Emma González Roberts March 25, 2020 Tax Increment Financing and the Opportunity for Equitable Economic Development in Chicago

Emma González Roberts March 25, 2020

Tax Increment Financing and the Opportunity for Equitable Economic Development in Chicago

Introduction Tax Increment Financing (TIF) is the most widely used tool for financing economic development in the United States.1 TIF is a place-based and race-neutral tool that was originally designed to address disinvestment by funding public infrastructure and private development in “blighted” areas. TIF has evolved to become a tool for financing all kinds of economic development and infrastructure projects and tend to take place in districts that are not a city’s most blighted. While TIF typically succeeds in growing a district’s property tax value within a set period of time, it is not clear that TIF improves economic opportunity and quality of life for cities as a whole. Rather, it tends to promote economic development and improve infrastructure in neighborhoods that are already economically stable, vibrant, or “up and coming”. In order for Tax Increment Financing to have the greatest positive impact on communities, cities should use a racial equity-based approach to designing, implementing, and evaluating this tool. This is especially true for cities with large minority populations, severe racial inequities, and persistent segregation such as the City of Chicago.

A Brief History of TIF Tax Increment Financing originated in California in 1952 in response to Title I of the 1949 Housing Act (also known as Urban Renewal) which required cities to finance one-third of the cost of their urban renewal projects.2 The traditional way to finance redevelopment required residents to vote in favor of the city issuing public long-term debt. After residents repeatedly voted against these proposals, the state wanted to find a way to take advantage of the federal urban renewal money without needing to get voter approval. So, the California state legislature designed TIF.3 This ability to increase the tax base without needing to get voter approval or increase local taxation continues to be a key reason for why municipalities are so keen on using TIF.

When President Nixon terminated the urban renewal program in 1973, the use of TIF to finance development and infrastructure skyrocketed. Today, 49 of the 50 states (all but Arizona) and Washington, D.C. have authorized the use of TIF. According to research by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, there were about 15,700 total TIF districts in the U.S. in 2018.4 However, Figure 1 shows how the use of TIF is not distributed evenly across the country. Of the ten states with the most TIF districts, eight are in the Midwest (Minnesota, Nebraska, Iowa, Wisconsin, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio).

1 Briffault, Richard, “The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the Political Economy of Local Government,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 77, No. 1 (Winter 2010), p. 65. 2 Lefcoe, George and Swenson, Charles, “Redevelopment in California: The Demise of TIF-Funded Redevelopment in California and Its Aftermath,” National Tax Journal 67(3), (September 2014), p. 719. 3 Davidson, Jonathan, “Tax Increment Financing as a Tool for Community Redevelopment,” 56 U. Det. J. Urb. L. 405, (1978-1979). 4 Merriman, David, “Improving Tax Increment Financing (TIF) for Economic Development,” Policy Focus Report, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, (2018), see tables on pp. 26-29.

1 One hypothesis for why this is the case is because Midwestern states were hit particularly hard by deindustrialization throughout the 1980s and 1990s and were in need of financing tools to respond to the economic decline and population loss. That said, states in New England also experienced severe industrial decline during the same time period and do not leverage TIF to nearly the same degree. For example, while Massachusetts, Vermont, and New Hampshire state legislatures have all authorized TIF and have a handful of districts (2, 9, and 32 respectively), they all borrowed $0 in TIF debt between 2000 and 2014.5

Figure 1

Source: Merriman, David, “Improving Tax Increment Financing (TIF) for Economic Development,” Policy Focus Report, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, (2018), p. 30.

Interestingly, there is not a consistent relationship between the number of TIF districts a state has and the amount of TIF borrowing the state does. For example, while Iowa has the highest total number of TIF districts (about 3,340 as of 2018) the state only issued about $315 million of TIF debt between 2000 and 2014. On the other hand, while Colorado has only 140 TIF Districts, the state issued $1.6 billion in TIF debt during that same time period. Of the New England states, Maine uses the tool the most heavily with 483 districts and $31 million in TIF debt.

One reason for this variance is that there are no national standards or requirements for the use of TIF. State legislatures have full jurisdiction regarding how and when to use the tool. While TIF began as a way to finance urban renewal projects and address “blight”, it has evolved into being a tool for economic development of all flavors. It even goes by many names—from Revenue Allocation District Financing in New Jersey to Tax Increment Reinvestment Zones in Texas. TIF is used in many different projects including the development of shopping centers, hotels, casinos, stadiums, tourist attractions, office space, parks, transportation facilities, housing, and everything in between. It has been

5 Ibid.

2 implemented in virtually every type of environment from central business districts, to distressed urban neighborhoods, to suburbs, to small towns, to even farmland.6 That said, there are some common elements that TIF shares across states.

How TIF Works Tax Increment Financing is an economic development tool that creates special taxing districts to divert property tax money into specific development projects. The development is financed by the expected increase in property tax that the project itself will help create. University of Illinois at Chicago Professor David Merriman summarized it nicely when he said, “the most distinctive feature of TIF is that the revenues used to fund economic development are generated by that same economic development.”7 While each state legislature determines its own rules and regulations for TIF, the following steps are consistent across the country:

1. Designate geographic areas or “districts” with clearly defined boundaries. 2. Determine the duration of the district (typically 20 to 30 years). 3. Assess property taxes within the districts and establish base values. 4. Pursue projects within or adjacent to the district that encourage economic development. 5. Finance the projects with the anticipated increases or “increments” in property taxes (typically by issuing municipal bonds). 6. When the district retires, the increased property tax value becomes the district’s new base value and goes back to the overlying City budget.

Figure 2 provides a helpful visual aid to understand how this tool works. Let’s say that the City of TIFLandia designated a new TIF district in the year 2005. Per City of TIFLandia regulations, the TIF district will be in place for 23 years. At the time of designation, the City determined that the district has a total assessed value of $130 million. That is the base value for the district that will continue to go towards the overlying governments—the City, County, and local school district to provide general public services. The dotted blue line shows an example of what a district could expect to see in terms of increased property tax value over a period of 15 years. The neighborhood changes, buildings are built, infrastructure is maintained, and the assessed value increases from $130 million to nearly $200 million.

Now, the orange line shows what, in theory, a district could expect to see when TIF is in place. By borrowing against expected gains in property value, TIFLandia was able to finance more economic development and infrastructure projects within the district. Over the same 15-year period, those projects increased the property tax value from $130 million to over $400 million. In theory, that development and the substantially increased value it created would not have been possible “but for” the Tax Increment Financing.

6 “Missouri Supreme Court Clear TIF to Redevelop Blighted Farmland,” Rouse Frets White Goss Gentile Rhodes, P.C., (December 26, 2012). Accessed March 24, 2020. https://rousepc.com/missouri-supreme-court-clears-tif-to-redevelop-blighted-farmland/. 7 Merriman, David, “Improving Tax Increment Financing (TIF) for Economic Development,” Policy Focus Report, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, (2018), p. 14.

Figure 2

Source: Merriman, David, “Improving Tax Increment Financing (TIF) for Economic Development,” Policy Focus Report, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, (2018), p. 7.

Beyond the six steps listed below, states have a lot of leeway with how they implement TIF. For example, Maine’s statute maintains the intention of addressing blight stating that downtown districts must be in a “blighted area or an area in need of rehabilitation or redevelopment.” 8 Illinois’ statute outlines three kinds of districts—blighted, conservation, and transit. Conservation districts are defined as “rapidly deteriorating and declining” areas that “may soon become blighted if their decline is not checked.” 9 Meanwhile, Iowa’s requirements are even more nebulous, permitting TIF in any “economic development area” as long as the municipality designates the area “appropriate” for urban renewal.10

Apart from the concept of “blighted” having a permanently fuzzy definition, there are many ways in which the implementation and use of TIF varies. Below is an attempt at a comprehensive list of questions that states are able to answer for themselves when it comes to TIF.

1. What is the goal of TIF? Is it to improve blighted and distressed areas? Improve quality of life? Create jobs? Promote economic development more broadly? 2. How does the municipality define a successful TIF?

8 See Maine Legislature Revised Statutes, §5242 State tax increment financing. Accessed March 24, 2020. http://legislature.maine.gov/legis/statutes/30-A/title30-Asec5242.html. 9 See Illinois Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act. 65 ILCS 5/11-74.4-1. Accessed March 24, 2020. http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs4.asp?DocName=006500050HArt.+11+Div.+74.4&ActID=802&ChapterID=14&SeqStart= 213100000&SeqEnd=215400000. 10 See Iowa Code 2020, §Section 403.5 Urban Renewal. Accessed March 24, 2020. https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/403.5.pdf.

4 3. How are TIF districts designated? What areas are eligible to become TIF districts? How are the boundaries drawn? 4. How large can a district be? Is there a minimum or maximum base value that a district must have? 5. What is the duration of a district? 6. How much municipal debt should be issued for a project? 7. Which private developers will receive the tax subsidies? 8. What kinds of project costs are eligible to be financed through TIF? 9. What is the process for reviewing and approving proposed projects? 10. What is the process for tracking and monitoring TIF districts? 11. To what extent is community input considered? Who is invited to participate in community meetings? How are the meetings facilitated and how often are they held? 12. What governing body provides oversight for TIF? How is this group selected? 13. What percentage of the tax increment does the TIF district receive versus the overlying governments? 14. How will inflation be taken into account? 15. To what extent will information about TIF plans, debts, and revenues be made available to the public? How will it be accessed?

Because there is so much variance in how states answer these questions, I will focus on the state of Illinois and on the City of Chicago, a municipality that heavily relies on TIF, to further explore this tool.

TIF in Chicago The State of Illinois approved the usage of TIF in 1977. In 1983, Chicago’s City Council approved the usage during Mayor Harold Washington’s first year in office.11 The use of TIF grew substantially under the reign of Mayor Richard M. Daley who was in office from 1989 to 2011. In 2011, then-Mayor Daley stated, “TIFs are the only tool a mayor has, basically, to deal with rebuilding communities, even in wealthy areas."12

Since the tool’s inception, the City has created a total of 184 TIF districts. In 2018, the 138 active districts generated $841 million in tax revenue for the City, a new record.13 This is equivalent to 12.5% of the City’s total tax revenue. About one-third of all properties in Chicago are in TIF districts.14 Figure 3 shows how the use of TIF districts and associated revenues have grown over time in Chicago and Cook County.

11 “City of Chicago Tax Increment Financing Program Guide,” Department of Planning and Development (2020). Accessed March 24, 2020. https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/dcd/tif/2020_TIF_Program_Guide.6.1.pdf. 12 Strahler, Steven, “The Daley Dynasty,” Crain’s Chicago Business, (March 29, 2008), Accessed March 23, 2020. https://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20080329/ISSUE02/100029540/the-daley-dynasty. 13 “Cook County TIFs to bring in nearly $1.2 Billion. Chicago TIF revenue up more than 27%,” Cook County Clerk’s Office, (July 31, 2019). Accessed March 24, 2020. https://www.cookcountyclerk.com/sites/default/files/pdfs/2018%20TIF%20Report.pdf. 14 Jacobs, Joel, “How Chicago’s Controversial TIF Program Took Over a Third of the City,” Medill Reports, (February 22, 2020). Accessed March 25, 2020. https://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/how-chicagos-controversial-tif-program-took-over-a-third-of-the-city/.

5 Figure 4 provides a visualization of how much of the city is designated as a TIF district and where they are located. This map was generated using the free TIF District Portal on the City of Chicago website.

Figure 3

Source: “Cook County TIFs to bring in nearly $1.2 Billion. Chicago TIF revenue up more than 27%,” Cook County Clerk’s Office, (July 31, 2019). Figure 4

6 Source: City of Chicago TIF District Map: https://webapps1.chicago.gov/ChicagoTif/

The use of TIF in Chicago has been a source of controversy for decades. First and foremost, it is perceived to be used in areas that are plainly unblighted. For example, the very first TIF district established by Mayor Harold Washington in 1984 was intended to redevelop Block 37, a shopping center at the heart of the downtown district.15 In April 2019, City Council, under the newly elected Mayor Lori Lightfoot, approved $700 million in TIF support for “the 78”, a proposed megadevelopment directly adjacent to the South Loop that is currently a vacant field. While the 62-acre vacant field meets the state’s definition of “blighted”, it is challenging to understand why an area directly adjacent to one of the wealthiest parts of the City requires the use of TIF. The project’s sleek website describes itself as a “groundbreaking new neighborhood” that will include housing, loft-style and high-rise office space, retail including “curated” restaurants, hotels, cultural institutions, a new academic research facility, and publicly accessible green space.16

Figure 5

Second, people are concerned that the tax increments gained from the development projects are diverted from public schools to the pockets of private developers. Meanwhile, the City argues that TIF benefits Chicago Public Schools (CPS) by financing the construction and rehabilitation of schools, growing property tax value within districts, and returning surplus to CPS, the City, and the County. However, those arguments continue to fall short for activists and people passionate about the success of CPS. In February 2020, the Chicago Teachers Union called for retiring downtown TIF districts early and returning the $400 million in increments to the overlying City budget, school district, and park district.

Third, people are concerned that developments backed by TIF lead to gentrification and displacement.

15 Ibid. 16 See https://www.78chicago.com/.

7 In the case of the Bloomingdale Trail, an elevated trail converted from a vacant railroad and partially funded by TIF, these fears have been proven true. The development has dramatically increased housing costs, increased the rate of new construction of high-end condos in the area, and increased the risk of displacement for lower-income residents within one half-mile of the trail. According to analysis conducted by the Institute for Housing Studies at DePaul University, the median price for a 2 to 4-unit building rose from $97,000 in 2012 to $462,000 in 2018.17 In January 2020, two local aldermen proposed a 14-month moratorium on building permits, demolition permits, and zoning changes in the effort to take time to understand how to slow the displacement of lower-income residents who are predominantly African American and Latino. This dynamic continues to be a challenge for TIF—how can development projects improve infrastructure and amenities within a community without displacing residents who have called that district home for decades? Is it possible to increase property taxes through economic development while protecting low-income renters and homeowners?

Figure 6

Photo of Bloomingdale Trail by Emma González Roberts taken July 2019

Lastly, especially during the Mayor Daley years, TIF functioned with a blatant lack of transparency and oversight. In 1997, the Chicago Tribune Editorial Board called on then-Mayor Daley to tighten up his “loosely run slush fund” offering several examples in which TIF had been abused. These examples included expanding a district in the North Loop without issuing a plan for how the money will be used, not holding regular meetings with the Local Review Board, and repeatedly working with developers represented by the Daley family law firm.18 In 2009, journalists Ben Joravsky and Mick Dumke launched

17 “Displacement Pressure in Context: Examining Recent Housing Market Changes Near The 606,” Institute for Housing Studies at DePaul University, (January 15, 2020). Accessed March 25, 2020. https://www.housingstudies.org/releases/Displacement-Pressure-in-Context-606/. 18 “Daley Endangers the TIF Tool,” Chicago Tribune, (July 27, 1997). Accessed March 23, 2020. https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1997-07-27-9707270007-story.html.

8 an investigative reporting series in the Chicago Reader that further shined a light on the inequities of the City’s “shadow budget.” 19

In response to this effort as well as activism on the part of many groups including the Better Government Association, Chicagoans United for Equity, Civic Lab, and the Grassroots Collaborative, the newly elected Mayor Rahm Emanuel established a TIF Reform Panel in 2011. Their recommended reforms included establishing goals and metrics to measure TIF performance, ensuring that TIF projects are aligned with the City’s Capital Improvement Program (CIP), and making more information regarding TIF plans and budgets available to the public online. While the Mayor declared that these reforms would go into effect “immediately”, none of them were fully implemented.20

Chicago’s Attempts at TIF Reform In a 2019 inquiry, Chicago’s Office of the Inspector General found that reforms were not implemented in the following ways: the CIty does not identify clear goals and objectives for TIF, TIF allocation does not align with the City’s CIP, the City does not publish justifications that the development would not occur without TIF, metrics are not made easily available online, and the TIF oversight body still “does not have any documented responsibilities, leadership, authority, or accountability.”21 For any program, but especially one of this scale that affects one-third of the City’s properties and accounts for 12.5 percent of the City’s tax revenue, this is completely unacceptable and unjust.

Just as Mayor Daley had favored expanding and using TIF in wealthier and whiter districts, Mayor Emanuel followed suit. Between 2011 and 2015, about 48 percent of new TIF spending took place within downtown—an area bounded by the wealthiest neighborhood in the City (the Gold Coast) to the north, the developed Lakefront (including Navy Pier, Millenium Park, and Grant Park) to the east, McCormick Place to the south, and the United Center to the west.22 This area accounts for 5 percent of Chicago’s land area and 11 percent of its population.23 Meanwhile, the south and west sides of the City whose residents suffer from the highest rates of poverty, segregation, and racial inequalities, received 16 percent and 4 percent respectively. Figure 6 shows how TIF expenditures between 2011 and 2015 (left) map onto the City’s racial demographics (right).

19 See The Chicago Reader TIF Archive. Accessed March 25, 2020. https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/the-chicago-reader-tif-archive/Content?oid=1180567. 20 Jacobs, Joel, “How Chicago’s Controversial TIF Program Took Over a Third of the City,” Medill Reports, (February 22, 2020). Accessed March 25, 2020. https://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/how-chicagos-controversial-tif-program-took-over-a-third-of-the-city/. 21 “OIG Inquiry finds that the City has not fully implemented several recommendations for improving transparency, accountability, and efficiency in Chicago’s TIF Program,” City of Chicago Office of Inspector General (OIG), (June 3, 2019). Accessed March 25, 2020. https://igchicago.org/2019/06/03/oig-inquiry-finds-that-the-city-has-not-fully-implemented-several-recommendations-for-imp roving-transparency-accountability-and-efficiency-in-chicagos-tif-program/. 22 See “The richest neighborhoods in Chicago,” Curbed Chicago, (March 20, 2014). Accessed March 25, 2020. https://chicago.curbed.com/2014/3/20/10129228/chicago-richest-neighborhoods-wealthy-expensive-incomes. 23 Joravsky, Ben, “Who wins and loses in Rahm's TIF game?,” The Chicago Reader, (March 26, 2015). Accessed March 25, 2020. https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/mayor-rahm-emanuel-tif-funds-downtown-neighborhoods/Content?oid=17009841.

Figure 7

When Lori Lightfoot ran for mayor in 2018, her campaign centered on tackling inequities, creating economic opportunity, and a promise to reform TIF. In February of 2020, the newly elected Mayor Lightfoot made good on her promise by unveiling the City’s latest round of reforms. This time, the reforms centered on the following: 1) center equity in decision making by expanding TIF spending in neighborhoods that have historically lacked investment, 2) hold developers to higher standards by adopting a more rigorous “but for” analysis, and 3) improve transparency by publishing a new TIF Program Guide and releasing data on an more user-friendly version of the TIF Portal. She also announced the reorganization of the TIF Task Force Committee that internally reviews proposals and is now led by the City’s first Chief Equity Officer, Candace Moore.

Conclusion While Lightfoot’s reforms confirm her administration’s intent to change the way TIF operates in Chicago, they are not enough to promote equitable economic development because they continue to be completely race-neutral. In order for TIF to truly be leveraged as a tool for equity, the City must commit to an explicitly race-based approach. For example, the City should consider racial demographics when creating new districts and allocate a certain percentage of spending to majority-minority communities that have suffered from decades of disinvestment. They should commit to evaluating how proposed projects will benefit or harm low-income people and people of color by conducting Racial Equity Impact Assessments. They should require higher minority- and women-owned business (M/WBE) hiring requirements for developers taking advantage of TIF subsidies. Chicago’s racial inequities are pervasive, persistent, and costly. In order for TIF to have a fighting change at addressing deep economic inequities,

10 it must center race in its reforms. Bibliography

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