VIEWS FROM ASIA Islam and Politics in

By Shiraishi Takashi

USLIMS account for 87% of basis and regularly attend religious lec- port for Islamic parties (28.3%) as well. MIndonesia’s population or a total tures account for 49.8% of adherents. As a result, one can say that the major of 180 million adherents, and this The remaining 50.2% are less devout support base of the Islamic parties is majority makes it the world’s largest and fall in the category of what might be made of devout Muslims. This does not “Islamic” nation. While it is a trend called “statistical” Muslim. The degree mean, however, that devout Muslims within Islam throughout the world, to which devout Muslims (43.3% of the unanimously support the Islamic parties. Muslims in Indonesia are becoming entire population), statistical Muslims As one can see in Table 1, the party more devout than ever. Whereas it was (43.7%) and non-Muslims (13%) sup- receiving the largest degree of support hardly seen in the 1970s, for example, port political parties is shown in the from devout Muslims is , and the jilbab worn by Muslim women has table. (Table 1) close to half of devout Muslims (48.6%) become a common sight, and increasing In Indonesia, the term “Islamic par- support either Golkar or the Indonesian numbers of believers are attending ties” is used to refer to five particular Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP7). Friday services at mosques. political parties. These are the three Other points of interest come from Accompanying this “Islamic revival,” Islamist political parties (the PPP, the PKS comparisons with the 1955 election. In in the political world in recent years, and the PBB) which advocate the estab- Indonesia’s electoral history, the elec- those advocating the establishment of lishment of an Islamic state governed by tions of 1955 and 1999 stand out as rea- Islamic states ruled by the increasing Islamic law, the National Awakening sonably free and fair elections. In the influence of Islam and Islamic law Party (PKB4, headed by former president 1955 election, four Islamist parties col- (Sharia) have come to the fore. For , former chairman lected 43.5% of the total vote. These example, when one visits the city of of the orthodox Islamic social and educa- included the modernist Masyumi8 Surakarta in central , where Jemaah tional association Nahdlatul (20.9%) which advocated the introduc- Islamiyah (JI) was founded, one sees [NU]) and the tion of rule by Islamic law, the orthodox posters of Osama bin Laden on the (PAN5, headed by current MPR6 Speaker Nahdlatul Ulama (18.4%), the walls. Islamist Yusril Ihza Mahendra, , former head of the mod- Indonesia-Islam Alliance party (2.9%) chairman of the Crescent Moon and ernist social and educational association and the Islamist Education Association Star Party (PBB1) and the Minister of ). It is generally held (1.3%). Justice, has been mentioned as a candi- that devout Muslims overwhelmingly In comparison, according to the date for the presidency. In the national support these five parties. August 2003 survey, of those who said parliament are such Islamist political However, when one looks at the they had voted in the 1999 election, parties as results of the survey, this does not seem 10.7% cast votes for the PPP, 1.9% for (PPP2, whose chairman is , to be the case. As one might guess, non- the PBB and 1.4% for the PKS, or a total the current Vice President), the Welfare Muslims do not support the Islamic par- of 14% of those surveyed. Asked which Justice Party (PKS3) and the PBB. The JI, ties at all, and statistical Muslims are party they would vote for if an election which engineered a series of terrorist conspicuously low in their rate of sup- were held immediately, the responses attacks such as the Bali bombing and the bombing of ’s Marriott Hotel, Table 1 Political party support among devout Muslims, statistical Muslims and non-Muslims continues to be influential. How potent are the Islamist influ- ences within the government, and will Islamist strength grow larger than what it is at present? To answer these ques- tions, let us examine the results of the survey carried out by Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI) in August of 2003. According to the results, some 87% of Indonesia’s population are adherents to Islam. Of these Muslims, the devout who pray five times each day, fast to the the very end of Ramadan, chant the Koran daily, pray additionally on a daily

38 JAPAN SPOTLIGHT • May / June 2004 VIEWS FROM ASIA

Photo: Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia were 9.8% for the PPP, 1.9% for the PBB and 2.3% for the PKS, also making a total of 14% of those surveyed. In short, during the past 45 years the ratio of support for Islamist political parties has plummeted from 43.5% to a mere 14%. From the above, it may be said that over the past 20 years, within the con- text of world-wide trends, expansion of educational opportunities and the rise of the middle class, Indonesia’s Muslims have become more devout. However, this has not meant that Indonesian Muslims are now supporting or will in the near future support the introduction of Islamic law or the establishment of a state based on Islam. The PDIP and Golkar have already established them- selves as national political parties and Muslim women wearing the jilbab at a wedding ceremony in Indonesia virtually half of devout Muslims support one of the two. In contrast, the ratio of character, specifically the fact that sever- is no small number of politicians such as support for Islamist political parties even al thousand members are thought to Yusril Ihza Mahendra and others who among devout Muslims is no more than have received military training in are driven by either opportunism or 21.8%. Moreover, the PKB and the PAN, Afghanistan and on Mindanao. One of conviction to pursue the appeasement of which together receive 29.5% of the the reasons this kind of force has radical Islamist forces. As a conse- support of devout Muslims, oppose the become stronger in recent years is that quence, one cannot expect that the gov- introduction of Islamic laws. the political elite – out of a variety of ernment will, at least in the short-term The possibility that in the near future motivations – is supporting them. A future, suppress such groups. It is prob- Islamist forces will become a major second reason is that, since the crisis of ably safe to assume that the current state influence in the national parliament is 1997-1998, amidst the continuing social of affairs will continue for some time to extremely small. This is not to say that crisis, poor devout Muslims from rural come. Islamist influence is not significant. To communities, who have received only illustrate one need only look at the activ- Islamic education from primary through Abbreviations ities of “militant” Islamist organizations secondary levels, perceive the conflict in 1) PBB: Partai Bulan Bintang such as the JI. Such forces will not be Ambon and Poso in central Sulawesi as a 2) PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan able to take political control, but their confrontation between Islam and 3) PKS: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera activities do pose various challenges both Christianity and are becoming radical- 4) PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa domestically and regionally. Similar ized. 5) PAN: Partai Amanat Nasional Islamist organizations have existed in Such radical Islamist groups are not 6) MAR: Majelis Permushawalatan Indonesia since the 1920s. During the particularly large in membership, but all Rakyat, or National Assembly 7) PDIP: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 1940s and 1950s, the the government can do is to abandon Perjuangan movement, which sought the establish- the policies of appeasement and, with 8) Masyumi: Majelis Syura Muslimin ment of an Islamic state, carried out the cooperation of prominent social and Indonesia armed resistance against the republican educational associations such as government. Islamist groups like the JI Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, emerged from this radical lineage that seek to contain them. Since the Bali Shiraishi Takashi is a professor at the has continued for several generations. bombing, this has become the basis of Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto What makes the JI different from its government policy in Indonesia. University. He specializes in Asian studies forebears, however, is its international However, within the government, there and international relations.

JAPAN SPOTLIGHT • May / June 2004 39