Linksalternative Milieus und Neue Soziale Bewegungen in den I970er lahren

Herausgegeben von CORDI A BA UMANN SEBASTIAN GEHRI G NI COLAS BUCH SE im Auf trag der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften des Landes Baden-Wilrttemberg

U niversitatsverlag WI NTE R Heidelberg Bibliogr3fische Inronnation der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzciehnet di ese Publikalion in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie: detaillierte bibliografische Dalen sind im Internet lIber hltp://dnb.cI.nb.de abrufbar.

I. Einieitung

UMSC HLACBILO CORDIA BAUMANN, NICOLAS SOCHSE, SEBASTIAN GEHR IG C dpa. OemQIISlraliQn gegen geplan/I!( Atomkraftwerk Whyl. Protest und gesell schafllicher Wandel in den I 970er Jahren ...... II

n. A USSERPARLAMENTARISCHER PROTEST IN DEN I 970ER JAHREN­ SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHE UNO HISTORJ SCHE P ERSPEKTIVEN

DIETER RUCIIT: Linksalternatives Milieu und Neue Soziale Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik: SelbstversUindnis wld gesellschaftlicher Kontext ...... 35

JACCO PEKELDER: Towards another Concept of the State: Historiography of the 1970s in the USA and Western Europe ...... 6 1

1II. STUDIEN

J. BEWEGUNGEN UND MIUEUS:

EV A- MARIA SILIES: Ein, zwei, viele Bewegungen? Die Di versital der Neuen Frauenbewegung Dieses Werk einschlieSlich aller seinerTeile iSI urheberrechdich geschlilZt. Jede in den 1970e r Jahre n der Bundcsrepublik ...... 87 Verwertung auBerhalb der engen G r em~en des Urheberreehtsgeselzes ist ohne Zuslimmung des Verlpges unlullissig und strafbar. Dlls gilt insbesondere fUr VervielOilligungen. OberRtzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die Einspeicherung ANDREA HAJEK: und Verarbeilung in elektronischen System.:n. Fragmented Identities: Transformations in the Italian Al ternati ve C 201 I Universitlllsveriag Winler GmbH lieidelberg Left-wing Mil ieu 1968- 1977 ...... 107 Imprim «! en Allemagne· Printed in Germany Drucie.: Memminger MedienCenlrum, 87700 Memmingen 2. M EDlEN UNO GEGENOFFENTLfCHKEIT: Gedruckt aur umweltfreundlichem.chlorrrei gebleichlem und aherungsbestllndigem Papier REGINA WICK: Den Ve rlag crrei<:hen Sic im Internet unler. ,,Eine Bewegung, tiber die nichl berichlet wird. findet nicht statt." www.winter·verl ag·hd.de Das Bild der Friedensbewegung in bundesdeutschen und britischen Zeilungen ...... 133 Jacco Pekcldcr

Towards Another Concepl of the Slale: Hi stori ography of the 1970 s in the USA and Western Europe

After ycars of neglect, the 1970s have recently entered the array of academic interest. In the USA and in Western Europe a growing nllmber of historians are finall y pulling the decade out of the shadows of the I 960s and the I 980s. As can be e x. pected in such an early phase of academic exploration, there is still lillIe that tics all publications about the Sevent ies together. In steud . the repre­ sentation of thi S imporlunt decade suffers from a degree of fragmentation that blinds out the grander narratives. Of COUfse. it is unrealistic 10 ask of every single historian to already In.ke a bird· s eye view of the decade. especially since we arc still in such an early phase of studying the Seventies. In effect, with all the historical sources that are still wailing to be explored, most researchers will have to get on thei r knees and look at things from below. In order nOt to over­ reach themselves. they will have to narrow down the themes of thei r projects to well-delineated topics and to restrict their attention to only (a parl 01) a single coumry. The writer of these lines has himself among other thin gs published a detailed study about a relatively minor aspect of the Seventies; the loose net­ work of left -wing Dutch acti vists and intellectual!-; sympmhizing with terrorists of German y's Red Amly Faction (RAF).' However understandable th is focus on manageable themes may be. it does entail the ri sk of narrowing down the line of questioning, too, which woul d be a shame. All {he lllore so, since some hi storians. in thcir obsession with dctail. betray a tendency to overstate the uniqueness of the phenomena they study, an yway. Di sregard of comparable developments elsewhere does not have to be, but historiography about the 1960s has for instance shown thm fragmenta­ tion into so many national namllives is hard to avoid. Not until fairly recent ly have hi storian s begun to seriously take into account internaliomil and transna­ ti onal elements in their writings :.lbout the Sixti es. It would be a shame if re­ searchers of the 19705 needed as long a time to take that same turn .

Jacco Pckelder: s)·II I/Jalhie l"/}()r elf! RAJ." - De Ho/r: Armel! "·rakli,m il! Nf!der/mu/. /970-/980. Amslcrdam 2007. and Jw:co Pekeldcr: ·· Dynarniken des Teu orismus in Deu tsc hland lind den Nicdcrl anden,·· in: Ge .~chiC " I .' wul GeSI!/I.1"clld{i 35 (2009). No. 3. Pl'. 402--t28. 62 Jatoo Pckelder TOlVllrd~ AnOlhcrConccpl 01" th e St:HC 63

Therefore it seems useful to present a critical evaluation of Seventies' hi SlOrj­ away, too. With great passion Schulman wrote about the Seventi es as an era of ography. comparing the ground-breaking publications of a number of Ameri­ a "new sensibilily", a decade of irony, ambivale.nce, tonaues in cheeks:\ In can hi ~ t o ria n s with the efforts of some of their Eu ropean colleagues . How do sholt. Schulman portrayed the era as a meaningful and thoughtful tim('. And both characteri ze the: decade. What politicaL economic and cultural develop­ next to that, Schulman argued that the Seventi es had been a pivotal tim(', in ments lire prominent ill thei r research and. of course. what are the similarities whi ch cru ei!1 1 changes occurred that together amounted to "a great shift in and di fferences in the way lhe Seventies arc portrayed? Such an overview will American cultu re. society. and poli tics". as the subtitle of his hook rings out. assist hi ~l ori ans in contextualizing their studies and will heighten their aware.­ With thi s reappraisal of the 1970s Schulman was clearly ahead of the ness of broader. ilH ernational and transnational developments that might have crowd. writing at a moment when mOSt swdents of contemporary hi story re­ 1 an inlluence on the smaller-scale phenomena they analyze. Moreover. it wilt garded the.se tepid times ;IS either an after-party of the fri volously revo lutionary also enable them to provide better explanations 1.0 their fellows in the academic Sixties or us a foreplay for the hedonistic bonl"ire of the Eighties - in ShOll, as community and the. public at large as to why it makes sense to commit as much an inconsequential impasse between more innuenliul t ime s .~ Since then. the time as they do to th e. seemingly small problems they study. I 970s have slowly acquired morc interest among histori ans. tn 2006 Edward Before commencing, it is important to note that when it tomes to Europe. Berkowitz (George Washington Univcrsit y) presented :l second serious mono­ my aCCOUnl betrays a bias towards Gennany. Britain and of course the Nether­ graph about the decade. and gave it the programmat ic title "Someth ing hap­ lands, because I am especially well acquaintcd wi th hi stori ography about these pened." to correct everybody who was still clinging to the image of the 1970s countries. Apart from th is, I should mention that my interest in general ac­ as a du li and uneventful period.5 Apan from thaI. several collections of essays counls of the decude sprang from a far tm)rc specific interest in left -wing po­ were published in the US . sometimes with a stress on social issues and popular liti cal violence and terrorism in West Germany front the lme I 960s to the end culture,6 and sometimes with more attenti on to politica l developments.? of Ihe 1990s. Through the study of the broad milieu of radical left-wing com­ With two or more hi storians in a room. you mi ght expect a discussion munes. comminees. part ies et cetera in the 1970s and their reactions to the ac· about periodic delineation. and Schul man and Berkowitz are not about to dis· ti ons and proclamations of thei r violent comrades of the RAF Hnd other tcrror- prove thi s rule. Schulman On the onc hand sketches the Seventi es as a 15-yenr 1st organizations. I gathered that there was morc to thc decade than the general period. starting ri ght after 1968. In his opinion thi s double-faced year, wi th its image accoullled for. revolts. its polilical assassinations. its crushing of the Prague spring and its Re­ publican conq uest of the presidency. marks the end of the Sixt ies und the be­ ginning of the Seventies. According to Schulman the "Lon& Seventies'· did American Beginnings onl y end with President Ronald Reagan's second victory. Berkowitz on the other hand nUlTOWS the era down to the period 1973- Serious academic work aboul the 19705 be.gan in the USA , where Bruce 1981 . 1n his eyes the Seventies firs t took off in the year when American troops Schulm

In fact the co ll cction Ri,qllll1'nril Buulld. ediled by Schu lmun ;\lId ZeliF.er. nmkc$lhis tllSI poi nt I: Tum Wulft:: "The Mt: Dcclide lIlal the Third Greal Awakenin g." in: Tnt New Ym'ku, 23 Au­ even mOre f<)rcc full y. gU<1 11)76 (reprinted in: Tom Wolfe: Milul't! GIOI'ej (llid Madlll"lI, C!wl<'r fwd WIIC, New '/ Schulman: The Set'eli/it'S. fn ], p. 4. York 1976). 1'1 Berkowi ll.: Some/hillS hlll'pt'lled. fn 5, p. Q, () Philippe Ch~s~3igne: us A!!Iu!e~< 1970 _ Fill d'lIl! MOlld., 1'1 (}rigilll!- de /IOU'/!' 'IImlemill . PllriS I t Schulman: nil: Set'(mir.I'. fn 3. p. xii. 2 00~ . 66 Jaceo Pekcldcr T()w ard ~ Anolher COIlC'::pt of che StOIC 67 more or less combines the di sc·ussion of the decade wi th the ,19805 under the vious decades of escalating growth. twO German historians have for instllnce caplion "Recession:!l: 1971- 1989".1<1 Not surplisingly, olher than Schulman. framed history since 1970 as time "after the boom.,, '11 A s this phrase ill1p li ~ Judi does not hold the Seventies in high esteem. cenainly not when it concerns 100. these books often make the point that the 1970s wefC the threshold of our the culture of the limes: "In the li fe of the mind. the nineteen seventies were own times. Another German historiun. Konrud JarHusch. presents lhe decade tiS Ihe most dispiriting decade o f the twentieth century:· 15 offering "a pre-history of present-day problcms:·'9 Comparing Ih c~c general account" with the American historiograph y spc­ In Western European historiography many of the four points di~ti ll ed dali z.ing on the 19705;s of course of limited valu!;! , but still it is interesting 10 above from the works of Schulman and Berkowitz retu rn . The manlier in nole thaI there obviollsly is a broad consensus .lnlOng historians thm the Seven­ which the huge cultural changes in the Seventies are depicted is for example tic !> were a cru cial turning point in world hi5101)'. All of them agree thai, to very sim il ar to the accounts of the cuI tum I changes in the US. But ther(' are quote the widely rc !;pccted Eric Hobsbawrn: "An em was at an end:,l/) [t was also important differences. Instead of fnlllling the arri val of new groups to the the decade in which "The Goldcn Ycars" or. to say it with typical French gran­ poli tical arena as a "rights revolution." hi storians describi ng Western Europe deur. "Le~ Trente Glorieuses" (the thirty glorious years). came to a close. for instance mostl y strc"S the appearance o f "single issue movements," or "new Around 1970 the exceptional postwar period of more than twenty years o f un­ social movements:' mentioning not onl y the feminist or women's emanclptressed too: Vietnam and lhe pressure on the dollar, the end of ties anti established represenl:llive institutions. The fact thut in multiparty pu­ Brcllon Woods. the Oil Crisis. the economic recession, and the. revolutionizing litical ~ystem s like West Gcnnany or. even morc. the Nethcrlands. some of of social bonds and cultural h'lbi ts. 17 While most of them t ak~ 1973 as the ye:lr these single issue movements fairly e:lsily entered the central politic.al arena. the pag~ was tumed. and Ih u~ display a likeness to Berkowitz. some put more be it as an independent p:lrty or as un intluential group in an established party. ~ Ire ss on the slow drift into the crisis era from the late Sixties onward, and tim!) strikes many histori ans as typical for the age. 111is also counts for the evapora­ are nearer to Schulman. tion of traditional affiliati ons to the large established (Social or Christian De­ Books. collectjons or magazine specials deali ng with certain European mocratic) catch-ull parties from whieh the new pol itical formation s profited. w untries in the 1970s amVor concenlnning on specific themes (culture, eco­ As far as the severe economic problems and the crisis of competence arc nomi cs, politics) have started to appear in respectable numbers over the last concerned, it is clear that Ihese were also general phenomena in Europe. Like yearf.. In my attempt to establish the similari ties and differences between US leaders, European governments at first tried to tackl e thc recession of the American and European de~c ription s o r the decade. I will conc~ ntrat e on these early Seventies with the Keynesian instruments po l itici:lIl ~ and economists had kinds of speciClc publications rather than on the general accounts. A s one grown accustomed to. Likewise. these responses proved to be futile, in part be­ wou ld expect, Ihe speciali zed publications share the appreciat ion of the decade cause "spending your way out" of the crisis was not a viabl e and sustainable as a time of change, :llld thus of importance, otherwise they would probably strategy anymore when governments werc already pumping large amounts of not have bee n published. In a negati ve wuy. offsetting the Seventies to the pre- money into the economy and were already heavily indebted. Just like the US. Western Europe was facing problems of a more structural " Eric ~I ohsbaw m : Tilt AS/' II/ £'tlrtmes - nt Short Th:e./Ilielh Ctll/l'ry 1'1/4-1991. London character than mOSt people initially realized. Already at the outset of the 1970s t'l9~, M :llt MalQwcr: J),,,* Comim'II 1 - Eurdpt's T"'('IIlielil Ce" /lIn.. London t998; Tony Western Europc's economy was in a bad shupe. In part. the economic take-off Jud I. f'OJlnor - A lliS/IIr)''-1 EUrrJ/~ .~ill a 19J5, LondOn 2007: Bcm~rd W:.s.-.erslcin: IJmvll' of Western Europe after the war had been u result of incomes remaining rcluw rilm Ch: "VCrkantill'r Slrukllllwllndel _ Di e siehl:iger Jllllrc ai, Vorgesc:hi.::hle d.::r IiII'. ed. by idemfCharlcs S. M:lIcrlErez MUllllc talDun icl J. Sargt'nl. Cambridge, MA 2010, pp. Problcme dcr GegeIl W:.rt. Min: Duj Elltlt, f/er Zm'l'okh(? - Oil' sil''':I,~t' r J"lrrt' til, GI"{'hidr 1- 2 1, p.2(J. Ie, ed. by Kunrad H. Jarilli sc h. GtlllJngcn 2008. pp. 9- 26. 68 Jatco Pckeltlcr Tuwards AnOlher Concepl of lh.; Slale 69 figure~ high. However, already in the course of the [960s competitiveness of German historians even call the Seventies the "Social Democratic Decade" Western European economics on the world market started to slip, because em­ (Bernd Faulenbach), a term they use precisely in this dual sense. that Social ployers - in part fo rced by narrow labor markets - started paying higher wages Democr:lcy was calling the shots but also faced the greatest dilemmas in the and governments started 10 mise taxes to mee t the risi ng costs of an ex panding I 970s.!O welr:lrc Sl:Itc. As a consequence profits dropped and inllation rose, and result­ In a 10( of respects for West Gennany this image of the "Social Democratic ing hi gher prices cre:l1ed new pressure to raise salaries and social benefits. Decade" makes good sense. From 1969 to 1982 the Sozialdemokratische Panei Even aflcr those in power realized the severity of the situation. gavem­ Deulschlands (SPD, Social Democratic Party of Germany) ruled the count ry in mcnls failed 10 convince the public, and especially organi7.cd interests. espe­ a coalition governmenl wit h the Freic DemQkratische Partei (FDP, Free Dc­ cially the trade unions, that Keynesian methods were nOI going to offer a solu­ mocratic Part y). which was by far its j unior. Two SPD leaders, Willy Brandt tion 10 innalion tlnd rising unemployment ligu res. In their inability to jump the (until 1974) and Helmut Schmidt. fun ctioned as Bundeskanzler. be it with impasse, govcrnment.s all over Westem Europe appeared powerless and not styles of leadership that were very different.21 It was these Social Democrat unlikc the si tuati on in thc US in Western Europe this crisis of competence gave leaders that became central to fhe popular and acadcmic historical image of the rise to a break-down of thc postwar consensus regarding the abi li ty of govern ­ 1970,. ments to steer and structure society and economic affairs, Where in the US the The tendency 10 fram e the Seventies as a Social Democratic era in German liberal conse nsus crumbled and Democra ts slowly lost their grip, in Europc's postW:lt hi story is furthcr enhanced by the fact that in the years before and afler case the Social Democrats were at the centre of the slOry, this period the Chri:. tlich Dcmokrntischc Union (COU, Christian Democratic Union). firsl under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and hi s immediate successors Ludwig Erhard and Kurt Georg Ki esinger and from 1982 to 1998 under Chan­ Social Democracy under Pressure cellor Helmut Koh l. together wit h its Bavarian partner. the Christlich SoziaJe Un ion (CSU. Christian Social Union). has had slich a disproportionately long Europe's version of the "postwar" or "liberal consensus" was what Tony Judt stay in power in the country. So it is understandable that in lhis light the Sev­ has named "The Social Democratic Moment ." After 1945 all over Westem emies automaticall y appear as the Social Democrat ic phase in German history. Europe essential points of the Social Democrati c poli tical program were im­ This is however to some extent a distortion of the facts of political life in the plemented. In a number of countries, especially in Scandinavia and. from 1945 Federal Republic of Germany, in which there always have been big differences \0 the carly Fifties and then again fro m the mid Sixties. in Great Britain. the in the make-up o f governments on the federal level and in the states. On the Social Democrats themselves were directly responsible for the vast ex pansion one hand. long before gaining govemmcnt posts in Bonn, the Social Democrats of the welfare state and the ever-growing influence of state institutions on eco­ !X'sscssed a fai r share of power and intluence. especiall y in WeStern and nomic c nterpri .~ . the redistribution of wealth and many aspects of everyday Northe.rn states, where they dominated governments for years on end. On the life. In other countries however. conservative or confessional parties. by them­ other, in the Seventies, with the Social Democrats seemingly dominan!. the selves or in coali,ion governments with either Socialist or even rightwing par­ Christian Democrats had powerful state governments that could innuence fed­ ties, built the welfare state Social Democrats had demanded for so long. Such eral poli lics through the Statcs' representatives in th t! Federal Council. in was the postwar consensus in Western Europe. holding that state regulation of whi ch they even had a majority from the mid 19705 onwards. These facts make the economy and state moderation of socio-political tensions by deali ng out the Fifties and Sixties somewhat less of a Christian DemOC ratic era, and corre­ benefits fo r instance, was elementary to progress and prosperi ty. .~ pondin g l y. nuance Ihe Social Democrutic character of the Seventi es. Still . it was II consensus lIHlt hud a Social Democratic ring to it. and when the brcak-down started ill the early J9705 it was Social Democracy thilt came under pressure most to come up wi th new answers - and that had the hardest lime 10 take leave rrom its former policies. Books about the UK. the Federal JI. (krmJ Faulcubach: "Di e Siebl.igcrj;lhl'l: _ .;in soz:iahlCl1ltlkr;.uJ\Ches Jah w:hm!: ' iu: An'hil' /iir RepUblic, and the Netherlands in the 1970s bear witness to this by the exten­ Sidalgeschichu 44 (2O()J). I'r. 1-37. ~J S.:t: Peler Mersehurgcr. lVi/'" IJrl/lJdl 19/J- f992 - Vi.lifJu tir 111111 Ht'n/iSl, SllIt1g:1M 2002; EO­ sive way they portnlY the plight of the respective Social Democratic parties. gar Wotfl'\lm: Oil': seslilc:fcl(' Demokrolil': - Gl':Jl.'iliriJle tier Hum/rJrtpllhllk O{lu/Klritllld I'ml German hi <; torio£raphy deli vers the clearest example of thi s, because some ihrell Atif/ill81'1l hi.~ ;:Ilr Gegellll'ori. Slul1glln 2006. pp, 283--1',!o. 70 h CCI) Pckclder Towrll'o:ts Anorher Concep, of lhc StUle 71

Still. on a policy level the Social Democrats were indeed sctling the agenda, III committee life and little evaluation and development of ideas and party plat ­ leaH in the !Irs! half of Ihe decade. In foreign policy. for instance, these were forms. With Helmut Kohl at the helm - he bcc,\llIc i ~ chairman in 1973 - Ihe years of Brandt's "Neue Ostpolitik" (New policy towards Easlen! Europe), CDU was reStructured into a modem party with a range of lIctivities and a far in wh ich he rcached agreement" with the Soviet Union and Poland Ihul paved more modern image. As a result. party me.mber .. hip doubled in a few years and the way for a normal izat ion of relations wi lh the German Democratic Republic press allention for the Christian Democratic cil use al so increa,>ed . Wi thin CDU, (GDR), including recognition of the communist govcllImcnt in East Berlin - a conservative intellectuals dc"eloped a strategy to counter thc government's fe· near 10lal revers,,] of the confrontational policies of fomler governments led by form program and espec.ially the democratization ideology thai backed it up. the Christian Democrats. At the same time. with Brandt and Schmidt al Ihe They argued that democratization was not the sol ution for every social or hu­ helm West GcrmullY was onc of the driving forces behind the Conference on man problem. To the COn trary. the claim inherent in government policy that Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) thai would eventuall y leud to the every ilSpeCt of society and life had to be democratized fonned a potential signing of the Fi lial Act in Helsinkj in 1975. At first the Christian Democrats thrcutto human freedom. according to CDU intellectuals, because it politicized put up 3 hard fight to this rapprochement with the Eastern Block and in 1972 all aspects of life in the same way as happened under IOtulitarian ru le. In the thcy even tficd to oust the Brandt govemment by forcing a vote of nu­ second half of the I 970s on the basis of these ideas a new aggres~ i ve opposi­ confidence in parlimnelli. but this failed, and the parliamcnlary elections later tiollill course developed around the election slogan: "The choice is liberal thm year turned into a referendum on the "Neue. Ostpolitik," with the SPD {meaning free. JP] or sociali :\ t democnlcy." This was backed up by a campaign scoring better than ever before. Arter thi s the Christian Democrats grudgingly that stressed the urge to put the so-cnlled "new social question" on the agenda. llccepted detente toward s- the East and after Ihey regained power in 1982 the CDU proclaimed itself to be the defender of thc under· represented and unor· new Chancellor Heimul Kohl immediately declared thaL he would continue the gani zed people. like the elderly. the owners of .. mall businesses, working establi shed policy.22 Illothers, and the families lhat were lhreatened by li bertarianism and totalitari­ In total contmst to this ret;ollciliation in the domain of foreign polic)', in anism. The pany even claimed to be the organizer of the fight against inhu­ domestic affairs the Christian Democfllts kepI on contesting thc Social Democ­ mane ci ty planning and infraslructural projecLS.24 rat agenda. At first whcn the Social Democrats and Liberals introduced their Allhough the Christian Democrat'" did not succeed in winning power in aim to "democratize" govemment and society in West GeITTlany wi th Bmndt Bonn in the general elections during the 1970s (in 1972. 1976. and 1980). they proclaiming in his first !. peech as Chancellor that his government endeavored dio well in state elections. wh ich seemed to prove that the party had gOllen to "dare more democracy." Christian Democrats just rai sed thei r eyebrows. hold of something. At COU gatherings talk started of a ·;Tendenzwende." a Slowly IhroughOlIl the Seventies however their opposition to the idea of de­ swing of the zeitgeist, in fa vor of conscrvatism, and the media picked up on mocratization gained in intellectual strength. The governmcnt"s propos'll s to thi s. As a result the 'Tcndenzwende" turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy. promote participOltion of workers ill industries and students in uni versities and Prominent people were seen 10 confess their taste for conservative lifestyles to give citizens more say in infrast ructure and town planning, mel wi th criti­ and morals, without a him of embarrassment. Even Chancellor SChmidt, semi­ cism by the Christ ian Democrats. and sometimes it had to be adapted to pass ing the changing mood. snid he was n conservati ve in many respects.2S Hi s parli ament. After 1972. despite Brandt's huge victory, the govcOlment's rc­ electi on slogan in 1976, " Modell Deutschland" (the Gemlan mood). was also fonn program IOil t its drive, p3l11y because some of the plans had l at.~ked real· ruther conservative, because it sounded more li ke a proud reflection on past ac­ ism. partly becau'Ie Lhe economic agenda was starting to demand rull attention. complishments than as a hold thru st toward~ the fu ture.!" After Brandt had stepped down in 1974 as a result of an espionage ~candal and Schmidt look over, the reform zeal petered out all together?J l' Axet S.::hildt: "'Olt: Kr:lHc dcr Gcgcllrcfofln ,"ut ouf brcllcr l'rOI\[ nll gctrclcn - Zur tonser· AI that time the Chri)o ti an Dcm()(T.Hs were busy reorganizing themselves in v~livcn Tcnden7.lVt: nd e in den Slchzigerjahrcn," 111 : Ar('JUI' {In· S(}Ziu/SI"R·hil.'ll/t." 44 (2()()4), pp. the relative qu iet of opposition. Up until the 1970s, their pal1y had no t been , 449-47!l. p. 460 r. much more than a vehicle to win clectioll~. with little activity in tcrm .. of Ibid .. p. 46J. ~ It \VQUtd lle worthwhile 10 study rhe une ~JlC c t ed dynamiCs lh:1I del'eloped around this ··MQdcIl I)cuL..chl:md." a sll)gan lhal hcgun lb 311 ad ~c ni

As a vision for (he future Schmidt had indeed little to offer besides his own out of power at the beginning of the decade. when parli:nnentary elections es­ widely acclaimed managerial qualities. This was no small asset. however, at a tablished a Conservati ve government under Prime Minister Edward Heath. Af­ time when the idea that it had bewme imposs ible to govern Western society - ter an unsuccessful ~ tl e ml>t to master the recession and a final showdown with a debate was going on about "Unrcgicrbarkeil" that was the German equivalent the lJ'ude unions in the winter of 1973- 1974, Heath called early elections thai of the American crisis of competence.!7 Schmidt's dealings with international were meant to deliver a fundamental decision against union power. Instead the monetary. financial and trade questi ons ut European and world foru ms and the electorate, dispirited by weak government. decided to punish the Conserva­ stern w :.! )' he operated in the terrorism cri sis in 1977 imp r es.~cd many Germans. tives. Although hi s party had nOI won a majority ei ther, Harold Wil son suc­ In fae l hi s leadersh ip rcmainc<.l unquestioned until his own party started to ceeded in installing a minority Labour government with the support of smaller break away behind him from the end of the Seventies over issues like the mod­ parties like the Liberal Democrats. Two years later Wilson stcpped down and ern;lation of NATO's nuclear c:lpac it y and the future of nuclear energy in was replaced by James Callughan. Like Heath in 1974. in 1979 Callaghan was West Germany. ultimately brought down by the inability of his government to control the un­ According to F:llIlenbach, this changi ng of the agenda did nOl make the ions after the strike-ridden and extremel y harsh "winter of discontent" ( 1978- 19705 any less social democratic. because. he argues. the SPD in the course of 1979) had left the country crippled and dysfun ctional.:2lI the decade developed into a stage on which the tensions of the times were The fact that union power was the central issue in the problem of govern­ played out. At the beginning of the Seventies. when Brandt was Chancellor, ability of the isles and that this issuc was largely fou ght out within Labour lind the party opened itself to romler acti viSL<; of the student revolt of the I 960s . thai this party was identified most SlrongJy with [hi s fi ght . makes it legitimate and in thi il way it morc or less absorbed the zeitgeist into its ranks. At tirst this to talk of the I 970s in Britain as a Social Democntli c decade, in spite of Con­ seemed lIll advantage. because young. enthusiast members introduced new servatives ruling part of it. Within Labour, union representati ves. supported by themes to Ihe party. and livened up internal debate. After a while however. the len-wing socialists like Tony Benn. battled with moder.lIes like Wi lson and downside of SPD's openness also became apparent when the skepticism about Callaghan over the party platfonn. Although the uni onist.s were making gains the ability of the government 10 steer society and crilicism of the role of the in the pany itself. 10 their frustrJtion the parliamentary pany remained on the state. that slowly came to the fo re in society as a result of the recession and of whole more in line with the government , This fostered extrJ-parliamentary ex­ new ways of thinking about the environment and the possibility and desirabi l­ tremism among union leaders who repeatedly declined request.s of the Labour ity of ongoing growth, entered the discussion s in SPD committees and confer­ government to scale down wage rise demands in yearly negotiations wi th em­ ences, The SPD came 10 reflect the. basic characteristic of the Seventies as a ployers. Instead they succumbed 10 comm uni st uni on activ ists. outside Labour. "Wendezcit ," a lime of fundamental change, and demanded huge incre,lses to compensatc for cqual inflation fi gures. show­ For the United Kingdom and the Netherlands it seems at first harder to casing the governmenl's inability to reverse Britain-s economic decline. maintai n the centrdl position of Social Democrats in the 1970s. because other Call aghan tried to inject more realism in his party. for inslance by reading than in West Germany they were no[ the ruling party all of the time. In the UK the fun eral rites for Keyne~ ian poli tics allhe 1976 pany conference. shortly af­ to the surprise of many. Labour Prime Mini ster Harold Wilson was even voted ter being eJected as pany le:tder. "We used to think that you could spend your way out of a recession and incre:lse employment by cutting laxes and boosting government spending. I tell you in all candour that that option no longer ex­ 20011. I1fl ' j75-579 lUld Thomlls Henfc[~t'it. 666 Rudilill/mlt" ·, n.p. 1')78: Joachim Bi n-eh : Da Sirill!" /ic/lnlalll - iJllS " /lfIHlI'II Ikulst.:llllllld,·· ~l'illl! Krise 11,,,1 tI,l' Jl f lll!II ~'(I~ioll:n IJ<'wl'gUll8l'1r, FrJnk run (I, M. 1980: t-lein ilr li ving on borrowed lime. [ .. . ] The cosy world we were told would go on fo r Kipphardt: \lum dt'lm'du'II lIer/l,I/ ::.um IJIt'idrCIi dtll/$clicli Winltr- £i/l USt!blll'/i : 111" /I1mll'l! ever. where full employment would be guaranteed by a stroke of the chancellor IA~ 't1Jc "'llI1d. MOnehcn 198 t. 101' the exchequerJ's pen, CUlling laxes, deficit spending - thai cosy world is !T 0 , J c n ~ !lacke. "Dcr Sl:\al in Gcfahr _ Oil' Bundc~r'Cpublik der [971kr Jahre (wischen Lcgi­ IlJlralion~kriSl: und Unregierbarkeil." in: Sireilllln liE" Slaat - /""'IIe1mwlll! Iniwll(';11 i" dr.r Hmrdeu"f'publil.: 1%/J-1980, ed. by Dominik Geppert/Jens Hacke , G3! hngen 2(X)8. W. 188- 206. 3 Ju,Jl: /'(1lflo'/lr. fn 14. fl' 537 rr. 74 hcco Pd;dder Tow:lrtl~ Anlliher Cum::cpl ul mi: SI~IC 75 gone ... ,,29 In spite of these and other genu ine cffolts. Labour leade rshi p did not late 1960!) the Social Democrats had developed :I very confrontational style !)ucceed in bringing the pill1y nor the unions around. Instead Benn and the len towurds the thrce traditional Christian Democr;uic partics (catholic, orthodox introduced an alternative economic strategy. which according 10 Brit ish histo­ prQteSHUl! and national prOlc!.tant ) that were still operating as sepamte units, al ­ rian Alwyn Turner would have arnounleJ to a "siege economy bunressed by though they oft'en found each OI hcr ill joint coalition governments (in fact the impan cDlurols:' thai was unsustai nable in the modern age. Strikes remai ned Catholic pany had even been pan of evcry government ... ince 1918). With tllb endemic: in 1977 some 10 mi llion days were lost in indUStrial disputes. which confrontational style the Labor Party had succeeded in integrating paris of the was fou r times higher than in France and uuerly incompumble with West Ger­ Sixties prote:\tcrs. but it hi.ld worsened the relationship wi th the Christian De­ many's 86.000 losl days:"') mocrats so muc h that it hardly seemed possible to Olake a coalition govern~ Like the Gcnmm CDU the British Conservative Pany used the period in menl when the resuhs of the 1972 elcctions pointcd in lhat direction. In the opposition as a lime to reorganize. Since the late 19605 the pany had been end. a ncr negotiations that took over live months. in 1973 a government under plagued by the v;t riolic nationalist Enoch Powell. who had created deep COil· Social Democrat leader Joop den Uyl was finally installed, with ministers of troversy in Bri tish I>oli tics with the so-callcd ';ri vers of hlood'·-spcech on im­ the Labor pany, two (of thl\."C) Christian Democratic parties and a fcw sma ller migration he delivered in April 1968. Consen 'ative party leolder Heath had len -wing part ies. This govern ment presented itself as :t left-wing, not centre­ immediately thrown Powell out of hi s shadow cabinet, but that had not ended left , cabinct - the only one wit h thi~ l>ig naturc in Dutch history. That was also the ma n's polit ical cnreer. From the bac khenches he remained an effective the reason why the IWO Christian Democratic parti e/>, despite sending ministers speaker for the cx tre me rig ht wing constitucncy of the Conservatives (Ill a tillle to thc Cabinet. ke pt at Some distance and regularl y took an o ppositi onal stance the Briti sh Nilli omll isL PM ), was also all racting more vote rs), attacking not .In parI ·ta ment.·"- onl y Labour but ever so often his own party leadership tOO. This infighti ng The fact that the re was s uch a government, and thllt it ru led fo r about fo ur onl y ended a few months after Hcath lost theclcctions 10 Wilson, when in Feb· years, can be interpreted as proof of a Social DClllocr:uic dcc!!de in the Nether­ ruary 1975 Margaret 111alehe r defeated him and severJ.1 OI her c ha llengers, in a lands. But in 3 way. Joop dcn Uy l's cabinet came tOO late. A lready at the end leadership contcst within the ConservaT ive parli amentary party. of 1973 within a year of its installation the count!)' W:l~ hit by the Oil Crisi!<.. in This is not to say that Thatche r's triumph immediately set the party on a which the Netherlands together with the US was sin gled out by the Arab oil monetarist course. away from established policy paue ms, although as party producing countries in :I boycott because of their Ismel friendly stance during leade r at her tirst party conference she pleaded for '·a decisive act of will [. .. 1 the Yom Kippur war. This meant that the ambitious refonn program of the So­ to say ·Enough··'. and establi sh a decisive turnaround in British politics. cial Democrats in the Nethe rlands, th:l t was somewhat similar to that of Ger­ Surely, she appealed to the illlellectual monetarism of ri ghtwing th in k tanks. many's SPD and aimed at spreading weahh. education and well-being more bu t at the same lime. as Turner rightly stresses. she also auracted ··a public that evenl y among a ll Dutch ci tizens, had to be scaled down. In an early speech in was mistruslful of intellect, and she look care to e mphasize her r emO t e nc .~s which Den Uyl. reacting to the Oil Crisis, announced fuel ~ a vi n g ·'car free from the polit ical elite."·ll In a way she portrayed herselt" as a Powell -like rebel. Sundays·' he warned the public, referring to the past decades of unlimited regardless of the fllC I that she was pal1y leadcr and not at all It backbencher. It growth based on eX lremely inexpensive oil :lnd gas: "Those times will never wasn't until she beat Lnbouf in the general elections of 1979th:1I everybody in re tu rn.·, J~ the UK became ful ly aware o t"t he right wi ng revolution she had in stock. As the III their st ran ge semi-oppositional situation, the three Chris t i~1I1 De mocratic realization sank in. Thutl:her's populurily fi gures plummeted, und with hi nd­ partics merged into one form:1tiO I1 . called Christen-Democrati sch Appe.1 (CDA. sight it secms clear thai her government was in fact saved by some Argentine Chrislian Democrmic Appeal). and the C:lt holi c mi nister of Justice. Dri es va n generals and their decision to make hi !<.lory by invading the Falkland Islands. Agt, developed inw a strong oppositional fig ure within De n Uyl's own cabi net. In the Netherlands the P

./', Alwyu W. Tumer: Cmn? IVlrl/l CI"i.,i:;? - IJrillllll III Ih" 197(Js. London 2U08. I'. 1117 [ 11 ~e: Duco IkILema: ··Das Eude de~ Forsclm ll s Die Niedcrlandc lind die JiicbLlger Jahn:' .~ 111 ill thid .. p. I ~x r. JUhrluri:ll 18 (2007), pp. 85- TOI . " Ihid .. p. 112 r. 'J Ane! Bleich: JO()P cil'lI UJIIY/y....I~7 _ Dr'''IIt'T fit d""Tr/lllmt'r, AmMerdam 21108. p. 293 ff. 76 Jacco Pekcldcr Towards AnQtllerConcept of the State 77 no clear mandate in any Dutch party, except maybe the righlwing liberal!; of Its author. historian Gerd Koenen, was himse lf in the 1970s an ucti visl in a the Volksp:utij voor Vrijhcid en Democratic (V VD, People's P:lrty fOr Free­ small. bu t industrious Communist party in Frankfurt am Main . He presented dom and Dcmonucy). although in all big parties criticism of ong.oing defici t­ his book as the long awaited explanation of those act ivist years he und other spending ancl other Keynesian mC:lsures was growing. Instead, CDA was members of the pro t e~ 1 general ion owed to themselves. their children. parents. founded more on the shared Christian background of the three parties and a and fri ends. The aim of his book was thus to explain what moti vated activists wish 10 resist the challenge both the Social Democrats and falling numbers of like himse lf 10 see themse l ve~ as actors in a world revol ution that with hind­ ChUfChgoeno had confronted them wi th since Ihe late Si.xtics. sight was only happening in their own imaginution. In the Netherlands, jour­ Den Uyl , a poetry-c iting. messy but well-spoken intellectual with a vision­ nalis! Antoine Verbij, himself a part-time agitUlor in the Seventies, closely fol­ ary tinge. was a hi ghl y popul ar fi gure in lcft -wing circles, especiall y in larger lowed Koenen'S exumple and published a monograph abDUl , what he called. urban areas. but he mobilized his opponents too. and by posing as an Anti-Den "ten red years" of Dutch left-wing radicalism. with whkh he conveniemly UyL Van Agt successfully built himself up as the champion of the Christian meant the exact period 1970-[980.31 Democrats and the countryside. In 1977 Den Uyl succeeded in winning more In Gernlany Koenen's book rea ll y put the Sevemies on the map, but it was votes Illan ever. but almost all o f them carn e from other left-wing parties. In onl y one of several factors that led to a strong emphasis on left-wing e:< trelll­ the end thi s fru strated the formation of a second Den Uyl cabinet, because after ism in German historical accounts of the 19705. Of more impact was the wider months of haggling Van Agt broke off the negotiations and within weeks debate about the heritage of thc proteS( movement of the 19605 im d its ufter­ formed a cabinet with the VVD. Whatever was left of u Social Democnlli t: math in the 1970s. specifically its meaning for democratic governance and decade in lhe Netherlands was pUI 10 rest allhe beginning of 1978. with the in ­ open society in Germany. Especially since the downfall of Soviet-style com­ stall ation of the fi rst Van Agt govemmenl. 34 munism in 1989 and the Genltan Unification in 1990. the last ing relevance of the "'1968" protest generation became the subject of heated debatc. From an Ame ri can perspectivc. one could call this the German equi valent of the Amcri­ Red Decade can "cultu re wars." When the Greens, the party considered especially represenlilti ve of the pro­ That many hi storians give so much attention 10 the Social Democratic features test generation. entered govemment in 1998 us the junior purtner of the Soc.ial of the 19705 is to a certai n degree also a reaction to ot her hi stori ans putting Democrats, whose Chancell Or Gerhard SchrOder was also strongly identified great emphasis on anot her striking aspect of Western Eu rope in the Seventies: wi th "'1968," th is put e:cwcgllflg: ' in: Vi/! Su:io/I!II BCII'1!8UII81!JI . ! Sec Beatrice de Gr.l3 f: Th l'a1I'f I'm! dr ("'8,\'1 - De Jlrijd ,eget! '''rr(l6~me in Netiul(wd, Ollil.l· ill D"u'w;hloml sell IW5 - Eill Hmufbllch. cd. by Roland Roth/Dieter Rm;hL Frankfurt a. M land. ha/ii; ell AIIU'rikll. AIIl~ terU :l1l1 20 I O. 2008.pp.441-47J. " See I~ n Bururna: kflmlrr h, Am.l'lu{/am, New York 2tX)6. "' Vert>ij: Tien rl!llejori'/J, fn 11. p. [2. 80 Joc.:o J't!kcldcr Toward~ Allother COllCept Or thc Slalc 81

Towards Another Concepl of the Stare eral. Especially from the mid 1970s the battle against terrorism look centre stage in this policy comple,, :" Fi nall y and more impon:tnlly, most Dutch RAF sympathizers were mQti vated In tbe confrontation wi th lefl-wjng terrorism this had seduced politi tiam. 100, by un anxiety tnat what was happening in West Germany against the left i1ll0 a large build-up of police and security forces and inlO a policy of ·'S taat and against RAF was not so speci,,1. On the contrary. they argued Ihal cv cnl:~ in zeigcn'· (showing (he state) by large-scale and very public tram c contro ls, Germany were representative of a general deve lopment all -over thc western fiizziChc Herm..r und die: ··Sympathil.ill g Subcultures? - The Miht·os of W

1<1 Schlllln~n: Thf' Sf'I'en,ie,f. (n 3. p, 256. .... 111is C (lI1 tr:I~1 might also explain why lhe l'QlIl.,,(!pi uf new social llJol)vfmenl., has !l ever H!luioeu 1I ~il1lil aT (lUpulori lY among Amcri{'an ncudernlcs (See: Hunspclcr Km:si Cl ~J. ; Nf'w SlId,,1 M"\'t'ml'II/I' 1/I £umpl' - /I ..:m11IJimllil'l.' (/I/O/I'W,I', M lIl u.:apolis 1%15. p. 231:1) . • / For in,luncc: Gnhrlclc DI(· lz.:/Marula SchmidllKrisline von Soden k dsl: Wild + =lIhm - Die j,eb:I$l'f Jah,.e. Berlin 1997: M,lr\an van det KtcinfSaskia Wiering:l teds,): Alle .~ kQII lUllJI'r.t - Prol e~'I/'t'IIf!(lIJire.r ill Nf({er{IIIII{. 1965-1005, A msterdam 2006: H:In .. T irnmcnnans (cd,): 70's ill NiJmegell - Tiell /.:.rejatlf'I·l' Ilhil'jaf" II, NijnlCgen 2007. ~! Karl ·Werner Orand: "Verglcichcndc;<\ RC"\(lmcc:' in: Nt'ue Jo::iflfe Bell'egullgell in II'tfll'um,XI ,II/(/ Jell USA - Ell, /nft muIUmnlf'r Vf'rKlt'cll. ed, by idem. Fr:mlfun a. M. t985. pp. ]06- lJ.t. p .' 10,