Fort Leavenworth, KS Volume 8, Issue 02 February 2017

PIRTUNI SUPPLEMENT TO DATE RELEASED INSIDE THIS ISSUE by Angela M. Williams, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (DAC)

Chinese QBZ-95 Rifle ...... 3 Users of the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) now have even more options for scenario development and training with the addition of a new IFC Pt 2 ...... 6 operational environment to DATE: the country of Pirtuni. Pirtuni represents a MCTP WFX 17-1 ...... 10 nation with more traditionally “Western” attributes, and is physically located Situational Breach ...... 21 adjacent to Donovia on the real-world terrain of the Ukraine. ACMAT VLRA Lt Truck ...... 29 Key conditions found in Pirtuni ACE-TI POCs ...... 32 include: stable democracy; member of NATO; 100,000-member Army with tier-2 capabilities; regional insurgent/guerrilla groups; majority (80%) Orthodox Christian population; free press; 34,000 miles OEE Red Diamond published of petrochemical pipelines; and large by TRADOC G-2 OEE ACE Threats Integration agricultural and industrial economic components. For e-subscription, contact: The Mission Command Training Nicole Bier (DAC), Program (MCTP) was directed by the Intel OPS Coordinator, Chief of Staff of the Army to G-2 ACE-TI implement new scenarios; the

Topic inquiries: addition of Pirtuni gives it added Jon H. Moilanen (DAC), flexibility to do so. The supplement is Operations, G-2 ACE-TI accessible to any DATE user who or would like more options. Pirtuni was Angela Williams (DAC), written as a supplement instead of a Deputy Director, G-2 ACE-TI modification to the baseline DATE

Copy Editor: document because, like all conditions in DATE, use of it is at the commander’s Laura Deatrick (CGI CTR), discretion. Users can find the Pirtuni Supplement on ACE-TI’s page on the Army G-2 ACE-TI Training Network.

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

RED DIAMOND TOPICS OF INTEREST by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration This issue of Red Diamond opens with an article on the understanding of the OPFOR operations process, the Chinese QBZ-95 assault rifle. With its adoption, China operational framework used, and decisions that led to joined several Western countries that have selected a the final outcome. It is clear that the effects of the two bullpup assault rifle for primary issue to their armed days of competitive fighting between OPFOR and forces or, at a minimum, to special operations forces or BLUFOR would have had a significant impact on all other elite formations. Besides the fact that the QBZ-95 subsequent engagements if the fighting had been able to is a new design for China, the country also designed and continue. developed its own proprietary cartridge. As a challenging condition in US Army training, an OPFOR The next article concludes a two-part series on the conducts tactical operations with a number of collective opposing force (OPFOR) use of an integrated fires drills in support of accomplishing its tactical tasks. One command (IFC). The command is composed of a drill that occurs often during mission tasks is situational permanent or standing command and control structure, breach of an obstacle. A situational breach is the rapid with various types of fire support units task-organized reduction of and passage through an obstacle and integrated in an approach to synchronize indirect encountered in the execution of another tactical task. fires for a maneuver force. Topics covered in the article The third article in this issue describes how the OPFOR include the “system of systems” concept and the performs this task and includes a tactical vignette. components of the IFC—artillery, missile, long-range The final Red Diamond article this month focuses on the reconnaissance, integrated support, naval, and special- French ACMAT VLRA 6X6, a relatively-inexpensive light purpose forces. transport truck that features excellent mobility and Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) Warfighter commonality of parts. This truck is reliable, simple, Exercise (WFX) 17-1 was scheduled as a distributed, rugged, and includes interchangeability of 80% of its simulation-supported, corps-level, command post parts, extending to models produced 30 years ago. There exercise. The first two days of the exercise occurred as are multiple variants for different requirements, along scheduled, but a hurricane triggered the abandonment with multiple mounts for weapons systems. It is primarily of the WFX as originally planned. The third article a reconnaissance, escort, and support vehicle. It is also provides an overview of the actions of the WFX during used as a heavy patrol vehicle, equipped for long- the first two days, with the intent to provide greater reconnaissance missions.

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By Mike Spight, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (CGI Federal CTR) It’s reasonably certain that the majority of people—unless they are military small-arms aficionados or defense department subject matter experts—would be unaware of the fact that China no longer issues the Type 56 assault rifle (an AK-47 clone) to its military and security forces. In fact, the country has not issued that particular weapon to its forces for 30+ years, although it may still be found in the armories of militia and very-low-tieri reserve forces. The Chinese military adopted the Type 81 assault rifle in 1983 and it served as the Chinese military’s and security forces’ primary individual weapon until adaption of the QBZ-95 in approximately 1997. Over the past 20 or so years, the QBZ-95 has generally replaced the Type 81 in all Chinese military Tier 1 units and is steadily replacing it in reserve military, security, and police organizations. With adoption of the QBZ-95 (95 being the year of acceptance), which is a bullpup assault rifle design, China joined Great Britain, France, Australia, Austria, and several other countries that have adopted a bullpup assault rifle for primary issue to their armed forces or, at a minimum, to special operations forces or other elite formations. But besides the fact that the QBZ-95 is a totally new design for China, it also began design and development of a proprietary cartridge in 1979 and brought it to full production and issue in 1987. This cartridge is 5.8x42mm (DPB-87) and it is certainly logical that China would build its new bullpup design around this cartridge. Not as well-known is a variant of the Type 81 assault rifle, the Type 87 assault rifle, that was produced for use in testing the new cartridge. Note that the Type 87 was very limited in production and is reported to have only been issued to Figure 1. Original version of the Chinese QBZ-95 Chinese Special Forces units, and it has most probably been fully replaced in those formations by the QBZ-95. Between 1987 and adoption of the QBZ-95, the QBZ-03 assault rifle, also chambered in 5.8x42mm, was the issue weapon for the Chinese military. Very similar in appearance to the Type 81/87, it will be the topic of an article in a future edition of the Red Diamond. Variants The original variant of the QBZ-95 is estimated to have been first issued to higher-tier Chinese military units in 1997, and was configured as seen in Figure 1. Designed and manufactured by NORINCO, the Chinese state weapons design and manufacturing conglomerate, the weapon system was rather ergonomically unfriendly, as the safety and fire selector switch (safe, single round, three-round burst, and full auto) is located to the rear of the action, near the butt stock. Adding to the ergonomic issues was an ejector and ejection port that would eject spent brass directly towards the face of a left- handed shooter. Clearly a significant issue, this reportedly resulted in all Chinese military personnel who were left-handed

i Editor’s Note: Tier level indicates a weapon’s age and/or sophistication, with highest-tier (Tier 1) platforms being the most cutting- edge. For an explanation of equipment tiers, see pages 10–11 of the 2016 Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG).

Red Diamond Page 3 February 2017 being forced to train to fire and operate the QBZ-95 right-handed. When coupled with the fact that this would require the shooter to crane his neck to the right in order to use his left (dominant) eye, this was not an optimal situation. Also, on the original variant, the carrying handle was quite high (reminiscent of the French FAMAS) and, if an optical or red-dot sight was mounted, the shooter was unable to maintain a proper cheek weld when utilizing the sight. Besides the standard rifle, a carbine (QBZ-95B) and light support weapon (QBB-95, Figure 2) were produced and issued. In the case of the carbine, other than a shorter barrel, it is identical to the rifle. The light support variant has a longer, heavier barrel that is designed to dissipate the heat generated by fully-automatic fire, is fitted with an integral bipod, and is issued with a drum magazine feed system that will hold 80 rounds. It also fires a 5.8x42mm cartridge that is loaded with a heavier projectile than used in the rifle or carbine. Figure 2. The Chinese QBB-95

Additionally, a designated squad marksman rifle, in bullpup design, was also developed and issued to Chinese forces. The QBU-88 (Figure 3) is equipped with a bipod, longer and heavier barrel, an improved flash suppressor, and a faster rate of rifling twist designed to stabilize a special loading variant of the DBP-87 cartridge, which features a projectile that weights 70 grains (grs), is more streamlined, and is capable of acceptable accuracy out to 800 meters. The rifle is equipped with both iron sights and with an issued 3-9x40 or 6-24x44 variable optic of Chinese manufacture. Figure 3. The Chinese QBU-88 As noted earlier, the original QBZ-95 variant was a revolutionary small-arms development for a country with such a large standing army. And yet, the original was terribly flawed from an ergonomic stand point, and it was eventually realized that the design had to be re-evaluated and a follow- on, improved variant be designed, manufactured, and issued to Chinese military and security forces. It is estimated that the QBZ-95-1 variant was developed over a period of years and initially issued in limited quantities for testing and evaluation somewhere around 2010–2011. The most important improvements addressed moving the firing selector switch to a position directly above the pistol grip, where the operator can easily access it with his thumb (right-handed shooter) or with his trigger finger or thumb (left-handed shooter). Perhaps most importantly, the ejection pattern was corrected by redesigning the ejector and the ejection port. Spent brass is now ejected to the shooter’s 1:00 instead of his 4:00 position, and left-handed shooters no longer have to be trained to operate the weapon as a right-handed shooter. Other improvements included a re-designed flash suppressor and a slightly longer and heavier barrel with a different rifling twist rate, designed to stabilize a new variant of the 5.8x42mm cartridge with a heavier projectile. Modifications to the butt stock and slightly lowering the integral carrying handle would ensure that the majority of operators would have little or no trouble in achieving a proper cheek weld when an optical or red-dot sight was mounted on the weapon. Logically, a QBZ-95B-1 carbine and QBB-95-1 light support weapon were also designed, and integrated the same improvements as the QBZ-95-1 rifle. One final modification was a newly-designed forward handguard with a diamond-shaped profile for improved heat dissipation and elimination of the forward vertical grip that was integral to the trigger guard of the original model of the QBZ-95. Specifications In terms of overall “handiness” and ease of carry and use, the dimensions of the QBZ-95 and 95-1 families are virtually identical; the major changes were in regard to ergonomics. As for specifics, the following is known: QBZ-95 rifle—length of 29.3 inches, weight of 7.2 lbs.; QBZ-B carbine—length of 24 inches, weight of 6.4 lbs.; QBB-95 light support weapon— length of 33.1 inches, weight of 8.6 lbs. Even the QBU-88 designated squad marksman rifle is impressively light (9 lbs.) and only 36.2 inches in length. Certainly no surprises there, as the primary reasons for the existence of the family of bullpup

Red Diamond Page 4 February 2017 weapons are decreased weight and overall length for the purposes of reducing the operator’s overall weight burden and making a weapon that is handy in tight, confined spaces, such as infantry fighting vehicles or while engaged in clearing buildings. Ammunition These weapons systems were designed around the new, proprietary cartridge developed by the Chinese as a direct competitor to both the Russian 5.45x39mm and US/NATO SS109 (aka “Green Tip”) 5.56x45mm intermediate cartridges. The Chinese sought to produce and issue a cartridge that would possess superior capabilities to penetrate helmets and body armor, have superior accuracy at all ranges, and provide a low, manageable recoil pulse for the average-sized Chinese male serviceman. The original round developed was, as noted earlier, the DBP-87, which was loaded with a 64-gr projectile, produced a muzzle velocity of 3,100 feet per second (fps), and was for use in both the rifle and the carbine. For use in the QBB-95 light support weapon, a cartridge loaded with a 77-gr projectile (DBP-88) was produced. The heavier projectile was intended to increase its ability to penetrate body armor, helmets, and barrier materials at longer ranges than the 64-gr rifle and carbine cartridge, and it produced a muzzle velocity of 2,900 fps. But with development of the new variant, the QBZ-95-1 series, the decision was made to, in tandem, develop a cartridge that would meet the requirements of the rifle, carbine, and light support weapon. As a result, the DBP-10 cartridge with a 71-gr projectile was developed, tested, and issued for use in the new QBZ variants. This cartridge produces a muzzle velocity of 3,000 fps and, with improved propellant, provides China with a cleaner-firing cartridge with a modern copper- coated, steel-core projectile. Although China has claimed flatter trajectory, improved accuracy, and greater penetration for all variants of the 5.8x42mm cartridge, to the author’s knowledge, those claims remain to be seen or proven in straight- up, side-by-side tests against either its Russian or US/NATO competitors. The new QBZ-95-1 rifle and carbine variants are capable of mounting the new under-barrel grenade launcher, the QLG- 10A, which fires a caseless 35mm grenade (DFS-10) that leaves nothing behind in the launcher after firing. As a result, subsequent grenades are loaded from the muzzle, thus potentially speeding up the rate of fire and alleviating the need for an opening breech for removing empty grenade casings and reloading. China has certainly joined the world of modern, advanced weaponry with the development and continued upgrades to its QBZ-95 family of weapons. Whether the rifle, carbine, light support weapon, or designated squad marksman variant, continuous upgrades to the weapon itself and to the ammunition types available have ensured that China will be Figure 4. Marines of the People's Liberation Army on par with any other world power with regard to the armed with QBZ-95s weapons its military and security forces are issued.

References

Arthur, Gordon. “PLA Type 95 Rifle: Breaking with Convention.” Small Arms Defense Journal. 21 October 2013. Military Today. “QBZ-95.” Accessed January 2017. Popenker, Maxim. “QBZ-95 and QBZ-95-1, QBZ-97 [Type 95, 95-1 and 97] assault rifle (People Republic of China).” Modern Firearms. Accessed January 2017. (Link is not accessible from a US government computer.) US Army, TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. Worldwide Equipment Guide – Volume 1: Ground Systems. December 2016. ______

Red Diamond Page 5 February 2017

By Walter L. Williams, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (DAC) During the redesign of the opposing force (OPFOR) model in the late 1990s, the lead writers focused on a paradigm or mindset of “Good OPFOR equals Good Army” during research and writing. This mindset led to the development and publication of a hybrid threat (HT) doctrinal construct and organizational model based upon a composite of the best operational and tactical practices employed by various actors, both state and non-state. The overarching objective was to design and publish a doctrinal construct and force structure that would challenge rotational training units at the combat training centers for a period of at least 20 years. This article is part two of a two-part series discussing one of the key components of the HT model, the Integrated Fires Command (IFC). This article continues the previous discussion of the IFC headquarters organizational structure and the various supporting components, and begins with a discussion of the systems warfare approach to combat. “System of Systems” Concept During the Planning Process The HT uses the concept of a systems warfare approach to combat during its operational planning process. The HT conducts an analysis of its own combat system and determines how it can use the combined effects of this “system of systems” to degrade or destroy the enemy’s combat system. In systems warfare, the subsystems or components of a combat system are targeted and destroyed individually. Once a favorable combat situation has developed, the targeted enemy subsystem is quickly destroyed, thus making the enemy’s overall combat system vulnerable to destruction or at least degrading its effectiveness. Within the systems warfare approach, the HT employs a fire support concept centered on a phased cycle of finding a critical component of the enemy combat system; determining its location with reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) assets; engaging it with precision fires, maneuver, or other means; and recovering to support the fight against another part of the enemy force. The primary reason for attacking an enemy with fires is to degrade or destroy one or more key components of the enemy’s combat system and/or to create favorable conditions for degrading or destroying other parts of his combat system. IFC Component Organizational Structure During a Threat Tactics Course or Mobile Training Team visit, a common question asked is, “What led to the term Integrated Fires Command?” The answer is quite simple. The doctrinal writing team tried to select a term or name that described the function of the organization or unit representing the composite of the best operational and tactical practices employed by various actors. Thus, there is no fire support organization in the world with the name IFC. The IFC organizational construct of a permanent or standing command and control (C2) structure with various types of fire support units task-organized and integrated in an approach to synchronize indirect fires for a maneuver force facilitates the favorable employment of the system of systems approach to combat. The allocation of subordinate firing units is mission-dependent. The IFC is designed to conduct operations across the full range of military operations. These operations range from combined arms maneuver to wide area security. The command and control systems can be all digital, analog, or a mixture of both. The types of units may be regular, irregular, or both. The IFC is primarily found at division tactical group (DTG) and operational-strategic command (OSC) levels. The primary difference between the two is that joint-level fires are conducted by an OSC-level IFC. The subordinate indirect firing units within an IFC consist of both constituent and dedicated units. An OSC-level IFC is capable of engaging designated operational and strategic targets; however, there are circumstances where an IFC may be formed at the theater level. For example, the theater could have two separate campaigns, requiring a centralization of critical fire support assets at theater level to achieve the strategic or theater campaign objectives. When

Red Diamond Page 6 February 2017 this occurs, the theater commander forms a theater-level IFC commanded by the deputy theater commander. This IFC exercises C2 over all fire support assets retained at the theater level of command. Figure 1 offers an example of a DTG IFC with the subordinate components. Artillery Component The artillery component is a task organization tailored for conducting artillery support during combat. In a division IFC, it consists of all assets of the division’s artillery brigade that are not allocated in a constituent or dedicated relationship to subordinate maneuver brigades. In a DTG, it is organized around—  Assets of the artillery brigade of the division that served as the basis for the DTG, except for assets sub-allocated for the task organization of subordinate maneuver brigades; and  Any additional artillery units that are allocated to the DTG and remain subordinate to the DTG in a constituent or dedicated relationship, rather than being further sub- Figure 1. Possible IFC components in a DTG allocated to subordinates. Such additional assets usually come to the DTG through the OSC when the latter decides not to retain them at its own level of command. The artillery component includes appropriate target acquisition, C2, and logistics support assets. The number of artillery battalions assigned to an IFC varies according to such factors as mission of friendly units, the enemy situation, and terrain. However, the number of artillery units also can vary based on the capabilities of the supporting artillery fire control systems (AFCS). For example, a multiple rocket launcher (MRL) brigade AFCS may have enough command and staff vehicles for the brigade commander and his chief of staff, as well as the subordinate commanders of battalions and up to 18 batteries (6 battalions). An AFCS supporting a cannon, MRL, or mortar battalion may consist of enough command and staff vehicles to support 3–4 batteries, each consisting of 4–8 systems. Army Aviation Component The army aviation component is a task organization tailored for the conduct of tactical-level aviation missions. It is a flexible and balanced air combat organization capable of providing air support to the DTG commander. It includes attack aviation capability as well as requisite ground and air service support assets. The IFC commander exercises control through facilities provided by the airspace operations subsection of the DTG staff and/or the army aviation unit(s). Figure 2 provides an

example of Army Aviation in a DTG IFC. Figure 2. DTG IFC Army Aviation Example

Red Diamond Page 7 February 2017 Missile Component The missile component is a task organization consisting of long-range missiles or rockets capable of delivering conventional or chemical, biological, radioactive, or nuclear munitions. It is organized around a surface-to-surface (SSM) or rocket battalion or brigade and includes the appropriate logistics support assets. An OSC may or may not allocate SSMs or rockets to support a DTG IFC in a constituent or dedicated relationship. Long-Range Reconnaissance Component The long-range reconnaissance (LRR) component normally consists of assets from the division’s constituent LRR company. Personnel of this company are specially-trained for insertion in small reconnaissance teams at distances of up to 100 km from the rest of the division. An OSC may allocate additional LRR assets to the DTG if the OSC has received such units from the administrative force structure. The LRR component provides the OPFOR the ability to reconnoiter and attack enemy forces throughout its tactical depth. The LRR assets conduct actions to achieve tactical objectives. Such actions may have either long-range or immediate impact on the enemy. The OPFOR concept of LRR missions includes reconnaissance, direct action, and diversionary measures. If an OSC has received special-purpose forces (SPF) units, it may further allocate some of these units to supplement the LRR assets a DTG has in its IFC. However, scarcer SPF assets normally would remain at OSC level. Even when allocated to a DTG—probably in a supporting status—the SPF would pursue tactical goals in support of operational objectives. SPF are trained for missions similar to those of the LRR company, but may be inserted to even greater distances. Integrated Support Group The integrated support group (ISG) is a compilation of units performing logistics tasks that support the IFC. Other combat support and combat service support units may be grouped into this component for organizational efficiency, although they may support only one of the major units of the IFC. For a DTG IFC, the ISG typically is a task-organized composite of division-level units and other units suballocated from the OSC. Naval Component Naval fire support includes shipborne gunfire, sea-launched cruise missiles, and fixed and rotary wing attack aircraft. Naval fire-support assets are only allocated to an OSC IFC or remain under control of the theater-level commander. Thus, the command relationship of these assets is either constituent or dedicated. The assets are not allocated to a DTG IFC since the DTG is not a joint-level command. However, a division, DTG, separate brigade, or BTG can request naval fire support through OSC channels. Naval fire-support assets under the theater-level commander generally remain under the command of the Navy with a supporting task to provide support for ground operations. This provides an OSC commander another means of long-range indirect fires. Depending on the hydrography and the orientation of the ground operation, naval fire support may provide deep indirect fire attacks on enemy formations and installations. During the course of combat operations, enemy actions threatening naval operations may cause the target attack priorities of the respective naval vessel or air asset ship to suspend or cancel land-related fire missions. Once the threats have subsided, the fire-support assets resume their support of the ground maneuver force. A theater or OSC that receives naval fire-support assets in a constituent or dedicated relationship may further allocate such naval assets to a division or DTG in a supporting relationship. However, such naval assets remain under the command of the theater- or OSC-level IFC. A naval fire-support liaison team augments the operations section of the division- or DTG-level IFC staff when naval fire support is required to support a ground maneuver force, even in a supporting relationship. The liaison team provides special staff representation and advice on naval fire support to the IFC commander. Additionally, it coordinates requests for naval fire support and operates the naval fire-support nets in the IFC fire support coordination center. Members of the naval fire-support liaison team are specially-trained in the conduct of naval gunfire. However, the observer procedures are simplified and standardized so that any observer from the supported ground force unit can effectively adjust the fires of a supporting naval vessel with a minimum of additional training.

Red Diamond Page 8 February 2017 Special Purpose Forces Component At OSC level, the SPF component provides the hybrid threat the ability to conduct surveillance and to attack (if required) its enemies throughout the strategic depth of the operational area. It conducts operations to achieve strategic military, political, economic, and/or psychological objectives or to achieve tactical or operational goals in support of strategic objectives. Such operations may have either long-range or immediate impact on the enemy. The SPF may include elite commando units. Like SPF units, commandos normally operate in territory not controlled by the state. In addition to proficiency in various infantry-type tactics, they receive training for more-specialized commando missions, with emphasis on infiltrating and fighting in complex terrain and at night. In some instances, the IFC may include a maneuver force element that has been allocated by the OSC or DTG commander to perform missions such as a strike (discussed in Chapters 1 and 3 of TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics), to act as part of a disruption or exploitation force, or to provide security for the IFC against hostile forces. Training Implications and Summary As the world political situation becomes more complex, US adversaries take on different forms, be they nations, terrorist groups, criminal groups, or individuals. Their weapons embrace not only advanced technologies, but also increasingly- proliferated average technical capabilities. Therefore, the training of the force must account for more rapidly-changing actor forms as well as modifying or tailoring the training venue to match unfolding realities. In essence, force training can no longer afford to focus on who an adversary may be or where a war may occur. Rather, the training must instead focus on how to achieve desired affects against a wide range of potential adversaries on a variety of battlefields. The HT offers trainers the tool to accomplish that. The HT doctrine is a flexible framework with an emphasis on dispersing forces throughout the area of responsibility (AOR). The organization of the forces is by function rather than by position on a battlefield and/or by echelon. The forces are arrayed on the battlefield where they are best suited to achieve the desired end-state. These forces employ operational and tactical conditions and methods that are reasonable, feasible, plausible, and practical. An objective is to destroy Western and regional forces’ key systems and cause casualties vice simply the attrition of maneuver forces. For example, the IFC may focus its efforts on the neutralization or destruction of key weapons systems, command and control nodes, and logistics nodes. The HT stresses that fire support is the collective and coordinated use of target acquisition, indirect fire weapons, aircraft, and other lethal and nonlethal means in support of a battle plan. The HT considers information warfare (IW) an essential element of fire support. It provides a nonlethal alternative or supplement to attack by fire and maneuver. It is integrated into the overall concept of the battle to confuse, deceive, delay, and disorganize the enemy. The goal is to synchronize all available fire-support and IW systems to achieve the most effective results, thereby maximizing combat power. HT commanders try to accomplish their missions using a combination of maneuver and fire. They understand that effective fire support enables HT ground forces to attack successfully and quickly to exploit weaknesses. The HT commander always seeks to increase the effectiveness of air and missile strikes and artillery fire to destroy enemy formations, weapon systems, or key components of an enemy combat system. This ensures continuous fire support for maneuver units throughout the AOR. At the strategic level, the HT continues to expand and upgrade fire-support systems to achieve a qualitative edge over its regional opponents. However, it realize that it may be at a qualitative disadvantage in some instances when compared to a modern Western force. The HT will employ adaptive measures to preserve its combat power while using sophisticated strikes or attacks to disrupt and destroy enemy combat systems and forces.

References

Allen, C.B. “4th ID DCX II: The Digitized Division Fights the COE OPFOR.” Field Artillery. March-April 2002. Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 9 December 2011. Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.4, Hybrid Threat Force Structure Organization Guide. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. June 2015. US Army I Corps. “Corps Warfighting in the Contemporary Operational Environment Briefing.” 2002.

Red Diamond Page 9 February 2017 by LTC Matt Morgan, MCTP OPFOR Commander, Ops Group X, and Patrick Madden, TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI (BMA CTR) Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 17-1 was scheduled as a distributed, simulation- supported, corps-level, command post exercise at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The WFX was scheduled for 4–12 October 2016 but was cut short because of a hurricane. The first two days of the exercise occurred as scheduled, but Hurricane Matthew triggered the abandonment of the WFX as originally planned. The decision was made to suspend the WFX for the safety of the personnel and equipment. The hurricane came and went, but not without causing significant damage to the infrastructure to support a digital simulation. Some training audiences continued to take advantage of the opportunity to train with the support of MCTP. The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the actions of the WFX during the first two days, 4–5 October. This includes the first critical event for both the opposing force (OPFOR) and blue forces (BLUFOR) and the outcomes of that critical event. This article will cover the scenario design and actions leading up to the start of the exercise (STARTEX), the actions in the two days after STARTEX, and insight into the planning factors used by the OPFOR. The intent is to provide greater understanding of the OPFOR operations process, the operational framework used, and decisions that led to the final outcome. It is clear that the effects of the two days of competitive fighting between OPFOR and BLUFOR would have had a significant impact on all subsequent engagements if the fighting had continued beyond 5 October. Scenario Design The scenario design for WFX 17-1 was similar to the design of WFX 16-5 at the strategic level.1 However, at the operational level the fight was established as a mostly north-south fight; i.e. the BLUFOR divisions were located in the north and northwest, which provided a different battlefield architecture. Establishing the fight as a north-south fight required a few changes to the scenario. First and foremost, the Caspian Sea was converted to a Caspian Ocean. This enabled joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration to occur at two locations. The 4th Infantry Divisionii (ID) entered the joint operations area (JOA) from the Black Sea through Gorgas in the west and was positioned in the northwest with a compliment of division and corps enablers. The 3rd Infantry Division (ID) entered the JOA through a port north of Baku from the Caspian Ocean. STARTEX occurred on 4 October and was preceded with multiple intelligence feeds to BLUFOR as well as a simulation “warm start” period of six hours. During warm start, rotational training units are allowed to conduct reconnaissance with unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and confirm or deny their understanding of the opponent. Units are NOT allowed to conduct any ground movement.2 OPFOR Mission and Organization Mission The mission of the Operational-Strategic Command (OSC) was to seize Baku and defeat Atropian Forces in order to seize and retain critical hydrocarbon resources. On order, troops were to seize key industrial resources and force coalition forces to withdraw in order to enable the installation of true Islamic Ariana-friendly political regime. This translated to a force that was terrain-oriented with the operational objectives of Baku, the Sangachal Oil Terminal, the Trans-Caucasus Petroleum Pipeline, and bridges over the Kura River.

ii Editor’s Note: Military unit names in this article appear in either red (OPFOR), blue (US), or green (host nation) text for readability purposes.

Red Diamond Page 10 February 2017 Options to Achieve Strategic Objectives The OPFOR assessed that it could achieve its strategic objectives in a number of ways. This could occur along an axis to the northeast and Baku, or to the northwest and Yevlak. Seizing and retaining the Sangachal Oil Terminal would control the flow of oil from the Caspian to the west. Seizing Baku would enable control of the economic and political infrastructure. Seizing Yevlak would provide alternative locations to serve a similar purpose if the OSC was unable to achieve the intent of capturing Sangachal or Baku. The seizure of Trans-Caucasus Pipeline pumping stations in the vicinity of Yevlak would enable control of oil flow further west. Seizure of Yevlak and its infrastructure (economic center of the west, hydroelectric capacity at the Mingachevir Reservoir dams) in the area would provide the power to influence everything in Atropia except Baku. Additionally, the seizure of Yevlak would effectively sever any coalition lines of communications (LOCs) between the west and east, and enable Ariana to isolate the coalition in the vicinity of Baku and ultimately defeat it. Organization The OSC was created as part of a campaign plan similar to the forming of a joint task force in BLUFOR doctrine. Ariana began with the 2nd Army, mobilizing the forces with a mission, task-organizing accordingly, and reflagging the unit as an OSC. During this exercise the OSC organized the division tactical groups (DTGs) based on the intent required. This occurred in the exact same fashion as in Army Field Manual 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. The OPFOR determines the intent to be achieved in a given area, assesses the likely enemy (BLUFOR) to be in the area, and conducts relative combat power analysis. Once the OPFOR has determined the requisite force by type and size, the units are then grouped based on the amount of forces required. The last step in the process is assigning a headquarters. MCTP OPFOR follows this method on almost all occasions; however, deviations do occur. When there is a deviation it is a deliberate decision with a specific intent to be achieved and acceptable risk analysis. Task Organization During WFX 17-1 the OSC was organized with the four constituent DTGs of the 2nd Arianian Army.3 The DTGs were the 17th Mechanized Infantry (MEI), 18th Truck Mobile Infantry (TM), 19th Motorized Infantry (MOI), and 20th TM (see Figure 1). Also constituent was the 306th Reconnaissance Brigade (REC), 302nd Mechanized Infantry Brigade, 304th Tank Brigade, 308th Anti-Tank Brigade, and the Arianian Naval Infantry Regiment (ARNIN). The 302nd and 304th served as the OSC reserve. The 3241st Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) were constituent as well. Units dedicated to the OSC included the 995th Commando Brigade, 600th, 601st, and 602nd Militia Brigades, the 10th Aviation Regiment, the 704th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, and the 935th MRL Brigade.

Figure 1. OSC organization (select units shown) How the OPFOR Task-Organizes The OPFOR operationally task-organizes with a few principles in mind. First, provide each DTG a balance of forces. Each DTG has a constituent tank brigade. The OSC task-organized so that each DTG had a mechanized or motorized brigade tactical group (BTG) and a light BTG (truck mobile). This enabled each DTG to have the capacity to clear and retain complex terrain with light forces, and to conduct a combined arms breach with heavy forces. This is similar to the modularity concept used by BLUFOR. Additionally, these horizontal task-organized forces in the DTGs provided assets across the spectrum instead of specializing in light or heavy forces. Secondly, force ratios are critical. The OPFOR deliberately preserves combat power whenever possible. This protects assets and preserves them for employment elsewhere as required. The third task-organization principle currently used by

Red Diamond Page 11 February 2017 the OPFOR is the relative vertical retention of enablers at the OSC and/or DTG level. This applies to assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles, commando, SPF, electronic warfare, and aviation—both fixed and rotary wing. In general these assets are task-organized and employed in accordance with the unit Modified Table of Organization and Equipment and OPFOR doctrine. These assets are generally not broken down and pushed to lower levels, with a few exceptions. This enables the OSC to employ these assets in specific, discrete windows to achieve a specific effect at a critical event. That said, the OSC also retains the vertical and horizontal capability across its organization in order to rapidly task-organize different types of forces, such as a strike force, in order to destroy a specified enemy organization. OPFOR Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield: Enemy Event Template Understanding of the Coalition (BLUFOR) Options The higher command was a notional VII Corps staffed by the 82nd Airborne Division and served as both the corps and the Coalition Joint Forces Land Component Command (CJFLCC). STARTEX signified the CJFLCC transition to Phase 3 (Dominate) in accordance with Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations. The OPFOR assessed four critical events for the CJFLCC: (1) Passage of lines with Atropian Forces; (2) Establish and defend to force the culmination of the 19th DTG north of the Kura River; (3) Seize Kura crossing sites and defeat the 19th DTG at the Kura; and (4) Restore the international border. It was also calculated that the CJFLCC main effort was the 3rd ID in the east, based on its proximity to the capital of Baku. Figure 2 is a graphical depiction of the OPFOR assessment of CJFLCC options.

Figure 2. OPFOR assessment of the BLUFOR courses of action (COAs)

Red Diamond Page 12 February 2017 The OPFOR assessed that the CJFLCC had a few significant decisions at the corps and division level as outlined below. Corps Decisions:  Main effort 3rd ID (east) or 4th ID (west)  Sequence of river crossings  Commitment of the reserve  Sequence of actions south of the Kura Division Decisions:  Sequencing of actions north of the Kura  River crossing (Location, how many sites) 3rd ID COAs in the East OPFOR calculated that the 3rd ID would conduct a passage of lines and attack to reinforce Sangachal with a brigade. It would simultaneously seize the key terrain to the immediate northwest of Sangachal with a brigade. Once completed with these two key tasks, the 3rd ID would establish a defense to force the culmination of the 19th DTG. In the defense, the 3rd ID would have the capacity to defeat six attacking brigades if it was able to establish the defense prior to the OPFOR attack. The OPFOR assessed the 3rd ID would need to establish a defense because, with its four maneuver brigades, it lacked the force ratio to go on the offense and penetrate or defeat the 19th DTG at the Kura River. After forcing the culmination of the 19th DTG, the 3rd ID would retain the initiative and advance to the river. This would enable it to exploit the opportunity to limit the ability of the OPFOR to reinforce at the river. It was anticipated that the 3rd ID would penetrate the river just south of Hajigabul, where it would have some relatively-protected routes to the river and shorter LOCs. After establishing a bridgehead line, it would be forced to decide whether to exploit any success at that river crossing or to establish a second location further southeast, across open terrain and extended LOCs. Starting Conditions: Actions prior to 4 October STARTEX Attack to Kura River The OSC began its conventional liberation of Atropia prior to 4 October. The 19th DTG seized river crossing sites at the Kura (Figure 3, red #3 and shaded in blue). This was done along two axes of advance with two BTGs on each axis. The 19th DTG had the 195th Artillery Brigade (constituent) and the 211th Artillery Brigade (ART BDE) supporting with fires. The DTG had secured the far side of the significant Kura River crossing sites on 3 October. Prior to continuing its attack to Sangachal, it required time to consolidate, reorganize, and posture forces that would enable operational reach. The continued attack was planned for 4 October (STARTEX). Protect in the Northwest The 306th REC Brigade attacked simultaneously to the northwest (Figure 3, red #1 and shaded in green). It secured Aras River crossing sites and subsequently established a guard along the Kura River. This included securing two significant crossing sites and establishing a guard on the friendly side of the river on 3 October. The 306th was reinforced by the 212th Artillery Brigade. However, the 306th was second in order of priority behind the 20th DTG. Block the Southwest In the southwest, the 20th DTG attacked to seize Aras River crossing sites (Figure 3, red #2 and shaded in yellow). It secured the two significant crossing sites in Imishli and established a bridgehead line on 3 October. It was supported by the 205th Artillery Brigade (constituent) and the 212th Artillery Brigade. Enablers The OSC supported the initial attack with the 310th and 312th constituent aviation (AV) brigades. Each of those brigades were given an area-support role, with the 312th AV supporting the east and the 19th DTG. The 310th AV was responsible for the west and support for the 20th DTG and the 306th REC.

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Figure 3. STARTEX Uncommitted Assets The 17th DTG, 18th DTG, and all reserve forces remained in Ariana prior to 4 October (STARTEX). The 3241st SPF Brigade infiltrated approximately 75% of its personnel prior to the movement of conventional forces from the OSC. This included a battalion in Baku and one battalion along each likely coalition avenue of approach. Similarly, 995th Commando Brigade had infiltrated approximately 50% of its forces prior to the OSC conventional attack. The remainder of each brigade would serve as reserves or infiltrate beginning on 4 October to link up with their forward units or to establish a disruption zone in depth. Strength At the beginning of the exercise, the overall strength of the OSC was approximately 70%, resulting from previous attrition from the invasion into Atropia. Units that experienced contact were obviously at a lower strength than those not in contact. The 19th DTG began the exercise at 70% strength based on the contact it experienced, while the 17th remained in Ariana at 95% strength. OPFOR Plan Framework for Operations The OSC uses a common framework for almost all operations. It is based on FM 3-94, Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations, and the principles in the first three chapters. The framework includes four critical effects that must be achieved to be successful in any engagement:

Red Diamond Page 14 February 2017  Shaping to set force ratios: Organizing the battlefield architecture into manageable-sized elements and reducing or shaping elements that are too large for a given subordinate to manage;  Isolating to enable/maintain force ratios: Helping to maintain force ratios and enabling a decisive or main effort to focus actions inward;  Sustaining to enable operational reach: Setting conditions that enable tempo and ensuring a unit retains the capacity to exploit opportunities; and  Sequencing in time and space to enable the decisive effort. How OSC IPB Influenced the Development of the OPFOR Plan The OSC assessed the 3rd ID COAs as indicated above. However, there were a few key assumptions that influenced how the OSC planned its attack. First, the OSC assessed that the congested, restricted terrain west of Baku would have a significant impact on the coalition tempo. As a result, the OSC estimated it would take approximately six hours for 3rd ID to complete a passage of lines and reinforce the units at Sangachal. Secondly, although the OSC knew that 3rd ID had the capacity to conduct an air movement to reinforce Sangachal, it was assessed as high risk and not likely to occur. Thirdly, the OSC assessed that the seizure of key terrain northwest of Sangachal would occur simultaneously with the reinforcement of Sangachal. Nonetheless, the latter half of this article articulates the fact that all three of these critical assumptions were proven invalid during execution. Additionally, the OSC did not observe and assess indicators appropriately that would enable an adjustment decision if the assumptions were proven invalid. OSC 2 Concept: Actions Beginning 4 October and Beyond OSC Concept Figure 4 depicts the mission, terrain-oriented objectives, and tasks to maneuver units. The operational timeline across the bottom depicts the planned timeline and included anticipated BLUFOR critical events. The graphic depicts the desired unit dispositions for 7 October. This would place the OSC in position to make the decision to commit the 17th DTG to isolate Baku. The OSC was not in these locations at the start of the exercise and would be required to competitively fight to move into these positions. The four terrain-focused objectives were: Baku, Sangachal, the Trans-Caucasus Pipeline, and bridges over the Kura River. The OSC planned to continue to employ the 19th DTG to retain bridges over the Kura and to seize Sangachal. The 20th DTG and 306th REC Brigade (Figure 4, yellow #2, yellow shaded area, and yellow #3, green shaded area, respectively) planned to enable the 19th by protecting in the west and southwest. The 306th REC would continue to guard along the Kura, west of the Agshu River, to protect the northern flank of the 20th DTG. This would enable the 20th to focus west toward Yevlak if required. The 17th DTG (Yellow #4), was in Ariana at the start of the WFX, and planned to isolate Baku for the 18th DTG. The OSC decision points:  Commitment of the 17th DTG  Location of the 17th DTG commitment  Commitment of the 18th DTG  Seize Yevlak in lieu of Baku  Commitment of a reserve force (300st MOI, 302nd MEI, 304th Tank) First Planned Decision The OSC anticipated making the decision on 7 October to either commit to Baku or Yevlak. If the OSC did not have the capacity to seize Baku, it would shift to Yevlak as a branch plan. The concept for the OSC beyond 7 October was rather simple regardless of orientation, east or west. The DTG on the supporting-effort axis would establish a defense to protect the flank of the main effort, while the second-echelon DTG would pass through the DTG on the main-effort axis to continue the attack to seize the critical city and infrastructure. The employment of the second- and third-echelon DTGs was intended in the direction of the main effort. The movement of the 17th DTG, the OSC second-echelon division, signified the potential direction of the main effort.

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Figure 4. OSC concept 19th DTG (Action Force) Plan at Sangachal4 Action Force The 19th DTG was designated as the OSC initial Action Force, with the mission to seize and retain the Sangachal Oil Terminal (see Figure 5). It was task-organized with just enough combat power to seize the terminal if there was less than two coalition brigades at Sangachal. The DTG lacked the capacity to fight in two different directions. This meant that the DTG would have to seize the initiative early and seize Sangachal before the Coalition could reinforce the area or apply pressure from the northwest. Enabling Operational Reach The 19th DTG planned to enable operational reach by employing the three infantry battalions of the 203rd Brigade Tactical Group (BTG) to retain the bridges over the Kura River (Figure 5, yellow #3). The 4th Tank Battalion (BN) of the 203rd was designated as the DTG reserve. The 191st BTG was tasked to protect the northwest flank of the DTG and prevent the DTG from having to fight in two directions. This included all four battalions of the 191st and the two bridges over the Kura in the northwest (Figure 5: Yellow #2). The 191st had the capacity to establish a block, but did not have the operational reach to establish at the Aras River.

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Figure 5. 19th DTG concept The 194th BTG was tasked with isolating Sangachal Oil Terminal and the key terrain just northwest of Sangachal. Its mission was the most difficult based on the location, terrain, and potential of a coalition brigade being able to seize the key terrain (Figure 5, yellow #1) before the 194th could get there. The DTG action force was the 192nd BTG with the task to seize and retain Sangachal (Figure 5, yellow #4). The 192nd planned on leading with the 4th Tank BN of the 192nd to breach any obstacles. It would be followed by the 1st and 2nd Motorized BNs to seize and retain Sangachal. Lastly, the 3rd Motorized BN would establish a block north along the avenue of approach from Baku. The 19th DTG would begin with the 203th assuming responsibility for the Kura crossing sites. This would occur simultaneously with the 194th moving northwest to cross the river south of Hajigabul ahead of the 192nd. The 191st would attack to establish its block at the same time as the 203rd was moving to assume crossing sites. The 194th would establish the isolation immediately northeast of Sangachal. Then the 192nd would be able to attack into Sangachal either south to north or west to east. The reserve, 4th Tank BN of the 203rd BTG, would follow the 192nd. Setting Force Ratios The 19th DTG planned on moving the 195th BDE north of the Kura to provide the range required to support Sangachal. The OSC would support the DTG with two rotary wing attack companies from 310th AV. This would equate to eight MI 35M HINDs that are employed as companies of four each. OSC-level targeting was planned to disrupt the coalition theater ballistic missiles and high to medium air defense coverage of Sangachal. This will would enable the employment of rotary and fixed wing assets north of Sangachal to isolate and help set force ratios.

Red Diamond Page 17 February 2017 Isolating from the north The OSC planned to isolate Sangachal from the north with an integrated attack. This would suppress integrated air defense system (IADS)/anti-access and area denial (A2AD) and allow the employment of aviation in the area. Fires would suppress assets in Sangachal and help set the force ratios. Isolating from the north would also help set and/or retain the appropriate force ratios for the 19th DTG. The OSC planned to employ family of scatterable mines along the avenue of approach out of Baku. Execution OSC Big Picture On the morning of 4 October (STARTEX), the OSC continued its attack to block in the west and seize Sangachal in the east. The 20th DTG was able to establish a defense at the river in the southwest as planned. The 306th was able to improve its guard at the Kura in the northwest. The 310th and 312th AV BDEs positioned forward with the capacity to support as planned. Confirm Enemy Situation at Sangachal During the night of 3–4 October, the OSC reconnaissance assets confirmed the presence of an Atropian brigade defending Sangachal with an obstacle belt along the avenue of approach from the south. The OSC was also able to observe a coalition air assault that put a minimum of two battalions south of the Atropian brigade and established an overwatch of the obstacle belt. Reinforce Sangachal from the North During daylight hours on 4 October, reconnaissance detected a brigade from 3rd ID passing through the Atropian forces located between Sangachal and Baku. The OSC anticipated that if that brigade was able to get to Sangachal, the 19th DTG would not have enough combat power to seize the objective. The OSC targeting assets began to detect and neutralize Atropian strategic A2AD, though at the neglect of tactical A2AD at Sangachal. The OSC subsequently employed aviation assets without fully assessing the effects achieved from targeting. This was done based on time sensitivity and preventing the BLUFOR ground maneuver brigade combat team (BCT) from reaching Sangachal. The OSC was able to disrupt the BCT at a minimum, but it came at a significant cost. A substantial number of aircraft were lost due to the operational and tactical A2AD assets in Sangachal that were not suppressed by OSC targeting. The OSC actions ultimately slowed the BCT. Nevertheless, it did not stop the BCT from reinforcing Sangachal. Seizure of key terrain While this was occurring, the OSC and 19th DTG neglected to confirm or deny the presence of enemy on the key terrain northwest of Sangachal. This critical oversight proved costly as well. During the night of 3–4 October, a coalition brigade from 3rd ID had conducted a passage of lines and seized the key terrain. This provided 3rd ID dominant overwatch of the avenues of approach to Sangachal from the west. It closed the time gap the OSC had assessed and seized the exact terrain that the 194th BTG had intended to occupy. The coalition had seized the initiative with its uncontested air assault, BCT attack from the north, and seizure of key terrain. This is clear in hindsight, but was not apparent during execution because of OSC difficulties in assessing current operations. The coalition was able to do this based on its planning and execution but it was not without unintended help from the OPFOR. 1st BN, 156th Missile BDE Left Behind The 1st BN, armed with SS-21 surface-to-surface missiles with a 120-km range, was tasked to support the isolation from an assembly area position just south of the Kura. This would place it in range to reach almost all 3rd ID assembly areas and clearly in range to support Sangachal. In the first days of the campaign, this battalion had moved into southern Atropia with the capacity to support either east or west. The unit did not get the notification to continue its movement north to support Sangachal. When called to fire in support, it was not able to range as required.

Red Diamond Page 18 February 2017 Collection Plan The OPFOR collection focus at the OSC level was focused on corps enablers. The OSC did not initially collect to confirm templated locations of coalition forward arming and refueling points or attack aviation assets. The DTG focused collection on combat units at Sangachal and did not include obstacles or enablers. As a result, the OSC and DTG did not know the coalition had committed an attack aviation battalion to support the defense at Sangachal until they were in physical contact. The only asset capable of countering this capacity was the OSC MI 35M HINDs that were employed at the company level (four aircraft at a time). These companies were committed one at a time in two-hour blocks with a priority for engagement of air-to-air, then air-to-ground. They were also limited in the depth of employment since the OPFOR failed to neutralize or suppress the IADS at Sangachal. Commitment of the HINDs did achieve the desired effect; however, much too late. They were not able to facilitate any OPFOR offensive operations. The net effect of not targeting the appropriate IADS in Sangachal as well as not having the appropriate fires assets in range to suppress limited the ability of the OPFOR to employ any air assets. This affected rotary and fixed wing assets. This was coupled with a lack of OPFOR air defense assets positioned with the forward ground units, which had resulted from a failure to follow up on task-organization changes. The failure to isolate Sangachal from the north or northwest enabled BLUFOR to reinforce almost at will. The BLUFOR’s only limiting factor was throughput capacity on the avenues of approach from the north to the south and the amount of units remaining available to move south. 19 DTG, Sangachal—Box Method The 19th DTG continued posturing to set the conditions for the attack. The 203rd BTG assumed responsibility for the majority of river crossing sites, but took longer than planned. The 191st BTG attacked north and established blocking position to protect the northwest flank of the DTG without incident. The 194th Tank BTG conducted its movement from the eastern axis of advance to the center axis. Its movement occurred relatively smoothly until it began to approach the river crossing sites near Hajigabul. Based on the relief in place (RIP) between the 203rd and 192nd, the routes became congested. It took the 194th much longer to get across the river than planned. The 192nd initially pushed its lead two battalions across and east to make room for the 194th to pass behind. This created separation between the four battalions of the 192nd that would prove difficult to overcome. The DTG reserve (4th Tank BN / 203rd BTG) and 195th BDE both postured across the river slightly behind schedule. The 211th BDE was postured in an assembly area position south of the Kura in position to range the southern half of Sangachal. After approximately five hours, the DTG was postured to continue the attack to seize Sangachal. This was well after the 3rd ID had already seized the initiative. Using the dominant terrain to the northwest of Sangachal, 3rd ID was able to employ indirect fires, attack aviation, and some ground fires to force the culmination of the 194th BTG. Less than two hours after the 194th had begun its attack from the Kura it had culminated, but did not fully understand the conditions. The 194th trail elements continued to attack while the lead elements had culminated. The BTG was unable to isolate Sangachal or force the enemy there to fight in two directions. Assessing Current Operations It proved difficult to assess the current situation based on the inadequate collection plan and pace of operations. The OSC and DTG did not know they had lost the capacity to seize Sangachal with the culmination of the 194th. The 194th continued the attack toward Sangachal from the south. However, the separation that the brigade experienced between the four battalions while posturing for the river crossing was now exacerbated. As a result, it attacked with only two battalions. The two trail battalions remained on the south side of the Kura River, unable to get across due to the congestion at the crossing sites. The OSC and DTG main effort attacked into the main obstacle belt, against two brigades in prepared defensive positions, without the objective being isolated and with inadequate force ratios. The OPFOR did not stand a chance. Conclusion The OPFOR failed to target and shape in order to set force ratios or to isolate to maintain the desired ratios. BLUFOR began at Sangachal with one brigade in a deliberate defense. This meant that the OPFOR required a minimum of three brigades attacking Sangachal to be effective. The desired ratio of five or six attacking brigades against the one defending brigade would potentially ensure success. Without the isolation effect, BLUFOR continued to reinforce the objective with two

Red Diamond Page 19 February 2017 infantry battalions that air-assaulted to the south of Sangachal. This was coupled with the seizure of key terrain to the northwest of Sangachal from another brigade. This equated to three BLUFOR brigades (-) at Sangachal, supported by a brigade to the northwest. Thus the force ratios equated to eleven BLUFOR battalions defending in the area of Sangachal and four OPFOR battalions attacking. The four OPFOR battalions consisted of the two lead battalions of the 194th and the two lead battalions of the 192nd. The OPFOR had deviated from its fundamentals and as a result lost the battle before it knew what was occurring. Late in the day on 4 October, the 19th DTG and OSC were finally able to put the pieces together and assess the situation appropriately. The OSC had failed to isolate the objective or to set the appropriate force ratios for the DTG. The DTG had moved much slower than anticipated because of sequencing and congestion at the river. The OSC had culminated. The DTG and OSC commanders acknowledged the conditions and formally directed the consolidation and reorganization at the Kura River. This was not much of a formal decision; it more closely resembled the respective commanders acknowledging what was already occurring at the BTG level. The ground forces did not have a choice and were already executing consolidation and culmination. Sequencing It is clear that the OPFOR did not sequence in time and space to achieve the desired effects. This is evident in the fact that the 19th DTG required significant posturing at the Kura prior to continuing the attack. It attacked with a balanced formation with two brigades on two parallel axis of advance. The 192nd BTG had to wait on the 194th to move west and across the river to attack toward Sangachal. This cost valuable time and allowed BLUFOR to execute unimpeded. This was coupled with the required RIP at the river crossing sites for the 203rd BTG to assume security. This had significant second- and third-order effects in the subsequent hours. The end effect was that BLUFOR was able to seize the initiative without having to kinetically fight for it. Consolidation and Reorganization OPFOR’s failure to seize Sangachal triggered a defense in depth at the Kura River to protect the northeast flank of the OSC. This included the remaining three battalions of the 203rd BTG at the river and remnants of the 192nd and 194th. The 194th was combat ineffective. The 192nd had two remaining battalions that were task-organized to the adjacent BTGs as reserve forces to block any penetration at the river. The 191st BTG repositioned to the key terrain north of Hajigabul to serve as the DTG disruption zone. The OPFOR had the capacity to defend each river crossing site against a single brigade and the capacity to reinforce with a single battalion reserve at two separate sites. This equated to defending two sites against two brigades. Had this warfighter exercise not been cut short, the OSC would not have been able to continue hostilities in Atropia.

Notes

1 For more information, see: Madden, Patrick. “MCTP Warfighter Exercise 16-5.” Red Diamond. September 2016. 2 Editor’s Note: Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) is the title given to platforms used by US, allied, and friendly forces, such as rotational training units. When these platforms are used by adversaries of the US—to include the OPFOR—they are referred to as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). 3 “Constituent units are those forces assigned directly to a unit and forming an integral part of it. They may be organic to the table of organization and equipment (TOE) of the administrative force structure forming the basis of a given unit, assigned at the time the unit was created, or attached to it after its formation. Dedicated is a command relationship identical to constituent with the exception that a dedicated unit still receives logistics support from a parent headquarters of similar type.” Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 9 December 2011. Paras 2-6, 2-7. 4 Action Force definition: “One part of the unit or grouping of units conducting a particular offensive or defensive action is normally responsible for performing the primary function or task that accomplishes the overall mission goal or objective of that action. In most general terms, therefore, that part can be called the action force or action element. In most cases, however, the higher unit commander will give the action force or element a more specific designation that identifies the specific function or task it is intended to perform, which equates to achieving the objective of the higher command’s mission.” From: Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 9 December 2011. Para 2-52. ______

Red Diamond Page 20 February 2017 by Jon H. Moilanen, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (DAC) As a challenging condition in US Army training, an opposing force (OPFOR) conducts tactical operations with a number of collective drills in support of accomplishing its tactical tasks. One drill that occurs often during mission tasks is situational breach of an obstacle. A situational breach is the rapid reduction of and passage through an obstacle encountered in the execution of another tactical task.1 An OPFOR situational breach drill is a combined arms tactical task/drill executed by functionally-organized elements performing designated subtasks. A situational cue during tactical operations prompts an OPFOR leader to initiate a breach drill with minimal orders to execute a prescribed group of collective actions and sub-tasks. A key principle to situational breach is maintaining tactical momentum in what are often dynamic conditions of a tactical operational environment. The vignette in this article presents a task-organized mechanized infantry company—an OPFOR company detachment (CDET)—conducting offensive mission tasks that include a situational breach by an advance security platoon.

Figure 1. Woodland route for rapid CDET maneuver to objective and blocking position Tactical intelligence on the enemy situation and typical actions and employment at the tactical echelon of operations, understanding the natural conditions in an area of responsibility (AOR), and anticipating enemy tactical actions shape how an OPFOR leader prepares to execute a situational breach. Nonetheless, a tactical requirement can arise unexpectedly that requires an OPFOR situational breach action. OPFOR Situational Breach Drill A situational breach drill involves a succession of primary actions and several enabling actions that support critical subtasks during execution of the drill. An OPFOR element that conducts the primary action in achieving this drill is the action element. However, in progressing through the actions of a situational breach, the primary action transitions sequentially among elements of the unit based on the critical sub-task being conducted. For example, focus during one period is to breach as the action element, but action priority shifts subsequently to an assault element as this element assaults through the breach point of the lane and out of the obstacle point of penetration in order to continue the mission task. An OPFOR element that enables―by fixing or isolating enemy elements so the enemy cannot interfere with the primary action of the breach―is a fix element or isolate element. The functional action determines the element designation. For example, a disruption element generally disrupts, but also may need to fix a part of the enemy element or force. The functional designation then becomes fix rather than disruption. Another example of enabling function is a security element. As an OPFOR security element identifies an obstacle that cannot be bypassed, or current intelligence updates notify the OPFOR leader of an obstacle not expected in the initial

Red Diamond Page 21 February 2017 enemy situation and terrain, a security element may be directed to maintain its reconnaissance or surveillance focus to provide early warning of enemy in the immediate area. This element may be directed to shift attention to fixing or assisting in the isolation of enemy elements defending an obstacle. Other enablers are support elements, such as indirect fires or engineer elements that are prepared to obscure the obstacle area with indirect fires and smoke to suppress or neutralize the enemy’s ability to defend the obstacle. Actions in a situational breach that occur in quick succession are—  Isolate the obstacle,  Breach and reduce the obstacle to secure a lane through the obstacle area,  Penetrate with an assault through the obstacle, and  Continue the mission with sustained momentum to an assigned objective. This article uses a reinforced lead platoon of a CDET in a tactical vignette for the situational breach. The platoon leader knows rapid movement and maneuver are critical to the CDET mission of occupying key terrain several kilometers to the east before the arrival of approaching enemy reported to be of motorized battalion task-force strength.

Figure 2. OPFOR reinforced mechanized company: situational breach vignette Task organization of the platoon has supporting elements of combat engineers to complement the standard platoon sections, squads, and headquarters, as well as priority of indirect fires allocated by the CDET commander. The weapons squad and antitank squad of the weapons section are integrated into the three infantry platoons. The CDET commander has just received additional intelligence from the regional guerrilla unit affiliated with the OPFOR: a guerrilla informant identifies an enemy security outpost on the CDET axis of advance and provides the obstacle coordinates to his guerrilla leader. The guerrilla liaison reports that a small group of enemy— approximately 10–12 soldiers—are deployed in the treelines east of the obstacle and both north and the south of the trail. This enemy dismounted infantry squad is defending a hasty obstacle of abatisiii, several strands of concertina wire, and surface-laid antitank mines with antipersonnel mines in the obstacle and adjacent woods. The platoon’s security elements identify the obstacle and occupy overwatch positions as they report to the platoon leader that no enemy soldiers are visible at the obstacle and confirm the guerrilla description of the obstacle. The engineers are already well forward in the advancing formation and report readiness with their Bangalore torpedoes and grappling hooks to initiate a situational breach. Several soldiers from the security elements meet the Figure 3. Enemy hasty obstacle engineers and send a ready signal to the platoon leader. iii Abatis: an obstacle created from trees felled and intertwined across a direction of movement/maneuver

Red Diamond Page 22 February 2017 The platoon leader calls for smoke indirect fire, which obscures the obstacle. The other mortar section shoots high- explosive rounds on the suspected enemy team positions with adjustments from the guerrilla squad, recently-arrived from the north. Engineers move forward to the breach point as security elements—now functioning as fix elements—assist in isolating the obstacle with direct fire to its flanks. Direct and indirect fires continue to suppress designated targets.

Figure 4. Situational breach and isolation of the breach defended by enemy infantry squad Direct fires shift to the far side of the obstacle. Engineers use grappling hooks and detonate several antipersonnel mines. Some wire is cleared from the designated lane, but other wire and suspected mines remain in place, as well as the intertwined abatis.

Figure 5. Situational breach to secure the passage lane Bangalore torpedoes are connected section by section, positioned, and detonated to create a breach lane in the obstacle. Engineers and support from platoon soldiers mark the passage lane and report to the platoon leader that the initial

Red Diamond Page 23 February 2017 passage lane is marked and the far side of the breach lane is secure. Engineers and soldiers employ direct fires on enemy positions to the north and south of the passage exit point to suppress or neutralize enemy fires. Guides assist the assault element in moving quickly through the marked lane to continue the assault and penetrate out of the obstacle. Follow-on elements of the platoon move through the lane and continue toward an initial objective of the trail intersection east of the obstacle. The OPFOR platoon’s assault element continues rapidly to the east on the trail system as forward security for the platoon and CDET. As the platoon leader confirms his last element is clear of the passage lane and obtains a status on platoon casualties, the CDET commander directs him to orient north and prepare to defend. Guerilla elements report that motorized enemy in five trucks with heavy machine guns are headed south on the trail and should arrive at the trail intersection in about one hour. The lead platoon is to protect the CDET’s left flank until the CDET clears the trail intersection and continues east. On order, the platoon will become the trail element of the CDET rapid maneuver east.

Figure 6. Penetration of situational breach to continue mission The OPFOR platoon leader maneuvers quickly to each flank of the restrictive north-south valley corridor and establishes simple battle positons oriented north to protect CDET elements as they maneuver to the east. The platoon must block any enemy ground maneuver emerging from the north. The CDET commander will recall the platoon into the maneuver array once all CDET elements have cleared the trail intersection, and follow-on elements take control of the secured lane. Training with OPFOR Tasks, Conditions, and Standards As an Army standard, the OPFOR conducts situational breach actions in accordance with tactics and techniques in Training Circular (TC) 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics and TC 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces, the mission order, or higher commander's guidance. The OPFOR leader acknowledges the mission order, conducts reconnaissance or surveillance to accomplish security requirements, and executes the mission. Stay-behind elements, on order, conduct follow-on tasks that can include but are not limited to reconnaissance, surveillance, and coordination to disrupt, delay, suppress, neutralize, defeat, and/or destroy designated enemy elements and/or capabilities. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration (ACE-TI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has updated the task, condition, and standards for designated OPFOR collective tasks and drills for use in US Army training, professional education, and leader development. Current OE considerations and emergent threats since the publication of OPFOR tasks in TC 7-101, Exercise Design Guide, required this reevaluation and update of how to best portray threats and an OPFOR in learning conditions that span the live, virtual, constructive, and gaming environments of the US Army, allies, and partners.

Red Diamond Page 24 February 2017 In a current multi-domain threat environment, an OPFOR must be a realistic, robust, and relevant threat that challenges the capabilities and limitations of Army forces in the execution of their military missions. The current OPFOR drill for a situational breach is as follows: Task: Execute a Situational Breach The unit conducting a situational breach may or may not have expected an obstacle, but in either case, conducts a situational breach with readily-available resources and does not wait for specialized equipment and other support. A situational breach requires rapid passage through an obstacle to sustain offensive momentum with all of the task organization combat power. The OPFOR typically attempts to breach an obstacle from its tactical movement or maneuver with minimal delay, assault and penetrate through the passage lane, and press the attack without halting to consolidate on the far side of the obstacle. OPFOR elements following the breach and assault elements proofiv and improve, as needed, the initial passage lane for follow-on elements or forces. OPFOR positive control is maintained of the passage lane or lanes to facilitate successive passage of other friendly elements or forces, and to prevent the enemy from re-establishing obstacles in a previously- proofed obstacle area. Conditions The OPFOR is conducting operations independently or as part of a larger element or force and receives an operation order (OPORD) or fragmentary order (FRAGORD) with a mission task, purpose, and intent. The order includes all applicable overlays and/or graphics. Task organization provides the combat power capabilities to accomplish a mission task that may require a situational breach. The OPFOR has communications with higher, adjacent, subordinate, and supporting elements. Friendly force and enemy coalition forces, noncombatants, government agencies, nongovernment organizations, and local and international media may be in the operational environment (OE). The OPFOR is not constrained by standardized rules of engagement and does not necessarily comply with international conventions or agreements on the conduct of warfare. Standards The OPFOR conducts situational breach actions in accordance with TC 7-100.2 and/or TC 7-100.3, the order, and/or higher commander's guidance. The OPFOR, in accordance with the mission order, coordinates for reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence, and target acquisition (RISTA) actions to accomplish the commander’s security requirements, acts to rapidly isolate, secure, and penetrate an obstacle, and maintains momentum of movement and maneuver as the OPFOR continues the mission. Performance measures are listed in Table 1 of this article.

PLAN

 Identify reconnaissance and surveillance objectives for collection and analysis in support of AOR situational awareness and situational understanding requirements.  Collect current information on enemy element/force capabilities and limitations and other OE information.  Analyze action and enabling functions that must be performed to achieve mission and collective drill success for a situational breach.  Determine the functional tactics to be applied by action, enabling, and support elements.  Identify task organization requirements for elements/forces by function in accordance with TC 7-100.2 and TC 7-100.3.  Determine how and when functional elements act or enable security tasks, offensive actions, combat support and combat service support, and/or transition to other tasks-subtasks.  Identify time constraints and/or restrictions on accomplishing the mission and supporting requirements.

iv Proof: to confirm that a lane is clear of obstacles

Red Diamond Page 25 February 2017 PREPARE

 Provide situational understanding of the enemy and the OE from current reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence reports.  Report regular, periodic, and/or unexpected information updates in a timely manner to satisfy the commander’s critical information requirements and mission intent.  Task organize elements/forces by function in accordance with TC 7-100.2/TC 7-100.3, which typically include security, support, breach, assault, and reserve.  Coordinate the integration of available RISTA assets for continuous and overlapping coverage of designated areas, zones, routes, and/or special objectives in the AOR, and zone of reconnaissance responsibility.  Conduct counterreconnaissance actions that prevent enemy situational understanding of OPFOR intentions and/or offensive actions.  Tailor elements’ capabilities considering anticipated complex terrain, survivability measures, and camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception.  Conduct mission and task rehearsals of action and enabling elements/forces, and the action element subtasks in the transition and rapid momentum of the breaching element and the assault element.  Confirm redundant command and control communication requirements and capabilities.  Execute information warfare (INFOWAR) in support of offensive actions.

ISOLATE

 Infiltrate security elements to conduct reconnaissance of obstacles.  Conduct counterreconnaissance to destroy or defeat enemy security elements.  Report when a practical bypass exists to obstacles.  Provide early warning of enemy actions that can influence the situational breach.  Detect enemy forces and prevent them from contacting the enemy near the breach site.  Deny the enemy freedom of movement and maneuver along ground or air avenues of approach that can reinforce him at the breach site or interfere with the tasks of the breach and/or assault elements. As required— ambush, block, canalize, contain, delay, destroy, disrupt, fix, suppress, neutralize, interdict, and/or isolate.  Prevent the enemy from gaining further information.  Execute INFOWAR in support of the situational breach.  Position a reserve element for rapid movement/maneuver, on order of the OPFOR commander, to support the mission.  Obscure the breach site and surrounding terrain from enemy visual and technical observation.  Conduct direct and indirect fires and INFOWAR to suppress and/or neutralize designated targets.  Initiate breach element actions at the breach point.

SECURE

 Target enemy elements in vicinity of the breach site.  Neutralize enemy defending the breach site.  Continue direct and indirect fires to suppress designated targets.  Coordinate obscuration of breach site and surrounding terrain to prevent enemy visual and technical observation.  Report progress as each obstacle is reduced.  Lift and/or shift fires as the breach element progresses through the obstacles.  Report the initial passage lane marked and secure.  Call forward the assault element to continue the attack momentum.

Red Diamond Page 26 February 2017 PENETRATE

 Guide the assault element quickly through the marked passage lane.  Support the rapid advance of the assault element and follow-on elements through the passage lane.  Report when trail element of the action element has exited the far side of passage lane.  Inform follow-on elements of any enemy explosive obstacles marked and bypassed along passage lane.  Seize or secure objective beyond passage lane exit.  Report status of casualties and location of friendly-element casualty collection point in vicinity of passage lane.

CONTINUE MISSION

 Continue rapid forward momentum of elements to assigned objective or objectives.  Report regular, periodic, and/or unexpected information updates in a timely manner.  Inform follow-on elements of any situational countermobility obstacles emplaced during the breach to protect the passage lane and route or axis of advance.  Coordinate for logistics linkup points for combat support and combat service support.  Recommend if current tactical conditions require an adjustment to mission actions.  Report accomplishment of subsequent mission task or tasks. The commander conducting an event can select and focus on aspects to emphasize in training, assessment, and evaluation of the drill. The performance measures associated for the OPFOR situational breach drill can be found in Table 1. Table 1. Situation breach OPFOR performance measures

Red Diamond Page 27 February 2017 OPFOR Training for Sustained Readiness The TRADOC G-2 is the responsible official for the development, management, administration, integration, and approval functions of the OE and OPFOR program for the US Army.2 Per Army Regulation 350-2, “an OPFOR is a plausible, flexible, and free-thinking mixture of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces and capabilities (doctrine, tactics, organization, and equipment). The OPFOR is used in lieu of a specific threat force for training and developing US forces, and can be configured to represent a hybrid threat.”3 TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI serves as the US Army lead for the TRADOC G-2 to design, document, and integrate threat or OPFOR and OE conditions in support of all Army training, education, and leader development programs.4

A trainer, curriculum developer, or unit leader can use this OPFOR training literature to support Army sustained readiness. This baseline of tactical information, tactics, and application options can be adjusted to satisfy specific learning requirements in live training at combat training centers; major exercises in constructive and virtual simulations; regional field training with allies and partners; home station training; and other Army professional education venues and collective unit/activity or individual professional development. As TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI continues to refine and update tasks, conditions, standards, and measures of performance for an OPFOR in US Army learning venues, TRADOC G-2 is presenting easy online access to OPFOR readiness resources, such as the TRADOC G-2 Virtual OPFOR Academy (VOA), that include instructional video vignettes and virtual simulations of OPFOR tactical actions, tasks, and drills. These resources will include updated OPFOR tasks, conditions, standards, and measures of performance posted to the Army’s Combined Arms Strategies (CATS). Future articles in the TRADOC G-2 Red Diamond monthly newsletter will continue to promote these and other resources in providing a realistic, robust, and relevant OPFOR conditions to challenge specified and implied mission requirements for US Army readiness. Of note, TC 7-100.2 is being revised in 2017. This revision will address an OPFOR that represents various individual threats and can include multi-domain threats projected into the near-term years. Periodic updates on the revision will be posted in issues of the Red Diamond newsletter.

Notes 1 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 9 December 2011. Para 5-25. 2 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Army Regulation 350-2, Operational Environment and Opposing Force Program. June 2015. Para 2-8. 3 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Army Regulation 350-2, Operational Environment and Opposing Force Program. June 2015. Para 1-5b. 4 Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command. TRADOC Regulation 10-5-1, Organization and Functions: Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. July 2010. Para 8-18c(1)(a). ______

Red Diamond Page 28 February 2017 by Marc Williams, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (ThreatTec Ctr) The French Ateliers de Construction Mécanique de l'Atlantique (ACMAT) Véhicules de Liaison, de Reconnaissance et d'Appui (VLRA) 6X6 is a relatively-inexpensive transport truck that features excellent mobility and commonality of parts. There are multiple variants for different requirements along with multiple mounts for weapons systems. System Employment & Proliferation Built in France, ACMAT has exported 85% of the 12,000+ VLRA 6X6 vehicles it has produced to 47 foreign countries on five continents, including Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, Cyprus, Ethiopia, France, Ireland, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Somalia, Tunisia, Uganda, UK, and Zimbabwe. The VLRA was targeted for export to Asian and African countries that could not afford more-expensive vehicles. Major conflicts that have seen ACMAT trucks include: 1983: Operation Manta in Chad by the French Foreign Legion 1991: First Gulf War in Saudi Arabia/Iraq/Kuwait by the British 21st Special Air Service and the French 6th Light Armored Division 1993: Somalia intervention by the Irish Contingent (1st Transport Company) 2013: Operation Serval in Mali by the French Army (3rd Mechanized Brigade, two companies from 21st Marine Infantry Regiment, one squadron from 1st Foreign Legion Cavalry Regiment, and one battery from 3rd Marine Artillery Regiment) System Capabilities and Characteristics This 6X6 truck is reliable, simple, rugged, and includes commonality and interchangeability of 80% of its parts, extending to models produced 30 years ago. Parts commonality includes cabs, structural components, engines, and drive trains for all of its lines of 4X4 and 6X6 vehicles. It is primarily a reconnaissance, escort, and support vehicle. It is also used as a heavy patrol vehicle, equipped for long-reconnaissance missions. All VLRA variants have full-time all-wheel drive and an integrated water tank that holds 200 liters of drinking water. Standard equipment of the VLRA 6X6 includes fuel cans, a pioneer tool kit, a toolbox with tire inflation system, and a sand filter for desert operations. This vehicle is crewed by two soldiers and can carry 12–19 soldiers, depending on the configuration. VLRA vehicles are air-transportable by C-130 Hercules (two vehicles), C-160 Transall (one vehicle), A400M Atlas, or can be sling-loaded by CH-47 Chinook. Variants for the ACMAT VLRA include semi-tractor trucks, dump trucks, 4,000 liter tankers, carriers for troops and shelters, and command vehicles. It can also be used as the prime mover for a 105-mm towed howitzer. Armored variants are also available as an armored personnel carrier or armored crew cab/cargo vehicle. The standard VLRA 6X6 can be equipped with a full range of armament as pedestal-mounted or 360° ring-mounted for 7.62- or 12.7-mm machine guns. In addition, more 5.56-mm machine gun swivel stations can be added at the front and at the rear of the troop compartment. The cargo area can transport heavy weapons such as antitank or missile launcher systems.

Red Diamond Page 29 February 2017 Threat Doctrine Manifestations OPFOR tactics are covered in TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics, in Chapter 14, Logistics. The ACMAT VLRA would be used in the concept of “Support Forward.” Logistics units are organized and deployed to support forward. The guiding principle is that a combat force should retain its organic support resources—such as trucks, recovery equipment, and ambulances— to support its subordinate units. Motor transport becomes essential as supplies are moved forward from railheads, field depots, or supply points to combat units. After the relocation of supplies from national-level supply bases, the OPFOR distributes them within operational-strategic commands (OSCs) and divisions, primarily by truck. Within an OSC, the heaviest truck transport requirements are primarily above the division level. The ACMAT VLRA can fill any authorized light truck position in the OPFOR organization guide. TC 7-100.4, Hybrid Threat Force Structure Organization Guide, shows two light trucks in the infantry companies of motorized infantry battalions (Figure 4-1); 20 command and staff vehicles (Figure B-7), 215 light trucks (Figure B-9), and 22 2,000-liter tanker trucks in a brigade tactical group (motorized) (antiarmor). Two light trucks are in the direct action cell (mortar and rocket) insurgent organization when the cell has 120-mm mortars (Page C-22). In a motorized infantry battalion, there are 14 light trucks, six light trucks (prime mover), one light truck (wire), and two 2,000-liter tankers (Page D-22). In guerrilla hunter/killer companies of guerrilla battalions, there is one light truck to transport munitions and materiel for the immediate fight (Page E-2&3). Guerrilla battalions have a total of 26 light trucks, three light trucks (prime mover), and one light truck (wire) (Page E-22). Training Implications The training and sustainment implications for the actor who has the ACMAT VLRA are very good. Driver and maintenance training are relatively easy given the simplicity of the systems and rugged design. Sustainment concerns are eased as the commonality of parts reduces lines of logistics. If supply lines are cut, parts can be cannibalized easily. US Army units facing an opposing force (OPFOR) equipped with this truck will need to understand its mobility capabilities over varied terrains, narrow streets, and bad roads. Training scenarios cannot presume supply and transport trucks cannot access an area. Intelligence officers will most likely need to revise their “slow go” and “no go” terrain analysis.

FRENCH 6X6 LIGHT UTILITY TRUCK ACMAT VLRA

TPK 6.40 SM2 with front winch

Red Diamond Page 30 February 2017

SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS AUTOMOTIVE SPECIFICATIONS Véhicules de liaison, de Engine Perkins 6.354.4 diesel, 160hp Alternative Designation reconnaissance et d'appui Cooling Liquid Date of Introduction 1950s Cruising Range (road) (km) 1,200 48 countries, including Speed (km/h) 100 Botswana, Chad, Chile, Fuel capacity (liters) Proliferation Cyprus, France, Ireland, Right Tank 180 Kenya, Mali, Morocco, UK, Left Tank 180 and Zimbabwe Towing Capability (kg) Troop Capacity 2 in cab, 12-19 in rear Off Highway Weight (mt) On Highway Gross Vehicle Weight 6.8 Gradient (loaded) (o) 60% Curb 4.3 Fording Depths (m) 0.9 Length Overall (m) 6.3 Height Overall (m) 2.56 VARIANTS SPECIFICATIONS Width Overall (m) 2.1 Semi-truck, 8mt to 10mt TPK 6.35 TSR Payload on/off Highway (mt) 2.5 trailer towing capacity Number of Axles 3 TPK 6.40 SB 6,000 kg dump truck Ground Clearance (mm) 500 TPK 6.40 SC 4,000-liter tanker Turning Radius (m) TPK 6.40 SG Tar spreader Side Slope (o) 30% TPK 6.40 SH Shelter carrier Vertical Step (m) 0.5 TPK 6.40 SM2 6x6 troop carrier Wheels TPK 6.40 SM3 with 105mm towed howitzer Size TPK 6.40 SWT Recovery vehicle Central Tire Pressure Armored variant available as No Regulation System TPK 6.50 BL an APC or armored crew Run Flat No cab/cargo vehicle 12.7mm machine gun TPK 6.50 SH Shelter carrier circular station, swivel TPK 6.60 SH Shelter carrier station for 7.62mm machine Command vehicle with VCT Armament gun, or 40mm grenade radios launcher, or launcher station for anti-tank or air defense missile Armored or unarmored; NBC Options defense system

NOTES ACMAT (ATELIERS DE CONSTRUCTION MÉCANIQUE DE L'ATLANTIQUE, ALSO KNOWN AS ALM-ACMAT) SINCE 22 MAY 2006 IS A WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF RENAULT TRUCKS. KNOWN FOR THEIR RELIABILITY, SIMPLICITY, RUGGEDNESS AND THEIR 80% (OVER 3,500) COMMONALITY OF PARTS ACROSS THE ENTIRE PRODUCT LINE. THESE VEHICLES WERE ORIGINALLY TARGETED AT AFRICAN AND ASIAN COUNTRIES WHO COULD NOT AFFORD MORE EXPENSIVE VEHICLES. THE ACMAT COMPANY BUILT THEIR VEHICLES BASED ON STANDARDIZATION, COMMONALITY OF PARTS AND COMPONENTS, AND ON INTERCHANGEABILITY; PARTS ARE INTERCHANGEABLE WITH VEHICLES BUILT 30 YEARS AGO. PARTS COMMONALITY INCLUDES CABS, STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS, ENGINES AND DRIVE TRAINS. ACMAT USES MANY OF THE SAME PARTS FOR ALL OF ITS LINE OF VEHICLES. STANDARD EQUIPMENT OF VLRA 6X6 INCLUDES FUEL CANS, PIONEER TOOL KIT, TOOLBOX WITH TIRE INFLATION SYSTEM, AND SAND FILTER FOR DESERT OPERATIONS.

THE VLRA SERIES OF TACTICAL MILITARY TRUCKS HAS BEEN DEVELOPED ESPECIALLY FOR RECONNAISSANCE, ESCORT AND SUPPORT DUTIES. IT IS ALSO USED AS A HEAVY PATROL VEHICLE, EQUIPPED FOR LONG RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS. ALL VLRA VARIANTS HAVE FULL-TIME ALL-WHEEL DRIVE AND AN INTEGRATED WATER TANK THAT HOLDS 200 LITERS OF DRINKING WATER.

______

Red Diamond Page 31 February 2017 What ACE Threats Integration ACE Threats Integration POCs Supports for YOUR Readiness

Determine Operational Environment (OE) conditions for Army training, education, and leader development.

Design, document, and integrate hybrid threat opposing forces (OPFOR) doctrine for near-term/midterm OEs.

Develop and update threat methods, tactics, and techniques in HQDA Training Circular (TC) 7-100 series.

Design and update Army exercise design methods-learning model in TC 7-101/7-102.

Develop and update the US Army Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE).

Develop and update the US Army Regionally Aligned Forces Training Environment (RAFTE) products.

Conduct Threat Tactics Course resident at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Conduct Threat Tactics mobile training team (MTT) at units and activities.

Support terrorism-antiterrorism awareness in threat models and OEs.

Research, author, and publish OE and threat related classified/unclassified documents for Army operational and institutional domains.

Support Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and Home Station Training (HST) and OE Master Plan reviews and updates.

Support TRADOC G-2 threat and OE accreditation program for Army Centers of Excellence (CoEs), schools, and collective training at sites for Army/USAR/ARNG.

Respond to requests for information (RFIs) on threat and OE issues.

Red Diamond Page 32 February 2017