Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Japan’s Debate over Russia and the Ukraine Conflict A Review of Japanese Periodicals and Think Tank Publications in 2014 and 2015 Leon Daiske Oberbäumer and Alexandra Sakaki

German observers tend to view the causes and consequences of the Ukraine conflict Zeitschriftenschau in a Euro-Atlantic context. Their primary focus lies on Europe’s economic well-being - and stability. The political discourse in Japan reveals a very different perception of the events. In Japan, Russia is viewed not primarily as a European power but rather as an Asian power. In their analysis of the causes and consequences of the conflict, Japanese experts consequently concentrate on the Asian context. Many of them call on Japan to intensify relations with Moscow – even if doing so means departing from the G7 line and Western sanctions policy. Japan’s interests, they argue, are best served by such a SWP course of action.

Before the Ukraine crisis, Japan under the been discussed in numerous political leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe periodicals and think tank publications. was set on achieving an historic break- Much of the analysis is focused on iden- through in relations with Russia. In his first tifying the causes of the crisis. Japanese fourteen months of office, Abe met with specialists place a much greater emphasis the Russian president five times – more than their European colleagues on the than with any other head of or govern- Russian-Chinese relationship and the con- ment. Abe and Putin intended to negotiate flicting interests of the two nations in the a compromise to resolve the territorial dis- post-Soviet space, above all in Central Asia pute over the four southern islands of the and Ukraine. Second, many experts focus Kuril archipelago and finally – seven decades on the rapprochement between Russia and after the end of the war – to conclude a that has taken place since the begin- peace treaty. These plans have been put on ning of the crisis and which springs pri- ice as a result of the Ukraine crisis and marily from Russia’s weakness as a result the sanctions imposed on Russia by the G7 of its international isolation. Opinions are nations. divided on the extent to which this con- Since then, the Ukraine conflict and its vergence is likely to lead to a strong long- effect on Japanese-Russian relations have term partnership. A third area of research

Leon Daiske Oberbäumer, who was an intern in SWP’s Asia Division, is completing a Master of Public Policy SWP-Zeitschriftenschau 3e at the Hertie School of Governance and the University of Tokyo. Dr. Alexandra Sakaki, an Associate in SWP’s Asia Division, October 2015 is a Senior Fellow with the Robert Bosch Stiftung for the topic »Japan in the international system«.

1 lies in extrapolating implications for But Tanaka argues that in recent years, Japanese policy. Many experts call for a Sino-Russian relations have increasingly change of strategy towards Moscow. They become tainted by strategic rivalry and argue that Tokyo’s interests are better distrust. The catalyst for this tension, he served by rapprochement with Russia than believes, is the Silk Road initiative, Beijing’s by the current ambivalent course, which attempt to build an economic belt extend- consists of Japan joining in Western sanc- ing from Central Asia across the Middle tions while at the same time signaling to East to Europe. According to Tanaka, Mos- Russia its desire to maintain good relations. cow disapproves of the way China is em- Calls by right-wing conservative groups ploying massive investment to expand its in Japan for a military buildup, by contrast, political and economic influence to former represent but a minority opinion. Few Soviet republics. Tanaka bases his analysis Japanese researchers address the long-term primarily on statements made by various effects of the Ukraine conflict on the inter- Ukrainian researchers. national order. Tanaka observes that Moscow views China’s rapprochement with Ukraine with great suspicion, given that China has in- The Goals of Russia’s Course creased its acquisition of military tech- of Action nology from former Soviet stockpiles in Ukraine. China made its first purchase Many German observers see the Ukraine in 1998, when it acquired an old aircraft conflict as a geopolitical power struggle carrier, which it subsequently modernized between Russia and West. In their assess- and equipped for its own navy despite ment, the crisis is a manifestation of Russia’s promises to the contrary. According to efforts to bolster its political influence in Tanaka, China has also purchased icebreak- the post-Soviet space and to put a stop to ers and hovercraft and – it is rumored – any further eastward expansion by the even missile technology from Ukraine. It EU and NATO. But many Japanese experts has also been active on the economic sphere. consider such an interpretation one-sided. In 2008 China began promoting the ex- They see the geopolitical competition pansion of an agricultural area in a region between Russia and China in Central Asia with defunct coal and iron ore factories – at and the Ukraine as a second important first as an ecological project. Following the motivation for Russia’s course of action. initial success, China expressed an interest An essay by Tetsuji Tanaka in the con- in leasing the vast three-million-hectare servative monthly Bungei Shunjū (circulation area for no less than thirty years. In order approx. 500,000) is representative of this to facilitate the transport of regional agri- view. Tanaka, who is the director of the cultural products to China, explains Tanaka, Central Asia and Caucasus Research Insti- Beijing is planning to build a large com- tute in Tokyo, concedes that Russia and mercial port on the Crimean Peninsula China have in fact cooperated in Central near Yevpatoria. This plan is alarming the Asia in the past. The two countries have Russian government, whose most impor- actively participated in the Shanghai Co- tant naval port for its Black Sea fleet lies operation Organization (SCO) in order to only 100 km away in . counter the growing influence of the US Tanaka sees the Ukraine conflict as a in Central Asia. Immediately following the strategy by Moscow to thwart China’s plans breakup of the the two coun- and preserve Russia’s sphere of influence tries also came together in the framework and power. Even after the annexation of of the Shanghai Five, the precursor to the Crimea, China is still interested building SCO, in order to resolve regional border its Crimean port and leasing farmland in disputes. eastern Ukraine; but Russia is doing every-

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2 thing in its power to stop it. In Tanaka’s servative camp, he points out that Russia assessment, Russia’s ongoing support for has become an aggressive and strong mili- the armed separatists in eastern Ukraine tary power. Because the influence and the and for an independent “People’s Republic independence of the country depend pri- of Donetsk” are aimed at hindering China marily on access to natural resources and from carrying out its leasing plans. safe export routes, he explains, Russia wants Shinji Hyōdō of the National Institute to use Crimea to export raw materials for Defense Studies (NIDS), a think tank via the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. attached to the Ministry of Defense, also Hidaka predicts that in the future Russia sees the geopolitical competition with will devote more attention to expanding China as a key factor in Russia’s Ukraine its Pacific fleet in Asia. Moscow has become policy. But he places more emphasis than increasingly interested in the natural re- Tanaka on the interplay with two other sources found in the Arctic and has ramped factors. First, Russia perceived the eastern up is presence there. In Hidaka’s assessment, expansion of NATO as a threat. For the loser the sea route from the North Pole across of the , writes Hyōdō, it was hu- the Bering Sea (bypassing Japan) is pivotal miliating to witness the accession of former as it provides Russia with access to these Soviet countries to the alliance. By annex- resources. Hidaka considers it unlikely that ing Crimea, Putin prevented Ukraine from Moscow will make concessions in the terri- following suit. Hyōdō points out that Russia torial dispute over the Kuril Islands, which made use of the same tactic in the Georgia are under Russian administration. Hidaka’s conflict: By recognizing the independence assessment stands for the right-wing con- of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia ren- servative camp, but not for majority opin- dered Georgian accession to NATO impos- ion in Japan. sible. Second, Hyōdō focuses on the conse- quences of waning US power. Washington’s The Sino-Russian Relationship decision not to intervene in the Syria con- since the Beginning of the Crisis flict, argues Hyōdō, has made clear that the US is no longer able to play the role of Japanese observers agree that Moscow is “global policeman”. In view of this fact, the looking for new partners in Asia as a result Kremlin has excluded the possibility of a of being economically and politically iso- US intervention in Ukraine. Hyōdō believes lated by the West. Consequently, the Rus- that the loss of US power also explains why sian-Chinese relationship has suddenly Moscow has annexed a region in the cur- improved. The authors discussed here are rent crisis, whereas in the Georgia conflict in agreement that China has benefited it limited itself to recognizing regions as from Russia’s weakness. For example, China independent. Hyōdō reasons that all three has been able to negotiate favorable prices factors – NATO’s eastward expansion, US for Russian gas imports. But none of the weakness and China’s growing influence in Japanese experts believes that Moscow is Ukraine – have motivated Russia’s course content playing the role of junior partner of action in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. to Bejing. Opinions vary on the prospects Yoshiki Hidaka, visiting senior fellow for Sino-Russian relations. at the Hudson Institute in the US and a Hiroyuki Tanaka, Moscow bureau chief journalist for the Japanese broadcasting of the daily newspaper Mainichi Shimbun, company NHK, comes to a different con- recapitulates the swift rapprochement clusion. In an article published in the between Russia and China since the begin- monthly magazine Seiron, which has a cir- ning of the Ukraine crisis in the liberal culation of approximately 80,000 and is monthly magazine Mainichi Foramu. Tanaka directed primarily at the right-wing con- believes the rapprochement is setting the

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3 course for the coming years. In 2014 alone, national Economic Studies, and Kazuhiko he notes, President Putin and President Xi Tōgō, professor at Kyoto Sangyo University Jinping met five times. Numerous joint and former Japanese ambassador to the projects have been initiated, resulting in Netherlands, come to similar conclusions. certain strategic interdependencies. As evi- Even if Russia has turned to China due to dence, Tanaka cites the gas agreement of Western sanctions, they say, Moscow con- May 2014, according to which Russia com- tinues to harbor deep distrust towards its mitted to provide China with gas for thirty emerging neighbor. Russia therefore wants years beginning in 2019 via a new pipeline. to avoid one-sided dependence on China The author emphasizes that the bilateral at all costs. This is also evidenced by the cooperation is not limited to the energy sec- planned route of the gas pipeline to China, tor. To support Russian enterprises, Chinese which largely traverses Russian territory. banks and investors have stepped in to com- This route allows Moscow to use the pipe- pensate for the lack of Western capital. line to deliver gas to other countries in the Chinese firms are also involved in construc- future. The two researchers believe that the tion of a planned high-speed train connec- Sino-Russian rivalry could have a negative tion between Moscow and Kazan, which lies effect on Japan if Russia expands its mili- 800 km to the east. Supposedly Russia even tary presence in the Kuril Islands in the wants to sell China its newest jet fighter, coming years. A return of the islands to the Sukhoi-35. Though Beijing has not come Japan would then become even less likely. out clearly for or against Russia’s annexa- tion of Crimea, it is providing de facto sup- port. Tanaka views Russia’s plans to involve Implications for Japan Chinese companies in the construction of a bridge between the Russian mainland and Nearly all the authors of the articles ana- Crimea as evidence of this support. Tanaka lyzed here call for a realignment of Japa- sees great potential for cooperation between nese policy towards Russia. The govern- the two countries in the coming years, even ment under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has if Moscow wishes to avoid becoming overly thus far pursued a dual-track strategy. On dependent on Beijing and is looking for the one hand, the government has joined other foreign policy partners. the other G7 countries in condemning The previously mentioned Tetsuji Tanaka Russia’s actions in Ukraine. On the other is more skeptical when it comes to rap- hand, it has only half-heartedly imple- prochement tendencies. Tanaka ironically mented the toothless sanctions imposed on calls them a “honeymoon” resulting solely Russia. This approach has enabled Tokyo to from Western sanctions and points out that signal to Russia its desire to maintain good the competitive relationship remains and relations with Moscow, a message that will continue to impede close long-term Putin has understood. But most observers cooperation. He also warns observers not to judge that this ambivalent policy does not be deceived by Russia’s involvement in the sufficiently serve Japan’s interests. They New Development Bank BRICS (with head- urge Japan to pursue closer ties with Russia. quarters in Shanghai) or by possible partici- Some authors justify this assessment by pation in the Asian Infrastructure Invest- pointing out the advantages for Japan. They ment Bank (AIIB) initiated by Beijing. In speculate that Russia, weakened as it is by fact, Moscow’s leading circles are deeply Western sanctions, is likely to make con- concerned about China’s growing claim cessions in the dispute over the Kuril Islands; to power in Central Asia. the timing is therefore propitious for nego- In an interview printed in the liberal tiations. This opinon is shared, for example, monthly Sekai, Tomoaki Nishitani, director by the previously mentioned Kazuhiko Tōgō of the Toyota-financed Institute for Inter- and by Mitsuhiro Kimura, head of the right-

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4 wing nationalist political group Issuikai. In powers that currently counterbalance an interview with the conservative monthly China’s growing regional and international magazine Gekkan Nippon, they allege that influence. Given this state of affairs, Abiru Moscow has a great interest in maintaining recommends that Japan make clearer strides good relations with Tokyo, since Russia is towards Russia, even if that means breaking anxious to reduce its dependency on Beijing. ranks with the G7. Abiru points out that Japan should therefore lift its economic such a strategy also has its supporters in sanctions against Russia and seek to estab- the US, citing as an example a Foreign Affairs lish closer economic, cultural and military article by Ely Ratner and Elizabeth Rosen- cooperation. If Tokyo holds out the pros- berg from August 2014. The authors call on pect of technology transfer and bilateral Washington to allow its Asian alliance part- energy trade, then Russia will open up to ners greater room for maneuver in their cooperation and dialogue. The authors relations with Moscow in order to reduce argue that Japan should pursue an inde- Russia’s dependence on China. Abiru also pendent foreign policy and not allow itself notes that the first “search-and-rescue” to be guided by other G7 countries. The training conducted by Russian and Japa- previously mentioned Tomoaki Nishitani nese naval units since the Ukraine crisis, believes that pursuing such an active, in- which took place in October 2014, met with dependent policy can strengthen Japan’s a positive response by Robert Thomas, Com- role as a global actor and make it a worthy mander of the US Seventh Fleet. In view of US partner. the lack of contacts between US and Russian Other authors draw attention to the naval forces, Thomas assessed the training risks of continuing to pursue an ambivalent as a particularly important point of contact Russia policy. Taisuke Abiru, a research with Russia. fellow at the influential private think tank It is striking that most proponents Tokyo Foundation, outlines two of these underestimate the negative effect that a risks in an article on the think tank’s web- change of strategy towards Russia could site. First, though Tokyo has endeavored to have on the observance of internationally diversify its energy imports since the Fuku- binding norms and rules. If Tokyo were to shima catastrophe, Abiru questions whether stop implementing sanctions, Beijing might an intensified Japanese-Russian energy co- conclude that breaches of international operation will develop as envisioned. He law, though temporarily condemned, are points out that there have been signs that ultimately tolerated. Many Japanese govern- Russia is withdrawing from plans to build ment officials thus fear that China could several liquid natural gas plants in eastern follow Russia’s example and occupy the Siberia following the conclusion of the Rus- Senkaku Islands (Chinese: Diaoyutai) in the sian-Chinese agreement on gas deliveries in East China Sea, which are currently under May 2014. According to statements made Japanese administration. by the CEO of Gazprom and his deputy in Only a few of the authors discussed September and October 2014, the company here draw attention to this possible conse- is in the process of determining whether quence. One of them is Shigeki Hakamada, gas acquired in Siberia can be delivered professor at the University of Niigata Pre- exclusively to China. Such considerations fecture. In an article in the magazine Gaikō, reveal how weak Russia’s negotiating posi- published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tion vis-à-vis China currently is. he advises Japan to maintain good reala- Second, Abiru fears the balance of power tions with Russia but to also make clear in Asia could be upset if Russia were to that it is unacceptable to violate the sover- become more dependent on China. Forcing eignty of Ukraine. If Japan does not position Moscow to play the role of junior partner to itself clearly vis-à-vis Russia, it can hardly Beijing would simultaneously weaken those expect the international community to sup-

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5 port it should China occupy the Senkaku tive monthly magazine Chūō Kōron, that a Islands or even Okinawa Island, the main split between the BRICS and the G7 coun- US military base in Japan. For Hakamada, tries and their allies is looming on the Tokyo therefore has no choice but to con- horizon. Yoshizaki points out that Russia tinue pursuing its dual-track policy – a has intensified its cooperation with the difficult diplomatic balancing act. other BRICS partners since the beginning of Yoshiki Hidaka comes to exactly the the Ukraine crisis. At their summit meeting opposite conclusion. In an article for the in July 2014, the BRICS countries agreed to monthly magazine Voice, which like Seiron establish their own New Development Bank is directed at the right-wing conservative as well as the Contingent Reserve Arrange- camp, he argues that Japan must arm itself, ment, a monetary reserve fund – thus chal- as it is facing two major powers that dis- lenging the West and the established inter- regard . Tokyo cannot rely national financial institutions. Yoshizaki solely upon its alliance partner, the US. sees China and Russia, in particular, as Hidaka argues that it is unclear whether working together in this area in order to Washington would stand by Japan mili- defy the West. Nevertheless, he believes that tarily in a conflict situation, for example the BRICS countries are destined to fail over the Senkaku Islands. The domestically because they lack both political unity and weakened Obama administration, Hidaka economic stability. points out, lacks the financial resources The already-mentioned Shigeki Haka- to engage in another conflict. Thus, Japan mada dismisses as unrealistic the idea that needs to provide for its own protection. But blocs could be established similar to those Hidaka does not stipulate the extent to formed during the Cold War. He concedes which he believes Japan should arm itself. that the Russian president intends to form a Eurasian Economic Union of former Soviet republics as a counterweight to the Implications for the EU and that Putin wants to add further International Order Soviet successor nations to the current list of five members (Armenia, Kazakhstan, The long-term effects of the Ukraine con- Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Belarus). Due to the flict on the international order receive little close ties between some of these countries attention in the Japanese debate. None of and the EU, however, this plan is unlikely the authors discussed here addresses how to come to fruition. In the end, Hakamada the crisis is affecting international disarma- concludes that the mutual economic de- ment efforts, particularly the resultant loss pendencies in today’s globalized world run of trust among negotiating partners. Also counter to the formation of such a bloc. lacking are proposals for how to institute effective crisis management in the future. The consequences of the crisis for Europe’s Conclusion security order are also neglected. When aspects of political order are dis- In light of the conflict over Ukraine, most cussed, Japanese experts concentrate pri- Japanese experts agree that Russia is seek- marily on the question of whether this ing to secure its political influence in the conflict has the potential to split the inter- post-Soviet space vis-à-vis the EU and NATO national community into two power blocs. as well as an ever-stronger China. They Tatsuhiko Yoshizaki draws attention to believe Moscow is alarmed at Beijing’s in- this very danger. Yoshizaki, an economist tention – which has become apparent in at the Sojitz Research Institute, which is the past few years – to strengthen its ties sponsored by the Japanese trading company with Ukraine and Central Asian countries. Sojitz Corporation, argues in the conserva-

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6 The sudden improvement in Russian- Articles Discussed Chinese relations since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis despite geopolitical competi- Abiru, Taisuke, “Ukuraina kikigo no wa tion is attributed to Russia’s international ga kuni no tai roshia senryaku – rochū isolation and the sanctions imposed on it. sekkin no torendo ni dō taisho suru ka” At the same time, there is some disagree- [The Japanese Russia Strategy after the ment as to whether the current improve- Ukraine Crisis: How Should One Respond ment has the potential to lead to close part- to the Trend towards Russian-Chinese nership. Due to the ongoing competition Rapprochement?], in Tokyo Foundation between the two sides, many researchers (online), 4 December 2014, http://www. call this prospect into question. In their tkfd.or.jp/research/project/news.php?id= view, the rapprochement is not based on 1377. trust and conviction, but rather on Russia’s Hakamada, Shigeki, “Puchin no yabō, weakness alone. Yūrashia dōmei to sekai shin chitsujo” The advice Japanese experts are giving [Putin’s Ambition: Eurasian Union and their own government provides German the New Global Order], in Gaikō, May policymakers with food for thought. Japa- 2014, pp. 24–30. nese researchers favor rapprochement with Hidaka, Yoshiki, “Puchin wa Hokkaidō Moscow for several reasons. They suspect o nerau” [Putin’s Goal Is Hokkaido], in that due to its current weakness, Russia is Voice, July 2014, pp. 104–111. willing to make concessions in order to Hidaka, Yoshiki, “Roshia no kyokutō gain international partners and overcome tāgetto wa Hokkaidō da” [The Goal of its isolation. This stance could facilitate an Russia’s Eastern Pivot Is Hokkaido], agreement in the Japanese-Russian terri- in Seiron, October 2014, pp. 280–287. torial dispute. Furthermore, by continuing Hyōdō, Shinji, “Gunjiteki shiten de its current Russia policy, Japan could ob- yomitoku roshia no kurimia hennyū, struct its own plans to diversify its energy ‘Kinji te’ ni fumikitta haikei” [Russia’s imports. As Russia is both a European power Annexation of Crimea Analyzed from a and an Asian power, the two regions inter- Military Perspective: Background to act on many levels. Both Japan and Ger- the Decision to Commit “Foul Play”], in many, as well as Europe as a whole, would Gaikō, May 2014, pp. 36–41. benefit from a better understanding of one Nishitani, Tomoaki and Kazuhiko Tōgō, another’s respective vantage points. Active “Ukuraina no antei he, Sekai o ugokasu exchange on the academic and political nihongaikō no yakuwari to wa nanika” level would facilitate discussion regarding [Ukrainian Stability as a Goal: What the aforementioned interaction and pro- Role Must Japan’s Foreign Policy Play in mote improved foreign policy coordination Moving the World?], in Sekai, October between the two sides. 2014, pp. 38–51. Tanaka, Hiroyuki, “Chūgoku ni kyūsekkin suru roshia, Sekai wa ima” [A Russia That Is Quickly Moving towards Rapproche- ment with China, the World Today], in Mainichi Fōramu, Dezember 2014, p. 40. Tanaka, Tetsuji, “Puchin no hyōteki wa Chūgoku da” [Putin’s Goal Is China], in Bungei Shunjū, June 2015, pp. 324–331.

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7 Tōgō, Kazuhiko and Mitsuhiro Kimura, “Abe Seiken wa tai-ro seisai o kanwa seyo” [The Abe Administration Should Ease the Sanctions against Russia], in Gekkan Nippon, January 2015, pp. 48–53. Yoshizaki, Tatsuhiko, “Ukuraina ga tsukuru G7 tai BRICS no zushiki” [The Ukraine Crisis Is Causing a Split between G7 and BRICS], in Chūō Kōron, September 2014, pp. 20–21.

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Translation by David Barnes

(English version of SWP-Zeitschriftenschau 3/2015, September 2015)

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