRATERFORD STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION arriv;;ll of adequate reinforcements could have States Attorn:cy General Rudolph Giuliani. and resulted in the loss of many lives. The decision to Federal Bureau of Prisons Director Norman Carlson On the basis of its review, the Governor's Panel promptly responded in making the reprs::.3ntatives personnel. Within minutes of detection of the event, have an armed assault team ready in the event of available. to Investigate the Recent Hostage Incident at Superintendent Cuyler had been notified at his home, violence by the captors, but to contain the problem, Graterford State Correctional I nstitution makes 12 reported to the scene and had taken charge. He talk with the captors and negotiate for a peaceful Outstanding courage and public service were findings. remained at the scene, oversaw the locking-up and resolution was the correct course of action. displayed by the outside mediator, Chuck Stone, who management of the prison and participated in the responded to the Governor's request to assist in the decisions related to the hostage situation in the The effective performance of key individuals at resolution of the incident. Chuck Stone spent kitchen for most of the duration of the five-day the scene of the incident contributed significantly to extended periods of time sitting with his back against FINDING 1. The successful resolution to the incident. the successful outcome. Graterford Major Donald a corridor wall talking to the armed captors who hostage-taking incident derived from the interaction Vaughn has been cited by many officials present stood in a doorway across the corridor. He provided of many factors, most prominently: (a) the leadership The Panel finds that Graterford administrators during the incident as demonstrating courage and necessary clarification of negotiated points and and good judgement evidenced by Governor Dick and line staff promptly and correctly moved to resourcefu Iness. Because of his willingness to assume provided assurance that no physical harm would Thornburgh and his staff; (b) the professionalism and lock-up the 2,136 inmates who were in various areas an important role and his credibi lity with Graterford befall the hostage-takers if they surrendered. Chuck restraint evidenced by officials and staff of the of the Institution at the start of the incident. inmates, Major Vaughn became the principal Stone's ability to publish the captors' side of the Bureau of Correction and the State Police; (c) the Securing the I nstitution without conflict to minimize mediator during the first three days of the crisis. He story and to make public any reprisals agninst the courage and resourcefulness of several key opportunities for the disorder to spread beyond the spoke face-to-face and by telephone with the armed captors is seen as an important element of his participants, including Graterford's Major Donald kitchen area was essential to effective containment .inmates and his mediating skills were outstanding. involvement. He was ably assisted in his efforts by Vaughn and intermediary Chuck Stone; (d) the advice of the incident. The same traits shown by Major Donald Vaughn were Joseph Bowen's older brother, Jeffrey Bowen, who and assistance provided by representatives of the also evidenced by Captain William Winder and participated in the face-to-face discussions with the Federal Bureau of Prisons; (e) the utilization of a Although there was substantial confusion amcilg Lieutenant Ronald Lucas, who mediated in Vaughn's captors. The credibility and efforts of both Chuck credible outside mediator in the person of Chuck Graterford administrators and staff during the first absence. Stone and Jeffrey Bowen contributed significantly to Stone; and (f) the recognition by the captors that the peacefu I outcome. they could not escape from the facility, coupled with two hours of the hostage incident and some individual breakdowns in staff discipline over the I n addition to these performances, there were the fear they had for their own physical safety and other noteworthy actions by Graterford staff. After The hostage-taking incident followed a failed the eventual issuance of demands that did not include course of the incident, generally the administrators Ciild line staff at Graterford performed their duties the hostage-takers took control of the kitchen, they escape attempt. There is no evidence that this was freedom, amnesty or other items that could not have responsibly and with restraint under extremely trying had the keys and weapons necessary to move out a fall-back plan. The inmate captors wanted out of been accommodated. circumstances. of the kitchen area and into the prison's cell blocks. the prison. After returning to the kitchen arJd taking Admin istrative Assistant Stephen Lucash and hostage the staff they had earlier incapacitated, the The Panel finds that Governor Thornburgh and The performance of the State Police on the Lieutenant Robert Dietz, accompanied by captors sought to determ ine whether they cou Id his immediate staff - Jay Waldman, Richard Glanton scene was exemplary. Troop K Commander Captain Correctional Officers Joseph Roche, Thomas Buzzar, escape. Hostage Lieutenant Lorenzo Alleyne made it and Paul Critchlow - provided effective leadership in: John McKenna, who under State Police policy was Kenneth Sobolewiski and Fran k Cascino, armed on Iy clear to the captors that although they had keys that establishing a clear chain of command and the on-scene commander, and Major Roy Titler, with pistols, were dispatched to cover the primary wouk..i enable them to march their hostages through communication; deciding to engage in dialogue rather maintained close communication with State Police exit points from the kitchen--the loading dock and the cell blocks and a variety of intermediate gates, than as~aulting the hostage-takers' position, seeking Commissioner Daniel Dunn, made quality the service corridor. Even though they believed the they could not get out the front gate. The guards the advisory presence of Federal officials, identifying recommendations on the response options and had captors had greater firepower, including shotguns, who controlled the front gate were located in an and requesting Chuck Stone to serve as mediator once an armed, trained cadre prepared to assault if that the officers held these positions for one and a half inaccessible bu flet-proof cu bicle and were under the impasse developed, and seeking Federal permission became necessary. The State Police evidenced hours before being relieved by adequately armed standing orders not to open the front gate regardless to accept the hostage takers into the Federal prison self-restraint and professionalism throughout the replacements. Other correctional officers* risked of any act that might be committed by insurgents. system. hostage ~ituation, especially after a shotgun was fired their lives by pursuing the armed inmates across the With the realization that escape was out of the down the corridor toward the State Police position prison yard to the kitchen while they themselves were question, the captors focused their concern on The Panel finds th::>,(: Bureau of Correction and wadding or a pellet hit a trooper. carrying only batons. The six staff hostages, fortifying their position against an armed rush and Commissioner Ronald J. Marks, State Police Lieutenant Lorenzo Alleyne, Correctional Officers seeking assurances that they would not be physically Commissioner Daniel F. Dunn and their central office Of particular importance, the Panel affirms the Bozek and Ward and Kitchen Stewards Mohn, harmed. Physical safety was a foremost concern as staffs established immediate contact with the ringleader Joseph Bowen had reportedly been decision to engage in dialogue with the captors rather Holiday and Lowery, certainly contributed to the Govern.or's Office, each other and their responsible safe resolution of the incident by maintaining their severely bea!:en following his murder of a warden and subordinates on the scene. Both agencies established than to assau It the kitchen area so 10l1g as there was discipline and composure under life threatening deputy warden in Philadelphia's Holmesburg Prison the. effective resolution of the hostage incident as no evidence of harm to the hostages. During the circu mstances. before being transferred to State custody. His their foremost mission and coordinated their efforts. initial minutes after taking control of the kitchen, Coordination was essential because of the shared the inmates were extremely excited, had taunted responsibilities these two agencies have in responding corrections officers to assault and h,ad shot their to prison emergencies in Pennsylvania. weapons at least twice. They had extem;ive firepower *Lieutenant Francis Ewing, Sergeant George Glahn and Correctional Officers Kevin Collins, Martin Earhart, and hostages. Graterford staff were unarmed and by Joseph Mushinski, Daniel Pastor and David Wachtman. There was prompt notification and response to the time they were able to obtain weapons from the I the incident by ranking Graterford and State Police

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11 II ~ r, realization, and that of the other hostage-takers that three concurr&nt sentences of one and one half years I On October 2, 1974 Joseph Bowen was harmful to the individual. He stated that Bowen's they had never been physically harmed by staff while to three years, to be followed by a consecutive convicted of second degree murder for the kilHng of "lack of sociability has no relevance to at Graterford contributed to the captors' agreeing to sentence of six months to three years. Bowen served the Philadelphia police officer on February 17, 1971. dangerousness," and stated that in order for the cycle negotiate a peaceful conclusion. the full six years maximum. He received over 30 Sentencing on this conviction was delayed another of violence - secure confinement - belligerence to be misconduct reports during his six-year stay. His year. In February 1975, shortly before Bowen's broken, Bowen wou Id need to be given the Finally, the willingness of the Federal behavior in custody was characterized by frequent scheduled March 1975 trial for the murders of the opportunity for more meaningful interaction with authorities to accept the captors into the Federal verbal and physical aggression. correctional officials in Philadelphia, a suit was filed others and his dangerousness should only be assessed system and the perception that this helped allay the in Federal court on Bowen's behalf by Community at that time. Bowen's psychiatrist further stated that fears of the captors of eventual retribution by staff Four days after his release from prison in 1971, Legal Services, Inc. of Philadelphia. The suit alleged the assessment of "dangerousness" and "threat to or inmates were the final pieces to the effective Bowen was arrested for shooting and killing a that Bowen was unconstitutionally held in maximum r.resent order!! could only be made once Bowen was solution. Philadelphia police officer, who caught Bowen trying security at Graterford and should be released to the 'thoroughly studied, psychologically, psychiatrically, to hot-wire a car. While being held in Philadelphia's general inmate population. The suit further sought and behavioralistically by competent professionals in FINDING 2. Emergency preparedness on the Holmesburg Prison, Bowen's behavior was marked by $10,000 in monetary damages to be paid to Bowen the field qualified to make such predictions on part of the Bureau of Correction and the the same patterns of belligerence and misconduct that as compensation for the time he had spent in human behavior." Following receipt of this Pennsylvania State Police is essential for effective characterized his earner stay in State prison. This maximum security confinement. It cited psychiatric report, records available in the Attorney response to crises such as the hO:3tage incident. behavior reached its extreme in May of 1973 when constitutional rights violations and charged that General's Office indicate that staff of the Attorney Bowen, in concert with another inmate, stabbed and under procedural due process guarantees of the General's Office believed that the Federal courts The response of the leadership and staff of the killed the warden and deputy warden of Holmesburg Fourteenth Amendment to the United States would ultimately decide to order the removal of Bureau of Correction and the State Police Prison and stabbed, but did not kill, a correctional Constitution and under Bureau of Correction policy, Bowen from maximum security. They also expressed contributed significantly to the favorable outcome of officer. In light of these murders, Philadelphia Bowen could be placed in maximum security only concern that financial damages might be assessed the crisis at Graterford last October. Nonetheless, officials felt that Bowen had to be removed from if warranted by specific acts committed in Bureau against the Commonwealth. some emergency responsibilities were overlooked the Philadelphia prison system. Philadelphia of Correction custody, after a hearing. His attorneys during the incident and there was considerable promptly requested that the Commonwealth of alleged that Bowen had not committed specific acts In December 1976, Bowen's attorneys and confusion as to the role armed correctional officers Pennsylvania accept Bowen into the State prison at Graterford that warranted maximum security and Attorney General Robert Kane entered into a Federal would have played if an assault on the kitchen had system as Dn unsentenced prisoner. Bowen was had not received a hearing before his initial placement consent decree. The consent decree was agreed to been ordered after State Police were on the scene. transferred to State custody and placed in maximum in maximum security. This suit was in negotiation over the formal protest of the Commissioner of the security at the State Correctional Institution at for two years between Community Legal Services and Bureau of Correction, William B. Robinson. Even Huntinpdon. At that time, some 28 months after the Pennsylvania Attvrney General's Office. after the consent decree was signed{ Commissioner It is imp~rative that the Bureau of Correction Bowen s arrest for killing the Philadelphia police Robinson urged the Attorney General s Office to seek and the State Police have in place: 1) sou nd policies officer, Bowen had sti II not been tried and convicted In March 1975, following nine court a rehearing. In each instance, the Commissioner was relating to response time, armed force, chain of on that offense. continuances, Bowen was convicted on the two overruled. command, negotiation parameters and operations Holmesburg murder charges and on the assault assessment; 2) standing orders for certain critical In July 1974, Bowen was transferred from charge. In September 1975, Bowen was sentenced to By the consent decree, the Commonwealth operational assignments; and 3) thorough trainir,g~or Huntingdon to the State Correctional Instit.ution at two life terms, one term of 10 to 20 years, and one agreed to remove Bowen from the behavforal select personnel at Graterford and Troop K. The Graterford, the State prison most proximate to term of two to five years on the three murders and adjustment unit (maximum security) at Graterford Panel has found deficiencies and ambiguities in Philadelphia, in order that he might be more easily the assau It. The two life sentences were for the and place him in administrative custody where he existing policies, plans, orders and training and has transported back and forth from Philadelphia for trial killing of the warden and deputy warden. These were would have more opportunity for contact with others identified emergency responsibilities that were not on the 1971 mu rder of the police officer and for the maximum sentences allowed under Pennsylvania and greater opportu nity for participation in carried out during the hostage crisis. A discussion court hearings on the murders of the warden and law at that time. Bowen continued to remain in institutional programs. Security and supervision in of these items as well as recommendations to deputy warden. He was placed in the behavioral maximum security at the prison following the administrative custody remain, nonetheless, close, as overcome them are set forth in a separate con'fiderit!al adjustment unit (maximum security) at Graterford. sentencing. all movements are supervised by staff. The consent memoiandum to the Governor. This was Bowen's second stay at Graterford. During decree further required preparation of a report on 1971 after he was arrested for killing the Philadelphia This placement was reviewed on a Bowen's psychological development while under police officer, he was temporarily transferred from month-to-month basis by Graterford's Program administrative custody. This report was to be FINDING 3. The presence of JOlleph Bowen in Holmesburg Prison to Graterford to testify as a Review Comm ittee and was continued on the basis submitted to the court within three months of the general inmate population was a consequence of witn('!ss in a court hearing in Montgomery County. of his attitude described in correctional reports as Bowen's removal from maximum security. Most grave inadequacies and inefficiencies in the criminal While in the Montgomery County Courthouse, Bowen "arrogant, belligerent and threatening. II significantly, the consent decree also provided that j!.lstice system. In addition, Bowen's placement at and two other inmate witnesses attempted to break at the end of nine months, Bowen would be placed a minimally supervised work assignment where he was out of the court lock-up. Using wooden legs they During the two years of negotiations between in "general population" within the prison, unless the in contact with outside delivery vehicles was a lapse broke off tables, they assaulted security guards. the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office and COlilmonwealth showed reasons not to place him in in institutional secu rity. Later in 1974 at Graterford, staff uncovered evidence Commu nity Legal Services, I nco of Phi ladelphia, general population at that time. Placement in general of an escape plan, of which Bowen was the alleged Community Legal Services sought and received population would make Bowen eligible for all Joseph Bowen was originally sentenced to the organizer. The escape plan included smuggling guns permission to have Bowen examined by a psychiatrist institutional programs and activities within the State prison system in 1965 at the age of 19. He into the Institution through the visiting room in order of their choosing. In a report submitted to the Institution and would not restrict his movements was convicted of assault with intent to kill, carrying to facilitate the escape. The written plans were Attorney General's Office in July 1976, Bowen's more than any other inmate's. a concealed deadly weapon (firearm), aggravated discovered before the guns were smuggled into the psychiatrist stated that in his opinion Bowen's assau It, robbery, burglary, conspirClcv and disorderly prison. presence in maximum security confinement "was During the nine month period Bowen was in conduct. On these convictions, Bowen was given medically wrong" and psychiatrically and medil~ally administrative custody, he received monthly

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I! evaluations by the Institution's Program Review keep our community as safe as possible." 'It was Committee. They found that his attitude continued signed by Lieutenant Lorenzo Alleyne, who later Interviews with Graterford officials make it clear that In spite of Bowen's aggressive and belligerent to be arrogant, belligerent and threatening. The became one of the six staff hostages taken by Bowen. staff and many administrators believed that Bowen history, his convictions for three murders of criminal psychological evaluation of Bowen was not was ordered into general population by the federal justice officials, the frequently stated concerns that comp leted within the three month time frame At the end of tne nine month period, the judge. They seemed unaware that Bowen's presence he was engaged in various conspiracies among inmates provided for in the consent decree as Bowen refused Attorney General's Office received a letter from in general population came about as a result of at the Institution, and four prior documented escape to participate in the psychological assessment. This Community Legal Services, Inc. of Philadelphia voluntary agreement between Attorney General Kane planning and preparation efforts, Bowen was assigned was communicated to his counsel. Bowen was pointing out that the nine months had passed, that and counsel for Joseph Bowen. to a work detail in the kitchen area of the Institution. informed that he must cooperate if he was to obtain no reasons had been submitted for keeping Bowen In this area there is ready access to knives and other release to general population. Bowen did from general popu lation, and therefore, Bowen Subsequent to his release to general population, possible makeshift weapons. Bowen was specifically subsequently cooperate and a report was prepared should now be placed in general population. The Bowen's behavior and attitude, although never engaged in work which included unloading outside and submitted to the court. letter concluded by stating that if Bowen was not becoming positive, showed less frequent and less delivery trucks, which received minimal inspection by placed in general Ropulation, Community Legal dramatic signs of hostility and aggression. institutional staff in the period of time preceding the Nonetheless, between his release to general hostage-taking incident. The psychological report was preparea by Services would take I appropriate action" against the Graterford treatment services staff. The institutional Commonwealth for violating the consent decree. population in 1977 and the events of the adjustment section of the report minimized Bowen's hostage-taking incident in 1981, Bowen was cited for past behavioral problems and concluded by stating The Attorney General's Office conferred with four misconducts which resulted in his placement that Bowen had "not created any major secu:-ity officials at Graterford and the Bureau of Correction. into maximum security for short periods of time. FINDING 4. There is a need within the problems." The psychological impressions section of According to an internal memorandum to the file in Two of his misconducts, one in November 1978 and Bureau of Correction and specifically within the report was based on "a limited amount of the Attorney General's Office, the Attorney General's another in August 1979, specifically related to Graterford to identify and closely observe those interviews" and is very brief and general. It described Office stated a willingness tq contest the matter and possession of escape material. The escape material inmates who can be classified as primary security Bowen as distrustful, suspicious and hostile toward informed the correctional officials that they should found in 1978 consisted of maps, a travel brochure, risks, because of their past deeds both in and out authority but also stated that he was open, honest, promptly prepare a report "replete with justification" a phone book and a hand-made weapon. The escape of prison. who are caught in escape had religious convictions, moral codes, good impulse for retaining Bowen in administrative custody. material confiscated 1n August 1979 was extensive attempts or in predatory acts against other inmates control and was capable of understanding the rules However, according to Bureau of Correction records and included 70 feet of rope, metal hooks and pieces or staff should be carefully tracked, so that work and regu lations governing life in general popu lation and interviews with relevant correctional officials, of piping which presumably were to be tied to the assignments, program participation, personal fund at Graterford. The psychological evaluation was their understanding was that the Attorney General's rope as steps. In addition, further investigation accounts, mail privileges and visiting procedures are transmitted from Graterford to the Attorney staff saw the case as hopeless and believed that the revealed that the foundations for the bottom not used by these inmates to further their criminal General's Office to the Federal court with brief Federal court would order them to place Bowen in left-hand windows of his cell had been removed and intentions. The efficacy of utilizing a separate transmittal notes. general popUlation. They also believed that failure then replaced with a soft putty. section of each State prison or of designating one to place Bowen in general population after these nine such prison in the State for the identified high The nine month trial period passed without months could result in the correctional officials being In 1979 and again in 1980, Superintendent security risk and predatory inmates should be Graterford, Bureau of Correction or Attorney found in contempt of court and personally liable for Cuyler requested the Bureau of Correction to transfer explored. Regardless of whether a separate location General's Office staff initiating any written contact!>' financial damages. The weight of the evidence Bowen to another facility. The reasons cited is used or not, procedures for inmate control must on this case, with each other or the Federal court, indicates that the Attorney General's Office did not included Bowen's involvement in escape preparations be commensurate with their security risk and other than the transmission of the psychological exhibit interest in this case commensurate with its and his reputation for belligerence. These transfer dangerousness. report. There was no submission to the court of seriousness and did not pursue it vigorously. The requests were seen as "premature" and not in the reasons why Bowen should not be released to the correctional officials did not monitor this case closely "best interest of the Bureau of Correction and the In a large prison system there are apt to be some general population. and appear to have been extrem~'ly confused over the inmate" and were denied. The Bureau's Transfer inmates so dangerous and intent on escape that the legal aspects. Committee believed Bowen could be best controlled system cannot be adequately designed to absorb them Significantly however, there are memoranda on by staff who had known him over the years and it without risking harm to other inmates and guards. was doubted that his adjustment would be more Such inmates may not be manageable in file from corrections' officers and supervisors, Regardless of what understandings or prepared during the nine month period, which urge favorable in any other institution. In July 1981, Pennsylvania's prisons that house general population misunderstandings existed, the Bureau of Correction Superintendent Cuyler again requested the transfer inmates, as no amount of attention to job assignment Superintendent Cuyler to oppose the transfer of and Graterford administrators chose to voluntarily Bowen to general population. The memoranda cite of Bowen to another State prison as Bowen, in or program participation will be sufficient to manage place Bowen in general popu lation and did so on concert with other inmates, including Calvin Williams, them safely. Thus, a consideration should be given Bowen's past murders, history of belligerence and the November 7, 1977, thus making unnecessary any fact that he was out of maximum security was believed to.be engaged in a "movement to disrupt to the creation of a special secure facility(jes) for further litigation. Confusion on this matter existed the normal routine of this institution." Bowen's the housing of this type of inmate. At a minimum, confinement in prison for only four days before he from this point forward, as documentation available killed the police officer in Philadelphia. One letter "propensity for instigating others" into dangerous an inmate with the background of a Joseph Bowen at Graterford on Bowen's transfer to ~eneral group activities was also cited. The request to should not be allowed to have a job assignment which stated that the author saw" no reason to light a fuse population continually makes reference to the 'court of dynam ite in order to see if it wi II explode or not." transfer Bowen was one of several submitted by provides opportunities to conceal and move large order" or "Federal judge's action" that made the Superintendent Cuyler at this time. This transfer amounts of contraband and to come in contact with Another letter stated: "In closing, I would like to Institution place Bowen in general population. ask you one more question: What rationale will we request was denied along with several others in outside service vendors. Prisoners, whose immediate Indeed, on November 10, 1977, Superintendent Bureau headquarters in July of 1981, "due to the past actions do not present a cau se for placement use to describe to loved ones and families of the Cuyler met with the Deputy Attorney General who future inmates and officers who heave been killed or inability to transfer all inmates" for whom requests in the institution's restrictive housing unit, but whose handled the case and showed hirr. a copy of a letter were filed. Some of the other requests were criminal and/or inmate history suggest a propensity maimed by our lack of foresight? Help us who have the Superintendent had drafted to the Federaljudge to work and live in an institutional community to approved. The Bureau did not give specific reasons for violence and/or escape must be carefully citing the dangerous action by the judge in making for the denial of Bowen's transfer. monitored while in general population. A the Institution put Bowen into general population. recommendation related to this finding is made under "Inmate Classification" in Section III.

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FINDING 5. Deficiencies in physical and FINDIrJG 7. There has been compliance with FINDING 9. There is a need for the cleanliness, food preparation, intramural athletics and operational security at Graterford contributed to the the 19 points to end the· hostage incident. establishment of a Ilgood time" system whereby processing of inmate accounts have all received planning and execution of the escape attempt and inmates can earn time off their sentence for good careful attention and improvements are noted. The to the hostage-taking. The agreement between the insurgent inmates behavior. corrections officials should be commended for these and the corrections officials is generally seen as efforts. They need to be sustained and the resources The ability of the inmates to obtain, store and reasonable and inmates within the Institution place Testimony in support of the enactment of necessary to expand upon these efforts. need to be move weapons and institutional keys, escape importance on the Bureau living up to it. This could "good time" provisions such as have been proposed provided to the Bureau of Correction so that the equipment and other contraband through the prison be a significant factor in the Bureau having the by Governor Thornburgh was given by numerous safety of the public, the staff and inmates of undetected is greatly disturbing as is the knowledge credibility to safely resolve any future incident of guards, inmates and correctional officials. The use Graterford and the other institutions in the that six staff members could be under the control this nature and in the willingness of credible of "good time" was seen as particularly important Commonwealth's correctional system are assured. of those preparing to escape for up to one and intermediaries to become involved. as an incentive for positive inmate behavior and for one-half hours without their absence being noted by maintaining discipline and control of the prisoner supervisors or co-workers. The Panel has found a population. The need for "good time" is further general laxness in control of inmate movement within stated in Section III. FINDING 12. The management and account­ the institution. The Panel has examined this and ability of correctional services in the Commonwealth numerous other aspects of security at Graterford and FINDING 8. The escape attempt and would be improved by the creation of a State offers many observations and recommendations on hostage-taking incident were the result of a desire to Department of Corrections. improving security in Section III. break out of the prison, not a reaction to prison FINDING 10. The development of more jobs conditions. All four hostage-takers were chronic and better training programs in areas relevant to The current organizational placement of criminal offenders and three were serving life future employment opportunities is essential to corrections as a Bureau within the Office of the sentences without parole consideration. Bowen and rehabilitation efforts. General Counsel to the Governor deprives the FINDING 6. Damage to the Torah in the Williams had a history of escape planning and escape corrections system of the visibility and stature· that Synagogue was not caused by the team of attempts. Williams had successfully escaped from the Particular attention was focused on the it warrants. National studies of the organization of correctional officers who searched the chapel area on State Correctional I nstitution at Camp Hill in 1976 desirability of expanding the Pennsylvania prison corrections have pointed out that programmatic and November 5, 1981. Officers on thEI search team by scaling the fence. Nonetheless, in keeping with industries program (PENCOr.) and experimenting budgetary needs of the prison system are more clearly followed standing orders in conducting the search. its charge, the Panel has examined conditions of with privata sector participation in prison industries. identified and better met when corrections is However, damage to the doors of an ark and a cabinet confinement at the Institution and has identified A discussion of these areas with recommendations is accorded departmental rank and not submerged as in the Synagogue and a cabinet in the Catholic several conditions that contribute to institutional included in Section III. a component of the Attorney General's Office, chaplain's office caused during the search could have tensions and management problems at Graterford. General Counsel's Office or other agency. Governor been avoided. Thornburgh has advocated the creation of a State Section III of this Report provides discussion Department of Corrections and bills to accomplish The Panel makes several recommendations that, and recommendations concerning conditions of FINDING 11. Following the escape attempt this have been introduced in the General Assembly. if implemented, will improve both conditions for confinement, which includes: (a) increasing inmate and the creation of this Panel, the Bureau of We endorse legislation that will create a Department inmate worship at Graterford and security in the populations at the facility, with resultant Correction and Graterford officials have taken of Corrections. chapel. First, the Panel recommends that the Bureau double-ceiling, higher inmate/staff ratios, more numerous steps to remedy problems found by the of Correction should designate an area within physical confrontations among inmates and between Panel. Corrections must be given needed attention by Graterford's chapel to be used solely as a Synagogue. inmates and guards, and diversion of limited resources the Governor and the Legislature in the 1980's. With Second, several specific revisions should be made to from programs to additional clothing, food and Significant policy and procedural changes have prison populations climbing rapidly, it is imperative improve standard procedures for searching areas of supplies for the expanded population; (b) the occurred at Graterford in tlie areas of emergehcy that adequate capital and operating resources be worship in the chapel. Specifically, clergy or a presence of approximately 200 inmates who cannot preparedness and institutional security. Increased provided to the correctional system to ensure its safe designee should accompany correctional officers fully participate in the normal prison program due emphasis has been placed on staff accountability. and effective operation. assigned to search the chapel. Third, staff at to mental health problems; (c) the need for additional Conditions of confinement relating to institutional Graterford perceive that members of certain religious maximum security cell space to house the predatory groups are receiving special treatment because they inmates who cannot be safely maintained in lesser E:!r# allowed to observe religious practices and security classifications; (d) the lack of expansion of t,~)Hdays. Religious practice of Jewish, Muslim, institutional staff in the last two years even though Catholic and other groups shou Id be described to the inmate population has gone up by 12% in that correctional staff during training programs. An period and a rapid turnover of institutional staff has inmate's right to observe religious holidays and resulted in the presence of an inexperienced corps practices is a principle that shou Id be clG'arly stated of first-line staff in direct contact with the inmates; in correctional policy and fulfilled by the action of (e) the need for additional in-service training of staff; correctional staff. Fourth, the entire chapel area, (f) poor labor-management relations; (g) inadequately including offices of the clergy, is conducive to the controlled inmate traffic; (h) insufficient medical storage of contraband. Either more searches or a services; (i) the need for better food preparation; and redesign should be undertaken. Finally, about (j) delayed processing of inmate accounts. one-fourth of all inmates are Muslim, the largest religious group at Graterford. Appointment of a full-time Muslim clergy should be considered. A summary of the Panel's investigation of' the "Desecration of Religious Articles" i!i included in Section III.

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SECTION III beds will provide eventual relief, overcrowding in the is particularly overtaxed. An appreciation of GRAT'ERFORD EXAMINED: Bureau and at Graterford is a serious problem at Graterford's history reveals an evolution from a present and will continue to be a problem in the facility utilized to house inmate farmers into SELECTED ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS future. Pennsylvania's largest maximum security prison. Graterford was opened fifty years ago as a satellite I n keeping with the Governor's charge that the populations remained fairly stable. Crime rose in part Graterford has a rated capacity of 2,000 inmates, to the old Eastern State Penitentiary in Philadelphia, Panel not only assess the incident but also "review because of the demographic fact the post-war baby using the one-in an to a cell criteria that has historically about thirty miles away. The original design of the the conditions in the correctional system at boom generation was in its "high crime years" of been used in PennsyJvanii:rState prisons and which the structure was to provide for easy movement of Graterford and advise, what, if any, further legislative the late teens and early twenties. These are not, Panel supports as reasonable. The population at prisoners out of their cell blocks, out of the prison or administrative actions might be appropriate to help however, the "high years" as many of Graterford on June 30, 1982 was 2,152 or 152 and on to the 1654-acre reservation of farm land. ensure the safety of the inmates, correctional these youngsters once arrested were treated leniently inmates over capacity. Overcrowded conditions The design of the prison did not contemplate space emp loyees, visitors and the public in general," the as first or non-serious offenders and given probation contribute to many problems of prison management. for program activities, school, correctional industries, Panel found it useful to consider the management or other non-prison sentences. As they have grown The ratio of inmates to staff goes up and problems diagnostic/classification, psychiatric care or indoor and operation of the State Correctional Institution older, the courts have lost patience with them. The of staff supervision of inmates and assurance of sports. Also, only limited space was provided for at Graterford within two larger contexts. First, all first offender who received probation but did not security increase. Additional funds must go to pay maximum security segregation, since only those who of institutional corrections in Pennsylvania and reform has come back to the courts as a repeat for food, clothing, medicine and health care for the were assessed as sufficiently low security risks to elsewhere have gone through periods of great change offender and is sentenced to prison. Thus, the "baby larger number of inmates. Physical facilities such as work out on the farm would be housed at this prison. in the past decade. These changes have placed many boom" group has moved into the "high imprisonment showers, laundry and kitchen equipment receive pressures on the corrections system both in terms of years" of the mid-twenties and late twenties. greater wear, thus reducing the time allowed for each Basically, the prison was built solely .to sleep greater numbers of inmates to manage and in terms inmate's use and requiring more frequent repairs. and feed a large number of inmates. There are five ofa wider diversity of expectations on the goals In addition to the demographic shift, the Visiting rooms become more crowded, thus reducing 692-foot long cell blocks that run perpendicularly of corrections. Second, institutions like individuals societal tolerance for crime has dropped substantially. privacy, and visiting times are shortened to allow from the main corridor, are parallel to each other have histories. Their development is influenced by As a result, judges have been giving longer sentences more inmates to have visits. Idleness grows as and are each separated by a yard. Each block has many factors, and current problems can often be over the past few years, and tough anti-crime institutional jobs do not increase and more inmates four hundred cells in two tiers, central showers and understood by examining the factors that brought mandatory sentencing and sentencing guideline are unable to work. Counseling and other treatment a separate dining room. A massive kitchen, capable them about. We have examined operations at measures have been enacted into law. The tougher services are less available as the time must be of accommodating 6,000 meals a day, is linked to Graterford in the light of the pressures placed on stance of judges has already increased the average distributed across more clients and treatment staff the cell block dining rooms by a 400-foot long service corrections in Pennsylvania in the 1980's and in light length of stay in State prison and the statutory resources are diverted to other areas related to inmate corridor. Though the design of the physical plant of the history of the Graterford institution itself. measures will send more criminals to prison and for movement and supervision. Most importantly, did not lend itself to the provision of services and longer periods in the future. More frequent inmate-to-inmate, and Inmate-to-staff aggression restriction and observation of inmate movements The phrase "The Crisis in Corrections" is one revocation of parole by the Pennsylvania Board of grows as these problems described here are necessary for a large maximum security population, that has been frequently used over the past year to Probation and Parole returns more offenders back compounded by sharing the 6' by 12' 8" cell with the architects did surround the 6,030-foot perimeter describe a phenomenon that has increasingly into the system. The reduced exercise of another inmate who is often young, angry and of the prison compound \/\I'ith a massive 30-foot high occupied the minds of governors across the country. commutation* under the Thornburgh Administration assertive. There is customarily an increase of inmate nonagon wall, four foot \/vide at its base. A watch The National Governors' Association reported that has decreased the number of inmates released physical assaults on correctional officers. tower was positioned at lElach juncture of the nine concern over financing and managing state prison annually from state correctional institutions. sides. systems is the foremost public protection concern of Though under these conditions, the recruitment governors. The Panel suggests that the problems These factors have combined to increase the and retention of qualified staff becomes difficult and In 1969, at a time of relatively low and associated with effective management of prisons will flow of inmates into prison and decrease the flow is examir,ed more thoroughly in the body of this decreasing statewide prison population,a decision was be greater than any other problem facing the criminal out. At the same time, the overall capacity of the Section, the Panel has been encouraged that it reached to close the antiquated Eastern State justice system over the next decade. State prison system has declined by 572 from 9,192 received no reports of staff brutality or physical Penitentiary. The initial plan to close Eastern State in 1969 to 8,620 in 1982, due partly to the closing violence upon inmates by guards. Although many was predicated on the camtruction of a modern 1000 Effects of Overcrowding of Eastern State Penitentiary in 1970. Although of the inmates interviewed expressed displeasure at bed facility in the Phliladelphia area, using funds 2,380 new state prison beds are authorized for what they perceived as guard harassment, none appropriated for that purpose by the General The crisis in corrections developed out of the construction in the next few years (500 of these beds described any physical abuse. Indeed, it is widely Assembly in 1965. As often happens in corrections, interplay of many factors. During the 1970's crime are planned for Graterford), they are not yet under believed by Institutional staff and Bureau officials community opposition to the new prison's location rose rapidly in Pennsylvania, though prison construction. Thus, although the newly authorized that the fact that the captors knew they had never effectively destroyed the opportunity for that new been physically harmed in their years of incarceration construction. However, the 30 - foot wall at at Graterford contributed significantly to their Graterford allowed the pians for closing Eastern State * Executive clemency in Pennsylvania has been the subject of a study recently completed by the Pennsylvania willingness to work toward a resolution to the to be salvaged, since its more seasoned and more Commission on Crime and Delinquency for the Pennsylvania Board of Pardons. The study examined the incident and is a reason they did not physically harm dangerous inmates could be transferred to Graterford extent and nature of recidivism (re-arrests) for 1,591 individuals granted clemency from 1968 to 1981 the hostages. with minimal concern over their ability to escape. an~ for ~hom ~alidated case records were available. Approximately 300;6 of .all those receiving clemency Eastern was completely deactivated on April 13, while servrng prrson terms were subsequently rearrested for new offenses. Copies of the report are available Graterford's History, Current Status and Limitations 1970. from the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, P.O. Box 1167, Federal Square Station Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108. ' Though the effects of overcrowding are straining Though by this time Graterford had already the management and physical resources of all the proceeded well on its I~volution from a farm camp Commonwealth's correctional institutions, Graterford to a penitentiary, the merger of the former Eastern

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,1 , ------

are not easily overcome. Since the establishment of State staff and inmates into Graterford dramatically they negotiate higher salaries and fringe benefits but will not only provide cost savings to the State, but should facilitate further security of the Institution. the Bureau of Correction twenty-eight years ago, changed the character of the prison. The population also they could now gain a great deal of leverage'over there have been only two other employees jumped from 1,200 to 1,600 inmates overnight operating decisions and policies, which were One other element that contributes to the throughout the system that have been killed in the Graterford now had to accommodate purposes for heretofore the exclusive prerogatives of the line of duty. which it was not built: diagnostic and classification superintendent. The Graterford union's influence difficulties of managing staff and inmates at Graterford is the legacy from the 1970's of three services, indoor recreation, school, psychiatric culminated in an illegal work stoppage and waikout Effective management of corrections at isolation and various programs and treatment in 1978 that resulted in several significant separate, violent murders of a guard captain and two kitchen stewards by inmates who were in general Graterford under these stressful conditions makes activities. To make space available for some of the operational changes favored by the guards. Though administration of the facility one of the most essential services, others were cut back. Part of the the current State Administration's statements and popUlation. To remain effective in their jobs, prison staff, particularly those correctional officers, demanding jobs in government. It requires attention, hospital area was reorganized to provide treatment actions have made it clear that illegal walkouts will' fiscal resources and commitment from both the off!ces and a staff dining room. More recently a no longer be tolerated, the right to collective stewards, tradesmen instructors and maintenance workers whose daily job assignments are to enforce Governor and the Legislature. It requires outstanding maintenance garage was converted to a make-shift bargaining means that management of Graterford as leadersh ip at both the Bureau and institutional levels. gymnasium. Though critical to security and well as the other State prisons is to some degree rules within the bowels of the institution, must accept the potential for violent assault as a condition Correctional administrators must possess the institutional authority, only 37 cells were and are negotiated with the rank and file, rather than experience, judgement and high energy level needed commanded. of employment. Assaults against staff occur at today available for maximum security isolation for Graterford as they do at every other prison where to manage corrections in an environment made the most recalcitrant, violent and predatory inmates. violent, disrespectful people are confined against their continually more complex by increasing volumes of Beyond the physical inadequacies of the facility, two As the budget for Graterford was being allocated will. However, the cumulative effect of three brutal inmates, strong organization among the rank and file staf!s divergent in operating procedures, home during the 70's for more treatment and educational staff, periodic judicial intervention and frequent news programming and for higher staff salaries, routine and staff killings at Graterford provides an acute distrust environment and ethnic background were thrust and wariness in the inmate/staff relationships, which media scrutiny. under the same roof into competition for promotion pre~entive maintenance was neglected. The entire and choice job assignment. Former Eastern staff root was allowed to deteriorate to the point that we~e largely ~rawn from urban, black Philadelphia, today even after extensive repairs many cells while a majority of staff at Graterford had heritage routinely flood. Many windows on the 2000 cells , I Issues Examined Page Number from suburban or rural, white northeastern are warped and sprung. . The power plant is worn Pennsylvania. If not prejudice, there clearly exists out and not capable of producing sufficient energy 1. Institutional Security 30 a lack of communication and understanding between for the institution. The lighting in the yard and the staff from these two backgrounds, which impedes throughout the institution is inadequate. Good Time 33 effective team work. 2. Due to community opposition to proposed sites, 3. Desecration of Religious Articles 33 The same year (1970) that saw the merger of the State had been unable to undertake the Eastern and Graterford heralded a total reorientation construction of a new prison in Southeastern Media Relations 36 of Pennsylvania corrections with the appointment of Pennsylvania in the sixteen years, since funds were 4. a new Commissioner, who placed less emphasis on originally appropriated for that purpose in 1965. Staff Resources 37 discipline and regimentation and more emphasis on Consistent with the judgement of correctional 5. inmate programs and rehabilitative treatment. In professionals, the goal was to establish a small 500 40 1971, this approach caught up with Graterford with bed facility in addition to Graterford. That desirable 6. Inmate ClassifiCCltion goal was not achieved. In September 1981, prior the appointment of a new Superintendent with a Mental Health Services 42 mandate from the Commissioner to Jessen to the hostage ordeal, the Pennsylvania General 7. regimentation and control and to spur inmate Assembly authorized the construction of 500 Med ical Services 46 activities and programs. Through the eagerness of additional cells within the walls of Graterford. This 8. capital authorization provides the opportunity to the new Superintendent, these changes occurred in Prison Industries 50 one fell swoop, partly because the "G reat Society" address some of the problems listed in the preceding 9. paragraphs. Through a comprehensive structural programs at the Federal level provided the financial Prisoner Education 54 resources for school, job training, college education assessment and innovative architectural design, many 10. and the like. Institutional schedules providing for of the deficiencies of the institution may be rectified Inmate Accounts 55 more freedom of inmate movement were arranged to as well as adding the additional cell space. The Bureau 11. permit participation in a variety of programs. of Correction is curently drawing plans for a new Inmate G rieva:-.~ r.:s 55 Though the superintendency changed eight years ago diagnostic and classification center, new 100 cell 12. and the extensive programming of years earlier has restrictive housing unit, new infirmary and new Food Services 57 been largely terminated with the cutback of Federal psychiatric ward. The construction of new yard 13. funds, the general lack of regimen continues. lighting, new field house, new roof and new power plant is already authorized. Though the remodeling The dramatic shift of philosophy in the Graterford will receive over the next three or four treatment of prisoners was coupled with new years is critically needed, this period of large scale awareness of and perceived need for influence by construction will provide a particular challenge for prison staff unions. Pennsylvania employees gained the administration to maintain security. In this vein, the right to collectively bargain in 1970 and the the contemplated relocation of the State Police Field correctional staff soon realized that not only could Installation at Limerick to the grounds of Graterford

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,,' ISSUE ONE: INSTITUTIONAL SECURITY Establishment of an Outside Storage Area: At the Recommendation 2 Graterford Institution all the supplies, food stuffs and Commentary raw materials necessary to care for over 2,000 Given the widespread rumors that prisoners, to operate correctional industries an~ to substantial contraband enters the institution through these outside workers, maintain the physical plant must be transported Into the Panel recommends the establishment of Murder, assault, rape, extortion, drug dealing movement. As noted earlier in this report, several the compound and stored until needed. Private and other rackets occur in prisons. The frequency deficiencies in standard security procedures were a facility for more thorough searches of vendors' vans, trucks and trailers laden with ma.terial returning workers. of violent crime, the extent of illicit commercial evident on the night of October 28, 1981 and deliveries are driven by civilians through a vehicular activity and the number of escapes and escape provided the insurgent inmates the means and passage in the wall to various storage areas; there to attempts within a prison is influenced to a large opportunity for escape or rebellion. Four guns and be unloaded by inmate labor. Since the hostage extent by the limitations imposed upon the a large amount of ammunition were brought into incid('nt, procedures have been established to more Searches of Staff Entering the Prison: Though use introduction of contraband into the prison and upon G ra1terford undetected. Kitchen staff and careflilly inspect the vehicle and its contents before of reliable metal detectors can help prevent weapons the freedom of movement and association of the correctional officers were held captive for over an it eni'!rs the institution, to escort the civilian driver from being carried into the institution, other prisoners. houlr without being missed and with inmates having with a correctional officer and to supervise and procedures must be employed to detect and prevent total control of the culinary area. A large amount monitor the unloading by inmates. However, the vast the flow of contraband such as drugs, maps, alcohol, Prison contraband includes weapons, of the escape apparatus and paraphernalia was stored etc. One such procedure, which has not been number of deliveries and the huge volume of cargo routinely 'Jsed at Graterford for the past several instructions to make weapons and explosives, escape in cells. By overpowering anyone of the officers, renders the security procedures less than optimal in materials, road maps, drugs, ingredients for hooch which they did, the insurgent inmates had keys which years, is randomly selectin~ and II patting down:' sta~f discovering any determined effort to smuggle as they enter the institution. Though vye beheve. It (home-made wine), cash and any other item that could open all corridors, all five blocks, the control contraband into the prison. is a small number of staff who supply Inmates With could jeopardize the safety of the prison and keeping center, the hospital and every other vital area of the contraband, the Panel has received reports from of the prisoners. Much of the prison contraband is prison. Therefore, from early on in its inquiry, the Recommendation 1 guards and inmates alike that some contraband comes not native to institutional operations and therefore PanElI became concerned over infusion of contraband in through staff. Providing a random pat dow':! search must be illegally brought into the prison. into the prison and inmates' ability to move through The Panel recommends that the Bureau of on each shift would raise the risk of detection and Notwithstanding the reason-altering effects of drugs the institution. Correction establish a warehouse located would clearly express a resolve of the prison and the increased risk of during their outside the walls of the institution. The administration to halt the flow of drugs into the use, selling drugs in prison is a lucrative part of the As the Panel identified weaknesses in procedu ral institution. Likewise, the use of dogs trained to sniff greatest volume of supplies then could be and detect drugs could irregularly be brought through underworld economy of the prison. Outside or physical security, it shared them with the delivered and stored outside the wall and operatives buy, divide and funnel drugs into the Commissioner of Correction, so as not to needlessly roll call line-up, as well as walked through the entire small. closely supervised. institutional institution. prison. Inside merchants sell or trade the drugs. By delav corrective action. The Commissioner of vehicles could transport supplies into the prison standards, the merchants become rich and Cornection and the Superintendent of Graterford prison as needed. Recommendation 3 powerful and inmates rob and steal goods from other have made several important security tightening inmates to support their drug use. Though most changes since the failed escape attempt. There have The Panel recommends that a greater prison weapons consist of shanks (home-made been more random cell searches, more thorough strip Creation of an Adequate Facility for Screening determination be made to identify staff knives), zip guns or improvised clubs, manufactured searches of inmates receiving visitors and more who breach security through the smuggling Outside Workers: Prisoners who work on the farm of contraband and that pat down searches. guns do come into prisons. The security and safety thorough pat down searches of inmates returning or on grounds maintenance go outside the wall daily of a prison requires preventing of contraband from from work assignments on the grounds outside the metal detectors and drug-sniffing dogs be and then return into the prison for the evening meal used as part of this effort. coming into the prison. wall. New restrictions on non-institutional vehicles and lodging. Though employing inmates outsi?e the formerly allowed in the prison are in place, as well walls is necessary, there is much opportunity to Since prisons have considerably more inmates as explicit instructions on the procedure for searches retrieve contraband (drugs, cash, weapons) from a Security for Large Inmate Banquets: Various inmate than staff, any time large numbers of inmates are and I:!SCOrts for those outside vehicles which have to "drop" somewhere in the fields or along the road organizations hold banquets for their memb.ership unlocked from their cells, surveillance of their enter the facility. There is now a staff call-in system and to bring it into the prison. Existing procedure and invited guests. These events are held In the activities is difficult. Activities of school, work, for all security posts in the prison, which should provides for a pat-down search of the in~~tes as !hey summertime outdoors in a prison yard and can range religion, sports, counseling, eating and medical care make' it considerably more difficult for staff's capture re-enter the prison, although the supervising officers in size from a hundred to over six hundred people, are all necessary to the continued healthy functioning to mmain undetected for long. A loud speaker may at their discretion strip search an inmate at half of whom would be visitors to the institution. of the individual and the institution. However, the system is now operational. A second metal detector random or when suspicious. However, the regular and Much of the large quantities of food required for movement of inmates to these and other activities has been purchased and installed, so that now both routinized movement of these many inmates in and these banquets is prepared and brought int? the also provides opportunities for dealing in drugs, primary entrances to the prison are covered. Though out of the prison and the fact that these prisoners prison by the invited visito~s. The opportu~lty to plotting escapes, getting revenge, intimidating and the yard lighting and tower spot lights have not yet are considered good security risks to be employed bring contraband into the prison, when there IS such extorting, thieving, robbing and raping. The security been upgraded, these improvements have been in outside work details, does not provide the a large number of people carrying various contaiilers and safety of a prison require limiting inmate travels budgeted. However, in spite of these changes, many incentive for vigorous surveillance or body searches. and baskets of food is very great. The deployment to the various activities to prevent opportun ity for security problems the Panel found at the Institution One of the trailers already on the compound of sufficient correctional officers to provide adequate violence, crime and conspiracy. Moreover, during any at the time of crisis last fall continue. (previously used by work-release inmates) could be search and surveillance during the large banquets inmate disturbance, being able to limit the movement converted to provide a two-room pass-through where would cause the security in other parts of the prison of the insurgents is critical to isolating and controlling The Panel offers four recommendations to all inmates would change clothes as they enter or to suffer or cause exorbitant overtime costs. the .trouble. control the introduction of contraband into the leave the prison (remove clothes in one room; p~t Attempting a thorough search of all the invited Institution: fresh clothes on in the other room). ThiS visitors with insufficient staff would cause long delay The Panel finds that security operations at arrangement is simi~ar to that used currently for in admitting people into the prison. The use of a Graterford are in need of improvement, especially inmates receiving visitors. pass-through metal detector and an airport type x-ray relating to control of contraband and inmate

30 31

) ! machine (which could be used regularly at the mail room) seems necessary for the banquets. Key Control: Many institutional keys (b01th official Additionally, in a maximum security setting, if such and home-made) have been found hidden or in the The Panel is concerned over the vulnerability of the, The Panel finds wide support for the institution events are held, it seems reasonable to limit the possession of inmates during searches of tbe prison control center, in the event of an inmate distu rbance. of a "good time" system in Pennsylvania. Bureau number of visitors who are admitted at one time. over the last several years. These keys wOiuld open The commUllications. room is surrounded by of Correction administrators, a prison psychiatrist every area of the prison except for the main gate plexiglass as a barrier to noise and dirt, rather than and correctional officers at Graterford emphasized Recommendation 4 and ,include keys for prison vehicles. Changing the by hardened, translucent material sumcient to stop that ':,good time" was the single most important lockmg mechanisms and issuing the new ke~(s under objects or gun fire. There is no outside ventilation incentive they could think of for maintaining The Panel recommends that special a procedure of precise accounting seems wa'irranted. system for the control center to keep out toxic gas discipline and control of the inmate population as . precautions be taken to monitor the and assure adequate fresh air. There is an unbarred well as for encouraging inmate cooperation. Several : supplies brought into the institution for Recommendation 7 window to the office adjacent to the communications inmates also urged it~ adoption. inmate banquets so as to intercept any room, which could easily be broken tCI gain access contraband that is hidden in baskets. The Bureau of Correction should assess the to the control center, and only one screen of security Recommendation 11 foodstuffs or other containers. current system and insure the existence of wire separates the inmate commissary from the inside a satisfactory key control system. of a room adjacent to the rear of the communications The Panel recommends that Pennsylvanm room. statutorily enact "good time" as a The Panel offers five recommendations to restrict I behaVioral incentive in Pennsylvania sadult inmate movements and access to areas of the prison: Controlling Inmate Traffic: Inmates who are In the Recommendation 9 prison system. general population at Graterford have freedom within 1· Utilization of Zone Keys: Two keys provide access the prison from 7:30 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. count. The The Panel recommends the physical to most areas of the prison and are common to the ;:vritten r.ass system is characterized a~ being as an I security and placement of the control key rings of all secu rity posts in the prison. If the on-you system, where the correctional officers do I center be upgraded. ISSUE THREE: DESECRATION OF RELIGIOUS not ,preyent inmates' entry to the blocks where they ARTICLES AT GRATERFORD keys fall into the hands of an insurgent inmate (either ! Commentary by taking them from a corectional officer or by don t live or to other unauthorized area3. It is i manufacturing duplicates) the purpose of the security un~erst~od that if the inmate gets ir: trouble, the Recommendation 10 InvelJtigation Summary gates is quickly defeated. A system of zone keys officer IS not responsible. The institution utilizes would provide that an officer would only have keys very few work lines, school lines, or other lines. ,All These examples as well as others reported On November 2, 1981 correctional officers were that would access his area of responsibility, thereby four general population cell blocks are simultaneously uonfidentially to the Commissioner of ordered to search the State Correctional institution making the security gates capable of confining an opene~ to the. main corridor a:lowing the majority Corrections or the Superintendent at Graterford. Numerous weapons, ammunition and inmate disturbance to a particular area ofthe prison, of their 1~00 mmates to flow into the hallway at sufficiently trouble the Panel, that a other items were discovered and confiscated. One even if an inmate has taken an officer's keys. !he same time. '.nmates also visit the cells of othl'ilr thorough review of the physiaal and unanticipated result of the institutionwide search was ~nmates in violation of Bureau policy. Seven31 procedural security at Graterford State the desecration of a Torah* and other objects of Recommendation 5 Inmates and guards have informed the Panel that the Correctional Institution is strongly religious significance in the area that is used as a greatest ~m.ount of extortion and homosexuality recommended. This review should be Synagogue by Jewish inmates. The search of the The Panel recommends that the Bureau of occurs Within the cells. Guards and inmates have conducted under the auspices of the Synagogue occurred on November 5, 19B1. The Correction assess the costs of utilizing a urged the Panel to recommend that entry of an Commissioner and should list prescriptive damaged Torah was discovered by'two inmates on zone key system and move toward inmate into the cell of another should be prohibited. improvements with established timeframes November 9, 1981. . establishing such a system as budgetary Conversation and interaction can occur in the blocks for imp i?m en tatio n, opportunity allows. and does not require the presence of inmates in the Following the incident, it was alleged that four cells of others. correctional officers had damaged the Torah and ------JSSUE 11lV0: GOOD TIME other religious articles belonging to Jewish inmates. Regular Inspection of .f.,ocking Mechanisms and Recommendation 8 Administrative charges were brought by the Bureau Security Gates: Locks, hinges, and gates that are Commentary of Correction against each of the officers assigned continuously operated in a prison wear and In light of these observations, the Panel to the team that searched the chapel. ** In light of deteriorate. At Graterford, if the mechanism breaks reco '!l '!lends that the Grate.,ford The opportunity for prisoners to earn time off qdmll1lstrators more effectively control the documented sacrilege and subsequent charges, the it is repaired, but there is no regular examination by their sentence through good behavior while in Panel agreed that an independent investigation of the ll1mate traffic. Special conSideration custody is known as "good time." Correctional the prison locksmith to determine the sufficiency of should be gi~'en' t6 enforcement of the pass Torah desecration was warranted. the gate or lock to withstand force. A hair line crack system, staggered releases from the cell administrators throughout the country cite "good in a hinge or a lock that can be pried open with blocks and enforcement of the prohibition time" as a worthwhile incentive system that The Panel's investigation included interviews a screw driver can allow an otherwise isolated prison against inmates Visiting other inmates' cells. encourages good behavior by inmates and assists in with staff and inmates at Gr9terford. Special disturbance to consume the entire compound. the safe management and control of the prisoner assistance was provided by Rabbi Edward M. Maline population. and Reverend Sidney Barnes. Recommendation 6 PhYSical Security of Control Center: The control ce~ter is th~ communications, dispatching and The Panel recommends the establishment a~slgnment po lOt for all custodial personnel. At the *The term "Torab/' refers to the first part of the Bible, cQmmonly known as the five Books of Mose£ of a schedule of examination and time of a disturbance, it is the most critical area for or the Pentateuch. In the Jewish religion tne Hebrew text of these books is written in a prescribed preventive maintenance for all locking the deploymant of personnel. More than any other way by a scribe on parchment, which is then attached on two rollers. As the Torah portion is read mechanisms and security gates. ~rea, the loss of the control center to insurgent at a weekly Synagogue service, the scroll is advanced by turning the rollers. The Torah is completely Inmates woul~ create manaJ1ement. and organizational read each year and~'olled to the beginning on the holiday of Simchas Torah. chaos at a time when swift, dehberate systematic **The chapel area consists of a large sanctuary used primarily by Protestants and' Catholics. There is a staff actions are most essential. ' mosque. In addition, there are several offices used by the three full-time clergy, two Protestant ministers and one Catholic priest. Finally, there is a small room that serves as the Synagogue, as well as a meeting room for small Christian sects.

32 33

,1 ! In order to verify information, Mr. William When Lt. Jones returned following the search Anderson, a nationally known polygraph expert, of the mosque, he was informed that the unlocked the chapel area and he decided to survey the scheduled for Monday, November 16. At the time st;heduled interviews with three members of the areas of the chapel had been searched. However situation. He entered the Catholic office and noted of the hearing, the officers requested specific search team. The fourth member of the search team locks to the Catholic chaplain's office and to th~ the damage to cabinets that had been forcibly information relating to the charges and were left the Bureau's employ in March, 1982 to accept Synagogue prevented access to those areas. The keys opened. Similarly, when he went to the Synagogue, informed that the Bureau of Correction was a job nearer his home. Ultimately, polygraph tests to those locked cabinets could not be found and Lt. he observed that the ark had been forced open. He conducting an internal investigation in order to were administered to Correctional Officer James B. Jones discussed the matter with Rev. Williams. Rev. observed damage to the ark, including broken sashes specify those charges. The administrative hearing was Douglas and Correctional Officer Linwood Hughes. Williams informed the Lieutenant that keys were not on the door. He noted that the Torah was in place adjourned, to be continued when the investigation Test results confirmed that the correctional officers available for the locked areas. and covered. Father John Gallio observed damage was completed. On May 10, 1982 Superintendent ",!ere telling the truth. The two inmates who in the Synagogue with Rev. Barnes. No investigative Cuyler officially informed each of the accused discovered the damaged Torah refused to be tested. Lt. Jones had not previously searched the action was taken by correctional/officials at this time. officers that the investigation had not substantiated Synagogue and did not seek to determine whether The Synagogue door was locked and no one is known the alleged infractions and that all pending charges The Chapel Search - November 5, 1981 any Jewish inmates had keys for the ark or other to have entered the room again until the inmates were had been dropped. cabinets. He ordered Officer Linwood Hughes to go released from their cells. Lt. Rufus Jones was ordered to conduct a search to the control center and pick up lock cutters. When Interpiew with Rabbi Maline of the chapel area on this date. He selected a detail Officer Hughes returned, he was ordered by Lt. Jones The possibility exists that someone could have of correctional officers from those serving on to remove padlocks from the cabinets. After entered the Synagogue after the search and before Rabbi Edward M. Maline stated to Panel miscellaneuLis duty and proceeded to the chapel area. re.moving the locks, the cabinets in the Synagogue Rev. Barnes and Father GalJio~s inspection or after members that the desecration of the Torah was not Officers selected for the assignment included stili would not open as they had built-in I0":' ks. Lt. their investigation. However, no evidence supporting an isolated act, but seemed to be one in a series of Correctional Officer Willis E. Burgess, Correctional Jones ordered the offic:;rs to pry open the locks and this possibility was discovered by the Panel. problems experienced by Jewish inmates at Officer James B. Douglas and Correctional Officer that was accomplished, but not without splintering Graterford. Other problems that he cited include: Linwood Hughes. As of August 1, 1982, these the :Irk's door panels. On Monday, November 9, 1981, inmates were correctional staff members, except for Correctional released from the general lock-up. Shortly thereafter Friends and family have had difficulty in Officer Burgess, were still employed by the Bureau I n a large cabinet (the Holy ark) opposite the two inmates, Kenneth Paull and Sheldon Glasshofer, obtaining passes so that visitors can meet of Correcti on. door of the Synagogue, the officers found the Torah. arrived at the chapel. They requested and Rev. with Jewish inmates. According to Officer Douglas, he removed the scroll Barnes provided them access to the Synagogue. At Following thE' selection of the search team, Lt. from the cabinet, placed it on top of a table and that point, Rev. Barnes left the inmates alone for Representatives of religious groups Jones ordered Officer Douglas to go to the control proceeded to remove its cover and untied the strip a period that he estimated tlO be 15 minutes. The sometimes have a problem entering the room and pick up keys for the chapel area. of cloth which held the scroll together. The scroll inmates returned to Rev. Barnes' office and asked I nstitution. Delay has been experienced Correctional officers then conducted a full search of was then searched by Officers Douglas and Burgess him to accompany them to the Synagogue and view even if the proper forms are completed and the chapel area. The officers proceeded in a manner to prevent damage. When the scroll was the damage, not only to the ark, but to the Torah available·. to gate guards. Rabbi Maline systematicairy and searched all areas to which they found not to contain any contraband, Officer and a small facsimile of a Torah. The damage was observed· that on occasion he has waited had access. This included the Synagogue area, the Douglas stated that he replaced the strip of cloth as 'later inspected by several prison administrators. 30 to 40 minutes before being allowed to chapel, offices of clergy staff members and other he found it. The Torah was recovered and the scroll enter the prison. open spaces within the chapel. Eman Schoor, a was then returned to the ark. Later in the day Rabbi E.dward M. Maline was Muslim leader residing in D Block, was asked by Lt. informed of the damage to thE: Torah and scheduled Jewish inmates made special requests to Jones to accompany him during the search of the Lt. Jones stated that he gave Officers Douglas a visit to the Institution on Wednesday, November prison officials to allow an annual banquet mosque. and Burgess specific instruction concern ing the 11, 1981. On that visit, Rabbi Maline spoke to Rev. at the facility. The original requests were unrolling of the Torah. Lt. Jones left the room after Barnes and surveyed the damage to the Torah and not granted and ultimately a law suit filed Rev. Barnes, Protestant clergy, related that his instructing them in search procedures and did not to the ark. by an inmate led to an agreement that such co-w?rker, Rev. Nathan Williams, Protestant clergy, return to the Synagogue until after the search had a banquet could be held. was mformed of the chapel search by Lt. Jones. Rev. been completed. The Bureau repaired the damaged Holy Torah. Williams could have accompanied the correctional The Jewish inmates do not have exclusive officers during their search of the Synagogue area, Several articles of contraband were discovered Subsequent Experiences of Staff Members use of the Synagogue area. Rather, the area but decided not to do so. by Correctional Officers Douglas, Hughes and is considered to be a space to be used by Burgess. Those items included coffee and other According to correctional officers interviewed, Jewish inmates and other fr-ligious groups. Lt. Jones stated during an interview that he had foodstuffs. After searching the chapel and Synagogue, they were served an official notice of charges filed On a recent visit to the Institution, Panel conducted prior searches of the prison, but had not the area was secured by Officer Douglas and door against them by the Bureau of Correction on members observed that the Synagogue was recently searched the area of the chapel and had keys were returned to the control room. Early on November 11, 1981. The charges included: 1) being used by Jehovah's Witnesses for a never searched the Synagogue. He stated that the afternoon of Novemb~!" 5, the four officers, Rev. conduct unbecoming an officer and negligence; 2) service. institutional lockdowns were an infrequent Williams and the Muslim inmate left the chapel. destroying state property and destruction of property occurrence at Graterford. However, contraband had belonging to Jewish inmates at Graterford; 3) The Synagogue had been broken into on been discovered on prior searches of the chapel. According to Rev. Barnes, he conducted a destruction of state property, including locks, hasps, a prior occasion. Religious documents Search procedures for the religious area are the same routine inspection of the chapel following the etc; 4) destruction of inmate property, including the were not desecrated at that time. However, as those for other areas of the Institution. However, correctional officers' search on Thursday, November Torah and the ark. human feces was found and the Synagogue correctional officers are instructed to leave chapel 5. He had learned upon arrival at the Institution required a thorough cleaning. areas exactly as they are found. that correctional officers had conducted a search of On Friday, November 13, 1981, the officers were notified of the charges by letter and were Rabbi Maline observed that the problems informed that an administrative hearing had been experienced by Jewish inmates may not be

34 35

I k 1 I"'""' I I

II

intentional. Rather, they may be' caused by the Recommendation 14 It is clear that the problems with the media The Graterford Panel concurs in the steps taken staff's general lack of understanding and concern during the hostage incident had th~ir roots in by the Bureau of Correction to better accommodate about the religious programs operating in the prison. Several revisions should be considered to Graterford's inability to provide information on a and work with the news media during any future He noted that he first learned of the damage to the improve standard search procedures in the regular basis. During the first few hours, disturbances at Graterford or elsewhere and offers Synagoqueon . Monday, November 9, following the overall chapel area. approximately 100 telephone inquiries were handled two recommendations in this regard: inmates report that the Torah had been damaged. by Bureau of Correction and Graterford spokesmen. At one point, between 150 and 200 reporters were Recommendation 15 Rabbi Maline visited the Institution on Wednesday, a. Because of the chapel's physical November 11, and received a full account of. the layout, it is difficult to ensure on-site at Graterford covering the story. The problem at that time. However, correctional officials, institution wa,s not prepared for. this kind of presence The Panel recommends that during an adequate security. For example, incident one institutional representative, including religious staff members at Graterford, had inmates often hide contraband in the or coverage.' No special facilities for the media were not attempted or considered contacting Rabbi Maline set up. The media occupied the entrance area to trained in media relations, be given chapel's removable tile ceiling. This the prison through which all staff entered and left responsibility for all news briefings and be either prior to or after it was known that the locks problem will be minimized if on the ark had been opened on November 5. during the incident. Only one telephone was relieved of other responsibilities. Back-up frequent, . routine searches of the available in this area, so it was extremely difficult persons should be identified so 'that chapel area are conducted by for reporters to phone in their stories and meet twenty-four hour coverage is provided. When asked what improvements were needed to correctional officers or permanent tile ensure adequate opportunity for the practice of the deadlines. Eventually, a special bank of phones was The Bureau of Correction press spokesman is installed. Routine searches will set up for the news services in a parking lot adjacent should be available to go to the scene Jewish faith at Graterford, the Rabbi stated that discourage inmates from' storing there is a need for a separate area of worship for to the main entrance. News briefings were initially personally. if the incident or problems in contraband in the chapel. In addition, provided by different institutional personnel who had media relations are of such magnitude as Jewish inmates. Moreover, Rabbi Maline felt strongly officers participating on search teams \ to warrant the greater Bureau-leve!expertise.. that correctional officers must recognize that other principal duties to perform. The briefings did should receive training and gain skills ,If not occur according to any regular schedule. The traditional religious practices of Jewish inmates in treating the religious articles of all ,. should be accommodated within the prison. information was sparse, sometimes inconsistent with Recommendation 16 denominations with sensitivity. prior information and frequently at odds with The Panel did not discover how or by whom information provided by staff, who passed through Information disseminated to the press b. A member of the full-time clergy staff the media area. dUring an incident should be provided only the Holy Torah was damaged. However, based on or designee at Graterford should through official channels. Correctional and information developed, the following conclusions accompany each chapel search team. were reached: In pursuit of their stories and in view of the police personnel should be clearly Since there is no full-time Jewish or limited information provided from official channels instructed on the importance of ensuring Muslim clergy, an inmate of that faith 1. Officers assigned to search the Torah did during the first three days, reporters called directly that only accurate, valid information is should be present during a search of into ihe kitchen and spoke to inmates there. News prol1ided to the press and that the not damage the religious object However, the Synagogue or mosque. damage to the Holy ark resulted from representatives monitored State Police and information is provided through the offiCial corrections radio bands and obtained information channels. action taken by correctional officers to pry c. Staff at Graterford should become open locked door panels. This damage that had not been officially confirmed or approved familiar with Jewish religious practices for release. A newspaper reporter obtained and cou Id ha'Je been avoided if appropriate and holidays. This should reduce the • ISSUE FIVE: STAFF RESOURCES search procedures were used. II published the tentative list of demands the captors impression held by some staff at gave to Chuck Stone. Mr. Stone had assured the Graterford that Jewish inmates are Commentary 2. Officers .assigned to search the chapel area captors the demands would remain confidential. A receiving special treatment. This news helicopter flew close over the kitchen area Staff Turnover completed the assignment according to recommendation may be valid for standing orders. during a crucial point in the negotiations and the other religious groups and it is captors, fearing that a helicopter assault had begun, The increasing numbers of inmates and the recommended that the Bureau of 3. Policies relating to the search of temporarily broke off negotiations. influx of inmates who are more difficult to manage Correction review the issue and take compound the problems and burdens placed on the Graterford's chapel should be improved to appropriate action. ensure that similar problems do not recur. Because of this tension, the Bureau of existin~ staff complement at Graterford. For the 18 Correction's Press Secretary was sent to Grateriord month period ending May 31, 1982, the Graterford inmate population increased twelve percent, while the The Panel makes three recommendations for on Saturday morning. At that point, the briefings improving the conditions for inmate worship at ISSUE FOUR: MEDIA RELATIONS were regularized, adequate information was provided staff complement increased by only one-half of one Graterford: and relations became more satisfactory. percent. The Panel reviewed manpower deployment Commentary and was informed that compared to other State Recommendation 12 Subsequent to the incident, the Bureau of prisons, Graterford has a higher staff turnover rate, , As described in Section I, relations between the Correction has taken steps to require each institution resulting in more frequent vacancies, less experienced Jewish inmates at Graterford should news media and correctional officials at Graterford to establish an emergency briefing area for media staff and an overtime cost in excess of $2,000,000 formally request, and the Bureau should were tense during the first three days of the incident. representatives and to ensure that adequate telephone for the 1981-82 budget year. approve, the designation of an area of Corrections officials informed the Panel that on service is available. The Bureau has also undertaken worship to be used solely by that group. several occasions they felt that actions of the media a training program for those staff at each institution, It is a widely held principle in correctional seriously jeopardized efforts for a peaceful resolution. who will be responsible for news briefings. Finally, management that correctional officers need, and with Recommendation 13 Yet it was a media repres\~ntative, Chuck Stone, who each institution will be required to schedule an time and experience acquire, a "sixth sense" which helped bring the incident to a successful end. annual news media orientation program. This will enables them to notice subtle alterations in habit, The followers of the Muslim faith Newsmen have reported that they received involve a presentation of background information on practice and attitude of inmates and inmate groups comprise the largest religious group at inadequate information during the first few days of the institution and a tour of the facilities. that enable them to identify potential problems early Graterford. The Bureau should approve the incident. I n light of th,e important role played the appointment of a full-time Muslim by the media in prison disturbances, the Panel has clergy, if requested by Muslim inmates. examined the area of media performance and media relations during the incident. 36 37

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on. Both correctional literature and correctional had any knowledge of this material, or recollect being specialized training at the State facilities. officers and food service workers, among others. This managers emphasize the need for a cadre of trained in this area. Tower guards were not This section has partial responsibility for level of training is not provided at Graterford or other experienced officers. At Graterford, approximately adequately trained in the use of emergency overseeing the training coordinators who State institutions in Pennsylvania. 20% of the corrections officers have less than one telephones. Graterford's complaint officer assumed work as fu II-time trainers under the year experience and are in effect trainees. Over 50% this position more than a year ago following extensive direction of the institutional superinten­ The problem with annual in-service training is have less than five years of experience. Correctional experience as a correctional officer but received no dents. not a lack of capability to deliver it, but the overtime experts outside of Pennsylvania confirm the concerns training on his responsibilities and role. Guards and cost involved. The Bureau maintains that the of Bureau administrators that this high level of inmates cited interpersonal and racial tensions Generally, the Bureau has the capability to complement shortage makes it impossible to train inexperienced staff compounds problems of between the guard force, yet in-service training has provide relevant training in most areas to all staff cor~ectional officers and food service workers during institutional management. not been provided in interpersonal relations. levels so that American Correctional Association their normal work hours, as they are in critical Communications problems exist between Graterford training standards are met. Where in-house resources positions th~t cannot go unattended. Consequently, The Panel has not reviewed turnover for civilian management and the guards' union that impede are not available, other state agencies, universities and staff must either volunteer to attend training during positions at Graterford. However, officials report that effective cooperation. Tower guards are the colleges or consultants are utilized. non-work hours or, if required to attend must receive turnover in kitchen steward, counselor and other institution's perimeter security, yet prior to the time and one-half compensation. ThL has been a positions is also high and the inexperience of staff incident, they received no weapons training beyond (a) Entry Level Training perennial problem since the early seventies when the leads to problems in these areas as well. basic training. The presence of mentally ill inmates Commonwealth agreed to pay time and one-half for and the special problems they create have not been ,The rising prison population! staff shortages and hours worked above the normal work day. The availability of adequate numbers of trained, addressed through staff training. Correctional the Increased number of younger and more violent experienced staff is essential if Graterford is to be officers are daily confronted with more extreme inmates serving longer sentences lay the groundwork The estimated cost to provide the 40 hours of managed safely and effectively. The rapid increase problems and experience increasing job-related stress, for potentially dangerous environments. Entry into training to a correctional officer at time and one-half In inmate population, together with anticipated yet many of them have not participated in stress this environment must be preceded by a well-designed is $512. To train all the correctional officers at increases, make it imperative that the Bureau of management training programs offered by the program to provide the new employee with the G n:~terford wou Id cost $182,044 for a one year Correction recruit, train and retain adequate levels Bureau. knowledge, skills and abilities to function properly. penod. The cost for training a food service instructor of staffing. Paradoxically, the same pressures of The new correctional officer on the cell block has for 40 hours is $472 or $14,160 for all the food increased inmate populations and attendant problems The Panel finds that greater resources and a vital need to know what to do, and what not to service instructor staff at Graterford. The annual cost that underscore the need for more experienced staff emphasis must be committed in the area of training. do. to train all Bureau correctional officers and food also contribute to increased staff stress and job Implementation will require attention not only from service instructors for 40 hours is estimated at dissatisfaction which leads to resignations, vacancies correctional administrators and personnel, but also The Bureau of Correction correctly provides a $889,160. and overtime costs. The overtime. costs at from the Governor's Office of Budget and seven week pre-service training program, consisting of time-and-a-half deplete the budget and funds are then Administration, the Pennsylvania General Assembly 176 hours of training. The course length and course Treatment staff is also in need of in-service not available for replacement staff. and the American Federation of State, County and content compare very favorably with the most training. Fortunately, Bureau of Correction records Municipal Employees. advanced standards for pre-service training of show that 90% of treatment staff do participate in correctional officers. This basic training is followed approved 40-hour in-service training annually. Training The Bureau of Correction's training activities are up by three weeks (120 hours) of on-the-job training However, on Iy 10% of correctional officers receive organized within its Personnel Management and Staff under inten~ive supervision. Following this period, 40 hours of in-service training and only 15% of food The Panel's review of standards from the Development Division. Its function is to provide the new officer gradually assumes more independent service instructors receive this level of training. American Correctional Association, the National basic orientation, in-service and technical training to responsibility and for the remaining 42 weeks of his Advisory Commission on Standards and Goals for Bureau and county prison personnel. first year on the job, he receives on-the-job (c) Supervisory and Management Training Corrections, and other documents highlights the need supervision on a part-time basis. for quality training programs to enhance staff This Division consists of four components: Commissioner Marks advised the Panel that he performance, staff accountability and staff The Panel finds that the entry-level training believes existing Bureau policies, duty descriptions sensitivity. Central Academy which is responsible for program, although needing continual review and procedures are adequate, aibeit with room for the supervision of the basic academy refinement and supervision, is a good one and well continual refinement, and that the key to an serves the Bureau of Correction. I nterviews conducted by the Panel also orientation program and several in-service effective, safe adult corrections system in highlighted the need for improved staff training. academy programs; Pennsylvania is the following: "If each employee Administrators and ranking officers at Graterford, in (b) In-Service Training does his job according to existing policies and most instances, were unfamiliar with the contents of Eastern Academy which is responsible for procedures, for eight hours every day, the system will their own institutional emergency preparedness plan management and specialized train-the­ Although entry level training is important work and work well." and their role in carrying it out. Although hostage trainer seminars; professionalism is a continuous learning process. Th~ negotiation training had been provided less than two !l10st common skil!s require regular practice; Ensuring that reasonable efforts are made to weeks before the incident, it was provided to on Iy County Training which is responsible for Infrequently used skills need -refreshing; and new reach this level of performance requires a small number of correctional personnel from each coordination with the 67 county prisons methods and ideas should be tested. As the working accountability. Accountability rests not just on institution, primarily Superintendents and their for academy and on-site {raining (upon enyironment changes,the employee must develop the individual staff, but on managers and supervisors who Deputies, and was the first time it had been provided request of county); skills and ability to change wlth it. must see to it that policies are clearly understood in many years. Although the Bureau has training and that staff perform their duties properly. The material for staff on how to survive as a hostage, Institution Training which is responsible The American Correctional Association supervisors must strive to ensure that first-line staff none of the many correctional officers and stewards for the supervision and coordination of recommends the provision of 40 hours of in-service understand the reasons behind policy directives in interviewed, including the actual staff hostages, in-service training, pre-service training and training annually to administrators, correctional· order to maintain a safe institution.

38 39 Supervisory and managerial positions in Recommendation 20 residing in general population. classification system. The Bureau contracted with corrections are generally filled through the upward the Correctional Services Group of Kansas City, promotion of staff. Lateral entry is rare. It is The Bureau should utilize the proffered As stated, the purpose of classification is to Missouri, a consulting firm nationally recognized for important that supervisors and managers continue to specialized training expertise and materials determine the security level, custody and its expertise in the area of inmate classification receive training, advice and direction in their new of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to help 'f program/service needs of each inmate. Each inmate systems, to conduct the evaluation. In discussinj:1 this roles. alleviate the racial tension identified among 11· is interviewed, tested anld examined for medical matter with the consultant, the .Panel has rearned the guard force and enhance team work ! condition, criminal history, current offense, mental their evaluation indicates few major changes are Four recommendations to improve Graterfordls among staff. !. status, educational level" cultural and religious necessary, but some refinements are needed. staff resources are made by the Panel: background, escape riS',k, violence potential, vocational interest and other topics. A written report The Correctional Services Group stated that of Recommendation 17 ISSUE SIX: INMATE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM and evaluation, including custody recommendations, the seven state systems they have evaluated, is prepared by the classifit:ation staff and used by lPennsylvania measures very favorably overall, has,the Commentary The Panel recommends that the Secretary the classification committe€l. The process, from the Ibest written policies and procedures and the best of Budget and Administration appoint a The purpose of classification is to indicate what point of intake to the point of assignment to general performance. The consultantls final report was small task force of budgetary, personnel should be done with a particular inmate regarding population (or special custody), has standard policies !iUbmitted to the Bureau of Correction in late June, services and correctional officials to review Sf!curity, custody and program needs. Proper and procedures that schedules all the necessary steps. '1982. Major recommendations have been made and staffing needs and resources at Graterford Glassification of inmates is of paramount importance, The system operates from a clinical perspective will take about a year (beginning September 1982) and elsewhere in the State prison system if large numbers of inmates are to be managed by (professional judgement) with a three to four member to implement. The major refinements recommended to ensure that staff resources are adequate small numbers of prison staff, if a continuum of team (representing custody, counseling, psychological by the consultant are as follows: to manage the growing inmate population maximum security and community-based programs is services and management perspectives) making a in a safe and efficient manner. In addition to be safely used and if more vulnerable inmates are classification recommendation to the Deputy 1. Program levels should be revised by making to recruiting and retaining adequate staff, going to be housed in the same facilities with more Commissioner of Correction who approves or the existing system more descriptive and there must be a staff development program predatory inmates. Consequently, the Panel decided disapproves it. simple. As a result, more inmates will be which promotes professionalism, compe­ to study the Bureau 'of Correction IS inmate assigned to each of the five program levels, tency, and encourages high standards of classification system. Each institution can accommodate inmates rather than using only one or two levels performance. assigned to any of the five program levels.' The levels for the vast majority of inmates. Such a A classification system can only provide an range from I to V and indicate the type of custody change will assist in better identification of Recommendation 18 indication of what IIshould be donell with a particular ;\ an inmate requires, the privileges allowed and the custody and programming needs and will inmate. What actually can be done depends upon , [ programs needed. The five levels are: maximum, make the system a more refined operation. The Panel recommends that the Bureau 01 existing staff and resources. The increasing growth , ! close, medium, minimum and community. Letter Correction enhance its in-service training of prison population can severely limit the '\ codes may be assigned to further discriminate within 2. The method of classification should also be I program levels. Ten codes, ranging from IIwork program at Graterford and the other Stalte effectiveness of classification, since a principal ll changed from a clinical (subjective) to a prisons by taking gradual, affordable steps concern changes from what should be done to where release to IIspecial observation II, may be used with clinical-actuarial approach to provide toward meeting the 40-hour annual is there space? specific designations for outside visits, limited greater objectivity by insuring that all in-service training standard. It should do privileges or other categories of assign ment or classification factors are equally considered this through the development of an The Bureau of Correction operates three privilege. for each inmate. A total score wi I(' then increased training budget request and diagnostic and classification centers (DCCs) for indicate the program level most through negotiation with the Office of inmates entering or returning to Bureau custody. This process of assigning inmates from any appropriate; and, information on interests wogram level to any institution is considered a Budget and Administration and the General Each DCC serves a particular area of the State, ll and supervision needs will indicate which Assembly. Special efforts must be made to geographically broken into reception regions. They Imulti-Ievel approach in classification. The Bureau institutions would be most appropriate. educate representatives of these bodies that are located at Graterford (Eastern), Camp Hill of Correction uses this approach, even though most correctional staff training is essential to (Central) and Pittsburgh (Western). The DCCs are other correctional systems use a dual-level or On the basis of its own review and discussion effective correctional lYtanagement. a distinct component of the state correctional s;ngle-leve'J' approach, wherein inmates from one or with the consultants, the Panel finds that the institutions (SCls) where they are housed and all two particular program levels only are assigned to a Bureauls initial classification system is basically a Recommendation 19 arriving inmates are placed in the DCC section of particular institution. With the multi-level approach, good one, although it can benefit from the the facility, not in the general population of the SCI. each institution has a mix of all program levels. recommended refinements. The initial classification The American Federation of State, County Therefore, when an inmate is reclassified, transfer to system is able to reasonably indicate appropriate and Municipal Employees, which represents From May 1, 1981 to April 30, 1982, the three another SCI is usually unnecessary. All inmates are security, custody and program le'lrels for incoming the correctional officers and food service DCCs processed 3,472 inmates. The Graterford DCC reclassified at least once a year and more often, as inmates. workers at Graterford, needs to recognize processed 1,558 of these inmates. New receptions needed. the importance of ongoing training to the must be processed within 20 work days according Beyond the initial classification of inmates, physical safety, mental health, longevity, to Bureau policy. Often persons are not immediately Assessment and improvement of the Bureauls however, problems of inmate placement, case and job satisfaction of its members. In this transferred after classification due to overcrowded initial classification system for incoming inmates has management and reclassification are noted. In regard, it should work with the Bureau of conditions throughout the SCls and inmates await been a priority of Commissioner Marks, and the this regard, it was discovered that although a Correction to identify training areas of transfer about ·~O additional days. For parole Bureau applied for and received a grant in 1981 from classification assignment might be geared to greatest need, renegotiate the time and half violators, the 2O-d~'y processing time starts after the National Institute of Corrections to study, placement in a particular institution because of pay requirement so that it does not apply results from the ret 'I'11mitment hearing are received. evaluate and recommend changes in the existing special program interests, this placement might not to training provided. outside of the normal Parole violators may IDe placed in general population work day and encourage its membership to 30 days after reception if hearing results have not participate in such training. been'received. They are subsequently classified while

40 41

) , f\

inmates and the guards who observe them, it is a Some require close monitoring to insure that their be available due to oversubscription in that program available at the time of classification. matter of life and death. Although this problem has mental health condition does not regress to the point or unease at that institution. Similarly, a review of Therefore, classification staff often must been studied by three separate task forces* in the where transfer to a forensic mental health facility is the Bowen case revealed that Bowen spent very brief rely on inmate self-reports for information past four years, the Panel requested and received necessary. time periods in security confinement following his that is needed. Some counties readily from Bureau of Correction staff specific information being detected in escape planning activities in 1978 provide information, some counties provide on the magnitude of the problem at Graterford. This With reference to forensic mental health and 1979, because there are very few maximum the information, but not in a timely brief report does not duplicate the work completed transfers, the Panel was provided with information fashion to prepare the classification security bed spaces at Graterford and these . were by earlier research. Rather, the Panel has reviewed that oftentimes patient~. returning from forensic more urgently needed for inmates who were being summary, while other counties provide no the findings of prior study groups in light of recent mental health units have their psychosis in remission assaultive or who were awaiting transfer to a secure information at all. The Bureau of documentation of the number of inmates at only while taking drugs. Since the drug taking is mental health facility. Also, case management Correction should work with the counties Graterford who are unable to participate in voluntary, when they stop taking the drugs, the problems were noted, in that Bowen was employed and with the Administrative Office of correctional programs because of their mental illness. problems recu r. in an institutional work assignment where he had Pennsylvania Courts to institute a system minimally supervised contact with outside gelivery whereby counties promptly furnish the The critical nature of the problems documented A primary treatment method used by vehicles. There was no system to track Bowen s work necessary information. by the Panel requires the immediate attention of Graterford's psychiatrists involves the prescription of assignments or program involvements and thus he was mental health and correctional officials and the full psychopharmaceuticals for mentally-ill inmates. Only able to attain a work assignment without it being Recommendation 24 support of the Governor and the General Assembly. staff psychiatrists prescribe these medications and a known by a case manager or the Graterford monthly monitoring report is forwarded t6" the adm in istrators. After the initial classification process Before recommendations were developed for Bureau's central office to ensure that adequate whereby the new inmate is placed in a improving the care and treatment of mentally-ill control is maintained on this treatment modality. Recommendation 21 particular institution at a certain inmates at Graterford, several key questions were Based on the Bureau's reports, the Panel learned that security/custody/program level, there is a researched. in June 1982, 292 inmates received The Panel finds the recommendations periodic reclassification at the institutional psychopharmaceuticals. Th irty-three different contained in the Correctional Services level. It is the Panel's impression that this 1. How many mentally-ill inmates at psychopharmaceutical medications were prescribed Group's report to be reasonable and reclassification is not as thorough and Graterford are a serious mimagement including: thorazine (17 inmates), prolixin (2), believes that the Bureau of Correction comprehensive as it should be in order to problem for corrections administrators? ritalin (2), haldol (14) anddilantin (20). Consultants should implement the proposed be aware of the need for changes in the How are psychopharmaceuticals used to asked to review the medication schedule concluded refinements in order to improve the inmate's security, custody or program level. control this population? that the use of psychopharmaceuticals by 13.4% of existing initial classification system This It is recommended that greater attention the inmates at Graterford was within acceptable should be done by a formal, systematic be paid to the reclassification process. In April, 1982, Graterford's treatment staff standards. approach which will enable uniform identified 41 inmates who were seriously mentally-ill application and periodic evaluation. Recommendation 25 and who presented severe management problems to The Panel concluded that inmates at Graterford prison administrators. exhibit mental illness symptoms of varying type and Recommendation 22 There is a particular need for intensive case severity. On the date of the .Panel's review management of the small number of Twelve of the 41 inmates were housed iri the about 1 .9% (41) of the 2, 150 in mates at Graterford It is recommended that the Bureau strive inmates such as Joseph Bowen who,because infirmary area's D Ward, which has been designated required intensive mental health services. to make initial claSSification consistent of the nature of their previous crimes as a psychiatric holding area. The balance had to throughout its institutions. Currently a and/or the behavior they exhibit while be held in other areas including the restrictive housing program level II-A desigf1:ation at under correctional custody, present clear unit (11), E Gallery ('11), and in general population Thus, as the following chart shows, there are Graterford does not appear to be the same threats to safety and security. Prisoners (7). Given the very limited space in the restrictive up to 200 inmates at Graterford who have treatment as a program levelII-A at other institutions. who are caught in escape attempts or in housing unit, the presence of 11 mentaily-ill inmates needs that overlap services provided in the A method of uniform assignment of predatory acts against other inmates or has meant that space needed to confine disciplinary involuntary mental health treatment system and in program levels should be implemented; the staff should be carefully tracked so that cases has not been available for that purpose. the correctional system. In order to treat this group consultant has suggested that the NIC work assignments, program partiCipation, of inmates, the members of the Corrections/Mental ReclaSSification Instrument may be helpful personal fund accounts, mail privileges and It was noted by treatment staff that other Health Task Force recommended and representatives for custody analysis to assist in visting procedures are not used by these inmates in the general populatiol) have mental health of the Department of Public Welfare and Bureau of Bureau-wide uniformity. In addition, there inmates to further their criminal intentions. problems that negatively affect their ability to Correction agreed that emergency mental health is a need for training to promote a participate in prison programs but who are not severe treatment .services should be provided in prison. thorough understanding of changes in management problems. Many of these individuals are Long-term treatment for inmates should be provided methods of claSSification and the revised withdrawn or erratic in behavior, but are not seen in the Department of Public Welfare's forensic mental program levels for relevant Bureau staff. ISSUE SEVEN: MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES as threats to safety or security in the institution. health hospitals. Commentary Recommendation 23

Members of claSSification teams have The problem of treating prison inmates for *1978 - Governor Milton Shapp appointed a Task Force on Maximum Security Psychiatric Care. indicated that records on inmares, such as mental illness is a matter of great concern to 1980 - A Pennsylvania House Judiciary Committee Joint Staff Task Force completed a report on mentally­ pre-sentence investigations, mental health Pennsylvania's correctional administrators, mental ill inmates in State correctional facilities for the House Subcommittee on Crime and Corrections. commitments, etc., are frequently not health offiCials and inmates. For some r,lentally-iJI 1981 - Attorney General Bartle appointed a Corrections/Mental Health Task Force to study the treatment needs of mentally-ill inmates.

43 42

t' i, 11,

. .".~ ...,- ..,,, .. ,,,--.-.~ ''"

CHART 1 During the course of interviews with medical E'stlma t eso f the Number of Graterford Inmates in Need of Mental Health Services (April 1982) staff, it was discovered that ;'It current programming and treatment services and to annually prepare a report Mentally-ill and unable to Graterford further complicates the treatment of mentally-ill inmates. The specific problem occurs on these ~ervices and make suggestions for Mentally-ill and a participate fully in Total in need improving them. ' management problem correctional programs* of service when new admissions an:ive at Graterford. New inmates usually are housed in isolation on E Block Number: 41 159 200 until medical checks and classification procedures are A clinical review team has been created at completed. However, on occasion in recent months, Graterford to carefully review any suicide % of Population: 1.9% 6.4% 8.3% E Block has been full and new admissions have been cases or serious suicide attemots to temporarily housed in the infirmary's D ward with determine what may be learned to help * Estimated from figures developed by the Corrections/Mental Health Task Force. mentally-ill inmates. The evaluation of medical avoid such events in the futu reo services at Graterford completed by the Bureau's 2. What mental health services should b~ a. To provide emergency mental health medical services chief in March, 1982 recommended The Bureau has hired two mental health provided in state correctional institutions, services in individual cells for acutely that the practice of ,mixing new admissions and coordinators at Graterford. It is the mentally-ill inmates requiring i~tensive inmates awaiting placement or hearing on a mental responsibility of the coordinators to keep As defined by the Mental Health Procedures Act staff supervision. Some persons assigned to health petition be discontinued. The Panel supports track of emotionally unstable inmates to (P.L. 817, No. 143), July 9, 1976, as amended by these secu re rooms will require transfer to this finding and agrees that new arrivals can be make certain that they receive the services P.L. 1362, No. 324, November 26, 1978, these programs operated by the Office of Mental negatively affected by initial contact with the that they need. services include: Health as per the Mental Health Procedures seriously mentally-ill. Act. Involuntary emergency treatment as j' The Panel learned that in 1981, 57 petitions a. Section 407 - Voluntary services provided per Sections 302 and 303 of the Mental As a resu It of the cooperative efforts of alleging the need for an inmate's involuntary to inmates. Health Procedures Act may be provided by legislators, judges, mental health administrators, commitment to a mental health facility were filed the corrections based program. Extended correctional administrators and citizens Who served by Graterford's staff. The judge or a mental health b. Section 302 - Involuntary emergency and involuntary treatment (Section 304) will on the Corrections/Mental Health Task Force, several review officer approved transfer to a mental health treatment services not to exceed 120 hours continue to be provided by the Office of chronic problems that had delayed the treatment of facility in 50 of the 57 cases. In 1981 40 cases were in duration as authorized by a physician. Mental Health facilities. mentally-ill inmates in the State system have been returned to Graterford following short periods of relieved.' Recently, a plan was implemented to ensure involuntary commitment at Farview State Hospital c. Section 303 - Extended involuntary b. To provide a mental health treatment ward that Department of Public Welfare forensic mental or a regional forensic unit. Thus, the movement of emergency treatment services not to exceed for those inmates who cannot be treated health facilities serve only those individuals who are inmates in and out of the available mental health beds 20 days as certified by a judge or mental in the general prison population, but are serious criminals and mentally-ill, thus freeing-up means that a substantial number of mental health health review officer. not severely mentally disabled and forensic beds that had been occupied by patients cases will always remain at Graterford. The monitoring process described above will ensure that involuntarily committable as per the under civil commitments. Currently, the waiting list Thus, emergency mental heal.th treatment Mental Health Procedures Act. It is for placement in DPW forensic institutions has been 'inmates in need of mental health services will not services operated by the Bureau. and hcensed ~y the expected that the voluntary provisions of be lost in the process of transfer between correction reduced and inmates committed to the State's secure and mental health syst:ems. Department of Public Welfare Will, when esta~hshed, the Mental Health Procedures Act will be forensic mental health unit at Farview and to regional provide a conti,,!uum of !llental health services to utilized to authorize placement in these forensic mental health units can usually be those involuntanly committed for up to 25 days. residential areas. transferred promptly. A total of 418 beds are In general, the Bureau of Corr£1('1;ion can be available in the forensic mental health units. Of those commended on the planning and develvpment work At the end of that 25-day period, continued c. To provide additional ?ut-pati~nt servdices beds, 225 are at Farview., completed to date on this critical matter. If involuntary treatment, if nec~ssary, would be ' to inmates interested In and In nee 0 f proposed, correctional mental health treatment provided in a Department ~f. Pubhc Welfa~e operated treatment who are stable enough to Commissioner Marks participated on the Task services are developed and staffed according to plan, forensic mental health faCIlity for a pe~lod not to maintain residence within the general Force and has taken steps to implement then the problem of treating those who are exceed 90 days. This court-ordered mvolunt~ry inmate population. recommendations. Thus, planning for the mentally-ill will be more successfully managed. treatment would be authorized following the review development of an emergency care mental health unit of a Section 304 petition by a judge or mental health d. To provide supportive activities to at Graterford has been initiated. The unit will be The Graterford Panel makes the followi'ng review officer. Extended treatment cou I~ be ordered individuals participating in each of the a part of the new 500-bed facility to be constructed recommendations to continue the improvement of after the initial 90-day com!'T1itment penod elapsed. mental health treatment components. correctional mental health treatment efforts initiated within Graterford's walls. When completed and fully by the Bureau: staffed, the new 65-bed in-patient unit will assist 3. How will the Bureau provide 'emergency If the continuum of mental health services as correctional staff in managing mental health cases. mental health treatment services to inmates described initially by the Corrections/Mental H(~~lth Recommendation 26 at Graterford? Task Force is developed at Graterford, then prison Other recent improvements that have been administrators should be able to adequately T,anage implemented by the Bureau's staff include: The Panel recommends that emergency Additional resources are required, if the staff at this persistent and serious problem that aff~~ts .up mental health treatment services should be Graterford is to successfully manage i.n!1lates to 8.3% (200) inmates. The urgency of dey!#lopmg The creation of a mental hea,Ith services provided by the Bureau of Correction to exhibiting mental health problems. Speclflcal.ly, these services is stressed by the Panel as they~~are not , review comm ittee at Graterford :md"'each the group of inmates at Graterford who are treatment services should be developed to accomphsh now in place. Serious and well-d~u!llente~ of the other state correctional instit4tlons. unable to participate in correctional the foII owin{) objectives: management and treatment problems persist m their The function of the committee is to !review programs because of their mental illness. abse~ce. ' When necessary, inmates who are

44 45

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mental health services for inmates, Bureau of Correction Medical Services Evaluation-1981 chronically mentally-ill should be including the development of an emergency transferred to fo~c!nsic mentf)l health care mental health unit and adequate The Bureau of Correction established a in correctional institutions. programs administered by the Department out-patient mental health service at of Public Welfare's Office of Mental Health. menagement review for health car~ services in 1980. Graterford. The checklist developed by the Bureau is designed According to the nursing staff, nurses at Recommendation 27 to assess major components of each institutional Graterford frequently transfer to the State Institution ISSUE EIGHT: MEDICAL SERVICES health care prGgram and provides superintendents with for the Mentally III at Norristown. A starting nurse The Panel supports amendments to ~he a comprehensive evaluation of their own institution's at Graterford could begin, if properly qualified, as Mental Health Procedures Act that wzll: Commentary health care delivery system. It also ensures that a Nurse II for an annual salary of $14,592. The same written commu nication is established between the . indiv:dual hired at Norristown State Hospital would The delivery of medical services to the 2,200 Bureau's coordinator for medical services and begin at a position as a Psychiatric Nurse I with an include correction facilities in the inmates at Graterford State Correctional Institution definition of sites that can operate admin istrators at each institution. entry level annual salary of $16,646 per year, or requires the skillful management of limited resou.rces. possibly, as a Psychiatric Nurse" at $17,408. Given DPW-licensed emergency mental However, some critical aspects of the correctional health treatment units; The most recent report on medical services at the difference in starting salary for the two state health care system are beyond the control of Graterford was provided to the Panel in March, 1982 institutions 20 miles apart, it is not difficult to administrators. For example, the current shortage by Commissioner Marks who noted that "there is understand why Graterford is unable to recruit, hire provide for the immediate transfer of of registered nurses, practical nurses, physicians inmates found committable under ~nd much to be done; however, I remain optimistic and and retain qualified nursing staff. Competition in other support staff cannot be affected. by the a~tlon Section 304 of the Mental Health continue to pursue the day-to-day activity at salary and working conditions at private hospitals in of medical services program managers In correctional Graterford from the standpoint that we need to the area compounds the problem. Procedures Act to DPW-operated facilities. Thus, even if the Bureau of Correction has mental health facilities. continue to improve." sufficient fu nds the competitive job market for Medical staff observed that the inability to hire health care professionals still makes it difficult to Recommendation 28 The Bureau's report describes specific areas an adequate number of registered nurses results in provide basic health care for inmates. For these ~nd where additional personnel are needed to improve the greater responsibility for correctional infirmary other reasons, needed improvement to medical quality of health services delivery. Specifically, the supervisors. The supervisors work many overtime Until emergency mental .health treatment services at Graterford must be carefully planned and units are operative, the Panel recommends report recommends: hours each week and the Medical Director at mmates w'ith chronic or acute mental judiciously implemented in the coming years. Graterford believes that the excessive workload may health problems should be house~ 1. the hiring of additional clerical personnel impair their efficiency and effectiveness. Nursing Graterford expends $1.4 million per year for the to expedite the heavy administrative staff believe that in the rush to provide emergency separately from other inmat~s. In . thIS delivery of medical services to regard the Restrictive Housmg Umt at inmat~s. Fo~~een workload of the medical services depart­ and routine services, medication needed by inmates doctors I medical administrator, 5 medical specll'lllsts, ment; is sometimes not delivered on schedule. Grate;ford should be used exclUSively for 6 registered nurses, 8 correcti.on~1 infirrn~ry housing disciplinary cases. It should not supervisors, and I clerk are charged With operatmg house mental health cases. 2. the hiring of an additional dentist on a The Bureau is attempting to upgrade personnel the medical health care services program. Numerous limited wage position to improve the and services in correctional infirmaries, so that Similarly, the Panel recommends that it is inmates work in the infirmary. delivery of dental services; current minimum health care standards can be met. inappropriate to co-house, .even. on .a In this regard, the Bureau has made significant temporary basis, newly commItted mmates Health care expenditures for Graterford in 1981 3. the recruitment of adequate numbers of improvements in recent years, including: with mentally-ill inmates on D Ward. Panel ·included: staff to provide patient care on all shifts and to preclude inmates from performing establishing annual physical exeminations members agreed that prison adjustment $ 700,000 problems for new inmates are compounded Salaries functions in lieu of staff; and for all inmates over 40 years old; when their initial placement is in a ward Community Out-Patient/I n-Patient with seriously mentally-ill inmates. 4. the initiation of an intensive effort to contracting with medical specialists and Consultations (This includes hospital recruit staff so licensed personnel are hospitals in the Graterford area to ensure 598,875 It is recognized that this recommendation services required by inmates.) available to provide medical services in the the availability of diagnostic and treatment infirmary 24 hours a day. This would services; may be difficu: f for the Bureau to fUlfill. 56,600 However, the seriousness of the problem Drugs require that a registered nurse and a correctionalirifirmary supervisor be training and certification of all new requires prompt action by the Bureau and 32,700 by the Department of Public Welfare's Medical Supplies physically preseilt in the infirmary seven employees in CPR and first

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medical services at Graterford and other state of c:"'ses requiring medical service cannot be handled in tne restricted space allocated for the infirma'ry. are employed i~ t.he infirmary area and supervised institutions noted that ,lithe Joint Staff Task Force who are drug abusers is inadequate and Bureau of Correction officials agree with these by correctl(~nal infirmary supervisors, this practice is inm~tes was established by the House Judiciary extremely nsky. r~qUlres special attention and cooperation between Subcommittee on Crime and Corrections to inspect recommendations and plan to expand the infirmary. A fully equipped infirmary consisting of 60 in-patient tH e I Bureau of Correction and ·the Department of ond evaluate medical services in Pennsylvania state working in the infirmary record the ea tho correctional institutions. The Task Force consisted beds will be included in the new 500-bed .I~mat~s construction a.t Graterford. admln~stratlon of medication on the medical card of of individuals from various state and private agencies eaCh. In.mate. That documentation includes the Graterf~rd's ~edical Director stated that on who are experienced in monitoring health services." and dosage prescribed and the d t f ~ev~ral . occaSions, Inmates have been sent to other Standard 122 - LICENSURE. State licensure, med!c~tlon. In order to determine compliance with the American administration. a e 0 ~stl~utlOns for detoxification,· particularly to Medical Association's standards, the Task Force used certification or registration requirements and . or.nst?wn State Hospital. However these a series of questionnaires developed by the restrictions apply to health care personnel who Sta'!dard 1 ~ 3- INMATE WORKERS, Written '~t'tut,ons .h~ve sent the inmates back to G;aterford Pennsylvania· Medical Society to measure medical provide services to inmates. The verification of polzcy requlres that inmates are prohibited from a er J?rescnblng a medical treatment, even though services in each prison. . current credentials is on file in the facility. the following duties: theh pnhson. does not have personnel trained to carry t roug With the treatment. I n response to its charge, the Panel directed that Due to a ruling of the Civil Service Commission performing direct patient services' an update of the 1980 report should be completed. in 1978, correctional infirmary supervisors are no schedul!n? health care apPointme;1ts; Standard 163 - MANAGEMENT OF In order to complete this update the Panel secured longer deemed to be qualified to fill medical health determmmg access of other inmates to PH/}.RMACEUTICALS, A written policy and the support and cooperation of the Pennsylvania service provider 'positions in correctional facilities. health care services; defmed procedures reqUire that the proper Medical Society, the Pennsylvania Department of The Bureau and the Civil Sf-rvice Commission agreed handling or having· access to: management of pharmaceuticals includes: Health, Pennsylvania Legal Services, a contracted that as the correctional infirmary supervisors leave physician with expertise in evaluating correctional the Bureau's employ, they will be replaced by surg~cal !nstruments, syringes, needles, adhe~ence to State law as related to the medical services and staff of the General Assembly. registered nurses or licensed practical nurses. At the medlcatlOns, health records' and practIce of pharmacy; present time, eight correctional infirmary supervisors operating equipment for which they a fo.r.mulary specifically developed for the On June 2, 1982, Mr. O. William Kelsey, Chief remain at Graterford. are not trained. faclZzty; of the Health Care Section of the Pennsylvania adherence to regulations established by the Bureau· of Correction, coordinated activities with Standard 127 MEDICATIONS . Not only ?re inma~es in the Graterford infirmary Federal Controlled Substances Act. Superintendent Cuyler ~nd other administrators at ADMINISTRATION TRAINING. A written assigned s~e~lflc tasks listed above, but they dispense prescription practices that require tilat: Graterford to complete the health care services policy and defined procedures guide the and. administer medications, even though many review. The review included interviews with training of personnel who administer or distribute s~udles have recommended against these practices. psychotropic medications are prescribed correctional officers, inmates, medical services staff medication and require: only when clinically indicated and are and the analysis of written polici~s, procedures and Standard 1..,'8 - CHEMICALLY DEPENDENT not allowed for disciplinary reasons; medical records. training from the responsible phYSician and I~MATEs' W~itten policy and defined ~he .long-term use of minor tranquilizers the facility administrator or their designees; PlOce~ures regardmg the clinical management of IS dzscouraged' In a publication entitled "Standards for Health chemIcally dependent inmates require: "stop ?rder" ~im~' periods are stated for Services in Prison (1979), II the American Medical training regarding: behavlOr modlfymg patients and those Association cites 69 standards that define to some diagn.0~is of chemical dependency by a subject to abuse' extent the quality of medical services within a prison. accountability for administering or physlClan; re-~v~luation .be'performed by the pre­ The stan'dards fall in six general areas: administrative, distributing medications in a timely phys~cian deciding whether an individllal scnbm,g p,rovzder prior to the renewal of personnel, care and treatment, pharmaceuticals, manner according to physician IS prescnptlOn; l reqUl~es pharmacological or non-pharma­ health records and medical-legal issues. orders; and ; cological care; procedu~es. for r;zedication dispensing "} an iJtdividualized treatment plan which is and ~dmInzstratlOn or distribution; and The Panel finds that Graterford is in general recording the administration or developed and implemented; and '!laxlmum security storage and weekly comp Hance with 56 of the applicable health services distribution of medications in a referral to specified community resources mv~ntory of all controlled substances, standards. They do not comply with 8 standards manner and on a form approved by upon release when appropriate. synnges and needles. and 5 others do not apply. The following summary the health authority, describes specific areas of concern needing prompt Sta,!dard 149 - DETOXIFICATION. A written Much of the written policy and defined attention and improvement. There is no written policy or defined procedure, pollcy. ,an~ defined procedures require that procedures concerning the handling of to guide the training of personnel who administer or detoxificat.lOn from alcohol, opioids, stimulants pharmaceuticals is adequate. The problem in this Standard 107 - SUPPORT SERVICES. If health distribute medication. The physician in charge at ~nld sedatlve hypnotic drugs are effective as area relates to the implementation of those services are delivered in the facility, adequate Graterford has not had the time or resources to JO lows: proced~re.s and the number and type of staff available staff, space, eqUipment, supplies and materials conduct training sessions. In t~e I~flrmary to properly dispense and administer as determined by the health authority are when pr?vided at the facility it is under medication. provided for the performance f health care There is inadequate accountability for the medlcal supervision,' and delivery. administering or distriboting non-psychotropic 'vI!hen not peliormed in the facility, it is con­ . Based on interviews with the pharmacist and medications. To Some extent this results because the au~ted in a hospital or community detoxifi­ Dlrect?r of Medical Services at Graterford the Shortages exist in the Graterford nursing staff pharmacist is available only during the day shift and callon center. follOWing information was documented: ' and there is a need for an additional dentist. Major others, including inmates, are responsib!~ for 1. changes in policy and staffing are required to ensure dispensing and administering the medications at other Althou~h the Bureau's written policy generally During certain shifts each week, inmates, the efficient operation of the pharmacy. The voiume times. Although inmates that dispense medications conforms With these standards, the treatment of ~ue to a sh~rt~ge o.f personnel, are involved In the administration and distribution of

48 49 " , '\., , ~ "'1'.'\

Correctional Industries - A National Perspective * Recommendation 31 · t' n When the pharmacist is me dIca 10 • • • • n Although most states do operate some form of classification staff, and for firing workers; absent this is done under the superv.lslo I The dispensing and administ!:ation~f correctional industries, most operate them on a very fa' registered nurse or correctlOna pharmaceuticals and ~he operatzq,n of :~e modest scale. Only about 1 ()O~ of the almost 300,000 shop operations becoming self-sufficient or fnfirmary supervisor. Inmates. ~re ~Iso pharmacy must be zmproved., Me~."al state prison inmates work in prison industries. The profitable within a reasonable time after responsible .for charting the admlnlstr~l~n services staffing shortages could b~r relzeved variance here ranges from Rhode Island, Which start-up; and of medication on medical he~lth re~r d~ I~ if the Bureau develops a contracl\ for the employs 49% of its inmate population in correctional direct violation of Amerlc~n e ~ca delivery of pharmaceutical s~rviIFes. A industries, to Mississippi, which employs only 2%. coordination of prison industries with Association standards and 11"1 posslb~e private pharmacy or pro!esslOn~tl. group Pennsylvania employs 17% of its inmates in its correctional and other agencies placing violation of standards set by t e could assist the Bureau zn asses,~zng the correctional industries program. released inmates in jobs to maxi m ize' the Pennsylvania Pharmacy Board. feasibility of establishing such a \system. benefits of the prisoner's industrial Correctional industry programs are generally expel'ience. 2. In summer the pharmacy area can become Recommendation 32 characterized as having short work days, low inmate hot that capsules actually melt. There wages and productivity, overstaffing of shops and The Free Venture Program has b.een tried in ~~ no air conditioner in th~ p~armacy, nor The Commissioner should establish a limited product markets. Correctional industries seven states. Inmates have generally been paid .the is there adequate ventilation. Most Graterford medical services revieW team generally use obsolete or outdated equipment. It is Federal minimum wage or base wages with bonuses. medications are not manufactl~red to consisting of Bureau staff and health care generally reported that work environments do not Several of the projects have achieved productivity withstand high temperatu res which can professionals to monitor the planned emulate conditions found in the private sector, levels comparable to those found in outside facilities impair the effectiveness of some drugs. improvement of pharmaceutical, and including a lack of meaningful production standards similarly equipped and have consistently generated medical senJices. Thzs team should e:xplore or work measurement techniques. What research has profits. Yet, no state has successfully implemented 3. The Federal Controlled S~~stances Act ~as methods of providing cost effective bealtll been done has concluded that the skills acquired in all of the design elements of the Free Venture established regulations gUiding the handling care services to inmates and should a(fd~ess correctional industry programs have had very limited Program. Traditional prison industrial processes and of controlled substances. At Graterford, the chronic problems of understaffl11g, impact in helping inmates obtain employment upon attitudes have been reluctant to change and prison regulations relating to the. stora~e and inadequate space, and the dispen~ing of release. administrators have had great difficulty reorganizing security of drugs are being Violated. medication. They should also conszder ~he supervision, counseling services, visiting programs, u Specifically, controlled substances n: ~ be possibility of contra~ting for all m~'~lc~l One program that has been developed dining schedules and other aspects of prison life kept in a locked cabinet or saf~ Within a services from the przvate .sector, WhZ(l,h 1S experimentally at the national level is the "Free around the revised correctional industries programs. locked room. This double-locking. system being pursued in other przsons throughout Venture Program." Developed by the Federal Law does not exist at Graterford. When In~ates the country. Enforcement Assistance Administration, the Free Correctional Industries in Pennsylvania refuse to take medication or wh7n delivery Venture Program was intended to turn prison is not possible, the drugs are put In a plastic industries into financially viable enterprises Correctional industries is a "self-sustaining" bag and kept in a safe. Membe~~ of ~he resembling private businesses. The program operation that does not receive tax dollars. It pays review team observed a large bag filled With incorporated specific characteristics of private for materials, inmate wages, salaries of state unmarked medications and were told by industries, such as: employees, and services and utilities received. As of the pharmacist that from time to time he ISSUE NINE: PRISON INDUSTRIES April 1982, there were 144 civilian and 1,600 inmates destroys these unused drugs. This system Commentary a full workday for inmates, the length (17.4% of the population) working for the Bureau's is not accountable. being defined by the supervisor's workday; correctional industries division. The pay for inmate work ranges from 13«1: to 34«1: per hour during a 4. Pharmacy services have not improved since The Graterford Panel received a :J\~ide range ~~f wages based on production, with six-hour work day. There are certain incentive a House Judiciary Joint Staff Task Force testimony which emphasized the .crltlcal. need tp differentiation among workers by skill clauses providing for up to $1.00 per hour in a few Review cited deficiencies in 1980. improve and expand .cor~ectional industries. Thl~ level, and the base level of wages areas. In 1981, the inmate payroll reached $750,000 Controlled substances are stored on open matter assumes increaSing Importanc~ becau.se of th~. significantly higher than those of inmates on a production of between $15 million and $16 shelving and not double I?cked. Moreover, rapid growth of inm~te .populatlOn Without ~l, not participating in Free Venture; million worth of goods. expired drugs are sometimes used. concomitant increase In Jobs, and presents an immediate problem of increased idleness and a lana: productivity standards comparable to those According to the Bureau of Correction's recent The Panel makes three recomm.endatic:lns for range problem of releasing most inmates .at the en " of outside industry, taking into account 18-month report, the industries operation includes a improving the delivery of medical services to Inmates of their sentence without marketable skills.. ManlY workers' skill and existing automation; total of 44 shops. Each institution has a variety of at Graterford: inmates expressed their frustration at not being a!J e shops. More than half (808) of the 1,600 inmates to stay active or learn a marketable skill thr?ugh Job final responsibility resting with industry employed are in farming (400), garment (295), and Recommertdation 30 training or correctional industry opportUnity. In management for hiring industrial workers, furniture (113) operations. The State Correctional keeping with the high level of .importa~<:e place1v~~ after preliminary screening of the total Institution at Graterford employs approximately 440 Registered nurses at Graterford should be correctional industries by prison ?fflclals, pro I inmate workforce by custodial or inmates (out of a population of approximately 2,100) on duty 24 hours, seven days per week and citizens and inmates, the Pa~el exam med correctJOna should be classified at the same salary grade industries issues very closelY· as those with Similar training and * Materia! on the national perspective was derived from reports prepared by the National I nstitute of Corrections. experience, who are employed a.t The Panel has prepared the foliowinQ analyticaJ Norristown State Hospital. Emphaszs summary of the prison industries, both natlonally.an should be placed on the recruitment, hiring in Pennsylvania, and offers several re~omm~ndatlo.ns and in-service training of nursing staff for future action to improve correctional mdustrles operations in Pennsylvania.

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in correctional industries, manufacturing textiles for sometimes sent to work in jobs where such The Panel ccnsidered the need for inmates' inmate uniforms, underwear and sheeting, dress ability is essential and -inmates who are d~ve!opment of better work habits and job skills The Board ~ould be charged with ensuring shoes, work shoes and slippers, cardboard containers participating in necessary educational ~Ithln the conte"t of the current economic situation ~he op;ratzon of a quality correctional and farm products. . instruction often leave the educational In the Commonwealth and the need for expanded ~ndustnes program in Pennsylvania which program to obtain a correctional industry employmen~ opportunities in the private sector IS geared toward the production of needed Correctional industries are not the only inmate job. Inmates are not required to While cognizant .of th~ current high unemployment products and the development of job skills jobs at Graterford. In addition to the 440 jobs participate in educational programs and rate, the P~nel stili beheves there must be an intense Cfnd w~rk experience that enhance the available in correctional industries, it is the Bureau's rarely choose to do so voluntarily. In and s~stame~ effort to improve and expand mmates future employment prospects and goal to provide jobs for all of the able inmate addition, inmates are often placed in cor.re.c~lonal Industries as a means of redUcing value as employees. . population. Such jobs are in the culinary, industry programs without any prior reclddlvls.m and preparing inmates to become maintenance, sanitation, infirmary and other areas. orientation. pro uctlve taxpayers. Recommendation 35 Due to the increase in the inmate population and the tight correctional budget, the goal of providing 5. During the recent past, correctional The Graterford Panel provides six Tlfe Bureau of Correction should work jobs for all able inmates has not been reached. industries has experienced a modest deficit, ~comn:'enda~io.ns to improve and expand prison wzt~ th~ Department of General Services Officials report that about 40010 of the Graterford with the farming operation being the least Industnes Within the Bureau of Correction: to Identify new or expanded market areas. inmate popUlation do not have jobs. Many of the profitable industry. These losses, coupled Resources permitting, the costs for existing jobs are half-day, some are less than half-day. with rising costs, have created a vicious Recommendation 33 reas.onable ~tart-up investments in terms of As the number of inmates at the Institution inc:-eases, cycle since funds are not available to capztal eqUIpment should be undertaken by the number of hours each inmate is able to work replace worn equipment or invest in new The -!anel recommends that all State the Commonwealth. will decrease and the period of idleness will increase. equipment that could create' new jobs agenczes be required to maintain lists of and/or profits. l!roduc~s manufactured by correctional Recommendation 36 Impediments to Prison hldustries mdustTles and when seeking bids to 6. Current law provides that only government purchr:se such products, be encouraged to The Bureau of Correction should establish agencies (excluding Federal government) or submit !equests for bids to the Bureau of an. orientation program for inmates In examining ways in which correctional entities which receive tax dollars as part of CorrectlOn. aSSIgned to correctional industries industries jobs could be expanded and the their funding (e.g., school districts) are Corr~ctional industry managers hav~ correctional industries program could become more eligible to buy prison goods, thus limiting conSls~ently reported that inmates assigned profitable and provide better post-release job potential sales markets. In support of this recommendation the to ~helY shops arrive without orientation to preparation training, the Graterford Panel identified Panel has. identified twenty-two products theIr . ~ork responsibilities, salaries, work several impediments. They included the following: 7. There are no requirements or incentives for and servl~es that could be significantly co,!dlflons, . etc. The Bureau should also government agencies or entities eligible to expanded if State agencies would purchase strzve ~o mtegrate the educational and 1. A recent survey indicated that 68% of all purchase from correctional industries. them. 'The Department of Public Welfare correctIOnal industries programs inmates had only a second to eighth grade Other State agencies that purchase goods and Department of Education buy beds Educa.tional achievement may be usefully education. Sixty percent have a fifth grade of the same type manufactured in shf;ets, .mattresses, uniforms, soap and es~ablzshed as a pre-condition to correction­ or lower read ing level. Only 1.2% had the correctional industries are not even many other products for their institUtions al mdustries participation. ability to pass an entry-level examination requ ired to solicit bids from correctional and. colleges. The Department of Agnculture and Department of Environ­ Recommendation 37 for computer programmer trainee. Over industries. - ! 50% have never held a sustaining job. mental Resources purchase laboratory coats 8. Correctional . industries has had and ~mocks and coveralls. All State The Bureau of Correction should place agenCI~S purchase furniture, cartons, and 2. I nstitutional superintendents are not documented problems in product quality greater .emphasis . on e:zsuring quality business managers, their primary concern is ?ther l~ems available through correctional control .m correctIOnal mdustries shops, and late delivery which has discouraged mdustTles. If correctional industries were for the custody and care of inmates. As and . mcreased accountability on o· previous purchasers from making new to capture only a small percentage of this the overcrowding problem increases, there purchases. ~upermtendents, industry managers and is even greater concern with custody and vast State agency purchasing market it mmat~s to ensure that industries are run would significantly enhance the progr~m. security and fewer jobs to go around. The Panel believes these problems must be effectIvely and profitably. viewed as challenges to be overcome rather than 3. Correctional industry managers, engineers reasons to downplay the importance of correctional Recommendation 34 Recommendation 38 and other high technical level positions do industries. The problems of illiteracy, minimal work ~ot pay salaries comparable with private experience and poor job skills impede inmates finding The Panel recommends that a Correctional The Correctional Industries Advisory Board Industry. Consequently, it is difficult to jobs upon release from prison. The overwhelming !ndustri~s AdvisOlY Board, conSisting of and th; l!ureau of Correction should strive attract skilled people in these areas. About majority of inmates are eventually released, either by mfluentlal leaders from bUSiness unions to asszmllate some of the components of half of the existing correctional industry parole or serving their maximum sentence. The lack the Legislature, local elected offiCials and the Free Venture Program into managers at the institutional level are of marketable skills of prisoners makes it difficult State government l General Services and Pennsylvania S correctional industries former correctional officers. for the ex-offender to become a productive, Office of Bu~get. and Administration), prolfram. The patterning after private taxpaying, responsible citizen. If inmates are not should be appomted either by the Governor bu~ness an,d the direct involvement of 4. There is insufficient coordination and given the opportunity and encouraged to develop or by the Commissioner of the Bureau of l!rzvat~ busmess in ~he corrections system,' integration between the educational and job-relevant skills, law-abiding citizens are penalized Correction. mcludIn,g t~e locatIOn of private industry correctional industries programs. Thus ~mploymg mmate labor on prison grounds, with higher welfare costs, loss of tax revenue and IS encouraged. inmates who can't read instructions ar~ additional crime.

52 53 ,1, '" " "" .. ~-.,. -.~- -.--- -_. -- -..~-.. ._-~ .. -' ~-,~--,----~ .. -.. - ._"- ~~ ...

In Congress, Senator Arlen Specter has The Panel asked the Bureau of Correction to ISSUE TEN: PRISONER EDUCATION introduced a bill that would require that states make ll analyze the accounting systems with a view to a IIgood faith effort to see to it that prisoners speeding the process. Since that time, Graterford Commentary released after terms of imprisonment of two years personnel are now required to" transfer all The Panel does not intend to duplicate the or more are able to read and have a basic skill so considerable work of the Department of Education ?oc~m~ntatio~ . of accounts to the receiving In order for an individual to find and hold a that they will be able to earn their way in the outside mstltutlon wlthm 72 hours after an inmate is job, to understand laws and government, to maintain in evaluating Graterford's school program nor to world as a condition of receiving any Federal funds report the findings and recommendations of their transferred. In addition, the Bureau has identified bank accounts, balance a checkbook and to simply for their prison programs. the counties which are particularly' tardy in sending function normally in society, he must be able to read, review. * The Panel does find that the efforts at Graterford to assess, recruit and counsel inmates to accou nt records to the receiving :mstitution. The write and do basic arithmetic; skills usually acquired Recommendation 39 Bureau is working with these counties to expedite by the eighth grade of school. At Graterford, 1,300 enroll and remain in basic academic and vocational their processing time. ' inmates, sixty percent of the prison population, test programs are inadequate. The lack of parity between The Panel recommends the adoption of a below the threshold of eighth grade with the majority the 34¢ an hour that can be obt(',ined for the most goal of assuring that every mentally Recommendation 40 of these falling below the fifth grade level. However, menial prison job and the set 13¢ an hour (half of suffiCient inmate possesses at least eighth attendance in basic academic and vocational programs which goes into escrow) for attending school, grade competency levels in reading, writing The Panel urges the Bureau of Correction averages less than 400 prisoners. discourages school enrollment for prisoners who want and mathematics before release into to monitor and abide by the 72-hour to earn money for extras (cigarettes, shampoo, the community. Prison administrators, processing time limit on transfer of inmate As dismal as these statistics are, the school snacks) or who need to send money home to education officials, the Legislature and the accounts between State Correctional program at Graterford is greatly improved from seven dependents. The lack of academ ic or' vocational Governor should adopt mandatory prisoner Institutions. Further, the Bureau should years ago. At that time, the Commonwealth's requirements for prison industries jobs provides no education as a rule and develop the assure the timely transfer of inmate Department of Education became partners with the incentive to attend school for the uneducated strategies and resources for its account records from counties, through the Bureau of Correction to develop schools within the prisoner. Likewise the shortage of evening courses implementation over the next five years. Bureau's semi-annual inspection responsi­ State prisons. This arrangement combined the and the lack of coordination and cooperation One modest interim step could be a bility of the county jails. educational expertise and Federal and State funding between prison industries managers and school requirement that in filling correctional capabilities of the Department of Education with the teachers discourages inmates who want to work and industries jobs, priority will be given to knowledge of inmate behavior, security skills and attend school. Even with considerable progress, those inmates who are enrolled in school physical resources of correctional institutions. Graterford has limited vocational courses for the size or who possess eighth grade competency ISSUE TWELVE: II'JMATE GRIEVANCES of its population, inadequate screening at time of levels in reading, writing and mathematics. Commentary Previously the program at Graterford consisted reception for individualized educational planning and The purpose of a IIgrievance mechanism II is to of one full-time teacher and relied on instruction in insufficient space to accommodate its current provide a formal means for obtaining resolution of basketweaving and pottery. Today there are ten students. ISSUE ELEVEN: INMATE ACCOUNTS complaints. The need for such a mechanism to deal full-time and five part-time teachers and a full-time Commentary with problems and help prevent the escalation of education director. All academic teachers are State The Panel concludes that inmates, who are tensions is recognized by the Panel and by all of the certified. Course offerings include a broad range of unemployable when they enter prison because of an The slow posting of money in inmate accounts, correctional administrators with whom the Panel met. academic subjects; vocational instruction in air inability to read, write, and do basic arithmetic or when inmates are received into or transferred out of conditioning/refrigeration, business typing, dental because of a lack of vocational competence, should Graterford, is a problem. When an inmate is received In adult correctional systems throughout the technology, electronics, home renovations, small be taught these basic skills before being released. into prison without sufficient proof of funds in the country, three basic approaches have been utilized engine repair and welding (currently planned); and While recognizing the difficulties in forcing people prison account, he is unable to make purchases to to implement a grievance mechanism - formal post secondary courses leading to a one year to learn, the problems of coordinating schooling with supplement the necessities provided by the grievance procedures, ombudsman programs and certificate or an associate degree. In addition, a prison industries and maintenance jobs and the institution. The lack of cigarettes, snacks and inmate councils. Regardless of the method utilized guidance counselor and a job placement specialist are toiletries allows the unsuspecting new inmate to necessity of reordering budget priorities, the Panel ll it requires the trust of three distinct constituencie~ accept a IIfriend's offer, after which homosexual employed full-time. believes that to return prisoners to society without ll - administration, line staff and inmates - each of basic employment skills is foolhardy and exacts a IIfavors are expected. The inmate who accepted the which has a different perspective and interest. The Department of Education assures that funds monumental price from the public in welfare "gifts" must then either succumb or fight. Also, slow earmarked for inmate education are spent according payments, lack of tax payments and additional crime. posting may encourage new prisoners to seek funds The Bureau of Correction utilizes a structured, to planned priorities, rather than diverted to support from an inmate loan shark or to rob or extort the formal procedure to respond to grievances. It does prison operations. In keeping with its role of prison The Panel also recognizes recent Federal wanted goods from weaker inmates. nut utilize an independent ombudsman or inmate educational overseer, the Department of Education leadership to address problems of illiteracy within councils. For the purrrose of clarification the term The problem can be traced to procedures at undertook an extensive review of all the State correctional settings. In June of this year, the IIgrievance mechanism I as used here includes both correctional institutions in 1980 and made Federal Bureau of Prisons established a new rule Graterford and some counties. Until recently, th~ inmate complaint ilystem and the disciplinary recommendations on a range of issues from physical mandating that inmates in Federal institutions attend Graterford personnel were not preparing and sending grievance procedure. and equipment resources and student recruitment an Adult Basic Education program for a minimum the necessary documentation on inmate accounts as policy to teacher in-service training, affirmative of 90 calendar days if they are functioning below tran.sfers from Graterford took place. Consequently, Inmate Complaint System action and use of inmate teacher aids. In all, they the 6.0 academic grade level in reading, writing and an Inmate transferred to another prison may have issued thirty recommendations to the Bureau of mathematics. At the end of 90 days, the inmates may experienced a thirty-day delay in having his account The inmate complaint system applies to all Correction. The Department of Education intends withdraw from the program or may continue brought up to date. At the other end, however, the aspects of prison conditions (food, medical, staff to re-evaluate each prison against these standards to voluntarily. speed of posting accounts of inmates transferred to relations, etc.), except discipline and the pre-release measure improvements or continued weaknesses. Graterford varies from county to county; posting programs. It calls for individual, written complaints from some counties occurs almost immediately but which are delivered daily to the Superintendent's from others requ ires over a month. office in sealed envelopes.

*The interested reader is referred to the Bibliography, Appendix J to this Report.

55 54 ------.

A designated complaint officer acknowledges the program review committee (PROt which is , . Althou~h. t~e differing .. assessments of the receipt, keeps records, investigates the matter .and composed of the two deputy superintendents and the gnev~nce m~chanlsms are predictable, the depth of Crime and Correcti?ns in November '1980. The House baSk Force conSisted of representatives of the prepares a written summary and recommend~tlOns classification and treatment supervisor. !legatlve feeling among the correctional officers and Infmates can only serve to undermine the effectiveness epartment of Environmental Resources and the which he provides to the superintendent. Copies of o the· system. staff of the House Subcommittee. the summary and recommendations are given to all The three member PRC is to promptly render affected parties. A written objection to any a decision and rationale to the inmate and chairman pn fI.1aY.13; 1982, Mr. Gary German, Chief of recommendation may be filed by any affected party. of the hearing committee. The inmate is given a . The. Graterford Panel offers two recommenda- DER s DIVISion of. Food Protection, Mr. Keith written statement of the decision and its rationale. tions to Improve the handling of inmate grievances: Graham, F,ood Service Coordinator for the Bureau The superintendent makes a decision on the All PRC decisions are to be reviewed by the of Correction, and Panel staff visited Graterford to matter and notifies all affected persons in writing. Superintendent who sustains the decision or reverses Recommendation 41 ~omplete the. review of sanitary conditions in the The complainant may appeal to a three-member panel it. In addition to this appeal function, the PRC ood preparation and storage areas. at the Bureau of Correction in Harrisburg, if not periodically reviews the cases of individuals detained Effective implementation of a grievance in administrative or disciplinary custody and . '!lechanism requires more active Since the time of the Panel's first visit to satisfied with the disposition at the institution level. Grate~ord on January 8, 1982, corridors, ceilings and The Panel reviews the matter within 21 days of determines appropriate changes in status. mvoJvement b;r. the Bureau's Central Offlce. The gnevance mechanisms" of balls In many storage and food preparation areas had receipt and either affirms, modifies or reverses the each institution should be periodically . een scraped ~nd painted. These and other earlier decision. According to the Bureau's 18-month report, assessed. and the changing nature of Improyements In the physical appearance and (January 1, 1980 to June 30, 1981), the following comp lam ts and grievances should be cleanliness o~ the kitchen and food storage areas were Panel staff conducted an analysis of inmate misconducts were reported for this period. observed. This observation should give the o~sehrved dunng the review. The improved appearance complaints filed at Graterford during the time period Centr~l Office a. be~ter. "barometer" of o t e~ areas and the comprehensive Food Services February - March 1981 and February - March 1982. Misconducts Statewide Graterford conce1r}s at the InstltutlOn and pinpOint Eval!Jatlon Report c~m~leted by the Bureau's Food This was a follow-up to a legislative staff evaluation poten~lal problem areas for immediate Service Co~r~l!lator indicate that significant efforts in 1980. The majority of complaints in 1981 and Class I 16,325 3,755 attentlOn a'!ci./or in-depth review. Also, the have be~n Inltla.ted to improve the quality of food 5,618 419 House Judl~lary Subcommittee on Crime preparation services. The report was developed early 1982 fell into the missing property and correctional Class II In 19~2 and included an independent food services officer categories. The 1980 study indicated that TOTAL: 21,943 4,174 and Correcfums. should periodically review the Bureau s gnevance mechanism in order analYSIS completed by Foodynamics, Inc. medical and missing property were the most frequent to proyide an independent assessment of its areas complained about. The Bureau's "grievance mechanism" policies to effectlveness and objectivity. . Commissioner Marks informed the Panel on govern inmate complaints and disciplinary grievances Apnl15 that staff services at Graterford had been Total number of complaints for the time periods are in accordance with relevant American Recommendation 42 upgrad.ed through the hiring of a food service in the two evaluations were as follows: Correctional Association Standards regarding: (a) the supervlso~ a~d a coordinator. He related that opportunity to file complaints and obtain a timely The Bureau of Correction should ensure 'i:herapeut.lc d,ets were available Bureauwide and that March/April 1979 114 response; (b) the establishment and publication of t~at. (he inmate complaint system and ? consulting, regist~red dietitian/nutritionist assisted March/April 1980 103 rules of conduct specifying prohibited behavior and dlsclplmary appeal process are known and ~n menu prel;laratlon and evaluation. Continued February/March 1981 79 penalties; (c) the existence of a written policy and understood by inmates and staff. The Impr.ovement In the quality of food at Graterford is procedure providing for a decision rev!;~w and appeal Panel found widespread miSinformation February/March 1982 132 qnd '!lisu!lderstqnding of the system, contingent upo.n staff performance and the purchase process and informing inmates of the steps. necessary mcludmg Its ratlOnale and its procedures of needed equipment. The increase in 1982 can be attributed to 31 to avail themselves of the process; and (d) the keeping qmong staff and inmates alike. Every complaints regarding missing property filed in March. of records on the complaints, grievances and appeals mmate should have a copy of the inmate Based. on an assessment of available information filed, as well as the dispositions of same. handbook fin which the system is t h e Panel finds: ' Disciplinary Grievance Procedure desqri~ed) and the handbook should be However, testimony to the Panel, interviews penodically updated and reissued. 1. The. most recent Department of The Bureau of Correction's Administrative with Central Office and Graterford staff, inmate EnVironmental Resources sanitation review Directive 801 sets forth standards of behavior, defines interviews and analysis of complaint system and found minimal evidence of cockroaches Class I (most serious) and Class II (less serious) disciplinary review system records provide a wide ISSUE THIRTEEN: FOOD SERVICES and rodents. The Bureau has taken steps misconducts and establishes procedures for handling range of perceptions regarding the effectiveness and L; Commentary to ensure the continued control of the them. credibility of the grievance mechanism. In general, The Governor's Panel received many complaints pro.blem by hiring an exterminator and it can be said that Bureau of Correction and on. ~h.e food preparation services at Graterford. taking measures to prevent a recurrence of A written misconduct report is made by a staff Graterford administrators favor the existing grievance Sp~';lflc complaints recorded included the following: such problems. Additional safeguards member and a copy provided to the inmate and mechanism and feel that it is working well. ~hould be taken to prevent the entry of relevant staff members. The misconduct is then Correctional officers at Graterford are largely 1. fOOd preparation areas at Graterford were Insects and rodents. referred to a hearing committee that makes a decision indifferent to the complaint system, but feel that the Infested with insects and rodents. based on a preponderance of evidence. The hearing disciplinary review system serves to give the inmates 2. The review of sanitary conditions showed 2. Condi~ionF: in food preparation areas were comm ittee is composed of three members including too many opportunities to delay justice, puts the unsanitary. that several sjgnificant improvements have one ranking correctional officer, a caseworker and officers on the defensive and detracts from staff oc~urred since the initial Joint Task Force either a teacher or vocational training instructor. The resources to perform other necessary functions. 3. Food wa~ often served cold and menus did review was completed in November, 1980. inmate is permitted to contest the misconduct and Inmates generally praised Graterford's Complaint not prOVide a balanced and nutritious diet. !here are several areas where improvement may call witnesses and receive assistance in presenting Officer personally, criticized the Superintendent for IS needed. his case. A written summary is prepared and the not supporting the Complaint Officer more f d In o~er to complete a comprehensive review of inmate may receive the decision and rationale. The frequently, and felt that the disciplinary review 00 services, the Panel decided to update a report inmate may have the decision formally reviewed by system was merely a long, drawn-out process for c~mpleted for the House Judiciary Subcommittee on rubber-stamping guards' decisions and actions.

Uo"., ______56 ~~ ______"..,."-.' ------~~----- .. 57 Areas of improvement cited: 3. It is believed by the Panel that equipment f. All potentially "hazardous" foods problems and shortages at Graterford are Recommendation 45 a) Weekly food service inspections are being largely responsible for the fact that food must be held at 1450 P (or abOve) or· conducted by the Food Service Manager. 450 P (or below). This will ensure is served at 100PF - 125 OF rather than at It is recommended that inmates assigned to Training by the Central Office of t.~e Bureau 1450 F or above. The purchase of new that unwanted bacterial growth does of Correction is being provided to the managers equ ipment and the repair of existing steam not occur. the kitchen work crew should be carefully g. screened and then provided training to to help standardize this inspectiona/ activity. tables will· remedy this problem. The use of wooden paddles in the kitchen and bake shop be discontinued. improve their job performance and future h. emplo!ability. Qua!ity food preparation is b) Food Service managers and supervisors have The nutritional aspect of food preparation More large garbage remoJJal dumpsters been provided some training in food service are needed. essential to the SJrlooth operation of any is mon itorecl:-by a contracted consu Itant i. corr:ctional fat:ility. A well-trained and sanitation. and master menu planner. The consultant All openings to the outSide which may permit the entrance of insects or motIvated Wurk force should improve the has commented that lithe new therapeutic I quality of food preparation. c) The Food Service Procedu re Manual of the diet system is going well and that meals ! rodents should be closed. Bureau of Correction has been updated. served du ring her visit to Graterford were in conformance with the Master Menu. 1I A d) Significant. cleaning and painting of food computeri~ed assessment of nutrients is preparation rooms and equipment has been . now being developed. accomplished. Overall, the Bureau staff has initiated a major e) Evidence of rodents and cockroaches was effort to improve food services at Graterford. The minimal. fol/owing three recommendations are offered by the Graterford Panel in the belief that further f) Preparation and serving areas have been improvement can be achieved. screened to control flies. Recommendation 43 Efforts to follow through on other administrative recommendations of the It is recommended that gas-heated serving November 1980 report should continue. Most counters in the cell block dining rooms be APPENDICES TO THE PANEL REPORT important is the training of food service repaired or ,replaced. More importantly, personnel in an attempt to keep updated on Page heated serving carts should be purchased APPENDIX A Sketches of State Correctiona/lnstitution at Graterford. technical information. for transporting foods from the kitchen to 60 each of the dining areas. This will ensure APPENDIX B Selected Photographs ...... Areas where improvement is needed and which that meals are served at the proper 62 have significant public health importance: temperature, thereby preventing potential APPENDIX C Glossary of Names Associated with the Graterford Hostage Incident health/sanitation problems. 64 a) Improper temperature for potentially APPENDIX D Employee Hostages...... hazardous food during preparation, display, 66 service and transportation. Recommendation 44 APPENDIX E Hostage Takers and Other Involved Inmates 67 b) Poor personal hygiene practiced by some APPENDIX F In order to improve sanitary conditions, Material Found Near the Wall at the Point of the Attempted Escape food handlers. and in conformance with the D.E.R. 68 inspection report, the Panel recommends APPENDIX G State Costs Associated with the Hostage Incident c) Improper methods of dishwashing and lack that: 70 of proper equipment and utensil sanitation. APPENDIX H Agreement with Insurgent Inmates...... a. Additional cleaning is needed in the 71 J d) The presence of exterior openings 'l elevator shaft. APPENDIX I Bills of Information Filed Against the Defendants unprotected against insect rodent entrance. b. All meat cutting devices should be 74 sanitized after use. APPENDIX J Bibliography ...... e) Improper storage of toxic materials. c. Additional pot and pan storage areas 75 are needed. f) Improper thawing of frozen food and lack i/~ d. Soap and towels must be pro)'ided to :~; of adequat'~ food protection during storage, ensure use by food service employees. preparation and display. e. All products not in original containers must be labeled. ·i~; .... ~ :.: .,l~ , ; ,

.il'Jl ..~ "ft 58 .:;~.

59

II' o

APPENDIX A APPENDIX A CONTINUED

SKETCH OF THE SKETCH OF. C\PLINARY AREA STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION SCI-GRl?lTERFORD ' if AT GRATERFORD l

" TOWER 7 r'·~f9.·~A§.~ f.9, M.9..~ !~:rc :::: -\,,:'1 ::'~'::::.9. ~! 'l~I.p.~p.-.~.~.:.. ~o ... __..... 1.<:> ...... ESCAPE i::;; ~ ...., ROUTE S ~ ",?T ~.; : ~.J:lPI 1'( ~:j C V 3. LOADING DOCK 1. Hostages held .~ initially in Bread Room. NOTE\ A DISTORTION OF SCALE. THE WALL IS SITUATED APPROXIMATELY 2. Barriers TWICE AS FAR FROM LOADING eventually built RECRF.ATION 0 0 0 0 DOCK THAN IS REFLECTED IN YARD a: a: a: a: by inmates <{ <{ <{ <{ SKETCH. > > >- > TOWER 5 RAGE 3. "Would be" escapists fled from loading l£ l£ l£ l£ l£ U U U U dock to wall. 0 0 U ADMINISTRATION .J 0 0 0 .J .J .J .J OFFICES/RECORDS m m m m I I m 4. Primary negotiations 4: I I I HOSPITAL,STAFF m u 0 w conducted at this DINING,OFFICES,-r-;:n:t-t-~ point in 'shot gun ENTRANCEMAIN .1:~~======~~:M~~~~~C=~~~~~ alley'. VEHICLE ENTRANCE

~xxxxxxxxxxxxxx. ~ ~ ~ ~ Indicates area RESTRICTED controlled by ~ ~ HOUSING \1 ~ ~ captors. ~ HOUSE ~ ~UNIT t~~j Indicates area ~ ~ not under control .x.>

'0 1/ Ii j/ =" 60

,I 61 ------

APPENDIX B

SELECTED PHOTOGRAPHS

Graterford - SCI Main barrier constructed in front of bread room. A Main entrance and vehicle three foot square shoot­ lock on left; tower one on right. ing porthole is visible in the center of the picture.

Courtesy of State Police

Courtesy of Bureau of Correction

The guns that were smuggled into the prison and used during the escape attempt and the hostage-taking. Loading dock with trailer Top - 12 gauge, single barrel on far left; tower seven; wall cut-off shotgun Crescent at the place of the escape Firearms, Victo~, attempt. Picture taken manufactured prior to at the approximate time of 1933. the escape attempt. Left center - 22 caliber, 9-shot revolver, Harrington & Richardso'l model 929. Right center - 38 caliber, 5 shot revolver, Howard Arms Company, manufactured prior to 1941. I Bottom - 20 gauge, double barre! cut-off shotgun, East::rn Arms, manufactured prior to 1921.

Courtesy of State Police Courtesy of State Police 62 '" \ .. '

Pennsylvania State Police APPENDIX C Daniel Dunn - Commissioner Cyril Laffey - Deputy Commissioner GLOSSARY OF NAMES ASSOCIATED WITH THE GRATERFORD Roy Titler - Major - Area I Commander (Troop::. H, lJ, K, Land M) HOSTAGE INCIDENT John McKenna - Captai n.':' Formerly Troop K Commande'r, now Chi ef of Detecti ves, Delaware County . John Flannery - Lieutenant - Officer in charge of Limerick ne.ld Installation, Troop K Staff Hostages Edgar Richards - Lieutenant Oskar Stabs - Trooper Lorenzo Alleyne - Lieutenant I ' John Bozek - Correctional Officer . United States Department of. Justice James Holiday - Corrections Food Serv:ce Instructor Wesley Lowery - Corrections Food ~erylce In~tructor Rudolph Giuliani - Associate Attorney General Eric Mohn - Corrections Food SerVlce Supervlsor Jeffrey Harris - Deputy Associate Attorney Gen~ral Gregory Ward - Correctional Officer Norman Carlson - Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons Stephen Grzegorek - Northeast Regional Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons Governor1s. Office Ell iott Caggins - Equal Employment Opportunity Administrator for Northeast Region, Federal Bureau of Prisons Dick Thornburgh - Governor .' Homer Keeney - Chief Psychologist, Federal Correctional Institution ~t Jay ~Jaldman - General Counsel Petersburg, Virginia Richard Glanton - Executive Deputy General Counsel Robert Martin - Formerly Correctional Administrator for Security, Northeast Robert Ross - Deputy General Counsel Region, Federal Bureau of Prisons; now Superintendent, Federal Prison Paul Cri tchl ow - Press Secl~eti;lry Camp at Allenwood, Pennsylvania Kirk Wilson - Assistant Press Secretary Robert Verderyan -Warden, Federal Correctional Institution at Petersburg~ , Vi rgi ni a Bureau of Correction - Headquarters Hostage Takers Ronald Marks - Commissioner Erskind DeRamus - Deputy Commissione~ Joseph Bowen Raphael Belford - Chief of Psychologlcal Services Lawrence Ellison Kenneth Robinson - Press Secretary Leroy Newsome Calvin Williams Bureau of Correction - Graterford SCI Inmates Who Stayed in the Kitchen Voluntarily Julius Cuyler - Superintendent . Robert Mauger - Deputy Superi ntendent for 01 .. ~ratlOns Otis Graham Lawrence Reid - Deputy Superintendent.for Trea~ment. Drake Hall Donald Vaughn - Major - Principal Medlator durlng flrst three days Frank St. Clair R. H. Spaid - Major Walter Bullman - Captain - In charge of control center at ti~e of incident Outside Mediators ~ William Winder -'Captain - Relief Mediator Robert Dietz - Lieutenant Chuck Stone - Senior Editor and Columnist, Philadelphia Daily News Ronald Lucas - Lieutenant - Relief Mediator John Taylor - Sergeant Others Thomas Buzzar - Correctional Officer Frank Cascino - Correctional Officer Jeff Bowen - Brother of Joseph Bowen Edward Howard - Correctional Officer Marie Bowen - Mother of Joseph Bowen, Robert Molden - Correctional Officer Robert Louden - Member of New York City Police Department Hostage Joseph Roche - Correctional Officer Negotiating Team and Kidnap Task Force Paul Sites - Correctional Officer Harvey Schlossberg - Formerly Director of the New York City Police Kenneth Sobolewski - Correctional Officer Department's Psychological Service Unit Gulderen Bora - Consulting Psychiatrist T. Milton Street - Pennsylvania State Senator Stephen Lucash - Administrative Assistant for Operations Thomas Stachelek - Treatment Director

Co 65 64

,I' r r APPENDIX D

EMPLOYEE HOSTAt,ES

o

1 ~;, 1 '; I J..} r ! } t ,,:~ i1

I' , ·..- ---"-----

i "--- .. ···<--~.'--'.'.".m=."._~,,_._.~.~_~ ... _;\" : r . 0 r

APPENDIX E HOSTAGE TAKERS AND OTHER INVOLVED INMATES

Minimum Release Name Age i ~, Hometown Predominant Crime/Sentence Date Hostage Takers

Joseph Bowen 35 Philadelphia, Pa. First Degree Murder/Life (2) None Lawrence Ell i son 26 Philadelphia, Pa. Robbery, Burglary, Aggravated Assault and Battery/18 to 50 years 10/22/92 Leroy Newsome 27 Philadelphia, Pa. First Degree Murder/Life None Ca 1vi n Wi 11 i ams 31 Philadelphia, Pa. First Degree Murder/Life .....,C) None

Inmates Who Stayed in Kitchen Voluntarily Otis Graham 33 Philadelphia, Pa. Burglary/3 to 10 years; convicted parole violator serving backtime of 6 years, 11 months, 6 days; has a detainer sentence of 1 1/2 to 7 years to follow for Burglary and :,/ Larceny 12/27/87 Drake Hall 34 Philadelphia, Pa. Robbery/10 to 20 years 10/21/86 Frank St. Clair 32 Philadelphia, Pa. Theft/l to 2 years 6/12/82

u

J\~ ____ ... ' .. ' .... ------~'~'~------~. >, ~:.; >_ ... >.>.-, ....-.->.~>.- •'.

APPENDIX F 45. 61 envelopes of Lipton Cup-a-soup, assorted flavors 46. 27 packs of Camel Lights matches 47. Materials Found Near the Wall at the Point of the Attempted Escape 8 bags of Skinner's Salted Jumbo Peanuts, 2 3/4 oz. size 48. 5 bags of Simonis candy, 2 cherry and 3 Spearmint, 8 oz. size 49. 5 bags of Chuckles Ju Jubes, 8 oz. size . 50. 11 chocolate bars, 4 oz. size, 5 Mr. Goodbar, 1 Krackel and 5 chocolate w/Almonds 5l. 3 Snickers 6 pack 1. Two sections of conduit each 10'"2" in length, 311,cou~;i~~ ~n1g~e end of each 52. 2 Envelopes of Tang Instant Breakfast Drink, 4!z oz. size 2. On"e secti on of conduit, 6' 4" in 1ength, U hook 1 X . J h BOWEN 1D d 53. 8 110" size batteries . 3. Six 3" X 5" note books, black address book with papers, ,2 osep . c&r s 54. One sewing kit 4. Plastic bread wrapper containing crushed red pepper 55. One cake of Fostex skin cleanser 5. Manilla envelope containing crushed red pepper . . 56. One cake of soap 6. Red & clear plastic case containing compass, black leather band & dlrectlons 57. Two tooth brushes, one blue and one white 7. Nine bottles of Natural Brand Multiple Yit~min &Mineral Supplement 58. Two Bic Stic ban pens, one with black string .. (sealed bottlp.s, 90 tablets per bottl~) . . 59. Ten Lipton Flo-thru tea bags 8. Eight cans of Hoffman's Super Hi-Proteln Formula 90 rablets, 200 tablets each 60. One deck of Torpedo Poker p1ayirlg cards 9. One 3 oz. tube of Colgate toothpaste 6l. 10. One 2.8 oz. tube of Pepsodent toothpaste Two packs of Gillette double edge razor blades, 1 super stainless and 1 blue blades I 62. One Scripto disposable lighter, yellow in color 11. One 3 oz. can of Hoppe's Lubricating Oil f' 63. One small can opener 12. One l~ oz. container of G96 Buck Lure 64. 24 bread wY'appers 13. One 3~ oz. can of Connors Fi 11 ets of Herring v 65. 330 Frito-Lay Beef Sticks, .45 oz. size 14. One Space Brand Emergency Blanket, size: 56" X 84 66. One pair of grey sweat pants with red stripe on legs 15. Three 8~" clear plastic bottles containing clear liquid 67. One pair of grey sweat pants 16. One. 5!z" clear plastic bottle containing salt 68. One pair of Campus blue jeans 17. One 6" clear plastic bottle containing salt 69'. Three homemade sacks, brown corduroy 18. One 8" white plastic bottle containing clear liquid 70. One homemade sack, brown cloth > 19. One 8!2" plastic Dottle containing clear liquid 7l. One homemade quilted sack, green in color 20. One 5!2" clear plastic Baby r~agic bottle containing clear liquid 72. 11 One homemade quilted sack, green & white in color 21. One Thermos EmergEncy Thermal Blanket, size: 56 X 84" ~. 73 .. One ski cap, blue and bY'own in color 22. Three rolls of toilet tissue 74. One piece of white bath towel with"PA" "in blue 23. One Ri dgi d Heavy Duty 14" Pi pe wrench 75. Three green cloth belts with brass buckles 24. One Ridgid Heavy Duty 101t Pipe wrench 76. Two blue and white hankerchfefs 25. One pair of Channel Lock Pipe pliers 77. One brown cloth belt with brass buckle 26. One Crescent 10" adjustable wrench 78. One pair of insulated socks, red, green & black in c010r 27. One tan plastic cup 79. One pair of wool socks, white with red and blue stripes 28. One tin cup 80. One white sock . 29. One red and chrome Eveready 2 cell flashlight with batteries 8L One plastic rain hat, black in color 30. Three 12" Howard High speed/coarse hack saw blades 82. One brown cloth glove (pair} 31. One 8" Wear-lEver Aluminum dish \ !

68 69

I' , I~!I

APPENDIX G

STATE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE HOSTAGE INCIDENT APPENDIX. H Agreement With Insurgent Inmates

Physical damage to the Graterford State cor:ectional Institu~ion duri~g the hostage incident was minor. The greatest f~scal bu:-den was ~ncurred.~n the area of overtime costs for Graterford and State Pol~ce personnel, wh~ch amounted to $384,651 out of a $440,542 total cost. Correctional overtime costs include overtime necessary to conduct the post-incident shakedown l The absence of clear demands by the insurgent inmates during most of the from November 2 through November 8, 1981. The specific costs reported by the }. ' Bureau of Correction and the Pennsylvania State Police are presented below. five-day siege frustrated prison off;c;qls q$ the,y qttellJpted to negothte q Classification of Costs non...:violent conclusion to the crisis. When demands were finally drawn from overtime Costs for Institutional Personnel •..••••• $288,390 Overtime Costs for State Police Personnel (approximate) 91,000 the captors, they were largely points agreeable to the authorities. Correctional Indus'tries Payroll Charges 24~ 530 Food Spoilage • • • • • • • • • • . • •• 12,511 Salaries of Hostages • • • . • • • • • • • . • • . • • •• 11,326 Maintenance Materiials for Repairs • • • • 2,744 The Panel has monitored the implementation of the agreement and concludes Maintenance Repair: OVertime Costs • • •• 5 t 261 Equipment Rental • • • • •••• 1,965 the nineteen points have been honored in both letter and spirit. National Guard Expenses •••• • • •• 2, 815

Total ••.••••••••••••.••••.••••• $440,542

Source: Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction i I ~

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ISSUES AGREED UPON WILL BE HONORED ONLY HHEN ALL THE'HOSTAGES ARE RELEASED UNHARMED: 1. Bureau of C,orrections agrees to provide safe conduct for Bowen, Ne\'Jsome, 13. Ellison,·Williams, Hall, Sinclair and Graham to appropriate housing unit !tie Federal Authorities have ~greed to accept the follo\'Jing inmates as designated by the Bureau of Corrections. Also includes medical and lnto the Federal Bureau of Prlsons if State officials request. Joseph state police interviews. Bowen, Lawrence Ellison, Calvin Williams, LeRoy Newsome. 14. !he Burea~ and Federal Authori~ies agree to weekly contacts by someone 2. The Bureau of Corrections agr'ees that it will file no criminal charges 1n authorlty for all of Joe's peoPJ~. against inmates who are not involved in the initial escape attempt Qr ")' hostage taking. 15. The Bureau of Pri sons \'Ii 11 these i nma tes 1i ke any other StateFeder~J Boarders. t~eat 3. The amount of hole time spent in disciplinary custody will be in accord 16. with the Administrative Directive 801 governing Beh~vior Adjustment and A change of venue. is the responsibi 1ity of the courts;. however, the Restrictive Housing procedures. No more than six (6) months in disciplinary custody, if no further misconducts occur. Bureau of Forrectlons agrees not to oppose any such recommendation. 17. Any of the f?ur inm~tes transferred from Graterford to the Federal 4. Charges wi 11 be identified by the Pennsylvania State Pol ice, after an Bureau of Prlsons wlll be treated like any other inmate in Federal iftvestigation has been completed. custody.

18. f·~:"'~, I 5, Bureau agrees to provide signed documents confirming the agreements reached Upon req~est ?Y\the-o:

Sj gn cd : -t;.::t;d0~i,O~&~1~ 1.1 ~ ~,ll d J)c!,.1l.il15 Dc rut yeo 1!l!:1 i S $ i 0 il (; r HG r.·c;IlJ of Co rrcc t:i on

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" I APPENDIX J

Bibliography APPENDIX I These documents were reviewed by the Panel during their inquiry:

." " or f ation filed by'the Montgomery American Correctional Association, Riots and Disturbances in Correctional Institutions: A The following are"'B,11s ~~ ~~f~: againsttJdefendants Joseph Bowen, Discussion of Causes, Preventive Measures and Methods of Control, 1981. . county District Attorney L N wsome Cal vi nWi 11 i ams, Lawrence Ell ison and . eroy e • Correctional Services Group, Analyses of Bureau of Correction's Classification System, 1982. Newsome Will ia~ Ell i son Commission on Accreditation for Corrections, Manual of Standards for Adult Correctional Bowen Institutions, June 1979. . Assaul t by Life Prisoner x Correction/Mental Health Task Force, Report: The Care and Treatment of Mentally III Inmates, x x x Pennsylvania 1981. Assaul t by Pri soner X X Governor's Task Force on Maximum Security Psychiatric Care, Report: A Plan for Forensic Mental X X X Health Services in Penn'!Ylvania, December 1977. Escape X X Grissom, Grant R., Impact of Free Venture Prison Industries Upon Correctional Institutions, Terroristic Threats January, 1981. X X X x Criminal Attempt/Escape "EI Senor," Newsweek, August 1?, 1974, pp. 31-32. ., Weapons or Implements of X X Joint Staff'rask Force, SubCOMmittee on Crime and Corrections, Pennsylvania House Judiciary Crime/Escape x Committee, Report on Food Service Facilities, Mental Health Services and Facilities, and Medical Services in Pennsylvania State Correctional Institutions, November 1980. Conspiracy/Weapons or Implements of Crime/ x X National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Peaceful Resolution,of Prison Conflict, 1973. Escape Nadonal Institute of Corrections, Classification: An Overview, Prepared for the National Governors' Association, February21, 1982. Prohibitive Offensive x x x Weapons x National Institute of Corrections, Prison Industries, Prepared for the National Governors' J, Association, February 21,' i 982. /Consp; racy/Prohi bi ti ve x x National l,nstitute of Justice, "Assessing Priscn Environments: A Comparative Approach," 1981. Offensive ~eapons Nationaklnstitute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Grievance Mechanisms in Correctional posse%~ion Instruments of X x x I nstitutiotls, Prescriptive Package, September, 1975. Crime X New Mexico Attorney General, Report on New Mexico State Penitentiary Riot of February 2-3, Conspiracy/possession x 1980, Part I and Part II. .Instruments of Crime x X X Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction, Classification Manual (OM-l02l, March, 1981. Kidnapping X Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction, Classification Study Update, February 5, 1982. X X X Conspiracy/Kidnapping Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction, Correctional Industries Advisory Board Recommendations, X X X Criminal Conspiracy X 1978. X Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction, 18 Month Report, January 1, 1980 ~ June 30, 1981. Robbery Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction, Philosophy of Classification, Past - Current - Future, February, Charges were fil ed 3/17/82. Defendants were arrai ~ne~/ 1982., . 3/ 18/82. Preliminary hearing wa~ held on'3/~5/82 ln \ Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction, Program Level Revision, Administrative Manual, Volume Vii, Carroll A. Rosenberger's office 1n SchwenksVl11e,,::~~~. OM-102, April 21, 1982. . Pfmnsy"1 vania, Montgomery County. Pennsy,lvania COrhmission on Crim~ and Delinquency, A StUd~ of Recid.ivism Among Individuals Granted Executive Clemency In Pennsylvania, 1968- 1t 1, May 25, 1981. Source: Mo~tgomery County District Attbrney's Office c

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Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, "Prison Overcrowding Forum: Resource Material," September 1981. Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, "Staff Report: Prison Overcrowdif}1L Liter,3ture Review," July 1981.

Pennsylvania Department of Education, Review of 1979-80 Educational Programs in the Nine Pennsylvania State Correctional Institutions, 1980. Philadelphia Daily News, The Bulletin, The Philadelphia Inquirer, The Times Herald; Newspaper clippings concerning Graterford State Correctional Institution and hostage incident, October 29, 198! onward.

Special Committee on Prison Disturbances, Preliminary Report, Michigan, June 30, 1981.

Special Committee on Prison Disturbances, Final Report, Michigan, August 4, 1981. U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, National Institute of Mental Health Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency, Police, Prisons, and the Problem of Violence, 1977.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails 1980. '

Zimmerman, Sherwood E. and Harold D. Miller (ed.), Corrections at the Crossroads: Designing Policy, 1981.

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