ism. Gerges identifiedthree‘waves’ ofjihadistactiv- In arecentarticleMiddleEastspecialistFawaz Edinburgh School ofSocialandPolitical Science, Universityof Senior LecturerinInternationalRelations Dr EwanStein Historical Roots East andNorth Africa: Ideologicaland Modalities ofJihadismin The Middle Jihadism andViolenceintheArabWorld 2 1 shaped the20thcenturypolitics oftheMiddleEast. dition withelementsofthe modernideologiesthat vocabulary and symbols of Islam as a discursive tra- ogy. ‘Jihadism’ asanideological repertoire merges calities overalongperiod,as‘movement’ isideol- dalities ofpoliticalpractice,occurringindiverselo- What enablesustoviewthesequitedistinctmo- gional statepoliciesandglobalpoliticaldynamics. complex interplaybetweenjihadiststrategies,re- have evolvedovertime.Thesepatternsreflecta But theyencapsulateprevailingpatternsas each wavedoes not fullyeclipse the precedingone. They donotfollowinneatchronologicalorder,and for conceptualisingmodalitiesofjihadistactivism. Gerges’ three waves offer a useful heuristic device across stateborders. territory andtheestablishmentofpoliticalcontrol ganda, intensesectarianism,rapidacquisitionof ganisation distinguishedbyeffectiveuseofpropa- a brutally effective military or- lamic State(ISIS), than localregimes.ThethirdwaveisthatoftheIs- and targetstheUnitedStatesitsalliesrather gins withtheal-Qaedaembassybombingsin1998 ments. Thesecondwave,‘farenemy’ jihadism,be- sists ofgroupstryingtotoppletheirowngovern- from the1970suntilmiddleof1990s,con- Richard F a w 1 az ‘Nearenemy’ jihadism,thedominantmode A. Gerges, “ISISandtheThirdWave A. ofJihadism,” CurrentHistory , 113,2014,p.339. B onney , Jihad:FromQu’ran toBinLaden,PalgraveMacmillan, 2004. language shouldnotblind ustotheinfluenceof ly animportantdimension ofjihadism,religious Although thesymbolicrepertoire ofIslamisclear- States. the influenceofgreatpowers,notleast the United shifting socialandeconomicenvironments, in additiontothepoliciesofregionalstateswithin through theprismofnationalliberationstruggles, ishes theimportanceofmodernideologies,forged roots ofcurrentmovements,thisapproachdimin- Laden.’ operationalisation of jihad ‘from Qur’an to bin history, to tracetheevolutioninmeaningand have, toviewjihadisminthecontextofan‘Islamic’ extreme actions.Itispossible,assomescholars gious convictionmaymotivateindividualstotake consider themselvestobedevoutMuslims.Reli- lims andothersas‘Islamic,’ anditsadherentsmay Jihadism clearlydrawsonideasfamiliartoMus- Jihadism: ReligionorIdeology? rather thantimeless,quality. gies ofjihadistgroups have acontemporaneous, East andNorthAfrica.Assuch,theideasstrate- nomic andinternationalenvironmentintheMiddle evolved intandemwithshiftsthepolitical,eco- The main argument of this chapter is that jihadism eign policy, withrespecttothetrajectoryofjihadism. socioeconomic context,aswelltheroleofUSfor- also demonstratesthesalienceofpoliticaland larly Wahhabi andMuslimBrotherhoodthought.It of regionalideologiesonmodernjihadism,particu- This chapterofferssomereflectionsontheinfluence 2 Butasawayofexplainingortracingthe

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2015 47 Jihadism and Violence in the Arab World Keys IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2015 48 Jihadism and Violence in the Arab World Keys national liberationmovements. end oftheSecondWorld War, inthecontextof the turnof19thand20thcenturies,upto them. Mostoftheseideologiestookshapearound tic agents, and to mobilise populations against order todefineexternalenemiesandtheirdomes- They functionedasmechanismsof‘othering’ in communist, colonialist, things. Theywere,variously, anti-imperialist, genised aslocalnationalisms,anti-agreatdealof mention Zionism)were,astheybecameindi- Nasserism, communism,andIslamism(notto Saud amongtheBedouin tribes ofArabiainthe Wahhabism underpinnedthe expansionoftheAl against perfidiousShia,Jews andSufis. naries regarding Islam’s struggle againstunbelief, Abdel Wahhab. Itwasrepletewithapocalypticbi- vised bythe18thcenturypreacherMuhammadIbn and whose creed was de- in the oneness of God), who calledthemselvesthemuwahhidun an obscuregroupofArabianreligiousreformists ogy oftheSaudiState,referstoideasadoptedby ideology hastowardpolitics.Wahhabism, theideol- This maypartiallyexplaintheaversionitshegemonic ‘middle class’ drivingitsideologicaldevelopment. Arabia wasnotcolonisedandhadnomeaningful other modernideologiesmentionedabove.Saudi served ananalogousmobilisationalpurposetothe Wahhabism wasnotsociologically‘populist,’ butit Salafism, asitismanifestedoutsideSaudiArabia. nounced impact on jihadism is Wahhabism, or Another regionalideologythathashadapro- of authoritarian regimes system andmaintainthestability affirm thelegitimacyofSaudi to depoliticiseMuslimpopulations, sought toexportitsideologyinorder The Saudiregimehasconsistently ogy hasbeendistinctly‘negativist.’ common withotherpopulistideasystems,ideol- regional ideologies.InthemodernMiddleEast,in 3 in ModernEgypt , ed.byElie Elie P odeh andOnn anti-monarchical, anti-feudalist, W inckler P odeh , “Introduction:Nasserism asaFormofPopulism,” inRethinkingNasserism andOnn anti-shi’a, anti-Zionist, W inckler 3 Ba’thism, , Gainesville,Fla. ;London:University PressofFlorida :Eurospan,2004. anti-Arab. (believers anti- anti- the world (by restoring the Caliphate). Iftheideas the world(byrestoring Caliphate). power (the Islamic State) and, in so doing, change ( support base.Itsaspirationwastoeducatesociety the sensibilitiesofMB’sessentiallymiddleclass ism, strongmodernistcharacteristics.Thisreflects tion, had,initsscopeandaspirationtouniversal- MB ideology, although orientedtowardIslamisa- agents ofthecoloniser. the monarchyandsocialgroupsdeemedtobe iser aswellas,althoughthisdividedthemovement, life. Violentjihadwasmandatedtofightthecolon- individual wouldbefreetoliveagoodandfulfilling a fully realised Islamic society in which the Muslim was anexpressionofitsoverallmissiontoachieve then theinternationalsystem.ForMB‘jihad’ political reform:Islamisesociety, thentheStateand gramme wasorientedtoward‘inside-out’ socio- Saudi iteration,wasanti-political,theMB’spro- ‘Salafism.’ WhereasWahhabism, inits statised Rida repackagedinslightlymorepoliticalformas based IslamicreformistthinkerMuhammadRashid currents, aswellWahhabism, whichtheEgypt- with, socialist,fascistandevenliberalideological dle East.TheMBborrowedfrom,andcompeted Egypt occupiedtheintellectualcentreofMid- oped itspoliticalprogrammeinEgyptthe1930s, When the MB devel- Muslim Brotherhood (MB). another istheIslamism(orpoliticalIslam)of tant influenceoncontemporaryjihadistideology, If anti-politicalWahhabism constitutesoneimpor- tain thestabilityofauthoritarianregimes. firm thelegitimacyofSaudisystemandmain- ogy inordertodepoliticiseMuslimpopulations,af- regime hasconsistentlysoughttoexportitsideol- as nationalismorideology, butas‘Islam.’ TheSaudi the regionatlarge.Wahhabism presentsitselfnot ralist, ideologiesbothwithintheKingdomandin antidote toradicalleft-wing,andsubsequentlyplu- Wahhabism retaineditsmobilisationalqualityasan sion andbecametheKingdomofSaudiArabia, As themovementreachedlimitsofitsexpan- quire territorycontrolledbytheOttomanEmpire. motivate tribalwarriorsinarenewedjihadtoac- dawn ofthe20thcentury, withBritishsupport,to 18th andearly19thcenturies.Itwasrevivedatthe ), reshapethenatureandscopeofpolitical da’wa), : RevolutionandHistorical Memory Hasan al-Banna. of GamalAbdelNasseras itisoftheMBfounder humanity as a whole. Jihadism is as much a creature Egypt was, similarly, notjustthe‘Muslim world’ but demise ofworldimperialism. Qutb’sfocusbeyond Egypt wouldleadtoArab unity andultimatelythe world. ForArableftistsofmanystripes,revolutionin pluralism, anditsutopianaspirationstochangethe promising attitudetowarddetractors,itshostilityto emies fromwithoutandagentswithin,itsuncom- Islamic vocabulary, Nasserism’sparanoia abouten- herent unity of state and society. It duplicated, in Qutb’s thinkingmirroredthisobsessionwiththein- about nationalrenaissance. unity whoseenergiesshouldbemobilisedtobring (as doesBa’thism)viewedsocietyasanorganic world ideologiesontheleftandright,Nasserism modernist ideasystemthatborrowedmuchfrom Qutb’s ideasresembledNasseristpopulism.Asa Egyptian society. Inimportantstructuralways, pression of the dissatisfaction of excluded parts of endured inprison.Itcanalsobeconsideredanex- attributed tothetorturethatheandhiscomrades ship, particularlyinrelationtotheregime,canbe the Brotherhood’smessageunderQutb’sleader- ( Solongastheyfailedtoimplement God’slaw yya). society inastateofpre-Islamicignorance(jahili- ing. Qutbinsistedthatsecularrulerswerekeeping ology hadbecomeharderandmoreuncompromis- Qutb, publishedhismostincendiarywork,MBide- knowledged godfatherofmodernJihadism,Sayyid By the1960s,whichiswhengenerallyac- base essentially middleclasssupport reflects thesensibilitiesofMB’s modernist characteristics.This aspiration touniversalism,strong MB ideologyhad,initsscopeand of the MiddleEast. the regimes thatwouldcometorulestates sential meaningstheyweresimilartothoseof modern ideologyinIslamicvocabulary. Intheires- partially becausetheyexpressedtheessenceof of the MB influenced later jihadist groups it was shari’a) theyhadnorighttorule.Thesharpeningof lamist success inIran,jihadiststheArab world In thelate1970s,andespecially followingtheIs- followers hopedtosee. jihadist revolution of the type Sayyid Qutb and his Islamic Revolution was, at least in some ways, a in 1989,whotranslatedhis workintoPersian.The preme leaderfollowingAyatollahKhomeini’sdeath other thanAliKhamenei,whowouldbecomesu- among IranianIslamistintellectuals.Itwasnone like AliShari’ati.SayyidQutbwasalsoknown synthesised byrevolutionaryIslamistintellectuals leftist and Third-Worldist ideas more generally, as interpretation ofShi’iIslam.Butitalsoreflected digenous Iraniansources,includingaparticular date powerafter1979wouldnameit,drewonin- the revolutionaryfactionthatwasabletoconsoli- gime. The ideology of the Islamic Revolution, as the pro-Western, oppressive,corruptShah’sre- ment, harnessedwidespreadresentmentagainst cluding anincreasinglypowerfulIslamistmove- ity wasIran.Arangeofrevolutionaryforces,in- The firststateintheregiontorevealthisvulnerabil- vulnerable torevolutionfrombelow. in ideologicallegitimacy. Assuchitseemedmore ever, thepost-populistStatewas‘fierce,’ yetlacking ceeded himfromthe1970suntil 1990s, how- that resonatedinsociety. Forthejihadiststhatsuc- had been‘strong,’ identifiedwithapopularideology flourishing ofIslaminsociety. InQutb’sdaytheState of corruptingideas;theStatethatprevented oppressed them;theStatethatfacilitatedinflux For IslamistgroupselsewhereitwastheStatethat ing force. ans asMuslimsandthusdoomedtofailaliberat- ing unabletoharnessthetrueenergiesofPalestini- whichwasseenasbe- secular PLO (aquasi-state), Islamic the Israelioccupation,justifieditsexistenceasan the PalestinianHamas,whoseprioritywastofight lamist movement,wasthenatureofState.Even bound themtogetheraspartofatransnationalIs- The mainpreoccupationforthesegroups,which Qutb’s ideas to varying degrees as their manifestos. first waveof‘nearenemy’ jihadists,incorporated dle East and North Africa from the 1970s, Gerges’ The violentIslamistgroupsthatemergedintheMid- is theState Near EnemyJihadism:intheBeginning resistance movementasanalternativetothe

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2015 49 Jihadism and Violence in the Arab World Keys IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2015 50 Jihadism and Violence in the Arab World Keys campaign against theSovietUnion,coterminous tivists leave the country altogether. The multilateral gimes) regimeswerealsohappy toseejihadistac- today bytheEgyptian,Yemeni, Syrianand otherre- eas far from metropolises (a strategy still employed marginal, deprivedorstrategically unimportantar- In additiontoseekingconfinejihadistactivity litical directioninwhichjihadismwasevolving. grow, whichhelpsexplainthemorenihilistic,anti-po- Wahhabi influenceonjihadismwouldcontinueto Enjoining GoodandForbiddingEvil,orhisba.The forcing correctmoralbehaviourinsocietythrough res anddress,aswellaproactiveapproachtoen- sation’ ofjihadism.Thiswasmanifested insocialmo- Gulf connectionsalsoledtotheprogressive‘Salafi- agenda) tobuildanetworkofmosquesandcharities. was acentralelementofSadat’sdeindustrialisation from labourmigrationintheGulf(theexportofpeople The Gama’agrewrapidly, leveragingremittances Egypt (theSa’id). themselves tothedistantbackwatersofUpper and allowedtoproselytisesolongastheyconfined in Sadat’sassassination,werereleasedfromprison of theGama’aIslamiyya,onegroupsinvolved Islamist opposition to regroup and expand.Members survived withanewleader,whoquietlyallowedthe But Egypt did not go the way of Iran. The regime open-door (infitah)economicpolicyhadgenerated. ots’ expressedthelevelofsocialmalaiseSadat’s be onthebrinkofanexplosion.The1977‘breadri- sination ofAnwarSadatbelievedEgyptiansocietyto The jihadiststhatplannedandcarriedouttheassas- State PoliciesandtheFirstWaveofJihadism ripe forrevolution. sage thatregimeswerevulnerableandsocieties and legalIslamisation.Forjihadists,itsentames- social movementandpressureregimesintocultural them toredoubletheireffortsbuildanIslamic groups, therevolutionprovidedanopportunityfor Brotherhood anditsaffiliatedorlike-minded regimes, across the Arab world. For the Muslim sparked hope for many social forces, and panic for will bediscussedbelow, camelater.Therevolution lish Islamic states. The sharp sectarian divide, as deavour: to overthrow secular regimes and estab- and Iransawthemselvesengagedinacommonen- to migrate cities,especiallyCairoand Alexan- inhabitants oftheSa’id, Gama’a’sstronghold, tailment of remittance revenues led moreand more frontation withjihadisminthe early1990s.Thecur- key role in precipitating the State’s renewed con- In Egypt,too,socioeconomic conditionsplayeda wasborn. (AQIM), would evolveintoal-QaedaintheIslamicMaghreb which in whichtheArmedIslamicGroup(GIA), State headon.Theresultwasthebloodycivilwar activists feltthetimewasrighttoconfront celled electionsFISwassettowin,someIslamist tant exampleofpoliticalhubris,theregimecan- more roomforpoliticalmanoeuvre.When,inabla- ist movement,theIslamicSalvationFront(FIS), the governmentallowedcountry’smainIslam- content towardtheregimerosetosuchapeakthat sive youthunemployment.InAlgeria,populardis- es ledtoacontractionoftheeconomyandmas- During thepreviousdecadecollapseinoilpric- conflicts inEgyptandAlgeriatheearly1990s. revealed bythenear-simultaneouseruptionofcivil importance oftheregionalpoliticaleconomywas lation ofjihadistviolence,butnotinavacuum.The State policiesplayedasignificantroleintheesca- Islamic states secular regimesandestablish common endeavour:tooverthrow Iran sawthemselvesengagedina Iran, jihadistsintheArabworldand following theIslamistsuccessin In thelate1970s,andespecially formed thebackboneofal-Qaeda. to train,assistorfight.Networkscreatedhere travel oftheircitizenstoPakistanandAfghanistan the greatjihad.Regimesactivelyfacilitated Khomeini’s sails.Islamistsofallstripesembraced common strugglewouldtakethewindoutof evil) inwhichrulersandpeoplecouldunitea bearer ofcommunism(partIslamism’saxis confrontation witha superpower and standard- and adiversionforhome-grownjihadists.Anepic welcome distractionfromtheIranianRevolution the globalColdWar. ButforArabregimesitwasa with therevolutioninIran,wasacrucialchapter to regionalandglobalprominence. oil-rich Saudiregimeelevated itfrommarginalcult ence ofWahhabism, whose identification withthe intolerance ofIslamandeverythingabouttheinflu- in contemporaryjihadismsaysnothingaboutthe Saudi influence.Theforegroundingofsectarianism part ofregionalpoliticaldiscourselargelythanksto ble about it. Hostility toward the Shi’a became a torical context.Thereisnothingtimelessorinevita- features of‘thirdwave’ jihadism,inits correcthis- rise ofISIShasbecomeonethemostsalient important toplacethissectarianism,whichwiththe tained asanexistentialthreattoSunniIslam.Itis Sunni world,andwhichmustbevigorouslycon- Shi’i event,onewhichcouldnotberepeatedinthe cessful inrewritingtherevolutionasaspecifically denigrate therevolutioninIran.Theyweresuc- drew ontheanti-Shi’irepertoireofWahhabism to Saudiandotherreligiousfigures against Islam), was consideredtobepartofaJewishconspiracy against communism (which, along with Zionism, In addition to rallying troops for an apocalyptic jihad timents themselves. that theyhadarticulatedandencouragedsuchsen- ologies, convenientlyneglectingtoacknowledge jihadists’ virulentlyanti-Western andanti-Zionist ide- To attractforeignsupport,regimespointedoutthe police statestostymieevennon-violentopposition. crushed itsownIslamistuprising)builtformidable Tunisia andSyria(whichhad,in1982,brutally wise lessaffectedbyjihadistviolence,suchas cy capabilitiesduringthecivilwar.Countriesother- ternational assistancetoboostitscounterinsurgen- security sector. Algeria, similarly, could draw on in- huge amountsofUSmilitaryaidintothedomestic Egypt wasparticularlysuccessfulatthis,channelling gimes setaboutboostingtheircoercivecapabilities. social unrestcausedbyeconomicrestructuring, re- press oppositionofallkinds,andtohelpcontainthe To combat jihadism in the 1990s, as well as to sup- ceasefire in1997. war thatrumbledonuntiltheGama’a’sunilateral albeit on a lesser scale than in Algeria, was a civil toleration tipped over into confrontation. The result, close tohomefromtheregime’sperspectiveand dria. Thisbroughtthejihadistgrouprathertoo 4 Montasser al - Z a yy a t , TheRoadtoAl-Qaeda: TheStoryofBinLaden’sRight-Hand Man,London;Sterling, V.A.: PlutoPress,2004. racy promotion. of militaryinvasionwiththe softpowerofdemoc- Agenda, anattempttosupplement thehardpower The thirdresponsewastheso-calledFreedom regime tryingtobattlealooselydefined‘terrorism.’ senhower doctrine,supportwasextendedtoany struggle againstjihadism.InakindofupdatedEi- and whichwascouchedasa‘withusoragainstus’ George W. Bush misguidedly termed a ‘crusade,’ was tolaunchthecatch-all‘waronterror,’ which posed retaliationforthe9/11attacks.Thesecond vade Afghanistan and, two years later, Iraq, in sup- meet al-Qaeda’s expectations. The firstwas to in- The USrespondedinthreeconsequentialwaysto helped setthestageforphasethreeofjihadism. The UnitedStatestookthebait,andunknowingly thoritarian regimes. haust public support for propping up (infidel) au- Afghan trapthathadensnaredtheUSSRandex- in the region.ItwouldlureUSintosame tarnish itsimage,andthatofclientregimes, was toprovokeUSretaliation,whichwouldfurther mies, theinfidelregimes.Strategicallyplan the snake,’ toweakenbackersofthenearene- the shiftwasrationalisedasstrikingat‘headof member oftheIslamistaxisevil.Intellectually The crusading West was, of course, a permanent harder todrumupsupportfortheircause. that theattacksaroused.Thiswouldmakeityet ern coverage of cheering Arab crowds suggested) target populations(despitewhattendentiousWest- for theUnitedStates,includingfromwithintheirown mayed attheoutpouringofinternationalsympathy tional blessing,wouldensue.Theywerealsodis- feared theinevitablecrackdownsthat,withinterna- peace withtheirregimes(asinEgyptandLibya), those ‘nearenemy’ jihadiststhatweretryingtomake a strategicmiscalculation.Opponents,including community, with many (probably most) decrying it as three yearsearlier.Theoperationdividedthejihadist ed viatheembassybombinginTanzania andKenya geting the United States – thathad been inaugurat- in jihadiststrategy–fromattackingregimestotar- The 11September2001attacksconfirmedtheshift The FarEnemy 4

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2015 51 Jihadism and Violence in the Arab World Keys IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2015 52 Jihadism and Violence in the Arab World Keys authority overthecountry the centralState’sability toassertits ascendant, Shi’ielite,andweakened subordinate positionvis-à-visan formerly dominantSunnielitesina point forjihadistfighters,placed The invasionofIraqcreatedafocal cilitated bydonorsandsupportersintheGulf. brought into an expanding jihadist orbit, helped or fa- front ofpoliticallife.Anewgenerationfighterswas en andofcourseSyria,broughtjihadismtothefore- to discredit jihadism, their militarisation in Libya,Yem- US bellicosity. Althoughtheuprisingsseemedinitially resentment againstthecomplicityofregionalstatesin 2010-2011: increasingly fierce regimes, protests and ate theconditionsthatledtoArabuprisingsof The USresponseto9/11,inotherwords,helpedcre- The ThirdWave bour activism. Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation and la- tailed withoppositiontotheIraqwar,solidarity ulations in the 2000s. Pro-democracy activism dove- however, contributedto the politicisation of Arab pop- renewed debateontheregion’sdemocraticdeficit, ment againsttheUnitedStatesforitshypocrisy. The unintended consequencesofsharpeningArabresent- content. TheFreedomAgenda,foritspart,hadthe ing socioeconomicproblemstoincreasepopulardis- dented international blessing, combined withdeepen- ‘fierce’ states. Redoubled repression, with unprece- ther augmentedthecoerciveresourcesofregion’s after theinvasion.TheWar onTerror, meanwhile,fur- ISIS outoftheashesal-QaedainIraq,adecade This establishedtheperfectconditionsforriseof State’s abilitytoassertitsauthorityoverthecountry. overtly sectarian,Shi’ielite,andweakenedthecentral subordinate positionvis-à-visanascendant,aswell fighters, placedformerlydominantSunnielitesina The invasionofIraqcreatedafocalpointforjihadist in Iraq and Syria, engages with essentially the same in IraqandSyria, engageswithessentially thesame jihadism. Thegroup,whichhas filledapowervacuum ISIS hasbecometheposter child ofthethirdwave But the scale is unprecedented in the post-inde- ods, ambitionsandclaimsto representallofIslam. pansion oftheWahhabi movementitselfinitsmeth- the region.Morethananything itresemblestheex- completely novelorientation fornon-stateactorsin ever territoryitcanacquire. Thisisnot,however,a gimes asitiswithsettingupitsownstateonwhat- ISIS’ preoccupation is not so much with toppling re- throughout theregion. giance ofmoreand‘wilayas,’ orprovinces, takes more and more territory and secures the alle- vived, however,andcontinuedtoexpandasISIS before-the-horse approach.TheCaliphatehassur- derided acrosstheMuslimworldforsuchacart- phate, customarilytheendpointforIslamists.Itwas 2014, ISISannouncedtheformationofCali- State andtheCaliphate) ISIS is outside-in. In June was inside-out(fromindividualtosociety, tothe hood orderofbusiness.WhereastheMBstrategy ISIS has, however, reversed the Muslim Brother- and supportersintheGulf orbit, helpedorfacilitatedbydonors brought intoanexpandingjihadist A newgenerationoffighterswas estine orthecrusadingWest. importance andurgencythatagainsttheJewsinPal- ‘ ing tosubscribe.ForISISthestruggleagainst a levelbeyondthattowhichevenal-Qaedawaswill- habism. Thegroupalsoforegroundssectarianismto the moralitypolicingthatishallmarkofWah- ISIS usesitsquasi-stateauthoritytoenforcehisba, Yemen, havepledgedallegiancetotheIslamicState. by whichpre-existingjihadistoutfits,fromNigeriato all worldview, asisdemonstratedbytherelativeease against fellowjihadis.Buttheyaresimilarintheirover- wisdom ofegregiousactsviolence,particularly ing to the interpretation of scripture, or on the tactical main rival,quibblewiththegrouponmatterspertain- ity. Intellectualssympathetictoal-Qaeda,nowISIS’ fear andrespect,seemstoexceedallothersinbrutal- tice, expertlyconvertedintopropagandatoinspire and asignificantpartofIraq.Itsbrandroughjus- the timeofwriting,ISIScontrolssome50%Syria ideological canonasdidthose of previouswaves.At rafida,’ asShiaarederogatorilytermed,exceedsin ‘prepare theground’ andstructuregrassrootssup- through morality policing, charity and preaching to proliferation ofAnsaral-Shari’agroups,whichseek by the Arab uprisings, al-Qaeda has encouraged the order tobenefitfromthenewopportunitiesafforded even sodifferenttocurrental-Qaedapractice.In ders asahomefortheworld’sJewry. Anditisnot ism, whichestablishedastatewithambiguousbor- gious connection with Syria, is theexample of Zion- many ISIS fighters and supporters lack all but a reli- estinians aroundtheworld.Closerstill,giventhat then serveasabaseofresistanceandfocusforPal- Palestine. Thetheorywasthatsuchastatecould 1967, ratherthanwaitingforthetotalliberationof PLO inseekingastateterritories occupiedin ISIS’ strategyalsoresembles that ofFatah and the Palestine orthecrusadingWest urgency thatagainsttheJewsin termed, exceedsinimportanceand ‘rafida,’ asShiaarederogatorily For ISISthestruggleagainst of urbansociety. ing self-helppracticesofthoselivingonthemargins GIA inAlgeria.Thisreplicated,tosomeextent,exist- ‘emirate’ intheCairosuburbofImbaba,asdid Gama’a Islamiyya,forexample,setupashort-lived malise politicalauthorityonasmallerscale:the pendence period.Jihadistgroupshavetriedtofor- player inmodernMiddleEasternhistory. Jihadism hasbeennoaberration,butratheracentral not more,thanideasinheritedfromanIslamicpast. ideological dynamicsaffectitsevolutionasmuch,if has notbeeninevitable.Contemporarypoliticaland has shown,however,isthatthe trajectoryofjihadism militancy anytimesoon.Whatthehistoryofjihadism but the curtain is unlikely to come down on Islamist Middle Easttoday. Thefutureofjihadismisuncertain, have precludedanysuchjihadistmoderationinthe activity thathasoccurredinGeneralal-Sisi’sEgypt, Yemen, aswell astheharshclampdownonallIslamist The militarisationofuprisingsinSyria,Libya,and ble commitmenttoimplementshari’a. hoping toholdtheMuslimBrotherhooditsostensi- unprecedented influenceonmainstreampolitics, candidates inelections.Salafisandjihadiswielded these trendsestablishedpoliticalpartiesandfielded Gama’a IslamiyyaandJihadorganisations.Eachof hood, Salafisandthepost-revisionistjihadistsof Islamists ofallstripes,includingtheMuslimBrother- tre ofpoliticalIslam,hadyieldedahugedividendto Arab world’smostpopulouscountryandtheepicen- would formapoliticalparty. TheuprisinginEgypt,the that ifal-QaedawereallowedtooperateinEgyptthey In 2011aleaderoftheGama’aIslamiyyaquipped A RoadnotTaken? ties ofthethirdphasejihadism. port foral-Qaeda.Al-Qaedaisadaptingtothereali-

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2015 53 Jihadism and Violence in the Arab World Keys