Prospects for Afghanistan as ISAF withdrawal approaches
RESEARCH PAPER 14/18 19 March 2014
Security overall is deteriorating in Afghanistan and although the Afghan National Security Forces are taking the lead, questions remain about their effectiveness and the government’s dependence on international help to pay for them. It is unclear whether there will be any Western military presence after 2014. Negotiations with the Taliban do not seem to offer much hope.
The legitimacy of the government will depend on clean and convincing elections, but they are being held in a difficult environment. So far, the progress in governance and the delivery of services to the Afghan people has been patchy at best. Meanwhile, human rights abuses by the powerful in Afghanistan often go unpunished, and the rights of women are under attack already, even before the departure of most international forces. Violence against women is commonplace.
Better cooperation with Afghanistan’s neighbours might go a long way to help tackle some of the country’s problems. So far it has disappointed but there is potential for improvement.
Afghanistan gets a lot of UK overseas aid but progress towards the Millennium Development Goals has been slow and often confined to urban areas. Little aid has reached rural areas, particularly those less affected by conflict.
The economy is expected to slow after strong growth in the last few years; if international aid is cut off more abruptly than hoped, Afghanistan could go into recession.
After 2014, the country is likely to continue to be dominated by powerful local figures, and local and ethnic allegiances will continue to be important. However, many observers think the government in Kabul will survive, given international support, although it may increasingly have to come to terms with local strongmen and Taliban figures.
Ben Smith
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Research Paper 14/18
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ISSN 1368-8456
Contents 1 Summary 1
3 Introduction 3
4 Security 3 4.1 Security is deteriorating overall 3 4.2 Afghan security forces are taking the lead but problems remain 5 Paying the Afghan troops 6
4.3 The loyalties of fighting forces are not what they seem 6 4.4 Are the Taliban strong enough to take over? 7 4.5 International assistance after 2014 8 US/Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement 9 NATO Status of Forces Agreement 11
5 Elections 11 5.1 Problems looming for the presidential elections 11 Candidates 12 Election practicalities 14 Election observers 14 Outlook 14
6 Provincial Council elections 15
7 Is the Afghan government getting any better? 16 7.1 Corruption and regional horse-trading will not go away 16 7.2 Opium cultivation up 18
8 Peace negotiations with the Taliban 20 8.1 Few signs of progress at the top level 20 8.2 No political settlement? 22
9 Human rights abuses 24 9.1 Getting away with it 24 9.2 A difficult environment for the press 24 9.3 Internally displaced persons 25 9.4 Inadequacies of the justice system 25 9.5 Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission 26
10 Afghan women 26 10.1 Women and the elections 27
10.2 Education 28 10.3 Women and the peace negotiations 28 10.4 Backlash? 29
11 Regional relations 30 11.1 Istanbul Process for regional dialogue 30 11.2 Pakistan 32 11.3 India 32 11.4 China 33 11.5 Iran 33 11.6 Central Asia 34
12 Human development 35 12.1 Slow progress on the Millennium Development goals 35 12.2 Tokyo Donors’ Conference 35 12.3 Afghanistan gets a lot of UK aid 36 12.4 Aid has only reached certain parts of the country 37 12.5 Corruption and waste 38
13 Economic profile 39 13.1 Economy expected to slow after strong growth in past decade 39 13.2 Fiscal situation 40 13.3 Longer-term issues and risks to outlook 40 13.4 UK trade with Afghanistan 40
14 Conclusion: prospects after 2014 42
15 Further reading 45
Afghanistan and human rights conventions 47
RESEARCH PAPER 14/18
1 Summary 2014 is a pivotal year for Afghanistan, with a crucial presidential election in April and the end of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) combat mission in December.
Although the picture is somewhat mixed, the overall level of violence is increasing. This is partly to be expected as the numerous but inexperienced and less well-equipped Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have taken over day-to-day responsibility for security and the fighting has become dispersed and less controlled. The ANSF are largely up to strength but there remain problems with motivation, absenteeism and desertion, corruption and predatory behaviour. The Afghan Local Police, particularly, have been criticised for corruption and predatory behaviour, which has been blamed on inadequate supervision of this force. The biggest concern is perhaps about how the security forces will be paid for after 2014; the Afghan government is a long way from being able to afford it on its own.
In these circumstances, it is essential that the 2014 presidential election, set for 5 April, should be seen to produce a legitimate leader, acceptable to a wide range of Afghans from the different ethnic groups – unlike the 2009 poll, which was heavily criticised for ballot- stuffing. There are signs, however, that the election might not go well. Government interference with the Independent Electoral Commission and the disqualification of certain candidates have raised doubts, and the election risks being under-resourced, despite international assistance. Provincial Council elections are due on the same day.
On many measures the Afghan government has not really improved over the last few years. It remains riddled with corruption and such services as it does manage to provide are largely limited to the larger towns and cities. In remote rural areas the government is rarely seen except in the form of the security forces, despite the US ‘civilian surge’ of 2011 that was meant to boost government capacity. Afghanistan has made little or no progress in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index; nor has the country risen up the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index. The government is also failing to control opium cultivation, with a marked increase in the area under cultivation in the latest figures.
For some time the Afghan government’s policy has been to pursue peace negotiations with the Taliban leadership at the same time as persuading lower level fighters to hand over their weapons and re-integrate into society. While there have been many low-ranking fighters who have agreed to stop fighting, the Taliban leadership does not seem particularly interested in negotiating. The pre-conditions agreed by ISAF and the Afghan Government if there are to be negotiations are acceptance of the Afghan constitution, renunciation of violence and renunciation of al-Qaeda.
If there is no political settlement analysts fear that a return to civil war is possible, although the conflict might be low-level. Central government might have to accept a significantly reduced role in certain provinces, for example. The Taliban seem confident of outright victory, but if they do not topple the Kabul government, anti-government forces might accept a stronger role (perhaps with sympathetic provincial governors) in provinces where the Taliban are strong. Some analysts have suggested that this kind of de facto partition is close to inevitable and may be the ‘least bad’ solution.
Meanwhile, conservative forces within the Afghan establishment as well as anti-government forces appear to be gaining in strength and rolling back gains made on human rights, particularly, the rights of women. The Kabul government has weakened the Independent Human Rights Commission, allowed an amnesty law granting impunity for crimes against humanity committed before 2001 and reduced the number of seats reserved for women on provincial councils. There also appears to be a campaign of violence directed at prominent women and what one observer described as ‘pandemic’ levels of violence against ordinary
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Afghan women, although this may be partly attributed to increased reporting. The government passed an important law banning violence against women in 2009, although implementation has been patchy. The justice system remains deeply corrupt and unprofessional, and continues to hand down the death penalty.
In spite of the many problems, there has been some progress in the provision for the basic needs of Afghans over the last ten years. The country’s Millennium Development Index scores have improved slightly. Education and health care are greatly improved, but mainly for those in urban areas. Many schools have almost no infrastructure, particularly in rural areas, and the quality of teaching has been criticised. Child malnutrition is a big problem and there are reports that it is getting worse.
Afghanistan gets a lot of UK aid. The UK has been involved in projects from mine clearance to education. Distribution of aid is difficult, however, because of corruption, poor infrastructure and insufficient Afghan and international capacity for handling the money and monitoring projects.
The influence of Afghanistan’s neighbours will be important after 2014. Here there are reasons to be hopeful, despite the historic problem of India’s rivalry with Pakistan, which has exacerbated instability in Afghanistan over many years. Better relations between the West and Iran could offer the opportunity of a more overt role for that important country in the longer term, although that depends on a successful resolution of the nuclear dispute.
The Afghan economy has grown strongly in recent years, although from a very low base. It remains a very poor country. The biggest worry is that the end of the international combat mission will dramatically reduce the flow or foreign money into Afghanistan, both military and aid spending, and that this will push the Afghan economy into recession. Such an outcome would be very serious, and would probably lead to a further increase in opium production and instability.
Many analysts agree that it will be difficult for the Afghan government to survive in its present form and think that patronage will remain a very important part of Afghan life. The departure of most international forces will probably mean a continuing increase in the influence of conservative forces in the country. Maintaining the level of international support to the Afghan government, not least so that it can continue to pay army and police salaries, is essential. However, such financial support might be diverted to serve corruption and patronage purposes instead of what donors intended.
Much hangs on whether the US and Afghan governments sign the Bilateral Security Agreement, which will provide for some US troops to remain in Afghanistan after 2014. It has been controversial in Afghanistan because the US wants US forces personnel to be immune from prosecution through the Afghan justice system. It looks as if the agreement may not be signed until after the presidential election, if at all. A similar NATO Status of Forces Agreement is dependent on the outcome of the US/Afghan discussions. If there is no bilateral agreement, no Western forces will remain in Afghanistan.
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3 Introduction If the Taliban’s maxim when the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) arrived in Afghanistan in 2001 was ‘NATO has the watches, we have the time’, it seems that time for the NATO mission has indeed more or less run out. Increasingly unpopular with US and European voters, support for ISAF, the UN-authorised NATO mission in Afghanistan has gradually diminished and successive governments have announced that most of their troops will leave. ISAF’s United Nations mandate expires on 31 December 2014.
Not much is heard these days of the pledge, given in 2010 by David Cameron among others,1 that the withdrawal would be conditions-based. NATO has explained the conditions as follows:
The capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to shoulder additional security tasks with less assistance from ISAF;
The level of security allowing the population to pursue routine daily activities;
The degree of development of local governance, so that security will not be undermined as ISAF assistance is reduced; and
Whether ISAF is postured properly to thin out as ANSF capabilities increase and threat levels diminish.2
Security, and the ability of local security forces to maintain it, is widely accepted as essential to the future of the country. But the ability of Afghan government to hold society together is crucial too. With withdrawal approaching at the end of 2014, are security and governance in Afghanistan improving, and what might happen after that date?
4 Security Visiting Afghanistan in December 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron said that British troops could be proud of their achievement:
To me, the absolute driving part of the mission is a basic level of security so it doesn’t become a haven for terror. That is the mission, that was the mission and I think we will have accomplished that mission and so our troops can be very proud of what they have done.3
4.1 Security is deteriorating overall There are some positive indicators for security in the country. The level of violence at the beginning of summer 2013 was lower than in previous summers (the traditional ‘fighting season’ in Afghanistan). Insurgent attacks and deaths among ISAF personnel were considerably lower than their peak in the summer of 2010, which is to be expected considering the number of ISAF personnel that has been withdrawn.4 Government security forces are broadly in control of major towns and cities and anti-government forces have been driven out into rural areas.
On the other hand, civilian deaths caused by the fighting increased in 2013 compared with 2012 and there was an increase in the targeting of individuals for assassination. Civilian deaths, many from improvised explosive devices, rose by 7%. There was a 17% increase in
1 ‘Afghanistan withdrawal possible from 2011, says Cameron’ BBC News Online, 21 July 2010 2 ‘Transition to Afghan lead: Inteqal’, NATO media backgrounder, April 2013 3 ‘UK troops’ Afghan mission ‘accomplished’, says David Cameron’, Financial Times, 16 December 2013 4 Brookings Institution Afghanistan Index, 30 September 2013
3 RESEARCH PAPER 14/18 injured civilians and a 14% increase in total civilian casualties compared to 2012.5 The number of casualties among Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) personnel is rising rapidly. The proportion of civilian deaths caused by anti-government forces was 74%, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), a higher proportion than in previous years, while pro-government forces caused 11% of civilian casualties. 10% of civilian casualties were caused by ground engagements between anti- government fighters and pro-government forces.6
The UN reported in December that the level of attacks against humanitarian workers had trebled in 2013 to 237 attacks on personnel and facilities, leading to 36 deaths, 24 detentions, 46 injuries and the abduction of 72 people; fewer foreign-connected aid agencies are registering to work in Afghanistan.7 The Taliban political leadership does not encourage attacks on humanitarian personnel,8 but in a number of recent cases, Taliban fighters have openly claimed responsibility for some of these attacks, although many are due to common criminality.
One official of a humanitarian organisation blamed the fact that there were fewer foreign targets to be attacked:
I think it’s just that we don’t have any more ISAF in the field, so these people who are on a jihad, they need someone to attack — so we are the target because we are out there.9
Mark Bowden, humanitarian coordinator for the UN, said that the transfer of security responsibility to Afghan forces has changed the nature of the conflict:
The nature of the fighting has changed. You have more disseminated ground-level fighting than you’ve had before, and this has come as a result of a change of tactics by handing over the fighting to the Afghan national security forces. So civilian casualties have increased dramatically this year, so obviously you’re seeing more widespread displacement of people as well.10
As well as the tendency for more diffuse battles to lead to higher casualties, analysts worry that anti-government forces may be embarking on a crescendo of violence to disrupt the 2014 elections and show that withdrawing international forces have been ‘defeated’. The Taliban are expected to increase the number of ‘spectacular’ attacks as ISAF forces withdraw. Far from being exhausted by the fighting, one former Afghan intelligence chief says that the organisation is stronger if it continues to fight: “The moment they stop fighting that integrity and cohesion will fracture, and they know it.”11
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office points out in its latest monthly progress report that the Taliban may be changing tactics to target high-profile individuals to disrupt the forthcoming election:
5 Protection of civilians in armed conflict, annual report 2013, United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, February 2014 6 ‘UNAMA report shows sharp rise in casualties among Afghan civilians in first half of 2013’, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan press release, 31 July 2013 7 ‘After recent attacks on Afghan aid workers, UN official urges respect for humanitarian staff’, UN press release, 2 December 2013 8 Taliban policy and perceptions towards aid agencies in Afghanistan, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, July 2013 9 ‘Attacks on Aid Workers Rise in Afghanistan, U.N. Says’, New York Times, 2 December 2013 10 ‘Attacks on Aid Workers Rise in Afghanistan, U.N. Says’, New York Times, 2 December 2013 11 Amrullah Saleh in ‘Afghanistan's security prospects after Nato withdrawal’, BBC News Online, 28 January 2013
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Whilst the ANSF are matching and largely overpowering the insurgency on the battlefield, and providing effective security in the main population centres, the insurgency still maintains the will and capability to inflict harm on high ranking ANSF officials and members of the Afghan Government. Such assassinations, kidnapping and violent reprisals, including against women participating in Afghan politics and decision-making, provide a sober reminder of the difficult challenges that still lie ahead. The general decline in reported nationwide violence this summer is offset by a rise in targeted killings of these high value individuals.12
4.2 Afghan security forces are taking the lead but problems remain The ANSF now take the lead on major as well as minor operations, and most reports suggest that are improving their capabilities. They are very close to the authorised ‘end strength’ of 352,000:
Afghan National Army (ANA): approximately 185,300 personnel
Afghan National Police (ANP): 152,600
Afghan Air Force (AAF): approximately 6,600.13
With about 30,000 Afghan Local Police the number comes to 382,000. Most ISAF bases (except for large ones) have been transferred to the ANSF and most other ANSF bases have now been built. The only contribution still being made by ISAF forces is advisory, although ISAF is still available for close air support in an emergency.
There are still major problems with the forces, however, with high levels of absenteeism and problems with drug addiction and corruption. Ethnic imbalances in the ANSF have been reduced but still remain:
More Pashtuns have been recruited, but southern (Durrani) Pashtuns are still under- represented,14 calling into question the effectiveness of the ANSF in the crucial Kandahar and Helmand provinces.
Tajiks are still over-represented especially at officer level (an echo of the Northern Alliance victory over the Taliban in 2001).
Hazaras, the Shia minority from the centre of Afghanistan, are under-represented at officer level.15
The US Department of Defense said in 2013 that the ANSF still need international help:
Although ANSF capabilities have greatly increased over the past two years, it has yet to demonstrate the ability to operate independently on a nationwide scale. Therefore, the Afghan government will require continued assistance from ISAF and the international community over the next year and a half to help enable it to address these challenges and improve long-term prospects for stability.16
12 Monthly progress report on Afghanistan September 2013, Foreign and Commonwealth Office 13 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), NATO 14 Kenneth Katzman, ‘Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy’, Congressional Research Service, 23 October 2013 15 Brookings Institution Afghanistan Index, 30 November 2013 (figures for the Afghan Army from March 2013) 16 Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, US Department of Defense, July 2013
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It remains to be seen whether the ANSF will be as successful as ISAF at combating anti- government forces. A large-scale study commissioned by the US Congress,17 and published in February 2014, suggested that the Taliban threat would increase in the period 2015-2018, contradicting to the assumptions that it could gradually diminish after 2014. The authors therefore argued that the gradual reduction in ANSF numbers from the present high to 228,500 was unrealistic. They recommended that Afghanistan would need 373,400 security forces (including local police), and that there would continue to be significant gaps in ANSF capability. This would cost perhaps $5-6 billion. They recommended the continued presence of US advisers in the Afghan ministries of defence and the interior.
Paying the Afghan troops How is Afghanistan going to fund its now sizeable security forces in the medium term? The Afghan government’s own revenues are very limited. It is one of the poorest countries in the world. The US alone spent almost $200 billion over 2012 and 2013 on Afghanistan,18 largely on security (Afghanistan’s GDP is only about $35 billion).19 After the withdrawal of most US troops, past experience shows that the level of US aid is likely to fall sharply, and other countries, too, are likely to be less enthusiastic aid-givers as the profile of the Afghan problem goes down. Nevertheless, at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012, member states committed to support Afghanistan’s security forces after 2014 with $4.1 billion annually until 2017.20 A gradual reduction from present numbers to a ‘sustainable’ level of 228,500 was envisaged, to be ‘defined by the International Community and the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’.21
The Afghan economy has grown fast and has potential in minerals and agriculture but governance and security problems mean that economic growth is expected to be slower over the next few years (see the section on the economy, below).
Anthony Cordesman argues that there will be a financing gap of 40% of GDP in 2014-15 and that the shortfall in 2020-21 will still be around 25% of GDP, even if investment in mining and other industries is high and all aid pledges are honoured.22 It is unlikely that the Afghan government will be able to afford its own salary bill until around 2025.
Any abrupt decline in military aid would be disastrous for the survival of the Kabul government. This is not just because there would be little money to pay salaries and buy military equipment and supplies and capabilities would diminish. The psychological impact of cutting off Kabul’s supply of cash would be even more important. In 1992, when the Soviet Union stopped giving money to its client government, generals quickly started to defect to the rebel side.
4.3 The loyalties of fighting forces are not what they seem The difference between the Afghan government maintaining control of a province like Helmand and it falling to the Taliban may not be as clear as Western opinion would have it. There are already reports of the ANSF running joint patrols with Taliban fighters in parts of Helmand.
17 Independent Assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces, CNA Center for Strategic Studies, January 2014 18 Anthony H Cordesman, The cost of the Afghan war, FY2012-FY2013, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012 19 CIA World Fact Book, Afghanistan 20 For more information see the Standard Note NATO: The Chicago Summit, May 2012 21 Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan, NATO, 21 May 2012 22 Anthony H Cordesman, The Afghan War in 2013: Meeting the Challenges of Transition, Volume II: Afghan Economics and Outside Aid, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2013
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The ANSF is heavily penetrated by personnel with links to warlords and militias; soldiers and policemen may be more loyal to their former armed factions than to the Kabul government.23 Local strongmen and tribes have always played a dominant role in Afghan politics and some rivalries go back decades or even centuries. In Gereshk in Helmand province, for example, the main security presence consists of armed members of the Barakzai tribe loyal to the Karzai government. However, Barakzai leaders are fighting among themselves and there are historic rivalries with other tribes, especially the Alizai. Meanwhile, the Ishaqzai and Achakzai tribes, also important around Gereshk, tend to side against the Barakzai and are therefore with the insurgency.24
The Afghan Local Police (ALP), created in 2010 to boost the fight against the Taliban, particularly in rural areas, has also been criticised as being little more than the ‘re-badging’ of armed personnel loyal to local strongmen. Allegations of abusive and predatory behaviour abound. Human Rights Watch argues that, far from providing security, the ALP often exacerbates tribal and ethnic divisions and increases conflict.25
If elements within the ANSF perceive that the government has conceded too much to the Taliban in pursuit of a political settlement, it is possible that they could revolt against the government. Higher echelons of the army contain many Tajiks and others who would resist anything that looked like a capitulation. The inter-ethnic balance of power after the presidential election will be an important factor.
4.4 Are the Taliban strong enough to take over? Overall, the US military continues to strike a relatively optimistic tone:
The insurgency failed to achieve its stated campaign objectives during the reporting period and its ability to strike at major population centres is under pressure. The enemy is now less popular than in 2012. [...] The insurgency can mount attacks but generally cannot capture or destroy well-defended targets, and are unable to hold significant territory in the face of numerically superior ANSF. While tactically ineffective, these insurgent efforts potentially allow them to reap significant publicity gains.26
In December 2013, a classified US Intelligence Estimate report on Afghanistan after 2014 drew a more pessimistic picture,27 predicting that the gains made in the last three years by ISAF would be significantly eroded, even if the US military presence after 2014 is at the top end of estimates and the US continues to fund the Afghan government.
One US Administration official said that it was too early to say what would happen:
I think what we’re going to see is a recalibration of political power, territory and that kind of thing. It’s not going to be an inevitable rise of the Taliban.28
23 Thomas Ruttig, Some Things Got Better – How Much Got Good? A review of 12 years of international intervention in Afghanistan, Afghan Analysts Network, 30 December 2013 24 Deedee Derksen, ‘Armed, disarmed, rearmed: How Nahr-e Seraj in Helmand became one of the deadliest districts in Afghanistan’, Afghan Analysts Network, 6 January 2014 25 Just Don’t Call It a Militia, Human Rights Watch, 12 September 2011 26 Report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan, US Department of Defense, November 2013, p3 27 ‘Afghanistan gains will be lost quickly after drawdown, U.S. intelligence estimate warns’, Washington Post, 28 December 2013 ‘ 28 ‘Afghanistan gains will be lost quickly after drawdown, U.S. intelligence estimate warns’, Washington Post, 28 December 2013
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Taliban commanders are optimistic in public. Qari Nasrullah, reportedly a senior Afghan Taliban commander and member of the Taliban Kunar provincial shura or council, said in a recent newspaper interview that the Taliban would take over after the drawdown:
In Afghanistan, praise be to God, we are heading towards success. We are approaching total success as most of the country is now under our control. Our fighters have had huge successes with many attacks. We will be victorious. Once foreign forces have been exiled we foresee success. God willing, when Nato leaves it will be as it was before… the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan.29
A recent study published in International Affairs shows how adaptable and resilient the Taliban are.30 Despite concerted attacks from ISAF and ANSF, they remain an effective force, learning from battlefield setbacks, changing their tactics and becoming increasingly professional and well-trained. The study suggests that Taliban groups in Helmand lost an average of about 20% of their strength in 2011-2012 and yet they managed to keep operating in all districts of the province. The authors say that the Taliban is well-positioned to make progress in Helmand when the ISAF combat mission is ended in 2014.
Many Afghans fear that the Taliban will mount a concerted attempt to regain control after 2014. Some political leaders, particularly from non-Pashtun ethnic groups, are preparing to re-establish militias, such as those that made up the Northern Alliance, which fought the Taliban during the late 1990s.31 This raises the unwelcome prospect of ethnic conflict in Afghanistan or a division of the country into warlord fiefdoms.
Meanwhile, in strongly Pashtun provinces such as Helmand and Kandahar the Taliban are likely to remain influential. Central government will have to accommodate such strength somehow. This means that, while the Kabul government may continue to fight the Taliban on many fronts, local representatives of the state in the Pashtun heartland could be close to the insurgents. One former commander of the British Special Air Service said recently:
I will be very surprised if the future Governor of Helmand, when he is appointed in July or August, is not very closely connected to those who we call the Taliban. We will end up in a very uncomfortable position, where people will say: 'We've lost nearly 500 guys, most of those were in Helmand, and at the end of it all, we have handed Helmand back to a Taliban-sympathetic governor and Sangin and Musa Qala are full of guys with black beards and black turbans. What was it all about?32
4.5 International assistance after 2014 With the ‘surge’ of 2010 to 2012, the number of ISAF forces peaked at about 150,000. After the drawdown,33 the US aims to leave between 8,000 and 12,000 trainers and counterterrorism forces,34 while the UK will leave a ‘couple of hundred’ personnel, about 120 of whom will be running the new National Military Academy of Afghanistan outside Kabul, which received its first cadets on 20 October. Other NATO member states, and non-
29 ‘Taliban talks to the Mirror: Chilling face-to-face interview with terror commander Qari Nasrullah’, Daily Mirror, 3 October 2013 30 Theo Farrell and Antonio Giustozzi ‘The Taliban at war: inside the Helmand insurgency, 2004–2012’, International Affairs 89: 4 (2013) pp845–871 31 Congressional Research Service, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, October 2013 32 ‘Afghanistan: Taliban 'poised to regain Helmand' after British exit’, Times, 6 January 2013 33 For more information on the UK withdrawal, see the Library Standard note In brief: UK troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, May 2013 34 Congressional Research Service, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, October 2013
8 RESEARCH PAPER 14/18 members such as Georgia, have said that they would continue with some sort of military presence in Afghanistan after 2014.
According to one report, the UK external intelligence service MI6 is pushing to have more personnel remaining in Afghanistan after 2014, worried that the terrorist threat to the UK will rise. Afghanistan is reported to be a blind spot for MI6, which is relying heavily on the Army’s Defence Intelligence operatives; Defence Intelligence operatives might be seconded to MI6, according to the report.35
There are voices both in Afghanistan and in the US in favour of complete withdrawal of troops. Liberals in the Obama Administration as well as isolationists in Washington DC are reported to favour the zero option: withdrawing all US troops at the end of the combat mission.36
Complete withdrawal could threaten the stability of Afghanistan, however. Analysts point to Iraq, where US forces withdrew completely when the government of Nouri al-Maliki failed to agree a Status of Forces Agreement with the Obama administration, and there has been an upsurge in inter-communal violence (partly, it is true, due to the Syria conflict) since withdrawal in 2011. The US has also intimated that $8 billion of annual funding for the military and for development could be in doubt if no agreement is signed.
Those that favour it say that the continued presence of US troops in Afghanistan would make a tremendous difference to the country in many ways. It would boost confidence in the survival of the government and:
Encourage local powerbrokers, so important in Afghanistan, to bet on the survival of the Kabul government rather than to throw in their lot with the Taliban
Help persuade the Taliban to negotiate terms with Kabul rather than continue with the insurgency (although the Taliban has also said that one of its conditions for ending the insurgency is the removal of all foreign troops)
Boost confidence in the economy and encourage investment in Afghanistan, and discourage the drain of capital and entrepreneurs abroad
Make it easier for other international actors, official and NGOs, to maintain their programmes helping the Afghans
Make oversight of US funding easier, therefore making a continued flow of US money more likely.
Others have argued that the US really wants a foothold in Afghanistan to be able to continue with its drone war against terrorism in the region, particularly in Pakistan, and that the likelihood of attacks on US personnel both in the US and in Afghanistan will decrease if there is complete withdrawal.37
US/Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement Negotiations about the size and role of any US forces after 2014, to be finalised in a Bilateral Security Agreement, have been fraught with difficulty. In October 2013, John Kerry said that
35 ‘MI6 demands more spies in Afghanistan to fight terror’, Daily Telegraph, 21 October 2013 36 Mark Schneider, ‘Afghan security agreement needed’, The Hill, 15 November 2013 37 ‘Digging in on Drones and other Flawed Foreign Policy Strategies’, Institute for Policy Studies, 29 January 2014
9 RESEARCH PAPER 14/18 the deal was ready to sign apart from minor details. Then President Karzai, perhaps mindful of potential voter hostility, especially to a clause which would exempt US soldiers from prosecution in Afghanistan, decided that the document should be approved by a Loya Jirga (grand council).
US officials reacted angrily to the delaying tactics of the Karzai government, threatening to withdraw all troops. Not long after, however, Karzai changed his position again, saying that signing should be postponed until after the elections in April 2014. Exempting US troops from prosecution could indeed be a gift to the opposition in a country where resisting foreign influence is part of the culture. But it also may be a game of brinkmanship: President Karzai hoping that retaining some troops in Afghanistan to continue the fight against al-Qaeda is such a priority that he will obtain concessions from the US in return for signing. It is possible to imagine a scenario where President Karzai overplays his hand and ends up with no US troop presence
Finally, the Loya Jirga approved the agreement in late November 2013. US Secretary of State John Kerry welcomed the assembly’s suggestion that the document should be signed before the end of the year.38 The document remained unsigned in early December, with reports that President Karzai had made new demands: that the Administration should help get peace talks with the Taliban started and stop US military raids on Afghan homes, where drone strikes have caused civilian injuries and deaths.
Another obstacle to agreement has been prisoner releases. The Afghan government took charge of all detentions earlier in 2013. But the release of 65 prisoners at the start of 2014 immediately attracted sharp criticism from the American side, which argued that the prisoners were suspected of responsibility for attacks on NATO and ANSF personnel and civilians, and that they should go for trial rather than be released.39 The Afghan authorities claimed that there was not enough evidence against them for prosecution.40
Many forces on the Afghan side, including some close to the President, may want no security agreement at all and some explain the prisoner release move as an attempt to scupper the negotiations.
In February 2014 NATO ministers said that they were discussing the possibility that the agreement will not be signed and that all troops will withdraw.41 The Pentagon, too, was reported to be preparing plans for complete withdrawal. However, US Secretary of State John Kerry said that an agreement would be signed:
It will be signed by the way. Whether it's signed by him or not we obviously have serious reservations, but all six of the candidates for the presidency of Afghanistan have said that they will sign it.42
At least until an agreement is signed, it remains unclear exactly what presence the US intends to maintain in Afghanistan. According to some reports, five ‘super bases’ could remain in US hands, at Bagram, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif and Shindand. This would allow the US to maintain a powerful presence in the region, to the alarm of other
38 ‘The Loya Jirga and the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement’, US Department of State press release, 24 November 2013 39 ‘Afghans’ Plan to Release Prisoners Angers US’, New York Times, 31 December 2013 40 ‘Afghan prisoners freed from Bagram amid US protests’, BBC News Online, 13 February 2014 41 ‘ISAF Ministers discuss Afghan mission progress and post-2014 planning’, NATO press release, 27 February 2014 42 ‘Next Afghan leader will sign security pact: Kerry’, Agence France Presse, 26 February 2014
10 RESEARCH PAPER 14/18 powers such as Iran and Russia. Russia has argued that any US military presence after 2014 would require UN Security Council authorisation.
NATO Status of Forces Agreement If and when the US/Afghan agreement is signed, NATO would also reach a separate deal, modelled on the US document. A single NATO/Afghan agreement is the most likely outcome, although bilateral agreements are still a possibility. Negotiations on the status of Forces Agreement started on 21 December, although NATO made it clear that it would not be concluded until a US/Afghan agreement is signed.43
According to one unnamed official, NATO would aim to establish four bases in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of combat troops.44
5 Elections Afghanistan is due to hold Presidential and Provincial Council elections on 5 April 2014. Parliamentary elections to the Wolesi Jirga (House of the People) are due in 2015. On 3 September 2013 UNAMA met the Afghan Independent Electoral Commission and donors’ representatives, and donors pledged an extra $134 million to support the electoral preparations.45
5.1 Problems looming for the presidential elections The 2009 presidential election, which saw Hamid Karzai re-elected, was widely criticised. Turnout was low, particularly where the Taliban is strong in eastern and southern Afghanistan, suggesting that intimidation kept many voters from the polls. There were widespread accusations of ballot box stuffing and multiple voting. Inferior ink is thought to have allowed voters to bleach their fingers and vote again. The then head of the Electoral Complaints Commission, an experienced international election observer, said it was the most widespread, pervasive, and egregious campaign of fraud he had witnessed.46
Another election as questionable as the 2009 poll would be a serious problem. Giving evidence to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Andrew Wilder of the US Institute for Peace said the 2014 election is the most important factor in building a stable Afghanistan:
I strongly believe that the single biggest opportunity to protect the tremendous achievements of the past decade and to promote the US objective of a relatively stable Afghanistan that does not slide back into civil war, once again becoming a haven for transnational terrorist groups and destabilizing its neighbours, especially Pakistan, is a credible election in 2014 that produces a legitimate successor to President Karzai.47
Not only should the election be credible with the general population, it must also command the respect of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups, especially the Tajiks, who formed the backbone of the Northern Alliance that fought the Taliban in the late 1990s.
43 ‘NATO Secretary General welcomes the start of negotiations on Status of Forces Agreement with Afghanistan’, NATO press release, 21 December 2013 44 ‘NATO Ready To Establish Afghan Bases, But Only After Pact Is Signed’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2 December 2013 45 Monthly progress report on Afghanistan September 2013, Foreign and Commonwealth Office 46 Sarah Chayes, Prospects for Afghanistan’s 2014 Elections, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 May 2013 47 Andrew Wilder, ‘Prospects for Afghanistan’s 2014 Elections’, US Institute for Peace, 21 May 2013
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A genuine process at the 2014 presidential election would mean the first democratic transfer of power in Afghanistan’s history. A smooth and credible change-over from President Karzai, who is prevented by the Constitution from standing again, would be an important first step in the struggle for the present regime to survive after 2014. Not only is legitimacy important in the eyes of Afghans; a government that is perceived as illegitimate by the international community will probably attract less aid. Indeed, the 2012 Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework specifies a credible election as a condition for long-term assistance to Afghanistan beyond 2014.48
Candidates Political leaders do not come and go quickly in Afghanistan. Since political parties and civil society are underdeveloped and politics remains divided along entrenched ethnic lines, many of the figures in Afghanistan’s small political elite have remained unchanged over the last couple of decades and the list of candidates includes some familiar names.
In October 2013 16 candidates were disqualified by the Independent Election Commission (IEC), which said that the disqualified candidates had either retained citizenship of another country or failed to provide evidence of enough support. Some fear that the government may be behind the disqualifications, and there were complaints of lack of transparency about the process, although reforms have been made since the 2009 election to try to make the IEC more independent of the government. The accepted front-runners were in any case all confirmed as candidates. It seems that President Karzai, having reached his term limit, intends to choose a favourite, although he is in no hurry to announce his choice and prefers to keep his opponents guessing.
The full list of candidates is:
Zalmai Rassoul, former foreign minister who has for his running mates a man with connections to a warlord and a reformist provincial governor who is a woman. Could become the favoured Karzai successor.
Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, former finance minister and technocrat also seeking to inherit the Karzai mantle. His running mate is General Abdul Rashid Dostum, seen by some as a former warlord.
Abdullah Abdullah, former presidential candidate with connections to the former Northern Alliance. He got some 30% in the first round of the 2009 contest but withdrew from the planned second round after controversy about electoral fraud associated with the Karzai camp. He is the leader of the most serious opposition grouping to the Karzai government.
Qutbuddin Helal, a former prime minister under the short-lived government of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and still a member of Hizb-e Islami, an Islamist party rated a ‘Group of Concern’ by the US State Department with alleged links to Pakistani intelligence. In a recent interview, Helal encouraged reconciliation but appeared to justify suicide attacks as a response to foreign military action.49
Abdul Rab Rassoul Sayyaf, allegedly former mentor of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, one of the instigators of 9/11, and close to al-Qaeda, although he opposes the Taliban. His running mate is Ismail Khan who has also been described as a former warlord and has
48 Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, July 2012. 49 ‘Helal Favors Reconciliation, Discusses Women and Suicide Attacks’, Tolo News, 17 November 2013
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called for re-armament of militias to fight the civil war with the Taliban that he sees as inevitable.
Abdul Rahim Wardak, former mujahideen leader who fought the Soviets and has been a leading figure in the new Afghan army, especially as defence minister since 2001.
Qayoum Karzai, brother of President Karzai. He had a seat in parliament (the Wolesi Jirga) for some time but was criticised for not attending many sessions and has not shown great interest in politics until now.
Gul Agha Sherzai, former governor of Kandahar who was removed from that post by President Karzai, ostensibly because he could not hold both civil and military roles, although allegations of corruption and opium trading have been floated as the real reasons.50 Sherzai became special advisor and once again a governor, this time of Nangarhar province.
Sardar Mohammad Naeem, son of an Afghan diplomat and a low-profile businessman based in London until recently.
Hedayat Amin Arsala, an American-educated economist who worked in the World Bank though he took an active part in the fight against the Soviet invasion and became Afghanistan’s first post-Taliban finance minister.
Daoud Sultanzoy, an engineer and pilot with experience in the Afghan fight against the Soviet invasion. Worked as a pilot in the US after sustaining a war injury. Elected as MP in Ghazni province. Has experience in foreign relations and is noted for backing women’s rights.51
It is likely that some of the candidates will withdraw before the election, to make way for President Karzai’s chosen successor in exchange for some form of payoff. All of the presidential candidates are Pashtuns (which may be necessary in order to encourage acceptance of the process among Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group). Abdullah Abdullah, however, was close to Ahmed Shah Massoud, a Tajik leader during the civil war of the 1990s, and his mother was Tajik, so he is the most closely associated with the Tajiks, the second biggest ethnicity. Abdullah has chosen as his running mate a Pashtun member of the Hizb e-Islami party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, arch enemy of Massoud, to try to bolster support among Pashtun voters.
The Taliban has announced that it will boycott the presidential election. Mullah Omar said in his annual statement:
As to the deceiving drama under the name of elections 2014, our pious people will not tire themselves out, nor will they participate in it.
Our pious and Mujahid people know that selection, de facto, takes place in Washington. These nominal rulers are not elected through the ballots of the people.52
The Taliban have in the past threatened candidates and attempted to block access to polling stations. However, the idea that Afghan election results are determined in Washington was
50 ‘In Afghan war, official corruption is a bigger threat than the Taliban’, Christian Science Monitor, 21 April 2010 51 Information in this section based largely on ‘Afghanistan election: Warlords and technocrats seek to replace Karzai’, BBC News Online, 7 October 2013 and ‘Presidential Profiles’, TOLO News website. 52 Message of Felicitation of Amir-ul-Momineen (May Allah protect him) on the Occasion of Eid-ul-Fitr, 5 August 2013, posted on the Registan website
13 RESEARCH PAPER 14/18 undermined in early 2014, when former US Defence Secretary Robert Gates confirmed in his memoirs that US diplomats had openly helped candidates opposed to Hamid Karzai in 2009, something that Karzai had complained of at the time.53
Election practicalities Preparations for the election are not progressing particularly well, according to some reports. One former IEC official says that security has deteriorated since the last presidential election. Defence and Interior Ministry officials announced in January 2014 that 414 out of the total of 6,845 polling stations will not open on the day of the election because of security concerns.54
Less money has been made available to the IEC by Western donors than in the run-up to the 2009 presidential election.
In March 2013, the UN Security Council reaffirmed its commitment in Resolution 2096 to help Afghanistan with the sustainability, integrity and inclusiveness of the Afghan electoral process leading up to 2014.55 UNAMA helps the Afghan government with promoting democracy in general,56 while direct assistance to the IEC and other electoral institutions comes from the ELECT II project run by the UN Development Programme.57 ELECT II has a total budget of $338 million to assist with both the 2014 presidential election and the 2015 parliamentary election. The UK contributes to the project both individually and as a member of the EU.
Election observers There will be thousands of locally-organised election monitors. Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA) has announced that it will coordinate about 10,000 local observers for the presidential election. The Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan (TEFA) has also announced that it will deploy some 5,000 monitors, 1,600 of which would be women.58
The EU sent a preliminary delegation in January 2014 to discuss a possible EU observer mission. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe will be sending an election monitoring team to Afghanistan for both the presidential and the provincial elections, following a request from the Afghan government. This follows similar missions in 2009 and previously. Up to 20 election staff will go, administered by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.59
Outlook Some are not convinced that the prospects for the 2014 contest are good. The Afghan Analysts Network points out that 20.7 million voter cards have been issued while the electorate is less than 14 million-strong.60 International Crisis Group, in a report published in autumn 2012, sounded a pessimistic note:
Plagued by factionalism and corruption, Afghanistan is far from ready to assume responsibility for security when U.S. and NATO forces withdraw in 2014. That makes
53 ‘US 'tried to oust Hamid Karzai by manipulating Afghan elections'’, Guardian, 10 January 2014 54 ‘414 polling stations to remain closed on elections day’, Khaama Press, 11 January 2014 55 ‘Security Council extends mandate of UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan until March 2014, unanimously adopting Resolution 2096 (2013)’, UN press release, 19 March 2013 56 UNAMA, 2014 Presidential Elections 57 ‘UNDP-ELECT II Commits to Support the 2014 and 2015 Elections’, UNDP press notice, 27 August 2013 58 ‘EU To Send Probe Before Election Observers’, Tolo News, 27 December 2013 59 ‘OSCE to send team to Afghanistan to assist on April 2014 elections’, OSCE press release, 24 October 2013 60 Thomas Ruttig, Some Things Got Better – How Much Got Good? A review of 12 years of international intervention in Afghanistan, Afghan Analysts Network, 30 December 2014
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the political challenge of organising a credible presidential election and transfer of power from President Karzai to a successor that year all the more daunting. A repeat of previous elections’ chaos and chicanery would trigger a constitutional crisis, lessening chances the present political dispensation can survive the transition. In the current environment, prospects for clean elections and a smooth transition are slim.61
The report continued:
There are alarming signs Karzai hopes to stack the deck for a favoured proxy. Demonstrating at least the will to ensure clean elections could forge a degree of national consensus and boost popular confidence, but steps toward a stable transition must begin now to prevent a precipitous slide toward state collapse.62
The International Crisis Group thinks that fraud is all but inevitable:
It is a near certainty that under current conditions the 2014 elections will be plagued by massive fraud. Vote rigging in the south and east, where security continues to deteriorate, is all but guaranteed.63
Even after a fair election, a peaceful handover of power is not guaranteed, and this is another essential condition for stability in the country. A peaceful handover depends as much on the alignments between ethnic and other factions that emerge before the election as on the result. If negotiations have produced realistic candidates for the presidency and the vice presidency that command the acceptance of a wide range of factions and can credibly be expected to represent the whole nation, a smooth handover may be possible. The use of patronage in the distribution of government jobs after the election will be part of this process.
6 Provincial Council elections Provincial Council elections are also due on 5 April 2014. In November 2013 2,713 candidates were declared eligible for the Provincial elections, of whom 308 were women.64
61 Afghanistan: the long hard road to the 2014 transition, International Crisis Group, 8 October 2012 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 ‘IEC Announces Final List of Candidates for 2014 Elections’, Tolo News, 20 November 2013
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Afghan provinces map
Map courtesy of University of Texas
7 Is the Afghan government getting any better? 7.1 Corruption and regional horse-trading will not go away Afghanistan has never had a particularly strong central government. Local elites have always had a powerful grip on institutions such as the police and the judiciary, with the variety of cultural backgrounds that is inevitable in a multi-ethnic society such as Afghanistan.65 Power relations have often depended on clientelism and patronage, seen as legitimate by many of Afghan elite but, for Western governments, classed as corruption. In this context, the goal of Western powers to build a state almost from scratch that did not rely on patronage was always ambitious.
The ‘surge’ in US military personnel from 2009 to 2012 was accompanied by a civilian surge, which was intended to tackle some of the corruption and problems with government service delivery. The civilian surge, involving State Department and other officials, was an important part of the Obama Administration’s counterinsurgency strategy that would improve Afghan governance and thereby gain the trust and loyalty of the Afghan population. The US Administration reported in 2011 that the civilian surge was having some success:
65 Antonio Giustozzi, Empires of the mud: Wars and warlords in Afghanistan, 2009
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The United States has helped to build the capacity of Afghan institutions to withstand and diminish the threat posed by extremism, deliver high-impact economic assistance, create jobs, promote the rule of law, and draw insurgents off the battlefield. The military surge we pursued in 2009, combined with an unprecedented civilian surge initiated to help support Afghan institutions and improve Afghanistan’s governing capacity, have helped pave the way for security transition and for the diplomatic effort aimed at resolving the conflict.
Our coordinated, focused civilian and military efforts have led to substantial progress in stabilization and governance in some of the most volatile areas of the country. Today, economic growth has increased, and the Afghan government is making inroads in combating the cultivation, production, and trafficking of narcotics.66
The report went on to talk about successes in educational attendance, the take-up of microloans for business and improvements in life expectancy.
In spite of some areas of success, however, the Afghan government remains deeply ineffective and corrupt according to most reports. In Transparency International’s 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index,67 Afghanistan shares the bottom spot with Somalia and North Korea. The Afghan press is assessed as ‘not free’ by Freedom House, although Afghanistan’s 2012 performance on press freedom was an improvement on the previous year after a sharp decline in attacks on journalists.68 Afghanistan is also rated as generally ‘not free’ by Freedom House.69 In the Failed States Index, devised by the Fund For Peace, Afghanistan has made no sustained progress, remaining at around sixth or seventh rank for the last few years, slightly better than such countries as Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.70
The World Bank has an aggregate indicator of government effectiveness for the countries of the world. Each country is given a ranking against the performance of other countries; the outer, dotted lines indicate margins of error.
Source: World Bank
66 Status report: Afghanistan and Pakistan civilian engagement, Office for the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, US State Department, November 2011 67 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, Full table and rankings 68 Freedom House, Freedom of the press 2013, Afghanistan 69 Freedom House, Afghanistan 2013 70 Fund For Peace, The Failed States Index 2013
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Another indicator has been devised to show progress on the rule of law. On this indicator, Afghanistan fares no better, making no discernible progress since the 1990s:
Source: World Bank
On one indicator, regulatory quality, Afghanistan did show very slight signs of improvement from 2011 to 2012, but on others such as the control of corruption, and political stability and the absence of violence, there was no progress at all.71
However, these quantitative measures of the effectiveness of the state are perhaps unsuitable for Afghanistan in its present condition. Some of the workings of informal justice systems, for example, may be acceptable to some Afghans and that may not be counted; any statistics concerning Afghanistan should be treated with caution.
More importantly, as previously discussed, corruption is far more than just a means for individuals to enrich themselves. It is one of the bases for government power. As the amount of money coming into Afghanistan from international aid and military spending decreases after 2014, it will be more difficult for the next president to use these resources to maintain central authority.72 In any case, reliance by central government on patronage to secure its rule has the effect both of reducing the government’s effectiveness and of de-legitimising it among those ordinary Afghans who do not think that they are benefitting from it, undermining it in the longer term.
7.2 Opium cultivation up Another measure of the effectiveness of government is the level of opium production. There was some success in reducing the area dedicated to poppy cultivation and the total amount of opium in the years from 2008 but the latest figures available from the United Nations suggest that the trend has reversed in the last couple of years, with the area under poppy cultivation in 2013 rising 36% over the 2012 figure and the total production went up by about 50% over the same period.73
71 World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, Country data reports, Afghanistan 72 For more on this see 73 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013 Summary findings, November 2013
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Source: UNODC
A strong increase in the main opium-producing province of Helmand, as well as in other parts of the Pashtun heartlands and in the north, will be a serious worry to observers. Drug cultivation and production provide anti-government forces with one of their main sources of revenue. There are significant forces behind the increase in opium cultivation:
Reports suggest that powerful local figures who have until now profited from international money are looking to replace that revenue with money from opium.
Taliban external financing has also reportedly been squeezed, with wealthy Middle East donors finding new destinations for their cash, particularly in Syria, leading the Taliban to rely increasingly on opium.
In January, the outgoing head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan warned that failure to deal with the growing narcotics trade posed a threat to all the other goals of international cooperation in the country. Jean-Luc Lemahieu said that Afghanistan risks disintegration: "If no appropriate action is taken, then Afghanistan runs the risk of becoming a fragmented criminal state, ruled by an illicit economy."74 Lemahieu also drew attention to tension between security objectives and narcotics eradication:
The security agenda and short-term ideas of success didn't go well with the ideas of counter-narcotics work. For the international military, counter-narcotics went against their aim of winning hearts and minds.
74 ‘Drug trade could splinter Afghanistan into fragmented criminal state – UN’, Guardian, 6 January 2013
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The former UN official pointed out that school attendance was far higher in poppy-free provinces, and called for counter-narcotics to be given a higher priority in international plans.
8 Peace negotiations with the Taliban 8.1 Few signs of progress at the top level Negotiations between the Afghan authorities and the Taliban have been Afghan policy for some time, but progress has been difficult to discern, partly because the process is secretive.
The Afghan government created the High Peace Council in 2010, including on it some former members of the Taliban. By July 2010 the US had changed policy and was now more supportive of high-level reconciliation. Taliban commanders and much of the Kabul elite appear to be unwilling for now to share power.
In 2011 the leader of the Peace Council, Burhanuddin Rabbani - a former Mujahiddeen commander - was assassinated, probably by elements of the Taliban opposed to reconciliation. Seven months later, Rabbani was replaced by his son, Salahuddin.
The Peace Council has been credited with persuading thousands of junior fighters and some mid-level commanders to quit the Taliban. The United Nations Development Programme gives the following figures:
6,662 former combatants have joined the programme including 565 local commanders and leaders.
Nearly 5,442 weapons have been collected from former combatants.
6,277 transitional assistance packages have been given to the reintegrees
31 Provincial Peace Committees now engage in local outreach and negotiations, supported by 31 Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams.
A total of 146 Small Grants Projects have been approved--designed to provide livelihood assistance to reintegrees and reach out to beneficiaries in communities around the country.75
In a recent report of a successful attempt to re-integrate fighters in the province of Herat, a group of former Taliban members who had decided to give up fighting said that the imminent ISAF withdrawal was an important factor:
We were supported financially by the government of Pakistan. As far as we know that by 2014 the foreign troops would leave Afghanistan and the Afghan government would take the security responsibilities, therefore there would be no reason to fight anymore. We signed an agreement with the Herat Provincial Peace Committee and influential leaders to work together for the Peace Process, in addition, we urge those oppositions who are still against the government to set aside the violence and join the Peace Process.76
While there may have been some success in re-integrating mid-level Taliban fighters, top- level negotiations on an overall peace deal have been troubled. The Taliban opened an office in Doha, the Qatari capital, in June 2013, but the Afghans refused to visit the office because it was opened with such a fanfare, flew the Taliban flag and had a plaque
75 UNDP, Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) 76 Afghan High Peace Council, Re-integration of Armed opposition to the Peace Process in Herat, 12 August 2013
20 RESEARCH PAPER 14/18 proclaiming the ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’, the Taliban’s name for Afghanistan. This looked too much like a government in exile for the present Afghan authorities, who demanded the closure of the office.
The central Taliban demands – a timetable for the complete removal of US troops and the release of all Taliban prisoners – are a sticking point. Meanwhile, the Taliban response to the West’s demands – to renounce violence, accept the Afghan constitution and end all ties with al-Qaeda – remains ambiguous.
The Taliban has suggested that it would not allow international jihadis to operate. In June 2013 a spokesman said:
The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan [the Taliban] doesn’t want any threats from Afghanistan soil to other countries, and neither permits anyone to threaten other countries using Afghanistan soil. We support a political and peaceful solution that ends Afghanistan’s occupation, and guarantees the Islamic system and nationwide security.77
In August 2013 Mullah Omar, head of the Afghan Taliban, said that his group did not want to monopolise power, perhaps preparing the path for negotiations with other Afghan groups:
I reiterate once again that we do not think of monopolising power. Those who truly love Islam and the country and have commitment to both, whoever they may be or whatever ethnicity of geographical location they hail from, this homeland is theirs.78
The Taliban leader’s annual message was interpreted by many as an offer to reach a settlement with other Afghan political forces after the withdrawal.
Presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah showed the level of opposition among many mainstream politicians in Afghanistan to negotiations with the Taliban while they are still engaged in violence:
As long as the Taliban are terrorising the nation and making efforts to bring the system down and replace it with their own so-called Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, as long as they are associated with the terrorist organisations from around the world, and killing innocent people, masses, civilians throughout the country, they are denying themselves any constructive role in the process.79
Kabul wants Pakistan to facilitate peace talks with the Taliban. This is unsurprising given Afghan suspicions of Pakistan’s strong influence over the Taliban, accusations which the Pakistani government denies.
In October 2013, a meeting was organised in London between President Karzai and Nawaz Sharif, President of Pakistan. The most important outcome of the meeting was agreement for Afghan officials from the High Peace Council to travel to Pakistan to meet Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a senior Taliban official believed by Afghanistan to be prepared to discuss re- integration. According to a Wikileaks cable,80 there are suggestions that he was arrested by Pakistan in order to hinder negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government, because any reconciliation between the two could leave Pakistan without a seat at the table.
77 ‘US drops demand Taliban renounce al-Qaeda to allow talks to progress’, Daily Telegraph, 18 June 2013 78 ‘Leader says Taliban will sit out 2014 Afghan election’, New York Times, 6 August 2013 79 ‘Afghan deja vu: Abdullah to run for president’, Al-Jazeera, 1 October 2013 80 Wikileaks website, Cable 10KABUL693, Ahmed Wali Karzai
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In February 2014 there were widespread reports that a former minister in the Taliban government was leading a delegation for talks in Dubai with the Afghan government, reportedly in recognition of the government’s refusal to sign the bilateral security agreement. The Taliban rejected the move and denied that Mullah Agha Jan Mutasim represented the group.81 One member of the delegation was assassinated in Peshawar by unknown assailants after returning from the United Arab Emirates.
8.2 No political settlement? If a political settlement is not found, the possibility of Afghanistan descending into civil war is real. Many of the powerful figures that backed militias in the civil war after the fall of the communist government in 1992 are still forces to be reckoned with.
Many of these are also associated with particular Afghan ethnic groups and with the regional powers that duelled for advantage during the 1990s. Iran, Saudi Arabia, India and of course Pakistan are all reported to have backed particular horses during the civil war and if violence breaks out again, the temptation to intervene would still be there.
One outcome that has been discussed is a partition. De facto partition has happened before: in 1996, for example, the country was divided between the largely Pashtun areas of the south and east and two different Northern Alliance factions in the northeast and the northwest respectively.
81 ‘Taliban moderates ready to open peace talks with Afghan government’, Asahi Shimbun, 24 February 2013
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Map (1997) courtesy of University of Texas
Some have argued that this outcome is close to inevitable after the drawdown in 2014. If this is so, Western powers could continue to support the Kabul government and to back the ANSF in maintaining its hold on the capital and the north. Multilateral institutions could continue to support nation-building in those areas. In the south, actions might be limited to counter-terrorism, with special forces and intelligence services geared to prevent the use of the area as a base for terrorist organisations. 82
Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar appeared to refer to the possibility of partition in his Eid al-Fitr annual address. He said that it was ‘wicked’:
With the support of our people, we will not allow anyone to succeed in the wicked plan for disintegration of the country or to divide our country under geographical locations and ethnicity denominations. Our pious people consider it their responsibility to build
82 For example, see Robert D Blackwill, ‘Plan B in Afghanistan: Why a De Facto Partition Is the Least Bad Option’, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2011
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their common home and defend its every inch. Similarly, they consider it their religious obligation to maintain internal unity and give support to their Mujahid brothers.83
9 Human rights abuses 9.1 Getting away with it The increasing influence of conservative forces in Afghanistan is influencing the protection of human rights in general, despite Afghanistan signing up to several important human rights conventions (see the table at the end of the paper).
In 2007, warlords (or former warlords) in the parliament participated in the drafting the National Stability and Reconciliation Law, which granted blanket immunity for war crimes and human rights abuses committed before 2001. The law caused an outcry in human rights circles, with critics saying that the parliamentarians were blatantly protecting themselves; President Karzai undertook not to allow the law to pass. Nevertheless, in 2010, it emerged that the law had appeared in the Afghan official gazette and was in force. Supporters of the law said that prosecuting those suspected of crimes would destabilise the government and risk re-starting civil war.
In a report on allegations of gross human rights violations published in November 2013 the International Criminal Court found that ‘war crimes and crimes against humanity were and continue to be committed in Afghanistan’ by both pro- and anti-government forces.84 The court decided to investigate the admissibility of the cases in the light of actions taken by national authorities to deal with them. It is unlikely that the ICC would conclude that measures taken by national authorities are sufficient to meet the Afghan government’s responsibilities under the Rome Statute.85 A decision will be made in the near future as to whether to start formal investigations.
The immunity law was perhaps a foretaste of a coming roll-back of human rights protections in Afghanistan. Human Rights Watch says that Afghanistan’s human rights situation is showing signs of deteriorating and that although armed conflict is behind many of the abuses, the government is failing to live up to its obligations under international humanitarian law.
As the international presence winds down, there is less attention on the activities of the Afghan government and its agencies. Also, many of the institutions built up with the assistance of the international community and crucial to protection of human rights are likely to be less effective as the international presence diminishes.
9.2 A difficult environment for the press Although free expression is guaranteed by the Afghan constitution, the news media are rated ‘not free’ by Freedom House.86 Journalists are still arrested, imprisoned arbitrarily, beaten or even killed. Reporters without Borders said that the pace of attacks on journalists was increasing in 2013,87 accusing the government of ‘indifference’ to the problem.
There have been four different pieces of legislation regulating the press since 2002 and there is a certain amount of confusion about what law applies, leading to self-censorship. The restrictions on publishing anything that does not accord with Islamic principles or is offensive
83 Message of Felicitation of Amir-ul-Momineen (May Allah protect him) on the Occasion of Eid-ul-Fitr, posted on the Registan website 84 Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2013, International Criminal Court, November 2013, 85 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2002 86 Afghanistan Freedom of the Press 2013, Freedom House 87 ‘Journalists still targeted by violence, threats and censorship’, Reporters without Borders, 24 April 2013
24 RESEARCH PAPER 14/18 to other religions or sects also have a chilling effect, and the Attorney General has threatened media organisations with prosecution for publishing material deemed immoral or incompatible with Islam.
9.3 Internally displaced persons According to Amnesty International, there were about 600,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Afghanistan at the beginning of 2014, mostly in shanty towns around the major cities and in danger of forced and sometimes violent evictions. There is evidence that the number is increasing quickly. Many of these internal refugees, particularly children, died of illness or the cold, especially in the harsh winter of 2011/12. Amnesty welcomed a new policy for the protection of IDPs in 2014.88
9.4 Inadequacies of the justice system The death penalty continues to be handed down in Afghanistan by a justice system that is deeply corrupt and unprofessional. For example, despite central government guidelines that women should no longer be prosecuted for running away from home, there are many convictions for that (although it is not clear that it is a crime) and for ‘attempted sex outside marriage’ (‘attempted zina’), with both the formal and informal justice systems, like much else in Afghanistan, linked to local strongmen. The formal system lacks resources and facilities and most ordinary Afghans find it hard to access it, largely because of cost. The majority of disputes are taken through the informal system.
The police and prison authorities are accused of widespread use of torture, including in a number of secret prisons. Many prisoners arrested on national security grounds are tortured, according to the United Nations.89 ISAF responded to the allegations by suspending in 2011 the transfer of Afghan detainees to certain Afghan government facilities.90 The UK MoD had already suspended in 2010 transfers of prisoners to the National Directorate of Security.
The follow-up report from 2012 concluded that the frequency of torture had not significantly declined:
UNAMA found sufficiently credible and reliable evidence that more than half of 635 detainees interviewed (326 detainees) experienced torture and ill-treatment in numerous facilities of the Afghan National Police (ANP), National Directorate of Security (NDS), Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) between October 2011 and October 2012.91
In 2011 the Afghan government agreed to tackle the abuse of prisoners by transferring the administration of prisons to the Ministry of Justice from the Ministry of the Interior, the department which also administers the Afghan National Police. In 2012, however, prisons were transferred back to the Ministry of the Interior.92 Both the ANP and particularly the Afghan Local Police, which is barely supervised, are accused of torture.
88 ‘Afghanistan: New policy a lifeline to more than half a million internally displaced’, Amnesty International press release, 10 February 2014 89 Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody, United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, October 2011. 90 ‘Nato halts Afghan prisoner transfer after torture fears’, BBC News Online, 6 September 2011 91 Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody One Year On, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, January 2013 92 Afghanistan Universal Periodic Review 2013, Human Rights Watch, 7 January 2014
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9.5 Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission The AIHRC is a statutory body set up pursuant to the 2005 Bonn Agreement.93 In 2013, UN Human Rights Commissioner Navi Pillay visited Afghanistan, partly because of the replacement of certain Afghan commissioners by the Karzai government, which had raised concerns that the AIHRC was losing its independence. The head of the AIHRC was unhappy with some of the new commissioners, only one of whom has a background in human rights and one of whom was a former member of the Taliban. One of the new commissioners has called for the repeal of the Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) Law (see below).
Concerns about the appointment process for the commissioners were not laid to rest during the visit, and at the end of the trip, Ms Pillay said that abuses in Afghanistan were already getting worse:
My concern that the momentum of improvement in human rights may have not only peaked, but is in reality waning, has not been allayed. Afghanistan is clearly at a critical juncture with the ongoing political, security and economic transition concluding in 2014 – all of which will have an impact on the human rights of its citizens. There have been some distinct human rights achievements during the past 12 years, but they are fragile, and many Afghans are expressing fears that the overall human rights situation is deteriorating on several fronts.94
10 Afghan women There has been a growing controversy in Afghanistan about the role of women in the country’s democracy. The Afghan Constitution affords equal protection to men and women, guaranteeing women the right to education, political participation and economic opportunity. Special measures have resulted in an Afghan Parliament with 28% of women members. Both the Wolesi Jirga and the Meshrano Jirga (the lower and upper houses of the parliament, respectively) have quotas for women’s seats.
The Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) law, passed in 2009, made rape a crime for the first time and outlawed forced and underage marriage and physical and verbal abuse.
As well as having better legal protection, at least on paper, women are also employed in a range of jobs including as doctors and police officers. This would have been unthinkable under the Taliban, when employment outside the home and education for women were banned.
However, traditional attitudes to women’s position in society and in the family do not change quickly. There are reports that ‘honour’ killings and violent punishments for breaking the traditional rules of society are still widespread. According to a UN official, violence against women and girls in Afghanistan is almost at ‘pandemic’ levels:
Violence against women and girls is exceptionally high in Afghanistan and is almost at a pandemic level, with up to 87.2% of women having experienced some form of violence, such as physical, psychological, sexual, economic violence, social abuse as well as forced and early marriage.95
The Afghan state has so far not been particularly effective at protecting women from such violence, despite the 2009 law. One of the biggest problems has been the failure to establish a robust system of courts to replace the informal local jirgas (councils), which are usually
93 For more on the setting up of the present Afghan regime, see Commons Library Research Paper Afghanistan: the culmination of the Bonn process, RP 05/72, 25 October 2005 94 ‘UN human rights chief: Afghanistan at a ‘critical juncture,’ more effort needed to preserve gains’, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan press release, 17 September 2013 95 ‘UN: Violence against women in Afghanistan 'pandemic'’, Deutsche Welle, 22 October 2013
26 RESEARCH PAPER 14/18 dominated by local strongmen and take little account of the law. Commentators worry that the Afghan authorities will be even less effective after 2014.
Conservative Afghan politicians have criticized the EVAW law as un-Islamic – particularly the prohibition on child and forced marriages and the establishment of women’s shelters – and have threatened to repeal it.
An amendment to the criminal code has been passed by both Houses of Parliament to prevent relatives from testifying against their family members. It is now awaiting signature by the President. The change would make prosecutions of perpetrators of domestic violence, already rare, even more difficult. Campaigners were highly critical of the change: "It is a travesty this is happening. It will make it impossible to prosecute cases of violence against women … The most vulnerable people won't get justice now," said Manizha Naderi, of the campaign group Women for Afghan Women.96
In December 2013, the United Nations investigated the implementation of the EVAW law and found that while the number of complaints about violence against women invoking the law had gone up by 28% in 2012-13 compared with 2011-12, the number of prosecutions had only risen by 2% over the same period.97 There was also an increase in reported incidents of violence and a decrease in the number of criminal indictments. The increase in reporting was welcomed as a sign of raised awareness of the legal protections available but the number of prosecutions was disappointing.
10.1 Women and the elections According to Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission, some 2,028,000 people have newly registered to vote in the forthcoming presidential election. That figure includes some 630,000 women, about 30% of the total, against a target of 40%. The electoral register closes in March 2014.98
The risk of suicide attacks on polling stations is high. The election commission announced in August 2013 that there were just 2,000 of the 12,000 women needed to search voters entering polling stations set aside for women. The possibility has been raised of training teachers (rather than female police officers) to do the searches. The lack of women officials could pose a serious threat to the women’s vote at the forthcoming elections.
Generally, turnout of women voters has been relatively low in Afghan elections, although there are no official figures. It is reported that female turnout has been highest in Bamiyan province in the centre of the country (home of the majority Shia Hazara ethnic group who are no friends of the Taliban) and in parts of north Afghanistan. In both these regions the influence of the Taliban is much less than in the Pashtun Taliban heartland where female turnout has been very low.99
Of the 27 candidates who originally registered for the presidential election, the one woman candidate was disqualified. On a recent visit to Afghanistan, a senior official with the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) underlined concerns that progress for women over the last few years needed to be safeguarded:
96 ‘New Afghanistan law to silence victims of violence against women’, Guardian, 4 February 2013 97 A Way to Go: An Update on Implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence against Women in Afghanistan, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan/United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, December 2013 98 ‘In first visit to Afghanistan, UN official urges safeguarding of advances made for women’, Report, UNAMA, 8 October 2013 99 ‘Afghan women may be denied vote because of female security force shortage’, NBCNews, 28 August 2013
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Attention needs to be placed on ensuring that women’s participation is accelerated in the election process because it is fundamental in terms of women being able to really engage in choosing the government that they would like.100
Provincial elections In May 2013 the lower house of parliament passed a law abolishing a previous requirement that women should make up a quarter of elected provincial council officials. The upper house then reinstated the quota. After an intervention from the presidency, the two houses reached a compromise, reducing the quota to 20%.
The lists of candidates were finalised in November 2013. 2,713 candidates have now been declared eligible for the Provincial elections, of whom 308 are women.101
10.2 Education According to an Oxfam report published in 2011, gross enrolment of girls in schools under the Taliban fell to 6.4% and most girls’ schools were closed.102 By 2011, enrolment of girls had increased from about 5,000 under the Taliban to 2.4 million. The Oxfam report also showed that attitudes among parents were generally strongly in favour of girls receiving education: slightly more than half of parents wanted their girls to complete university education.
However, the same report said that provision was very uneven; much of the progress has been made in urban areas, while many rural schools have no buildings, not enough female teachers and mounting security worries.
10.3 Women and the peace negotiations Campaigners for women’s rights are often uneasy about negotiations with the Taliban. Not much is known about what discussions have taken place, but women’s rights could be one of the first things to be bargained away, given the traditional powerlessness of women in Afghanistan.
Only nine of the 70 members of the Afghan High Peace Council are women. An Afghan woman MP claimed that they are ineffectual: “These people do not represent the women of Afghanistan. They're negotiating for our rights - for my rights, for the rights of my daughters - from a position of weakness.”103 Najia Zewari, one of the nine female council members, argued that women’s views are being represented:
The women on the council - we want to know that the Taliban will respect our rights, that progress will continue. We also want the women of Afghanistan to know that we can be their voice.104
The British government says that it is aware of the problem. In October 2011, the then Foreign Office minister Alistair Burt said:
This issue is very important to the United Kingdom, and to the many Members who have written to me about it over the past few weeks. Women are represented on the High Peace Council; nine of its 70 members are women. They have also been
100 ‘In first visit to Afghanistan, UN official urges safeguarding of advances made for women’, Report, UNAMA, 8 October 2013 101 ‘IEC Announces Final List of Candidates for 2014 Elections’, Tolo News, 20 November 2013 102 High Stakes: Girls’ Education in Afghanistan, Joint report by Oxfam and other NGOs working in Afghanistan, 2011 103 “Afghan women fear losses in Taliban talks”, Washington Post, 26 July 2011 104 “Afghan women fear losses in Taliban talks”, Washington Post, 26 July 2011
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represented in Parliament and in last year's peace process. We continually stress to the Afghan Government that the commitment they have made to the equality of all their citizens and the inclusion of all in future processes must be met by action as well as words, and we will continue to take that forward as we look towards the Bonn summit.105
President Karzai denies that the peace negotiations will be in any way damaging to the interests of Afghan women:
Be confident my sisters, our achievements made on the basis of the Constitution, achievements towards the progress of the country and towards the better condition of our women will not be damaged or slowed down by any peace deals.106
Some commentators have suggested that any kind of negotiations with the Taliban will entail compromises on women’s rights and are likely to result in significant setbacks. Whether the Taliban would subsequently respect any agreement is also open to question. Louise Arbour, of the International Crisis Group, argues that Afghanistan needs the rule of law rather than accommodation with hard liners:
Given the opacity of negotiations with the Taliban, and the exclusion of women from the process, there are fears that these rights and protections could be conceded in bargaining by Kabul and its international backers. Instead of placing hopes in a process of accommodating hardliners, the Afghan government would be better served by building citizens' trust in the state, including through a police force that serves the people and a robust and effective formal justice system.107
10.4 Backlash? In August 2013, there was a violent attack against a female Meshrano Jirga member (senator) and her daughter. On 15 September, another attack resulted in the death of Lieutenant Bibi Negar, the most senior female police officer in Helmand. Also in September, a female MP who had been kidnapped by the Taliban was released as part of a prisoner exchange having been held for a month, and a Taliban splinter group dragged the Indian wife of an Afghan health worker out of her house in Paktika province, shot her repeatedly and dumped her body outside a religious school. There seems to be a particular campaign aimed at high profile women participating in Afghan public life, although there are of course attacks against male public figures too.
In November, it was reported that the Afghan Justice Ministry had overseen the drafting of a law to re-introduce public stoning as a punishment for married adulterers, while a law setting the penalties for rape, child marriage and the practice of giving girls away to settle disputes was also being drafted.108 According to Human Rights Watch, the number of women and girls imprisoned for “moral crimes” in Afghanistan increased by 50% between October 2011 and May 2013.109
Such reports suggest that, as the end of ISAF’s combat mission nears, the relative importance of conservative power brokers is increasing.
105 HC Deb 25 October 2011, c165 106 “Peace efforts will not derail women’s gains, Karzai and UN officials stress on Women’s Day”, UNAMA press release, 8 March 2011 107 Louise Arbour, ‘Fighting For Women's Rights in Afghanistan’, Foreign Policy, 22 October 2013 108 ‘Afghanistan 'plans to reintroduce public stoning as punishment for adultery', Daily Telegraph, 25 November 2013 109 ‘Afghanistan: Surge in Women Jailed for ‘Moral Crimes’ Human Rights Watch press release, 21 May 2013
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11 Regional relations
Map courtesy of the University of Texas
More effective cooperation between Afghanistan’s neighbours could bring enormous advantages in counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and trade and economic development. It is complicated, however, in particular by the long-term rivalry between India and Pakistan. The Afghan government is placing increasing importance on the support of its neighbours as Western support diminishes.
11.1 Istanbul Process for regional dialogue The Istanbul Process, sometimes referred to as the Heart of Asia process, was set up in Turkey in 2011 and encourages discussion between Afghanistan and China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and the United Arab Emirates.110 A number of Western governments, including the UK and the US, are official supporters of the process, along with organisations including the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the United Nations.
The process deals with counter-terrorism and counter narcotics, education, economic development and regional infrastructure and the response to natural disasters and is working through a series of confidence-building measures (CBMs), each led by a member or group of countries:
Counter-terrorism. Led by UAE, Afghanistan and Turkey, sharing information and expertise through technical workshops and expert meetings. Preventing the illicit movement of persons, weapons and explosives to Afghanistan is a priority.
110 Declaration of the Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan, November 2011
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Trade. Led by India. The Delhi Investment Summit of June, 2012 sought to harness opportunities for regional cooperation towards Afghanistan.
Education. Led by Iran, cooperating on higher education, including on scholarships, support to universities, preservation of cultural heritage, and cooperation in science and technology.
Counter-narcotics. Led by Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation, seeking to reduce demand and to prevent the supply of pre-cursors to Afghanistan, providing alternative livelihoods and tackling production and trafficking.
Disaster management. Led by Pakistan and Kazakhstan, creating a mechanism for pooling of knowledge and developing an early-warning system for droughts and other water-related hazards.
Regional infrastructure. Led by Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, providing land-locked Afghanistan with connections such as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan railway project, and other projects in water, telecommunications, agriculture and mining, and energy projects such as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline (TAPI) and the Central Asia-South Asia electricity transmission project (CASA-1000).111
The process is reportedly not delivering enough, according to one analyst:
...any sporadic practical results of the initiative – which, so far, to a large extent, remain in the bilateral sphere – fade against the daunting challenges facing Afghanistan and the wider region.112
The third ministerial meeting of the Istanbul Process was held in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in April 2013. Baroness Warsi attended for the British government. The Afghan Foreign Minister Zalman Rassoul said in his opening statement:
...from our perspective in Afghanistan, the Istanbul Process has been and continues to be by far the most successful attempt of many, many tries to promote regional cooperation over the past decade.113
Disputes continue to hamper cooperation, however, and attendance at the Kazakhstan meeting was reportedly down on the previous meeting. The latest round was described by one commentator as ‘hectic and contentious’,114 with disputes about funding.115
Bilateral deals and ties may be more promising than the Istanbul Process but some, particularly perhaps those with India, could undermine the multilateral approach as they risk alienating other neighbours.
111 Information based on: Heart of Asia ministerial conference Almaty April 2013, Conference declaration 112 S Reza Kazemi, ‘Afghanistan Conference in Kazakhstan: Will the ‘Heart of Asia’ Start Throbbing?’, Afghan Analysts’ Network, 25 April 2012 113 Statement of H.E Dr. Zalmai Rassoul, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan at the Third Heart of Asia Ministerial Almaty – Kazakhstan 26 April 2013 114 S Reza Kazemi, ‘Over-promising, Under-delivering: The Outcome of the Afghanistan Conference in Kazakhstan’, Afghan Analysts Network, 30 April 2013 115 ‘Istanbul process “catalyst for stronger Afghanistan and heart of Asia”, says Secretary General in message to ministerial meeting’, UN press release, 26 April 2013
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11.2 Pakistan Afghanistan’s fraught relationship with Pakistan will continue to be probably the most important after 2014. Pakistan has an interest in a stable Afghanistan and wants to be on friendly terms with whatever government emerges. Pakistan’s traditional fear of India does a lot to determine its policy towards Afghanistan, as towards much else, and Islamabad wants a friendly or even compliant government in Kabul to provide ‘strategic depth’ in relation to India: Pakistan does not want to be trapped between two hostile countries. Pakistan’s self- definition as an Islamic state (unlike India) also contributes to its ambiguous relationship with radical groups such as the Taliban, with some members of the security forces and intelligence services lending support to the Afghan Taliban.116 In the background there is a long-standing border dispute about the Durand Line that divides the two countries.
Analysts are not confident that the election of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif will significantly change Pakistani policy towards Afghanistan. In spite of encouraging pronouncements from the new government, civilian politicians have only tenuous control of the military and intelligence services.
British, Pakistani and Afghan leaders met in London in 2013. Karzai and Sharif committed to continue to work together on the Afghan-led peace process and economic cooperation. President Karzai also visited Pakistan in December 2013 to strengthen ties.
Many tensions remain, however. Despite a positive statement after the summit in the UK,117 Afghan politicians reportedly felt bitter after the meeting, where it is reported that some diplomatic niceties were not observed. More importantly, some Afghans see pro-Pakistan bias. One analyst familiar with Afghan government thinking said:
We have many in Kabul who think that London has an inherent pro-Pakistani bias, in the same way the US is not seen as an honest broker in the Middle East because of its pro-Israel bias. The reason Karzai accepted Cameron's invitation was that he thought the prime minister would attempt to exert some control over their errant child, Pakistan.118
A strategic partnership agreement has been drawn up but it remains to be signed.
11.3 India Pakistan also wants to keep the influence of its rival India to a minimum. India has been investing in reconstruction in Afghanistan and has become one of the most important suppliers of aid to the country. The Indian government is strongly opposed to the Taliban, partly due to its perceived support for the armed struggle against the authorities in Indian- administered Kashmir. The Indian embassy in Kabul was bombed in 2008, killing more than 50 people, with many Indians blaming the Pakistani intelligence services. The Afghan government signed a strategic partnership agreement with India in 2011, underlining India’s interest in preventing the Taliban’s return.
After a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting in October 2013, where Afghanistan was high on the agenda, the Indian External Affairs Minister made the following plea for continued international support for the Afghan government:
116 For more information on the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, see the Library Research Paper The ‘AfPak policy’ and the Pashtuns, June 2010 117 Chequers Summit Joint Statement, February 2013 118 ‘Afghan-Pakistani ties in a tailspin, with botched British diplomacy blamed’, Guardian, 1 July 2013
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India strongly believes that Afghanistan can successfully complete the security, political and economic transitions in coming years and regain its historical place as a hub for regional trade and transit routes. However, this presupposes fulfilment of pledges made by the international community for security and civilian assistance to Afghanistan and non-interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.119
Afghanistan certainly has a positive attitude towards relations with India. On a recent trade promotion trip to India, President Karzai said:
...we want to welcome you with a red carpet while others will get a grey carpet. But you need to come and walk on that red carpet. Do hurry up and take advantage of Afghanistan.120
11.4 China Chinese investment in Afghan mineral deposits is growing and China has an interest in promoting stability along its western borders, particularly in view of the separatist currents in its western Xinjiang Autonomous Region, home to the Muslim Uighurs. China is interested, too, in Afghanistan’s potential role as a trade route.
After the 12th trilateral meeting of Russian, Chinese and Indian foreign ministers in November, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that China wants to see a “smooth general election”, and an “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned” reconciliation process. China does not see a military solution to Afghanistan’s difficulties, believing that the Taliban is rooted in Afghan society and that the different Afghan groups need to find a way to live together. China advocates a strong role for the United Nations in coordinating international assistance to the country.121
11.5 Iran Iran’s relationship with Afghanistan is controversial. Many commentators say that if Iran committed more strongly to helping ensure the stability of Afghanistan after 2014, it could bring important advantages; Iran shares a long border with Afghanistan. Iran, with its Shia Muslim majority, is no natural ally of the radical Sunni Taliban. Iran also has problems with heroin addiction and therefore has a strong interest in stemming the supply of the drug from Afghanistan. Iran also wants the Afghan economy to work better. That would help to relieve the pressure of the hundreds of thousands of undocumented Afghan migrants fleeing insecurity and poverty and around a million Afghan officially-recognised refugees at present in Iran. The Iranian authorities have faced accusations of human rights abuses against both groups.122
Iran has committed considerable resources to stabilise Afghanistan, especially during the Khatami presidency of 1997-2005, although this was scaled back under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013). Some claim that these Iranian efforts have been under- recognised in the West.123 In December President Karzai signed a friendship and cooperation agreement with the Iranian government.
119 Vinod Anand, ‘Has the Sino-Indian Dialogue on Afghanistan Been Put on the Backburner?’, RUSI Analysis, 12 November 2013 120 ‘Karzai woos India to invest in Afghanistan’, The Hindu, 11 November 2012 121 Wang Shida, ‘Manmohan Singh’s Visit Boosts the ‘New Pattern of Relationship’ between China and India’, RUSI analysis, 12 November 2013 122 Unwelcome Guests, Iran’s Violation of Afghan Refugee and Migrant Rights, Human Rights Watch, November 2013 123 Bruce Koepke, ‘President Rouhani’s Election: Potential impact on Iran’s relations with Afghanistan’, Afghan Analysts’ Network, 2 August 2013
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Iran has been particularly active in the fight against heroin. The Triangular Initiative, under the auspices of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, is a programme of cooperation between the drugs enforcement agencies of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. Border liaison offices have been set up along with information exchange systems and the initiative allows for cooperation in other fields. According to the UNODC, cooperation has resulted in significant seizures of drugs and arrests,124 while analysts say that there is room for more.125
Iran has always worried about the US/ISAF military presence so close to its borders in the context of military options being ‘on the table’ over its nuclear programme. A significant reduction in the US military presence at the end of 2014 may make it easier for Iran to become more directly involved in efforts to ensure stability.
The election of Hassan Rouhani and the possibility of reconciliation between the US and Iran through a deal on Iran’s nuclear programme could lead to a general lowering of security tensions between Iran and the US. This in turn could provide impetus for greater Iranian participation. In one of his first statements after his election in 2013, President Rouhani said he would be pursuing regional cooperation:
Expanding ties with the neighbouring countries and strengthening regional cooperation in order to maintain peace and provide the interests of the regional nations is one of the foreign policy priorities of Iran’s 11th administration.126
Although no country has the power to solve Afghanistan’s difficulties alone, Iran’s cooperation would be significant. However, any cooperation between the West and Iran over Afghanistan would take years to develop.
11.6 Central Asia Perhaps the countries with most at stake in Afghanistan are the Central Asian republics. There are significant communities of ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks in Afghanistan itself (Tajiks make up almost a third of the Afghan population, not far behind the Pashtuns, the largest group).
Central Asian countries are experiencing an Islamic revival and governments there are worried about a resurgence of religious extremism in Afghanistan. One realistic worry is that fundamentalist Central Asian fighters, such as those from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), currently engaged in Afghanistan, could return home to Uzbekistan after 2014 and might conduct attacks. However, such groups probably have less support in Central Asia than in Afghanistan and those states have far stronger security apparatuses than Afghanistan’s.
Central Asian states share worries about drug trafficking, too. The transport of illegal drugs through their territories to Russia and Western Europe causes problems with addiction, corruption and organised crime along the way: the Russian government estimates that this already results in 30,000 Russian deaths each year.127 After 2014, this could get a lot worse. People-trafficking is another problem in Central Asia that could be exacerbated.
124 The Triangular Initiative, UNODC 125 Bruce Koepke, Regional cooperation, in Wolfgang Danspeckgruber (ed.), Working toward peace and prosperity in Afghanistan, 2011 126 ‘President-elect Rohani says Iran to expand neighborly relations’, Press TV, 2 July 2013 127 ‘Eurasia Awaits Post-2014 Afghan Storm’, International Relations and Security Network, Zurich Institute of Technology, 12 December 2013
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Rivalries prevent Central Asian countries from presenting a united front. Water, for example, is a contentious issue. Foreign policy differences are also important, with Kazakhstan much closer to Russia and more enthusiastic about regional initiatives than, for example, Uzbekistan, which is closer to the US.
Russia has increased its security presence in Central Asia, setting up new bases and providing local forces with subsidised training and equipment. It has also tried to bolster the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the military alliance of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, and all the Central Asian states except neutral Turkmenistan. From Europe, moves like these might look like geopolitical competition with the US, but the security worries in both Central Asia and in Russia about post-2014 Afghanistan are genuine.
12 Human development 12.1 Slow progress on the Millennium Development goals Have the millions of pounds of aid led to an improvement in the lives of ordinary Afghans? Yes, but not as much as they should have. Afghanistan’s Millennium Development Index scores have increased slightly over the last 10 years,128 although from a very low base. The country’s ranking has not improved over that time and Afghanistan remains near the bottom of the international league.
Life expectancy at birth of 49.1 years is shockingly low and Afghans have a mean of just 3.1 years in schooling, while the infant mortality rate is very high. There are 460 deaths per 1,000 live births in Afghanistan, compared with 12 in the UK. Perception of safety in the country is very low, while satisfaction with the national government is also minimal.
Malnutrition is widespread: from 2006 to 2010, 32% of children were either severely or moderately underweight, according to the UNDP, and there are reports that it is getting worse. Admissions for severe acute malnutrition to the hospital in the capital of Helmand are running at four times the rate of January last year,129 and across the country the number of cases has increased by 50% or more since 2012, according to the United Nations, although statistics are unreliable, as ever, in Afghanistan. Some increase in the detection of cases may be due to greater awareness among parents of the availability of help.
12.2 Tokyo Donors’ Conference At the Tokyo Conference, called in 2012 to coordinate aid and ensure sustained support, donor governments pledged $16 billion in civilian aid over four years. The biggest offers were from the US, Japan, Germany and the UK.
Afghanistan and the donors agreed in a Mutual Accountability Framework to the following goals:
Conduct credible, inclusive and transparent Presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2015
Improve access to justice for all, in particular women
Improve integrity of public financial management and the commercial banking sector
Improve the Afghan Government’s revenue collection
128 Human Development Report 2013 The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World, UN Development Programme, 2013 129 ‘Afghanistan’s Worsening, and Baffling, Hunger Crisis’, New York Times, 4 January 2014
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Achieve inclusive and sustained economic growth.130
Donor governments agreed that the Afghan government has needs beyond what it can cover through tax receipts and pledged to increase the flexibility of donations. Donors also agreed to channel more of them through Afghan programmes. A ministerial-level meeting will take place in 2014 and every second year subsequently to review progress, update indicators, assess resource requirements and renew international commitments. The 2014 meeting will be chaired jointly by the United Kingdom and Afghanistan.131
12.3 Afghanistan gets a lot of UK aid Afghanistan has been one of the biggest recipients of UK net bilateral overseas development assistance in recent years,132 and DFID has committed to spending £187 million per year in the country until 2017. Much UK aid has gone through Provincial Reconstruction Teams, composed of military officers, diplomats and development experts. The Conflict Pool (jointly run by the Department for International Development, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence) has allocated £45 million for financial year 2013/14 and £25 million for financial year 2014/15.133
Empowering women is one of the top priorities. DFID claims that its assistance helped to get more than 4.14 million children into primary school in 2011–12, of whom 1.67 million were girls. DFID also says that it has created around 20,000 jobs since 2011.134
The UK is also working on land mine removal with the HALO Trust, aiming to clear Herat province of mines and unexploded ordnance by 2018. Figures from October 2013 showed that over the preceding six months, more than 258 hectares of minefield and 322 hectares of battlefield in the province were cleared.135 Aid is also aimed at developing agricultural techniques, vocational training, strengthening the electoral process and developing civil society.
Asked about threats to the continuing flow of aid to Afghanistan, International Development Secretary Justine Greening called for reforms and accountability:
What the donors want, including the UK, is for people to stick to what was agreed in Tokyo and the mutual accountability framework. It is very important that we see the progress that ultimately can only be made by the Afghan Government, particularly by passing the necessary laws through Parliament. The law on the elimination of violence against women, for example, which has passed through Parliament, must now be seen to be implemented. We also need to see action taken to bear down on corruption and a successful outcome to the appeal process in relation to the Kabul bank corruption. We want to see the Afghan Government continue to make significant progress in several areas, alongside the work that donors are doing on their behalf.136
The minister also said that donors wanted to see the Afghan government stick to the economic reform programme set out by the International Monetary Fund.
In March 2014, the UK’s Independent Commission for Aid Impact published a report on the effectiveness of UK bilateral aid, having studied in depth five programmes running from 2006
130 Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, July 2012 131 Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, July 2012 132 Statistics on International Development 2013, DFID, 2013, p58 133 HC Deb 13 June 2013, c14WS 134 Department for International Development, Annual Report and Accounts 2012–13 135 DFID, FCO, MoD, Afghanistan monthly progress report, October 2013 136 HC Deb 17 October 2013, c916
36 RESEARCH PAPER 14/18 to 2018. The programmes account for about a third of DFID’s annual aid budget in Afghanistan.
It found that the projects had reduced poverty but that they might not be sustainable in the longer term and gave them an overall rating of amber/red: “The programme performs relatively poorly overall against ICAI’s criteria for effectiveness and value for money. Significant improvements should be made.”137 Perhaps echoing some who have criticised the West’s approach to Afghanistan in general as over-ambitious, the Commission said that it was hard for DFID to meet its targets:
DFID’s overall goal, flowing directly from the UK’s overall strategy for Afghanistan, is to help to create a ‘viable state’. While individual projects meet critical needs, the growth and livelihoods portfolio lacks strategic coherence. Weaknesses in design – particularly a lack of direct consultation with intended beneficiaries and unproven theories of change – have made it harder for DFID to meet and assess its intended targets.138
The Commission recommended that the UK should review its aid projects, consulting intended recipients over project design and should strengthen its monitoring process.
12.4 Aid has only reached certain parts of the country Distributing aid in Afghanistan is not easy. Security problems and the remoteness of some parts of the country mean that it is physically difficult. There is also the question of whether to deliver aid through the Afghan government directly. Most aid has gone through NGOs and multilateral bodies because of the government’s lack of administrative capacity and very poor accounting. Much of the money that does go through the Afghan government does not reach the provinces, as highlighted in the House of Commons International Development Select Committee’s 2012 report,139 partly because of a lack of capacity at the provincial level. Kabul and the most troubled provinces such as Helmand, where there is a stronger international troop presence, have received far greater aid flows than elsewhere, as this table shows:
Top ten provinces by aid allocation ($ millions)
Source: Afghan Finance Ministry
137 DFID’s Bilateral Support to Growth and Livelihoods in Afghanistan, Independent Commission on Aid Impact, March 2014 138 DFID’s Bilateral Support to Growth and Livelihoods in Afghanistan, Independent Commission on Aid Impact, March 2014, executive summary 139 House of Commons International Development Committee, Afghanistan: Development progress and prospects after 2014, HC 403, 2012-13, p29
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Much of the UK’s aid has gone through the UK-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand, which will be closed in 2014. The PRT system, where aid is closely associated with the military, has long been criticised, for example in a report published by major aid organisations in 2010:
The militarized aid approach is not working for Afghans, and more of the same is unlikely to yield different results.
The overemphasis on military issues at the expense of efforts to promote genuine development and good government matters not only because of the resulting human cost, but also because poverty, unemployment and weak, corrupt government are important drivers of conflict.140
12.5 Corruption and waste The sheer amount of aid relative to the Afghan economy has also created its own problems, by encouraging corruption among Afghan elites, leading to enormous waste and increasing Afghanistan’s dependency. The World Bank estimates that over 90% of the Afghan budget is made up of aid. On the other hand, the majority of aid does not reach Afghans at all, as the World Bank notes:
...only 38 cents of every aid dollar spent in Afghanistan actually reaches the economy through direct salary payments, household transfers, or purchase of local goods and services. . . . Much [aid] either never comes in or flows directly out through contracting international providers of goods and services, imports, and the expatriation of profits.141
The failure of aid money to improve lives in many instances has partly been blamed on the small proportion of that money that goes to delivering services. In the first place, government agencies and NGOs have very high overheads in Afghanistan. While NGOs working with USAID usually have administrative costs of about 30% of their programmes, in Afghanistan those costs rise to about 70%.142 Of the remaining 30%, some of it is wasted and some lost to fraud, as local officials and contractors and Western service personnel siphon money off, or it is lost through inefficiency, leaving a very small proportion that goes to help ordinary Afghans.
The Special Inspector General for Reconstruction in Afghanistan (SIGAR, appointed by the US Congress) found in his October 2013 quarterly report that there was very little oversight of projects. SIGAR listed facilities funded by US aid where there had been severe problems:
A district police headquarters that is in a state of severe disrepair for lack of maintenance
A hospital that has not been finished due to poor contractor performance
A courthouse that has never been completed
A medical clinic that was not built according to design specifications and has never been used.143
SIGAR investigations during the quarter resulted in $63 million in illegally-obtained assets being frozen in bank accounts.
140 Quick Impact, Quick Collapse: The Dangers of Militarized Aid in Afghanistan, Oxfam, 26 January 2010 141 Afghanistan in transition : looking beyond 2014, Volume II: Main Report, World Bank, May 2012, pp28-9 142 James R Petersen,’Was $73B of Afghan aid wasted?’, Politico, 1 November 2012 143 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, October 2013, Executive summary
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Heather Barr, Human Rights Watch representative in Kabul, said Afghanistan ‘is in many ways a perfect case study of how not to give aid.’144
13 Economic profile145 Despite strong rates of growth over the past decade, Afghanistan is a very poor country with GDP per head of $626 in 2013, ranking 173rd out of 186 countries in the IMF. The economy is heavily dependent on the agricultural sector, which makes up around a quarter of GDP and half of employment. Political and security uncertainty pose major risks to the country’s development.
Key statistics Currency: afghani Source: IMF
Population (2013) 33.0 million GDP per capita (2013) $626 (173/186, IMF)
GDP growth (2013) 3.1% (IMF estimate) Inflation rate (2013) 7.1% (IMF estimate)
GDP growth forecast 3.5% in 2014 (IMF) Curr. account (%GDP) +2.5% (’13 IMF f’cast)
13.1 Economy expected to slow after strong growth in past decade Afghanistan’s economy averaged annual growth of over 9% between 2003 and 2012, underpinned by security spending and international aid, although its performance was volatile over this period (see chart below). Strong growth in 2012 of 12.5% was driven by an exceptional harvest. The services sector – accounting for about half of GDP – also recorded rapid growth.146
Economic activity slowed markedly in 2013, as agricultural output failed to match the heights achieved in 2012 and business sentiment was hurt by the uncertainty surrounding the political and security situation. The IMF forecasts growth to slow to 3.1% in 2013 and 3.5% in 2014.
Afghanistan - GDP growth Afghanistan - inflation Annual % change, IMF data Annual % change, IMF data 25 IMF 30 IMF forecast 25 forecast 20 20 15 15 10 10 5 0 5 -5 -10 0 -15 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
144 ‘Afghanistan: Example of how not to give aid’, Politico, 25 July 2012 145 Information in this section is based on a number of sources and most heavily on: World Bank, “Afghanistan economic update : poverty reduction, and economic management”, October 2013; World Bank website, “Afghanistan Overview” [accessed 7 November 2013]; and IMF, “IMF Program Note on the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan”, September 2013. 146 A services sector accounting for around half the economy is about average for a developing country. While most Afghans are employed in the agriculture sector, most of the rest of the economy, including many government services, and activities such as transport, counts as services
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13.2 Fiscal situation In return for technical assistance and a $130 million loan from the IMF,147 the government has committed to improve fiscal governance and adopt policies aimed at moving the country toward fiscal sustainability. The key goal is to reduce dependence on donor aid. The World Bank estimates that annual international aid of around $8 billion per year has been pledged up to 2016. Some of this aid is conditional on the government increasing its revenue generation and on combating corruption.
13.3 Longer-term issues and risks to outlook Security concerns and political uncertainty cast a shadow over the economic outlook. Large increases in the population are also expected in the coming years, together with a rising working-age population, meaning that additional jobs need to be created. Diversification away from the very volatile agricultural sector would also be beneficial to long-term sustained growth. One possible sector of growth is the extraction industries. It is currently very small, but there is potential for rapid expansion given the country’s deposits of copper, iron ore and hydrocarbons.
In international comparisons of competitiveness Afghanistan performs poorly. The World Bank’s Doing Business ranks Afghanistan 164th out of 189 countries for ease of doing business.148 Corruption hinders the private sector’s development: Transparency International ranked Afghanistan equal lowest (with North Korea and Somalia) out of 177 countries for levels of transparency in public institutions in 2013.149
One Afghan commentator points to the threat to the Afghan economy posed by the withdrawal of ISAF troops and the likely reduction in the amount of Western aid. Nader Nadery argues that Afghanistan is at risk of a significant slowdown and that this threatens social and political gains:
The withdrawal of Western forces will be accompanied by the drawdown of international development agencies, the reduction of aid, and an uncertain investment climate. The immediate effects will be capital flight, heightened risks for investments, and the collapse of drivers of economic growth such us reconstruction, logistics, and transportation.
Progress on women's rights and economic participation, which has been a focus of the post-Taliban government, may fall victim to conservative backlash and diminished political will, further stunting development.
... Economic downturn can shock even the most developed nations; the destabilizing effect a recession would have on a fragile state like Afghanistan would be more devastating.150
13.4 UK trade with Afghanistan As a Least Developed Country, Afghanistan benefits from duty- and quota-free access to EU markets for most products except armaments under the ‘Everything But Arms’ initiative.
Afghanistan remains a minor trading partner for the UK, and the relationship is highly unbalanced, with UK exports exceeding imports in 2012 by a factor of almost thirty. Goods exports to Afghanistan from the UK in 2012 were worth £104m (0.03% of total exports).
147 Technically called an Extended Credit Facility. For more see IMF Sep 2013 program note on Afghanistan. 148 World Bank, Ease of Doing Business in Afghanistan [accessed 24 Feb 2014] 149 Transparency International, Corruption perceptions index 2013 [accessed 24 Feb 2014] 150 Nader Nadery, ‘Prospects for Afghanistan in 2014’, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 December 2013
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Goods imports from Afghanistan were worth £3.6m (0.0009% of total imports).151 Services trade figures are not available.
The top ten products exported to Afghanistan, and imported from there, over the period 2009-12 are shown in the two tables below.
UK exports to Afghanistan, 2009-12 - top ten product groups out of 62 product groups (SITC 2-digit classification), £000s £000s % of total Military arms and ammunition 70,970 45.3% Power generating machinery & equipment 48,708 9.1% Ele machinery, app & appliances & ele pt thereof 31,624 6.3% Telecomms & sound recording & reproducing app. & eqp. 29,953 4.1% Other transport equipment 28,917 3.8% Meat & meat preparations 23,263 3.7% General industrial machinery & eqp. & machine pts 22,893 3.0% Road vehicles (including air cushion vehicles) 21,411 2.9% Petroleum, petroleum products & related materials 21,097 2.8% Miscellaneous manufactured articles 18,858 2.7%
Source: Uktradeinfo database
UK imports from Afghanistan, 2009-12 - top ten product groups out of 62 product groups (SITC 2-digit classification), £000s £000s % of total Other transport equipment (besides motor vehicles) 15,162 58.9% Power generating machinery & equipment 4,188 16.3% Professional, scientific & controlling ins & app 1,651 6.4% Telecomms & sound recording & reproducing app. & eqp. 1,293 5.0% Ele machinery, app & appliances & ele pt thereof 1,267 4.9% Postal packages not classified according to kind 470 1.8% Vegetables & fruit 399 1.6% Textile yarn, fabrics, made up articles etc 251 1.0% Office machines & adp machines 140 0.5% Textile fibres not manufactured & their waste etc 135 0.5% Source: Uktradeinfo database
The chart below shows trends in trade with Afghanistan since 1996:
151 Souces: Uktradeinfo database and ONS Pink Book 2013 Series LQAD and LQAL
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UK trade with Afghanistan 1996-2012, £m 400 Exports 350 Imports Balance 300
250
200
150
100
50
0
-50
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997 1996
Source: Uktradeinfo database
14 Conclusion: prospects after 2014 In 1989, after fighting in Afghanistan for 10 years, the Soviet Union withdrew its combat troops. Despite becoming less unpopular after the Soviet withdrawal and the Afghan armed forces performing surprisingly well, the government of Mohammed Najibullah that remained in power still depended on Soviet help. Financial help from the Soviet Union amounted to some $3 billion annually, but the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991 and the assistance dried up. It quickly became clear how much the Afghan military had depended on that aid as the Mujahideen took control of Kabul in 1992.
There are many indications that it will be difficult for the present Kabul government, too, to hold on to power without international support. The economic outlook certainly does not suggest that the Kabul government can support itself without international financial backing. Much will depend on the level of engagement maintained by Western nations. This is unclear at the time of writing, as the US/Afghan bilateral agreement remains unsigned.
However, as discussed previously, Afghanistan has never had a unitary, centralised government in Kabul capable of controlling events in detail in the remotest provinces. Power in the capital has always been a matter of negotiation with powerful regional and local figures, whose loyalty to tribe or ethnicity or creed may be stronger than to the state, and whose self-interest may be strongest of all.
Afghanistan has continued to work in this way, rather than in the strong, fair and corruption- free democratic way that Western optimists might have hoped. Nevertheless, the patronage and negotiated power relationships developed by President Karzai with local ‘warlords’ and other figures look as if they will continue to prevail after 2014, in even the most optimistic of scenarios. On the other hand, the power of the presidency to co-opt powerbrokers through patronage will reduce as the amount of money coming into Afghanistan in the form of aid and security spending declines.
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The biggest question for Western nations that have expended such effort to defeat the Taliban and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven for international terrorists is – will the Taliban take over?
There are a number of reasons for thinking that while conflict is likely – perhaps amounting to what could be described as civil war – Kabul is likely to hold and the Afghan government will survive, at least in the medium term. The Taliban is not particularly popular, Kabul is not its heartland and the Afghan National Security Forces have some capabilities. International support will continue at least for the first few years.
Nevertheless, some commentators think that de facto control by the Taliban or by elements close to them is likely in the Pashtun areas of the south and east, bringing worries about terrorist havens.
However, Nazif Shahrani argues that the attempt to create a centralised presidential state was always doomed:
...reconstruction and the propping up of the same old centralised, person centred state system based on presidential sovereignty, with a large administrative and security force attempting to penetrate all parts of the periphery, is very difficult to achieve to begin with and, more importantly, has failed in the past and will not work in the future.152
Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggests three possible outcomes: a weak and divided state; a state that either devolves into regions controlled by power brokers or warlords; or one that comes under at least partial Taliban and extremist control. He argues that central government is not strong but that that does not translate automatically into a victory for the Taliban:
More than a decade of Western intervention has not produced a strong and viable central government, an economy that can function without massive outside aid, or effective Afghan security forces. There are few signs that insurgents are being pushed towards defeat or will lose their sanctuaries in Pakistan. Outside aid efforts have generally produced limited benefits, and the World Bank estimates such efforts have reached only a small percentage of Afghans – many of which will not be sustainable once Transition occurs and aid levels are cut.
Yet the combination of Afghan problems and uncertain outside support does not mean that the Taliban and other insurgents will win. The insurgents have been weakened by ISAF and ANSF attacks; they are relatively limited in number and in areas of influence; and they too have many weaknesses, divisions, and problems in winning public support. The end result of the present Transition effort may be an Afghanistan that muddles through, even if it divides along ethnic, sectarian, and tribal lines.153
Adam Ward, Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies foresee the Kabul central government surviving but with a reduced ability to co-opt strongmen because of reduced financial resources:
The solution will be for Karzai to embrace the rules of Afghan politics that existed prior to 1979, whereby the centre returns to a mediating role between the regions. This transition may be slow and painful but there appears to be no alternative in the light of
152 Nazif Shahrani, ‘Centre-periphery relations in Afghanistan’ in Conrad Schetter, Local politics in Afghanistan, 2013 153 Anthony H Cordesman, The Afghan war in 2013: Meeting the Challenges of Transition. Volume 1 : the Challenges of Leadership and Governance, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, May 2013
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the unavoidable reductions in Western military and financial support. With this in mind, the big question facing the Afghan presidency after 2014 is whether it will have the resources to tie Afghanistan’s political elite to its president and hence to Kabul.154
Sir William Patey, former UK ambassador in Kabul, said in evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee that he thought there was a 50% chance that Afghanistan would descend into civil war after 2014. However, he argued that the withdrawal timetable was right and that depriving the insurgency of the argument that they were fighting foreigners could tip the balance against it.155
A former chief of the CIA Afghan Task force and his colleague warn that a civil war is a strong possibility after 2014:
The withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014 is likely to be followed by a civil war between a predominantly non-Pashtun security apparatus and Pakistan- backed Taliban forces.156
They go on to argue that the experience after the Soviet withdrawal shows that international support for the Afghan military will be essential and suggests that much US and NATO equipment should be left with the ANSF to boost their capabilities.
Rahul Roy-Chaudhury argues in Afghanistan to 2015 and beyond that Pakistan is the most important of Afghanistan’s neighbours and that thinking in Pakistan may be changing.157 The ‘blowback’ that Pakistan is experiencing from its policy of supporting Pashtun groups in Afghanistan is posing a severe threat to the Pakistani state, as the Pakistani Taliban and other radical groups make the border areas with Afghanistan almost ungovernable. Whether new thinking takes hold among the Pakistani security services and military depends on the persistent problem of relations between India and Pakistan and continuing difficulties over Kashmir.158
On the question of al-Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan after the withdrawal, Brian Michael Jenkins argues that the US withdrawal will make it easier for al-Qaeda to operate from Afghanistan but that the US will continue its counter-terrorism actions from Pakistan and elsewhere:
The increased risk right now is marginal. Without being in Afghanistan, al Qaeda can still launch attacks from Pakistan and Yemen. But it has had less success, because of better Western intelligence and improvements in law enforcement. These improvements can be preserved, for the most part. Overall, al Qaeda has been weakened. A measured American withdrawal will not suddenly reverse al Qaeda’s fortunes.159
Nigel Inkster points out that there are only perhaps 100 or so al-Qaeda fighters based in Afghanistan and that the leadership of the Afghan Taliban has at times suggested that it
154 Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman eds. Afghanistan to 2015 and beyond, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012, p256 155 Securing the Future of Afghanistan, House of Commons Defence Committee Tenth Report of Session 2012– 13, HC 413 2012-13, 10 April 2013, p54 156 Jack Devine and Whitney Kassel, ‘Afghanistan: withdrawal lessons’, World Policy Institute, Autumn 2013 157 Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman eds. Afghanistan to 2015 and beyond, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012 158 For a summary of recent developments in kashmir, see the Library Standard Note In brief: Kashmir - volatile stalemate , August 2013 159 Brian Michael Jenkins, Al Qaeda in Its Third Decade Irreversible Decline or Imminent Victory?, Rand Corporation, 2012, p15
44 RESEARCH PAPER 14/18 could break with al-Qaeda.160 On the other hand, al-Qaeda can still count on the support of the Haqqani Network, the radical group that is aligned with the Taliban and based in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan and over the border in the North Waziristan province of Pakistan.161
Anatol Lieven argued recently that Western governments have a responsibility not to abandon Afghanistan:
...the choice Afghanistan faces is not between some idealized version of Western democracy and a corrupt Afghan state; it is between a corrupt but more or less consensual Afghan state and the horrors of no state at all. Nor should it ever be forgotten that the US and the West bear much of the blame for what happened after 1992. Washington and its allies stuffed the Mujahedin parties with arms and money, helped to block any chance of a peace settlement between them and the Afghan government, and then lost any pretence of interest in what happened to Afghanistan the moment the Soviets withdrew.
The guns we provided then helped the Mujahedin parties and their warlords to slaughter each other and an uncounted number of ordinary Afghans. To this were added of course the guns carried by the soldiers of the Afghan army at the time, soldiers who also went to serve warlords and ethnic militias when Soviet subsidies ran out and the army could no longer be paid. Today, we too have created an Afghan state and army that cannot survive without our help, and that will also disintegrate again into warlord anarchy if our help is withdrawn. The West has a deep moral and historical responsibility to make sure that this does not happen.162
15 Further reading Brookings Institution Afghanistan Index
Theo Farrell and Antonio Giustozzi ‘The Taliban at war: inside the Helmand insurgency, 2004–2012’, International Affairs 89: 4 (2013) 845–871
Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, October 2013
High Stakes: Girls’ Education in Afghanistan, Joint report by Oxfam and other NGOs working in Afghanistan, 2011
Jon Lunn and Ben Smith, The ‘AfPak policy’ and the Pashtuns, House of Commons Library Research Paper 10/45, June 2010
Conrad Schetter (Ed.), Local politics in Afghanistan, 2013
David Cortright, Ending Obama’s war, Responsible military withdrawal from Afghanistan, 2011
House of Commons International Development Committee, Afghanistan: Development progress and prospects after 2014, Sixth report of Session 2012-13, HC 403, 25 October 2012
160 Nigel Inkster, ‘The international and regional terror threat’ in Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman eds. Afghanistan to 2015 and beyond, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012 161 For more on the different insurgent groups in Afghanistan, see Jon Lunn and Ben Smith, The ‘AfPak policy’ and the Pashtuns, House of Commons Library Research Paper 10/45, June 2010 162 Anatol Lieven, ‘Afghanistan: risking a collapse’, New York Review of Books, 3 December 2013
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Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman eds. Afghanistan to 2015 and beyond, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012
Anthony H Cordesman, The Afghan War in 2013: Meeting the Challenges of Transition. Volume I: the Challenges of Leadership and Governance, Volume II: Afghan Economics and Outside Aid Volume III: Security and the ANSF, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, May 2013
Securing the Future of Afghanistan, House of Commons Defence Committee Tenth Report of Session 2012–13, HC 413, 10 April 2013
Afghanistan: the long hard road to the 2014 transition, International Crisis Group, 8 October 2012
Thomas Ruttig, Some Things Got Better – How Much Got Good? A review of 12 years of international intervention in Afghanistan, Afghan Analysts Network, 30 December 2013
Zekria Barakzai, 2014 Presidential and Provincial Council Elections in Afghanistan’, United States Institute of Peace, November 2013
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Afghanistan and human rights conventions
The United Nations provides the following information Afghanistan and human rights conventions:
Treaty Description Treaty Name Signature Date Ratification Date or Accession(a) Date
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or CAT 04 February 1985 1 April 1987 Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture CAT-OP
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR 24 January 1983 (a) Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil CCPR-OP2-DP and Political Rights aiming to the abolition of the death penalty
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced CED Disappearance Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination CEDAW 14 August 1980 5 March 2003 against Women
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial CERD 6 July 1983 (a) Discrimination
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights CESCR 24 January 1983 (a)
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All CMW Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
Convention on the Rights of the Child CRC 27 September 1990 28 March 1994
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on CRC-OP-AC 24 September 2003 (a) the involvement of children in armed conflict Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on CRC-OP-SC 19 September 2002 (a) the sale of children child prostitution and child pornography
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities CRPD 18 September 2012 (a)
Source: United Nations OHCHR
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