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Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy Author(S): John D Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy Author(s): John D. Huber, Charles R. Shipan and Madelaine Pfahler Reviewed work(s): Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Apr., 2001), pp. 330-345 Published by: Midwest Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2669344 . Accessed: 20/05/2012 17:41 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Midwest Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Journal of Political Science. http://www.jstor.org Legislaturesand Statutory Control of Bureaucracy JohnD. Huber ColumbiaUniversity CharlesR. Shipan UniversityofIowa MadelainePfahler UniversityofMichigan Existingtheories of legislativedelega- ureaucraticinvolvement in policymakingis a pervasivecondition of tionto bureaucracies typicallyfocus modernpolitical life. Bureaucracies implement policies that legisla- on a single legislature,often the U.S. tureshave enacted,and theycreate policies where legislatures have Congress. We argue thatthis paro- avoideddoing so. Theycan act to regulateindustries, to distributebenefits chial focus has importantlimitations. If and costs,and to redistributewealth. They tackle policy areas as disparate one contends thatpoliticians respond as telecommunications,the environment,transportation, and public rationallyto theirpolitical environment health. when adoptingstrategies for control- Given the pervasivenessof bureaucraticactivity, it is not surprising lingbureaucrats, then theories of thatpolitical scientists long have sought to understandthe relationship be- controlshould be able to explain how tweenlegislatures and agencies.Understanding this relationship is essential differencesin the politicalenviron- to democratictheory, as it focusesattention on the legitimacyof the role ment-and in particularin the demo- playedby unelectedpolicymakers in a representativedemocracy. Further- craticinstitutional arrangements that more,it shedslight on theactions, abilities, and motivationsof legislators. shape thisenvironment-influence Thus,scholars have attempted to ascertainwhether, to whatextent, and un- strategiesfor controlling bureaucrats. derwhat conditions legislators influence the actions of agencies. We offersuch a theoryabout the Much of thefocus of thisresearch has been on theU.S. Congress,and conditionsunder which legislatures much of the debatehas centeredon the questionof whetherin factCon- should relyon statutorycontrol (i.e., gresscontrols the bureaucracy. This is a difficultquestion to answer,as it detailed legislation)in order to limitthe requiresfairly precise information on legislatorpreferences and agency discretionof agencies. The theory outputs.But while settling the empirical issue has been difficult,in address- focuses on the interactionsof four ing thisquestion scholars have clarifiedseveral strategies for control, in- factors:conflict between legislators cludingthe use of budgetprocesses (e.g., Banks 1989; Bendor,Taylor, and and bureaucrats,the bargainingcosts Van Gaalen 1987), ongoingoversight (e.g., Aberbach 1990), and statutory associated withchoosing the institu- control,whereby legislators use legislationto influenceagency decisions. tionsfor controlling bureaucrats, the professionalcapacity of legislatorsto create institutionsfor control, and the impactof politicalinstitutions on the JohnD. Huber is AssociateProfessor of PoliticalScience, 732 InternationalAffairs Building,Columbia University, 420 W. 118thStreet, New York,NY 10027 (jdh39@ relativecosts and benefitsof statutory columbia.edu).Charles R. Shipan is AssociateProfessor of PoliticalScience, 341 and nonstatutorystrategies of control. SchaefferHall, University of Iowa,Iowa City,IA 52242 ([email protected]). We testour argumentusing legislation MadelainePfahler is a Ph.D.Candidate in PoliticalScience, The Universityof Michigan, AnnArbor, MI 48104([email protected]). from1995 and 1996 thataffects Med- icaid programs.The resultsshow that Originallypresented at the 1998Annual Meeting of the American Political Science As- sociation,Boston, Mass. The authorswould like to thankThe RobertWood Johnson legislaturesare morelikely to make Foundationand theNational Science Foundation for financial support, Andrew Bargen, use of statutorycontrols when control MaureenComfort, Todd Austin, and KevinChlarson for excellent research assistance, of governmentis divided between the GregAdams, Tim Amato, Steve Balla, Jenna Bednar, Dan Carpenter,Dave Clark,Rui de Figueiredo,Matt Gabel, Rick Hall, Becky Morton, Pev twoparties, the twochambers ofthe Squire,Craig Volden, and semi- narparticipants'at George Washington, Chicago, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio State, legislatureare unifiedin their opposi- and WashingtonUniversity for helpful comments and discussions.Finally, Shipan tionto the executive,the legislatureis wouldlike to acknowledgethe support provided by the Obermann Center for Advanced moreprofessionalized, and the legisla- Studiesat theUniversity of Iowa. turedoes nothave easily available AmericanJournal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 2,April 2001, Pp. 330-345 optionsfor nonstatutory control. ?2001 bythe Midwest Political Science Association 330 LEGISLATURES AND STATUTORY CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 331 Like much of the researchon Congress,this article empiricaltest, which focuses on Medicaid healthpolicy focuseson statutorymeans of control,with the objective in the states,and presentour results.The conclusion being to understandwhen, and underwhat conditions, summarizesthe main resultsand discussesideas forfu- legislatorswill attemptto use legislativestatutes to spell turework. out in detailwhat actions bureaucracies should or should not take. We, however,attempt to filla lacuna in the theoreticaland empiricalunderstanding of delegation,a lacuna thatinevitably arises when theories are developed AComparative Theory of Delegation and testedwithin a fixedinstitutional setting (like Con- gress).One shouldexpect that the broader political con- Our theoreticalargument about delegation is in the textin whichlegislators find themselves will affectlegis- rational-choicetradition that maintains politicians pur- lativestrategies for controlling bureaucrats (Huber and posefullyattempt to influencebureaucratic behavior (e.g., Shipan 2000a). Effortsto exercisecontrol, for example, McCubbins,Noll, and Weingast1987, 1989, Ramseyer should logicallydepend on factorssuch as the level of and Rosenbluth1993; Moe, 1989, 1990a, 1990b). Recent legislativeprofessionalism, the structure of legislative-ex- researchhas builton thistradition by developing and test- ecutiverelations, or the arrangementsfor legislative in- ing argumentsabout how featuresof the politicalenvi- terventionin bureaucraticactivity. When studiesof del- ronmentinfluence strategies for control. Epstein and egationare conductedin settingswhere such featuresof O'Halloran (1994, 1999),for example, develop and testa theenvironment are fixed(as theyare in studiesof Con- modelthat explains why legislators will be morelikely to gress),these featurescannot become elementsof our limitagency discretion during divided government. They, theoriesof delegation. alongwith Drotning (1993), also examinehow the level of Our primaryobjective is thereforeto develop and policy uncertaintyaffects delegation strategies.Bawn testa theoryof delegationthat is explicitlycomparative. (1995, 1997) looks at a similarset of issues,focusing pri- By"comparative," we are not simplyreferring to "outside marilyon tradeoffsbetween taking advantage of the ex- the UnitedStates," as the termis oftenused. Rather,we pertisethat bureaucrats possess and controllingagency mean thatvariation across institutionalarrangements drift.Her theoryindicates that the optimal level of discre- and politicalsystems allows us to makepredictions about tionthat legislators give to agencieswill be a functionof a the effectsof thesearrangements and systemson incen- systematicinteraction between the technicaland proce- tives to use statutorycontrol. We focus explicitlyon duraluncertainty that legislators face.' variationin institutionalarrangements within separa- Such researchhas done a greatdeal to improveour tion-of-powerssystems and testour theoryby conduct- understandingof delegationprocesses in Congress.But ing a comparativeanalysis of policymakingin the U.S. as notedabove, the near-exclusive focus on Congresshas states.The theory,however, easily can be adaptedto en- led to a set of explanatoryvariables that vary over time compass delegationin parliamentarysystems (Huber (e.g.,the levelof conflictbetween legislature and execu- and Shipan2000b). tive) or across issues (e.g., technicaluncertainty about We believethat a comparativeapproach is crucialto policies).This is obviouslyessential for explaining varia- testingtheories of delegationthat view the structures tion withinCongress, but thisdominant mode of theo- constrainingbureaucratic behavior as the resultsof ra- rizinghas impoverishedour understandingof how the tional choices by politicianswho care about the out- institutionalsetting
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