Unlocking the Equity in Your Home
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16 comment wenty years ago, National Mutual agents offered Australians a wonderful opportunity: they could all become rich, simply T by “unlocking the equity in their homes”1. Unlocking Your Home Is Your Future ● Your home is not just bricks and mortar . the Equity it’s dollars and cents! ● Saving won’t make you rich, but your home can! ● Your home is the pot of gold you have been looking for . ask us how. in Your ● Learn the secrets of wealth creation. Over the last 20 years, Dennis Jones and Company have Home shown thousands of people how to achieve financial peace of mind. Dennis and his team are now proud to present to you… the concepts that you can use to turn your most valuable asset, the family home, into your own pot of gold and in doing so, provide you with financial peace of mind. A CONTINUING OPPORTUNITY What was this amazing “secret of wealth creation”? It was National Mutual’s Negative Gearing Package. This was a double-geared TO MIS-SELL? investment strategy that had the following structure: ● Customers mortgaged their homes to raise investment funds. Normally, Citibank provided the funds via a variable-interest line of credit. ● Customers used the money to buy X units in National Mutual’s Australia Property Trust. ● Then they took out margin loans from National Mutual’s Mortgage Trust, to buy an additional 4X units in the Property Fund. ● All of the investor’s units in the Property Trust were pledged as collateral for the margin loans. The margin loans were usually set up with 80% leverage ratios. ACTUARY AUSTRALIA ■ July 2011 ▲ comment 17 This investment strategy did not turn out very well for the customers, who suffered substantial losses during the property crash of the early 1990s2. The value of property units fell; the income distributions fell; and interest rates on the margin loans hit historically high levels. And since the government imposed a 12-month freeze on unit trust redemptions in 1991, they couldn’t even bail out of the investment. As most of the customers were on low incomes, with limited resources, their debts blew out – and some were forced to sell their homes. This investment product did not turn out very well for National Mutual (NM) either. Customers complained to the Australian Securities Commission, which started an investigation. There was also a spate of negative publicity in newspapers and on TV (including a Four Corners program). In 1993, NM halted all further sales of the product. The insurer eventually paid about $19 million in compensation to their customers. Nor did Citibank escape unscathed. NM decided to sue the mortgage lender for a few million dollars3. This resulted in a rather This did not turn out very well for Storm’s customers, who suffered unusual court case. Usually a company accused of mis-selling substantial losses during the share market crash in 2008. Naturally, tries to prove its innocence. In this case, NM not only admitted its their debts blew out, and since many of them were low income culpability, but earnestly sought to convince the court that large earners with limited resources, the impact has been catastrophic. amounts of compensation should be paid to the customers. ASIC’s report indicates that some of these people are homeless, going without meals, turning off the heating in their homes and What led to such an unusual state of affairs? suffering stress-related health problems5. Prior to the commencement of this case, NM had already agreed This investment product did not turn out very well for the financial to pay compensation to the customers. NM believed that Citibank institutions either: deserved part of the blame and they wanted Citibank to pay its share of the compensation costs. NM sued Citibank, but in order ● The CBA set up a compensation scheme that is estimated to to succeed in this claim they first had to prove that there was, cost the bank at least $200 million. indeed, a legal liability to pay compensation to the customers4. ● The ANZ also offered compensation to its customers (although They were quite successful in this regard, the judge’s summary the ANZ had a smaller involvement with Storm). of the case was highly critical of numerous aspects of NM’s ● ASIC is suing BoQ and Macquarie for breach of contract, operations, finding that National Mutual was “wholly responsible unconscionable conduct, and liability as linked credit providers6. for the damage suffered by the Investors”. ● ASIC is suing the CBA, BoQ, and Macquarie for running an unregistered Managed Investment Scheme. Progress? Now this is all ancient history, isn’t it? The financial services industry In other words, it’s “déjà vu all over again”. has surely learned from past mistakes. Over the last 20 years, insurers have implemented much stricter controls over the sales and The Ripoll enquiry has revealed some unhappy similarities between marketing of their products. Nevertheless, despite all this burdensome the NM case and the Storm case. Highly geared strategies were regulation, the problem has obviously not been completely solved. recommended to people who could ill-afford to take on such risks; Just look at Storm Financial. It all looks depressingly familiar. the customers were repeatedly assured that the investment was safe and there was no chance that they would lose their homes; Storm Financial offered a doubly-geared investment strategy: loan applications were apparently massaged in order to maximise lending; and the intermediaries all benefitted from substantial fees and ● Customers mortgaged their homes to raise investment funds. commission (Storm charged 7% up front plus trailing commissions); The Commonwealth Bank (CBA) and Bank of Queensland (BoQ) usually provided the home loans. So what is different this time around? ● Customers used the money to invest in X units in equity trusts (usually from Challenger or Colonial First State). Risks for the Product Providers ● Then they took out margin loans to buy additional units. Usually 20 years ago, the financial advisors who pushed these high the margin loans were provided by subsidiaries of the CBA or risk, double geared products were working for a large insurance Macquarie Bank. company, which valued its own reputation and could afford to pay ● All of the investors’ units in the Equity Trusts were pledged as compensation for its misdeeds. By contrast, Storm’s advisors were collateral for the margin loans. working for a company that is now out of business and insolvent, ACTUARY AUSTRALIA ■ July 2011 ▲ 18 comment with insufficient funds to pay compensation7. Professional indemnity insurance has proved inadequate to meet this need. This appears National Mutual’s to be one of the side-effects of tighter regulation of insurers, i.e. Negative Gearing Package mis-selling of high risk financial products has not been completely stopped, but instead it has been pushed out to companies that are less tightly supervised. High Risk Complex Products The National Mutual Negative Gearing Package was high risk. The These financial-advice fringe-dwellers can only prosper by forging investors were borrowing at historically high interest rates. They links with the major financial institutions that provide the home were investing in commercial property – an asset class that certainly loans, margin loans, and unit trusts that are components of their cannot be classified as low risk – with 80% leverage ratios. package. In the Storm case, these links created three problems: Of course, just because a product is risky, does not necessarily ● Customers were comforted by the close relationship between mean that it is a bad product. It might be quite suitable for some Storm and the banks. If reputable financial institutions were customers. providing margin loans and managing Storm-badged unit trusts, surely this meant that Storm was trustworthy?8 Suitability to Customers ● As explained below, some of the financial institutions were, The NM Negative Gearing product was not at all suitable for many apparently, persuaded to relax their normal lending standards of its customers. A negative gearing package is suitable for people on behalf of the Storm customers. Storm’s financial advisors on high marginal tax rates; for people who can afford to cover the filled in the home loan application forms for their customers. negative cash flow in early years; who can meet margin calls without The Ripoll enquiry cited a disability pensioner with income of difficulty; who are experienced investors; and who understand the $800 per fortnight. According to his loan application (which risks. Unfortunately, the product was sold to people who did not was filled in by someone else), his income was $8300 per fit the profile. The customers included bricklayers, forklift drivers, month9. Also, it seems that property valuations were inflated labourers, mechanics, policemen and secretaries. None of them to maximise lending. were on high marginal tax rates10. They could not cover negative ● There may also be a blurring of responsibilities, i.e. confusion cash flows. For some investors, the interest charges on the loans about who was responsible for what. For example, in the exceeded their monthly after-tax income11. Many of the investors Storm case, who was responsible for informing the customers had virtually no investment experience – many had none12. about margin calls? The banks assumed that Storm would take responsibility, but Storm said that it was the banks’ Similarly, Storm has been criticised for its “one-size-fits-all” strategy. responsibility. Risk Warnings As a result of this confusion, many customers never received a It is perfectly reasonable to sell high risk products to suitable margin call but were only notified by the banks after their position customers, as long as the risks are fully disclosed. Unfortunately, the was closed out.