Yaron Pasher. Holocaust versus : How Hitler's "" Undermined the German War Efort. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2014. xiii + 364 pp. $34.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-7006-2006-7.

Reviewed by Edward Westermann

Published on H-War (November, 2015)

Commissioned by Margaret Sankey (Air University)

Gerhard Weinberg, the dean of German diplo‐ toriography revealed that , Re‐ matic historians, has long argued that the German ich leader of the SS and chief of the German po‐ military campaigns of World War II and the lice, focused his SS and police empire on the anni‐ events of cannot be separated and hilation of the European even in the face of must be considered together as an integral whole. pragmatic (not moral) protests from the Wehrma‐ [1] Indeed, over the last two decades historians of cht and Nazi ofcials in the occupied East con‐ the Holocaust and the German military have in‐ cerning the detrimental impact of these policies creasingly identifed the linkages between mili‐ on wartime production. Pasher reframes this is‐ tary operations and Nazi plans for the racial re‐ sue by examining the tension between ideology structuring of Europe, including the destruction and military efectiveness. In his view, the politi‐ of the European Jews.[2] Yaron Pasher’s Holo‐ cal imperative driving the annihilation of the Eu‐ caust versus Wehrmacht provides an important ropean Jews not only outweighed economic con‐ addition to this literature in a study aimed at ex‐ siderations, but even military and operational re‐ posing “the impact the resources invested in anni‐ quirements at critical junctures in the war. He ar‐ hilating European Jewry had on the Wehrmacht gues, “Hitler recognized an opportunity [for the and its operational abilities” (p. 281). In this re‐ annihilation of the Jews], and he was not about to gard, Pasher’s work is a natural but innovative ex‐ let it slip away. This insight made him try and ad‐ tension of previous studies that demonstrated the just his future foreign policy and military strategy tension between ideology and economics within to ft these ideological opportunities” (p. 282). the Third Reich as SS planning for the implemen‐ In approaching this topic, Pasher focuses on tation of the “Final Solution of the Jewish ques‐ the organization, policies, and capabilities associ‐ tion” resulted in severe economic consequences ated with the German military and civilian logis‐ for the overall German war efort. This earlier his‐ tics infrastructure, specifcally the Reichsbahn, or H-Net Reviews

German Railway Service. He asserts, “Train allo‐ ment. For example, since the focus of Pasher’s ar‐ cation for transporting German Jews to the East gument involves logistics and the resupply of Ger‐ had to be balanced with trains carrying ammuni‐ man forces, the absence of references to either tion, fuel, food, and other requisites. This is the Christian Gerlach’s or Alexander Kay’s work on key to understanding the symbiotic relationship the so-called Hunger Plan is perplexing. This plan between the Final Solution and the war efort” (p. proposed by German bureaucrats prior to the in‐ 41). He perceptively argues that these transports, vasion of demanded the ruthless confsca‐ although a small percentage of the overall daily tion of Soviet food resources in order to supply German rail trafc, should not be judged in abso‐ the Wehrmacht, with the explicit understanding lute numbers, but relative to the time and place of that this would lead to the deaths of tens of mil‐ their movements. In his analysis, Pasher exam‐ lions of Soviet civilians due to starvation.[3] While ines four major events in the European war that Pasher does refer to the policy of the “main ofce serve as case studies for evaluating the logistical of the Reich for food supply ... forcing the troops consequences of the Nazi anti-Semitic mania on to survive on what they could fnd within the So‐ the successful prosecution of military operations, viet Union, mainly by looting the local popula‐ including (1) Operation Typhoon (i.e., the battle tion,” the absence of a specifc and detailed dis‐ for Moscow) and German Jewish deportations to cussion of the process and details of the Hunger the East in 1941; (2) Operation Reinhard and the Plan is an important omission, especially since battle for Stalingrad in 1942-43; (3) the Battle of this plan materially afected the entire logistical Kursk, the Ghetto Uprising, the Allied in‐ plan for German forces in the East. Similarly, the vasion of Sicily, and killing operations at the death absence of any reference to Adam Tooze’s monu‐ camps in 1943; and (4) the extermination of the mental work on the German war economy is puz‐ Hungarian Jews and the Allied invasion of Nor‐ zling. In fact, Tooze provides comprehensive in‐ mandy in 1944. Pasher evaluates these events by formation on key elements of the German econo‐ looking at the opportunity costs incurred to mili‐ my, including the abysmal condition of the Reichs‐ tary operations by the use of the Reichsbahn to bahn prior to the war, as well as a strategic con‐ transport Jews to their deaths instead of using this text for evaluating the state of Nazi economic rail capacity to move supplies, equipment, and power during the war. In the case of the former, personnel to the combat fronts. Tooze’s argument about the serious shortage of The answers to be found in this line of in‐ German rolling stock and the “disastrous rail cri‐ quiry have the potential to provide signifcant and sis of the winter of 1939-40” could have been used original insights into debates surrounding Adolf to support Pasher’s argument. In contrast, Tooze’s Hitler’s role in the Final Solution, the acquies‐ analysis of the strategic context of German and cence (if not participation) of the Wehrmacht in Soviet wartime production and his contention the process of annihilation, as well as the central that “by July 1943 the war was obviously lost” of‐ role played by logistics in the ultimate defeat of fers a critical rejoinder to an assumption that lies . The primary sources used in ap‐ at the heart of Pasher’s overall argument.[4] proaching this intriguing analysis are impressive One of the key assumptions undergirding and demonstrate wide research in German, Pasher’s entire argument relates to the belief that British, Israeli, and American archives. In con‐ even as late as the summer of 1944, Hitler and the trast, the omission of several recent and impor‐ Nazi government still had a reasonable chance of tant secondary sources that have direct impact on either winning the war or gaining a negotiated Pasher’s conclusions weakens the work and raises peace. This assumption has several important im‐ questions about specifc elements of the argu‐ plications for the specifc case studies chosen in

2 H-Net Reviews the work, from Operation Typhoon and the battle Wehrmacht forces exhausted themselves upon for Moscow in late 1941 to the invasion of Nor‐ the layered defenses outside of Moscow in late mandy and the breakout from the beaches in the 1941. Similarly, Allied air superiority over the summer of 1944. In the case of the frst, Pasher beaches and coast of France during the cross- cites David Stahel’s pathbreaking work, Operation channel invasion in 1944 provides another exam‐ Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East ple; a superiority that not only allowed Allied tac‐ (2009), on two occasions, but he does not engage tical aircraft to roam freely and infict debilitating with Stahel’s thesis that the failure of the losses on German forces, but a superiority that Wehrmacht to conquer the by the prevented German tactical airpower from doing end of August 1941 essentially doomed their cam‐ the same to Allied forces. Likewise, Pasher’s con‐ paign in the East to failure, a thesis also found in tention that the German army in western Europe three of Stahel’s subsequent works on the war in in 1944 “was still stronger and more powerful the East.[5] Certainly, Pasher can choose to agree than the army that invaded France in May 1940” or disagree with the fndings of Tooze or Stahel in may well be true, but such an assertion must also his own research, but it is the failure to engage include a comparison of “relative strengths” that with these seminal works that constitutes, in the admits the exponential improvement of Allied air, mind of this reviewer, a critical oversight. To be sea, and ground forces in the same period (p. 283). sure, Pasher has a number of excellent secondary Similarly, the claim concerning an increase in the sources but the omission of those discussed above size of the Luftwafe’s “quota” of airplanes in Jan‐ and others, including ’s foundational uary 1944 and the peaking of synthetic fuel pro‐ work on the “Special Trains” to Auschwitz, de‐ duction in April 1944 does not take into account tracts from his argument and at some points cre‐ the debilitating shortage of fully trained and com‐ ates the appearance of an argument that has been bat-ready pilots or the disastrous curtailments to stretched or overdrawn.[6] pilot training caused by fuel shortages at individu‐ From a theoretical point of view, Pasher’s re‐ al airfelds that substantially afected the ability of peated assertions that “just one more division” the Luftwafe to contest control of the skies over might have turned the tide in a specifc battle or Europe, much less over France and the Low Coun‐ campaign is certainly plausible. However, this as‐ tries (p. 230). Certainly, Pasher is correct in argu‐ sumes that this “extra” infantry or panzer divi‐ ing that military history is replete with examples sion would have arrived with the necessary sup‐ of the “thin margin” between victory and defeat, plies and equipment at the right place, at the right but such an argument has a high threshold of time, with sufcient time to detrain at the rail proof if it is to move beyond the realm of cautious head and move to battle positions. It also makes speculation. the assumption of ceteris paribus, that all other In addition to these criticisms, there are sev‐ things remain the same, and that the adversary eral places within the manuscript that would would have been unable to react by shifting his have benefted from additional sourcing. For ex‐ own forces or reserves or by changing his own op‐ ample, the discussion of the key role allegedly erational plan. From a practical point of view, played by the US gangster Charles “Lucky” Lu‐ such reasoning is somewhat problematic since ciano in facilitating the successful invasion of Sici‐ one could also point to factors that might prevent ly in 1943 (pp. 189-190) is supported by one foot‐ the efective employment of these “extra” German note of very questionable validity—Otto Sko‐ forces, including the Soviet advantage of interior rzeny’s My Commando Operations (see footnote lines for shifting reserves or the beneft enjoyed 16, p. 314). Similarly, the contention that “the Om‐ by Russian defenders in prepared positions as aha beach landing was almost a failure, largely as

3 H-Net Reviews a result of the unwillingness of General Omar viewer, this is in fact the central issue and poten‐ Bradley, commander in chief of the American tially the most important contribution of this ground forces [i.e., 12th US Army Group], to ad‐ work because it not only exposes Hitler’s obses‐ dress the essential tactical problems confronted sion with the of the Jews, but also by an amphibious assault on prepared defenses demonstrates that the Führer’s political objective ...” certainly deserves a supporting citation (p. of annihilating the Jews ultimately outweighed 237). Additionally, the uncited contention that the military consequences and costs associated Himmler “had the power to control the number of with this efort and even led to his willingness to combat SS forces [i.e., Wafen-SS] wherever and risk defeat on the battlefeld to accomplish this whenever he wished” is somewhat misleading goal. since Wehrmacht commanders assumed opera‐ Notes tional control over these forces at the combat [1]. For a work that merges these threads see front and Himmler could not unilaterally decide Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global to withdraw them during combat operations (p. History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge 190). Finally, although I normally do not remark University Press, 1994). on editing issues, it is apparent that there are some avoidable errors of fact and syntax through‐ [2]. For examples see Omer Bartov, Hitler’s out the work, including the presence of Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and the War in the Third “Theodore” Roosevelt (vice Franklin Delano Roo‐ Reich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); sevelt) at the Tehran conference (p. 236), the iden‐ , War and Genocide: A Concise Histo‐ tifcation of Friedrich Krieger (vice Friedrich Wil‐ ry of the Holocaust (: Rowman and Lit‐ helm Krüger) as the higher SS and police leader in tlefeld, 2009); Johannes Hürter, Hitlers Heerf the (p. 120), and an unfortu‐ ührer: Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg nate sentence construction that reads, “Until June gegen die Sowjetunion 1941/42 (Munich: Olden‐ 7, an average of seven or eight trains transported bourg, 2006); Dieter Pohl, Die Herrschaft der approximately 290,000 people to Auschwitz daily” Wehrmacht: Deutsche Militärbesatzung und ein‐ (p. 251, emphasis added). heimische Bevölkerung in der Sowjetunion 1941-1944 (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, In spite of these criticisms, I still fnd that 2008); and Alexander Rossino, Hitler Strikes Yaron Pasher ofers an important, if in some re‐ Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity spects fawed, addition to the literature on the (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003). Holocaust and World War II. Admittedly, some of my criticisms relate to historical evaluations [3]. For a detailed discussion of the Hunger about the war that are still open to debate, includ‐ Plan see Alexander J. Kay, Exploitation, Resettle‐ ing the relative danger of Soviet collapse in late ment, Mass Murder: Political and Economic Plan‐ 1941 or the actual vulnerability of Allied bridge‐ ning for German Occupation Policy in the Soviet heads in Normandy in the early summer of 1944 Union, 1940-1941 (Oxford: Oxford University In this regard, Pasher makes a critical point, albeit Press, 2006). on the penultimate page of the manuscript, with [4]. Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: his assertion that “What is important is not The Making and Breaking of the Nazi War Econo‐ whether Germany really had a chance of winning my (New York: Viking, 2006), 343-344, 413, 671. the campaigns dealt with here, but the abilities [5]. See David Stahel, Kiev, 1941: Hitler’s Bat‐ Hitler believed the Wehrmacht possessed before tle for Supremacy in the East (Cambridge: Cam‐ he took a strategic decision and issued an opera‐ bridge University Press, 2012); David Stahel, Oper‐ tional directive” (p. 289). In the opinion of this re‐

4 H-Net Reviews ation Typhoon: Hitler’s March on Moscow, Octo‐ ber 1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), and The Battle for Moscow: Hitler’s Battle for Supremacy in the East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Clearly, Pasher would not have had access to the last of these works in the preparation of his own work. [6]. Raul Hilberg, Sonderzüge nach Auschwitz (Mainz: Dumjahn, 1981). To be fair, Pasher does include an earlier article by Hilberg, “The Reichs‐ bahn and Its Part in the Extermination of the Jews” [in Hebrew], Yalkut Moreshet 24 (1977): 27-50.

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Citation: Edward Westermann. Review of Pasher, Yaron. Holocaust versus Wehrmacht: How Hitler's "Final Solution" Undermined the German War Efort. H-War, H-Net Reviews. November, 2015.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=44880

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