U.S.-Russia Relations: Policy Challenges for the Congress

VOL. 25, NO. 1

FEBRUARY 15–21, 2010

DIRECTOR: Dick Clark

Washington, DC This project was funded by Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.

Copyright © 2010 by The Aspen Institute The Aspen Institute One Dupont Circle, nw Washington, DC 20036-1133 Published in the United States of America in 2010 by The Aspen Institute

All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 0-89843-522-6 1773/CP/BK Table of Contents

Rapporteur’s Summary ...... 1 Robert Legvold

Russia Back at the Center of U.S. Foreign Policy ...... 9 Thomas Graham

Russia and American Nuclear Interests ...... 15 Steven Miller

U.S.-Russian Relations: The Energy Dimension ...... 23 Angela Stent

Squaring U.S. Policy Toward Russia With U.S. Interests in the Larger Post-Soviet Space ...... 29 Steven Pifer

Conference Participants ...... 35

Conference Agenda ...... 37

Rapporteur’s Summary

Robert Legvold, Ph.D. Professor of Political Science Columbia University

The 35th seminar of the Aspen Institute’s West. It, notwithstanding the buffeting from Congressional Program on Russia convened the 2008 economic crisis, sees itself as a major in Madrid, February 15-21. Thirteen senators player, wants its voice heard, and means to and congressional representatives met with ten assert itself in a world viewed as highly competi- scholars, four of them from Russia, to discuss tive. Simultaneously, the broader geopolitical the broad theme of “U.S.-Russia Relations: landscape no longer encourages notions of a Policy Challenges for the Congress.” Thirteen United States standing astride the international months into the Obama administration, the order, solving problems alone or with a few meeting offered a good opportunity to assess willing partners. Rather it is a world increas- the progress achieved in reversing the dis- ingly marked by great upheaval, shifting power tinctly sour course of the relationship in recent balances, and uncertain outcomes—a world of years as well as to explore the challenge that intricate challenges exceeding the capacity of lies ahead. The agenda was designed both to any state, however powerful, to resolve alone. cover critical dimensions of U.S.-Russian rela- Second, Graham stressed the importance of tions—from nuclear arms control to tensions Russia to the United States—an importance over U.S.-Russian interaction in the post-Soviet often underestimated. If one agrees that U.S. space—and to highlight areas where Congress’ vital interests are containing nuclear prolifera- role will be particularly important. tion, revitalizing the global economy, stabiliz- Hence, the seminar opened with an overarch- ing the broader Middle East, securing energy ing assessment of the relationship and what has supplies, coping with the rise of China, and been accomplished since Presidents Medvedev repairing relations with Europe, in roughly that and Obama laid out their ambitious agenda in order, then Russia matters, because it figures London in April 2009. Thomas Graham, former significantly in all of these categories, with the senior director of Russian affairs at the National possible exception of the second. Security Council, led the session. He struck Then and later members of the group were three themes that stirred debate and shadowed not totally convinced. Some wondered why, if the discussion over the next three days. First, Russia is so important, it seems so low a priority he argued that the United States not only faces in U.S. policy. Others acknowledged Russia’s a Russia that is fundamentally different from centrality in controlling nuclear weapons and the Russia of the 1990s, but does so in a larger preventing their proliferation and its promi- geopolitical context also much changed. Russia nence as an energy exporter, but questioned is no longer prostrate, a supplicant for Western either its capacity or readiness to deliver in assistance, and eager to be in and like the other spheres, including the nuclear stand-

1 off with Iran and the war in Afghanistan. As United States of Russia as a declining power the week wore on and the relationship was matched on the Russian side by an increasing explored in greater depth, some of this skepti- tendency to see the United States as a power in cism dissipated, only to be replaced by resig- decline as a consequence of the policy failures nation among more than one congressional of the last decade, a view that adds to uncer- member over Congress’s inability to focus on a tainty in Moscow as it tries to come to terms U.S.-Russian agenda framed in complex terms. with the rise of China. Graham’s third theme generated still more A third Russian noted that these points, while discussion. Given his first two points, he argued valid, did not necessarily discredit the Obama that the United States needed to approach administration’s effort to re-engage with Russia; Russia differently from in the past. For all the they only underscored that the path will not be seeming contrasts in the policies of the two easy. Instead it becomes increasingly obvious countries and notwithstanding the deep dis- that the United States needs more partners trust built up over the prior decade, nothing that are strong and independent—and Russia in the way Russia views itself or the outside is stronger and “virulently independent.” To world precludes cooperation on issues of high- succeed, however, the United States needs est priority for the United States. But to realize to embrace a new, more subtle narrative for this potential the United States will have to Russia—one that recognizes a Russia that in deal with the agenda Russia has, not the one its nature is ever “more Western,” while in its we would like it to have. Others took the point policy becoming ever “less pro-Western.” further, suggesting that, if Russia is critical to success in areas of high priority to the United The third challenge was more fundamental, States, then Washington should take a harder and reflected a concern among some congres- look at the tradeoffs it is willing to make in sional members. What if, they asked, rather order to secure Russian support. than a self-confident, albeit assertive Russia, ready to cooperate with the United States, the This line of argument produced three chal- Russia likely to emerge is sliding into serious lenges. First, one member asked what the Obama administration’s new Russia policy had trouble, threatened by a demographic crisis, achieved—implicitly suggesting that, if not plagued by corruption, unable to move forward much, then the policy approach advocated with reform, and vulnerable to future economic held limited promise. It was a genuine, not a shocks? Presumably this would require a dif- rhetorical question, and the answer—a START ferent U.S. policy response—one marked by I follow-on agreement if reached and greater greater reserve and caution. The question left U.S.-Russian consensus on the Iran nuclear the issue unifying the morning’s discussion still issue were not a bad year’s work–seemed to more at the center of things. Throughout the resonate. The second challenge came from the discussion, both U.S. and Russian scholars had Russian side, and was not so much a refutation underscored that a critical moment in Russia’s as a complication. Russia, said one Russian development had arrived, driven in part by the scholar, poses a hard challenge, particularly, effects of the recent economic crisis and the when preventing further NATO enlargement harsh realization of what it meant to be depen- matters far more to its leaders than tightening dent on resource exports: Russia’s elite, across the nuclear non-proliferation regime; when its the political spectrum, now realizes that mod- new military doctrine privileges limiting the ernization, the goal articulated by President U.S. unilateral use of force over the struggle Medvedev, can no longer be postponed. The against terrorism. Another noted the problem problem arises, however, in the divisions over raised by the widespread perception in the how this is to be accomplished.

2 Day Two: The Nuclear Dimension Treaty to pursue nuclear disarmament in return Steven Miller, the director of the International for other states forgoing the development of Security Program at the Belfer Center for nuclear weapons. Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s The discussion that followed focused on Kennedy School of Government, led the sec- the prospects for a post-START I agreement. ond session, an exploration of the critical U.S.- Although the consensus seemed to be that an Russian nuclear dimension. Consistent with the agreement was likely—not least, because, as one general thrust of Graham’s argument on the U.S. participant put it, it preserves the super- first day, Miller—with little resistance from the power nuclear status of both countries—one group—emphasized Russia’s centrality in each well-informed Russian warned that opposition of the three areas of concern to the United to the treaty was building in hard-line Russian States: managing the nuclear relationship with circles. Nor was it assumed that ratification in Russia (key because the two countries have the U.S. Senate would be easy or swift. The more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear history of strategic arms control agreements is weapons); preserving and then strengthening of a long and slow ratification process involv- the nuclear non-proliferation regime, including ing years not months. In this case, however, as addressing the Iranian and North Korean chal- several participants cautioned, significant delay lenge; and guarding against nuclear terrorism. would severely cripple efforts to put the U.S.- When thinking about the role of nuclear Russian relationship on a more positive track. weapons in U.S.-Russian relations, he said, Not surprisingly, the bulk of the conversation the two countries are still operating with not turned on Iran and the threat its nuclear pro- only hardware from the Cold War but also gram posed for the non-proliferation regime. its “software”—that is, its mental frameworks. Miller began by stressing the looming threat Moreover, over the last decade, the system posed by the exploding interest in domestic slowly constructed in the last years of the Cold nuclear power in many parts of the world. War for managing this relationship has largely Preventing this “nuclear renaissance” from pro- collapsed. Whether it should be reconstituted, ducing a surge of countries with the capacity to and whether—were an interim follow-on agree- build a nuclear weapon, he noted, will require ment to the now expired START I agreement great effort both to strengthen the non-prolif- to be achieved—a new more ambitious round eration regime and to fashion good practices of strategic arms control negotiations should among nuclear-power exporting manufactur- be launched raises legitimate questions. Is ers. Russia will be critical to achieving both. a negotiated strategic nuclear arms control On Iran, attention shifted to Russia’s willing- regime necessary, given the natural constraints ness—and, if willing, capacity—to influence the leading to the attrition of Russian forces? Is it outcome. Russia, most agreed, does not want a worth the inevitable complications and frictions nuclear-armed Iran, but, because it has a much that long negotiations and the perils of ratifica- broader array of stakes than the United States tion entail? Miller answered his own questions in its relationship with Iran, it has not given by citing four potential benefits from a mutu- the nuclear issue the same priority nor has it ally acceptable legal framework: (a) increased been willing to apply the same pressure on predictability in each side’s nuclear activities; Iran as the United States. That may be chang- (b) increased transparency concerning each ing, as Russia’s relationship with Iran grows side’s arsenal; (c) an increased ability to shape rockier and its willingness to entertain the idea future developments; and (d) increased cred- of stricter sanctions appears to be increasing. ibility attached to the U.S. and Russian commit- Still, several members of Congress concluded ment under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation that real cooperation between Russia and the

3 United States on the Iran problem was unlikely liquefied natural gas (LNG) from North Africa in the absence of progress on a broader and begin to alter the energy equation. more constructive U.S.-Russian agenda. While in the abstract one would think that The more dramatic proposition came from the world’s largest exporter of energy and both a Russian and a U.S. expert. Each implied the world’s largest importer of energy would that the problem itself had been miscast: that have natural grounds for cooperation, Stent the best had been made the enemy of the good. explained why reality is often different. At By focusing on a maximum objective—rolling root the two countries have sharply contrasting back Iran’s enrichment program—the more notions of energy security: The United States pertinent objective of blocking the weapon- cares most about security of supply for itself ization of nuclear material was endangered. and allies; Russia, the security of demand. The They recommended instead a considerable United States works to promote the diversifi- strengthening of International Atomic Energy cation of suppliers and supply routes; Russia, Agency (IAEA) mechanisms for policing any their monopolization. Add to this the Russian sign of weaponization along with far stiffer tendency to favor non-transparent deals and penalties under Article 10 of the Nuclear Non- the primacy of state over commercial interests, Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for withdrawal from and the obstacles to cooperation become more the treaty. The idea passed without much reac- understandable. tion from members of Congress. The initial part of the discussion then turned to the basic question of whether Russia’s great Day Three: Energy, the Environment, and reserves of oil and gas are a curse or a bless- Climate Change ing. While some of the Russian participants Angela Stent, professor of government and suggested that on balance, whether right or director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian wrong, the Russian leadership clearly sees and East European Studies at Georgetown these resources as an advantage and one to be University, began the session by reminding peo- exploited to the greatest extent possible, oth- ple that U.S. concern over excessive European ers maintained that there is no simple answer. dependency on Russian energy had a long histo- Oil at prices too low raises political risks within ry tracing back to the Kennedy administration’s society; too high and they become an obstacle discontent over the 1963 Druzhba oil pipeline. to economic reform and compensation for the Energy, she noted, plays a complex role in the absence of democracy. U.S.-Russia relationship, only partially captured On the issue of Russian energy leverage over by sensational episodes such as the recent gas Europe, the Russian participants introduced and oil cutoffs to Russia’s neighbors during several nuances beyond the obvious point that price disputes. For Russia, the importance of oil Europe’s supply dependency is partially offset and gas revenue to the national economy is a by Russia’s market dependency (more than 80 two-edged sword, permitting economic growth percent of Russian oil and gas exports flow to and foreign policy confidence when prices are the European market and through pipeline high, raising the specter of social instability infrastructure that cannot be easily re-routed and underscoring Russia’s essential weakness to other destinations). For example, third when they are low. And, even as Russia moves parties, such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and to strengthen exclusive control over transit to Kazakhstan, use energy for their own politi- Europe by building the Nord and South Stream cal purposes, and are not merely pawns in a pipelines, it suddenly finds itself with uncer- Russian game. Second, the more Russia forces tain demand as the development of shale gas countries, such as Ukraine and Belarus, to pay in Europe and North America and the flow of world market prices for oil and gas, the more it

4 strengthens the independence of these states, needs to eliminate obstacles limiting Russian and even more so, if the pressure leads them investment in U.S. energy projects. They also to strive for greater energy efficiency. Third, recognized that delaying the re-submission of it is difficult to imagine what a generalized the U.S.-Russian agreement under section 123 European energy dependency means when dif- of the Atomic Energy Act adds an unnecessary ferent parts of Europe depend in such varying obstacle to bilateral cooperation in the nuclear degree on Russian gas and oil. energy field. Turning to the issue of U.S.-Russian energy The goal of this session, however, was not cooperation, a Russian participant insisted that to treat the energy dimension in isolation, but the starting point should be the de-politiciza- to link it with the collateral issue of climate tion of energy issues by all sides, followed by a change. Here, too, Stent noted that the picture serious effort to fashion a regime designed to is mixed. Although Russia is the world’s third protect the interests of consumers, producers, largest emitter of greenhouse gases, after the and transit countries, not simply the interests United States and China, and, therefore, needs of one segment. The problem, another Russia to be part of the solution, until recently Russian participant said, is that too many influential leaders have shown little willingness to exercise Russians believe that the United States wants leadership in this area. Part of the reason may to keep Russia a raw-material exporter—that it be that the effects of global warming are seen does not want Russia as a high-tech competitor. to cut two ways: on the one hand, temperature They assume, therefore, that they might as well increases may open new areas to agriculture in do as they please at home and with their neigh- Russia’s north, but, on the other, they will also bors, counting on the West’s need for Russian likely thaw the permafrost, and, hence, disrupt oil and gas to temper its reaction. Hence, it is energy infrastructure, while releasing large important that U.S. officials and congressional quantities of methane gas. representatives, when meeting with Russian parliamentarians, journalists, and business peo- As a result, and the point was underscored by ple, convey the stake the United States has in a members of Congress, while espousing support modernized Russia with high-tech capabilities; for a stricter regime at the Copenhagen UN but, at the same time, that they make plain what Conference on Climate Change last December, Russia must do to reduce the impediments on Russia’s representatives insisted on preserv- foreign investment. ing quotas that would, in fact, allow Russia to increase emissions. That noted, other con- And, indeed, among congressional members gressional members argued that, if as a conse- a readiness to think of ways the United States quence of Copenhagen’s failure, new interna- and Russia could cooperate in high-tech areas tional forums emerge to deal with the problem was instantly apparent. Similarly so was enthu- siasm for pushing cooperation in promoting of climate change, Russia would have to be energy efficiency in the two societies, an idea treated as an important participant in them. now receiving attention in the new U.S.-Russia Stent, in her paper, reviews aspects of an evolv- Binational Presidential Commission. Among ing Russian approach to climate change that congressional members with the deepest knowl- hold some promise for U.S.-Russian coopera- edge on energy issues, there was, in fact, puzzle- tion in this area. ment over why Russia is not straining to attract Stent also addressed an issue where energy, industry from abroad that would find low-cost climate change, and security intersect: con- energy a major incentive to invest in Russia. trol over the rich hydrocarbon reserves in the On the other hand, as some congressional Arctic. Global warming, if it continues at the representatives noted, cooperation should be present pace, will open the region to mineral a two-way street, and, hence, the United States exploration and exploitation within a matter

5 of decades, and already the states bordering it Pifer, however, went on to argue that, whatev- are staking their claims, and backing them up er are Russian aims, policy results to this point with military planning. Hence, this is an area have been far from satisfying. On the contrary, where the United States and Russia have good often Russian actions have had the effect of reason to pursue cooperation, building on what antagonizing or frightening its neighbors, and, they have achieved in the Arctic Council, rather as a result, pushing them away from Russia. Not than allow events to descend into competition just Ukraine or Georgia, but recently a naturally and friction. Stent also reminded congressional allied state like Belarus has sought to create members that the United States’ long-standing more space for itself in its relationship with refusal to ratify the 1982 UN Convention on the Russia. The reaction of Russian participants Law of the Sea seriously weakens Washington’s was more an elaboration than refutation of ability to make legal claims to Arctic resources Pifer’s point. Said one, “Empires don’t go away beyond its exclusive (200-mile) economic zone. overnight.” Adjusting to the loss of large parts of the Russian and Soviet empire has been emo- Day Four: U.S.-Russian Interaction in the tionally and politically far more wrenching than Post-Soviet Space the collapse of Soviet power in Eastern Europe. Many of the new states are also going through The seminar wound up by focusing on argu- a post-imperial transition, struggling to assert ably the most vexing and contentious dimen- their identity, a process that often involves dif- sion of U.S.-Russian relations—the interaction ferentiating—and at times distancing—them- of the two countries in and among the states of selves from Russia. Another Russian made the the former Soviet Union. Steven Pifer, senior point more sharply saying that a number of the fellow at the Brookings Institution and former post-Soviet states have chosen to fan an anti- U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, launched the Russian nationalism, which is then reciprocated discussion. He offered as a starting proposi- by the Russian side. tion that, at its core, the problem inheres in the fundamentally conflicting approaches of Still, as one Russian participant put it, those the two countries to the region. Russia believes determining the fate of these states will not be that to preserve and enhance its great-power Russia or the United States, but these states status it must maintain its position within the themselves. Hence, much of the focus on post-Soviet space. It does not aspire to re-create U.S. and Russian jockeying in the region and the Soviet empire, but it does seek neighbors much of the talk of “zones of influence” are deferential to Russian concerns, friendly gov- throwbacks to another era—archaic echoes of ernments open to Russian investment, and a a “great game.” Rather it is these countries that veto over basic choices by them seen as inimi- will decide for themselves with whom they will cal to Moscow’s interests. The United States, identify. A U.S. expert agreed. Too much think- in contrast, while wanting to build a construc- ing, he said, is still within a Cold War paradigm, tive relationship with Russia, also wishes to see treating developments in the post-Soviet space Russia surrounded by strong, independent, as a zero-sum geopolitical competition. This is democratically-oriented states, and strives to bad for the United States and Russia, because fashion a policy geared to this end. This often it allows third parties to exploit this mindset leaves the U.S. struggling to square a circle. to their advantage and to U.S. disadvantage. It Never is this clearer than in the case of NATO also leaves Washington and Moscow oblivious and its potential role with Ukraine and Georgia. to how dramatically the broader international The United States’ intentions on this score are context has changed, including the growing not anti-Russian, but Washington has no way of influence of other outside powers in the post- persuading Moscow that this is so. Soviet space, most notably China.

6 Pifer took a somewhat more equanimous Others had grown more convinced that the view of the challenge. For the moment, he United States had a real stake in seeing Russia argued, the most acute source of tension has successfully navigate this passage in its history, eased. The NATO question has been defused and, therefore, sensed a need for the United by the outcome of the recent Ukrainian elec- States to think more carefully and creatively tions, which placed in power a Ukrainian leader about ways in which it could be helpful. For opposed to Ukrainian NATO membership, some this included being true to core U.S. val- and before that by the effects of the Russian- ues, insisting before Russian listeners that the Georgian war, which for the foreseeable future prosperity enjoyed by the United States owed had disqualified Georgia. In an area like Central much to our respect for civil liberties, property Asia, the key dynamic now features Russia and rights, and the rule of law. China, leaving the United States with a lower Still others worried that policymakers and profile and the potentially positive role of a politicians were too stuck on “looking down mild balancer between the two. In these cir- cumstances, the chief objective of U.S. policy narrow pipes,” when they needed a broader in the post-Soviet space should be what Pifer prism. Rather than concentrating on the prob- called “three noes:” no war in or between these lems in U.S.-Russian relations, we would be states; no failed or failing states; and no Russian better off concentrating on problems where domination over any of these states. And the U.S.-Russian cooperation is essential. Rather path forward should focus on, first, simply than framing issues always in bilateral terms, we managing the U.S.-Russian interaction, work- should focus more on fitting the relationship ing to minimize competitive tendencies and into a multi-dimensional view of a world popu- a misreading of one another’s intentions; sec- lated by multiple players. Said one congressio- ond, on developing a direct dialogue between nal member, “We need a larger palette” when the two governments on these issues—but a painting Russia’s place in U.S. foreign policy. dialogue that is transparent to all the states The point echoed something Thomas Graham concerned; and, third, exploring ideas, includ- had said in the opening session: It is very dif- ing those advanced by the Russian leadership, ficult to draw into a single, coherent Russia for enhancing Europe’s security architecture in policy fragments of concern that are scattered ways that mitigate the security weaknesses in the across a wide range of issue areas, each the con- post-Soviet space. cern of policymakers with different geographi- Where are the United States and Russia cal and thematic preoccupations. No longer is really headed in their relationship? What are Russia what the Soviet Union once was, a point the priorities on which the United States should of departure on almost all key issues. Rather it focus when dealing with Russia? How should is a factor, often an important factor, but only a China be factored into the relationship? And factor in many different areas; and designing a how is one to assess the internal challenges fac- policy capable of mastering a Russia agenda as ing Russia, including the demographic crisis? elusive as it is important is not easy.

7

Russia Back at the Center of U.S. Foreign Policy

Thomas Graham, Ph.D. Former Senior Director of Russia Affairs National Security Council

Russia is one of the most consequential ests and less concerned by Russia’s domestic countries in the world today, given its mas- developments. Although the atmosphere has sive nuclear arsenal and expertise in nuclear improved greatly during the past year, and energy; vast energy reserves and other natural Presidents Obama and Medvedev have laid out resources; geopolitical position astride Europe, an ambitious agenda of cooperation, mutually the broader Middle East, and East Asia; UN beneficial cooperation on concrete matters has Security Council veto; and scientific prowess. proved elusive, as the extended endgame in And it will remain so, whether it is strong and negotiations of the START follow-on treaty has can mobilize those resources for its own pur- demonstrated. poses, or it is weak and stronger powers and more agile transnational actors (such as ter- The Russia We Face rorists) exploit them for their own ends. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union nearly twenty The counterpart in this third attempt is not years ago, Russia’s cooperation has helped the the Russia the Clinton or Bush Administration United States achieve our strategic goals, while faced. It has recovered its pride after the deep its opposition has complicated the challenges national humiliation of the 1990s, and the rapid we face. economic recovery during Putin’s presidency For that reason, the United States has sought elevated its global standing and provided levers constructive relations with post-Soviet Russia— for advancing its strategic interests. Although so far with little enduring success. The Clinton much Western commentary raises alarm about Administration’s ambitions to facilitate Russia’s a return to Soviet attitudes and behavior, Russia transformation into a pro-Western free-market bears greater similarities to 18th- and 19th- democracy collapsed in the wake of Russia’s century Imperial Russia. Like the elites of that financial meltdown in 1998 and growing period, today’s approach international affairs acrimony over NATO expansion. The Bush from a realist, not an ideological, perspective. Administration’s effort to build a strategic part- They start from the following assumptions: nership quickly ran afoul of competition in the • Global affairs are fundamentally competi- former Soviet space and American concerns tive (although not necessarily zero-sum), about Russia’s authoritarian path. with the great powers seeking advantage President Obama’s decision to “reset” rela- and lesser states adapting to great-power tions marks the beginning of the third attempt arrangements. The goal of foreign policy at enduring constructive relations, one focused is to advance interests, not to spread val- pragmatically on advancing our strategic inter- ues, and Russia should be pragmatic—

9 some would say deeply cynical—in the was global hegemony, which by definition would pursuit of its interests. deny Russia great-power status. More worri- some to Moscow has been what it sees as an • Russia is a great power and should be active U.S. effort to erode Russian power, first respected as such. “Russia can exist as a of all by expanding NATO and supporting anti- strong state, as a global player, or it will not Russian leaders in the former Soviet space. The exist at all,” Medvedev has noted. 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, viewed by • The former Soviet space—which is also the the Kremlin as a U.S.-instigated dress rehearsal former Imperial Russian space—is essen- for regime change in Russia, effectively put an tial to Russia’s great-power status. Primacy end to any hopes of strategic partnership dur- in that region gives Russia geopolitical heft ing the Bush Administration. and is critical to its security and well-being. For those reasons, Moscow wants to con- • A centralized, tightly controlled domestic strain the United States. It seeks to do this in political process is crucial to maintain- three ways: by forming anti-American coali- ing domestic order and protecting and tions in fact if not in name (e.g., the Shanghai advancing Russia’s strategic interests. Cooperation Organization, which includes China and several Central Asian states, as a Despite a remarkable recovery under Putin, means to limit American influence in Central Russia faces formidable challenges to sustaining Asia); by enhancing the role of the UN Security sufficient economic growth—quantitative and Council in global affairs, because Russia can qualitative—to back up its great-power aspira- veto American initiatives; and by reaching legal- tions. The global economic crisis drove that ly and politically binding agreements with the point home: In 2009, Russia was among the United States that limit our options and make worst performing economies in the G-20. The our behavior more predictable. focus now is on modernization: infrastructure Moscow also considers the moment oppor- renewal, diversification away from an excessive tune to rein in the United States. While it still reliance on commodities, mastery of cutting- sees the U.S. as the dominant world power, it edge technologies, and creation of an innova- believes the U.S. is in decline, a consequence tion society. Moscow knows that Russia cannot of the failed foreign policies of the Bush manage this task on its own. It needs invest- Administration, the ongoing financial crisis, ment, technology, and know-how from abroad. and the damage both of those have done to Although China might be able to provide some our confidence and our reputation for compe- of the investment, only the West can provide tence. In this view, the Obama Administration the needed technology and know-how. That needs the “reset” more than Moscow does, recognition lies behind efforts to rebuild rela- and Moscow can still squeeze out concessions tions with Europe and the United States after before reciprocating in a serious way. the near-total breakdown in the wake of the war with Georgia in 2008. Moscow, nevertheless, remains deeply suspi- The New Geopolitical Context cious of U.S. motives and still sees the United If the Obama Administration faces a changed States as the primary foreign threat to Russia’s Russia, it also faces a new geopolitical context. great-power status. Vice President Biden’s com- Simply put, not only is the Cold War history, ments last summer about Russia’s decline, even so is the post-Cold War world. The dominant though disowned by President Obama, raised American view of a generation ago, that the doubts that the Administration was willing to United States would lead the world as free- treat Russia as a major power and reinforced market democracy ineluctably spread across the concerns that the United States’ ultimate goal globe, no longer describes current realities or

10 the immediate future. Rather, the world has First, common challenges do not necessar- entered a period of great upheaval of uncer- ily translate into common interests, and even tain duration until a new global equilibrium where interests are shared, they often rank dif- emerges. ferently in each country’s priorities. While the character of that new equilibrium • Iran provides an apt illustration. Russia is unclear, the trends shaping it have been evi- shares the American interest in prevent- dent for some time. Global dynamism is shift- ing Iran from developing nuclear weap- ing from Europe and the Atlantic region to East ons, but not our sense of urgency. At the Asia and the Pacific region. The Middle East same time, it fears an American or Israeli lies in the midst of an historic struggle between military strike that would further desta- the forces of tradition and modernity, which is bilize the region along Russia’s southern spawning violent extremism with global ambi- border, and it is concerned that tough tions. The dark side of globalization presents a sanctions are a path to a military strike set of challenges—the proliferation of weapons (as was the case with Iraq). While it sup- of mass destruction, international terrorism, ports American engagement with Iran, it unregulated global financial flows, transnational is concerned that normalization of rela- crime, pandemic diseases, and climate change— tions would jeopardize Russia’s own com- that are beyond the capacity of any single state mercial relations with that country and to master and for which leading internation- could turn it into a strong competitor al institutions have proved inadequate. The in European gas markets, where Russia nation-state, the fundamental unit of the inter- earns a considerable share of its state rev- national order since the Peace of Westphalia enues. Obtaining Russian support for our in 1648, is under pressure from supranational, approach on the nuclear issue will require sub-national, and transnational entities, while taking into account Russia’s full range of the vast increase in the number of states since interests in Iran, as well as other matters the Second World War militates against effective (see the next point). international cooperation and action. Second, building cooperation will require trade-offs. As much as we would like to work Can We Work with Russia to Advance Our on discrete issues on their merits, for Moscow Interests? everything is linked. We will not persuade it What do the new Russia and geopolitical to help us on our priorities, unless we are pre- context mean for U.S.-Russian relations? That pared to help it achieve its goals (or, at a mini- there is, to be sure, no easy path to construc- mum, not obstruct its efforts). This will require tive relations, particularly given the deep dis- some tough choices. trust that has grown over the past two decades • The former Soviet space presents per- and the complexity of the challenges we face. haps the greatest challenge because there Nevertheless, it is also true that nothing in the is a fundamental conflict in interests. way Russia defines itself precludes cooperation Reasserting authority across that region, in on issues of high priority to the United States, which Medvedev has indicated Russia has while the new geopolitical context presents “privileged interests,” is a top Russian pri- common challenges that could provide the ority, which entails constraining American basis for productive interaction, if we pursue influence. The war against Georgia was our Russia policy with a clear sense of our own intended to send the clear message that interests and Russia’s and with patience and Moscow could and would use force to skill. Five considerations should shape our defend its interests, if necessary. The approach. United States, however, refuses to acknowl-

11 edge a Russian sphere of influence or priv- and oil resources, increasingly located in ileged interests and sees strategic benefit difficult geological and climatic zones, in strengthening ties with, in particular, while the United States has an interest in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. The bringing greater volumes of oil and gas urgent task is to define clearly our vital to global markets. The issue of equality interests in this region and then balance and reciprocity involves the willingness of our policies toward Russia and the other the United States to permit Russian equity former Soviet states in a way that advances participation in U.S. energy infrastructure. those interests, while minimizing the dam- Moscow wants guaranteed access to U.S. age U.S.-Russian rivalry in the region does markets for its (often state-owned) firms in to overall relations, including cooperation exchange for expanded access to its mar- on our top priorities, such as Iran. kets for American firms. Thus far, Moscow believes we have unfairly restricted access Third, Russia will demand, if not real equal- to our markets for political purposes. ity and reciprocity, at least the convincing appearance of such. • Moscow sees our failure to graduate Russia 3 • For this reason, strategic arms control, from the Jackson-Vanik Amendment as nonproliferation, and civil nuclear energy evidence of a fundamental unwillingness to respect it as an equal and a major provide promising grounds for coopera- power. tion: They are among the few areas of common interest in which the United Fourth, more often than not, we will be States and Russia can come together dealing with Russia in a multilateral context. as genuine equals and credibly present We need to ensure that its voice is heard, but themselves as global leaders. Previous we also need to demonstrate that we can and administrations have already laid a foun- will proceed with others should Russia seek to dation, which includes the Nunn-Lugar obstruct progress. Cooperative Threat Reduction pro- • Two broad issues illustrate this point. On gram, the Megatons to Megawatts pro- most global economic issues, the contri- gram (which uses down-blended highly- bution Russia can make lags far behind enriched uranium from dismantled Soviet that not only of the G-7, but also of China nuclear weapons for power generation and India, and those countries will be our in American civil nuclear reactors), and primary interlocutors and determine the the U.S.-Russian-led Global Initiative to range of possible action and the limits Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Further coop- of cooperation. We need, nevertheless, eration will depend on Senate action on to ensure that Russia has a seat at the a START1 follow-on treaty—once that table to encourage responsible behavior. has been negotiated—and Congressional On European security issues, we need to action on the “123 Agreement”2 on bilat- engage seriously on Medvedev’s call for eral civil nuclear cooperation, which the a review of architecture and take account Bush Administration withdrew from con- of Russian concerns as a sign of respect— sideration after the Russo-Georgian war and because we need to rethink European and which the Obama Administration security in the new geopolitical context needs to resubmit. for our own purposes. But we also need to be prepared to work separately with • There are also ample opportunities in our European allies and partners, should broader energy-related cooperation. U.S. Russia prove unconstructive. firms have the technology and manage- ment skills Russia needs to develop its gas

12 Fifth, presidential engagement is critical to References success. Only that will demonstrate to the Russians the respect and seriousness of pur- 1 The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the pose they believe is their due; only the presi- U.S. and the former Soviet Union, instituted in 1994 dent can set the priorities, make the trade-offs, to limit the number of nuclear warheads each country and energize and discipline the bureaucracy possesses, expired on December 5, 2009, but remains in force pending a successor agreement. to implement his preferred course of action. Absent presidential engagement, relations will 2 A “123 Agreement” is an agreement between the U.S. drift and, if history is a guide, not in a positive and a foreign country on the peaceful use of nuclear direction. energy, which is lacking between the U.S. and Russia. • The Bilateral Presidential Commission 3 “Jackson-Vanik” is an amendment contained in the coordinated by Secretary of State Clinton 1974 Trade Act that effectively denies unconditional and Foreign Minister Lavrov provides a normal trade relations to certain countries, includ- framework for productive interaction, ing Russia, that had non-market economies and that although it still needs to demonstrate its restricted emigration rights. Normal trade relations worth in practice. Congressional engage- may be extended, on a conditional basis, to a country subject to the law only if the President determines that ment with Russian parliamentarians pro- it complies with the freedom of emigration require- vides an additional and valuable channel ments of the amendment. Since 1994, Russia has been of communication. Those channels can found in compliance with the freedom of emigration amplify President Obama’s engagement requirements. It continues to be subject to semi-annu- but they cannot substitute for it. In 2010, al compliance reviews. Ending the application of the he will decide in a practical way, by the way Jackson-Vanik provisions to Russia requires legislation he apportions his time, how much of a pri- by Congress. ority Russia really is, compared to all the other challenges, domestic and foreign, that are competing for his attention.

13

Russia and American Nuclear Interests

Steven E. Miller, Ph.D. Director, International Security Program Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard University

Russia is crucial to the pursuit of America’s ences are compatible. But from the perspective nuclear interests. It is centrally connected of American policy the much more important to three contexts in which potential nuclear point is that interaction between the United threats to the United States arise: in the bilat- States and Russia on nuclear issues is inevi- eral nuclear relationship with Russia, which tably linked to and influenced by the wider encompasses more than 90% of the nuclear political relationship between the two powers. weapons that presently exist; in the realm of Unfortunately, the story line here has been nuclear proliferation, where the spread of disappointing. The high hopes in the early nuclear weapons to hostile states can jeopar- post-Cold War years for robust strategic part- dize American security and interests while also nership between Moscow and Washington and undermining the nonproliferation regime; and high degrees of harmony in their interests and in connection with nuclear terrorism, which policies have not been realized. Instead, there will be an all too plausible (and frightening) has been bickering over the Balkans in the possibility if nuclear weapons or weapons-usable 1990s, Russian anger over the progression of materials were to leak into a nuclear black mar- NATO enlargement, American anger over the ket. Russia is a critical player in each of these Russian opposition to the Iraq war, competition contexts. Consequently, Russian participation for influence and energy in the Caucasus and and cooperation is a necessary component of Central Asia, strong Russian objection to U.S. any efforts to effectively manage or resolve the missile defense policies, American frustration nuclear problems on the U.S. policy agenda. at the evolution of Russia’s internal political Without some degree of common cause with and economic system, Russian frustration at Russia, it will not be possible to minimize the Washington’s criticisms of Russia’s internal nuclear threats to the United States. Russia affairs, and—far from least—severe mutual must be part of the solution or it will be part of recriminations over the Russian intervention in the problem. Georgia. Over a two-decade period, the cumu- The record of U.S.-Russian nuclear diploma- lative effect of these bruising collisions has been cy in recent years, however, is mixed—marked to produce a substantial retreat by Moscow as much by friction, disagreement, suspicion from the conciliatory pro-American posture it and acrimony as by common interest and col- adopted in the early post-Cold War period, a laborative action. Some of the difficulties in growing estrangement from the United States this relationship reflect the reality that these within the Russian political elite, a rising suspi- two powers will never have identical interests cion in Moscow of Washington’s motives, and even if in many respects their nuclear prefer- an increasing tendency on the part of Russia’s

15 policymakers to resist American pressure and as it did at the peak of the Soviet-American diverge from Washington’s policies. Russian nuclear competition. However, estimates of rhetoric about the United States is now some- the current Russian nuclear weapons stock- times shockingly harsh, and an undertone pile suggest that thousands of nuclear weap- of rivalry can be detected in American and ons remain in its arsenal. According to one Russian perceptions of one another (coexist- recent assessment, for example, Russia has ing with persistent rhetoric about partnership). approximately 5,000 deployed nuclear weap- The Obama Administration came to power ons and another 8,000 in reserve or awaiting proclaiming the need to improve relations with dismantlement.1 This arsenal remains the single Russia and famously called for hitting the “reset largest physical threat to American security. Further, button.” How easy it will be to overcome the Russian nuclear weapons policy is still at least accumulated frustrations and grievances of two partially driven by residual concerns about the decades remains to be seen. United States (much as U.S. nuclear weapons Can the United States effectively pursue its policy is still influenced by a perceived need nuclear interests while relations with Moscow to “hedge” against a possible Russian nuclear are deteriorating? Are there significant trad- threat). Despite the end of the Cold War and eoffs in relations with Russia between the the passage of nearly two decades, Moscow and nuclear portfolio and other contentious issues Washington have not succeeded in escaping the on the U.S.-Russia agenda? Has Washington deterrence framework in their nuclear relation- given sufficient weight to the possible costs in ship. Thus, though the nuclear danger is not the nuclear realm of antagonizing Russia in perceived to be as grave as it once was due to other policy areas? Such questions have enor- the altered political context, in a physical sense mous implications because major nuclear issues Russia and the United States continue to pose are at play in U.S.-Russian relations. an enormous potential threat to one another. For a protracted period, the U.S.-Russia nuclear relationship has persisted in this odd limbo, no Russia and the Management of the longer fierce enemies but still committed at Strategic Nuclear Balance least to some extent to the logic of deterrence. The bilateral nuclear relationship between Both sides appear to harbor some concern that Moscow and Washington is unsettled. No lon- a more hostile—and hence more dangerous— ger bitter enemies but not quite reliable friends, nuclear relationship could recur. The restora- Russia and the United States find their nuclear tion of more open and intense nuclear hostil- arsenals sitting uneasily in the middle of their ity (and with it the possible revival of nuclear relationship. They have neither eliminated arms racing) in a relationship that still involves nuclear threats as a factor in their relationship nuclear weapons in the thousands is obviously nor found some reassuring new framework for undesirable from the perspective of minimizing governing their post-Cold War nuclear interac- nuclear threats to the United States. This leads tions. to the conclusion that U.S. nuclear interests are This matters for one very simple but compel- best served by measures that dampen nuclear ling reason: very substantial nuclear weapons hostility, constrain or reduce the nuclear forces capability still exists in the U.S.-Russian nuclear on both sides, and provide some collabora- context. The intense and prodigious nuclear tive bilateral management of the U.S.-Russian rivalry that marked the Cold War is thankfully nuclear relationship. consigned to history but a substantial residue That broad proposition, however, does not of nuclear weapons capability remains. It is of map easily onto the current diplomatic real- course true that Moscow no longer commands ity. The arms control framework built up several tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, over several decades to shape and manage

16 the nuclear postures of the two sides and the full weight of the U.S.-Russian nuclear rela- nuclear interactions between them has weak- tionship. Moreover, the summit at which the ened significantly. The ABM Treaty, negoti- Moscow Treaty was signed brought to a stop for ated in 1972 by President Nixon, was intended half a decade the strategic arms control process to prevent defensive deployments on one side between the United States and Russia. After from driving the other to ever larger and 2002, for the first time in nearly a quarter of more capable offensive forces, thus avoiding a century, there were no negotiations ongoing a so-called offense-defense arms race. But the and none desired or anticipated. ABM Treaty no longer exists because in 2002 Thus, Moscow and Washington have neither the United States exercised its (legal) right to a settled nuclear relationship nor an established withdraw. The START II agreement, signed in and intact negotiated framework and mecha- 1993 by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin, mandated nism for managing their nuclear affairs. The significant cuts in strategic nuclear forces and current negotiations for a follow-on to START banned multiple warhead missiles, a step that I represent a step in the direction of trying to was regarded as significantly buttressing to redefine the nuclear relationship and rebuild the stability of the nuclear balance. However, the diplomatic framework governing their START II never entered into force because nuclear affairs. As this exercise evolves beyond Russian ratification of the agreement included the immediate issue of replacing START I, it conditions that the United States never met. will necessarily have to confront a number of In June, 2002, Russia renounced START II in fundamental issues, most of which have not yet response to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM been addressed in any conclusive fashion. Treaty, which violated one of the Russian con- ditions for ratification. Thus two of the major • The role of deterrence: Is deterrence a products of Cold War nuclear arms control desirable, necessary, or inescapable com- have been eliminated. ponent of the U.S.-Russian relationship? If not, what conceptual framework should Further, the 1991 START I agreement, which replace it? has been the basic governing document in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship for the • The role of arms control: Should arms past two decades, and which contained all control remain at the center of the U.S.- the verification provisions associated with stra- Russian nuclear relationship? How much tegic arms control, expired on December 5, does it matter if a negotiated framework is 2009. Negotiations for a follow-on agreement lacking? Some in the United States believe have been under way for the past year and are that it is no longer necessary—a relic of reported to be nearing completion, but for the the past. Nuclear arsenals are dramatically moment there is no legally binding verification reduced and will be cut further due to regime in place (and the negotiations have political and financial factors; Moscow and been longer and more difficult than expected). Washington are no longer enemies and do The only bilateral strategic nuclear treaty in not need to engage in a laborious nuclear force today is the 2002 Moscow Treaty, a docu- arms control process. Others believe that ment of less than one page that was meant as it is essential to create a transparent, veri- an addendum to START I for the purpose of fied, negotiated regulatory framework to reducing overall numbers of deployed strategic govern U.S.-Russian nuclear relations to warheads. Much criticized for drafting errors, avoid undesirable developments down the the Moscow Treaty contains no verification road and to signal restraint to the wider provisions and expires at exactly the same world (which matters in the context of moment that it takes effect on December 31, Article VI disarmament obligations under 2012. It is not a document that can bear the the NPT). This debate will be consequen-

17 tial when Washington considers future almost certainly have to be addressed in treaties. future negotiations down the road. How can this issue be handled? Will the United • The role of verification: How much veri- States be prepared to accept limits on fication is enough? This has become an conventional deployments? Will it be pre- issue in the current START I follow-on pared to let this issue stymie nuclear nego- negotiations. tiations? Are there solutions that Moscow • The limits of force reductions: How low will find acceptable? can we go? What are the criteria? Can The nuclear order in which the United States strategic stability be maintained at low must function will be to a large extent deter- numbers? At what point will other nuclear mined by the nuclear relationship it works out powers need to be brought into the nego- with Russia. We are at a juncture where many tiations? basic issues are beginning to be addressed and • The role of missile defenses: Now that the the answers that prevail will shape the nuclear ABM Treaty has been abandoned, how will future. This is an issue that deserves to be at the missile defenses fit into the U.S.-Russian center of U.S. policy, that should garner high nuclear relationship? Russia clearly finds priority among decision-makers on both sides, them objectionable and to some extent and that should play a prominent role in the threatening. Standard arguments against formation of U.S. policy toward Russia. Today missile defense still need to be confronted: this set of issues is competing with many other they can easily be negated by the deploy- serious problems and does not always seem ment of much cheaper offensive forces, to make its way onto the high-level agenda. producing outcomes that provide little Careless or inattentive treatment of the U.S.- effective defense while provoking larger Russian nuclear relationship could produce an offensive threats; missile defense systems outcome we regret. are self protecting and fail catastrophically if opponents attack them at their weak Russia and the Management of the points (notably ground-based radars and Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime space-based sensors). Russia has proposed Every American president since the end of collaborative pursuit of missile defenses; the Cold War has proclaimed nuclear prolif- under what circumstances would this be eration to be the gravest threat to U.S. secu- acceptable to the United States? Many big rity. The United States and its international questions are begging for answers. interests can be seriously jeopardized if nuclear • Conventional threats to nuclear forces: weapons should somehow spread to the hands This is an asymmetric issue, of consider- of hostile, irresponsible states or to terrorists. able concern to Russia and much less wor- Accordingly, preventing the spread of nuclear risome to the United States, which appears weapons has been one of the highest priorities to be moving steadily in the direction in American security policy—a proposition gen- of acquiring such capabilities.2 Moscow erally accepted by both political parties and by fears that very precise missiles armed with both sides of the political spectrum. Few objec- specialized conventional ordinance will be tives are more important. capable of destroying its nuclear assets. It In this context, too, Russia is a critical player. therefore insists that these conventional It is a leading exporter of nuclear technology— threats be addressed in the nuclear nego- including most recently the signing of a huge tiations. Even if this issue is finessed in nuclear deal with India involving many bil- the START I follow-on agreement, it will lions of dollars and more than a dozen nuclear

18 power reactors. It is a key player in the inter- development and energy pipelines. All things national diplomacy associated with the nuclear considered, Russia is clearly one of the decisive nonproliferation regime. It is inconceivable, players—if not the decisive player—in dealing for example, that desired reforms and strength- with the Iran crisis and it is hard to see how the enings of the NPT regime can be achieved United States achieves its objectives vis-à-vis Iran without Russian support. Russia is a core mem- without substantial cooperation from Russia. ber of the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean Russia and the United States generally share nuclear program; China is more important in the goal of preventing nuclear proliferation; that context but Russia plays an influential role neither power sees its interests advanced by the in one of the ongoing preoccupying nuclear spread of nuclear weapons. This fundamental crises of great concern to the United States. convergence of interests establishes the basis for The centrality of Russia to the manage- collaboration in managing the nonproliferation ment of the nuclear nonproliferation regime is regime. What the Iran crisis shows, however, is illustrated in two contexts. First, it is an abso- that in particular nonproliferation settings the lutely pivotal player in the protracted nuclear broad aim of preventing the spread of nuclear confrontation with Iran. This crisis has long weapons does not guarantee the alignment of been an issue of great concern to Washington, U.S. and Russian policy. Russia does not agree and strenuous exertions have been made over with the U.S. characterization of the Iranian many years to try to stop Iran’s nuclear prog- regime as an extremist rogue state that poses ress. Russia built Iran’s Bushehr reactor (and enormous threats. It does not appear to share there are rumors of discussion between Iran the extreme fear of Iran’s nuclear program or and Russia over the construction of a sec- to assume that Iran is on the track to nuclear ond large power reactor at Bushehr). Russia weapons. It is clearly uncomfortable with the announced in January 2010 that it will com- American instinct to punish and coerce Iran mence the operation of the Bushehr reactor in an effort to curtail its nuclear activities. in this calendar year. Russia has supplied the Russia has been outspoken in its opposition to initial fuel for the Iranian reactor and holds the the consideration of the use of force against long-term fuel supply contract for the life of the Iran’s nuclear facilities. Moscow, in short, does reactor. Indeed, Iran views Moscow as its pri- not fully accept Washington’s diagnosis of the mary long-term partner in the realm of nuclear problem or its preferred remedies. Hence, technology. Despite serious pressure from the while there has been lots of discussion of Iran United States, Russia has been reluctant to sup- between Moscow and Washington and some port even relatively mild sanctions against Iran Russian cooperation with international efforts (though it has done so) and has refused to sup- to address the challenge of Iran’s nuclear pro- port strong, aggressive, or so-called crippling gram, there has never been full accord between sanctions. Russia is a significant arms supplier the two powers about what to do and never to Iran, including the provision of air defense full collaboration between them to effectively equipment that could complicate the option of confront Tehran over its nuclear program. It is seeking to eliminate Iranian nuclear facilities by not surprising then, that U.S. policy has so far the use of force. Some Russian arms deliveries failed to stop Iran’s nuclear program. Without to Tehran have continued during the period in much more collaboration with Russia, it is likely which Iran has been subjected to UN sanctions. impossible to succeed. More broadly, Russia is one of Iran’s important Second, Russia is central to efforts to prevent trade partners—with trade amounting to more nuclear terrorism by ensuring that nuclear than $2 billion annually—and they share com- weapons and weapons-usable materials (that mon economic interests in other significant is, plutonium and highly-enriched uranium) spheres of economic activity such as natural gas are kept securely out of illicit (black) markets.

19 When the Soviet Union collapsed, it left behind The security of its nuclear facilities, though a vast nuclear empire including tens of thou- greatly improved, is not as good as it could be; sands of nuclear weapons and vast quantities work remains to be done.3 Equally important, of weapons-usable materials. In the internal security improvements must be maintained if tumult and instability that followed the disin- they are to protect against risks in the future. tegration of the Soviet state, there was grave Experience has shown that achieving sustain- concern that Moscow’s nuclear assets were not able nuclear security is a significant challenge. It securely held. A rupture in its nuclear custo- remains as true today as it was twenty years ago dial system could result in a well-provisioned that leakage of weapons or materials from the nuclear black market in which weapons or Russian nuclear complex would be a nonpro- weapons-related materials could be available liferation disaster. Russia is not the only con- to any party—states, terrorists, even criminal cern—Pakistan and North Korea, among oth- syndicates—that had the financial resources ers, are firmly on the list of worries—but it still to buy them. The United States launched (as occupies a central place in efforts to lock down a Congressional initiative) what came to be the world’s weapons-usable nuclear materials. known as the Nunn-Lugar program (created In addition, in the context of global efforts to initially by the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction combat the threat of nuclear terrorism, Russia Act of 1991) which involved the expenditure can be an affirmative partner with the United of U.S. funds to help improve the security of States. Here is an area where interests are com- Russian nuclear assets. This program involved patible and many desired steps do not infringe U.S.-Russian collaboration to use U.S. funds other major interests of either power. for the purpose of improving the security at Russia’s nuclear facilities. The pace and char- acter of the program was determined to a large Conclusion extent by the extent of Russia’s cooperation American leaders often say that nuclear in allowing the United States to be involved threats—from Iran or North Korea or terror- in Moscow’s (still sensitive) nuclear empire. ists—pose the greatest threat to the United Though there have been many difficulties and States. If they really believe this proposition, numerous setbacks along the way, there was then it should have profound implications for sufficient cooperation over nearly twenty years U.S.-Russian relations. Russian cooperation is to allow steady progress in bringing nuclear essential if nuclear threats to the United States security in Russia to more reassuring standards. are to be minimized and if U.S. nuclear inter- Moreover, cooperation on this set of issues ests—both in the strategic relationship and in has remained relatively buffered from ups and the context of nuclear proliferation—are to downs in U.S.-Russian relations, so that practi- be protected and advanced. It is worth debat- cal collaborative steps continued even when ing what price Washington pays in terms of its broader relations were testy. Though the pace nuclear policies for making choices that anger was sometimes distressingly slow, the security of and alienate Moscow. Maybe it is possible to Russia’s still vast nuclear assets is much better challenge Moscow in some domains of policy than it was some twenty years ago. while still gaining needed cooperation in the Russia remains, however, the single largest nuclear realm. Maybe Moscow would not be reservoir of nuclear technology and material. more cooperative on some nuclear issues even

20 if U.S.-Russian relations were much better. References Maybe Washington values other issues more than it values nuclear cooperation with Russia. 1 Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Those are legitimate positions to consider. But “Current US and Russian Nuclear Stockpiles,” June 29, 2009. it is at least worth asking, for example, whether it makes sense to pursue over many years a set 2 For a thorough overview of the issues, see National of policies—from NATO enlargement to mis- Research Council, US Conventional Prompt Global Strike, sile defense to support of Georgia—that are (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2008). certain to produce dismay and recrimination in 3 For details, see the definitive work of Matthew Bunn, Moscow and then to adopt policies toward Iran Securing the Bomb, 2008, (Cambridge: Belfer Center for that depend utterly on cooperation from Russia. Science and International Affairs, 2008). What is certain is that the failure to achieve req- uisite nuclear cooperation with Moscow will, in several important nuclear contexts, cause dam- age to American interests.

21 22 U.S.-Russian Relations: The Energy Dimension

Angela Stent, Ph.D. Director, Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies Georgetown University

If you put together Russia’s energy potential in all areas, oil, gas and nuclear, our country is unquestionably the world’s leader.1 Vladimir Putin, 2006.

What is the Issue? bors and increase its influence in Europe and On the face of it, energy is an issue where Eurasia. Russia has responded that it is entitled the United States and Russia should be able to to a sphere of “privileged” interests in the for- cooperate quite effectively. America imports mer Soviet space, one that should guarantee very little Russian energy and it supports diver- access to Central Asian oil and gas, and that sification of global energy supplies. Russia, the its western neighbors, who were also once part world’s largest producer and exporter of oil, of the USSR and who transport oil and gas with the world’s largest gas reserves, is a wel- to Europe, have been unwilling to pay a fair come alternative to Middle Eastern oil and gas. market price for Russian hydrocarbons. The Moreover, both countries must deal with the global financial crisis has significantly altered common challenges of global climate change. the picture and defused tensions—European Once again, there is talk of a new U.S.-Russian gas demand is down and gas prices have fallen. energy dialogue. Yet energy has become an Nevertheless, even as the Obama administra- increasingly fractious issue in U.S.-Russian rela- tion’s bilateral U.S.-Russian energy dialogue tions for two reasons: Russian gas cutoffs to gets underway, questions of supply, price, and Ukraine in 2006 and 2008 that affected our alternative pipelines remain contentious. What European allies in the depths of winter and is the way forward? Moscow’s opposition to the U.S.-backed oil and An important starting point is that the gas pipelines in Eurasia that bypass Russia and United States and Russia define energy security transport Central Asian hydrocarbons, whose in fundamentally different ways. For America, transit to Europe Russia seeks to monopolize. the focus is security of supply and guaranteed Behind these issues lies a larger question: the access to hydrocarbons. For Russia the preoc- substantial role of Russian natural gas in Europe cupation is with security of demand, especially and the political implications of this reality. for long-term (30-year) natural gas contracts The U.S. and Europe have argued that with Europe, which currently purchases 82% of Russia seeks to use “soft” energy power much all Russian gas exports—representing 40% of as it sought to use “hard” military power during Europe’s gas imports. Washington has support- the cold war—namely to intimidate its neigh- ed diversification of energy supplies in Eurasia

23 by promoting the construction of pipelines that energy front, it needs to understand the cen- bypass Russia, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan trality of energy both for the Russian domes- pipeline that opened in 2006. Moscow, on the tic system and for Russia’s foreign policy. other hand, has sought to increase its energy Hydrocarbons have been the key to Russia’s security by preventing the construction of any return to the world stage after the decline of more oil and gas pipelines that bypass Russia. It the 1990s, resulting in its emergence as an ener- is also committed to lessening its dependence gy superpower. High oil prices fueled Russia’s on third country transit—especially Ukraine impressive economic growth from 2000-2008, and Belarus—for its access to the European mar- and energy exports enabled Russia to reassert ket and to constructing underwater pipelines regional and global influence. Moreover, con- that avoid transit countries. Under the Obama trol over energy resources has played a major administration, as during the Bush administra- role in the creation of Russia’s current domestic tion, competing American and Russian pipeline political configuration—known as “Russia Inc”. projects continue alongside a new commitment In this system, those who manage the affairs of on the part of Washington to cooperate with state also largely control the state’s economic Russia on civilian nuclear energy, new energy assets. Under Putin, the state recaptured the technologies and, possibly, on Arctic resources. commanding heights of the economy, most America and Russia also view the question of vividly illustrated by the 2003 arrest and impris- energy cartels very differently. In 2009, Russia onment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, CEO of the made a move to join the Organization of the private oil company Yukos, and the subsequent Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)—it destruction of the company and its takeover by offered to cut its oil production by 300,000 bar- Rosneft, whose chairman, First Deputy Prime rels a day, but the offer was apparently rejected Minister Igor Sechin, is a key Putin political and Russia did not join OPEC, to Washington’s ally and Russia’s energy czar. This symbiotic relief. However, in 2009 Russia and the other relationship between political and business major gas exporting countries—Algeria and elites makes it difficult to determine where Qatar—joined together to form “GOPEC”—a politics begins and commerce ends. Nowhere gas exporters’ cartel. From the U.S. point of view, is this more evident than in the actions of the a gas cartel that could restrict global supplies is behemoth Gazprom, which controls 80% of an unwelcome development, but it remains to Russia’s gas supplies and whose former chair- be seen how successful this new organization man, Dimitry Medvedev, is now Russia’s presi- will be or indeed whether it will even work. dent. Nevertheless, the United States should be The high capital costs of gas projects and the wary of assuming that Russian oil and gas policy high interdependence make the idea of coor- is primarily politically motivated. Commercial dinating production among producers quite factors are often paramount in Russia’s energy problematic. The major energy story of 2009 is decision-making. Indeed, some Westerners the political “discovery” of unconventional gas had criticized Russia for selling gas too cheaply from shale rock formations, which might offer to Ukraine, in effect subsidizing Ukraine’s con- a major alternative to Russian gas, although the tinuing inefficient use of energy. full implications of this new source of energy Hydrocarbons have also become a source remain to be determined. A related story is the of domestic debate. Economic liberals under- greater amount of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) stand that, if Russia continues to rely on energy available to Europe because of reduced demand exports and fails to diversify its economy, it for it in the United States, owing to the surge of will never be able to modernize and reach its domestically-produced shale gas. full economic and societal potential. Recently, As the United States moves forward on the President Medvedev has criticized Russia’s

24 excessive reliance on oil and gas exports, say- political point when it cut off the gas, it also has ing that he does not want his son to grow up legitimate commercial interests. Ukraine until in a country dominated by the energy industry recently paid below European market prices and the corruption it has engendered. Prime and was also siphoning off Russian gas for its Minister Putin, by contrast, has praised “the own use. existing model of development, which hinges Russia’s response to the uncertainties of on high commodity prices.” Nevertheless, for relying on the former Soviet states as transit the foreseeable future, oil and gas will continue countries has been to build alternative pipe- to drive the Russian economy and much of lines. After many delays, the Nord Stream Russian foreign policy. pipeline is under construction. This project, whose advisory board is headed by former Energy Security and Competing Pipelines German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, will transport gas overland from Russia to the Baltic Sea and then underwater to Germany, thus Europe bypassing Ukraine, the Baltic states and Central Russia has been exporting oil to Europe Europe. The second Russian project—South since the nineteenth century, and its natural Stream—will transport gas under the Black Sea gas deliveries to Western Europe began in to southeastern Europe, the Balkans and Italy. 1970. The United States has intermittently The successful completion of these pipelines expressed concern about its allies’ dependence will also depend on whether Gazprom can meet on Russian gas and twice during the Cold War the needs both of rising domestic demand and unsuccessfully sought to prevent the construc- of its existing and future foreign customers. tion of Soviet pipelines to Western Europe—in So far, it has not invested enough in develop- 1963 it was the Druzhba oil pipeline and in ing new sources of gas to meet these demands. 1982 the Yamal natural gas pipeline.2 The However, in 2009, European gas demand fell by historical record shows that the USSR was a 30% and this reality, plus the promise of shale reliable supplier to Western Europe, and fluc- gas, could present new challenges for Gazprom. tuations in supply were usually a function of weather conditions. Dueling Pipelines Since the Soviet collapse, 80% of Russian Since the 1990s, the United States has active- gas exports to Europe have been transported ly encouraged the construction of pipelines through Ukraine, with Belarus as the major oil that transport oil and gas to Europe bypassing transit country. Central Europe and the Baltic Russia. In retrospect, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan states (as well as Finland, which imports all of pipeline—which took heroic efforts to com- its gas from Russia) are more dependent on plete—may be the only successful U.S.-backed Russian energy supplies than are the Western pipeline project in the former Soviet space European countries, but it is important to that does not go through Russia. Moscow is understand that this a relationship of interde- determined not to see another pipeline that pendence—Europeans need Russian oil and bypasses Russia completed. The United States gas, but Russia needs hydrocarbon revenues, has encouraged the EU to move ahead with especially in difficult economic times. By and the Nabucco pipeline—once that competes large, both sides are comfortable with this rela- directly with South Stream—which would trans- tionship. The two gas cutoffs to Ukraine and port gas from the Caspian or Northern Iraq to the oil cutoffs to Belarus—the latest in January Southeastern Europe. However, it is unclear 2010—have caused concerns in the European whose gas would fill the pipeline. The EU is Union (EU). While Russia certainly made a in dialogue with Turkmenistan but, given the

25 recent Turkmen-Chinese deal, it is unclear the warming of the Arctic icecap, which has whether this is a feasible option. In December been melting for some time (summer ice cover 2009, the first of two pipelines transporting could completely vanish in 30 years). Professor Central Asian—mainly Turkmen—gas to China Artur Chilingarov, explorer and member of the was inaugurated. Iranian gas would be a possibil- Duma representing the ruling United Russia ity, but this is not an option from the U.S. point party declared, after he planted the Russian of view. Russian gas could also fill Nabucco, but tricolor, “The Arctic is ours and we should this would require a significant change in both manifest our presence.”3 A few days later, U.S. and EU policy, since Nabucco is currently Russia ordered strategic bomber flights over the designed to avoid Russia. Under current cir- Arctic Ocean for the first time since the Cold cumstances, it seems unlikely that Nabucco will War, prompting the Canadian Foreign Minster go ahead. Even if it were constructed, it would to retort “Look, this isn’t the 15th century. You only marginally impact Europe’s dependence can’t go around the world and plant flags and on Russian gas. Given economic pressures and say “We’re claiming this territory.” Is there a geographic realities, the United States should new “Scramble for the Arctic”? reevaluate the current policy—more muted The potential stakes are high. According to than it was in the Bush administration—of the U.S. Geological Survey, the Arctic holds pushing for alternative pipelines in the post- as much as one-quarter of the world’s remain- Soviet space. With new sources of energy and ing undiscovered oil and gas deposits, as well falling European gas demand, the American as diamonds, gold, platinum, tin, manganese, focus could shift to other ways of enhancing nickel and lead. If Arctic melting proceeds energy security. at its current pace, major parts of the Arctic Ocean will be ice-free in a couple of decades, The Asian Dimension greatly facilitating seabed mineral resource extraction. For the United States, Russia, and The exponential growth in Chinese energy the other Arctic littoral states (Canada, Norway demand is also changing the Eurasian energy and Denmark) the Arctic involves core national landscape. China and Russia are competitors security issues: territorial control, access to for Central Asian energy. China is also inter- energy resources and accessible transportation. ested in importing more Russian oil and gas. Russia’s major Arctic policy objective so far has Despite numerous delays in construction, in been to promote and protect its claims to conti- late December Putin opened the new East nental shelf territories beyond the 200 nautical Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil export terminal, part mile economic exclusion zone provided by the of a larger $12 billion project to transport U.N. Convention, in order to exploit the natu- Russian oil to China and possibly Japan. Moscow ral resources located there. The majority of the has frequently said that Asia is an alternative to Arctic’s energy reserves lie within Russia’s zone. Europe and that Russia could switch its exports east. However, this would require sustained The United States is the only Arctic country not to have ratified the 1982 United Nations pipeline construction and exploitation of new Convention of the Law of the Sea, despite energy sources that are still years away from many requests to the Senate to do so, most development. recently from the Bush administration. Without ratification, Washington lacks an international The Arctic legal basis for its territorial claims in the Arctic On August 2, 2007, the Kremlin dispatched beyond its exclusion zone. According to the a nuclear-powered icebreaker and two subma- Convention, the subarctic countries in the rines to plant the Russian flag on the floor for region own exclusive economic zones (up to the North Pole’s sea—an act made possible by 200 miles in width) and the continental shelf

26 (up to 350 miles) within which they have the demand. On the other hand, the melting of sovereign right to develop mineral resources.4 the permafrost in Siberia will place extra strains Thus, ratification would facilitate America’s on Russia’s aging energy and transportation ability to assert its sovereignty over both terri- infrastructure. Given Russia’s reliance on fos- tory and resources. North Pole warming and its sil fuel exports to sustain its economic growth, impact on both indigenous Arctic people and and the adverse impact of climate change on the Arctic ecosystem have added an element of its energy sector, there are significant incen- urgency to these complex issues. tives for Moscow to join with the United States, As Russia continues to claim that the Arctic China and India to reduce carbon emissions. seabed’s underwater ridges are an extension As was clear at December’s Copenhagen of Russia’s own continental shelf and other Conference, Russia does not see itself as a Arctic nations dispute these exclusive territo- leader in combating climate change, nor has rial claims, the United States and its partners, it played a major role on the issue until now. including Russia, should continue to work Nevertheless, Medvedev’s remarks indicate that within the Arctic Council (founded in 1996) Russia is willing to support further global nego- to promote greater cooperation in the area. tiations. In November, Putin gave tentative Given the high stakes and the imperative of backing to a Danish initiative on emissions that better multilateral cooperation on these issues, would replace the Kyoto Protocol, as long as it a Senate ratification of the Law of the Sea took Russia’s interests into account, particularly Convention would strengthen Washington’s its huge CO2-absorbing forests. Given Russia’s bargaining power. stated commitment to cooperation, the United States could reach out to Russia to work on Climate Change questions of emission reduction and carbon Vladimir Putin has on several occasions trading, an issue for which major Russian enter- remarked that global warming is good for Russia prises—such as the Rosneft—have expressed since it will be two or three degrees warmer in support. This can be part of the broader U.S.- Siberia—indeed Russia both benefits from and Russian energy dialogue. is adversely affected by the impact of climate change. President Medvedev’s remarks at the Prospects for U.S.-Russian Energy Cooperation Copenhagen conference and his promise that The first U.S.-Russian bilateral energy dia- Russia would cut emissions by 25% from 1990 logue, which began after 9/11 during the levels through 2020 indicate that the Russian brief era when Moscow and Washington coop- leadership now takes climate change more seri- erated closely on unseating the Taliban in ously than previously. Is this an issue on which Afghanistan, produced very modest results. A Russia and the United States can cooperate? key reason was the lack of projects that were After all, Russia is the third largest emitter of of interest to both sides, particularly after carbon dioxide after the United States and Khodorkovsky’s arrest—the Yukos CEO had China, ahead of India. been interested in building a commercial pipe- Experts agree that there is considerable line to Murmansk that would have transported variability in the impact of global warming on oil destined for the United States. Since the July Russia—the largest country on earth with very 2009 Obama-Medvedev summit, a U.S.-Russian varied climate and topography—but its long- energy dialogue is being established within term consequences could be quite serious.5 the Clinton-Lavrov bilateral commission, to be On the one hand, a warming climate will open headed by Energy Secretary Steven Chu and up new areas for agricultural cultivation in Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko. It is intended northern Russia and will reduce and shorten to cover issues such as energy efficiency, new the heating season, thereby reducing energy technologies like clean coal and smart grids, cli-

27 mate change and nuclear energy. Congress can References play a central role in facilitating this dialogue, 1 President of Russia, “Transcript of Meeting with for instance by revisiting the 123 legislation6 Participants in the Third Meeting of the Valdai that could facilitate U.S.-Russian cooperation Discussion Club,” http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/ on nuclear energy, one of the more promising speeches/2006/09/09. avenues for reducing dependence on hydrocar- 2 Angela Stent, From, Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political bons. This dialogue will require hard work and Economy of West German-Soviet Relations, 1955-1980 perseverance. As in all the other areas of U.S.- (Cambridge University Press, 1981) Russian dialogue, beginning with limited, prac- 3 Scott Borgerson, “The Scramble for the Arctic,” Foreign tical projects is usually most effective. However, Affairs March-April 2008 a major asymmetry remains. U.S. energy com- 4 Yuri Morozov, “The Arctic: The Next “Hot Spot” of panies are in private hands and Russian energy International Relations or a Region of Cooperation?” companies are by and large state-dominated, Carnegie Council paper, December 16, 2009. with the exception of a handful of privately- 5 National Intelligence Council, Special Report NIC owned companies such as Lukoil, of which 2009- 04 April 2009. Russia: The Impact of Climate ConocoPhillips owns 20%. Thus, a successful Change to 2030 (Washington DC: April 2009)

U.S.-Russian energy dialogue will have to devise 6 A “123 Agreement” is an agreement between the U.S. creative ways of transcending current structural and a foreign country on the peaceful use of nuclear impediments. energy, which is lacking between the U.S. and Russia.

28 Squaring U.S. Policy Toward Russia with U.S. Interests in the Larger Post-Soviet Space

Amb. Steven Pifer Senior Fellow The Brookings Institution

Introduction What Does Russia Want in the Post-Soviet In February 2009, the Obama administration Space? announced its intention to “reset” relations Since Vladimir Putin’s advent to power at the with Russia, which in 2008 had fallen to their end of the 1990s, Moscow has pursued a pol- lowest point since the Soviet Union collapsed icy aimed at regaining a measure of the great in 1991. There has been progress over the power status it enjoyed during the Cold War. A past 11 months, prompted in part by renewed central piece of this is maintaining influence in strategic arms negotiations and Washington’s the post-Soviet space. Moscow does not seek to decision to reconfigure its missile defense plans recreate the Soviet Union and understands that for Europe. Moscow has adopted a rhetori- it cannot exclude other powers from the region; cally tougher position on Iran’s nuclear pro- indeed, the United States, European Union, gram, though it remains uncertain how far the Turkey and China increasingly “intrude.” But Russians are prepared to go if new sanctions the Russians want deference from their neigh- become necessary against Tehran. bors on political, economic and security issues U.S. and Russian interactions with other that matter to Moscow, and they seek the abil- states in the post-Soviet space could pose the ity to veto strategic choices by neighbors that most contentious issues on the U.S.-Russian Moscow deems inimical to Russian interests. agenda. These include U.S. relations with The Russians employ various ways to encour- states such as Ukraine and Georgia, those age this deference: diplomatic pressure; acqui- countries’ aspirations to integrate into the sition of key economic assets in neighboring West and energy questions. Such questions states; control of energy transit routes; manipu- lie at the crux of U.S.-Russian relations, affect- lation of energy prices; “peacekeeping” forces ing many other dimensions of the relation- that perpetuate more than contribute to resolu- ship, including the broader issue of European tion of disputes; and military action. Russia also security, Moscow’s readiness to cooperate with seeks to influence its neighbors’ internal poli- NATO, and Russian willingness to work with tics. Overall, Moscow’s policy appears to have Washington on problems further afield, such had limited success: the neighbors, including as Iran and Afghanistan. This paper examines states such as Belarus, seek ways to decrease what Moscow wants in the post-Soviet space, their vulnerability to Russian leverage and U.S. interests and key regional issues that increase their freedom of maneuver. could prove fractious between Washington and Russian policy contributes to the weakness Moscow. of several neighboring states. In some cases,

29 Russia appears to want weak, even unstable, U.S. Interests in the Region neighbors, believing they will be more ame- The United States has an interest in a more nable to Moscow’s policy preferences. To be constructive and sustainable relationship with fair, the weakness of neighboring states often Russia. Specific goals for U.S. policy include results equally, if not more, from their failure reducing nuclear arms; securing Russian sup- to take needed political and economic reform port for nonproliferation, both in strengthen- measures as from Russian actions. ing the general nonproliferation regime and Moscow opposes further NATO enlargement in the specific case of Iran; and gaining greater into the post-Soviet space, especially for Ukraine Russian assistance on Afghanistan. Washington and Georgia. While Russian policy previously would like to see an increasingly democratic and pluralistic political process in Russia, but it had been ambiguous, Moscow made clear in has little real leverage to advance this objective. 2009 that it also opposes European Union enlargement and the EU’s Eastern Partnership, U.S. policy since the end of the Soviet Union designed to facilitate and expand EU relations has also aimed to support the development of with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, stable, independent, democratic states through- out the post-Soviet space. These goals some- Moldova and Ukraine. times conflict, e.g., the desire to press demo- Maintaining sway over neighboring states cratic reform in Central Asia vs. the need to may become more difficult for Moscow in the secure access routes to Afghanistan. U.S. policy longer term, for several reasons. The global has devoted particular attention to Ukraine and economic crisis showed the vulnerability of its Georgia, reflecting those countries’ strategic economic model that is heavily dependent on position, their democratic progress and the energy exports. Russia’s demographic decline appeal of particular leaders. Washington has will soon impact the labor force and military. supported expanded links between such states The northern Caucasus remains restive. And and NATO and the European Union, with the the Russian government does not respond goal of promoting a broader and more stable agilely to unexpected situations. Europe. U.S. policy has supported the develop- ment of multiple routes to bring Caspian and That said, there is little reason to expect Central Asian energy to global markets in order Moscow’s desire to maintain major influence to diversify global market supply. Finally, the in the region to change in the near term. United States seeks stability in Central Asia, in Consensus among the foreign policy elite favors part to reduce the vulnerability of those states this, and Putin remains at the center of Russian to radical Islamist tendencies. power. (Russian think tank experts have even Pursuing U.S. policy in the post-Soviet space suggested that Moscow insist on U.S. acceptance requires sustained, high-level and resourced of Russian primacy in the post-Soviet space as engagement, at a time when Washington is the price for cooperation on issues of inter- preoccupied with Afghanistan/Pakistan, Iraq, est to Washington. The Russian government Iran and North Korea. As a practical matter, has not framed its policy in such bald terms). the states on Russia’s periphery will receive less While domestic challenges might lead Moscow attention than needed. Washington thus must to downsize its “near abroad” objectives, it is just define priorities and look for ways, such as part- as possible that Russia will continue to pursue nering with the European Union, to maintain an assertive foreign policy despite those chal- Western influence. At the risk of oversimplifi- lenges, perhaps aimed to distract the Russian cation, U.S. objectives with regard to relations populace from domestic problems. between Russia and its neighbors might be

30 defined in terms of three “no’s”: no wars in would not come at the expense of third coun- the region, e.g., no repetition of Russia-Georgia tries; the United States would not recognize a in 2008; no failed states, particularly states near Russian sphere of influence and would support Afghanistan; and no Russian dominance over its the right of Russia’s neighbors to determine neighbors. their own foreign policy course. Striking the The last point bears elaboration. Russia has balance on particular issues will likely pose chal- legitimate interests in the post-Soviet space and lenges for Washington policymakers. What are will have influence with its neighbors. But that the key potential friction points with Moscow? should not mean that Moscow has a right to veto choices by sovereign states. For example, Ukraine. Owing to its size, strategic location and Russia should not be able to block a decision historical and cultural links, Ukraine remains by Kyiv to join NATO but should be able to the key regional state in Russian eyes. Moscow expect that the Alliance would take account of has sought to cajole, influence and threat- its concerns regarding the possible deployment en Kyiv toward a more Russia-friendly poli- of NATO military infrastructure on Ukrainian cy. Ukrainian-Russian relations deteriorated territory. Many in the Russian foreign policy sharply following the Orange Revolution and elite, however, would disagree with this; get- Victor Yushchenko’s election as president, with ting into what does and does not constitute a disputes over issues such as energy, Kyiv’s inter- “legitimate” Russian interest would be a diffi- est in NATO, the Black Sea Fleet and Crimea cult discussion. But differing U.S. and Russian topping a difficult and increasingly strained perceptions on this point will often lie at the agenda. heart of their differences in the region. For its part, the United States has since the early 1990s attached great importance to Key Friction Points in the Post-Soviet Ukraine, wanting to see it develop as a stable, Space independent, democratic state with a robust Better U.S.-Russian relations should make market economy and growing links to the West. it easier to manage differences regarding the Such a Ukraine would contribute to a more post-Soviet states. Improved relations may stable Europe and prove more capable of resist- also serve as a constraining factor on Russian ing Russian pressure. behavior. In 2008, U.S.-Russian relations All polls suggest that, following the February were so thin that Moscow simply did not care 7 run-off in the Ukrainian presidential election, about the impact of its actions against Georgia either Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko or on relations with Washington. Today, bad Regions Party leader Victor Yanukovych will be Russian behavior could risk things of interest the new president. Either as president will pur- to Moscow, such as strategic arms cuts. This sue policies less provocative in Moscow’s eyes may not be enough to dissuade Moscow, but than those of Yushchenko. The NATO issue it means a different dynamic than was the case will recede to the backburner, though Kyiv will in 2008. (Interestingly, post-Soviet space issues remain interested in drawing closer to Europe did not turn out to be as difficult on the U.S.- and the European Union. Russia agenda in 2009 as many anticipated at While continuing to support NATO’s “open the beginning of the year). door” policy, Washington should not press To some extent, U.S. policy seeks to have Ukraine to go further with the Alliance than it its cake and eat it, too. When describing the is prepared to go. Washington should encour- “reset” policy, senior U.S. officials said that it age Brussels to be proactive and conclude the

31 EU-Ukraine association agreement and free mercial conflicts at their core, e.g., Gazprom’s trade arrangement now under negotiation. understandable desire to stop subsidizing gas As Ukraine’s weakness vis-à-vis Russia stems sales. Others have appeared motivated by more from the failures of Kyiv’s leadership, Russian desires to advance political objectives, Washington should urge Kyiv to get Ukraine’s while a mixture of commercial and political house in order on critical issues such as energy motives has driven other disputes. security. Such a Ukraine will be a stronger Moscow has sought to exercise control over state, regardless of the foreign policy course it the transit of Caspian energy by locking up chooses. contracts that move gas and oil to European or global markets via Russia. Gazprom has Georgia. Georgia epitomizes the neighbor that often purchased most of the export gas from Moscow seeks to keep off balance. Russian Central Asian states, facilitated by the fact that, policy used the South Ossetian and Abkhazian until recently, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and disputes as levers with Tbilisi and Mikhail Uzbekistan lacked alternate routes for export- Saakashvili. In the aftermath of the 2008 con- ing major energy volumes. Moscow has also flict, the Russians expected Saakashvili’s ouster, proposed new gas pipelines—e.g., Nordstream as did many in the Georgian opposition. He under the Baltic Sea and South Stream under appears instead to have stabilized his position, the Black Sea—to reduce Russian dependency but the Georgian-Russian relationship remains on transit through Ukraine (currently, 80 per- tense. cent of the gas that Russia exports to Europe moves via Ukrainian pipelines). Washington wants to assist Georgia’s recovery and has committed serious resources to help. U.S. policy since the mid-1990s has sought Tbilisi’s democratic crackdown in 2007 and the to encourage multiple pipelines for moving 2008 conflict with Russia, however, caused many Caspian gas and oil to global markets. The in Europe to lose confidence in Saakashvili. In Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline represents the this context, Washington should encourage principal victory for this policy. Washington Tbilisi to adopt reforms and practical actions currently supports the Nabucco pipeline, which that will strengthen Georgia and bring it closer would move gas from the Caspian or Iraq to to NATO and EU standards, while recognizing Europe via Turkey. Moscow sees this as a chal- that Georgia will, for the foreseeable future, lenge to its energy pipeline policy. receive at best a cool embrace. China’s emergence as a Central Asia player Washington will want to carefully weigh the has begun to erode Russia’s energy position in pros and cons of military assistance to Georgia. the region. In December 2009, Turkmenistan Funding for military assistance would lessen opened a gas pipeline to China (in addition to the funding for needed political and economic a smaller gas pipeline to Iran). The Chinese reforms that would foster a stronger Georgian have contracted for gas from Kazakhstan as well state. While the United States has every right to and are interested in importing oil from Kazakh assist Georgia militarily, no conceivable amount fields on the Caspian. Such arrangements will of aid will provide Georgia the ability to defend allow Central Asian states to diversify their mar- itself against Russia. Washington should ensure kets and develop alternatives to Russia. Moscow Saakashvili understands—as he may not have in has little leverage to block this. 2008—the limits on American support. While not lobbying against Russian-proposed pipelines, U.S. policy should continue to sup- port multiple energy transit routes. Washington Energy Security and Energy Transit. Moscow has should coordinate with the European Union on played the energy card against its energy-depen- energy policy, as Europe remains the destina- dent neighbors. Some disputes have had com- tion for much of Russian and Caspian energy.

32 As with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route, new a greater interest in the region (though this pipelines such as Nabucco will be built only would have to be done with care, so as not to when commercial interests align with geopoliti- feed Pakistani suspicions about Indian policy cal considerations. toward Afghanistan). The most challenging scenario for U.S. inter- Central Asia. Moscow seeks to maintain its ests in Central Asia would be the collapse or influence in Central Asia, where it must deal potential collapse of one of the states and with several states that are already fragile. The potential rise of Islamist militant forces to China factor complicates Russia’s pursuit of its power. In such a case, U.S. and Russian inter- goals. While Beijing shares an interest in limit- ests would coincide. The Russians, perhaps ing American influence in the region, which under a Collective Security Treaty Organization Moscow welcomes, China is making major umbrella, might be prepared to deploy military investments and offers an alternative market forces to bolster the regime in question. As for gas and oil. These steps undermine Russia’s unpalatable as that may be, the U.S. military will general influence and its specific efforts to lock have few resources. China would not be will- up control of energy resources. There is thus ing to act militarily and might suspect Russian a potential for tension between Moscow and intentions, but the Russian military could be the Beijing, though it is not clear how Washington only answer. might be able to exploit that to better its own position—or whether it would be advisable to Bridging Differences try. As noted, U.S. and Russian objectives and U.S. engagement in Central Asia is complicat- policies regarding states in the post-Soviet space ed by distance, Russian and Chinese efforts to contradict one another, and there are multiple contain American influence, the reluctance of potential friction points. Bridging the differ- local leaders to adopt meaningful political and ences will prove a challenge for the bilateral economic reforms, and the priority of secur- agenda. To the extent that the broader rela- ing transit routes to supply U.S./NATO forces tionship continues to develop in a positive in Afghanistan. It is difficult now to see near- direction, managing differences on these issues term prospects to advance the sorts of reforms, should be easier. Likewise, if renewed NATO- including democracy, that would strengthen Russia contacts promote more cooperative and the stability of Central Asian states over the lon- constructive relations, Moscow may become less ger term. Washington lacks the resources, both concerned about NATO relations with other in terms of high-level attention and assistance post-Soviet states. funding, to pursue such goals. A candid and regularized dialogue between This leaves the U.S. government with limited Washington and Moscow regarding issues and policy options. It should continue to encour- countries in the post-Soviet region and their age multiple pipelines to move Caspian energy respective policies in the area may facilitate to global markets, either to China or via a understanding between the two capitals. It trans-Caspian route to Europe. Such routes may also help avoid surprises and reduce exag- will reduce the dependence of states such gerated suspicions about the other’s intent. as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on Moscow. A dialogue is unlikely, however, to produce a There may be other ways that an adroit U.S. pol- common view. To avoid creating an impression icy could play on possible Russian and Chinese that Washington and Moscow are negotiating differences over the region to increase the over the heads of Russia’s neighbors, U.S. offi- Central Asian states’ room for maneuver. It may cials should be transparent with those countries also make sense for Washington to encourage on the content and tenor of discussions with other peripheral states, such as India, to take Moscow.

33 Improved U.S.-Russian relations, more robust NATO-Russia cooperation and a candid dialogue on the post-Soviet space can lower tensions between Washington and Moscow over the region. But differing agendas regarding countries in the region mean that this will remain a delicate subject, one with the poten- tial for exploding in a way that would damage the broader U.S.-Russian relationship. While seeking better relations with Moscow and bal- ancing the U.S. approach toward Russia with that toward Russia’s neighbors, U.S. policymak- ers should be clear-eyed on this risk.

34 U.S.-Russia Relations: Policy Challenges for the Congress

CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

Madrid, Spain February 15-21, 2010

Members of Congress Scholars/Experts Senator Lamar Alexander Alexei Arbatov and Honey Alexander Russian Academy of Sciences Representative Roscoe Bartlett Deana Arsenian and Ellen Bartlett Carnegie Corporation of New York Representative Howard Berman and Janis Berman Thomas Graham Former Senior Director of Russia Affairs Representative Jim Cooper National Security Council and Martha Cooper Representative Diana DeGette Vartan Gregorian Representative Norm Dicks Carnegie Corporation of New York and Suzanne Dicks Fyodor Lukyanov Representative Lloyd Doggett Russia in Global Affairs (journal) and Libby Doggett Representative Maurice Hinchey Steven Miller Senator Tim Johnson Harvard University and Barbara Johnson Steven Pifer Representative Zoe Lofgren The Brookings Institution and John Collins Senator Dick Lugar Angela Stent Georgetown University and Mark Lugar Representative George Miller Dmitri Trenin and Cynthia Miller Carnegie Moscow Center Representative Jan Schakowsky Igor Yurgens and Robert Creamer Institute of Contemporary Development

35 Consultant and Rapporteur Robert Legvold Columbia University

Moderator Dick Clark Director, Congressional Program The Aspen Institute

Aspen Institute Staff Diane Anello Bill Nell Pat Walton

36 U.S.-Russia Relations: Policy Challenges for the Congress

CONFERENCE AGENDA

Madrid, Spain February 15-21, 2010

Russia Back at the Center of U.S. Foreign Policy Thomas Graham, Former Senior Director of Russian Affairs, National Security Council

A careful examination of the stakes the United States has in relations with Russia, the challenges Russia poses for U.S. policy, and both the chance for and obstacles to a closer and more constructive relationship between the two countries. Where do things stand with the agenda the two presidents set nine months ago at the London G-20 summit, and what items on it will require congressional attention over the next several months?

Addressing the Nuclear Threat: Russia, Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem? Steven Miller, Harvard University

A broad-scope consideration of the fundamental issues raised by the next phase of strategic nuclear arms control negotiations, assuming a successfully concluded follow-on framework agreement to START I—including the relationship of offensive to defensive systems (i.e., the role of ballistic missile defense). That is one half of the challenge. The other, more imminent issue is salvaging and then strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime on the road to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, including the prevention of a nuclear Iran and North Korea. Russia and the United States are the two key players in both realms. To what extent are they playing together or against one another?

U.S.–Russia Relations: Addressing the Linked Challenges of Energy Security and Climate Change Angela Stent, Georgetown University

There are three large, tightly-linked issue areas that are at a critical stage and that need to be given a fresh and far-reaching look. In all three areas U.S.-Russia cooperation is crucial. They are: (1) energy security (whether the interaction between the United States and Russia over gas and oil in the post-Soviet space, including over pipelines, is going to be competitive or cooperative);

37 (2) the development of hydrocarbons in the Arctic (as much as 20% of world reserves) and whether the disputed claims to them can be mitigated and a cooperative approach developed; and (3) climate change (cooperation among the U.S.-China-Russia, the three countries responsible for 45% of greenhouse emissions, in dealing with climate change, and review results of the Copenhagen UN Conference on Climate Change in December 2009 to ascertain whether that is possible).

Squaring U.S. Policy Toward Russia With U.S. Interests in the Larger Post-Soviet Space Steven Pifer, Brookings Institution

How can U.S. efforts to put the U.S.-Russian relationship on a different and more positive basis be reconciled with U.S. efforts to address Georgian and Ukrainian security concerns, to develop exten- sive energy partnerships with Russia’s neighbors, and to provide material and technical assistance to democratic institution building in the region? A number of issues in which members of Congress and their constituents will have an interest (e.g., dealing with the political and economic gridlock in Ukraine; providing assistance, including military assistance, to postwar Georgia; promoting alterna- tive pipeline routes out of the Caspian region, etc.) will continue to plague the relationship. How should they be addressed?

38