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Modalities of Jihadism in the Middle East and North Africa: Ideological

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Modalities of Jihadism in the Middle East and North Africa: Ideological Jihadism and Violence in the Arab World Keys Modalities of Jihadism in The Middle East and North Africa: Ideological and Historical Roots Dr Ewan Stein This chapter offers some reflections on the influence Senior Lecturer in International Relations of regional ideologies on modern jihadism, particu- School of Social and Political Science, University of larly Wahhabi and Muslim Brotherhood thought. It Edinburgh also demonstrates the salience of the political and socioeconomic context, as well as the role of US for- eign policy, with respect to the trajectory of jihadism. World Arab in the Violence Jihadism and In a recent article Middle East specialist Fawaz The main argument of this chapter is that jihadism Gerges identified three ‘waves’ of jihadist activ- evolved in tandem with shifts in the political, eco- ism.1 ‘Near enemy’ jihadism, the dominant mode nomic and international environment in the Middle from the 1970s until the middle of the 1990s, con- East and North Africa. As such, the ideas and strate- sists of groups trying to topple their own govern- gies of jihadist groups have a contemporaneous, ments. The second wave, ‘far enemy’ jihadism, be- rather than timeless, quality. gins with the al-Qaeda embassy bombings in 1998 and targets the United States and its allies rather 47 than local regimes. The third wave is that of the Is- Jihadism: Religion or Ideology? lamic State (ISIS), a brutally effective military or- ganisation distinguished by effective use of propa- Jihadism clearly draws on ideas familiar to Mus- ganda, intense sectarianism, rapid acquisition of lims and others as ‘Islamic,’ and its adherents may territory and the establishment of political control consider themselves to be devout Muslims. Reli- across state borders. gious conviction may motivate individuals to take Gerges’ three waves offer a useful heuristic device extreme actions. It is possible, as some scholars for conceptualising modalities of jihadist activism. have, to view jihadism in the context of an ‘Islamic’ They do not follow in neat chronological order, and history, to trace the evolution in the meaning and each wave does not fully eclipse the preceding one. operationalisation of jihad ‘from Qur’an to bin But they encapsulate prevailing patterns as they Laden.’2 But as a way of explaining or tracing the have evolved over time. These patterns reflect a roots of current movements, this approach dimin- complex interplay between jihadist strategies, re- ishes the importance of modern ideologies, forged gional state policies and global political dynamics. through the prism of national liberation struggles, What enables us to view these quite distinct mo- in addition to the policies of regional states within 2015 dalities of political practice, occurring in diverse lo- shifting social and economic environments, and calities over a long period, as a ‘movement’ is ideol- the influence of great powers, not least the United ogy. ‘Jihadism’ as an ideological repertoire merges States. vocabulary and symbols of Islam as a discursive tra- Although the symbolic repertoire of Islam is clear- dition with elements of the modern ideologies that ly an important dimension of jihadism, religious shaped the 20th century politics of the Middle East. language should not blind us to the influence of Mediterranean Yearbook 1 FAWAZ A. Gerges, “ISIS and the Third Wave of Jihadism,” Current History, 113, 2014, p. 339. Med. 2 Richard BONNEY, Jihad: From Qu’ran to Bin Laden, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. IE regional ideologies. In the modern Middle East, in 18th and early 19th centuries. It was revived at the Keys common with other populist idea systems, ideol- dawn of the 20th century, with British support, to ogy has been distinctly ‘negativist.’3 Ba’thism, motivate tribal warriors in a renewed jihad to ac- Nasserism, communism, and Islamism (not to quire territory controlled by the Ottoman Empire. mention Zionism) were, as they became indi- As the movement reached the limits of its expan- genised as local nationalisms, anti- a great deal of sion and became the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, things. They were, variously, anti-imperialist, anti- Wahhabism retained its mobilisational quality as an colonialist, anti-monarchical, anti-Zionist, anti- antidote to radical left-wing, and subsequently plu- communist, anti-feudalist, anti-shi’a, anti-Arab. ralist, ideologies both within the Kingdom and in They functioned as mechanisms of ‘othering’ in the region at large. Wahhabism presents itself not order to define external enemies and their domes- as nationalism or ideology, but as ‘Islam.’ The Saudi tic agents, and to mobilise populations against regime has consistently sought to export its ideol- them. Most of these ideologies took shape around ogy in order to depoliticise Muslim populations, af- the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, up to the firm the legitimacy of the Saudi system and main- end of the Second World War, in the context of tain the stability of authoritarian regimes. national liberation movements. If anti-political Wahhabism constitutes one impor- Jihadism and Violence in the Arab World Arab in the Violence Jihadism and tant influence on contemporary jihadist ideology, another is the Islamism (or political Islam) of the The Saudi regime has consistently Muslim Brotherhood (MB). When the MB devel- sought to export its ideology in order oped its political programme in Egypt in the 1930s, to depoliticise Muslim populations, Egypt occupied the intellectual centre of the Mid- affirm the legitimacy of the Saudi dle East. The MB borrowed from, and competed with, socialist, fascist and even liberal ideological system and maintain the stability currents, as well as Wahhabism, which the Egypt- 48 of authoritarian regimes based Islamic reformist thinker Muhammad Rashid Rida repackaged in slightly more political form as Another regional ideology that has had a pro- ‘Salafism.’ Whereas Wahhabism, in its statised nounced impact on jihadism is Wahhabism, or Saudi iteration, was anti-political, the MB’s pro- Salafism, as it is manifested outside Saudi Arabia. gramme was oriented toward ‘inside-out’ socio- Wahhabism was not sociologically ‘populist,’ but it political reform: Islamise society, then the State and served an analogous mobilisational purpose to the then the international system. For the MB ‘jihad’ other modern ideologies mentioned above. Saudi was an expression of its overall mission to achieve Arabia was not colonised and had no meaningful a fully realised Islamic society in which the Muslim ‘middle class’ driving its ideological development. individual would be free to live a good and fulfilling This may partially explain the aversion its hegemonic life. Violent jihad was mandated to fight the colon- ideology has toward politics. Wahhabism, the ideol- iser as well as, although this divided the movement, ogy of the Saudi State, refers to ideas adopted by the monarchy and social groups deemed to be an obscure group of Arabian religious reformists agents of the coloniser. who called themselves the muwahhidun (believers MB ideology, although oriented toward Islamisa- in the oneness of God), and whose creed was de- tion, had, in its scope and aspiration to universal- 2015 vised by the 18th century preacher Muhammad Ibn ism, strong modernist characteristics. This reflects Abdel Wahhab. It was replete with apocalyptic bi- the sensibilities of the MB’s essentially middle class naries regarding Islam’s struggle against unbelief, support base. Its aspiration was to educate society against perfidious Shia, Jews and Sufis. (da’wa), reshape the nature and scope of political Wahhabism underpinned the expansion of the Al power (the Islamic State) and, in so doing, change Saud among the Bedouin tribes of Arabia in the the world (by restoring the Caliphate). If the ideas Mediterranean Yearbook 3 Med. Med. Elie PODEH and Onn WINCKLER, “Introduction: Nasserism as a Form of Populism,” in Rethinking Nasserism : Revolution and Historical Memory IE in Modern Egypt, ed. by Elie PODEH and Onn WINCKLER, Gainesville, Fla. ; London: University Press of Florida : Eurospan, 2004. of the MB influenced later jihadist groups it was Near Enemy Jihadism: in the Beginning partially because they expressed the essence of is the State Keys modern ideology in Islamic vocabulary. In their es- sential meanings they were similar to those of The violent Islamist groups that emerged in the Mid- the regimes that would come to rule the states dle East and North Africa from the 1970s, Gerges’ of the Middle East. first wave of ‘near enemy’ jihadists, incorporated Qutb’s ideas to varying degrees as their manifestos. The main preoccupation for these groups, which MB ideology had, in its scope and bound them together as part of a transnational Is- aspiration to universalism, strong lamist movement, was the nature of the State. Even modernist characteristics. This the Palestinian Hamas, whose priority was to fight reflects the sensibilities of the MB’s the Israeli occupation, justified its existence as an Islamic resistance movement as an alternative to the essentially middle class support secular PLO (a quasi-state), which was seen as be- base ing unable to harness the true energies of Palestini- ans as Muslims and thus doomed to fail as a liberat- By the 1960s, which is when the generally ac- ing force. World Arab in the Violence Jihadism and knowledged godfather of modern Jihadism, Sayyid For Islamist groups elsewhere it was the State that Qutb, published his most incendiary work, MB ide- oppressed them; the State that facilitated the influx ology had become harder and more uncompromis- of corrupting ideas; the State that prevented the ing. Qutb insisted that secular rulers were keeping flourishing of Islam in society. In Qutb’s day the State society in a state of pre-Islamic ignorance (jahili- had been ‘strong,’ identified with a popular ideology yya). So long as they failed to implement God’s law that resonated in society. For the jihadists that suc- (shari’a) they had no right to rule.
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