8

Ethics or Politics? Th e Palmer Commission Report on the 2010 Gaza Flotilla Incident

Deane-Peter Baker

Few recent operational incidents have so dominated international head- lines than the so-called ‘Gaza Flotilla Incident’, in which a fl otilla of civilian vessels en route to Gaza were intercepted by the Israeli Defense Force, resulting in the death of eight Turks and a dual US and Turkish citizen. As with any incident involving and the IDF, the opera- tion was mired in controversy from the outset. Investigations into opera- tional incidents are diffi cult at the best of times, but are considerably more vexed when strong currents of international politics come into play. Both Israel and launched commissions of inquiry into the inci- dent, and (unsurprisingly) reached diametrically opposed conclusions regarding Israel’s culpability for the deaths that occurred. Th e United Nations then stepped into the fray by forming ‘Th e Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident’, also known as the Palmer Commission (after the Commission’s Chairperson, former Prime Minister of Sir Geoff rey Palmer). Th e commission was intended to help normalize relations between former allies Turkey and Israel, which had deteriorated sharply as a result of the incident. In July of 2011 the Palmer Commission Report was completed, but was not released until September 2011 because of concerns that it would in fact exacerbate the rift between the two nations.1 Th ese concerns turned out to be well founded. Th ough the Commission’s report issued a ‘rapprochement’ that suggested that Israel was guilty of wrongdoing in the execution of the boarding of the fl otilla vessels, particularly the MV

1 Neil MacFarqhar and Ethan Bronner, “Report Finds Naval Blockade by Israel Legal but Faults Raid”, New York Times 1 September 2011, accessed 9 March 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/world/middleeast/02fl otilla.html?page wanted=all.

David W. Lovell (ed.), Investigating Operational Incidents in a Military Context: Law, Justice, Politics. © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in Th e Netherlands. ISBN 978-90-04-27709-0. pp. 123 – 145. 124 Chapter 8 – Deane-Peter Baker

Mavi Marmara (the vessel on which the fatalities occurred), Turkey was incensed at the Commission’s fi nding that the naval blockade of Gaza was a legal and legitimate security measure.2 Israel refused to off er an apology to Turkey, despite international pressure to do so.3 Th e asymmetry of the Commission’s ‘rapprochement’ is striking. Despite acknowledging that “Israeli Defense Forces personnel faced signifi cant, organized and violent resistance from a group of passen- gers when they boarded the Mavi Marmara requiring them to use force for their own protection” and that “Th ree soldiers were captured, mis- treated, and placed at risk by those passengers” while “Several others were wounded”,4 “some seriously”,5 the Panel makes no parallel demand for compensation for the Israeli injured, or even a ‘statement of regret’, from the organizers of the fl otilla. Why this asymmetry? Given the con- siderable anti-Israeli sentiments that dominated international discourse in the aftermath of the Gaza fl otilla incident, it is worth considering whether the Palmer Commission’s conclusions were shaped by political pressure rather than by perspicuous ethical analysis. Th e Panel’s conclu- sions are in line with the congruence of international political sentiment regarding the incident, but do the Panel’s arguments adequately support its fi ndings? In what follows I focus on the reasoning behind the Commission’s conclusions vi (‘Israel’s decision to board the vessels with such substantial force at a great distance from the blockade zone and with no fi nal warn- ing immediately prior to the boarding was excessive and unreasonable’) and viii (‘Th e loss of life and injuries resulting from the use of force by Israeli forces during the take-over of the Mavi Marmara was unaccept- able’). I set aside the question of whether or not the fl otilla passengers were mistreated by Israeli security forces in the aftermath of the board- ing operation. While mistreatment of this kind, if it occurred, is cer- tainly morally problematic, the Palmer Commission’s ‘rapprochement’

2 Barak Ravid, “Turkey to refer Israel’s blockade of to Th e Hague” , 3 September 2011, accessed 9 March 2012 http://www. haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/turkey-to-refer-israel-s-blockade- of-gaza-strip-to-the-hague-1.382330. 3 “Israel refuses to apologise to Turkey over Gaza fl otilla raid”, 18 August 2011, accessed 9 March 2012http://www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2011/aug/18/israel-refuses-apologise-gaza-raid. 4 Panel, 59-60. 5 Panel, 56.