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FMECA Volume 6: All Rebreathers for In-Water Diving DOCUMENT NUMBER: FMECA OR V6 190910.Doc CONTRIBUTORS: Dr Deep Life Design Group REBREATHER SAFETY Comprehensive Database of Top Down Rebreather Failure Modes FMECA Volume 6: All Rebreathers for In-Water Diving DOCUMENT NUMBER: FMECA_OR_V6_190910.doc CONTRIBUTORS: Dr. Alex Deas, Dr. Bob Davidov, Marat Evtukov, Alexei Bogatchov, Dr. Sergei Malyutin, Dr Vladimir Komarov, Dr Oleg Zabgreblenny, Dr Sergei Pyko, Dr Alexander Kudriashov, Teoman Naskali, Brandon Horn, Walter Ciscato and client reviewers. DEPARTMENT: Engineering LAST UPDATE: 10th September 2019 REVISION: C1§ APPROVALS _____/Dr. Alex Deas/____________ ___10th September 2019________ Project Leader Date _____/KB/_____ ___10th September 2019_______ Date Quality Officer Controlled N Classified Document Document Unclassified if clear. Copyright 2003 to 2017 © Deep Life Group, Deep Life Ltd (IBC) FMECA_OR_V6_190910.doc Rev. C11 1 of 172 This document is the property of Deep Life Design Group and is released for Open Distribution, subject to no modification being made and the document being reproduced in full. “Deep Life Design Group” is a trademark of Deep Life Ltd (IBC). Deep Life Design Group Revision History Revision Date Description A 1st Aug 2004 Cases collated from earlier documents. B0: Independent Review 2nd Aug 2006. Inclusion of section for Umbilical supplied Diving. B1: added item 7.13. B2: added Commercial dive tool hazards and O2 cells due to fatal accident due to diver not hearing alarm. B3: added submarine sonar hazard and ESD hazards. B4: added cold water faults. B5: Isolating ALV faults. B6 (4th April 2007): ALV fault added to fault 6.1. B7 (21st May 2008): Added ALV failure incidents and connector failures. Hypoxia monitor added. B8 (30th June 2008): OPV failures broken out as a separate section and detailed. 2nd Aug 2006 – 14th Helmet oro-nasal valve failure added. Water drain faults added. B0 – 11 Mar 2009 B9 (28th Nov 2008): Diver thermal and respiratory shock added, commercial diver one way valves added, safety process fault section added. Deco risks added. B10 (28th Dec 2008): Cylinder risks separated. B11 (14th Mar 2009) Expansion of Sections 6.3 (Oxygen First Stage Overpressure hazards), p12 and Section 7.4 p24 (Make-up-gas First Stage Overpressure hazards) p23. Section 7.7 (Wrong Make-up-gas) expanded as a result of an accident study. Section 6.7 (Uncontrolled ascent) expanded. Numeration of requirements expanded so these can be audited using Mantis: Mantis uses the same enumeration. B12: §6.10, §12.13, §12.14, §12.2, §12.3, §6.8, §10.10, §6.23, §18. Sections reorganised by their safety functions. B13 (28th May 2009): Review improvements. B14 (29th May 2009): Proofread and further review comments included. B15 (23rd Aug 2009): ALVBOV and Manual O2 injector FMECA top down merged into this document. Material safety excludes Delrin and POMs based 22nd May 2009 – B12 - 18 on reports of lung burns from divers diving new rebreathers 26th Aug 2010 making extensive use of these materials. Fault §6.28 added, from a field failure. B17 (17th Dec 2009): Off-gassing material safety updated with PC.B18: Update to §6.7, §6.8, § 6.29, §7.9, §9.2, §??, §10.1, §10.13. Rev 18B (23rd Aug 2010): Added §6.29. Rev 18C (26th Aug 2010): Added §7.13, §7.14, §9.25, §17.17. §Rev 18C: §5.10, §5.11, §5.12, §5.13 C0: Post PPE certification. Added O2 cell failure mode detail. C1: Updated Sections §6.10, §6.30, §13.5, §13.8, added Section §13.9. C2: Correction to §17.3, added §18.4 C3: More detailed consideration of respiratory collapses, IPO and cardiac events. C0-C6 To 1st Dec 2014 C4: Added 8 corner check requirement §6.7, added detail to §11.1 and to §13.10. C5: Faults added from accident analysis C6: 11.9 One-way valve faults separated and clarified. 14.3 Polarised or UV filtered mask risk added C7 31st Dec 2015 10. Emphasis of cell water vapour blocks: review identified that FMECA_OR_V6_190910.doc Rev. C11 2 of 172 This document is the property of Deep Life Design Group and is released for Open Distribution, subject to no modification being made and the document being reproduced in full. “Deep Life Design Group” is a trademark of Deep Life Ltd (IBC). Deep Life Design Group previous description was succinct in the expectation the knowledge of this fault mode was common place. More detail and explicit description of these faults may benefit users, hence the edit. Further edit to description of water block faults to simplify the C8 th 13 April 2016 English and add in basic information how gas sensors operate. Annual review identified that fault previous included where diver does not close mouthpiece on surface, leading to hydrostatic pressure emptying counterlungs, the diver sinks and drowns, was not clear enough as it was included with other fault modes. This th C9 26 Feb 2017 fault mode is now separated and starts the section on Flooding and Drowning faults. Annual review and update of Severity and Risk assessment table (Section 21). Updated following annual review, added section on gas switches C10 21st August 2018 and added more emphasis on the effects of cylinder valves being opened too quickly to appropriate sections. Annual review. th Progressively opening valves released to mitigate oxygen hazards C11 10 September 2019 and to avoid risk of users damaging plastic valve seats by overtightening. FMECA_OR_V6_190910.doc Rev. C11 3 of 172 This document is the property of Deep Life Design Group and is released for Open Distribution, subject to no modification being made and the document being reproduced in full. “Deep Life Design Group” is a trademark of Deep Life Ltd (IBC). Deep Life Design Group Table of Contents 1 Purpose and Scope......................................................................................10 2 Source Data..............................................................................................11 3 Structure..................................................................................................11 4 SIL Compliance Objective.............................................................................12 5 Gas Supply Containment Failures.....................................................................12 5.1 Cylinder explosion.................................................................................12 5.2 Carbon Wrapped Cylinder Electrolysis..........................................................13 5.3 Plastic Core Decomposition......................................................................13 5.4 Carbon Wrapped Cylinder Core Delamination.................................................14 5.5 Oxygen fire from detritus in cylinder...........................................................14 5.6 Cylinder Valve Failure.............................................................................14 5.7 Cylinder Valve O-ring or Regulator O-Ring Failure...........................................15 5.8 High Pressure Burst Disk Related Hazards.....................................................15 5.9 Intermediate Pressure Relief Device Related Hazards.......................................16 5.10 Valve Outlet Profile Specification Error in DIN 477 & EN 144.............................18 5.11 SCUBA Regulator Hose O-ring Retention Fault...............................................18 5.12 First Stage Regulator O-ring Retention Design Fault........................................19 5.13 Hose sheath expands and bursts...............................................................20 5.14 Oxygen hose burst or fire from adiabatic compression....................................21 6 Oxygen Setpoint Failures..............................................................................22 6.1 Oxygen Cylinder Empty...........................................................................22 6.2 Oxygen Cylinder Switched Off...................................................................23 6.3 Oxygen First Stage Failure........................................................................24 6.4 Oxygen First Stage Over Pressure...............................................................24 6.5 Oxygen Hose Leaks.................................................................................26 6.6 Oxygen Solenoid or Injector Stuck Open.......................................................27 6.7 Oxygen Solenoid or Injector Stuck Closed.....................................................28 6.8 Oxygen Manual Injector Failure Open or Closed..............................................29 6.9 Wrong Gas in Oxygen cylinder...................................................................29 6.10 Oxygen fire........................................................................................30 6.11 Calibration using wrong gas.....................................................................31 6.12 Solenoid Stuck Shut, due to rise in Intermediate Pressure...............................31 6.13 O2 orifice motor driver failure (orifice type injectors)....................................32 6.14 Use of O2 instead of Make-Up-Gas.............................................................33 6.15 Use of hypoxic Make-Up-Gas when entering water.........................................33 6.16 Use of hypoxic Make-Up-Gas in ascent to surface...........................................33 6.17 Uncontrolled ascent (max 120m/min) with low PPO2......................................33 FMECA_OR_V6_190910.doc Rev. C11 4 of 172 This document is the property of Deep Life Design Group and is released for Open Distribution, subject to no modification being made and the document being reproduced in full. “Deep Life
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